

THE  
SRĪKARA BHĀSHYA

BEING THE VĪRASAIVA COMMENTARY ON  
THE VĒDĀNTA-SŪTRAS  
BY SRĪPATI

EDITED BY  
C. HAYAVADANA RAO

VOL. I  
INTRODUCTION



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TO  
HIS HIGHNESS  
SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR,  
G.C.S.I., G.B.E.  
MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

THIS ANCIENT WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED WITH  
HIS HIGHNESS'S GRACIOUS PERMISSION

BY  
HIS LOYAL AND DUTIFUL SUBJECT

K. P. PUTTANNA CHETTY  
PRESIDENT, MYSORE LINGAYAT EDUCATION FUND ASSOCIATION

IN ADMIRATION OF HIS HIGHNESS'S ABIDING INTEREST IN THE  
ADVANCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN INDIA

BANGALORE,  
18th June 1936.

"There are two ways of approaching a great philosopher. The one way is to study his precise teaching, setting it into relation with his age and with his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. I have the greatest admiration for those who perform this work of scholarship, which is the only satisfactory and respectful method of understanding a philosopher, requiring, as it does, both historical research and the most sympathetic philosophical insight. . . . . The other and easier method (is) of inquiring what a philosopher can teach us in our present problems."

—S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., *Hon. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester.*



## PREFACE.

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THOUGH the existence of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya's *Bhāṣhya* on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa has been long known, it has not so far been available in print. An incomplete Telugu edition was published many years ago but this is the first time the whole text is offered in the Dēvanāgarī script. The circumstances under which this edition has been undertaken have been set out at some length in the Introduction that follows and it is needless, therefore, to say anything further on that head here, except to state that it is entirely due to the public spirit and liberality evinced by the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association that it has at all been possible.

The publication of a work of this kind, a well-known commentary on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras*, raises the question whether there is any utility in making ancient works of this kind available to the general public. The criticism has been offered suggesting that there are systems of philosophy which though they have not yet passed away, still "drag on their barren life, a fixed monotony of centuries" and the specific instances offered are "the schools of Brahmans and Buddhists and Confucians, who have drained off the life-giving words of their ancient masters into labyrinthine canals and stagnant pools. There in the overteemed East is the limbo of unchangeable systems preserved from the fertilizing breath of change by a universal inertia."<sup>1</sup> That the East has been prolific in producing systems of thought may be admitted, but the suggestion that the systems have proved "stagnant" or have been overtaken by "inertia" cannot, perhaps, be easily demonstrated. Faint echoes of the criticism above referred to have been heard now and again, repeated or reflected,

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*

in the remark<sup>2</sup> that commentators in India have been content to build up their own systems of thought, profound though

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<sup>2</sup> Presidential Address at the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1930. See in this connection Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 63. A similar charge of sterility can be preferred against contemporary Western philosophy. "The scoffer may pretend," remarks Professor Wolf, after offering an account of recent and contemporary philosophy, "that all these philosophies are little more than the reminiscences of the thought of past ages. He may take to pieces all these philosophical tapestries (from Haeckel to Smuts, ranging from 1834 to 1934) and show that they are mainly a patchwork of scraps derived from Heraclitus or Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle, Descartes or Spinoza, Locke or Leibniz, Kant or Hegel, Schelling or Schopenhauer. And he may reiterate the oft-repeated charge that there is no progress in philosophy. Such disparagement, however, would be unwarranted, even if we admit some of the points on which it professes to be based. After all, the whole history of civilization is so short that it has been described as a 'provincial episode' when measured in terms of terrestrial time, to say nothing of cosmic time. And of this 'provincial episode', the whole history of philosophy is but a single aspect, which only emerged about twenty-five centuries ago and has been more or less smothered more than half the time. Moreover, the problems of philosophy are peculiarly difficult to answer in a manner that may command general consent. For they do not lend themselves to the kind of empirical verification which secures something like general agreement in the sciences. In fact, as soon as any group of problems becomes amenable to empirical verification, it forsakes its parental philosophic home, and sets up as a separate science. In this way, philosophy always remains the limbo of highly speculative questions, which it is very difficult to answer satisfactorily, but which most intelligent persons find it equally difficult to suppress. And since times do change and we change with them, each age needs at least a re-statement of old problems and old solutions in terms best adapted to its own habits of thought or speech. An excessive straining after originality, or the appearance of originality, may do more harm than good. A knowledge of the history of one's subject is probably a universal requisite, but especially so in the case of philosophy. For of philosophy it is particularly true that all history is contemporary history." (A. Wolf in *An Outline on Modern Knowledge*, Chapter XIII, on *Recent and Contemporary Philosophy*, 589.) What Professor Wolf says in regard to modern Western philosophy may, *ipsissima verba*, be said of Indian philosophy.

they be, "only as appendages to the *Vēdas* and *Upanishads*". Remarks like these miss the main point that the *Vēdas* and *Upanishads* enshrine philosophical thoughts far too fecund to be allowed to rust away. They simply refuse to die. Philosophy is yet philosophy whether it is found in the *Vēdas* or in the *Upanishads* or even in the mathematical formulæ in which Spinoza, of all modern philosophers, set it. Philosophy, whether in the East or in the West, has emerged from religion as often as it has entangled itself in its meshes, and the intermingling is not to be regretted if it has helped in the elucidation of truth. Nothing better brings out the justice of this observation than the lines on which Western philosophy itself has developed. To take but one instance, the case of Spinoza, who, perhaps, has most influenced European philosophical and even political thought in modern times. How much of his system, if a system it be, he owed to his Rabbinical masters, how much to the Neo-Platonists and through them to earlier Hindu thinkers and how much again to Descartes? Then, again, how much did the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and St. Augustine annex of the grand philosophy of religion built up by Plato and Aristotle, and Plotinus, Proclus and the rest of the Neo-Platonists during a period which covered some eight centuries of human thought? And how much of St. Thomas Aquinas is based on the later Platonists? And how much Neo-Platonism itself, as a system of philosophy, which tried to resolve the absolute or God into the incarnation thereof in the Logos, or reason of man, and which aimed at demonstrating the graduated transition from the absolute object to the personality of man, a concretion of European and Hindu philosophy and religion so-called? If philosophy is the science of religions or things in general, if it is properly an attempt to find the absolute in the contingent, the universal in the particular, the eternal in the temporal, the real in the phenomenal, the ideal in the real, or in other words, if it is to discover, as one interprets it, the single principle that possesses within itself the capability of

transition into all existent variety and varieties, which it presupposes can be done not by induction from the transient, but by deduction from the permanent as that spiritually reveals itself in the creating mind, then the philosopher should be a man, to adopt the words of Goethe, who stations himself "in the middle (between the outer and the inner, the upper and the lower), to whom the Highest has descended and the Lowest mounted up, who is the equal and kindly brother of all." Philosophy passes the borderland as often as not of religion in its speculations. And if religion is a craving after responsibility to a Higher Power ; a mode of thinking, acting and striving after God ; or determining one's spiritual relationship to the unseen World ; then philosophy needs must do this. Nor is philosophy mere Science either ; it is something more than Science. If Science has for its province the world of phenomena, and deals exclusively with their relations, consequences and sequences ; if it can never tell us what a thing really and intrinsically is, but only why it has become so ; and if it can only, in other words, refer us to one inscrutable as the ground and explanation of another inscrutable, then philosophy has a function to fulfil and a rôle to play. Where Science is silent, there steps in Philosophy. No wonder it has been described as "divine wisdom" instilled into and inspiring a thinker's life, irrespective of the sources from which the inspiration is drawn. Religion and philosophy cannot be kept in watertight compartments any more than religion and science can be to-day.<sup>2</sup> If men of

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<sup>2</sup> "All good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion."—Francis Bacon, in *Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, Book II.

"Religion is the elder sister of philosophy."—W. S. Landor, *Imaginary Conversations (David Hume and John Hume)*.

Keats claimed much more for philosophy. He sang :—

"Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,  
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,  
Empty the haunted air, the gnomed mine,  
Unweave a rainbow."

—Keats, *Lamia*, II.



science can invade philosophy and professing metaphysicians adopt the scientific methods and modes, there is no reason why religion and philosophy should stand divorced from each other, though they should normally function in their respective domains.

What is important is that the method pursued should be scientific, for philosophy is a science, if not, indeed, as Bacon has it, the great mother of sciences. There is no need to-day to elaborate this point. But it is necessary to stress the fact that the synthesis offered by Bādarāyaṇa is not only a scientifically drawn up one but has for its essence a system

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Schopenhauer went to the other extreme and said, "Philosophy is not science but an art"—if so, it must be held to be an art based on principles. Otherwise, reasoning which fills so large a space in philosophy would be without any justification and philosophy entirely restricted to an emotional something which can neither be proved nor disproved.

"There is a sharp line of demarcation separating religion and philosophy. The goal of religion is salvation and that of philosophy is truth. Yet even the most abstract type of philosophy contains a religious element, and the greater its development the faster its expansion."—Melamed in *Spinoza and Buddha*, Introduction, page 19.

Professor A. Wolf has recently remarked that "one of the most interesting features of recent and contemporary philosophy is the renewed co-operation between men of science and philosophers". After warning against the possible "dangers" of a hasty swing of the scientific pendulum, he refers to the "dangers" lurking in "the unusually friendly relationship which is loudly proclaimed to exist now between Science and the Churches". He suggests that "philosophy will be in a healthier condition when it has entirely ceased to be a handmaid to theology, and pursues its cosmic problems as independently as possible of vested interests" (*loc. cit.*, 589-592).

An absolute divorce between Philosophy and Theology is suggested by Bertrand Russell when he says: "Philosophy cannot itself determine the end of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view."

Pierre Boyle (1647-1706), author of the famous *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*, maintains the impossibility of reconciling faith with reason.

of thought which has for its sheet-anchor scientific thinking. His method is strictly scientific. By the term "method" is meant the path by which we arrive at a certain goal; a conscious and orderly way of doing something; a way of planning, organising and ordering one's research and thought. In the West, this problem of "method" was fought and settled, so far as natural science is concerned, some three hundred years ago, after the pioneering of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Boyle and others, and the settlement provided a basis on which the enormous scientific advances of ensuing centuries became possible. In social science, no such basic method yet exists. "Method" implies understanding and control. Looseness of thought and language are incompatible with it. If we understand Bādarāyaṇa aright, entirely from the mould into which he has cast his *Sūtras*, we have to postulate that to him "method" seemed all-important; for without it, he could not have controlled the seeming contrariety of thought that had come to prevail in the interpretation of Vēdic and Upanishadic texts and the anarchy, as it were, that had been introduced by different schools of thought (*shākhās*) in matters affecting the vital problems of the *Brahman* and the *ātman*. That many such schools existed and had their own separate text-books which had been handed down orally from teacher to pupil for countless generations, seems not open to any doubt. A crisis had evidently been reached in philosophical thought and the necessity of controlling interpretation had become obvious. Hence the rigidly scientific manner in which Bādarāyaṇa applies his mind to the method of *samanvaya*. Where all the texts should be given credence, scientific method, the method by which agreement can be reached, becomes all-important. He begins to question, not only texts in particular, but also the doctrines deduced from them by different schools. He seeks, in a word, a basic understanding, so that chaos which was claiming mastery in the philosophical domain, may be put out of court. In the dialectics employed by him, we see he uses rules and modes of reasoning which help to clarify the philosophical

standpoint he wishes to vindicate and lay down in authoritative fashion. The doctrine of *samanvaya*, which is the science and art of co-ordination, of re-interpretation of mutually opposing texts, and of educing the highest Truth from a consideration of the fundamental teachings of all Vēdāntic declarations considered collectively, receives in his hands a supremacy that is undisputed. It is no exaggeration to say that of all teachers of ancient times in India, he alone attempts the scientific and methodical approach to the study of Vēdic and Upanishadic texts in all their aspects and thus places the method of study itself on a pedestal that is from every point of view unassailable. The actual effect of this methodology was the restoration of order in place of chaos: those who came under its mighty influence, tried to keep to it, with the result that thinking was rationalized and kept within the bounds of reason instead of running to waste. The principle of *samanvaya* still holds the ground and if anything, has had extended scope given to it. Infallibility and unalterability ceased to be drags on philosophy with its increasing application. Philosophy, indeed, came into its own; it, in fact, came to be something more than a mere intellectual creed or a comforting belief. And its effect on religion was that it came to be regarded as something more than a mere system of ritual. It might, indeed, be claimed that Bādarāyaṇa's method revolutionized philosophical speculation in this country, inasmuch as it found a place under its wide wings not only for the spiritual teachers who stuck to the old order of thinking but also for those seers and seekers after the truth who, while obviously outside the purview of the current schools of thought, had still reckoned themselves to be within their pale by reason of the broadening of the base of philosophical reasoning initiated by him. Intellectualism, cured of its narrow and mechanical outlook, helped to be less destructive than it would otherwise have been. Under the dominating influence of Bādarāyaṇa's method, we have one all-embracing scientific standpoint, owing allegiance to that which is highest and most exalted in Upanishadic speculation, to

which all schools of thought owe obedience and respect and from which they derive their main sources of inspiration. The unification in method that has resulted has not impeded diversity in thinking, while it has helped to avoid the rise of a number of warring schools differing in their aims and working exclusively by themselves and endeavouring to exclude one another. The differing schools, as they exist to-day, owe a common allegiance to Bādarāyaṇa, as much because they follow his method of reasoning as for the fact that they have to argue and co-ordinate thought on the basis laid down by him. In him they find a common meeting point and through his method they are making their own contribution to the building up of a philosophical system which can be rightly termed universal. The texts of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads* are there; the doctrines and theories are there imbedded in them; it is only the method of co-ordinating them and interpreting them that is new. Bādarāyaṇa's great contribution is that he introduces a new method, a new manner of reading the texts, and a new way of interpreting them. With the march of time, changes in view-points should naturally vary. What satisfied one could not satisfy another. The highest expression of any philosophical truth at any given time cannot but be the expression of the highest philosophical consciousness of that time. If that be so, while the older formulæ may be retained, the frank recognition is inevitable that they are out of date in certain respects and that they ought to be re-interpreted in such a manner as will bring them into conformity with the highest philosophical consciousness of our own time. Bādarāyaṇa's perception and avowal of this fact is what makes him great in the Indian philosophical field. That is the very reason that we find no complaint against him for the departure he makes. On the other hand, there is a singular unanimity of opinion that his method is the right one and that is the reason why it has won universal approval among his successors. The fact of the matter is that as with Bādarāyaṇa, so with us, the measure of our light is always far in excess of the measure of our obedience, though this is

never explicitly proclaimed and all the time the legal fiction prevails that no change has been made in the position. It is thus that Bādarāyaṇa's method has helped to introduce scientific order and research in the study and interpretation of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*. With its aid, the conclusions of the past are being continuously brought into line with the findings of the present with the result that philosophy has never languished in this country, as the rise of the successive schools of thought bears eloquent witness to; in fact, it has contributed to the building of these living schools of thought, which, whatever may be their defects, have never agreed that the principle of scientific thinking can be set aside with impunity. It is this principle too that has helped to give universality and catholicity to Upanishadic views in the world of to-day.

The *Sūtras* are there to elucidate Bādarāyaṇa's position; for even without the commentators who have, each in his own way and from his own point of view, endeavoured to make known to us what they consider to be his views and opinions, there is enough in them to prove that the attitude assumed by him is demonstrably scientific. And that attitude is one that could only be postulated of one who is strictly scientific in his method. Bādarāyaṇa provides, in brief, an epitome of the *Upanishad* doctrine in his work, which accordingly becomes the foundation of the later *Vēdānta*. He shows that Brahman is the first principle of the universe; he proves this by *Samanvaya*, i.e., "from the agreement" of the *Upanishad* texts (I. 1. 4); and he proclaims the fundamental proposition that "all the texts of the *Vēdānta* deserve credence", *sarva-vēdānta pratyayam* (III. 3. 1). To Bādarāyaṇa, the *Vēdas* may be supernatural in origin and he may be held to construct his entire doctrine from them, but it is undoubted that where the meaning of a text is doubtful, he does not hesitate to call in the aid of experience to settle the sense. Inspiration and revelation give way to reason and ratiocination.<sup>4</sup> One who

<sup>4</sup> In this he followed, as a Mīmāṃsa teacher, the Mīmāṃsa rule of interpretation which lays down that when two texts differ,

is in search of the first principle of the universe cannot well avoid being fundamentally scientific in his outlook. It was so with Parmenides; it was so with Plato; and it cannot well be otherwise with Bādarāyaṇa, who is out to prove that the first principle of the universe is Brahman. The impression he has left on generations of scholars who have read and interpreted him has been this and there is no fear that generations of scholars yet unborn will not be impressed by the self-same fact. He throughout stresses reason rather than authority, re-interpretation rather than the blind acceptance of ancient views because they are ancient and scientific synthesis rather than a conglomerate of what seem mutually destructive texts. The *Sūtras*, indeed, challenge with scientific precision the validity of what appear to have been popular concepts that were still—in Bādarāyaṇa's time—the source of dangerous confusion to men, even to men learned in the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*. To those trained in the exact sciences and bred up in the atmosphere of the law, where rules of interpretation demand an exactitude in their application that could only be associated with a scientifically trained mind, a study of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa generates the feeling that they are dealing with a philosopher whose first and last concerns are scientific thinking and scientific method. He was a master in his line; he was that because his knowledge was profound and supreme. His intellectual eminence seems unquestionable from the evidence afforded by the *Sūtras* themselves, quite apart

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reason must be allowed to prevail in practice. (*Yagnavalkya*, II. 21). Manu also stresses reason as the final source of authority. Where no authority is available, Manu says that *ātma-tushti*, that which is in consonance with the reason of the virtuous, shall be allowed to prevail. According to the commentators, reason should prevail not only where a case cannot be decided by any other authority but also in cases where an option is allowed. Manu, indeed, sets down a high place to reason when he lays down the law: "Let him adopt the course of action which is deemed right by pure reason" (*Manu*, VI. 46).

from the form in which they are cast. He reduced his knowledge pertaining to their subject-matter to a system ; arranged it and systematised it ; and gave it out with full regard to its due bearings and connections. If one who does that cannot be described as possessing a scientific mind and if the method pursued by one such cannot be described as scientific, it is impossible to see who else and what else can be so described. It may be that to some the *Sūtras*—all *Sūtra* literature is like that—seem “ conundrums ” but that is a different matter. To those who have had the requisite training to understand them and to follow them in the manner they should be—and all sciences require training to understand and follow them—there can be no question that they bear ample testimony to the greatness of Bādarāyaṇa as a philosopher. To his philosophic mind, no circumstance, however trifling, was too minute. It was allowed its due weight and if rejected, rejected for right reasons. In him, the art of *Sūtra* making reaches its high water-mark, the very climax of perfection. That is so because his mind was clear ; his method perfect ; and his matter of supreme value. If any one can be named as deserving of the special title, in the whole Indian field of philosophy, of a master-mind, there is hardly any doubt his name would be the first to be mentioned. And if any one deserved the name of philosopher, it would undoubtedly be he—for he tries in one large sweep, as it were, to account for all the phenomena of the universe by a reference to ultimate causes. There is no system of thought, no school of metaphysics, and no department of theoretical knowledge known in his time that is not laid under contribution by him in the making up of his *Sūtras*. If philosophy is the science of all known sciences and if a philosopher is one who subordinates his mind to the strict discipline of scientific principles of thinking and enunciation of matter, the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa enshrine such a philosophy and Bādarāyaṇa himself—whether he wrote the *Sūtras* himself or inspired a school of his own to do it, it does not really

matter for this purpose—furnishes the best example of such a philosopher.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> It is needless to add that Bādarāyaṇa (also called Subōdhāyana and Vyāsa) has been reckoned in Hindu literature as a pre-eminent teacher. In the *Harivamsa* (I. 3), we read :

*Jayati Parāśarasūnus Satyavatīhridayānandanō Vyāsaḥ ।*

*Yasyāsyakumalagalitam vāṅmayam amrutam jagat pibati ॥*

Victory to Vyāsa, the heart-endearing son of Parāśara and Satyavati! From his lotus-like lips flowed freely the eloquent nectar (of knowledge) for the world to drink from.

Rāmānuja, in commencing his commentary on the *Vēdānta Sūtras*, prays :—

*Pārāśaryavachassudhām upanishad dugdhābdhi madhyōddhritām*

*Samsārāgni vidīpana vyāpagata prānātma sanjīvinīm ।*

*Purvāchārya surakṣitām bahumati vyāghātadūrasthitā*

*Mānītāmtu nijākṣharaiḥ sumanasō bhaumāḥ pibantvanvavam ॥*

“The nectar of the teaching of Parāśara’s son, which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the *Upanishads*—which restores to life the souls whose vital strength has departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence—which was well guarded by the teachers of old—which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions—may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words.”

Vādirājaswamin in commencing his commentary on the *Mahābhārata*, entitled the *Lakṣhābharāṇa* (Mangalācharaṇa Sūktas 1 and 2), has the following :—

*Vyāsāyāpratimētiḥāsarachanōllāsāya durvādinām ।*

*Trāsāyāsakarāya satsu kritaviśvāsāya dōshadvishē ॥*

*Bhāsāyā munaramya tōyasadrusāyāsāya māsēvinē ।*

*Dāsāyābhayadāya Madhvagururidvāsāya tubhyam namaḥ ॥*

*Agādhavyāsabodhābdhau nigūḍhāḥ śabdārāṣayaḥ ।*

*Na vivēchayitum śakyāḥ mādriśair mandabuddhibhiḥ ॥*

*Prakrāntārthānusārēṇa śikṣhāsūnya padasyacha ।*

*Artham kathamchidvākshyāmi tat kṣhantavyam mahātmabhiḥ ॥*

I bow down to the incomparable Vyāsa who takes delight in composing *Itihāsas* ; who makes vain argumentators tremble and exhaust themselves ; who confides in the virtuous ; who shuns the evil-minded ; who shines in his beautiful majestic ocean-like receptacle of Wisdom ; who blesses with his grace those who wait on him as his humble servants ; who ever dwells in the heart of the holy teacher Madhva.

In the unfathomable ocean of Vyāsa’s knowledge are concealed heaps of significant words ; people of dull intellects like ourselves are utterly unable to distinguish between them.



Bādarāyaṇa's survey of the Indian philosophical field of his day results in his conclusions being set down in a series of clear-cut *Sūtras* which are definitely of the decisive type. He looks at the philosophy of his time with the practical mind of a profound reasoner to whom philosophy is not a field for archæological research, but a living thing in the world of his day. With almost amazing knowledge and skill, he unfolds before us the ancient texts co-ordinated in such a logical manner that we see the science of Brahman rise before us in its full-fledged shape. To say that his *Sūtras* are succinctly composed, compact in form and diction, and full of the highest philosophical import is to utter a truism. To say that they reflect a close knowledge of the Vēdic and Upanishadic teachings of his time and a capacious yet sensitive mind, is to admit the bare truth. And to say that they represent his conclusions with a directness that, under a deep passion for order, precision and planning, a deep love for Humanity troubled with vital issues of Being and Becoming, is to confess the obvious. No more enduring monument can be thought for him than to understand aright his method and his plan as they are laid down for us in his magnificent work. Bādarāyaṇa is famous for the economy of words practised by him in the evolving of his *Sūtras*. To Bādarāyaṇa even a letter had a value of its own. He would not use it, if he thought it unnecessary; he could do without it.<sup>6</sup> What we have to more particularly admire in regard to the *Sūtras* is the order which controls them, the choice of

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Having no teacher to guide us, we explain with great difficulty, by a reference to continuity of thought and agreeably to the context. We therefore pray that the vastly learned will forgive us our shortcomings.

In Chapter X of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, in which the best of everything is mentioned, Śrī Kṛṣṇa says: "Of the sages also I am Vyāsa." (X. 37.)

<sup>6</sup> A saying in Sanskrit goes: "A writer rejoices as much in the saving of half a short vowel as he would in the birth of a son", a son being, according to Hindu ideals of life, an absolute necessity for the salvation of a man.

the doctrines and theories selected by him as fundamental to the position assumed by him—for he has by no means exhausted all, though he has hinted at most of them and dealt only with those which are really primal in character—and the varied but suggestive argumentation, producing conviction now by starting from causes, now by going back to facts, and now again by referring to texts, but always unassailable, irrefutable, exact and scientific in spirit. He is almost mathematical in his thought, in fact Euclidean in his method. What shall we mention as his special merit—his faculty for constant co-ordination, economy, orderliness, or the force with which he establishes every point? If one adds to or takes from it, he will recognize that he departs thereby from science, thus tending towards error. What is most difficult in each science is to choose and dispose in suitable order the elements from which all the rest may be derived. Whatever the case with others, Bādarāyaṇa has neither increased his first principles nor diminished them; neither has he abridged his proofs nor has he enlarged them indefinitely. In a treatise of the kind contemplated by him—convenient, catchy, topically arranged texts, easy of remembrance as Euclid's definitions, postulates and axioms—it was necessary to avoid everything superfluous, to combine everything that might be deemed essential, to consider principally, clearly and briefly all that might be held fundamental, to give propositions their most general form for, as a teacher, he should have realized that the detail of teaching particular cases only makes the acquisition of knowledge more difficult. Bādarāyaṇa's purpose in composing his *Sūtras* cannot have been, by any means, the writing of an encyclopædia of philosophy, which was obviously impossible in the limits he set to himself, but rather to offer to mature thinkers an introduction to the study of the method of reasoning to be adopted generally in regard to the interpretation of texts of the *Upanishads*, which, in its turn, was to prove a necessary preparation for the science of Brahman as worked out in them. Hence the particular emphasis Bādarāyaṇa lays on

formal and logical method as well as the deliberate omission, except by implication, of all practical applications. He has, indeed, helped towards the construction of a logic (*Brahma-tarka*) which has proved the best conceivable method of effective inquiry. On an analysis, it would be found to be one which, without breach of continuity, can be applied as much to belief on the one hand as to metaphysics on the other. He primarily aims at the flawless logical derivation of all philosophical propositions from premises stated in advance. Making necessary allowance for undoubted and, in some cases, serious uncertainty of text, it might be broadly remarked that the great historical significance of Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras* consists in the fact that through them the ideal of a flawless logical treatment of Upanishadic texts was first attempted to be transmitted to future times. As to the manner in which Bādarāyaṇa executed his work, it must be admitted that it is throughout well done, though from our modern standpoint we may think that too much is expected from the student. But we should remember it was not intended for the beginner but for the mature student of the *Upanishads*. It presumes a close knowledge of and a constant reference to the *Vēdas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa*, the whole of the *Sūtra* literature generally, including the *Āpastamba*, the *Gautama* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*, the *Smritis* generally, including *Manu* and *Yāgnavalkya*, and the *Purāṇas*, including the *Vishnu-Purāṇa*, and the epics, including the doctrines familiarized later by the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, *Pāṇini*, etc. Details of importance are accordingly omitted, and the uncertainties of the text render more difficult in some places the intentions of Bādarāyaṇa. But the whole development of ideas is natural, easy and impressive to a degree and makes understanding of the view-point assumed possible, which would have been infinitely more difficult in other circumstances. This is so because Bādarāyaṇa had before him in one conspectus, as it were, the whole position envisaged by him, from first to last. But it must be confessed, though such a confession cannot mean any reflection

on the author of the *Sūtras*, that his great emphasis on the logical renders it difficult to understand the subject-matter as a whole, and its internal relations, especially to one who has not had the requisite previous training in the study of the *Upanishads*.

The *Sūtras* will remain for all time the best and if one may assert without claiming over much for them, the only perfect model of logical exactness of principles and of rigorous development of propositions. The science of Brahman as developed by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Sūtras* may be capable of endless disputation as to what it connotes—that depends on our interpreter—but it cannot be improved upon from the point of view of the technique from which it is built up. If one would like to see how such a science can be constructed and developed to its highest stage from an extremely limited number of simple definitions and propositions, by means of rigorous syllogism, which at no time seeks any aid except what is derivable from the *Upanishads* and one's own reasoning faculty, one must turn to Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Their universally admired perfection must be set down by the philosophical historian as the natural result of a long criticism which was developed in the constructive period of Indian philosophy ranging from the Vēdic sages to Kapila, to whom the Sāṅkhya system is attributed. Bādarāyaṇa's method of reasoning has, since his time, left its permanent impress on his successors. After him, began a series of great commentators, who have fully illustrated, despite the differences between them, the real significance of the illustrious Teacher's methods and principles, by means of which they themselves tried to interpret and conquer the paradoxes concerning the Brahman. The fact that there has been no synthetic movement in the domain of Upanishadic philosophy since his time suggests the obvious inference that Bādarāyaṇa has not been exhausted by his commentators and commentators on commentators. The make-up of the *Sūtras* has, however, been vigorously assailed by modern Western critics, or rather by critics trained in the Western school of thought. To

say that he is "amibguous" or that he is unintelligible, cryptic or difficult is to confess lack of understanding on our own part. The merit of a *Sūtra* is its flexibility; it should be capable of interpretation and re-interpretation. Where metaphysical speculation is active, no philosophical conception can remain stationary. If it was capable of growth, it was transformed and allowed to grow. This process of re-interpretation was rendered possible in India because of the succession of great seers and philosophers who dominated its life since the Vēdic days. The process went on as much, indeed, on the Hindu legal and ritual sides as on the philosophical. No school of thought which makes this right of re-interpretation impossible can hope to survive, much less prove a leader in philosophical speculation. Without it, intellectual growth is impossible; and every limiting of it means the crippling of philosophical development and restricting the study of philosophy to mediocres and traditionalists, which means the ultimate barring of the growth of ideas. On the other hand, if the function of re-interpretation is clearly understood, then the difficulty of understanding the *Sūtras* will largely vanish. The many-sidedness (*viśvatō mukhaḥ*) that is stressed as one of the prime characteristics of a *Sūtra* means no more than that it should afford full scope for interpretation—scientific, consistent and co-ordinated and not arbitrary, meaningless and self-destructive.

Both the *Pūrva* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsas* deal primarily with the principles of interpretation, which evidently had long been in vogue. Jaimini, the reputed author of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*, is mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa, while Bādarāyaṇa is himself mentioned by Jaimini. They probably were contemporaries (third century B.C.). Jaimini set down the rules of interpretation to be followed in regard to ritual, while Bādarāyaṇa laid down those that should regulate the interpretation of conflicting Upanishadic texts. That Jaimini's methodology was capable of a wider application, as much in the ritual as in the philosophical region, was demonstrated by Bādarāyaṇa. The method itself was much

older than Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, being traceable to the *Brāhmaṇas* but these, among others,<sup>7</sup> perfected it and set them down in their respective domains in authoritative fashion. In Bādarāyaṇa's hands, the method, perhaps, attained its widest scope and highest perfection, dealing as it did with philosophical speculations enshrined in the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upanishads*.

It was said of Plato that philosophy did not find him noble, it made him so. In the case of Bādarāyaṇa, it may be said that philosophy found him noble and left him nobler. It was not the path of the passions which led him to philosophy but the patient search after Truth. And that pursuit led him to a conception of Truth which was all-embracing. And if he taught by his example, he but illustrated the great saying that the true Teacher does not teach but only tells. And what is Philosophy to him as gleaned from the *Sūtras* which bear his name? To him, in his calm and serene light, philosophy is not doubt. It is positive, provable and proved knowledge. It is to him a body of methodized essential Truth, whose single aim is the absolute understanding of the Self and its place in the universe—the very highest it is or can attain to. To vary the language, philosophy is to him as thorough a knowledge as can be acquired of man and his nature, his genesis and environment, and his relationship to what surrounds him and to what is above and beyond him. It is, however, something more than mere moral duty done or religious sanction obeyed. It is the perfect life; for, in the perfected understanding which to him is philosophy, he suggests is the only possible satisfaction of human nature. "Know Brahman—Become Brahman."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Bādari and Ātrēya, for instance, are mentioned both by Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa in their respective *Sūtras*. Labukāyana, Aitasāyana, etc., are others named by Jaimini.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. texts of the *Upanishads* like the following which are the staple food of commentators on Bādarāyaṇa:—"Brahma-vidāpñōti param"; "Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti"; "Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati"; "Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rugmavarṇam"; "Manō Brahmētyupāsita", etc., which may be rendered thus: "He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest"; "Having known Him thus

That is the way to perfect life. This theory of philosophy which makes complete knowledge the ideal life, is developed by him in the *Sūtras* as the direct result of his personal experience. The tone that dominates the *Sūtras* shows that they are the work of a person who has passed through the stress of the struggle indicated in them—of choosing between opposing views, of weeding out rejected opinions and of selecting approved doctrines—and attained peace.

And here Bādarāyaṇa touches on the kernel of the problem of Truth. Philosophy had made great progress since the days of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*. The Vēdic speculations—as found in the latest hymns of the *Rig-Vēda* and in the *Atharva-Vēda*—on the origin of the world and on the eternal principle by which it is created and sustained, had undergone great change under the influence of philosophical ideas. The cosmogonic legends of the *Yajur-Vēda*—describing how the creator brings into being all things by means of the omnipotent sacrifice—had also been deeply affected by the philosophic thinking that is enshrined for us in the earlier *Upanishads*. The idealistic turn that philosophy took in both the later hymns of the *Vēdas* and in the earlier *Upanishads* was not, however, left undisputed. Beside it grew an empirical school, which about 600 B.C., threw out the two great religious systems of Buddhism and Jainism, which though offshoots of Upanishadic thought, were still independent in their outlook. The *Upanishads* thus gave scope for different schools of thinking with the result that a number of them, which in later times theorists included under the well-known nine systems of thought, had come into existence at least as early as the sixth century B.C. The chaos that had been introduced into the Upanishadic philosophy may thus be imagined until Bādarāyaṇa, three centuries later, tried

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he passes beyond Death” ; “ He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman” ; “ He who knows this shines, warms” ; “ Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,” etc., etc. (*Taitt. Upa.*, I. 1. ; *Śveta. Upa.*, III. 8 ; *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9 ; *Ibid.*, III. 1. 3 ; *Chch. Upa.*, III. 18. 1, etc.)

to restore order into it. Another three more centuries were required to systematise the resultant teachings in manuals which to-day remain the main repositories of their doctrines. The contrast between the Vēdic times, which believed in an universe full of gods and mythical forms and the *Saṅkhya*, which postulates the absolute distinction between soul and matter and the twin systems of *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya* which explain the origin of the world from atoms shows vividly the gulf that separated the earlier from the later thought. The spirit of free inquiry, however, was not by any means confined only to the schools of philosophers; there is reason to believe that teachers like Buddha and Mahāvīra tried to extend it to the masses by the zeal they displayed in the propagation of their ideas. This was inevitable, especially as views of life and religion are deepened and broadened by criticism, reflection and re-thinking. The zeal for critical investigation was, if the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa are evidence of anything, intense, and extended to metaphysical problems of every kind, including those concerning life hereafter. The coming of philosophy foreshadowed in the Vēdic theogonies and cosmogonies was fully realized. In the systems of philosophy associated with the names of Mahāvīra and Buddha, the tendency to independent thinking receives its fullest development. The conscious effort is made to understand the meaning of the cosmos; system after system is offered to clear up the riddle of the universe; many are the metaphysicians—some mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa himself—who tried to solve the mysteries of being and becoming; the chief objects of interest were what is man, what is his place in nature and what becomes of him. Teacher after teacher tried to reach definite conclusions on these great questions which have eternally agitated this mundane world by conclusions reached in the metaphysical region. The age—sixth to third century B.C.—was undoubtedly one of enlightenment. It developed individualism. Authority was at a discount. The critical habit of mind, indeed, tended, with the undoubted good it did, to end in intellectual sterility, if not, in practical subjectivism. One



man's opinion was as good as that of another. Scepticism thus reigned supreme in the land. Discipline had lost its sway. But conservatism of the old type was not dead in the land. It found expression in writers like Jaimini, who opposed the new thought and tried to tighten the grip of the ancient order of things. The exponents of the new age were both intrepid and wise. They travelled and propagated their doctrines and attracted attention everywhere. But as their earnestness showed signs of abatement, the desire to merely outshine in debate mastered them. This eventually led to their downfall. But for the time being the set-back that philosophy received was very real. The critical spirit, which philosophy itself had helped to develop, began to affect adversely all metaphysical thinking. Philosophical speculation thus came into temporary disrepute, the more so as no two thinkers seemed disposed to agree on the question of the essence of reality. But this could not and did not, in fact, continue for any length of time. It was soon discovered that while criticism was necessary for developing sound metaphysical conceptions, it had its limits. While the appeal to reason seemed justifiable in itself, it was realized it lost its value if it did not use it in a constructive spirit. The new disputants no doubt brought philosophy from the heavens above to the abodes of men below on the earth and turned the attention from external nature to man himself. But they little saw the universal element in man. They made more of the differences in human judgments than of the agreements between them. They stressed more the accidental and the subjective elements in human knowledge than the objective, the principles which command universal acceptance. However this may be, their very criticism of knowledge led to a more serious study of the problem of knowledge. This, in fact, forced philosophy to examine the thinking process itself and paved the way for a theory of knowledge. In a word, the new movement awakened thought and challenged philosophy and the life based on it and compelled them to justify

themselves to reason. It became imperative to go back to first principles to build on more secure foundations. What is knowledge? What is truth? What is right? What is the cosmos? And what is man's place in it? These are the questions philosophers like Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa set themselves to answer.<sup>9</sup> Bādarāyaṇa considered it his first duty to address himself to the challenge of the new movement, which, in undermining knowledge, threatened almost the very basis of being, of ethics and of society. To him, philosophical reflection was the most necessary and practical of duties to be performed, if scepticism was not to rule supreme in the land and nihilism to attain the upper hand in social conduct. He perceived more clearly than any of his contemporaries that the ethical fallacies and philosophical errors of the new movement arose from a gross misconception of the meaning of truth. To him, it was clear that the key to the problem of truth lay in knowledge. If the new movement denied the possibility of knowledge, it was up to him to demonstrate that in knowledge lay the secret it had missed. With this firm conviction and with even firmer faith in the power of human reason to meet the exigencies of the situation, he started on his work. His aim appears to have been as much the construction of a system of philosophy as to fill men's minds with the love of truth, of virtue and of the knowledge which could, in his opinion, enable them to think right, in order that they may live right. His aim was not less practical than speculative; he was as much intent on the correct method of acquiring knowledge as in constructing a theory of such a method. He was as much offering a theory as practising a method, which, by living it himself, he bade others to adopt. A careful analysis of his first four *Sūtras*, on which his whole teaching may be said

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<sup>9</sup> Jaimini's first *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1) is: *Athāto Dharmajignāsā*, while Bādarāyaṇa's (I. 1. 1) is: *Athāto Brahmajignāsā*. *Jignāsā* is literally the desire to know. While Jaimini starts with an enquiry into what is duty, Bādarāyaṇa begins with an enquiry into what is knowledge, the knowledge of Brahman, the highest knowledge.

to be based, shows this in more simple fashion than a written volume could. In the first, he stresses, as against the prevailing contradictory views and opinions, the need for a knowledge of the Brahman, the highest knowledge, which will open the key to the truth of being and becoming, of cosmos and man, and of here and hereafter. Then, in the second *Sūtra* he answers the question what is Brahman? *i.e.*, he suggests it is that which gives us knowledge of creation, *i.e.*, of the cosmos. In the third, he refers to the source of knowledge, and throws down the hint that *Sāstra* (Scripture)<sup>10</sup> forms the source. Lest you should run away with the idea that the very contradictions he condemns, cannot be the source of knowledge, he lays down in the fourth *Sūtra* the proposition that true knowledge is to be sought in agreement, not in contradiction. Bādarāyaṇa concedes, as it were, the fact that it is difficult to know the truth. But he suggests, that it can be. Every stray opinion, he says, is not truth. If it is natural to differ, to hold contradictory opinions and to put view against view—it is equally easy to sift these opposing thoughts and clear the ground. It is indeed our duty to clear up our ideas, to grasp the real meaning of the terms we employ, to define definitely our notions and to know precisely what we are trying to interpret or to formulate. We should have reason too, to support our views. We should try to prove our propositions; we should put our views to the test, verify them by the facts we can gather, weigh them scrupulously and impartially, and finally educe the truth. Think before you theorize. The Sāṅkhyas, Nyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Mādhyaṃikas, Chārvākas and the rest of them may each

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<sup>10</sup> *Sāstra* here means the eternal *Vēda*, not any written text. The source of knowledge is knowledge itself. As Sankara expressively puts it, "the origin of a body of scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself." See Sankara, *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 3. That is knowledge which helps you to know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you have the means to test Truth itself. The Truth cannot be known by perception alone; the super-sensuous is beyond perception, deduction, inference, I. 1. 3.

put forth their own views;<sup>11</sup> these may differ from one another; may contradict each other; some of these may even deny truth, or say they know it not, or suggest that one view is as good as another. This, opines Bādarāyaṇa, is not right. If there is diversity of thought, it is our duty to see whether in the very conflict of opinions that is perceived there may not be agreement, some common ground on which all can stand, some principle to which every school of thought can subscribe or agree. To evolve such universalized propositions was the aim and object of Bādarāyaṇa. That was the sole purpose of his method—the method of *Samanvaya*. If the Socratic method was “an ingenious method of cross-examination” to evolve certain generalizations of perfect validity, the *Samanvaya* method was the double-distillate of a critical method employed to arrive at the indisputable truth. It is the method of orderly development of ideas, of propositions, of Truth. So skilful is its handling by Bādarāyaṇa that, if the early commentators are any guide, of what he meant and if the text of his *Sūtras* is any evidence of his method, the opponents of Truth are soon seen to oppose each other, himself seeming to know no more of the proposition disputed than either or all of them, yet, all the while quietly driving them, as the shepherd does his lost sheep, into his own fold. Such is the force of the *Samanvaya* irony that we see Bādarāyaṇa often acting as though he knew less than those whom he makes participants in his discussions. He raises most of the questions when he knows precisely how they stand. No wonder that the disputants saw their notions and theories shaping themselves before their very eyes into propositions of invulnerable Truth. Bādarāyaṇa had not learned the art of a *Vyāsa*<sup>12</sup> for nothing. If Bādarāyaṇa had his chronicler, as Socrates

<sup>11</sup> These are among the very schools considered, according to the commentators, by Bādarāyaṇa in I. 1. 1 to I. 1. 1-4.

<sup>12</sup> Literally an arranger. He was called *Vyāsa*, “the arranger”, because he is supposed to have arranged the *Vēdas* in their present form.

had his own in Xenophon to describe his method, we would perhaps have had many a young Euthydemus confessing his ignorance before him. But it is, perhaps, not wholly a misfortune that he had none such, for the *Sūtras* would then have lost their value to us not a little. The very cast of these *Sūtras* shows that before beginning an argument, he set down a proposition or propositions of which the truth had to be generally acknowledged. Thus, he not only laid a sure foundation for his reasoning but also was sure of assent to it from all sides. That is just what might be expected from the expounder of the *samanvaya* method, a method that made it possible to form one's reasoning on points acknowledged by all who could reason rationally. *Tattu samanvayāt*: That (the Truth) can be reached only by the method of reasoning.

To Bādarāyaṇa, then, knowledge is possible. Truth, according to him, can be attained; only we must follow the right method. We must define our terms correctly; we must go back to first principles; we must adhere to orderly treatment; and we must see to it that agreement is sought out as between opposing views. Knowledge has to do with the universal and the typical, not with the particular and the accidental. The new Schools failed to realize this fundamental issue, and went wrong. Bādarāyaṇa set them right and pointed the way to the realization of Truth. In doing this, he did the greatest service to philosophy and to humanity as well. The leaders of the new movement failed to note that Truth is many-sided; that it will not do for a man to say that what he feels is right *is* right even for himself, or what he perceives is truth *is* truth even for himself. They failed to grasp the essential fact that there is such a thing as universal good; a thing that all rational creatures recognize and accept when they come to think the problem out in all its bearings. Bādarāyaṇa suggests that there is such a thing as *the* good and *the* truth, the *good* or the *truth* for which all else is good or true, the highest good, the highest truth. Knowledge, he says, is the highest good—knowledge of the

Brahman. That is *the* knowledge you should seek for, inquire or pursue—the highest knowledge. And the highest knowledge is not only true happiness here but also in the hereafter. Hence he starts his work with the famous declaration—*Athāto Brahmajignāsā : Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman, i.e., an enquiry that will enable you to know the Truth* you are desirous of. If you *know* Brahman, you *know the Truth*.

Bādarāyaṇa not only laid down the correct method of acquiring knowledge, but he also evolved a theory of such a method. He not only offered a theory but also practised it. He was, in a word, a Socrates and a Plato rolled into one. He taught by his example both the theory and the practice of it. He coupled his theory of knowledge with the ultimate nature of being, and correlated their study by making them interdependent. Knowledge is of little use if it has no reference to reality ; and reality is meaningless if it is not based on knowledge. Being has no meaning if it is not related to Becoming ; and Becoming is impossible without Being. Bādarāyaṇa interweaves the ideas of Being and Becoming, the one into the texture of the other ; he interlocks the two concepts in a manner that makes his successors wrestle with his text in a hundred ways to distill out his intended meaning. In the later stages, perhaps, some of these exaggerated the dialectical phase of his teaching and revelled in many kinds of subtleties. That was due to the training they had had in other fields of study. There is hardly any doubt that Bādarāyaṇa himself never intended it, for we have clear indications in the methodology elaborated by him that he was against such hair-splitting. The doctrine of *samanvaya* limits such a tendency.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Good examples illustrative of this limitation are to be seen in, for instance, Rāmānuja's commentary on IV. 3. ; IV. 4. 4 ; IV. 4. 12. These may be taken as fair but random examples of the method of *Samanvaya* enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa. Of course, examples of this kind abound in the comments of the other equally great commentators.

This apart, Bādarāyaṇa stands out as the chief reconstructor of the philosophic thought of his age. He gave out the correct method of acquiring knowledge; he outlined a theory of knowledge, and he elaborated a theory of the cosmos. He employed the art of *samanvaya* to evolve the truth. But for the help he received from it, he would hardly have been able to produce the wonderful synthesis he has presented us with. From first to last, it is conceived in a manner which shows not merely mastery in the art of reasoning but also discloses the theory of the method he employed to reach the Truth. The logical operations which enable him to do this are laid bare before us. Indeed, he lets us into the secret of his logic. There is no mistaking the development of his thought, his reasoning and his objective. The great point about him is he shows not merely how to reason but also how he himself arrives at the conclusions he does. He shows by the method he adopts that the problem of knowledge cannot be solved without understanding the system of harmony and order that marks the cosmos. He leads you on step by step—*Sūtra* by *Sūtra*, if you like—and demonstrates that to *know* reality is to know Brahman.<sup>14</sup> But “knowing” other things is not the same as “knowing” Brahman. You may “know” the empirical sciences but yet not “know” Brahman.<sup>15</sup> What is an aid as regards knowledge in the world of sense may prove a snare in regard to knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge of empirical reality may, indeed, become an actual hindrance to the knowledge of Brahman. Sense-perception would not lead you to Brahman. The world of forms, names and works veils the Brahman.<sup>16</sup> *Amritam satyēna channam*, the immortal (Brahman) is veiled by the (empirical) reality—the word *satyam* here signifies the reality of experience.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> “The *Ātman* is truth, he should be seen, heard, comprehended, reflected upon” *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 2. 45; “The Self that we should search for and endeavour to know.” *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 7. 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 6. 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 6. 3. Parmenides and Plato affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception.

Brahman is the *satyasya satyam*<sup>18</sup>—the reality of reality. Interpreted with reference to the context, this means that the vital spirits (together with the worlds, Gods, and living creatures, as may be inferred from what precedes) are the reality, and Brahman is their reality.<sup>19</sup> He is the actual reality of the so-called reality. Only of Him is there knowledge, all else is not knowledge. It is only of Him, that a real knowledge is possible.<sup>20</sup> All other knowledge—including the four *Vēdas* and the empirical sciences—is “mere name” (*nāma ēva*). Nārada, who was well versed in such knowledge, finds himself in darkness, from which he is delivered first by the knowledge of Brahman.<sup>21</sup> True knowledge thus is only of Brahman, knowledge that rests upon experience being mere ignorance. Ignorance is the fleeting, knowledge is the eternal: *kṣharam tu avidyā hi amṛitam tu vidyā*.<sup>22</sup> Here knowledge is the “eternal” in the sense that it is an object of knowledge. The goal of ignorance is pleasure (*prēyas*), the goal of knowledge is salvation (*srēyas*). Those in pursuit of the former say “this is the world” (*ayam lōko*), and deluded by the troop of pleasures aimlessly tramp hither and thither like blind men led by comrades blind as they themselves, while the latter direct their attention to gain knowledge, with their gaze on another world.

If you desire, then, to know reality, you should know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you know the essence of reality. To know the oneness, the completeness, the comprehensiveness of Brahman is the all-important task—that is, the task that Bādarāyaṇa sets himself to in the very first *Sūtra*. What follows is a development of the idea that the Brahman can be known only when the world-order is realized and the method of knowing it is clearly grasped.

<sup>18</sup> *Bṛihad. Uṇa.*, II. 1. 20.

<sup>19</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, II. 4. 7-9.

<sup>20</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, VI. 1. 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, VII. 26. 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Svēta. Uṇa.*, V. I. Compare with Plato who held the view that only the eternal is an object of knowledge.



No wonder that Bādarāyaṇa before he has finished with the fourth *Sūtra*, has developed in characteristic fashion a universal system that is fully illustrative of his method. The harmony and order that governs the cosmos should guide your understanding of it. That is knowledge that helps you to do this and that is reality that you reach by its aid.

Bādarāyaṇa stressed, as no body did in his time, the importance of the problem of knowledge for a correct understanding of the philosophy of Brahman. His dialectics is the natural result of his love of truth. The form in which he has cast the third *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1) *Sāstra-yōnītvāt* shows he rejects the position that perception can lead to knowledge.<sup>23</sup> No known kind of perception can lead to the Brahman; neither can inference help us in the matter; nor even can the generic way of induction afford any assistance. Propositions based on perception or inference would thus prove fallacious. Hence the dictum in the *Sūtra* that the Brahman is not cognizable by any other means of proof but solely by a reference to the *Sāstra*, which, as has been remarked, stands here not for any written text but for what is the eternal truth in its widest sense interpreted with the aid of the doctrine of *Samanvaya*.<sup>24</sup> This leads on to the fourth *Sūtra* which lays down the doctrine itself. If perception does not help us to reality, then true knowledge cannot be reached through its aid. What rests on mere feeling, on mere self-persuasion or perception is thus no knowledge. True knowledge, then, can be reached only on reasoning, reasoning that can help to make certainty doubly sure. Such reasoning is attained to by the method of *Samanvaya* on which is based the art of *Brahma-Tarka*, the logic that helps knowledge to authenticate

<sup>23</sup> See Rāmānuja's *Srī-Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1. 5 and VIII. 7. 1-3; "He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth." Compare with *Pūrvamīmāṃsa* III. 4. 12 and III. 5. 21. Rāmānuja commenting on I. 1. 3 makes the Mīmāṃsaka objector say that the "*Sāstra* has a meaning only in so far as it relates to what has not been already arrived at".

itself; helps to make it know it is knowledge.<sup>25</sup> It is only love of truth that can lead you to this: you should desire the truth and you should will the truth. The contemplation of the Truth will lead you to the realization of Truth.<sup>26</sup> But the process is the process of reasoning having an all-round regard to every thing relevant. Thus the love of truth is the rockbottom foundation of the doctrine of *Samanvaya*. It is the love of truth that impels us to *jignāsā*; this to dialectics; and dialectics to the rejection of perception as a source of knowledge; this leads us from the particular to the general. The method of *Samanvaya*, then, is made up of two parts: first, putting together of particulars in one idea; and second, in making the idea yield the generalization. Correct reasoning is possible only on this basis. With such reasoning we pass from concept to concept, particularising or generalising,<sup>27</sup> analysing or synthesizing as we proceed. But such reasoning would be of no avail if it did not aim at true knowledge. And true knowledge should have reference to the highest aim of man—the knowledge of the Brahman, knowledge which assures felicity, happiness and final absolution. That is the end of true knowledge; that has connection with the highest aim of man, that is, the highest objective aimed at by him. Knowledge that has no reference to it is not knowledge. Man is thus the measure of all things, of all truth; because there lie hidden in the innermost recesses of his soul certain universal principles, concepts or ideas,

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<sup>25</sup> He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth. *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. I. 1. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. "Verily, my dear one, the self has to be seen....has to be steadily meditated upon." *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 5., "He (the Self) has sought after, He has to be specially desired and known". *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7. 1, etc.

<sup>27</sup> Rāmānuja has made the acute observation in concluding his commentary on I. 1. 4. that if reasoning—based on Upanishadic texts—does not lead to reality, "then," he says, "although they give rise to the (conceptual) knowledge of the Brahman, there would be (to those passages) no finality in utility."

which form, as it were, the starting-point of all his knowledge. Such principles or concepts, thus, do not have their origin in sense-experience. Particular circumstances may be the means of bringing to consciousness such a principle or notion, which *ab initio* has existed in the soul.<sup>28</sup> When the principle or notion has been thus developed, other principles or notions may be deduced from it, and thus we would be enabled to end in reaching certain knowledge. Plato puts forth a similar theory of knowledge but he does not show why the individual soul should implicitly carry with it the principle or notion or how any circumstance can help bring it to its consciousness. Bādarāyaṇa offers the explanation that because the individual soul is the Brahman itself.<sup>29</sup> Until we reach modern times—the period marked by Spinoza's advent—we do not hear of an explanation in Western philosophy which approximates that of Bādarāyaṇa.

If Bādarāyaṇa postulates a metaphysical doctrine—the doctrine of the Brahman—for proof of the validity of knowledge, Plato does the same by appealing to his world-view. Plato's world-view is based on his doctrine of ideas, ideas or forms being not mere thoughts in the minds of men or even in the mind of God, for even divine thought is dependent on them. He conceives them as existing in and for themselves. They are substantial forms, existing

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<sup>28</sup> This would seem to follow from the doctrine of the Brahman. See II. 1. 15; for, according to it, it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual soul; Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of the individual soul in all living bodies. Cf. "Having entered into them with living Self" (*Chch. Upa.*, VI. 3); "The one God hidden within all beings" (*Svêt. Upa.*, VI. 11); "The one God entered in many places"; "That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth" (*Kath. Upa.*, I. 3. 12); "There is no other seer but he"; (*Brihad. Upa.*, III. 3. 23), etc. The many individual souls are the reflection of the one Brahman. They are liable to "impurity" because "of their limiting adjuncts."

<sup>29</sup> See II. 3. 42, *Amsônānā vyapadēsāt*, etc. The commentary of Ānandatīrtha will be found interesting in this connection from the purely dualistic point of view. See his commentary on the whole of the Adhikaraṇa entitled *Amsādhikaraṇa*.

prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The forms too are numberless, though they constitute a well-ordered world. The idea of the good is the supreme; it is the source of all the rest. Unity therefore includes plurality; in the intelligible or ideal world, as Parmenides said, there is no unity without plurality and no plurality without unity. Plato's universe is thus a logical system of ideas, forming an organic spiritual unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the good. It is accordingly a natural moral whole. Its meaning cannot be grasped by the senses, which perceives only its imperfect and fleeting reflections and never rise to a vision of the perfect and abiding whole. How is the ideal world related to the real? What is meant by the statement that the particular objects in nature are copies of ideas? How can the pure and perfect, changeless principle be responsible for the incomplete and ever changing world of sense? To answer this, Plato develops a philosophy of nature which is redolent of pluralism. According to him, there is another principle, which is everything that idea is not, and to which sensuous existence owes its imperfections. This principle—designated by Aristotle as Platonic "matter"—forms the basis of the phenomenal world. It is, as such, the raw material upon which the forms are somehow impressed. It is perishable, unreal and imperfect—non-being; whatever reality, form, or beauty the *perceived* world has, it owes to ideas. Plato thus needs such principle besides the idea to account for our world of sense, or nature, which is not a mere illusion of the senses, but an order of a lower rank than the changeless ideal realm. This substratum, untouched by the ideal principle, is conceived of as devoid of all qualities—formless, undefinable, unperceptible. It is non-being, not in the sense of being non-existent but in the sense of having a lower order of existence. The sensible world partakes of a measure of reality or being, in so far as it takes on form. Ideas, thus, are somehow responsible, according to Plato, for all the reality things possess. They owe their being to the

presence of ideas, to the participation of the latter in them. At the same time, the substratum—non-being—is responsible for the diversity and imperfection of the many different objects bearing the same name. Non-being is, as Zeller remarks, a second kind of causality, the causality of a blind, irrational necessity. There are thus two principles, mind and matter, of which mind is the true reality, the thing of most worth, that to which everything owes its form and essence, the principle of law and order in the universe. While the other element, matter, is secondary, a dull irrational recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind, which somehow, but imperfectly, takes on the impress of mind. Form is the active cause, matter is the co-operative cause. Since the world of ideas is identical with the good, the non-ideal *must* be evil. If we had to label this part of the Platonic system, we should call it, with Thilly, *dualism*.<sup>30</sup> Plato makes no attempt to bridge the gulf that exists between mind and matter. Bādarāyaṇa, though he also falls back on metaphysics for his explanation, connects the two by his doctrine of Brahman, and makes his philosophy of nature—unlike Plato—a consistent, scientific, logical whole. Unlike Plato, too, Bādarāyaṇa does not trench on the mythical ground for explaining the origin of nature. Aristotle's reconstruction of Plato's theory was, indeed, intended to remove the inconsistencies inherent in it and to make it scientific and logical.<sup>31</sup> But Plato, it must be confessed, at various points, approximates to Upanishadic views. Thus, his theory, that all knowledge is reminiscence, by which he teaches that the soul somehow possesses ideas prior to its contact with the world of experience, that it has viewed such ideas before but has forgotten them, that the imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense bring back its past, reminding it, as it were, of what it has been before, comes as near as may be to the doctrine of *pūrvapragṇā*, which is imbedded in the doctrine of

<sup>30</sup> Frank Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, 66. Thilly's account is both lucid and critical.

<sup>31</sup> Thilly, *loc. cit.*, 75-76.

transmigration.<sup>32</sup> Similarly Plato's explanation of how the pure rational soul happens to unite with a body, is, apart from the mythical parts of it, based to some extent on the doctrine of transmigration, derived through Pythagorean sources. But here too, his theory of knowledge is overburdened by his mythical ideas and it is found unequal to the demands made on it.

To Bādarāyaṇa, then, sense-perception is no source of knowledge. The truth is beyond it. And to reach it, he stresses the art of *Samanvaya* reasoning. Within its framework, he combines and transforms the teachings of the philosophers who thought before him and during his own times. With the Sāṅkhyas he agrees that being is plural ; with Patanjali, that mind is the means of salvation ; with Jaimini, that knowledge is uncreated and eternal ; with the Vedāntists that being is one and indivisible and like a mirage unperceivable ; with the Nayāyikas, that perception, inference and deduction are means of knowledge, though not exclusively so ; with the Vaisēshikas, that a strict classification of ideas is necessary for knowledge ; with the Chār-vākas, that matter is real ; with the Bauddhas, that the universe of (appearances) is momentarily fluxional ; with the Jainas, that continued existence cannot be disputed ; with nearly all rational thinkers, that the world is governed by harmony and order. Whether he owed anything to his predecessors or not,<sup>33</sup> there can be no question that his system represents the high water-mark of Upanishadic interpretation of his time and a crown of glory to his reasoning powers.

Whatever the case with the classical tradition of Christian philosophy, which passes among Roman Catholic

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<sup>32</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 2-6 ; III. 2. 13. The chief text of the doctrine of transmigration is *Chch. Upa.*, V. 3-10, which may be compared with *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Deussen thinks he did. He says : "It was undoubtedly on the foundation of older and earlier works that Bādarāyaṇa formally undertook an epitome of *Upanishad* doctrine in the *Brahmasūtras* ; the foundation of the later Vedānta." See *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 27.

scholars as *philosophia perennis*, the perennial philosophy which Dean Inge, in his latest lectures,<sup>34</sup> speaks of as not merely the only possible Christian philosophy but is the only system which will be found ultimately satisfying, philosophical writers in India have given the widest vent to their views and critiques of existing or extinct systems of thought in a manner which, if it is not putting it too high, has wrung admiration from Western scholars. Commentators on synthetic philosophy of the kind evolved by Bādarāyaṇa have filled a useful rôle and have helped to advance, not retard, the progress of philosophy in India. But for the tradition created by them, we would have lost not only a Śankara, a Rāmānuja and an Ānandatīrtha but a whole host of others who have modelled themselves on them and their predecessors. The best part of their thinking—hard and fruitful thinking too it is—is in their commentaries and if they endeavoured to separate and stress the elements combined by synthetists like Bādarāyaṇa to build up their particular theories, why independence of thought in the realm of philosophy should be killed, or why dogma and religious creed should clog the wheels of their thought, or why indeed there should result the “universal inertia” so impressively urged on us, it is impossible to perceive. It would be just as correct to say that St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest theologian the Western Church has known, because he wrote a commentary on Proclus’ *De Causis*, despite the fact he was quite unaware of what he had done, impeded the march of scholastic philosophy, though his voluminous writings constitute, with those of his rival Duns Scotus, the high watermark of scholastic philosophy and the watershed of its divergence into the philosophico-speculative thought on the one hand and the ethico-practical (or realism) of modern times on the other.

The truth of the matter is that until recently men in the West had not recognized that knowledge is “a

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<sup>34</sup> W. R. Inge, *God and the Astronomers*, containing the Warburton Lectures, 1931-1933, (1933), Preface vii.

world whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move". They had believed that truth was something definite, which might be grasped by the aid of a clear head, diligence and a sound method. Hence the tone of confidence that breathes through their inquiries; and hence too the completeness they aimed at. This tone of confidence and this aim at completeness have both died out, the first because it has been perceived that there is no ground for it and the second because completeness is unattainable. "The time has passed," as Pollock himself observes, "when systems of philosophy could be regarded as final and absolute . . . . . Science has for good and all abandoned the dream of finality. The discoverer well knows that his discovery while it brings new certainty and new power over things, will also throw open a new series of questions."<sup>35</sup> But the work done by the pioneers and later inquirers—the products of their thought—have proved valuable in many ways undreamt of by them, their first fashioners, and long after their original use had become obsolete. Though their systems may have proved inadequate or defective as a whole, they have helped to enrich the world of ideas in a manner and to an extent which cannot be over-estimated. If no system is to be entirely true, it ought to be equally clear that no system can be entirely original. Each must in great measure be the re-combination of elements supplied by its predecessors. To this rule, the Indian commentators are no exception. Many of their leading ideas may—as they themselves frankly acknowledge—be traced to earlier thinkers and in the last resort to those great sages who contributed to the making up of the *Upanishads* and the *Vēdas*. Still, we need not deny originality to the later thinkers any more than we can to the earlier. The writers of glosses and commentaries have had a useful rôle to fill. As Professor Alexander has pointed out, in his lecture on *Spinoza and Time*, a commentary must be and is historically true and as such marks the exact extent of the teacher whose work is expounded by the commentator. A gloss is widely different;

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<sup>35</sup> Sir Frederick Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 76-77.



if it deals with the subject-matter of a work in an unhistorical manner, it seeks to recognize the real greatness and spirit of a writer and endeavours to appreciate it by asking "not what he said himself but what he may lead us to say". In the philosophical field, this is the very method that fructifies thought and helps to advance originality. The text may be there, but the glossator is not more concerned with it than with his gloss. A great man need not be followed slavishly and may be more honoured by divergence than by obedience. That is the line of advance that has marked the work of Indian glossators on Bādarāyaṇa's text and the various commentators who have tried to elucidate him for centuries. To say that thought has not advanced during the period covered by them or that philosophical teaching has proved to be sterile is to deny patent facts and to own ignorance of the many works that have come down to us which tangibly demonstrate how philosophical thought has kept pace with the march of time in this country.

Of the commentator Śrīpatipaṇḍitāchārya, whose work we are dealing with here, the reader will find all that can be gathered about his life and work in the Introduction that follows. He lived, from the data so far available, about 1400 A.D., and his view-point is summed up in the term *Dvaitādvaita*, unity in duality. This conception of Reality goes back to a period long anterior to the composition of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, as it is imbedded in them. A long line of commentators have either adopted it or criticised it. Sankara criticizes one such theory attributed to Bhartrīprapancha, said to have been a commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and the *Upanishads*, who is not mentioned by name but alluded to in his commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (V. 1. 1). Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa are others of the same persuasion criticized by Rāmānuja in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (II. 1. 15). These and others are dealt with in detail in the Introduction.

The two leading exponents of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*, Prabhākara and Kumārila, took opposite views in this

connection. Kumārila, in discussing causation, urges the reality of non-existence, thus postulating the co-existence of existence and non-existence. Everything, to him, has two aspects: its own existence as regards its self; and its non-existence as regards anything else. Both are real; otherwise, it would be impossible to differentiate things. Prabhākara denies reality to non-existence. According to Kumārila, in the one case, there is actual and in the other, mental perception.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, rejecting both the *Sūnyavāda* and the *Nyāya* views as to the difference of the whole from its parts, Kumārila takes the middle view that a whole may be, in one sense, different from its constituent parts.<sup>37</sup> The whole being indivisible, the idea of its relation to its constituent parts in whole or in part is a question which can arise only in respect of the constituent parts, and would be meaningless as applied to the whole. This theory has been sometimes described as *Bhēdābhēda* and sometimes, again, as *Samuchchayaavāda*,<sup>38</sup> differentiating it from *Vivartavāda*

<sup>36</sup> *Ślōkavārtika*, 473-492.

<sup>37</sup> *Ślōkavārtika*, 632-634; also A. B. Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāṃsa*, Chap. III, 44-60.

<sup>38</sup> The idea underlying the term *Holism* of General Smuts would seem to be correctly conveyed by the Sanskrit term *Samuchchayaavāda*, the *doctrine of the whole*, from *Samuchchaya*—collection, assemblage, aggregation, mass, etc. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word *whole* was formerly *hole*, *hool*, the *w* being erroneously attached to the word. It has been derived from Anglo-Saxon, *hāl*, whole, sound, safe and Gothic *hails*, healthy, sound, whole. The term *Samuchchayaavāda*, which may be literally translated the *doctrine of the whole*, is evidently derived from the figure of speech of the same name, *Samuchchaya*, which is defined by the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* as joining together of two or more things independent of each other, but connected in idea with reference to some common action. (See *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, 10, *kārikas* 115-116.) In the *Upanishads*, holism may be said to be well summed up in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text *Om Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam pūrṇāt pūrṇamudachyate pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamēvāvasishyātē* which may be thus translated: *Om, That (Brahman) is Whole, and this (Universe) is Whole. The Whole proceeds from the Whole. (Then) taking the Whole of the Whole, it remains as the Whole (Brahman) alone.* It may be

and *Parīṇāmavāda*. The *Vivartavāda* postulates the doctrine that the visible world is illusory and that Brahman alone is the real entity, the unreal or illusory appearance being caused by *avidya* or human error. As a serpent (*sarpa*) is a *vivarta* of a rope (*rajju*), so is the world a *vivarta* of the real entity Brahman, the illusion being removed by true knowledge (*vidya*). The *Parīṇāmavāda* postulates the transformation of the Brahman into the names and forms of the phenomenal world. The *Samuchchayavāda* endeavours to combine the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* views on the analogy of the serpent and its coils and the sun and its radiance. The doctrine of *Dvaitādvaita* as propounded by Śrīpatipañḍitāchārya will be found to possess this fundamental merit that it tries to combine harmoniously the opposing views of *Dvaita* and *Advaita*. How this combination is reached will be better

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added that there are as many theories of holism as there are schools of philosophy in India, for each school has its own special theory of holism. See *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1, which reiterates what is enunciated in I. 4. 10. With this text may be usefully compared *Kath. Upa.*, IV. 10. See also the commentaries of Sankara on *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1 and the commentaries of Ānandatīrtha as well on the same text. By "holism" General Smuts means a tendency to the formation of systematic wholes, each of which is more than the bare sum of its component parts. A whole is not a mere aggregate of parts but has a certain structure in virtue of which it has greater potentialities than a mere aggregate of similar parts could have. Smuts suggests that this tendency to whole-making is traceable in all types of reality, and is the ground of what has been called creative or emergent evolution, which is inconsistent with bare mechanism. He also contends that modern science supports "holism". Matter conceived as a system of electric charges, organisms consisting of multitudinous cells. Mind and Personality are examples of the "holistic" structure of matter propounded by him. The *summum bonum* of holistic philosophy is free and harmonious self-realization. The holistic nīśus of the universe is regarded as a guarantee that the ideals of Well-being, of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly rooted in the nature of things, and are likely to be realised eventually. (See *Holism and Evolution*; for a succinct summary of the theory see A. Wolf's chapter on *Recent and Contemporary Philosophy* in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, 588-589.)

appreciated from a study of the text of the commentary itself in the original, though the main points of the argument will be found set out in the Introduction. Śrīpati-  
paṇḍitāchārya's chief merit consists in thinking a thought through to the uttermost end. He presents his theory to the final conclusion, with a conviction in its potency that is as impressive as it is suggestive. He was the systematiser of a very ancient world-concept, a concept that has had very wide vogue, both in the East and in the West. A brief reference to Western exponents of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory—or a theory akin to it or containing many of its cardinal elements—will be found in the Introduction. The reader will, perhaps, realize even from this altogether inadequate treatment of a large subject, how the theory has had attracted to itself some of the ablest philosophical thinkers the world has so far known. Among these, in the West alone, are—to name only a few—Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Lotze, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet, Croce, Royce, James Ward, Sorley, Taylor, Lossky, Husserl, Bergson, James, Alexander, L. T. Hobhouse, Whitehead, etc. The bare mention of these names ought to suffice to indicate the importance of the theory which our commentator deals with.

A word of explanation may, perhaps, be added in regard to the mode of presentation adopted in the Introduction. It is primarily an exposition. But it also attempts to be critical. Exposition in a sense involves interpretation, and interpretation merges imperceptibly sometimes into comparison and at others into criticism from the opposite points of view. Early training has induced a personal preference to what is called the historical method, that is, treating things historically. This is no mere academic penchant but a necessity when one has to deal with a writer of the type and character of Śrīpati-  
paṇḍitāchārya. Learned and profound, he is ever ready to throw a challenge to his adversaries. Not only that; his frequent references to previous writers, his astounding knowledge of the epics and Purāṇas and his consummate skill in getting over what seem

moot points render necessary a mode of treatment that would help to elucidate rather than cloud the points at issue. It has been impossible to fix his date without a variety of historical research which has necessitated a certain deviation from the subject-matter of his great work. It will be found, however, that the historical part is strictly limited to the collation of the requisite data for elucidating the position of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya among the great commentators on the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. The views of the leading commentators, besides Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha, have also been set down as gleaned from their own works entirely in the view that they may prove helpful from a comparative standpoint. The theories of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha which are frequently adverted to by Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya are summarised as propounded by Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya himself and not by themselves. A statement of their doctrines according to themselves is not attempted here except to a limited extent, for that would carry the purpose of this work beyond its legitimate sphere. Readers will, it is hoped, bear this fact in mind in judging the position assumed in the Introduction.

What is the attitude of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya to his predecessors? This question is discussed at more than one point in the Introduction, and it is needless to say more than to observe that while he steers clear of both Śaṅkara and Ānandatīrtha, while he is highly critical of Rāmānuja and while he writes approvingly within limits of Srīkanṭha, he is tenacious to a degree of his own position. He adopts a middle course, avoiding extreme positions and is accordingly able to outline a philosophy which, in its essence, is universal.

In discussing the viewpoint of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya, occasion has been taken to go into the relationship of the so-called Eastern and Western systems of philosophy. The subject is too vast to be dealt with at any length in a special work of this nature, but it was felt necessary that the tendencies of modern criticism in this regard should be made known. How far Neo-Platonic thought influenced

the making up of Western philosophy in general and how far it helped to mould Christian philosophy in particular during the earlier centuries of the Christian era are questions of vast import to students of Indian philosophy as they indicate, at any rate to some small extent, the influence that Upanishadic thought has exerted on both philosophy and religion in the West during the ages they were in the making. The space devoted to the discussion of these topics, including the sources of the system of Spinoza, perhaps the greatest name in Western philosophical thought, will, it is hoped, be not deemed altogether wasted, especially as they tread a ground not hitherto familiar at least to Indian scholars. Philosophical truths, whether propounded in the East or in the West, know no bounds and the fact that the East has influenced the West more than the West has the East in this connection, does not mean that the East has little to learn from the West in the domain of philosophy. If modern trends of thought indicate anything, they show that the East and the West have yet to learn a great deal from each other in this as in other fields of study.

I have been unsuccessful in obtaining a copy of the *Vṛitti* on the *Bhāṣya* referred to in the Introduction (see page 3). I much regret this and can only express the hope that Mr. Kundakuri Bālasūrya Prasādarow Garu will himself make it available to the public at no distant date.

The work is published in two volumes, the first being devoted to the Introduction and the second to the Text, with the Appendices.

In translating passages, clearness has been preferred to elegance. Philosophical terms have been rendered on an uniform basis, all attempts at subtlety being avoided. Well-known philosophical terms have, however, been retained. The use of Sanskrit terms and phrases which have acquired a definite significance, has more than mere utility to commend it. While it is difficult to find exact English equivalents for them, their frequent use is likely in the long run to popularize Indian thought in the West.

Footnotes have been given chiefly with a view to elucidate the text or the *Sruti* passage quoted.

The editing of this work has had to be carried out under difficulties, chief among which must be stated to be the want, in Bangalore, of an up-to-date and well-equipped library for the use of scholars interested in Oriental literature. It is undoubted that scholars will find much to criticise in it. It is, however, earnestly hoped that they will view with some indulgence its shortcomings, whatever they may be, especially because neither time nor trouble has been stinted in its production. The main object aimed at has been to give an adequate exposition in understandable English of Śrīpati's view, so that those who desire may be enabled not only to appreciate it at its full value, but also to judge, in the fulness of time, the validity of any particular interpretation to which they may be personally inclined. As Dr. Thibaut has suggested, this question—the question as to what the *Sūtras* really teach—is a critical, and not a philosophical one. And if it is to be solved at all, it can only be, as he adds, when the entire body of the *Sūtras* has been submitted to a detailed investigation “with the help to be derived from the study of all the existing commentaries”. The present attempt is to facilitate the realization of this much-to-be-desired objective. Apart from those who are either commentators on commentators or mere glossators, there are at least ten well-known leading commentators, whose commentaries deserve to be made available to scholars for solving the problem of the true meaning of the *Sūtras* which stand coupled with the illustrious name of Bādarāyaṇa. It is to be hoped that this attempt will be made and that scholars with adequate equipment will be forthcoming to undertake it, while a discerning public will find the means to support such a very laudable venture.

In conclusion, I must record my thanks to Pandit S. Venkata Rao, who has proved himself highly useful in getting up the text of the work and in passing it through the Press. He has also helped in the checking of references

and in a variety of other ways which it would be difficult to pass over lightly.

I feel I must also express my deep sense of gratitude to Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty, Kt., C.I.E., the President of the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association, for the warm and continued personal interest he has evinced in connection with the publication of this work. To him is justly due the credit of its publication in its present form to a wider world. To him accordingly are due the thanks of the reader for any enlightenment he may derive from it.

BANGALORE, }  
30th June 1935. }

C. HAYAVADANA RAO.



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## INTRODUCTION.

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In a paper submitted to the Indian Oriental Congress, held at Allahabad in November 1926, I gave a short but comprehensive account of this little known but from several points of view important commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyana by Srīpati Panditāchārya, a Virasaiva teacher of note. What was stated in it was the result of a cursory examination of the work and is, it is needless to add, entirely superseded by what is mentioned in this Introduction after a closer study of it.

A brief statement of the circumstances under which a critical edition of this work is being issued now, may not, in the first instance, prove uninteresting to the reader. The existence of a commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* under the name *Srīkara Bhāshya*, by one Srīpati Panditāchārya has been well known for many years, but no attempt has so far been made to critically examine its contents or to evaluate its position as a standard commentary.

### MSS. of the Work.

An incomplete edition of the text of the commentary in the Telugu script was published in the cyclic year Vijaya, corresponding to 1893, at the Srī Lakshmī Vilāsa Press, situated in Tirumalgiri Street, Secunderabad, and owned by one Nyālapalli Rāmaiya. The MS. of the work was, it would appear, first critically examined for publication by one Kōtilinga Sāstri of the family of Vēmanārādhya. After further re-examination by one Mallikārjuna Sāstri, son of Nandīsvara Sāstri and grandson of Basavēsvara Sāstri, who is spoken of as the moon born in the ocean of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhya, its publication was undertaken. Mallikārjuna, we are told, purged the MS. of all the errors committed by copyists. This edition of Mallikārjuna was printed by Bhairavārādhya, who, it is added, belonged to the family of Udbhatārādhya.

Bhairavārādhyā states that he issued the edition for the benefit of Vīrasaivas and for their advancement everywhere in this world throughout the whole time the sun and the moon last. It is further mentioned that the printing was rendered possible by the assistance given by one Talagadadivi Hanumantha Rao. Bhairavārādhyā, who evidently took the leading part in the publication of this edition, has prefixed to the text an account of his own family, which he, appropriately enough, calls *Bhairavavamsāvali*. Though there is nothing in it to connect him with Śrīpati, the author of the *Bhāṣya*, it is of interest mainly because it indicates that he himself belonged to a highly respected and learned Vīrasaiva family, originally of Benares, and that at the time of the printing of the *Bhāṣya* he was a highly respected *Guru*. This *Vamsāvali* is in Sānskrit. Descent is traced from Visvēsvara of Benares; from him was descended Udbhatārādhyā, known also as Visvanātha, who was, it is said, initiated by Rishi Bharadvāja. (Evidently he belonged to the Bharadvāja *Gōtra*.) Some generations after Visvanātha, came Mallikārjuna, whose son was Chandra-sēkhara, of Shanmukhāmsa. The latter married Annapūrṇa and had by her two sons. Of these, the elder was Bhadra *alias* Vīrabhadra, author of *Saivānḥika*, and the younger, Kumāra *alias* Mallikārjuna, who was the author of two works, called *Kunda* and *Darṣana*, besides a *Kōsa*, evidently a dictionary of some kind. Mallikārjuna had three sons Buchchalinga, Sōmārādhyā and Vīranārādhyā. Of these, the last had two sons, Rājalinga and Bhairavārādhyā. Bhairava left two sons, Lingārādhyā and Nāgalīngārādhyā. Of these, the latter had as his sons Lingārādhyā and Bhairavārādhyā. It is the latter who was responsible for the publication of the *Bhāṣya* and after whom the *Vamsāvali* is named. Of him we have a long panegyric, of which only the gist need be given here. He and his elder brother were, we are told, initiated and instructed by one Channamallēsvarārādhyā. They were subsequently taught by Kēdāralīngaguru in *Siva-tatva*, *Vēda*, *Purāna*, etc. From the high praise bestowed on both these teachers, we have

to infer that they were learned Vīrasaiva teachers. Kedāralinga-guru was possibly a *Sanyāsin*. Under his tuition, Bhairavārādhyā became, we are told, a great Vīrasaivādin and overpowered in argument the followers of the Buddhist, Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaita systems of philosophy. He was on earth, it is added, the *very* *Mrigēndra* (*Sākshān Mrigēndrō bhuvī*).<sup>1</sup> He bore the title of *Saivēndra Chūdāmani*. He was, we are told, born as the son of Nāgalinga, to establish the Vēdic Saiva faith by the publication of Srīpati Panditārādhyā's *Bhāshya*, which is described as a great work containing the essence of the true meaning of every system of Vēdānta (*Sarva Vēdānta Satyārtha Sārabhūtam*), as the conqueror of the pride of evil opponents, as the destroyer of evil desires, as the bestower of the sanctified wealth of *Sivagnāna*, and as the means of salvation from worldly bondage.

This Telugu script edition is incomplete inasmuch as it omits the following parts from the original MS. work :—

Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtras :—3, 4 and 5.

Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra :—46.

Adhyāya II, Pāda IV, Sūtras :—1 to 14.

The Government Oriental MSS. Library at Mysore has a small portion of this printed edition of the *Bhāshya*. Kandukūr Bālasūrya Prasādarow of Devidi House, Vizagapatam, possesses two palmyra-leaf copies of this work and one copy on ordinary paper with the *Sūtra-vritti*. These are all in the Telugu script and preserved in the Saiva Grantha Kāryālaya at Devidi, in the Ganjam District. Rāja Bālasūrya Prasādarow has also a copy of the Secunderabad Edition in the Telugu script, of which copies are now difficult to secure.

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<sup>1</sup> The reference here is to the "Illustrious Mrigēndra", an eminent authority on the *Saiva Darsana* quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*. See Cowell and Gough, 116 and 120. Cowell has suggested the identification of Mrigēndra with Meyganda *Ibid.* 116 f.n. 3, but this seems groundless. (As to the dates of Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya, and others bearing that name, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, 1930 Edition, II, iii, 1433-1446.)

The late Mr. Basavārādhya, B.A., B.L., of Bangalore, had in his possession a hand-written paper copy. This has been carefully compared and checked with the text of this Edition. The present edition is wholly in the Dēvanāgarī script. It is being undertaken under the auspices of the Mysore Lingāyat Education Fund Association, Bangalore, a well-known and enlightened body which has been doing much for the social and spiritual betterment of the large and progressive community of Vīrasaivas in Southern and Western India. The first MS. copy was prepared under the direct personal supervision of Rājāsabhābhūshana Dewān Bahadūr Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty, Kt., C.I.E., Retired First Councillor, Mysore State, who is the President of the Association and whose unabated interest in the work requires special mention on the present occasion. The idea of securing the MS., getting it critically examined and making it available for publication in proper form, has been entirely his. The Association has, under his inspiration, generously undertaken to meet the cost of the publication of the work. The Committee of the Association, which includes leading members of the Vīrasaiva community, deserves special thanks for the unstinted manner in which it has helped in the undertaking from the start. It is needless to state that an edition of this work in the Dēvanāgarī script, which is now being supplied, has been long a great desideratum.

### Name of the Work.

In the Preface to the Secunderabad edition, this work is described under three different names:— (1) *Vaiyāsika-Brahma-Sūtra-mukhyārtha-prakāśakam*, (2) *Sarvōpanishat-sahaja-samanvaya-dvaitādvaita-siddhānta-pradīpakam*, and (3) *Srīkara-Mahābhāṣyam*. The first of these titles means no more than that it is the enlightener of the gist of the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Vyāsa; the second suggests that this *Bhāṣya* conveys the real meaning of all the Upanishads taken together and interpreted in the light of the *dvaitādvaita* system of the propounder; and the



third is a mere repetition of the name given by the author himself in Adhyāya I of his work which is referred to below.

The author speaks of his work in a variety of ways:—

(a) Dvaitādvaitābhīdhāna Visēṣhādvaita Siddhānta Sthāpaka Brahma Mīmāṃsa Sūtrārtha Vīrasaiva Siddhānta Prakāśika :—(Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Colophon).

(b) Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśeṣhādvaita Vīrasaiva Siddhānta Vyavasthāpaka Brahma Mīmāṃsa Sūtrārtha Prakāśika :—(Adhyāya II, Pāda I, Colophon).

The difference between the two descriptions “Bhēdābhēda” and “Dvaitādvaita” Viśēṣhādvaita contained in the two colophons mentioned, deserves to be noted.

An alternative name for the work as given by the author in the 16 colophons of the work is *Srīkara Bhāṣya*. In Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra I, line 26, the name of the work is also described as “Sūtra Vṛiththim Samālōkya Kritham Bhāṣyam Sivamkaram”. In other words, the term *Sivamkara* seems to be set down as the equivalent of *Srīkara*. It is possible that the author is trying to impress upon the reader the point that Srīpati Panditāchārya named the commentary that he wrote, not after his own name, but after Srīkara or Sivakara, *i.e.*, the Lord Siva himself. Hence the alternative name, mentioned in every colophon, of *Srīkara Bhāṣya*, which, in Adhyāya I, Pāda I as above stated, is turned into *Bhāṣyam Sivamkaram*. It is thus evident that the commentary which is known as *Srīkara Bhāṣya* is named virtually after Siva himself, Siva having inspired him, as the author elsewhere states, to undertake the work. Hence, some writers refer to this commentary not as *Srīpati's Bhāṣya* but as *Srīkara Bhāṣya*. That the suggestion that this *Bhāṣya* is named after Siva is not without some foundation is seen from the name *Gōvinda Bhāṣya* given to Baladēva's commentary. This commentary was written by Baladēva and it is called the *Gōvinda Bhāṣya*, because it was written—so it is said—at the command of Lord Gōvinda. Baladēva's commentary is based on that of Ānandatīrtha, whom he mentions. He belonged to the Kanyakubja country and

followed dualism as taught by Chaitanya. His great-grandfather Murāri was the *guru* of Pratāparudra Gopāladāsa, King of the Utkala country. (Madras *T. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV. i. A. R. Nos. 2989 and 2990, pages 4343-4347.) His *Bhāshya* has been translated by Rao Bahadur Srīsa-chandra Vidyārṇava (Panini Office, Allahabad).

There is, however, one further point requiring consideration. It might be suggested, with some plausibility, that *Srīkara* is an alternative name of *Srīpati* and that the *Bhāshya* is, therefore, called by both names. The colophons lend some support to this view. A closer study of the colophons, however, shows that Srīpati named the *Bhāshya* as *Srīkara Bhāshya*, with the definite view that it should be so perpetuated. The name *Srīkara* itself is rather an unusual one, though it occurs as part of a personal name mentioned in a lithic inscription at Kōtūrpalli Strōtriyaṃ, Rapur Taluk, Nellore District, which records the fact that one Nārāpa Sahni Bhīmanāyakundu, a feudatory of Erra Siddhi Chōḍa, had for his preceptor *Srīkara Kantha Kēsaiyyangāru*, who is called a great *yōgin*. (*Nellore Inscriptions* III, 1252-56, Rapur 37.) The inscription is not dated but since it mentions that the Chief Nārāpa Sahni Bhīmanāyakundu was a contemporary of Erra Siddhi Chōḍa, it may be set down to the close of the 12th century A.D. (See V. Venkayya, *Ancient History of Nellore District* in the *I. A.*, XXXVII and XXXVIII, 99 and 7, where it is pointed out that Manmasiddhi and Tammusiddhi, sons of Errasiddhi, were feudatories of Kulōttunga-Chōla III, who ruled between 1178-1218 A.D.) It would seem to follow from this fact that Errasiddhi should be set down to about the close of the 12th century. The identification accordingly of *Srīkara*, the author of the *Bhāshya* named after him, with this *Srīkarakantha*—taking it for granted that he was called both *Srīpati* and *Srīkara*—seems impossible, for Madhvāchārya, whom the *Srīkara Bhāshya* mentions, came long after the close of the 12th century A.D. Moreover, in the record quoted above, the name appears in the alternative forms of *Karakanthadēva* and

*Srīkarakantha Kēsavyagāru*, thus suggesting that *Srī* here is the usual prefix of honour added to the name of *Karakantha Kēsavyagāru*. (See the original text of Rapur 37 at pp. 1254-1256, in the last of which the name appears also as *Karakantha Kēsavyagāru*.)

### The Author of the Work.

The author calls himself *Srīpati Panditāchārya*; also *Srīpati Pandita Bhagavadpādāchārya*. He gives also his titles when he describes himself *Srīmān Nirabhāra Vīrasaiva Yathi Vraja Parivridha Srīpati Pandita Bhagavadpādāchārya*. It will be noted that he calls himself *Nirabhāra Vīrasaiva Yathi Vraja Parivridha*. The term *Nirabhāra* means being free from the cares of a worldly life and is always applied to a *Sanyāsin*; similarly *Yathi Vraja Parivridha* means encircled by a multitude of those who have renounced the world and controlled their passions, *i.e.*, ascetics. It would, therefore, be right to assume that *Srīpati Panditāchārya*, later in his life, assumed the *status* of a *Sanyāsin* and had a number of ascetics either as his students or as his followers. The term *Vīrasaiva*, as is well known, distinguishes those who follow the tenets of that religion from the *Sāmānya*, *Misra* and *Suddha Saivas*. The *Sāmānya* and *Misra Saivas* worship Vishnu as well as Siva. The *Suddha Saivas* and *Vīrasaivas* are devoted exclusively to Siva. The *Vīrasaivas* differ from *Suddha Saivas* by the portable *linga* (literally meaning a symbol) that they wear on their body, preferably on the head, or suspended from the neck. The *Vīrasaivas* accept the twenty-eight *Saiva Āgamas*, especially the later ones, as also the *Siva-Gīta*, to which they assign an important place in their religious works. Among the leading doctrines of the *Vīrasaivas* are the *Ashtāvarna* and *Shatssthalā*. *Srīpati* not only describes himself as a *Vīrasaiva* but also refers specially to the doctrine of *Shatssthalā* repeatedly in his work. *Srīpati Panditāchārya*—or *Panditārādhyā* as he is described in certain works to be referred to below—was thus professedly

a Vīrasaiva and his *Bhāṣhya* must be taken as an authoritative commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* from the Vīrasaiva standpoint.

That Śrīpati Panditāchārya was a Vīrasaiva is also otherwise clear from the opening verses of his *Bhāṣhya*. He there refers to Rēvanasiddha Guru and speaks of him as *Rēvana Kalpavriksham* and *Rēvana Dēśikēndra*. He also praises Marula Prabhu, in other words Marula-Siddha. Next he mentions Ēkōrāma Siddha, whom he terms as *Saiva Samsthāpanādhyam*. He also describes the last as profoundly learned in Tarka, Vyākaraṇa and both the Mīmāṃsas and as shining in the hermit's robes. He speaks of him as *Ēkōrāma Yathēndra Sēkhara Sivāchārya* and calls upon him to bless him in the work that he is undertaking. The author calls his work the gist or essence of the meaning of the *Vaiyāsika Brahmasūtra*. Seeing that he praises Ēkōrāma so highly in his prefatory verses, it might be inferred he was connected with Ēkōrāma's Mutt, which is the well-known Kēdāra Mutt, on the Himalayas. This is one of the five famous Mutts of the Vīrasaiva faith—*Ādi Pancha Mathas*. There is a tradition that Śrīpati wrote on the *Prasthāna Traya*—*Āgama*, *Nyāya* and *Vēdānta*—besides commentaries on the ten principal *Upanishads*, the *Gīta* and other works as well. Some of these are said to be still available in MS. form, at Haiderabad, Urlam, and other places but my enquiries have not proved successful in locating copies of them there. The Madras and Mysore Government Oriental MSS. Libraries have no copies of any of Śrīpati's works—not even the *Bhāṣhya*, barring of course a part of the printed Edition of the *Bhāṣhya*, in the Mysore Oriental MSS. Library, referred to above. In view of the fact that Śrīpati describes himself a *Siddhānta Sthāpanāchārya* and a *Bhagavadpādāchārya*, it is possible he wrote the works attributed to him as above. It is undoubted that he was an eminent Vēdic and Upanishadic scholar, besides being well versed in *kāvya*, *nāṭaka*, *āgama* and other literature.

In the Preface to the Secunderabad Telugu script edition, spoken of above, there is a long panegyric of Srīpati. He is there referred to as proficient in all the *Vēdas*, *Āgamas* and the *Ubhaya-Vēdānta* (i.e., Dvaitādvaita); as a constant meditator on Siva, with all his Ashtāṅgayōgas; as a strict observer of the prescribed mode of conduct; as one who was absolutely free from all doubts in Vēdic procedure and firm in his absolute belief in Siva-tatva and capable of teaching and convincing his disciples of the Ishta Linga, Bhāva Linga and Prāna Linga aspects of Siva-tatva; as one who had suspended at the end of a *Sami* branch the fire collected and tied in a piece of cloth; as a *Sarvaparipūrṇa*, quite contented; as one who was capable of viewing Paramākāśa Parabrahma; as one who could fully comprehend Siva-tatva throughout without a break; as one who was born in the Nārāyanāmsa (*Nārāyanāmsya sambhūta*); as one who was the destroyer of the pride of every evil opponent who had built up a mountain of argument based upon a stray text of the *Srutis*; who was the *Guru* of the three worlds (*Trijagad-guru*), i.e., the Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaita worlds, etc. In this description, we have five points of interest to note: (1) that Srīpati was a great Vīrasaiva teacher; (2) that he was a great scholar in the *Vēda* and the *Vēdānta*; (3) that he was a keen-witted controversialist; (4) that he had performed what might be called a miracle in tying up burning coals in a piece of cloth and suspended the same by means of a *Sami* branch; and (5) that he was born in the Nārāyanāmsa. As regards the fourth of these points, there is independent testimony in certain literary works to which reference will be made below.

Apart from this panegyric, I have been able to trace some specific references in Telugu and Sānskrit literary works to Srīpati-Panditāchārya—who is styled in them as *Srīpati Pandita*, *Panditārādhya Dēsika*, *Srīpati Panditārādhya* or simply *Panditārādhya*. As mentioned below, Srīpati himself uses *Ārādhya* for *Āchārya* and *Dēsika* for *Āchārya* in his references to Srīkanta Sivāchārya. As a

matter of fact, *Āchārya* and *Ārādhyā* have long been treated as convertible terms of title. Literally *Ārādhyā* means *fit* to be worshipped or propitiated, a sense in which it is used by Kālidāsa in his *Raghuvaṃsa* (XVI. 12). It is the equivalent of *Ārādhanāya*.<sup>2</sup> *Āchārya* literally means a teacher or preceptor, particularly a religious teacher or spiritual guide, as also one who propounds a particular doctrine. In the case of Srīpati, this title is particularly apposite as he was both a religious teacher and the propounder of a new philosophical doctrine, the *Bhēdābhēda*. The term *Dēsika* means a *spiritual teacher* or *guide* and is generally used in the sense of *guru*. With these observations, we may refer to certain Telugu works in which Srīpati Pandita is mentioned. The first of these is the *Manuvamsapurāṇamu*, a work in five *Āśvāsas*, which professes to be a Telugu rendering of the Sānskrit work *Khandakapālākhyāna* (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu D.C.I.* No. 160). It is said to have been originally narrated by Mahēśvara to Umādēvi, and describes the origin and greatness of the Tēlikas. It is stated that some of the Kshatriya descendants of Manu were cursed by a sage named Visvamitra and they were born as Tēlikas. It is said that they were devotees of Srī Mallikārjuna, the presiding deity at Srīsaila, that they revelled (*i.e.*, lived) on the banks of the great and meandering Krishna at Vijayavātika (modern Bezvada); that they were possessors of bodies which had been purified by the benign, gracious and kindly glances of Panditārādhyā Dēsika, who had been specially blessed with countless good qualities by Nitalāksha (*i.e.*, Lord Siva); that they had settled

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<sup>2</sup> The term *Ārādhyā* was evidently at one time used as the equivalent of *Āchārya*. Thus Chinnabhatta in the colophon to his *Tatvabhāṣāprakāśika* describes himself as the son Vishnudevārādhyā. This Chinnabhatta speaks of himself as the younger brother of Sarvajna and a dependant of Harihara II. Rai Bahadur V. Venkayya identifies this Sarvajna with Sarvajna, the *guru* of Sāyana (see Aufrecht, *Cat. Cat.*, *Sāyana*; *E.I.*, III, 118). If this be so, the title *ārādhyā* was in the 14th century as much in use among Vīrasaiva Brāhmins as among other sects of Brāhmins.

at Kanakapuri, Ayōdhya, Gajapura, Vijāpura and Vijaya-vātika; and that their fame had spread all over the worlds. The author of the work, Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya, son of Vīrabhadra Mantri and Mūrtamāmba, of Sāndilyagōtra, declares himself a protégé of these Tēlikas of Bezwada and dedicates his work to God Mallēsvara of that place. In the introductory verse, he praises God Mallikārjuna of Srīsaila and then proceeds to narrate the circumstances under which he undertook the task of composing this *mahāprabandha*. It is in setting out these details that he tells us that the Tēlikas of Bezwada were disciples of Panditārādhyā Dēsika and that they had won that great teacher's special grace. Not only that, poet Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya sets down his own genealogy at some length and narrates the grants made to the leaders of the Tēlika (oil-pressing) caste by former kings of the country. Thus, he states that the grants made to Peda-Vēgi Erra Pōthanna Setti, Nidadavole Pōli Setti, Vaddādi Sāmi Setti, Tatikelapūdi Bommi Setti, Bezwada Varna Rāmi Setti and others of the Tēlika caste are to be found recorded in detail on the stone pillars to the east of the Mallikārjuna temple at Bezwada, the moon, the stars, the heavens and the earth being witnesses to the grants. Pratāpachōla, it is said, granted to several other Settis the towns of Bezwada, Peda-Vēgi, Jananāthapura, Dhananjayapuram, Tatikelapūdi, Padmāvati, Bhōgavati, Chintalapūdi, Gāthavaram and Sākēta, towns in Panchāla and other kingdoms, including Ātreypapuram in Madura and Manikarnika—in all fourteen towns to be enjoyed by them solely by themselves. He then adds the following:—

“Thus with these towns and with wealth of every kind, they (*i.e.*, the Tēlikas of Bezwada and other towns) lived happily by the good graces of the *guru* and Mahēsvara, protecting the poor, the whole being praised and blessed by Brāhmans as respected merchants, as descendants of Manu, as fortunate and lucky (people). They lived thus in the reign of that ornament to the Chālukya dynasty, King Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Devabhallāna Vīra-Perumāl

Pratāpachōla, rendering bright (the greatness) of the *guru*, God (Mahēśvara) and the throne. While they were thus prospering, in Saka 1109, some of the Tēlikas of certain towns lacking in good sense, said to their brethren at Bezwada: "As Bezwada, the Krishna river and God Mallikārjuna are (specially lovable) to you, to us are Nellore, the Pennar and God Mūlasthanēśvara. So you and we cannot commingle." So saying, they departed southwards to Nellore. Then Rāmi Setti, with the aid of such of the more well-to-do merchants (of Bezwada) as agreed with him, built a temple of many pillars to the Mallikārjuna temple and arranged for the conduct of the daily worship in it."

The following three points emerge from the above narration of poet Vīranāmātya : (1) that Sṛipati Pandita was not only the *guru* of the Tēlikas of Bezwada and other towns but also that of the then reigning king whose name he gives, as Chālukya Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Dēvabhallāna Vīra-Perumāḷ Pratāpa-Chōla ; (2) that both Sṛipati Pandita and the king lived in Saka 1109 (= A.D. 1127) ; and (3) that the Tēlikas of Bezwada and round about separated into two sections in that year, one portion of the caste going southwards to Nellore and settling itself there and the other continuing to live in Bezwada and the adjoining towns. Among the latter were Rāmi Setti—evidently the poet's chief patron—and others, who built the temple of Mallikārjuna and arranged for daily worship in it.

Inscriptions now found at Bezwada throw some light on the above statements made by Vīranāmātya. A mutilated lithic record, discovered in the courtyard of the Mallēśvara temple at that place, which mentions the Pallava king Mahāmandalēśvara Pallaketa as a subordinate of the Chālukya king of Vengidēsa, registers among other things that Panditārādhyā came to Bezwada and there proclaimed the superiority of Sivabhaktas to Brāhmans by holding live coal in a piece of China-muslin with the tender twig of a *Sami* tree (*M.E.R.*, 1910, No. 536 of 1909 ; see also paras 8-9 of Part II of the *Report*). The reference is



undoubtedly to Sṛipati Pandita's exploit already referred to above. The date of this inscription is unfortunately lost, but the late Rao Bahadur H. Krishna Sastri, Government Epigraphist for India, has suggested that it might be referred to the period of the Kākatiya King Ganapati (1199-1260 A.D.) and his daughter Rudrāmba (1295-1323 A.D.). That this date is a little too early for Sṛipati will be made clear below. The inscription gives some interesting anecdotes relative to the Mallēsvara temple at Bezwada and it is necessary to set them down here. It is recorded that prior to the Kali Age, the sage Agastya had named the god at Bezwada as Jayasēna. Arjuna, the *Mahābhārata* hero, whose capacity for wrestling (*Mallayuddha*) is famous, next called him, it is said, Mallēsvara. "The thus famous Siva," says the record, "graces with his presence the blessed town Vijayavāta, the ornament of which is the river Krishna." In the Kali Age, again, as early as the Saka year 117 (295 A.D.), there was a king famous on earth by name Mādhavavarman. The son of this king having killed a child of the woman "who eked out her livelihood by selling shoots of the tamarind tree (*tintrini-jīvani*)", the king sentenced him to be hanged in order to meet the ends of justice. On seeing this, God Mallēsvara was pleased and rained (on him) a shower of gold which brought back to life the deceased prince and the dead body of the child of the beggar woman. Thus the God Mallēsvara established in this world the fame of the great king (Mādhavavarman). Later on, the record continues, came a pious devotee of Siva by name Panditārādhyā who proclaimed to the world that the devotees of Siva were superior to the divine sages (perhaps, Brāhmanas) and illustrated the truth of it by bundling up live-coal in a piece of China-muslin, with the tender twig of a *Sami* tree—of course without burning the cloth! God Mallēsvara was pleased and manifested himself in the presence of his devotee. Such is Mahādeva Mallēsvara "the endless one, the lover of his devotees worshipping whom the lords of the earth prospered of old." (See *M.E.R.* for 1910,

para 8.) Such is the story told in the lithic record. But as Mr. Krishna Sastri has pointed out, an archaic Telugu record found at the same place and assigned by him to the 9th century A.D. (*M.E.R.*, 1910, Part I, page 3) registers the building of a temple at Bezwada for the God Kumāraswami (or Kārtikēya) by a certain Nripadhāmundu, while King Rājāsalki Rājāsraya Satyatrinētra Yuddhamalla, the beloved (son?) of Nripānkusa, was ruling. Another part of the same inscription states that the king built for the merit of his grandfather Mallaparāju, a mansion for (the god) and placed a pinnacle (*Kalasa*) over it. The third part of the same inscription adds that on the occasion of the king's coronation (?) a certain Mallundu, son of Trinayana, came to Bezwada from Chēbrōlu in order to attend a public festival (*jātra*) when, finding there the manifest presence of God Kārtikēya, he raised this temple for him. From these statements, Mr. Krishna Sastri traces the historical origin of the modern town of Mallēsvara to the founder Yuddha-Mallundu *alias* Nripadhāmundu. If this be so, then the question arises how a temple dedicated to Kumāra (Skanda), who is generally worshipped in the form of an image, came to be the shrine of a *linga*? Mr. Krishna Sastri suggests an answer to this query when he states that "perhaps the subsequent history of the temple, as given in the mutilated record under discussion, which reveals how in a later age a Saiva Ārādhyā established the superiority of the Saivas over the (Brāhmana) sages, may give a clue as to the period when the Kārtikēya temple at Bezwada was converted into the modern temple of Siva, Mallēsvara" (*M.E.R.* for 1910, para 9). It would seem to follow from this suggestion that the conversion of the temple should have taken place as the result of Sṛipati Panditārādhyā's influence at the place. That Sṛipati was against idol worship (*Saligrama Silā-pūja*) will be clear from what is stated below.

There are at least two literary references to Sṛipati's exploit. One of these occurs in Sankarārādhyā's *Basavēsa-vijaya*, where it is thus referred to:—

प्रसादः पावन इति प्रतिज्ञायामिमंशुके ।

बध्वा बबन्ध यश्शम्यां जीयाच्छ्रीपति पंडितः ॥

*Prasādaha pāvana iti pratignāyāgnimamsukē ।*

*Badhvā babandha yassamyām jīyāchchrīpati panditaha ॥*

Let Srīpati live long, who avowing seriously that His grace is holy and purifying, tied up fire in the folds of his cloth, and suspended it in the *Sami* tree.

Gubbiya Mallanna, the Kannada poet, in his *Bhāva-chintūratna*, praising the *Vīrasaiva Panditatraya*—Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Panditārādhyā and Mallikārjuna—refers to Srīpati's exploit thus :—

ಹರಿಯನಭವಂಗೆ ವಂದನೆಗೆಯಿಸಿ ಶಿಖಿಯನಂ- |

ಬರದಲ್ಲಿ ಕಟ್ಟಿ ಮೂರ್ಧಾಕ್ಷಿಗಳ ಪಡೆದು ನಿ- |

ಸ್ಮರ ವಕ್ರಮಂದತೀವ್ರದ ದುರ್ಗಣಗಳ ಮೈಷ್ಣವ ವಿಪ್ರಜೈನರೆಂಬ ||

ವರವಾತಪಿತ್ತದುಶ್ಲೇಷ್ಮಮಂ ಕಿಡಿಸಿ ಶಂ- |

ಕರಲೆಂಕ ಮಂಚಣ್ಣ ಶ್ರೀಪತೀಶ್ವರದೇವ |

ನುರುಮಲ್ಲಿಕಾರ್ಜುನಂ ಪಂಡಿತತ್ರಯವಾದರೆಮ್ಮ ಭವರೋಗಗಳಿಗೆ ||

*Hariyanabhavange vandanegeyisi sikhiyanam- ।*

*Baradalli katti mūrdhākshigala padedu ni- ।*

*Sthura vakra manda tīvrada durganagala Vaishnavā*

*Vipra Jainaremba ॥*

*Vara vāta pittha dusslēshmamam kidisi San- ।*

*Karalenka Manchanna Srīpatīśvaradēva ।*

*Nurumallikārjunam panditatraya vādaremma bhavarōgagaligē ॥*

“Having bowed to Siva, the destroyer of sorrows, Sankaralenka Manchanna, Srīpatīśvaradēva and Mallikārjuna, tied up (the god of) fire in a cloth and obtained pre-eminence and stupefied the crowds of wicked, hard-hearted, crooked, sluggish (in movement) and quick-witted (in argument) Vaishnavas and Jainas and became the *Punditatraya*—they proved spiritual physicians to those suffering from the diseases arising from the (wrong modes of) searching Brahma just as temporal physicians are to those who are suffering from the diseases arising

from (the preponderance of) excessive *vāta*, *pittha*, and *dusslēshma*.<sup>3</sup>

In the above verse, though praise is bestowed on all the three great Vīrasaiva Pandits—Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Panditārādhyā and Mallikārjuna Panditārādhyā—the exploit of tying up the fire in a cloth belongs to Srīpati alone. The story goes that Srīpati took a vow that Siva's blessing was all supreme and collected Agni (the god of fire) in a piece of cloth and tied him up to a *Vahni* tree, with the result that for seven continuous days Agni—having been thus tied up—was unavailable. Brāhmins living in the vicinity feeling that their daily ceremonial, which involves the worship of Agni, whether for sacrifices to be offered to the gods or to ancestors, would be rendered wholly impossible by this act of Srīpati, waited on him and handing him a certificate of victory, obtained back Agni from him. (See R. Narasimhachar, *Karnāṭaka Kavicharite*, Ed. 1924, 212-13.)

This miracle of Srīpati evidently produced a great impression and his fame spread far and wide, so that long after he ceased to exist, it appears to have given him a pre-eminence wherever Vīrasaivas lived. That is how we are to understand the references to it in the works of Sankarārādhyā and Gubbiya Mallanārya. When was the miracle wrought? The inscriptional record in which it is referred to has been assigned, as we have seen above, to the reign of Rudrāmba, the Kākatīya Empress, who ruled from 1295 to 1323 A.D. This may be temporarily accepted, provided it is understood that the event is set down to the end of Rudrāmba's reign rather than to its beginning. This is the more necessary, as Srīpati appears as a critic of Madhvāchārya's views in his Commentary and sufficient time should be allowed for such a dissemination of his views as to require pointed refutation at his hands. On

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<sup>3</sup> In this Kannada verse there is a pun on the words *Bhava* and *Pandita*. The whole verse is an example of what is known as the double entendre.

this ground alone, I would suggest that Srīpati was a younger contemporary of Queen Rudrāmba and lived long after the close of her reign. This view is strengthened by the Kondavīdu lithic record of 1405 A.D. which mentions Srīpati's grandson (see below).

We may here dispose of another suggestion that Srīpati should be assigned to the 12th century A.D. Mr. R. Narasimhachar in his *Karnātaka Kavicharite* states that as Vīrasaiva poets mention always together, at the commencement of their poems, the three Pandits, Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Pandita and Mallikārjuna Pandita, and praise them quoting *Basava Purāna* (Sandhis 9 and 58), they should have been contemporaries of each other and of Basava. This suggestion cannot be maintained in view of the fact that as Basava lived about 1160 A.D. in the reign of King Bijjala (1156-1167), Srīpati would have to be assigned to about 1167 A.D. to make him his contemporary. As a matter of fact we find him refuting the doctrines of Madhvāchārya, mentioning him both by name and by implication. As Madhvāchārya lived on and after 1238 A.D., Srīpati should be referred to a date posterior to him. As pointed out above, Gubbiya Mallanna, the Vīrasaiva poet, who flourished about 1513 A.D., mentions Srīpati (he calls him *Srīpatiśvaradēva*) in his *Bhāvachintā-ratna*. As Gubbiya Mallanna specifically states that he wrote the *Bhāvachintā-ratna* in Saka 1435 (A.D. 1513), there can be no doubt about that date. This fact leads us to the conclusion that the upper limit for Srīpati's time should be set down at about 1400 A.D. allowing about a hundred years for his attaining the status of an ancient worthy to be associated with the earliest resuscitators of Vīrasaivism and quoted with respect by Mallanna. It follows from this that Srīpati's date should be between 1238 A.D. and 1400 A.D. We may not be far wrong if we tentatively assigned him to about 1400 A.D. This would allow just a century and a half for the development of Madhva's system which Srīpati criticises in some detail.

Reverting to Vīranāmātya's reference to Srīpati, we have to enquire who was the king of Peda-Vēgi whose *guru* was Srīpati. Vīranāmātya gives his name as "that ornament to the Chālukya dynasty King Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Dēvabhallāna Vīra Perumāl Pratāpa-Chōla," who is coupled with the Saka date 1109 (A.D. 1187). This prince may be identified with Bhallanarēndra (or Ballādhinātha) who is mentioned in a couple of inscriptions at Peddakallepalli in the Krishna District. Both of these records are to be found on the Nandi pillar at the Nāgēsvara temple at that place, one dated in Saka 1076 (A.D. 1154), recording gifts of gold (*Kulōttunga-māda*) for lamps by Somaladēvi, queen of Bhallanarēndra (Ballādhinātha), the son of Chālukya Bhīma and Abbalaadēvi and grandson of Balla of the lunar race (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 131 and 132 of 1897; as to Chālukya-Bhīma I, see C. P. Grant No. 14 of 1908-09, *M.E.R.*, 1909, pp. 108-09 and *E.I.*, V. 127-137). As the difference between the date given by Vīranāmātya and that mentioned by the two inscriptional records is only 33 years, it may be conceded that the king's name is correctly given, though it has to be remarked that Srīpati could not have lived so early as 1187 or 1154 A.D., which is nearly a century earlier than the date of Madhvāchārya, whose views he criticises. The only possible inference is that Vīranāmātya has mixed up the dates of Srīpati and Bhallanarēndra and ante-dated the former, by nearly two centuries. It is possible that he did so in order to make Srīpati's connection, as their *guru*, with the Tēlikas, which was a fact, look more ancient. While Srīpati might not have been the *guru* of Bhallanarēndra, it is possible he was actually the *guru* of certain princes of his own time, as we know from other sources that Saiva teachers were actually during many centuries *gurus* of kings all over Southern India.

Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya also calls himself as Kolakatūri Virāna, he being named after Kolakatūri Vīrabhadra, his family God. He was the author of many other Telugu works including *Krishnārjuna Samvāda*,

written in his 14th year, *Vibhūtimāhātmyam* (in *dvipada* metre) in his 22nd year, *Mārkaṇḍeyacharitam* in his 26th year and *Srīmuktādēvukatha* in his 36th year. He states he composed the *Manuvamsapurānamu* in his 30th year. He also rendered Sankarāchārya's *Anandalahari* and *Soundaryalahari* and Bhartruhari's *Subhāshita* into Telugu *Satakas*. One other work of his of interest to us is *Bhallānacharitam*, in which there is a further reference to Srīpati Panditāchārya (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, D.C. II, No. 600). The genealogical verses and colophons of *Manuvamsapurāna* and *Bhallānacharitam* agree throughout, while in the introductory verses of the latter *Vīranāmātya* acknowledges his authorship of *Manuvamsapurāna*, which he styles *Manuvamsamukhya-nripa-purāna*. There is, therefore, no doubt that he is the author of both these works, besides many others, for in the *Manuvamsapurāna* he states that he had spent many days most piously in composing stories relating to Siva.

శివకథా రచనాది విశేషభక్తి ।

యుక్తి దినములు గడుపుచునున్నవాడ ॥

*Sivakathā rachanādi visēsha bhakti ।*

*Yukti dinamulu gadupuchununnavaḍa ॥*

He was evidently an ardent Saiva—probably a Vīrasaiva—of the Krishna district. There are vivid descriptions of Masulipatam (or Bandar) and Bezwada in his work. Though he belonged to Kolakatūru, he probably had made Bezwada his headquarters. Here he found a patron in a painter (of the *Chitrakāra* caste) named Dāmu Moggana, the second of four sons of Peddaya and Venkamāmba. His *guru* was, we are told, Sambhulinga, son of Mahādeva-Dēsika, who was born of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhyā of the prosperous town of Vijayavātika (*i.e.*, Bezwada). This part of the text may be quoted :—

శ్రీ లలిత జయవాటికానగర సంస్థాన.....శ్రీపతిపండితారాధ్య వంశ  
సముద్భవ మహాదేవాఖ్య దేశికాత్మసంభవ శంభులింగ నామ గురు కరణన  
సండును.....

*Srī lalita Jayavātikānagara samsthāna . . . Srīpati-panditārādhyā vamsa samudbhava mahādēvākhya Dēsikātma sambhava Sambhulinga nāma guru karajanānundunu.*

Vīrana states that it was at Moggana's instance that he undertook to compose the *Bhallānācharitra* (also called *Bhallānanripu-Katha*). He was entrusted with this work, because Moggana knew that poet Vīrana was a learned poet in both Sanskrit and Telugu and that he had made an intelligent study of the works in those languages. These are statements put into the mouth of Moggana about himself and may be taken as evidence of his intimate knowledge of Sānskrit and Telugu literature. *Bhallānācharitra* was, however, not dedicated to Moggana, who, though only a painter by profession, had humility enough to suggest to Vīrana that he should compose his work in the name of Mahēsvara. From the manner in which Dāmu Moggana is mentioned—holding court surrounded by his castemen, etc.,—it would seem he was a flourishing merchant who had evinced some interest both in religion and literary effort. His patronage of Vīrana helps us to realize the fact that Srīpati Panditārādhyā had left an abiding influence in his native district of Krishna and round about and that he had a large number of followers even among the humbler classes, who looked to his descendants for their spiritual welfare. Evidently Srīpati's name was still—in Vīrana's time—a name to conjure with; otherwise Vīrana would not have taken the trouble to mention Sambhulinga's descent from him. Srīpati's name evidently added, in Vīrana's opinion, to the weight of his patron's position and status in society.

The selection of *Bhallānācharitra* for the display of his poetical talents would seem to indicate that both Vīrana and his patron were ardent Saivas—and Vīrasaivas too. This inference is partially at least confirmed by the mention of the name of Srīpati Pandita as the ancestor of Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Vīrana's patron. The *Bhallānācharitra* narrates the story of Bhallāna, a devotee of



Siva, who is said to have pleased Him by sacrificing his dearest things for His sake. That it is a highly popular *Sivakatha* is evidenced by the fact that besides Vīrana's poetical version of it in Telugu, there are two others of it, one by Mallavarapu Vatāsvara (see Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu MSS.*, D.C. VI, No. 598) and another by Kūchimanchi Timmaya, the well-known author of the *Achcha Telugu Ramayana* (see *ibid.*, *Triennial Catalogue*, Telugu, Part III, No. 59).

The next literary reference to Srīpati Panditārādhyā is in the *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu* by poet Nāgalinga, son of Vīranārādhyā (or Virēsalinga), grandson of Sambhulinga, and a descendant of Srīpati Panditārādhyā. This Sambhulinga may be identified with Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Moggana, to whom Vīrana dedicated the *Bhallaṇacharitra*. (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu MSS.*, T.C., Part III, No. 16). In the introductory verses we are told that Nāgalinga was well versed in Sāṅskṛit and Telugu and that he was a great grammarian in both these languages. Also, he is spoken of as proficient in different kinds of poetry—such as *bandha*, *chitra*, etc.—and that he was a handsome-looking person and bore a character for equanimity of temper. It is specially mentioned that he was a descendant of the family of *Panditārādhyā* (i.e., Srīpati Panditārādhyā). The exact words used are:—పండితారాధ్యవంశ సంభవుడు (*Panditārādhyā vamsa sambhavundu*). In the colophon, we are further told that he belonged to the Kausika-gōtra, and that he was born as the moon to the ocean of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhyā. The actual words used are:—

....కవితామాధురీధురీణ కాశికగోత్రపవిత్ర శ్రీపతిపండితారాధ్యవంశ  
పయః పయోరాశి రాకాసుధాకరాయమాన ..... శంభులింగారాధ్య పాత్ర  
వీరనారాధ్య సత్కవిపుత్ర సకలసుకవివిధేయ నాగలింగాభిధేయ ప్రణీతంజన  
.....

....*Kavitā mādhurī dhurīṇa Kausikagōtra pavitra-  
Srīpatipanditārādhyā vamsapayah payōrāsi rākāsudhā-  
karāyamāna*.....

If, as suggested above, Sambhulinga, the grandfather of Nāgalinga, may be justifiably identified with Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Chitrakāra Moggana of Bezwada, to whom Kolakatūri Vīrana dedicated his *Bhallānacharitra*, then these two works—*Bhallānacharitra* and *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu*—cannot be separated from each other by a long distance of time. Probably a period of fifty years separated them from each other in regard to the date of their composition.

Nāgalinga, the author of *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu*, dedicated his work to Venkatarāya, a Madhva Brāhman, whose genealogy is given at length by him in the introductory verses. He evidently belonged to a respected family which had for some generations been connected on the maternal side with the family of Kondavīti Appāji, whose descendants had administered the territories dependent on the fortresses of Vinukonda, Bellamkonda and Kondavīdu, in the present Guntur district.

Another reference to Srīpatipandita is to be found in a work called *Gurustōtram*, which is in praise of one Paramārādhyā. This Paramārādhyā is described as the son of Mallikēśvaralinga, who again is spoken of as a descendant of Srīpatipandita. As Paramārādhyā is said to have belonged in this work to the Jayavātika family, it has to be inferred that Srīpatipandita's family was familiarly known by this name, because Srīpati had made himself famous in Vijayavātika (*i.e.*, Bezwada). The following verse from the *Stōtra* gives the above information :—

श्रीमच्छ्रीपतिपण्डितान्वयसुधा सिन्ध्वादि मूलोगुरुः ।

स्वामिश्री जयवाटिकानगर संतानो द्विजाग्रसारः ॥

श्रीमल्लेश्वर लिङ्गगर्भ जननः शृङ्गार भास्वद्वरो ।

धामार्यः सकलार्थमुक्तिफलद स्तंभावयेऽहं सदा ॥

*Srīmad Srīpati Panditānvaya sudhā sindhvādimūlō guruhu ।*

*Swāmi Srī Jayavātikānagara santānō dvijāgrēsaraha ॥*

*Srī Mallēśvaralinga garbhajananaḥ sringārabhāśvadarō ।*

*Dhāmāryaha sakalārthamuktīphaladaha tam bhāvaye aham sadā ॥*

"I meditate upon him always who is the chief descendant of the family of Srīpatipandita of spotless fame and who is the best among the *Dwijas* of the Srī Jayavātikānagara family; who was born in the parentage of Mallēśvaralinga, who was shining resplendent in good qualities and who was the chief source for granting the fruit of salvation (*Mukṭi*) to many of his adorers."

Perhaps the title of "Jayavātika" was applied to by Srīpatipandita's descendants to distinguish them from the descendants of other Srīpatīs known to Sānskrit literature, e.g. Srīpatidīkshita and Srīpati, the author of *Jyautisharatnamāla*, *Siddhāntasēkhara* and other astrological works. (See Madras *D.C. Sānskrit* XXIV, R. No. 13423 at p. 9049; R. No. 13506 at p. 9125, etc.) Srīpatidīkshita was the father of Dēvarādīkshita or Dēvarāya, the author of *Prasannarāmāyana*. (*Ibid.*, XX, No. 11607 at p. 7780.) There was, besides, a Srīpatibhatta, who was the father of Nārāyanabhatta, author of a commentary on Vādirāja's *Rukmaṇīsavijaya*. (See *ibid.*, XX, R. Nos. 11717 and 11718.)

The combined testimony of inscriptions and literary references so far put forward may be held to establish the following facts:—(1) That Srīpati Pandita was a person of great fame as a Virasaiva teacher and was not improbably the *guru* of the ruling king of Vegi of his time; (2) that he lived about *circa* 1400 A.D.; (3) that Bezwada was the centre of his religious activities, at least before he attained to *Sanyāsa*; (4) that the miracle of bundling up live coals in a China-muslin cloth was performed at Bezwada; (5) that one of the effects of his activities and of the miracle performed by him was probably the conversion of the old temple of Skanda there into that of Mallēśvara, probably after the famous god of Srī-saila, to whom he was devoted; (6) that his influence spread as far as Srī-saila in the Kurnool district; (7) that he had a large number of followers in what are now the Guntur, Nellore, Kurnool and probably also Gōdāvari districts; (8) that influential industrial and mercantile classes like the Tēlikas, Chitrakāras and others

more largely adopted Vīrasaivism as the result of his activities; (9) that he belonged to a highly literary family, learned in both Sānskrit and Telugu; (10) that some of his descendants distinguished themselves as religious teachers and as poets; and (11) that there is every reason to believe that he was himself instrumental in popularizing the Vīrasaiva faith over a wide extent of country.

### Object of the Bhashya.

The *Bhāshya* is intended to put down, Srīpati says in his work, the pride of evil opponents. He further praises his work as follows:—As one putting an end to all evil deeds and results; as one honoured by wise men; as one which sheds light on the eternal truth; as one containing the essence of all Upanishads; as forming an ornament to Visēshādvaita; and as a Sūtra *Bhāshya* which inculcates Sivagnāna.

Srīpati adds that he specially composed the work for the benefit of Vīrasaivas, whom he thus describes:—

The Saivas who have knowledge of the Vēdas and Āgamas and their inner spiritual meanings; who are fired with the desire to attain Mōksha; who are followers of the Vēdic path; and who are strict in following the tenets of pure or strict Saivism.

### The Vrihthi on which it is Based.

Srīpati Panditāchārya suggests that his exposition of the Visēshādvaita from the point of view of the Vīrasaiva doctrine is in consonance with the declared views of all the Smrithis. He also mentions the further fact that his *Bhāshya* follows in its interpretation of the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, the *Vrihthi* of Agastyamuni. (See Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 1, Mangalācharana Sloka, No. 16, page 27, line 26.) Apparently as Sankara followed the *Varāha Sahōdara Vrihthi*, Rāmānuja the *Bodhāyana Vrihthi*, and Madhva the *Hayagrīva Brahma-vidya*, Srīpati seems to have followed the *Agastya*

*Vriththi*. This *Agastya Vriththi*, which must be presumed to be an ancient work, should not be confounded with *Agastya Sūtras*, a Sūtra treatise evidently modern in diction and style, written in imitation of *Vyāsa Sūtras*, which are apparently intended like the very similar work *Sāktadarsana*, to establish that Sakti is the supreme deity. (See *Triennial Catalogue of MSS. of the Madras Oriental MSS. Library*, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 89 and 778.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Agastya is often described as the progenitor of the civilization of the South of India. In a MS. included in the Mackenzie Series, an account of this great *muni* is given, based partly on the first section of the *Kāsi Khanda* of the *Skanda Purāna* and partly on local legends. (See *Agastya Varalar*, Wilson's *Mackenzie MSS.*, p. 242, No. 17.) In this work, he is said to have come from the North of India, and settled finally in the South, where he composed the first elements of Tamil Grammar. His grammatical writings no longer exist in consequence, it is said, of an imprecation upon him by his disciple Tolgāppiyar. All the same, a short grammar of the Tamil language—called *Agastya Vyākaraṇa*—is known (*ibid.*, 248). In another MS. work called the *Agastya Jnyāna* in the same Mackenzie series (*ibid.*, 227-228), Agastya is himself made to declare that he was originally a Sūdra and that he was subsequently purified by his Brāhman preceptor. The story, which is set down in a hundred verses, is interesting as showing how closely Agastya is connected with Siva and the religion named after him. "I declare," he is made to say, "that I obtained the eminent name of Agastya, because I was formerly a Sūdra, my preceptor being a Brāhman who resided in the South of Mahāmēru. Before receiving his instructions, I purified my animal frame of all imperfections by abstract devotion. I forsook the world, and lived in caves and rocks, when my holy preceptor appeared and said, 'Come, I admit you as my disciple'. I assented and followed. He lighted a sacrificial fire, and placed in it a jar, into which he commanded me to leap. I did so, and was consumed, and was born again, and issued from the jar, which was then changed into the form of a woman. Verily that jar was a form of Mahēswari, and the Brāhman of Mahādēva, who were my parents. They brought me up, and trained me in all learning and finally Siva conferred on me immortality." Later, by command of Siva, he repaired to the South to illuminate the darkness of the people. Here he invented, it is added, eighteen languages, including the Sen Tamil, the old or poetical Tamil. Finally, under the order of Siva, he

### Siddhantas mentioned in the Bhashya.

Among the Siddhāntas Śrīpati refers to are the *Kāṇva Siddhānta*, from which he differs, and the Sankara, Bhatta, Bhāskara, Naiyāyikamata, etc., *Naiyāyikamatāsiddhānta*, evidently meaning *Nyāya siddhānta*, i.e., the Siddhānta of the Nyāya School. There are several works of this school such as *Nyāya Kaustubha*, which is a treatise on Nyāya logic by Mahadeva Panatāmakara (Punatambakar), son of Mukundapandita (Madras D.C. VIII, No. 4200);

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composed various Sāstras and wrote works on *Rasāyana* (Alchemy), Medicine and Divine Wisdom. Most of his works are said to have perished, though a list of those bearing on medicine is given in the MS. above referred to (*ibid.*, 228). Agastya is said to have taken up his residence on Podimalai, at the source of the Tāmraparni river, mythologically described as his daughter by adoption, given to him by Siva. The Mackenzie MSS. include a number of works on medicine attributed to him. Among these are:—(1) *Agastya Vaidyam*, which treats of the preparation of medicines; (2) *Agastya Purāṇa Sūtra*, which is a work on mystical and alchemical medicine, on the cure of diseases by religious rites or visiting holy shrines; it also comprises the *Pūjā-Vidhi*, which treats of the worship of Siva and other deities and the *Dikshā-Vidhi*, which treats of the *Diksha* or ceremony of initiation in the Saiva faith; (3) *Bhasmamore*, a work on alchemical or metallic medicines, containing rules for their calcination and reduction to powder, the preparation of different kinds of oxides, and the extraction of sulphuric acid; (4) *Bālachikitsā*, a treatise on the diseases of infants, difficult parturition, puerperal fever, etc.; (5) *Agastya Vaidya Munnūr*, a tract on the calcination and reduction of various vegetable and mineral articles to powder, for use in medicine; and on the extraction of essential oils, etc.; (6) *Agastya Vaidya Nūthiyambid*, a treatise on the purification of various poisonous substances and their employment in medicine; (7) *Agastya Vaidya Nappatettu*, a short tract on the cure of gonorrhœa; (8) *Vaidya Sūtra Nūru*, a set of hundred verses on different diseases and modes of treatment; and (9) *Maṭṭu*, a tract on preparing medicines of the alkaline ashes of vegetables, etc. (Wilson, *Mackenzie MSS.*, 245-246). Other works attributed to Agastya in Tamil are: *Agastya Tirattu*, *Agattiyam*, etc. A disciple of Agastya is said to have written *Pannirupadalam*, on which is based the *Purapporul Ventamālai*, written by Aiyanāridanār, a descendant of Chēra Kings. (See Madras D.C. Tamil, I, No. 78.) Agastya is thus suggested to be the original civilizer of the South and as the

*Nyāyachūdāmani*, another work on logic by Ramakrishnādhwarin, son of Dharmarājavarīndra (*ibid.*, No. 4201); and *Nyāyapāriṣāta* by Yallayārya (*ibid.*, No. 4202). Other well-known works are *Nyāyaprakāśika*, a commentary on the *Tarkabhāshāprakāśika* of Chennabhatta, by Naraharimisra; *Nyāyaratnatīka* (or *Dyutimālika*), a commentary on Manikantha's *Nyāyaratna* by Nrisimhayajvan; and *Nyāyasāstrārthadīpa* by Sasādhara, which is better known as *Sasādhariya* after the author. A commentary on this work is the *Prathā* by Bhishagraṭna. Another commentary, called *Nyāyaratna*, is by Dharmarājādhvarīndra. Finally there is the *Nyāyasiddhāntamanjari* by Jānakīnātha *alias* Chudāmanibhattāchārya. There is a commentary on this work, called *Tarkaprakāśika*, by Śrīkanta.

Bhatta is, we know to be, Kumārila Bhatta, the great Mīmāṃsa commentator, who lived about 730 A.D. He was the author of *Tantravārtika*, a commentary on Sabara Svāmin's *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsa Sūtras*, perhaps the oldest *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsa* in existence, going back to probably the first century B.C. On the *Bhāṭṭa-mata*, as his system is called, there are many valuable unpublished commentaries in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. Prabhākara is another commentator on the *Mīmāṃsa* and his system is known

originator of the Tamil and other languages current in it. His close connection with the Saiva religion is also more than hinted at in some of the Tamil MSS. above referred to. A Sanskrit MS. describes him as the author of *Panchadasi Mūlamantra Vyākhyā*, which is a commentary on the *Panchadasi Mūlamantra*, which is an alternative name for *Panchadasāksharimantra*. This mantra is addressed to Tripurasundari and consists of fifteen syllables. It is supposed to have power to confer prosperity on one and to make him a great poet. The commentary is sometimes called *Śrīvidyātikā*. (See Madras D.C. XIII, No. 6552; also Nos. 6548 to 6550.)

There is thus some reason for connecting Agastya with Saivism. Evidently Śrīpati echoes the tradition when he states that he follows the *Vriththi* of Agastyamuni in his interpretation of Bādarāyana's *Brahma Sūtras*. The suggestion seems to be that the interpretation is an ancient one and is based on the traditional views attributed to Agastya.

as *Prābhākara-mata*. He is not mentioned by name by Śrīpati. On his work, the *Bṛihati*, which is a commentary on Sabara Svāmin's *Mīmāṃsa Sūtra Bhāṣya*, there is an excellent commentary written by Śālikanātha, a well-known exponent of Prabhākara doctrines. It is known as *Rijumālāpanchika*, a MS. copy of which is in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. Both Bhatta and Prabhākara are mentioned by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* in his chapter on the *Jaimini-Darsana*. The difference between these two exponents is well brought out by him in his account of them. The followers of Bhatta maintained, he says, that words signify something definite by themselves, apart from the sentence. Those of Prabhākara, on the contrary, held that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done. The former are called *abhihitānvaya-vādins* and the latter *anvitābhidhāna-vādins*. The Prabhākaras are referred to by Rāmānuja in his *Śrī-Bhāṣya* (Adhikarana 1, Sūtra 1) as "those who maintain that the syntactical meaning of sentences is to be finally found in action," etc. Bhāskara is another commentator mentioned by Śrīpati. As there are many authors, ancient and modern, of this name, it is necessary to point out that the Bhāskara referred to by Śrīpati is the earliest and most famous of them all. He was an early commentator of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana and is referred to and criticized by Rāmānuja (see *Śrī Bhāṣya*, II. i, 15) and by the author of the *Madhva-vijaya* (*Sarga 1*) as one criticised by Ānandatīrtha. In the colophons to his work, called *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsa Bhāṣya*, Bhāskara styles himself as *Bhāskarāchārya*. He should be distinguished from Bhatta Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, who is referred to below. He should also not be confounded with the great astronomer Bhāskarāchārya, born in 1114 A.D., whose *Siddhānta Sirōmani* is next only in authority to the *Sūrya Siddhānta*, a work that has been referred to about 300 A.D. The Bhāskara of Śrīpati notices, with



Sankara, the Lōkāyatikas, a sect of the Chārvākas, in his work. Srīpati's references to Buddha, Rāmānuja and Madhva and their Siddhāntas will be found detailed at some length below. Srīpati also mentions Nīlakantha Bhagavatpāda, Ghantānāda and Jyōtirmatha (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 21, page 74, line 30).

Nīlakantha is further referred to below. As to Ghantānāda, not much is known. The term, however, appears as a title of Panta Mailāra, described as the great-grandson of Sūra, grandson of Pōta and the son of Mumbāmba and Mummadīndra, a brave lieutenant of Pratāpa-Dēva-Rāya II in battle. At the request of this Mailāra, who, by the way, has been identified with the chief of the name mentioned by Srīnātha in one of his *Chātu* verses, Dēva-Rāya II made a grant, dated on the Sivarātri day of the month of Māgha in the year Kīlaka in Saka 1351 (A.D. 1429). Another grant in his favour was made on the 11th day of the bright fortnight of Māgha of the year Subhakrit, Saka 1404 (A.D. 1482) by Dēva-Rāya, who is here spoken of as Praudha-Dēva-Rāya. If the title *Ghantānāda* is identical with this title, Ghantānāda should be taken to be a great religious teacher who lived long before the 15th century A.D., and whose fame was such that his name came to be assumed as a title by Saiva Chiefs in later times (see Sewell's *List of Antiquities*, C. P. No. 87; also Butterworth and Venugopal Chetty, *Nellore Inscriptions*, C.P. No. 18; *M.E.R.* No. 211 of 1894). The *Jyōtirmatha* referred to is quite an ancient system of thought to which we have references in the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and the *Uttararāma Charita* (*Bhagavad-Gīta*, V. 24 and XIII. 17; *Uttararāma Charita*, IV. 18). According to this school of thought, Light is regarded as the Supreme Spirit, the Light referred to being the Light of Brahman. In this school, light is the divine principle of life and of intelligence.

#### The Author's Date.

As regards the period of time to which Srīpati, the Commentator, should be assigned, it has been pointed out

above that judging from certain lithic records and literary references he should have belonged to *circa* 1400 A.D. From the internal evidence afforded by his *Bhāshya* itself, it is clear that he is posterior to Rāmānuja, to whose doctrines he specifically refers by name and which he refutes in detail, especially his regard for Tāntric Āgamas, including idol worship, which Srīpati throughout denounces.

*Pāribhāshāpradhāna Rāmānuja Sāstram Vēdamūlatvā bhāvāt avaidikam iti ghantāghōshaha* (Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 42, line 18, page 247).

There is a reference also to the practices prevailing among the followers of Rāmānuja in regard to the branding of the Sankha and the Chakra and the worship of the Sāligrāma in a passage occurring in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 12. The relevant passages are as follows :—

तान्त्रिकस्सर्वकर्माणि विष्णुमुद्दिश्य कारयेत् ॥

वैदिकस्सर्वकर्माणि शिवमुद्दिश्य कारयेत् ॥

तथापि शिवोपासनामेव सद्यो मुक्तिः ॥

*Tāntrikas sarva karmāni Vishnumuddisya kārayēt ॥*

*Vaidikas sarva karmāni Sivamuddisya kārayēt ॥*

*Tathāpi Sivōpāsanaṁeva Sadyō-muktihi ॥*

Again,

शंखचक्रमुद्राधारणनिरासः ; तथा च सालिग्रामशिलापूजादि अवश्यं वर्जयेत् ॥

*Sankha chakra mudrā dhārana nirāsaḥ ; tathācha*

*Sāligrāma silā pūjādi avasyam varjayēt ॥*

He is as much against the Tāntric doctrines of Pāsupatas as of Rāmānuja. In Adhyāya I, Pāda II, Sūtra 1, he has the following :—

पाञ्चरात्रादिवत्पाशुपत्यागमानां निरस्तत्वात् ॥

*Pāncharātrādivat Pāsupatyāgamānām nirastatvāt ॥*

Srīpati is also posterior in date to Ēkōrāma and the five Āchāryas of the Vīrasaiva religion, who, though they are by some modern writers classed (see E. P. Rice's *Kanarese Literature*, 54-55) as contemporaries of Basava, the great reformer, who himself belonged to the third quarter of the 12th century, are undoubtedly considerably more ancient than Basava. Basava's work presumes the

previous existence of Āchāryas who had prepared the ground for him. Basava's vigorous propaganda resulted in the development of the Vīrasaiva religion. This is entirely in accordance with the view of Sir R. G. Bhandārkar as developed in his *Vaishnavism, Saivism*, etc., 132. Though Basava is not referred to by name by Srīpati, it is inferable that Srīpati belongs to the post-Basava period. This could not well be otherwise, as Basava came long after Rāmānuja.

Not only Srīpati refers to and refutes the doctrines of Sankara and Rāmānuja, but also criticizes in more than one place the distinctively dualistic philosophy of Madhvāchārya. Srīpati's date has, therefore, to be fixed as posterior to Madhvāchārya, say between 1300 and 1400 A.D. This date may be taken as approximately correct, though it is not quite in agreement with what Mr. P. Gopinath Kaviraj has suggested (1200 A.D.) in the *Hindustan Review* for January 1923. Seeing that Rāmānuja lived in the first half of the 12th century, during the reign of the Hoysala King Vishnuvardhana (1111 to 1141 A.D.) and that Srīpati is posterior in date to Basava, who lived about 1167 A.D., and that Madhvāchārya lived from and after 1238 A.D., this date being fixed with reference to the Sri Kūrmam inscriptions of Narahari Tīrtha and Mutt traditions combined, it seems safe to assume the date mentioned above.<sup>5</sup> This date will allow a certain period of time for the promulgation of the doctrines of Rāmānuja and Madhvāchārya for them to assume a predominance, which required refutation at the hands of a Vīrasaiva teacher of eminence like Srīpati Panditāchārya.

### Light from Inscriptions.

A few lithic inscriptions lend additional weight to this deduction. The most important of these is one

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<sup>5</sup> According to lithic inscriptions dated in 1281 and 1293 A.D., Naraharītīrtha, the Madhva saint—third in succession to Sri Madhvāchārya—who is mentioned in them should have lived about that time. (See *M.E.R.* 1896 and 1900.) He is believed to have lived up to 1333 A.D.

which comes from a ruined *mantap* at Kondavīdu, the celebrated hill capital of the Reddis, who ruled from 1328 to 1427 A.D. This is a Telugu record and is dated in Saka 1327, cyclic year Pārthiva and registers that the stone beam in the *gōpura* of the Visvēsvara temple there was presented by one Damalapati Chennamaneningāru for the merit of his spiritual teacher Srīgiriayyamgāru, who was the grandson (?) of Panditārādhyaḍēva (*M.E.R.*, 1910, 539 of 1909). There is little doubt that the Panditārādhyaḍēva referred to in this record is the same as Srīpati Panditārādhya, he having been, from what has been stated before, known more commonly as *Panditārādhya* (see above quotation from *Pattābhirāmaṣilāsanu*). This identification being conceded, we have the date Saka 1327, Pārthiva, for his grandson Srīgiri. Saka 1327, Pārthiva, corresponds to A.D. 1405. Taking it for granted that Srīpati had had a grown-up grandson in the 40th year of his age—a by no means impossible suggestion—his date would fall in or about 1365 A.D., and if he had been alive even a few years before the date of this grant in favour of his grandson—who himself is spoken of as a spiritual teacher in this record—he would have to be set down to *circa* 1400 A.D., a date which is in agreement with our deductions from independent sources as to his time. On a pillar of the same *mantap* on which the above-mentioned record is found, there is another one—a mutilated one—of Reddi King Peda-Kōmati-Vēma dated in Saka 1330, corresponding to 1408 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, 1910, No. 538 of 1909). This record is dated only three years later than the one recording the gift in favour of Srīgiri, grandson of Srīpati Panditārādhyaḍēva. Peda-Kōmati-Vēma, as we know, was the author of *Sringārāḍīpika*, a commentary on the *Amara Sataka*. Evidently, Srīpati Pandita was a contemporary of Peda-Kōmati-Vēma. The Reddi chief, Damalapati Chennamaneningāru, who presented the stone beam for the merit of Srīpati's grandson, was evidently the descendant of a Tamil chief who had long held sway in the

Kondavīdu country, as his title "Damalapati" (*i.e.*, Dramilapati, or Dravida lord) shows.

The next record comes from Panem, Kurnool district, but is unfortunately not dated. On a pillar in the *Mukha-mantapa* of the Panikēsvara Svāmin temple at this place is a record which registers the fact that one Vibhūti Gauraya visited the temple. It is mentioned that he was born at Māchirājupalli, near Warrangal, and that he had settled on the top of Srīgiri and was the servant of Panditārādhyā, who may be identified with Srīpati Pandita. There are three other records of this Vibhūti Gauraya, who was evidently a person of some importance as the details given about the place of his birth and his settling down at Srī-sailam indicate. The statement that he was the "servant" of Srīpati Panditārādhyā signifies possibly his retirement from temporal affairs and becoming a disciple of the great teacher Srīpati Panditārādhyā, probably the greatest Vīrasaiva teacher of the time. (*M.E.R.*, 1914, No. 169 of 1913; also 168 of 1913; for the Reddi kings of Kondavīdu, see *E.I.*, XI, 313 *et seq.*; and Venkayya, *Ancient History of Nellore*, 23-24.)

#### Posterior to Nīlakantha, Author of Bhashya on Sūta Samhita.

Srīpati quotes from Nīlakantha's *Bhāṣhya* on *Sūta-Samhita* (on *Dhyāna Yōgakhanda*) in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 42, page 244, line 7; also in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 21, page 74, line 29, where he refers to Pūrvāchārya Nīlakantha Bhagavadpādāchārya's *Bhāṣhya* on *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*. I have been unable to trace these works in any of the Catalogues accessible to me. But there is hardly any doubt that this is the Nīlakantha, who is popularly but mistakenly described as an independent Saiva commentator on the *Vēdānta Sūtras*, whose alleged work is called the *Saiva Bhāṣhya*. Srīpati nowhere quotes the alleged latter work; if it had been in existence, he would have referred to it. He should not be confounded with the Nīlakantha, the best known Commentator

of the *Mahābhārata*, who lived and wrote his *Bhārata-bhāvadīpa* at Kūrpara, to the west of the Gōdāvari, in Mahārāshtra, and who, according to Burnell, belongs to the 16th century (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, No. 1958; Macdonell, *Sānskrit Literature*, 282, 290). Another Nīlakantha, *alias* Ayya Dīkshita, who flourished in the 1st half of the 17th century, was the author of the *Sivātīlārṇava*. He was the grandson of Acca Dīkshita, grandson of Appayya Dīkshita, one of the finest exponents of Saiva Siddhānta. Nīlakanthasivāchārya's alleged *Bhāshya* goes by the name of *Nīlakantha Bhāshya*, which, on closer investigation is found to be only another name for Sṛikantha's *Bhāshya*, known as *Brahma Mīmāṃsa Bhāshya*. A commentary on the latter is Appayya Dīkshita's *Sivādityamanidīpikā*, in the colophon to which work Appayya Dīkshita plainly states that it is a commentary only on Sṛikantha's *Bhāshya* and not on that of Nīlakantha's also, as has been suggested in some quarters. It is more than doubtful if there was really a Nīlakantha or Nīlakantha-Sivāchārya who was also a commentator on the *Brahma Sūtras*. Mr. S. S. Sūrya-nārāyana Sāstri, the author of *Sivādvaita of Sṛikantha*, has, since the above was written, arrived at the same conclusion, arguing from a different point of view (see *Sivādvaita of Sṛikantha*, 18, f.n. 23). The doctrines of Saivādvaita religion are propounded in *Sivādvaitanirnaya* by Appayya Dīkshita. The Nīlakantha-Sivāchārya above named should not, further, be confounded with a third person of the same name, who is well known to Vīrasaiva literature. This is Nīlakantha Sivāchārya, whose Sānskrit work, entitled *Kriyāsāra*, is often popularly, but erroneously, described as a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. He is one of the more familiar Vīrasaiva teachers of the Kannada country. As he has been referred to in Mallannārya's *Vīrasaivāmṛita-purāṇa*, a work which belongs to 1530, he must have been anterior to Mallannārya. How much exactly anterior to him, it is not known. But he has been assigned to the 14th century, though

this seems a little too early for him. He cannot have lived earlier than Srīpati. In some MS. copies of his work, he is called Nīlakanthadīkshita or simply Nīlakantha. His work is also alternatively known as *Nigamāgama Sārasaṅgraha*. It is not a *Bhāṣya* on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras*. It is a work which, as the author himself states, treats of the quintessence of action as derivable from the Vēdas and Sāstras (*Nigamāgama Sārabhūta Kriyāsāra*) in the spirit of the teachings of the *Vyāsa Sūtras* (*Upōdghāta*, verses 11 and 12; *Prathamōpadēsa*, verse 1). He styles his work a *Prabandha* or treatise. It is divided into 32 *Upadēsas* and treats of a variety of topics, including the fundamental tenets of the Vīrasaiva faith. It is, in fact, a hand-book of interpretation of Vīrasaiva doctrines and beliefs. Even the 18 Purānas (including the *Rāmāyana*, the *Bhāgavata*, etc.) are interpreted in this work from the Vīrasaiva point of view. The point to note in regard to it is that it is undoubtedly a work much later than that of Srīpati. Its style is modern and somewhat artificial in character. The author's knowledge, though undoubtedly great, nowhere approaches the profundity of Srīpati. Srīpati shines as a learned scholar, an acute thinker and a great dialectician of a rare type, who had drunk deep at the fountain-head. Nīlakantha, who describes himself as the knower of the secret of the *Ekōththara Sathasthala*, shows himself as a redactor and popularizer intent on interpreting everything known from the Vīrasaiva point of view. Nīlakantha refers to another work of his at the end of the nineteenth *Upadēsa* of his *Kriyāsāra*, but its name is not mentioned. His philosophical standpoint is also *bhēdā-bhēda* (see 3rd *Upadēsa*, verse 3) which is in keeping with Srīpati's teaching. Srīpati uses the phrase *Ubhaya Vēdānta Nigamāgama* repeatedly in his work and the fact that Nīlakantha gives this name to his work and suggests that his doctrine is also *bhēdā-bhēda*, shows that he was not unaware of Srīpati's work, to which he does not, however, so far as can be seen, directly refer by name. It is strange,

however, that in the colophons appearing in the *Kriyāsāra* in the MS. copies of this work as found in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library (see *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library, XI, Nos. 5438 and 5549) and as printed in the Telugu script edition published by Mr. Vīrasangappa, at the Mysore Sārada Press, in the year Tārana, the work is described as that of the teacher Nīlakantha, who possessed the secret of the doctrine of *Ēkōththara Sathasthala* of the *Visishtādvaita* philosophy. A possible explanation is that the reference here is to *Saivavisishtādvaita* and not to Vaishnava or Rāmānuja's *Visishtādvaita*, for the *Ēkōththara Sathasthala* doctrine is not part of the latter's *Visishtādvaita* philosophy. The Vīrasaiva standpoint, though described by Nīlakantha in his colophons as *Visishtādvaita*, evidently following Śrīkantha, who called his system Siva Visishtādvaita, is also plainly called by him *Bhēdābhēda*, which is in keeping with the Vīrasaiva standpoint as propounded by Śrīpati in his *Bhāshya*.

### Posterior to Śrīkantha, Author of *Brahma Mīmamsa Bhāshya*.

Śrīkantha-Sivāchārya, whose *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* is also well known, though not a professed Vīrasaiva, approaches the Vīrasaiva point of view (see Bhandārkar's *Vaishnavism, Saivism*, etc., 137; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, p. 3874). Śrīkantha-Sivāchārya is referred to by name by Śrīpati in Adhyāya II, Pāda I, Sūtra 22, page 200, line 8, as *Saivāgraganya Śrīkantha Sivārādhya* and he quotes from Śrīkantha's work *Brahma Mīmāmsa Bhāshya*. He again refers to him in Adhyāya III, Pāda II, Sūtra 8, page 320, line 33. Here he refers to Śrīkantha as *Sivāchārya* and cites him in connection with the discussion of *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, the leading topic of Sūtra 8. The change from Śrīkantha *Sivārādhya* to Śrīkantha *Sivāchārya* should be noted. The former designation would seem to indicate his being claimed as a Vīrasaiva by Śrīpati.



Srīkantha Sivāchārya was the author of a Saiva commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. The work is commonly called *Brahmasūtrabhāṣhyam*, though in the colophon the author styles it more formally *Brahma Mīmāṃsa Bhāṣhya*, the name by which it is actually cited by Srīpati. The most famous commentary on it is the work entitled *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣhya Vyākhyāya : Sivādityamanidīpika* by Appayya Dīkshita. Srīkantha Sivāchārya is sometimes briefly referred to as Srikanthāchārya, while he appears simply as "Srīkantha" in the colophons contained in his *Bhāṣhya*. Appayya Dīkshita wrote his *Nakshatravādāvali* (also called *Vādanakshatra Mālīka*) to support the views of Srīkantha. (See Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, Nos. 5079 and 5092, pages 3857 and 3874.)

#### Date of Srikantha from Literary Data.

The date of Srīkantha is not yet definitely settled. It has been suggested, on the basis of verbal and doctrinal resemblances, that he probably flourished close to the period of Rāmānuja, who, as we know, lived about the beginning of the 11th century A.D. But it has been stated that it is difficult to decide the question of priority and that there is also the possibility of explaining the resemblances referred to on the basis of a common original. The suggestion has been made that Srīkantha's treatment of Sūtras III, 3, 27-30, where he criticizes views which are said to be those of Rāmānuja and Nimbarka, who, chronologically speaking, came some time after Rāmānuja, is fairly conclusive in the matter. Mr. S. S. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, who puts forward this view (*vide* his *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 45 *et seq.*), holds that Srīkantha's criticism is effective and is not attempted to be met in any other commentary. Briefly put, this criticism bases itself on the position that until the attainment of Brahman, bondage continues (even after death) and that bondage without Karma is inconceivable. This position, it is remarked, has not been controverted elsewhere. Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri also states that there

is an inversion in the order of Sūtras 29 and 30, as read by other commentators and the inversion is not noticed by others. On these grounds, he suggests that it is "likely that Sṛīkantha came after all these, probably some time in the 13th century, when the Saiva Siddhānta was taking shape in the hands of the Santāna Āchāryas." There is, however, little in this reasoning, to support the question of date. Nor is there anything in the criticism of Rāmānuja that is novel; and as regards the inversion in the order of the Sūtras, such inversions occur in Sṛīpati's commentary also. This by itself cannot, therefore, be accepted as settling the question of the priority of Rāmānuja to Sṛīkantha. A writer in the *Jignyāsa*, suggests the opposite view that Sṛīkantha preceded Rāmānuja (see *Jignyāsa*, Part II, article on *Sṛīkantha*). In commencing his work Sṛīkantha states that he has corrected the errors (*kalusha*) of the commentators who preceded him and that Āryas and pious Saivas would find his commentary a great treasure (*mahānidhi*) (see Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, p. 3874 *et seq.*, at page 3875; also *M.E.R.*, No. 188 of 1905). The words are:—

*Pūrvāchārya kalushitam Sṛīkanthēna prasūdhate ॥*

*Sarvavēdāntasārasya saurabhāsvādāmōdinām ।*

*Āryānām Sivanishthānām Bhāshyamētanmahānidhihi ॥*

Who were these commentators whom Sṛīkantha corrected? This statement would seem to indicate that several commentators had preceded him. Until we have definitely fixed his date, the reference to previous commentators cannot be correctly explained. Epigraphic records appear to throw some light on his date and to this we may now turn our attention.

### Srikantha's Date as determined from Inscriptions.

Numerous inscriptions mention or refer to persons bearing the name of Sṛīkantha and as the references occur at different intervals of time, it is of some interest to see which of these relates to Sṛīkantha, the author of the *Bhāshya*. First in order of date, perhaps, should have

been the Sṛīkantha after whom the Sṛīkantha-Chaturvēdimangalam, a village in the Musuri taluk, Trichinopoly district, is named. This place is referred to in as many as fifteen lithic records dated from the 30th year of the reign of the Chōla King Parāntaka I to the 3rd year of Rājarāja III. It would seem to follow from these inscriptions that the Sṛīkantha after whom it was named should have flourished anterior to the rule of Parāntaka I (907-948 A.D.). Who he was, it is not possible to determine. A person bearing the name of Tiruvaian Sṛīkantha, *i.e.*, Sṛikantha, the son of Tiruvaian, is mentioned in an inscription, dated in 965 A.D., found at Grāmam in the present South Arcot district (*M.E.R.*, No. 74 of 1905). He figures in it as a Vaidumba feudatory of the Rāshtrakūta King Krishna III (*M.E.R.*, 1901, page 42). Whether he could be identified with the name-father of Sṛikantha-Chaturvēdimangalam is difficult to say in the present state of our knowledge of the history of Vaidumbas. The following is a list of the records in which *Sṛīkantha-Chaturvēdimangalam* is mentioned :—

- (1) 600 of 1908 at Tirupattur, Musuri taluk, Trichinopoly district. Reign of Rājarāja III (18th year). Grant by a native of the place, a *brahmādāya* of Urattunnādu.
- (2) 511 of 1912 dated in 13th year of Vikrama-Chōla (1118-35). Sale of land in this village, also called Nambīkurichchi.
- (3) 512 of 1912 dated in Vikrama-Chōla's reign. Land sale in the same village.
- (4) 97 of 1914 dated 25th year of Rājarāja I. Grant of gold to the temple at the place.
- (5) 100 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājendra-Chōla I. Gifts to the temple at the place by one of the members of the village assembly.
- (6) 102 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājakēsarivarman. Land granted for digging a channel from the tank at the village for irrigating the lands.
- (7) 105 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājakēsarivarman. Sale of right to a private party to levy a definite quantity of paddy on the lands of the village for digging a channel.

- (8) 111 of 1914 dated 30th year of Parāntaka I.  
Grant of land to the temple.
- (9) 114 of 1914 dated 4th year of Rājakēsarivarman, Rājarāja I.  
Grant of gold for lamp, etc., to the temple.
- (10) 117 of 1914 dated 5th year of Rājakēsarivarman.  
Gift of a lamp to the temple.
- (11) 119 of 1914 dated 18th year of Rajakēsarivarman.  
Gift of a lamp to the temple.
- (12) 120 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājendra-Chōla (1050-62).  
Remission of taxes to the temple at the place.
- (13) 123 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājakēsarivarman.  
Sale of land.
- (14) 133 of 1914 dated 5th year of Rājakēsarivarman.  
No taxes should be levied on the temple belongings.
- (15) 136 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājarājadēva III. (=13th February 1219 A.D.)  
Gift of land. Village called also *Malari*.

As will be seen, these inscriptions range in their dates from the reign of Parāntaka I to Rājarāja III.

A Telugu-Sānskrit record dated in Saka 1193 (corresponding to 1271 A.D.) cyclic year Prajāpati, which comes from Tripurāntakam in the Markapur taluk, Kurnool district, mentions a Brāhmana resident of Madhurāntaka (perhaps the village of that name in the present Chingleput district) who bore the title of Chōdamandala-pratisthā-chārya, and a certain Sṛikantha-siva, probably a Saiva ascetic. In another record at the same place, wholly in Telugu, dated in Saka 1192, cyclic year Pramōdūta, corresponding to 1270 A.D., in the reign of the Kākatīya queen Rudrayyadēva Mahārāja (Rudramma), we have mention made again of a Sṛikantha-siva (*M.E.R.*, No. 246 of 1905). Another record comes from Tiruvidamarudur in the modern Tanjore district, dated in the fourth year of the Chōla King Vikrama-Chōla, who reigned from 1118-1135 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, No. 301 of 1907). It records a gift of land to the image of Kulōttunga-Chōlīsvaranudaiya-Mahādeva (named after Kulōttunga-Chōla I) set up by Svāmīdēvar Sṛikantha-siva, who has been identified (wrongly as will be shown below) with Sṛikantha, the

commentator. (*Ins. in Madras*, II, p. 1276, No. 328.) Mr. V. Venkayya has identified this Svāmidēvar Sṛīkantha with Sṛīkantha-Sambhu, the father of Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, the *guru* of Kulōttunga III. (*M.E.R.* 1908, p. 64.) As Sṛīkantha's son, Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, who wrote the *Siddhānta Ratnākara*, was the *guru* of Kulōttunga III (1178-1216 A.D.) and consecrated the temple built by Kulōttunga III at Tribhuvanam, in the Tanjore district, it has to be presumed that his father Svāmidēvar Sṛīkantha-siva himself had passed away by then. Vikrama-Chōla, in whose reign the grant was made, ruled between 1118-1135 A.D., while Kulōttunga-Chōla I, in whose name the image was set up, ruled between 1070-1120 A.D., and preceded him. Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, the son of Svāmidēvar Sṛīkantha-siva, who set up the image, was the *guru* of Kulōttunga III, who ruled between 1178-1216 A.D. Thus nearly a century separated Kulōttunga-Chōla I from Kulōttunga-Chōla III. Taking it for granted that the image was consecrated in the year in which the grant was made to it, *i.e.*, in the fourth year of Vikrama-Chōla's reign, corresponding to 1122 A.D., Svāmidēvar Sṛīkantha should have been living in that year, while his son Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva belonged to the period 1178-1216 A.D.

Svāmidēvar Sṛīkantha cannot, therefore, be identified with the Sṛīkantha of the two Tripurāntakam records, dated in 1270 and 1271 A.D., though this (Svāmidēvar) Sṛīkantha was evidently a great Saiva teacher. His son Sōmēsvara is, indeed, described as well versed in the *Saiva-Darsana* and the eighteen *Vidyās* and as having expounded the greatness of Siva as taught in the Upanishads. As remarked above, Sōmēsvara was also the author of *Siddhānta-Ratnākara*. Sōmēsvara was also known as Īsvara-Siva, a name which the late Mr. Venkayya was inclined to identify with Īsāna-siva, which was borne by a Saiva teacher who wrote the *Siddhāntasāra*. In the same line of teachers there was also a Sṛīkantha. Both Īsāna-siva and Sṛīkantha are mentioned by the Saiva teacher,

Vēdajñāna, in his *Ātmārthapūjā-paddhati*. This Īsānāsiva has, however, to be distinguished from the person of the same name who belonged to the Āmardakamatha and wrote a work called *Krinākramadyōtika* (see Hultzs, *Report on Sānskrit MSS.*, II, xvii; also *M.E.R.* 1908, para 64). There is a Sṛīkantha mentioned in a record, dated in the 21st year of the Pandya King Māravarman *alias* Tribhuvanachakravartin Sundara-Pāndya I (1216-35 A.D.), "who was pleased to distribute the Chōla country". This records a sale of land to Sṛīkantha-siva, one of the Āchāryas residing in the Tirugnānasambanda matha at Tirupattur (the place of that name in the present Ramnad district) by a local chief. From the point of view of dates, the Sṛīkantha of this record—whose date works out to 1236 A.D.—may be the same as the Sṛīkantha of the Tripurāntakam records, which belong to 1270 and 1271 A.D. If the Sṛīkantha of these records is Sṛīkantha, the commentator, then he should be assigned to about 1270 A.D. In this case, he should be held to come long after Rāmānuja and Nimbarka and not before them.

There remain three others of the name of Sṛīkantha to consider. One of these is Sṛīkantha, the Tāntric writer, who belonged to the Kashmir School and composed the *Ratnatraya Parīksha* prior to the 10th century. He has to be distinguished not only from the Sṛīkantha, who lived from about the first quarter to the third quarter of the 13th century A.D., but also from Svāmīdēvar Sṛīkantha, father of Sōmēsvara, the *guru* of Kulōttunga-Chola III above named (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, 5092, pp. 3874-7; also Hultzs, *Search for Sānskrit MSS.*, No. II, p. xvi, for Sṛīkantha, the Kāshmirian author). Another is the Sṛīkantha, identified with the Sṛīkanthanātha mentioned in the undated records in the Arulāla-Perumāl temple at Conjeevaram as the preceptor of the Vēdic scholar Sāyana, whose "master" was Sangama II, the son of Kampa and grandson of Sangama I. (*M.E.R.* 1893, p. 5, para. 13; Inscription No. 50 of 1893; *E.I.*, III, 118-19.) This Sṛīkanthanātha has been identified with the

person of the same name mentioned as the preceptor of Sangama II, son of Kampa I and grandson of Sangama I, in the Bitragunta grant of Sangama II, dated in Saka 1278, Durmukhi, corresponding to 1356 A.D. (*Nellore Ins.* I, C. P. Grant No. 20; *E.I.*, III, 21-25.) This grant records the gift of the village of Bitragunta to twenty-eight Brāhmans at the request of the king's (Sangama II's) preceptor Sṛikanthanātha, on the anniversary day of the king's death. In consequence, the village came to be known as Sṛikanthapura. At the request of the same *guru*, Sangama II granted another village, called Sinhēsari, identified with Sankēsari, near Pushpagiri, in the Nellore district. The question arises whether the Sṛikanthanātha mentioned in the Arulāla-Perumāl temple and Bitragunta records, both doubtless referring to the same person, can be identified with the Sṛikantha-siva of the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records mentioned above. The Bitragunta record is dated in 1356 A.D., while the Tripurāntakam records belong to 1270 and 1271 A.D. and the Tirupattūr one to 1236 A.D. As the hiatus of time that separates the Bitragunta and Tirupattur records is about 120 years, it seems doubtful if they can be identified. It is possible that the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records refer to Sṛikantha, the commentator, while the Bitragunta one refers to a later successor of his who lived about the first half of the 14th century A.D.

Finally, there is a Sṛikanthadēva mentioned in an undated record on the north wall of the Ilamīsvara temple at Tārāmangalam, Omalur taluk, Salem district. It mentions a certain Sṛikanthadēva, who bore the title of *Gaudachūdāmani* and *Vidyāsamudra* and records a gift of land made to his father as *gurudakshina* by the six Vellālas of the place, of whom Nalla Udaiyappar was one. (*M.E.R.* 31 of 1900.) It is rather difficult to identify this Sṛikanthadēva, though it is quite possible, judging from his high sounding titles and the Vellāla disciples he possessed, that he might have been the same as the Sṛikantha-siva mentioned by Aghōra Sivāchārya in his *Mahōtsavavidhi*. He

belonged to the Āmardakamatha above named. His predecessors in order were :—Paramēśvara ; Hridaya Sankara ; Dhyāna Siva ; and Sṛikantha-Siva-Dēsika, who, it is said, was an immigrant from the Gaudadēsa (modern Bengal). This Sṛikantha, it is added, moved south to offer worship to the god at Chidambaram, and became thereafter the *guru* of Vikrama-Chōla, son and successor of Kulōttunga-Chōla I. Vikrama-Chōla ruled from 1118-1135 A.D. and was a devout Saiva, though not intolerant of Vaishnavism. (See *Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 1133-1134.) The fact that this Sṛikantha was from the Gaudadēsa, which is noted by Aghōra Sivāchārya, enables us to identify him with the Sṛikantha mentioned in the Tārāmangalam record, who, it is mentioned in it, bore the title of *Gaudachūdāmani*. Whether this Sṛikantha, who is alleged by Aghōra Sivāchārya to have been the teacher of Vikrama-Chōla, can be identified with the Sṛikantha-siva, who set up the image in the name of Kulōttunga-Chōla I, in the fourth year of the reign of his son Vikrama-Chōla, is a moot point. If Aghōra Sivāchārya is correct in his statement, the two Sṛikanthas would have to be identified. If this be so, the Tārāmangalam record would have to be referred to about 1135 A.D.

The above identification of Sṛikantha, the commentator, with the Sṛikantha-siva of the Tripurāntaka and Tirupattūr records would fix him up to about the third quarter of 13th century A.D., which would allow a sufficiency of time for his being honoured as a great authority by Srīpati, about a century later. If this be so, Srīpati, who quotes Sṛikantha, with evident feelings of regard, should have come long after him. This brings us again to about the middle of the 14th century A.D. (1350-1400 A.D.). The date of Bhatta Bhāskara, from whose writings Sṛikantha has undoubtedly borrowed (see *Bhatta Bhāskara*, Mys. Ed., pp. 34, 81, 82 and 138 and Sṛikantha's *Br. Mīmāṃsa*, IV. 4. 19 ; I. 3. 12), may be fixed from an epigraph found on the base of a mantapa in front of the central shrine in the Saumyanāthaswāmi temple at Nandalūr in the Pullampet



taluk of the present Cuddapah district (see *M.E.R.* 1908, App. B., No. 577 of 1907). It is a Grantha and Tamil record recording a gift by Bhujabala Vīra-Nārāyana Āhavamalladēva Mahārāja and mentions Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya. The king mentioned is undoubtedly the Kalachurya king Āhavamalla, who possessed the title of *Vīra Nārāyana* or *Rāya Nārāyana*, as a record in the Shimoga district mentions it (*E.C.* VII, Shikarpur 245), and was also known as *Kalachurya Bhujabala Chakravarti*, etc. (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 896-97). We know he succeeded his brother Sankama in or about 1181 A.D. and reigned up to 1183 A.D. Though this inscription is undated, it has to be referred to one of the four years ranging from 1181-1183 A.D. Accordingly, the Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya referred to in it would have to be set down to about the same period. The name as given in the inscription may be interpreted as "the teacher Bhāskarabhata," which in later times came to be "Bhatta Bhāskara", evidently to distinguish him from many other persons of the name of "Bhāskara". If Bhatta Bhāskara is the person referred to in this record, as it seems probable, then he should be taken to have lived at about 1183 A.D. and was the recipient of a gift at the hands of the Kalachurya king Āhavamalla. This king is referred to in another record found at Chintalapattūru, in the Cuddapah taluk, in which he is termed a Mahāmandalēsvara (*M.E.R.* 320 of 1905). This record may have to be referred to 1179 A.D. or even before that year, when he was associated with his brother Sankama, a division of the kingdom having been effected about that year (*Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 896).

This *Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya* should not be confused with the *Bhāskarabhata*, who was the author of a work called the *Vaikhānasasūtra Vyākhyānam*, otherwise known as *Bhāskara Bhattīyam*. In the colophons to his work, this writer styles himself *Bhāskarāchārya* or *Bhāskarasūrin* and describes himself as the son of Nrisimhāchārya of Gautamagōtra (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, B.

No. 3463 (b) at pp. 5173-74). The scribe who copied this MS. calls its author Bhāskara Bhattāchārya. Tenāli Gōpanārya in his *Vaikhānasa Sūtrānukramanika* refers to this work and states that this was written by *Bhāskara-bhatta* (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, B. No. 3473 (a), pp. 5185-86). There is hardly any doubt that he is not the *Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya* referred to in the Nandalūr epigraph and that the latter has to be identified with the famous Bhatta Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āranyaka*. Āhavamalla as also the rest of his dynasty were, it is true, Jains, but there is nothing to show that they were not generally tolerant towards Saivism, which, in fact, was revived under the influence of the great Basava and his followers in the Kalachurya period (*Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II. ii, 898-99). The gift in favour of Bhatta Bhāskara, the eminent teacher of the Upanishads, by Āhavamalla may be taken to be an act of recognition on his part of Bhatta Bhāskara's known popularity, piety and talents as a scholar. Bhatta Bhāskara may be taken to be the first philosophical fruit of the Saiva cult of the 12th century in which Siva is described as the transcendental Brahman. If this be so, then Bhatta Bhāskara should be assigned to about 1183 A.D., or the last quarter of the 12th century A.D. Accordingly Burnell's suggestion, based on tradition, that he belonged to the latter half of the 12th century has to be given up. He may have been an Āndhra in the sense that he lived in or about the modern Cuddapah district, where the grant in his favour has been found. As enough time will have to be allowed for him to become a well-known authority, at least to be adopted without citation as a leading authority on the Upanishads by Śrīkantha, we will have a period of about a century between the two, if we take the Śrīkantha of the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records as Śrīkantha, the author of *Brahma Mīmāṃsa*, and the Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya of the Nandalūr epigraph as Bhatta Bhāskara, the author of the commentary on *Taittirīya Āranyaka*. This identification will also possess

the merit of allowing sufficient time for Sṛipati in his turn quoting Sṛikantha as an eminent authority on the *Brahma Sūtras*.

### Srikantha and Meykandar.

While Sṛikantha has been identified by some with Meykandar (Meykandadēvar), the author of the Tamil translation of the famous Sānskrit work, the *Sivagnāna-bōdham*, his *guru* has been identified by others with Mrigēndra, the author quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*. (See Cowell and Gough, translation of *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* 116, f.n. 3.) Both these identifications seem unsatisfactory. It may be pointed out that while Meykanda belonged to Tiruvennanallūr, on the south bank of the Malattar, about 14 miles south-east of Tirukkōyilūr, in the South Arcot district, Sṛikantha, according to inscriptions, was connected with Madhurāntakam in the Chingleput district. There is at Tiruvennanallūr a shrine in honour of Meykanda, not far away from the new Chuttram in existence there, while there is a temple in honour of Sṛikantha at Vada-Tirumullaivayil in the Chingleput district. On the north wall of the Arunāchalēsvara temple at Tiruvennanallūr, there is an inscription dated in the 16th year of the Chōla King Rājarāja III (1216-48 A.D.) corresponding to Saturday, 22nd May 1232 A.D., which records a gift of land to an image set up by Meykandadēvar of Tiruvennanallūr (*M.E.R.*, No. 485 of 1902; see *E.I.*, VIII, 268). This record fixes definitely the date of Meykandadēvar, who declares himself the disciple of Paranjōti Muni, to about the middle of the 13th century. How long before 1232 A.D. did Meykandar set up the image for which the grant of land was made in that year? This may be fixed up with the aid of a lithic record which comes from Chidambaram. Meykandar, it is said, was the son of one Achyuta Kalappālan of Pennāgadam, who, it has been suggested, may be the Achyuta Kalappālan of Chidambaram, mentioned in a work called the *Tamil Nāvalar Saridai* as the person

who had taken captive the kings of Chēra, Chōla and Pāndya countries. Whether this is so or not, there seems to be some ground for identifying this Kalappālan with the Kalappālarāyar who, in the eighth year of the reign of the Pāndya King Jatāvarman *alias* Tribhuvana Chakravartin Sundara-Pāndyadēva—probably Jatāvarman Sundara-Pāndya I, 1251-1264 A.D.—made a grant of land for conducting festivals and providing offerings in the temple of Mākāli (at Chidambaram) which, the record states, was founded on the south side of the road by which the god was taken in procession for the sea-bath (*M.E.R.*, 297 of 1913). The eighth year of Jatāvarman Sundara-Pāndya I would be 1259 A.D. If the grant of Kalappālarāyar was accordingly made in that year, Achyuta Kalappālan, the father of Meykanda, should be assigned to about the middle of the 13th century A.D. He was evidently already an important person at the time—he is styled *Rāyar*—and may have been old enough to have had a fairly aged son. The difference in time between 1259 A.D., the date of the Chidambaram record of Kallappālarāyar, and 1232 A.D., the date of the Tiruvennanallūr record registering a grant to the image set up by Meykanda, is about 27 years. The Tiruvennanallūr record is thus 27 years earlier in date than the Chidambaram one, which would confirm the suggestion that at the time of the latter record Meykandar was already a well-known personage. Evidently Meykandar had, in the lifetime of his father, already become famous by his philosophical studies and religious zeal, as we see a grant being made for an image set up by him. In any case, there can be hardly any question, with these two epigraphic records before us, to doubt any longer that Meykandar actually lived about 1235 A.D., if not indeed a little earlier than that date. As we have seen above, we have independent inscriptional records which agree in fixing Sṛīkantha, the commentator, to about 1270-71 A.D. It is possible that Meykanda and Sṛīkantha were contemporaries, and this contemporaneity

ought to suffice to clear up the confusion as to the identity of Sṛīkantha's *guru* with Meykanda. Men of nearly the same age and celebrity, referred to in contemporaneous inscriptional records, in which they are spoken of as religious preceptors, cannot have been *guru* and *sis̥hya*. There are, besides, as pointed by Mr. Sūrya-nārāyana Sāstri, doctrinal differences between these two religious teachers which appear too fundamental to enable us to identify them. Sṛīkantha's system, as he points out, considers the world as due to the transformation of the Lord through His *Chitsakti*; it makes no independent provision for the creation of the material world; it does not specifically recognize *ānava mala*; it is extremely doubtful if it recognizes *jīvanmukti*; and while Meykandar seeks to establish his system on reasoning, Sṛīkantha appears to fight shy of it and so takes refuge in *Sruti*. It is hardly likely that a system with so many variations from the Saiva Siddhānta, could have owed much to the protagonist of the Siddhānta (*Sivādvaita of Sṛīkantha*, 22). As a matter of fact, Sṛīkantha's *guru* was one Svētāchārya, a name which *prima facie* has no relationship with that of Mēykanda-Dēva. (See Sṛīkantha's *Brahmanūmāmsa Bhāṣhya*, stanza following the colophon.) The identification suggested by the writer in the *Journal of Oriental Research* has been answered at length by a contributor in the *Jignyāsa*, I. ii, to which further reference may be made by the interested reader.

### Sṛipati anterior to Sivalinga-Bhupati.

Among the writers quoted by Sṛipati is Haradattāchārya, a famous Saiva sage. His date can be fixed with some degree of certainty. As Sṛipati quotes him and speaks of him with reverential awe, it might be presumed that he had, by Sṛipati's time, receded into the dim past. How far he was actually removed from Haradatta may be ascertained both from the story of his life as given in the *Bhavishyōttara Purāna* and from the writings of his commentator Sivalinga-bhupati. From the *Bhavishyōttara*

*Purāna*, which gives the story of Haradatta who is considered an incarnation of God Siva, we learn that he ascended to Heaven in a *vimāna* when the Kaliyuga was past 4000 years *minus* 21, *i.e.*, 3979 years, which corresponds to 879 A.D.—in the year Vilambi, Pushya month, Panchami, first half of the lunar month, Thursday, on the banks of the Cauvery at Kamsagrāma. Though in the *Sivarahasya*, Kaliyuga 3000 is given as a rough approximation as the date of Haradatta, the former has been accepted by Professor M. Seshagiri Sastri as the more correct one.<sup>6</sup> He also identifies this Haradatta as the

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<sup>6</sup> It has been suggested by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri that as the date given in the *Bhaviṣhyōttara Purāna* is not exactly correct in as much as, if the details given are reliable, the day should fall in the dark half of the month and not the bright half of the month mentioned in it, we would have to take the cyclic year alone into consideration and identify it with 1119 A.D. in which year there was a Friday which was the fifth day of the bright half of the month of Pushya. Though it is usual to stress the cyclic year in cases of this nature, still the date given in *Bhaviṣhyōttara Purāna* correctly works out to Friday, 16th January 879, though the Friday falls in the dark half of the month of Pushya. This is a detail in which a mistake might have been made. As regards the story of the ordeal that Haradatta had to undergo to prove the superiority of Siva, it is a familiar embellishment intended to glorify his greatness and no more. Moreover, we are still to know the exact conditions prevailing in South India at the close of the 9th century A.D., when the Imperial Chōlas under Vijayālaya and Āditya I began their sway over Southern India. Finally, there is no reliable evidence tending to confirm that there was religious intolerance in or about the reigns of Vikrama-Chōla and Kulōttunga-Chōla II, in whose reign Rāmānuja appears to have lived. (See *Mysore Gazetteer*, 1930 Edn., II, ii, 1141-1143.) In these circumstances the shifting of the date of death of Haradatta from 879 A.D. to 1119 A.D., on the grounds mentioned by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, cannot prove acceptable. The doctrinal similarities he points to as existing between Haradatta and Śrīkantha, from which he draws the inference that either Haradatta came *after* Śrīkantha or at least was an younger contemporary of his, are capable of being as satisfactorily explained by supposing that Śrīkantha as often elaborated the arguments of Haradatta as he barely adopted them on other occasions or simply set down the points raised by his

author of the *Harihara-tāratamya*, and the *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha* and with the Haradattāchārya who is quoted in Mādhava's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha* in the chapter dealing with the Nakulīsa-Pāsupata system (see *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, No. 2, 13-17). He also sets out the story of the birth of one Sudarsana, son of Vāsudēva, a devout Vaishnava at Kamsapura (now Kanjānur) in the Tanjore district and how he became a Saiva through the will of Siva and assumed the name of Haradatta and how he converted his parents, the king and the people of his native town (*Ibid.*, 14-15). This Haradatta has been distinguished from two other Haradattas, also eminent authors: (1) Haradatta, the commentator on the *Āpastamba Sūtra*, whom Bühler has assigned to some time between 1300 and 1450 A.D.; and (2) Haradatta, the author of the *Padamanjari*, a commentary on the *Kāśikāvṛitti* of Jayāditya Vāmana, who wrote the *vṛitti* on the *Sūtras* of Pāṇini. The second of these was the son of Rudrakumāra and younger brother of Agnikumāra and was evidently a resident of the Telugu country (*Ibid.*, 13, 16 and 17). Haradatta, the Saiva teacher, who wrote the *Harihara-tāratamya* and the *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha*, and who is quoted in the *Sarvadarsana-sangraha* (see Cowell and Gough, *Sarvadarsana-sangraha*, 104) is undoubtedly the Haradattāchārya referred to by Śrīpati. Though he is referred to by Śrīpati, there is no mention made by him of Sivalinga-bhūpati, the commentator of *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha*. This would seem to show that Sivalinga-bhūpati wrote his commentary on Haradatta's work *after Śrīpati's time*.

In the colophon to his commentary, Sivalinga-bhūpati describes Haradattāchārya as *Sarvagnya Śirōmani*

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predecessor. It is, however, hardly necessary to elaborate on the danger of arguing on the basis of doctrinal similarities, for its inherent weakness is frankly admitted by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri when he concedes that "it goes, however, without saying, that it is extremely unsafe to rely on a conjecture based on information, which is itself at least partially incorrect" (*Sivādvaita of Srikantha*, Chap. I. 40-44 and Appendix II).

*Paramasiva Yōgi* (see Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS., X, p. 3854, No. 5077). The commentary is called in one colophon as *Sruti-sūkti-vilāsa* (*ibid.*) and in another as *Girīsa Sruti-sūkti-mālā* (*ibid.*, p. 3855, where the blank space left should be filled in, with the aid of Hultzsch's *Reports on Sānskrit MSS. in Southern India*, II, MS. No. 28, page 94, by the words गिरिस श्रुति सूक्तिमालायं). This commentary (*Girīsa Sruti-sūkti-mālā*) was composed by the Reddi prince Sivalinga-bhūpati. From the details given of his parentage, there can be little doubt that he belonged to a collateral branch of the Reddi dynasty, of which Kōmati-Prola or Pola, son of Vēmaya, was the founder. Sivalinga-bhūpati traces his descent from Kōmati; his fifth son Malla; latter's only son Pina-Kōmati; latter's third son Mācha; latter's first son Kōmati; his second son, himself (Sivalinga). (See Hultzsch's *Report on Sānskrit MSS. in Southern India*, I, page xii and 91-95.) This genealogy agrees with that which has been reconstructed with the aid of copper-plate and other records, except that in the latter, the collateral branch to which Sivalinga-bhūpati belonged is not set out (see *Nellore Inscriptions*, III, 1462; *M.E.R.* 1899-1900). This lacuna is filled in by the commentary above named. Sivalinga-bhūpati states that he ruled our Skandapuri, a town to the south-east of Srī-saila. (This town is now represented by the village of the same name at the foot of Srī-saila, where pilgrims halt for the night during the Kārtika *Jātra* time and proceed to mount up the Hill at dawn. The place is notoriously deficient in water.) He was a devotee of Sōmēsvara, the presiding god of Skandapuri. He was a liberal donor of gifts, having exhausted the gifts mentioned in Hēmadri's *Dānakhandā*. He was a great supporter of Bharata-mata, i.e., the arts of dancing and music. His *guru* Kondayōgi belonged to the Gangādhara *vamsa*, noted for its learning. Kondayōgi was the grandson of Tripurāntaka and son of *guru* Srīgiri, brother of Bhimēsasvāmi and Tripurāntaka Desikamuni. Kondaya was the *guru* of the country around Srī-saila. Through this *guru*'s grace,



Sivalingabhūpa says, he wrote his fine commentary called *Girīsa-sruti-sūkti-mālā* on the "great work" of Haradattasūri (*i.e.*, Haradattāchārya). From these details given us by Sivalinga himself, we can fix his date. His father Mācha was a brother of Srīsa Srīgiri, for whom we have the dates 1397-98 and 1400-1. Another brother of his was Rācha-Vēma, for whom we have the date 1397-98 (or 1398-99). For Srīsa Sivagiri's first son, Kōmati, we have the dates 1409, 1415 and 1430-31, while for his second son Mallaya or Srīgiri Malla, we have 1406-1407 and 1408-1409. Macha's son Sivalinga, a cousin of Kōmati and Srīgiri Malla, cannot have been far removed from them in date. We may, therefore, set him down from about 1408-09 A.D. to 1430-31, or about the first quarter of the 15th century. (See *Nellore Ins.*, III, App. I, Reddi Dynasty, 1462-64; *M.E.R.* 162 of 1899 and 543 of 1909; see also V. Venkayya, *History of Nellore*, 24.) From this it would seem to follow that he lived and wrote about 1430 A.D., from about a quarter to half a century later than Srīpati. That is, perhaps, the reason why we do not find mention of Sivalinga but only of Haradattāchārya in Srīpati's *Bhāshya*. Sivalinga quotes—without acknowledgment—from Srīkantha's *Bhāshya*, which accordingly should be presumed to have been known to him. Since Sivalinga came after Srīpati, Srīpati is the earliest author now known who quotes Srīkantha by name—barring, of course, the specific reference to Srīkantha in the *Panskara Bhāshya* attributed to Umāpati Sivāchārya, the author of *Samkalpa Nirākaranam*. It is, however, more than doubtful if this Umāpati was really the author of the *Panskara Bhāshya*. (See Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 24, f.n. 31; 32-33; and Note A to Chapter I.)

Sripati posterior to Revanarya, Author of  
'Siddhanta Sikhamani'.

Another authority quoted by Srīpati is Rēvanārya's *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, a work held in the highest esteem by Vīrasaiva teachers, ancient and modern. This is a

Sānskrit work available in print. Its popularity is betokened by its translation in the 17th century into Tamil by Turaimangalam Sivaprakāśaswāmi, of the Bommaiya-pālaiyam Periya-matham, near Pondicherry. (Ed. S. C. Nagichetti and published by Messrs. Gooroo Basava & Co., at the Kalāratnākaram Press, Madras.) Rēvanārya in his work says that the doctrines enunciated by him were first learnt from Rishi Agastya by Rēnuka, who made known to the world the Vīrasaiva-Samaya (*i.e.*, Siddhanta). According to him *Sivādvaita-Siddhānta*—evidently that is his philosophical standpoint—sets down the *ākāra* of Siva and bestows the *ānanda* of *Shatssthala*. In the introductory verses he states he bows down to Sānta Mallēsvara, who is the Lord Siva at Srī-saila, whom he describes as *Vēdāgama-Shatssthalārūpam*. As regards himself, he gives his name as Rēvanārya, son of Rēvanasiddha and grandson of Vīranārādhya. He claims to have been descended from the *kula* of Rēnuka himself. He thus sets down his descent:—Visvanātha, then Sarvēśa Dēsika, then Vīranārādhya, then Rēvanasiddha, and finally Rēvanārya, the author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*.

### Probable Date of Revanarya.

One Bhoga Mallēsa wrote a commentary on the *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, of which a copy is available in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 5119). He praises the *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* thus:—"It is pre-eminently the best among Saiva Sāstras and revels in the name of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* in this world; it incorporates the gist of all the (Saiva) Sāstras; it is the essence of all Saiva *tantras*; it brings to light Sivabōdha and gives a man a firm knowledge in Saiva Sāstra." As to the date of this work, there is no clue available in it. But as he says he belonged to the family of Rēnukāchārya, the great Vīrasaiva teacher, and was about five generations removed from him, the period of time that should have elapsed between him and the great teacher, may be set down as approximating about 100 years. Since

the original Rēnukāchārya (also called Rēvanasiddha) is said to have been a contemporary of Rajēndra-Chōla I, the great Chōla king (1013-1045 A.D.), whose daughter he is said to have married, he would have to be set down to *circa* 1000 A.D. Whether he married that great king's daughter or not, it might be allowed that tradition assigns Rēnuka to Rajēndra-Chōla's period of rule. If so, Rēvanārya, his descendant and author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, should have lived about *circa* 1200 A.D. But Rēvanārya, the author, is not *exactly* correct when he suggests that he was only five generations removed from Rēnuka, his ancestor, as we have independent evidence that he has omitted some steps in his account. As a matter of fact, we know from other sources, that Rēnuka had a son named Rudramuni, whose name is not mentioned by Rēvanārya. Making allowance for such omissions, we may take that Rēvanārya, the author, flourished approximately about 1250 A.D. This would allow him about 100 to 150 years to become a renowned authority to be quoted from by Srīpati with respect in his *Bhāshya*. (As to Rēnukāchārya, see Narasimhachar's *Karnataka-Kavi-charite*, I. 162; also *Rēvanasiddhēsvara Purāna*, *ibid.*, II. 139.)

Rēvanārya (or Rēvanārādhya), the author of *Siddhānta-Sikhāmani*, wrote four other works, each of which is a commentary on the work of his grandfather Sōsali-Vīranārādhya. These are:—(1) *Pancharatnavyākhyā* (or *Tantrasāraprakāsika*), which is a commentary on the *Tantrasārapancharatna* of Sōsali-Vīranārādhya; (2) *Tāarakapancharatnavyākhyā* (or *Tāarakapradīpika*), which is a commentary on the *Tāarakapancharatna* by the same author; (3) *Pancharatna-vyākhyā* (or *Sivatattvaparakāsika*), which is a commentary on the *Sivaratnapancharatna* by the same author; (4) *Pancharatnavyākhyā* (*Srutyārthapradīpika*), which is a commentary on the *Srutipancharatna* by the same author. This work is also called *Srutyārthaparakāsika*. In it, Rēvanārādhya mentions both his father's and grandfather's names, Rēvanasiddhēsvara and Sōsali-Vīranārādhya, which appear in the *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* as

Rēvanasiddha and Vīranārādhya, and his own name as Rēvanārya. This establishes the identity of the author of the above works with the author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* beyond all doubt. (MSS. of these works are in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. See Madras *D.C.* X, Nos. 5087-5090.)

Sivaprakāśaswāmigal of Turaimangalam, the Tamil translator of this work, is also the author of a Tamil rendering of the *Vēdāntaparichchēda*, which forms part of the *Vivēkachintāmani*, a work in Kannada by Nijaguna-sivayōgi. It explains the differentiations between the perceiver and the thing perceived, the nature of bliss arising from understanding the Mahāvākyas and the nature of the identity of the individual soul with Paramātmā as stated in the *Uttaramāmasa*. Sivaprakāśaswāmī's work is known as *Vēdāntachintāmani* (see Madras *D.C. Tamil*, III, No. 1604). Sivaprakāśaswāmī is held in the highest respect as a Saiva Siddhānta writer. His writings are not only inspiring to a degree, but also full of refined feeling. In the *Abidēkamālai*, a Vīrasaiva poem, we have his praise sung for us in a manner which shows the great hold he has on the Vīrasaivas of Southern India (see Madras *D.C. Tamil*, I, No. 333).

### Sripati's Native Country.

In view of the fact that Sripati is a confirmed Vīrasaiva teacher, the opinion may be hazarded that he belonged to the country which has long been inhabited in vast numbers by this community, *i.e.*, the country lying approximately between the Krishna and the Gōdāvari rivers. It is now clear from the authorities quoted above, that he hailed from the country round about what is now Bezwada, in the Guntur district, where some who claimed to be of his family flourished as religious teachers and poets. If this is so, it is not altogether unlikely that he was by birth a Telugu-speaking Ārādhya Brāhmana, belonging to the Krishna-Gōdāvari country, where the Ārādhya Brāhmanas are even now strong in numbers and from

where they have migrated to parts near and far. Śrīpati's descendants, from the latest information I have been able to collect, live at Kāladhari village, Tanuku taluk, West Gōdāvari district. One of these, Bhīmalīnga Ārādhyā by name, lives at Kāladhari village. Three or four other descendants of his found in this village claim to belong to the family of "Vijayavātika Śrīpati", which confirms the literary tradition above referred to which ascribes to him the surname "Vijayavātika".

### Śrīpati's Learning and Profundity.

Śrīpati was highly learned not only in the Vēdas and the Vēdānta but also in the *Itihāsas*, *Purānas* and *Āgamas*. As many ancient authorities are quoted by him, short descriptive accounts of the works quoted by him are given below. It should not, however, be understood that the list is in any sense, exhaustive.

#### (i) Vedas.

*Āpastamba Grihya Sūtram*.—The rites conducted with the domestic fire as dealt with by Āpastamba in the 27th Prasna of his *Kalpasūtra* (Madras D.C. II, Nos. 1180 to 1184).

There are commentaries on it :—

- (1) By Kapardasvāmin (*ibid.*, Nos. 1186 and 1187) called *Āpastamba Bhāshyam*.
- (2) By Sudarsanāchārya—called *Grihya Tātparya Darshanam* (*ibid.*, No. 1188).
- (3) By Kapardi—called *Kapardikārika* (Report II, No. 6). Kapardi is referred to by Rāmānuja.
- (4) By Haradattāchārya—called *Āpastambapāribhāshasasūtravyākhyā*.

The *Pāribhāshaprahasana* is a portion of the 24th Prasna of the *Āpastambakalpasūtra*. On it, Haradatta wrote his commentary (Madras D.C. II, No. 1075).

*Bōdhāyana Sūtra* (or *Bōdhāyana Dharmasūtra*).—This is devoted to the religious and social laws of Brāhmanism as taught by Bōdhāyana (Madras D.C. II, No. 1208).

There is a commentary on it called *Bōdhāyanavyākhyā* by Govindaswāmi.

*Jaimini Sūtra* (or *Jaimini Grihya Sūtram*).—The Brāhmins who follow this *sūtra* are not so numerous as the followers of the Drāhyāyana and other Grihya Sūtras belonging to the *Sāma Vēda*. It is divided into two *prasnas*—the first consisting of 25, and the second 9, *khandas*. Copies of this *sūtra* are rare. A copy of it was found by Prof. Seshagiri Sāstri at Trichinopoly and the Madras Oriental MSS. Library copy is a manuscript copy from this MS. (see Madras Report on MSS. I, page 2, No. 8; also see Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1168).

There is a metrical commentary on this *Sūtra* called *Jaimini Kārikā*, written by Bītāgnihotrin, a disciple of Venkatanātha Dīkshita, a native of Nāgārjunagrāma (see Madras Report on MSS. I, p. 3, No. 9 and Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1169).

Another commentary is by Sṛinivāsa. This is called *Jaiminiṣyākhyā* (see Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1170; also Report on MSS. II, p. 7).

*Vājasanēya*.—This is a part of the *Yajur-Vēda*, called *Vājasanēya Yajur-Vēda*, a Samhita complete in 40 *adhyāyas*.

*Satarudrīyam*.—*Rudrasārasangraha*, which investigates the meaning of the fifth Prasna of the fourth Kānda of the Black Yajurveda, has been commented upon by Nīlakanta, son of Govindasūri, in his *Rudrasārasangraha Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Rudramāmāmsa*. This work is, in its turn, based in *Satarudrīya* as acknowledged by the author himself in the beginning of his work. (See Madras *T. C. of Sanskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2070. For *Satarudramantrabhāṣya*, which describes itself as *Satarudra-upanishad*, see Deccan College Collections of MSS., I, p. 384, No. 541.)

*Rudrādhyāya* (or *Rudrādhyāmantra*).—This is the *Namaka* part of the *Namaka-Chamakam*. The first of these is the name given to the 5th Prasna of the IV Kānda of the *Taittiriya Samhita* and the second consists of the 20 Panchāsats in the beginning of the 7th

Prasna of the same Kānda. The two Prapāthakas are called the *Namaka* and *Chamaka* from the repetition of the words *Namas* in the first and *Cham* in the second (नमस् and चम्). The first is also called *Rudraprasna*, *Satarudrīya*, *Rudrādhyāya* or *Rudrōpanishad* (see Madras *D.C.* I, ii, Nos. 113 to 141).

Several MSS. of the *Rudraprasna*—which is the most popular name for the *Namaka* part—give the *Nyāsas* with it. It is a highly popular part of the *Taittirīya Samhita* and has had many commentaries on it, in Sānskrit, Telugu and Kannada. Among the Sānskrit commentaries are those of Sāyana (or Vidyātīrtha) and Bhattabhāskara, of which a free Telugu rendering is known (Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 123). A Kannada translation of Bhattabhāskara by Gurunanja is also known (Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 116).

Bhattabhāskara's commentary is called *Jñānayagna* (*ibid.*, No. 134). A Sānskrit abridgment of Bhattabhāskara's commentary is also well known (*ibid.*, No. 136). While Sāyana's commentary is famous, Bhattabhāskara's is highly popular. A commentary (*Rudrabhāshyam*) attributed to Vidyāranya is also known but it has been found that it does not agree with Sāyana's commentary on the portion of the *Krishna Yajurveda* as found in its IV Kānda. Moreover, it does not begin with the Mangalasloka found in all the Vēdic commentaries of Sāyana (*ibid.*, No. 140). As an abridgment of this work is found attributed to Vidyātīrtha (*ibid.*, No. 141), it has been suggested that this may be the commentary by Vidyātīrtha, who is said to have been a *guru* of Vidyāranya (*ibid.*, No. 140).

Two commentaries on the 5th Prasna of the IV Kānda of the *Taittirīya Samhita* of the *Yajurveda* written from the Purānic and the later Vedāntic points of view are worthy of note. One of these is *Namakārtha Prākasa Sangraha* by Abhinava Nrisimhāsrama (Madras *T.C.* III, i, A, No. 2163). Another is *Rudrasārasangrahaṇyākhyā: Rudramīmāṃsa* by Nīlakantha, who interprets the hymns in reference to the Kāsikāstōtra and the manifestation of God Siva therein.

*Rudrayāmala*.—It is also known as *Bhairavayāmala*. It consists of several parts and embodies a *Samvāda* between Umā and Mahēsvara. Amongst its various parts are :—

(1) *Ganapatisahasranāmastōtram*, which gives the significant names of Ganapati, beginning with the letter ण; its colophon states that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, No. 2546.)

(2) *Bālātripurasundarīkavacham* or *Bālākavacham*, which is a *mantra* addressed to the Goddess Tripurasundari conceived as a young girl. It is believed to be efficacious in securing protection. The colophon to this work says that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIII, No. 6376; also Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (c).]

(3) *Bālamālamantrah*.—This *mantra* is intended to propitiate the Goddess Dēvi conceived as Bāla. The colophon acknowledges that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (d).]

(4) *Bālāstavarājah*.—A eulogy on the Goddess Bāla, who is a manifestation of Sakti, sometimes called also as *Tryaksharastōtra*. The colophon in it acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (c); see also Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, Nos. 10792-10805.)

(5) *Bālātripurasundarīpatalam*.—*Bālātripurasundari* is only a manifestation of Pārvati, to whom this Patala is devoted. It is in praise of her greatness. Its colophon acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (f).]

(6) *Bālātripurasundaryastōttara Satanāmastōtram*.—The 1000 names of *Bālātripurasundari*. In its colophon it acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. (See *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XVII, No. 9157.)

There is also a work of the name of *Rudrayāmalōttara-satakam*, with a commentary called *Kuladīpikā* on it. It is a work of six *Patalas*. (See Madras *D.C.* XII, Nos. 4365, 4367, 4434 and 4435; and 4435-37.)



*Laghusūtravṛiththi*.—This is a work I have been unable to trace. Whether it is the same as the *Laghuvṛiththih* is not certain. The latter is a commentary on *Uchchōdarki*, a work on the determination of the two accents, *Uddāta* and *Prachaya*, they having to be indicated by the fingers of the reciter, each in a peculiar way, when a Svarita accent is followed by an Uddāta or Prachaya. [See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, II, No. 878; also Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2591 (*k*).]

## (ii) Upanishads.

Srīpati was conversant with the ten principal Upanishads, *Dasōpanishad*. Among those quoted by him are the following which come under the 108 or 98 *Upanishads*, sometimes called the *Akshamālīka Upanishads*, after *Aksha*, a bead, and *mālīka*, a rosary, meaning a rosary of beads. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, 246 and 247.)

*Atharvasīra Upanishad*.—This treats of the attributes pertaining to Siva who is taught in it as the Supreme Being. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 257 to 263. Compare with this *Atharvasikhōpanishad*, which also treats of the superiority of Siva and the sanctity of the syllable *Ōm*. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 250 to 256.)

*Nārāyanatapinyupānishad*.—This Upanishad explains how the eight-syllabled *mantra* “*Om Namō Nārāyanāya*” represents Siva and the ten *avatars* of Vishnu. It enumerates a number of mystic formulæ connected with this *mantra* and describes the *yantra* or magic figure to be used in the worship that is conducted with the aid of this *mantra*. Lastly, it describes the high value of the *mantra* and the greatness of God conceived as Nārāyana.

*Aitarēyōpanishad*.—One of the *dasōpanishads* and forms part of the *Āranyaka* of the *Rig-Veda* and consists of Adhyāyas 4 to 7 of the second Prasna. Some copies contain the whole of the second Prasna of the *Āranyaka*. The 2nd and 3rd Prasnas of the Aitarēya-*Āranyaka* are known by the general name of Upanishad, sometimes as *Bahvirchōpanishad* or *Mahaitarēyōpanishad*, while Adhyāyas

4 to 7 of the second Prasna are more particularly called the *Aitarēyōpanishad*. Hence some copies give—as above remarked—the whole of the second Prasna as the *Aitarēyōpanishad*; and it is for this reason obviously that the commentary on this Upanishad by Sankarāchārya deals with the whole of the second Prasna. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 323-325; Nos. 325 and 331.) It teaches that Ātman is the cause of the manifested universe, that the knowledge of Ātman which leads to salvation is the result of renunciation, and that the nature of Ātman is consciousness though variously thought of. Sankara has a commentary on this Upanishad called *Aitarēyōpanishadbhāshyam*. It is according to Advaita Vēdānta. There is a gloss on it called *Aitarēyōpanishadbhāshyasya-tiṣṭanam* by Jñānāmrita-Yati. In some MS. copies, this gloss forms part of Sāyana's *Vēdārthaprakāśa*, dedicated to his brother Mādhava. The current idea that Sāyana took much help from others in composing his Vēdic commentaries is clearly borne out by the inclusion of this gloss in his *Vēdārthaprakāśa*. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 332.) Another commentary on this Upanishad, called *Aitarēyōpanishadbhāshyam*, is by Ānandatīrtha from the Dvaita standpoint.

*Bṛihadāraṇyakōpanishad*.—This Upanishad consists of 6 Adhyāyas from the 3rd to the 8th Adhyāya of the Āraṇyaka of the *Sukla-Yajurvēda*. After treating of *Avidya* in the opening chapter, it gives in the next three, a lengthy discourse between Janaka Videha and Yāgna-alkya regarding the true nature of the Supreme Being and of His relation to the universe. The 5th and 6th chapters deal with a number of Upasanas or modes of meditation and worship as leading to the salvation or Moksha, or to the attainment of the higher wisdom, which delivers one from the bondage of Karma and reincarnation. Among the commentaries on it are the following :—

(a) *Bṛihadāraṇyakōpanishad Bhāshya*.—Commentary by Sankarāchārya. A gloss on Sankara's commentary, *Bṛihadāraṇyakōpanishadbhāshya-Tīka*, is by Ānandajñāna, pupil of Suddhānanda. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 645.)

(b) Another commentary on this Upanishad is by Nityānandāsrama, pupil of Purushottamāsrama. This is known by the name of *Mitākshara* (not to be confounded with the legal work of the same name).

(c) There is a metrical commentary on this Upanishad by Ānandatīrtha.

*Brihajjābālōpanishad*.—This Upanishad consists of 8 Brāhmanas and explains the origin of the sacred ashes of Saivism known as Bhasma or Vibhūti, its preparation, the deities presiding over it, the various ways in which it is to be used and the virtue or merit attached to its use, illustrating it all with a story. It also gives the legendary origin of Rudrāksha and describes the merit that would accrue to the wearer of a string of Rudrāksha beads. (Madras D.C. I, iii, Nos. 629-632.)

This comes under miscellaneous Upanishads. It may be added that the *Jābālupanishad* and *Rudrāksha Jābālōpanishad* belong to the *Sāma-Vēda* Upanishads; the *Jābālōpanishad* to the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda* group of Upanishads; and the *Vṛiddhajābālōpanishad* to the group of Upanishads classed under the head "Miscellaneous". (See *Tanjore Catalogue*, II, Contents ii-iv.)

*Chchāndōgyōpanishad*.—This Upanishad first explains the two different results accruing from the practice of Karma, according as it is or is not associated with the knowledge of certain Vidyas, and then proceeds to set out the nature of the highest knowledge to be attained and examines the different means of securing it. Sankara has a commentary, *Chchāndōgyōpanishadbhāshyam*, on it from the Advaita standpoint. A gloss on it, from the Visishtādvaita portion, is by Rangarāmānuja. Ānandatīrtha has a metrical commentary on it from the Dvaita standpoint.

*Hamsōpanishad*.—This Upanishad teaches that the Supreme Being is to be identified with Hamsa and is to be conceived as immanent in the human body. He has to be meditated upon and worshipped by the *Hamsa-mantra*. (Madras D.C. I, iii, Nos. 841 to 850.)

*Mantrōpanishad*.—One outside the 108 mentioned in *Muktikōpanishad*. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, 710; but see No. 285, where the Upanishad is mentioned as occurring with the *Ātmaprabōdhōpanishad*.)

*Īsāvāsyōpanishad*.—This Upanishad teaches the omni-penetrativeness and other qualities and characteristics of the Supreme Being and the insufficiency of either works (*Karma*) or knowledge (*Gnāna*) alone to lead to bliss.

Among the commentaries on this Upanishad are the following :—

(a) By Sankara called *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshyam*, a gloss on which is *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshya-tippanam* by Sivānandayati. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 312.)

(b) Another by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandātma. (*Ibid.*, No. 316.)

(c) A third one called *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshyam* by Ānandatīrtha. This is in *metrical form* and is according to the Dvaita School of Vēdānta taught by him.

(d) A fourth one by Vēdāntadēsika, called *Īsāvāsyōpanishad-bhāshyam*, according to the Visishtādvaita School.

*Jābālōpanishad*.—This Upanishad deals with a particular kind of *yōgic* meditation in which the aspirant is asked to concentrate his vision on the junction-point of the nose and the eyebrows and to repeat the Satarudrīya prayer; it further deals with the Sanyāsa *āsrāma* or the religious life of asceticism and describes the Sanyāsin who deserves to be called *Paramahansa*.

[In the Kshūrikōpanishad, which is not referred to by Srīpati, the practice of *Yōga* is explained at some length and then it is declared that *Yōga* is capable of cutting like a razor the endless cord of Samsāra. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 418 to 421.)]

The *Jābālōpanishad* above mentioned should be differentiated from the *Jābālyuṇpanishad*, which explains the terms *Pasu* and *Pati* as used by the Pāsupatas. It teaches that the smearing of the *Vibhūti* is capable of leading to the acquisition of the knowledge which is essential for attaining salvation. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 476.)

Then, again, the Upanishad called *Tārasārōpanishad* agrees in its first *khanda* with that of *Jābālōpanishad*, though the two differ from the second *khanda*. The *Tārasārōpanishad* teaches that the Nārāyanāstaka mantra is a mystic prayer-formula possessing the power of leading human souls to salvation, when men use it in the practice of yōgic meditation. (Madras D.C. I, iii, Nos. 478-479.)

*Kaivalyōpanishad*.—This Upanishad teaches that salvation is to be attained only by realizing that Siva or Nīlakantha of innumerable attributes and powers is identical with the attributeless Self. (Madras D.C. I, iii, Nos. 395-410.) There is a commentary on it, according to the Advaita system, by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandāsrama. It is called *Kaivalyōpanishad Dīpika*. (Madras D.C. I, iii, Nos. 411-413.)

*Kathavallyupanishad*.—Mrityu (the God of Death) teaches to Nāchikētas the fruitlessness of worldly pleasures, the greatness of eternal freedom and the immortal and blissful nature of Ātman. Sankara has a commentary on it called *Kathavallyupanishadbhāshya*. A gloss on it called *Kathavallyupanishadbhāshyasya-tippanam* by Sivānanda, who mentions his name in the colophon to his gloss. Ānandatīrtha has a metrical commentary on it.

*Kauṣītakyupanishad*.—In this Upanishad, the Saguna and Nirguna forms of worship and the nature of the Supreme Being are described and explained.

*Māndūkyōpanishad*.—This Upanishad describes the meaning and the power of *Pranava* as a means of knowing the nature and the reality of the Self. Some copies of this Upanishad contain a number of *ślōkas* by Gaudapāda in interpretation of it. Some think that these *ślōkas* form part of the Upanishad itself. These latter are divided into 4 *prahasana*s and expound the Advaita School of the Vēdānta and are intended to meet certain objections that may be raised against that school. (Madras D.C. I, iii, No. 694.)

Sankara's commentary on it is called *Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyam*. A gloss on it by Ānandatman is called

*Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyasya-tiṣṭhanam.* Sankarānanda's commentary is called *Māndūkyōpanishad Dīpikā*. Ānandatīrtha's commentary is called *Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyam*.

*Mundakōpanishad.*—This Upanishad first premises that wisdom acquired by the study of the Vēdas and the Sāstras is lower and that the other wisdom which results from the knowledge of the Immortal One is higher, and that Karma associated with wisdom leads to the salvation of Mōksha. Then it treats of the characteristics of the Supreme Being as well as of the nature and the origin of the Universe. It enjoins renunciation and asceticism and Yōgic meditation as the means of attaining the higher wisdom and almost discards the Vēdic religion of rituals.

Sankara has a commentary called *Mundakōpanishadbhāshya* on it. On it is the gloss called *Mundakōpanishadbhāshyasya-tiṣṭhanam*. Ānandatīrtha's commentary is also known as *Mundakōpanishadbhāshyam*.

*Nārāyaṇōpanishad.*—This Upanishad teaches that the Universe proceeds from and returns unto Nārāyaṇa, that he is the universe and that the eight-syllabled *Mantra*—*Om Namō Nārāyaṇāya*—is the means of worshipping Him and thus winning salvation.

*Svētāsvatarōpanishad.*—This Upanishad explains the characteristics of the Supreme Being and the individual soul, and teaches meditation and worship by means of the Pranava, the Supreme Person being identified with Rudra as the bestower of salvation.

A commentary on it, called the *Svētāsvatarōpanishad Dīpikā*, is by Vijnānōttama, pupil of Jnānōttama. It is from the Advaita standpoint. (Madras D.C. I, iii, No. 810.)

*Taittirīyōpanishad.*—This Upanishad, after describing the importance of the Pranava and mentioning certain rules of conduct, explains the nature of the Supreme Being and of the worship and meditation which lead to the salvation of Mōksha.

A commentary on this Upanishad is by Sankarāchārya called *Taittirīyōpanishad Bhāshyam*. A gloss on Sankara's commentary is by Achyuta Krishnānanda Tīrtha, pupil of

Svayamprakāsa Sarasvati. (*Ibid.*, No. 509.) It is called *Taittirīyōpanishad Vyākhyā Navamāla*. (*Ibid.*)

An unknown author has another commentary on it. (Madras *D.C.* II, iii, No. 508.) It is called *Taittirīyōpanishad Vyākhyā*.

Another gloss of this Upanishad is the *Taittirīyōpanishad Dīpika* by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandātma. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 511.)

Another commentary is by Sāyanāchārya and is part of his commentary on the *Krishna Yajurvedaka*.

Another commentary on this Upanishad is by Rangarāmānuja Muni according to the Visistādvaita system of Vēdānta. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 513.)

There is a metrical commentary on this Upanishad by Ānandatīrtha.

### (iii) Puranas and Itihasas.

*Harivamsa*.—A supplement to the *Mahābhārata* and deals with the story of Krishna and his descendants. (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 1968 to 1973.)

*Sivagīta*.—A work in 16 Adhyāyas. Said to be a portion of the *Padma Purāna*. (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* III, i, A, No. 2114; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, No. 2546.) Aufrecht, in his *Cat. Bodl.*, No. 61, gives the contents of the chapters of this work. This work is intended to establish the superiority of Siva, as God. In the Madras Oriental MSS. Library there are five copies of this work. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, Nos. 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549 and 2550.) There is a commentary on it, called *Sivagīta-tātparya Prakāsika*, in 16 Adhyāyas by Paramasivēndra Sarasvati, who describes himself as the disciple of Abhinavanārāyanēndra Sarasvati. There are three copies of this in the Library above named.

It is stated in the *Sivagīta* that its greatest secrets were narrated by Siva to Rāma in the forest of Dandakāranya, the same being again narrated by Skanda to Sanatkumāra. In the colophon to this work it is described as an Upanishad occurring in the *Padma Purāna*.

*Siva Purāna*.—This is a work in 75 Adhyāyas in the Pūrva Bhāga. (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2476; *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, Nos. 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363 and 2364.) It is a Purāna treating of the greatness of Siva and the manner of His worship. It also gives many details about Saivism. A list of contents of this Purāna is given by Aufrecht in the *Cat. Bodl.*, No. 113.

*Vāyavīya Samhita*.—It is a part of the *Siva Purāna* which consists of many different parts—*Dharmasamhita*, *Vāyavīya Samhita*, etc. It is described in 2 parts of 30 Adhyāyas in the *India Office Library Cat.*, I, p. 1314; also see Madras *D.C.* IV, ii, No. 2364.

A *Vāyavīya Purāna* is also known. (See Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 140, at p. 184.) It is cited by Sāyana in the commentary (attributed to him) on the *Rudraprasna*. (*Ibid.*, No. 140, p. 182.)

*Brahmāndapurānam*.—This *Purāna* contains:—

1. *Arthapanchakavivarana*, which in 30 Adhyāyas treats of the five essentials of religion—*svasvarūpa*, *para-svarūpa*, *upāyasvarūpa*, *pūlasvarūpa* and *virōdhisvarūpa*.

2. *Kshētramāhātmyakhanda* (1 to 12 Adhyāyas)—

(a) *Srīrangamāhātmya*; (b) *Venkatagirimāhātmya*, etc.

3. *Adhyātma Rāmāyanam*.—Treats of the story of Rāma as an incarnation of God in 7 Kāndas. There is a commentary on this work by Rāmavarman, king of Srīngiberapura, son of Himmativarman and pupil and patron of Nāgēsabhatta. The commentary is called *Adhyātmarāmāyanasētu* (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, No. 2159). This part of the Purāna is highly popular with religiously inclined people in Southern India.

Many MSS. of this work are known (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2145 to 2149).

*Vishnudharmōttaram*.—A portion of the *Gārudapurāna*, intended to establish the supremacy of Vishnu above all other gods and to teach how Vaishnava worship is to be conducted. (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2111—2118.)

*Parāsarapurāna*.—A work complete in 18 Adhyāyas, said to contain 1008 stanzas. An *upapurāna* attributed



to Parāsara. A list of its contents will be found in the *India Office Library Cat.*, page 1230. (Madras D.C. IV, ii, No. 2348.)

*Linga Purāna*.—A Mahāpurāna of 159 Adhyāyas treating mainly of the Linga and the various forms of Siva. It also gives a few genealogical events from Priyamvrata to Krishna. It also narrates the stories of the destruction of Tripura and other demons by Siva, besides instruction for the performance of the different ceremonies in honour of Siva. Aufrecht gives a list of contents of this work in the *Bodleian Library Catalogue*, No. 101. There are three MSS. of this work in the Madras Oriental Library. (Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS. IV, i, Nos. 2257 to 2259.) This Purāna is said to be narrated to Nārada and the Rishis in the Naimisha forest by Sūta, who heard it from Vyāsa.

*Kāmigāmah*.—This voluminous work of over 136 Patalas deals with the worship of Siva and the performance of the various religious festivals in Saiva temples. (Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS., XI, page 4227, Nos. 5431 to 5432.) Though it is described as a *Māhātmya*, it also deals with the construction of temples, making of images, etc. It has a bearing on sculpture which cannot be over-estimated.

*Skāndapurāna*.—This Purāna is the storehouse of all the stories connected with Siva and his greatness. It contains many sections, each a separate work in itself :—

Nāgarakhanda; Umāsamhita; Bhīmakhanda; Sankara-samhita; Sētumāhātmyam; Isānasamhita; Brahmōttarakhanda; Kālikakhanda; Kāsikhanda; Jambūdvīpodbhava; Dharmakhanda; Sūtasamhita; Saurasamhita; etc. Each of these is again sub-divided into a number of parts, with further sub-divisions among each of them. Thus, the *Nāgarakhanda* has 13 Adhyāyas and deals mainly with the artisan descendants of Visvakarman, viz., goldsmiths, carpenters, etc. This is described in detail in the *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1347. The *Hātakēśvaramāhātmya* is included in it. (See *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1348; also Madras D.C. of

*Sānskrit MSS.* IV, No. 2302.) The *Umāsamhita* treats of the story of the *Rāmāyana*. The *Bhīmakhanda* deals with the object of pilgrimages and the many benefits to be derived from them. (See *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1357; *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, Nos. 2310-2311.) The *Sankarasamhita* treats of Vīramahēsvara-prasamsa, Sivabhaktadhyānapūja and Laukikāchārya. (See *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, Nos. 2287 and 2313.) A *Khanda* of *Sankarasamhita* is *Sivarahasyakhanda*, which, in its turn, has included in it the Upadēsakānda in 85 Adhyāyas treating of Kailāsa and its Lord (*ibid.*, No. 2314); the Sāmbhavamāhātmya, the Asurakānda, the Vīramahēndrakānda, the Yuddhakānda, the Dēvakānda and the Dakshakānda (*ibid.*, Nos. 2314 to 2318); also the Mōkshakānda, which sets out the incarnations of Vishnu and treats of rules of conduct and of the means of salvation. (*Ibid.*, No. 2312.)

The *Sanatkumārasamhita* which includes the Sivatatvasudhānidhi, Jīvanmuktaprakaraṇa, Vidēhamuktaprakaraṇa, and the Mahāvākyaprakaraṇa. (See *ibid.*, No. 2287.) The *Srīsailakhanda* is also a part of it. It treats of the sacredness of Srīsaila and the places connected with it. (*Madras D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2319-2320.) The *Tungabhadra-khanda* forms part of this Samhita. It treats of the greatness and holiness of the Tungabhadra and of the holy places and tanks near it. (*Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, No. 2298.)

The *Sētumāhātmya* treats of the sacredness and greatness of Sētu. (*Ibid.*, No. 2287.)

The *Īśānasamhita* treats of Sivarātriprādurbhāva-tadvratapūjāvidhāna, Sukumāraganēsvarapradāna and Sivarātrimāhātmya. (*Ibid.*, No. 2288.)

The *Brahmōttarakhanda* treats of the greatness of Siva and of the value of devotion to him. (*Ibid.*, Nos. 2303, 2309; also Aufrecht, *Bodleian Catalogue*, Nos. 127 and 128.)

The *Kālikākhanda* treats of the greatness of Siva, and of the wearing of the Rudrāksha beads and sacred ashes.

It criticizes the practice of branding the body with the marks of conch and wheel, the emblems of Vishnu, and the wearing of the Urdhvapundra. It also narrates various stories to prove the superiority of Siva to Vishnu. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, 2290.)

The *Kāśīkhanda*, which is in 100 sections, treats fully of the greatness and sanctity of Kāśī and the places connected with it. (See Aufrecht, *Bod. Cat.*, No. 120; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, No. 2291.) A commentary called *Padyōjana* has been written on it. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2294-2296.)

*Jambudvīpōdbhava* has included in it the following:—  
Sahyāmalakagrāmamāhātmya; Kēralakhandavarṇana; Dakshinakāṇḍa; Kēraladvīpavarṇana; Nilanadvīpavarṇana; Hēmādrīkhanda; Mukṭāpurīvarṇana; Hēmēsvarīmāhātmya; Bhaviśhyadvamsāvalīvarṇana; Madhyāranyamāhātmya; Vatēsvarakṣhētramāhātmya; Śrīmukhakṣhētramāhātmya; Bhaviśhyatkathānuvarṇana. (*Ibid.*, No. 2297.)

In the *Dharmakhandā*, the story of the early life of Vālmiki is given and occasion is taken to inculcate certain moral and religious *dharma*s based on it. The greatness of *Rāmāyana* is also set out in it at some length. (See *ibid.*, No. 2299.)

The *Sūtasamhita* is in four Khandas and is separately dealt with below. The same remark applies to the *Saurasamhita*.

*Sūtasamhita*.—This is a work in four Khandas, namely, Sivamāhātmyakhanda, Jñānayōgakhanda, Mukṭikhanda and Yagnavalkyakhanda, in the last of which the Uparī Bhāga containing Brahmagītā and the Sūtagītā occur. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326 and 2327.)

A detailed description of this work will be found in the *India Office Library Catalogue*, pages 1377-1380. Briefly put, it is a collection of Saiva doctrines and legendary illustrations, especially according to the Yōga practices collected from and forming part of the Skāṇḍa Purāṇa. Later treatises on Saiva ritualism and philosophy are

avowedly based on what is contained in the *Sūtasamhita* (see, for example, *Kriyākramōdyōtānikā*, which deals with the rites to be performed in Siva temples and *Sivakalpadrumah*, which treats of Saiva philosophy, both of which quote the *Sūtasamhita*, see Madras T.C. IV, i, B, pp. 4919 and 4988, Nos. 3304 and 3348). There is a well-known commentary on this work which is called *Sūtasamhita-vyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Tālparya Dīpika*. This commentary is, according to the work itself, by Mādhavāchārya, who is spoken of in it as the pupil of Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti. (See Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS., IV, i, Nos. 2328-2331.) This work has been published in the Ānandāśrama Sānskrit Series.

Mādhava mentioned as the author of this *Vyākhyā* has undoubtedly to be identified with Chāunda Mādhava, the general and minister of Bukka I, the Vijayanagar king, who is mentioned in a lithic inscription, dated in 1368 A.D. (*E.C.* VII, Shikarpur 281). According to this record, this Mādhava called, for the sake of differentiating him from others of the same name, Chāunda Mādhava, was known for his ascetic virtues and belonged to the Āngirasa-gōtra. He has to be distinguished from Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya, of the Srīngēri Matha, who was a contemporary of his and who belonged to the Bhāradvāja-gōtra. Chāunda Mādhava was a *Saiva*, whereas Mādhava, the son of Māyana and brother of Sāyana, was an Advaitin of Sankara's School. Of Chāunda Mādhava, the inscription above quoted states that he was an astonishing expert in policy, as great as Brihaspati in wisdom and a learned man engaged in composing poetry which gave great pleasure to the minds of all. Through the grace of his teacher Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti, he attained, we are told, great celebrity as a *Saiva*. He is also described as the conqueror of many countries on the shores of the Western Ocean. This statement is confirmed by the Goa plates and other records and is therefore no empty boast. Kriyāsakti is described in this inscription as "the manifest incarnation of Siva".

It was at his instance, we are told, that Mādhava, his disciple, made the grant of the three villages, mentioned in it to Kashmir Brāhmins, who were "travellers to the farthest points of the *Chārāyanāya-aticharanāmnāya*, daily observers of all the rites appointed in the pure *Sivāmnāya*, ever devoted to the worship of the Ashtamurti" (*i.e.*, the Vidyēsvaras, who were the objects of adoration in his vow). A few points worthy of note in connection with this grant are:—(1) that the three villages gifted were re-grouped into one and called Vidyēsvarapura and made over with the consent of King Bukka-Rāya I; (2) the gift was made in order to fulfil the great Saiva vow, which Mādhava had commenced with special rites a year before as directed in the *Sivāmnāya*; (3) the gift was made by Mādhava after obtaining due permission for so doing, from his sovereign by petition, saying, "From the funds of my own property, I will carry out your order; give me leave"; (4) that after obtaining Bukka's permission for the gift, Mādhava purchased the three villages situated in his own *Mandala* (*i.e.*, the province over which he himself governed as Viceroy)—"purchasing," we are told, at the price of the day, with the knowledge of the authorities of the *Mandala*, which speaks eloquently to his high character, he not taking any advantage of his position as Viceroy in a transaction so personal to himself; (5) the gift was made in the month of Kārtika, the day being Monday, both being sacred to Siva; and (6) the grant was undertaken on the advice of the Sivaguru Kāsivilāsa Krīyāsakti. "In order to have an oversight of that kingdom (*i.e.*, the Āraga province of Vijayanagar, which extended as far as the shores of the Western Ocean with which Mādhava was entrusted by Bukka), without trouble, before making the gift, Mādhava", we are told, "worshipped in the manner of the *Sivāmnāya*, the god of gods embodied in his own favourite *Linga*, Tryambakanātha, by means of daily special ceremonies, and by a number of rites and practices." (See *E.C. Shimoga VII*, Shikarpur 281.) There can be scarcely any doubt that Chāunda Mādhava, the author of the *Tātparya-Dīpika*, was as great as a

warrior and administrator as a poet and philosopher. Nor is there any room for suspicion that the Mādhava of Shikarpur 281 is the same as the Mādhava described as the author of the *Tātparyā-Dīpikā*. While the *Sūtasamhita* is mentioned by Srīpati, he does not mention Chāunda Mādhava's commentary on it. This may be taken as evidence of the fact that he was a contemporary of this Mādhava, both having probably lived, as above indicated, about the third quarter of the 14th century. (We know from the inscription quoted above that Chāunda Mādhava lived about 1368 A.D. and that Srīpati's grandson mentioned in the Srīsailam record had probably just died in 1405 A.D., for the gift of the beam therein referred to was made for his merit."<sup>7</sup>)

*Sankarasamhita*.—A part of *Skānda Purāna* of which a part (Adhyāyas 180 to 183) treating of Vīramahēsvara-prasamsana, Sivabhaktadhyānapūja and Laukikāchāra is available in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library. (*D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, No. 2313.)

*Saurasamhita*.—A portion of the *Skānda Purāna*, treating mainly of Siva as the Supreme Being, his nature

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<sup>7</sup> In his *Sūtasamhita Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Tātparyā-Dīpikā*, Mādhava styles himself *paramabhakta* of Kāśivilāsa Kriyāsakti, and *Srīmat tryambaka pādābja sēvā parayanēna* (one who is devoted to doing service at the lotus feet of the sacred Tryambaka). The inscription referred to in the text describes not only as the disciple of Kāśivilāsa Kriyāsakti but also as deeply devoted to Tryambakanātha i.e., Siva. In the beginning of his *Vyākhyā*, Mādhava describes himself as the worshipper of *Kāśivilāśākhyā Kriyāsaktīsa*, i.e., Kāśivilāsa Kriyāsakti who was the manifestation of Siva himself; and further as *Srīmattryambaka pādābja Sēvā-nishnāta Tējasa Vēdasāstra pratishtātra Srīman Mādhava Mantrina*. (See Madras *D.C. Sanskrit MSS.*, IV, i. p. 1588, No. 2323.) In the colophon to the first Adhyāya, he also speaks of himself as *Upanishanmarga pravartakēna Srī Mādhavācharya*, etc. (*Ibid.*) In this MS. there is an interpolation which states that there is a *Sūtasamhita Vyākhyā* called *Advaita-Dīpikā* by Vidyāranya (*Ibid.*, pp. 1589-1590). There is an evident mixing up of Mādhava, the Saiva, and Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya. (See for further information, *Mysore Gazetteer*, (1930 Edition), II, iii, 1431-1446).

and attributes. It is of 16 Adhyāyas described at length in the *India Office Library Catalogue* (p. 1382). (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2332 and 2333.)

*Sivadharmah.*—This is a work descriptive of the details connected with the worship of Siva. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5507 and 5508; see also Vol. IV, No. 2325, for description of a MS. of this work under *Sūtasamhita*.)

*Vātūla.*—This is evidently a shortened form for *Vātūla-tantram*, a Saivāgama work which is made up of the following ten *Patalas* :—

1. तत्त्व भेद पटल	Tatva bhēda patala
2. वर्ण भेद पटल	Varna bhēda patala
3. चक्र भेद पटल	Chakra bhēda patala
4. वर्ग भेद पटल	Varga bhēda patala
5. तन्त्र भेद पटल	Tantra bhēda patala
6. प्रणव भेद पटल	Pranava bhēda patala
7. ब्रह्माऽभेद पटल	Brahmā-bhēda patala
8. अङ्ग भेद पटल	Anga bhēda patala
9. मन्त्र जात पटल	Mantra jāta patala
10. मन्त्र कील पटल	Mantra kīla patala

(See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5477 to 5480.)

There is a Kannada *Tīka* (commentary) on this work. (See *ibid.*, No. 5480.)

The *Anubhavasūtram*, a work of eight Adhikaranas, is a part of this exhaustive Āgama treatise. This part is devoted to the topic of the realization of Siva as the Supreme Being in self-realization. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, 5074.) A part of it is *Sarabha Sāluva Mantrakalpa*, which treats of the repetition of the *mantra* addressed to Sarabha Sāluva Pakshirāja. (Madras *D.C.*, of *Sānskrit MSS.*, XV, Nos. 8096-8098.) A rendering in Tamil of the 7th Patala of this work by Ārumugaswāmi, a Brāhman writer of Tirukkoilūr, is known. (Madras *D.C. of Tamil MSS.*, III, No. 1418.)

*Vīrāgamaha.*—This is a work in two parts, *Pūrva-bhāga* and *Uttarabhāga*. (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, X, No. 5118.) This work should be distinguished from

*Vīrasaivāgamah*, a treatise on the religion of Vīrasaivas, in 12 Patalas. (See *ibid.*, Nos. 5497-5501.) The *Vīrāgamah*, however, is usually found in MSS. with *Vīrasaivāgamah*. (See *ibid.*, Nos. 5499 and 5500 under description of those MSS.) There are at least four incomplete copies of the *Vīrāgamah* in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library, no complete work having been so far found. (See *ibid.*, Nos. 5502-5505.) According to one copy—the longest available (No. 5504)—it should be taken to be a fairly long treatise, extending as it does to 40 Patalas. The *Uttarabhāga*, known also as *Nirālamba Yōga*, is the part generally available.

*Yāgnavalkya Sūtra*.—To be distinguished from *Yāgnavalkya Smṛithi*, the well-known treatise on Hindu law. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* V, No. 2702; also *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2676.)

*Sāṅkhya Sāstra*.—This is a reference to the Sāṅkhya system in general and not to any particular work bearing on it. It should be distinguished from the *Sāṅkhya Chandrikā*, a short treatise on the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy by Nārāyana Pandita. (Wilson, *Descriptive Catalogue of Mackenzie Collection of MSS.*, page 176, No. 1.)

*Sāṅdilya Smṛithi*.—A work of five chapters of the Āchāra portion of the code of which the sage Sāṅdilya is the reputed author. (See Wilson, *Descriptive Catalogue of Mackenzie Collection of MSS.*, page 164, No. 6.)

*Mahimnaha*.—This is short for *Mahīmnastava*. It is a hymn of praise and prayer addressed to Siva. There are many MS. copies of this work in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, Nos. 11103-11124; IV, i, No. 2153.) Another incomplete copy is also to be seen there. (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, i, B, No. 399.) Another copy of this work, complete with commentary, is also in the same Library. (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2015.) Some commentators attribute this work to Pushpadanta, whose name is actually mentioned in the colophons appearing in certain MS. copies of it. (Madras



*D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, Nos. 11106, 11112; also *Madras T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2015.) Others, however, hold that it was composed by Kumārilla Bhattāchārya. Thus Ahōbala states in his commentary that Pushpadanta, a Gandharva, composed this hymn to glorify Siva, when he appeared before him in response to severe penance. In another commentary it is said that Pushpadanta composed this hymn in expiation of the sin of disregarding the remains of the offerings made to Siva. Dēsayāmātya, another commentator, attributes it to Kumārilla Bhatta, whom he describes as an incarnation of Subrahmanya, son of Siva. It should be added that some MSS. contain colophons actually mentioning Bhattapādāchārya (*i.e.*, Kumārilla Bhatta) as its author (*e.g.*, see *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, No. 11109). Dēsayāmātya speaks of himself as the son of Annayāmātya of Kaundinya-gōtra and a disciple of Chandramauli, a descendant of Prōlanārādhyā and of Lolla-Lakshmīdhara, and that he was a minister along with Nādindlagōpa and Sāluva Thimma. (*Madras D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, No. 11120.) Ahōbala's commentary is known as *Kalpalatā* and is a full one. Ahōbala describes himself as the son of Narasimhabhatta of the Bhāskara family and Ramāmba. (See *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, No. 11119.) The popularity of this work can be easily imagined when it is stated that there are other shorter commentaries on it, some of them restricted to the first 33 stanzas only and some others furnishing summaries of the older commentaries on it. (See *Madras D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, Nos. 11123 and 11124; also No. 11122.) The work is sometimes—though less commonly—known as *Mahimnastōtra*. (See *Madras T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2015, colophon.) Pushpadanta is quoted by Rājasēkhara, the poet, who belongs to *circa* 900 A.D. Dr. Keith notes the fact that it is known to the *Nyāyamanjari* of Jayanta Bhatta and so cannot be later than the 9th century. (*History of Sānskrit Literature*, 220-221.)

*Agnirahasya*.—Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāṣhya* refers to this work thus (III, 3-19):—(1) “In the book of the *Vājasanēyaka*, called *Agnirahasya*, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called *Sāndilyavidyā*, and there is also a *Sāndilyavidyā* in the *Bṛihadāranyaka*” etc. (Thibaut, 641). (2) Another reference to this work in the *Srī Bhāṣhya* occurs at III. 3-44 (Thibaut, 668): “In the *Vājasanēyaka*, in the *Agnirahasya* chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, ‘built of mind, built of speech, etc.’”

#### (iv) Other Authors Quoted by Sṛipati.

Among other authors mentioned by Sṛipati in the body of his work may be mentioned the following:—(1) Manchana Pandita, author of a commentary on *Guhādhikarana*; (2) Paramasivārādhyā Bhaṭṭāchārya, who wrote the *Kaivalya Prakāsa*; (3) Dūrvāsa, author of *Kāraṇavṛittilakṣhaṇa*; (4) Paramānanda Ārādhyā; and (5) Jaimini, author of *Vēdapādastavah*. Whether the Manchana Pandita mentioned by Sṛipati can be identified with Manchana, the author of a work named *Āsvalāyanaśūtrapravṛṇapradīpika*, is open to doubt. (See Hultsch, *Reports on Sānskrit MSS. in S. India*, I, page 15, No. 175.) He was also known as Manchānārya. (*Ibid.*, III, No. 1616, p. 5.) He cannot be the Manchana referred to by Sṛipati as he is not an author. Another Manchana, son of Rāmarāja Prēggada, minister of King Vēma, and grandfather of Manchirāja, who performed the consecration of two *lingas*, brought from Sṛisaila, at the Mandukēsvara temple, at Mānikēs-varam, in the present Guntur district, and made other gifts to the latter temple, is mentioned in a record dated in Saka 1275 or 1353 A.D. (*Nellore Inscriptions* iii, 78, pp. 1037-45.) Whether this Manchana is identical with the *Manchapārya* mentioned as his younger brother by Chāundappāchārya, who wrote a commentary on the *Srauta Sūtra* of Āpastamba, which is a work on Vēdic sacrifices, is also open to question. This work is called *Pravṛṇaratnamāla* and in its colophon Chāundapa describes himself as the son of Chinnārya and elder brother of

Ādityadēva and Manchapārya and minister of King Bhūpati, son of Bukka II and Tippāmba and grandson of Harihara II of Vijayanagar. He states in the introductory verses that he wrote the commentary at the command of King Bhūpati and that Vidyāranya, having been requested by Pandits like Chāundapārya to comment on the *Srauta Sūtras*, explained its Hautra and Audgātra portions. (Madras, *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, i, C, No. 795.) As we know that Prince Vīra-Bhūpati ruled from 1409-1421 A.D., both Chāundapa and Manchapārya have to be set down to about the 1st quarter of the 15th century. This date would seem to suggest that the identification of Manchana, the author of *Āsvalāyanasūtraprayōga*, and Manchapārya, younger brother of Chaundapa, is open to objection. There was a Telugu poet named *Manchana*, who was the author of the Telugu work *Kēyūrabāhucharitam*, which is based on Rājasēkhara's *Viddhasālabbhanjika*. As the work is dedicated by Manchana to Nandūri Gundamantri, a minister of King Prithvīsa, described as the son of Rājēndrachōla, he will have to be assigned to about the middle of the 12th century A.D. (See Madras *T.C. of Telugu MSS.*, Part 3, No. 45(δ), at page 130.) There is nothing to show that this Manchana, though evidently a Sānskrit scholar, ever wrote any work in that language.

Sivārādhyā, author of *Sivamānasapūja*, a work on the mental worship of Siva (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5524), is probably the Paramasivārādhyā Bhattāchārya, who is referred to by Srīpati as the author of *Kaivalya-prakāsa* and *Sivagnānachandrōdaya*. Two other authors mentioned by Srīpati are Dūrvāsa, author of *Kārakavrittīlakshana*, and Paramānanda Ārādhyā, the latter of whom is evidently different from Paramasivārādhyā. Of these, Dūrvāsa, who is styled by Srīpati *Bhagavadpādāchārya*, appears as a Rishi of the Sāma-Vēda in the *Jaiminigrīhyasūtra*. (Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit MSS.*, I, 3.) A work known as *Dūrvāsasamhita* is known (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, see under No. 10005). To Rishi Dūrvāsa is attributed *Tripurasundarīstōtram*

(Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, No. 10758). Dūrvāsa's work *Kāraḥavrittīlakṣhaṇa* must be presumed to be a treatise on the meaning and force of declensional cases, like that of Rudrabhattāchārya's *Kāraḥavādārtha* (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, No. 3927) and Bhavānanda Vagīsa's *Kāraḥavivēchana*, which is part of a larger work of his, called *Sabdakhandasāraṃmanjari*. *Kāraḥavivēchana* contains a clear exposition of the various relations in a sentence that are given expression to by various declensional cases (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, No. 4309). Jayarāmapanchānana was the author of *Kāraḥavādārtha* [Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, A. R. No. 114(c)], *Pādārthamāla* (*D.C.* No. 4267) and *Samāsavādārtha*, a discussion in the nature of compounds (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XXVI, No. 14842, p. 9881).

We finally come to Jaimini, the author of *Vēdapāda-stavaḥ*, which is the shortened name of a work more familiarly known as *Sivavēdapādastavaḥ*. This is a hymn in praise of Siva, the last quarter of each stanza in it ending with a Vēdic passage. The authorship is attributed to Jaimini and the work is declared to be part of the *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*. MSS. of this work, however, differ in the contents of their colophon. Thus while the colophon in one copy mentions it as taken from Vyāsa's *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* and states that Jaimini was its author [Madras *Tri. Cat.*, I, i. B. R. No. 438(v)], another copy has a colophon which states that it is from the *Bhaviṣṭyōttarakhaṇḍa* and it adds that it bears the alternative name of *Pundarīkapurapāti-Jaiminisamvāda*. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, 2, R. No. 11204, at p. 7560.) This description of the work is, however, confirmed in the preliminary part of the MS. copy of this work first quoted above, where it is stated that when Sūta—the narrator of the Purāṇas—was asked by Saunaka and others as to what Jaimini did when he reached Pundarīkapura, he said that when the reverend Jaimini reached that town he with folded hands sang this hymn of *Vēdapādastava*. A third MS. of the work has a brief colophon which merely states that it

is the work of Jaimini. (*Ibid.*, R. No. 11207 at p. 7561.) There is a commentary called *Sivatattvadīpikā* on this work, by Sūryanārāyanasūrin, son of Tirumalabhakta of the Pattangi family. He belonged to the Mitrāyavagōtra and dedicates the work to Siva worshipped on the Srīsaila. (*Ibid.*, R. No. 11208 at p. 7561.) The commentator was evidently a native of Chidambaram, whose God he praises. He also notes the fact that the stōtra is taken from *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*.

Another work mentioned by Srīpati is *Sivādvaita-prakāśikā* (I. i, 2-2, page 34, line 24). An incomplete MS. copy of this work is in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library with a Kannada Commentary on it (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 5114, page 3913). This work treats of Saiva-Vēdānta religion and philosophy. Among the subjects treated in it are :—

- (1) *Sarvaprāpancha nivṛtiḥ kramaha ;*
- (2) *Vibhūti rudrākṣa dhārana pañchākṣarōchchārana  
viśvāsa lingādi sthala nischaya kramaha ;*
- (3) *Itara dēvatā sakti nirāsādi sthala nischaya kramaha ;*
- (4) *Bhāvi sanga nirāsādi ishṭa lingārpana kramaha ;*
- (5) *Bhaktādi saraṇāntasthala kramaha ; and*
- (6) *Gnāna sūnya kramaha.*

In this work the idea is suggested that Siva is *anādi*, beyond all comprehension and all knowledge ; he is beyond all forms and is formless. No one knows him exactly—neither Brahma, nor Vishnu nor Rudra nor Agni nor Vyōma (Akāsa), nor Samīra (Wind-God), nor Ambu (Water-God), nor Bhūmi (Earth), nor the Grahas (the Stars). No phenomenal agents existed then—when Siva was All (or the Only One) that existed. He existed in the form of Satchidānanda and Paripūrṇa (filled with everything), without a second. Beyond all comprehension and expression, devoid of cause or effect, beginning, end or non-existence, neither in space, nor out of space ; impossible to think of through meditation, or spiritual knowledge ; an empty mark incapable of being sought as an asylum (or support) ; this is the

state of absolute non-existence. (*Iti sarvasūnya sthalam sampūrnām.*)

The work ends thus:—"Everything is absorbed in that One comprising all forms of eternal Sat, Chit and Ānanda; in that Parabrahma pervading throughout the firmament. What is the fun of talking jestingly of those who are far beyond the farthest end of the ocean of knowledge and who are one with Paramātmā in his Being?"

"In trying to describe such of them, one does not know himself or Brahma, who is unsurpassed, unrivalled and who is in his form of Chit. When actual non-existence results, then everything is absorbed in the Linga (Lingaikya) and all such things as Bhāva and Abhāva with their reflection cease to exist. That state is known to be *Gnāna Sūnya Sthithi* (non-existence) where no feeling or knowledge of Brahma is experienced as the result of being freed from the bondage of Bhāva or Abhāva.

"That is said to be *Gnānasūnya* (the non-existent state of knowledge) wherein the knowledge and the object creating the knowledge with its characteristics are all absorbed in the *gnēyē* (knower) . . . . . May Siva (Sasibhūshana) who is unchangeable (*Nirvikalpa*), unprotected (*Nirādhāra*), characterless (*Nirguna*), uncovered (*Nirupādhika*) and who is still the absolute support for the visible universe (*Pratyaksha Jagadādhāra*), protect me."

The name of the author of the work is not known, being not mentioned in the colophons found in the MS. The colophons are short and state merely "*Iti sarvasūnya sthalam sampūrnām*" and so on. This work has nothing to do with *Sivādvaitam* (*ibid.*, No. 5113 at p. 3912), a work of seven *patalas* devoted to the doctrines of Saiva-advaita religion and philosophy. These seven *patalas* deal with:—Tatvabhēda, Varnabhēda, Chakrabhēda, Vargabhēda, Mantrabhēda, Pranavabhēda and Brahmabhēda.

It is interesting to note that among the citations made by Śrīpati is one from Kālidāsa, the famous dramatist. The following passage occurs in Adhyāya III, Pāda III:—

“किमिवहि मधुराणां मंडनं नाकृतीनां ॥”

*Kimivahi madhurāṇām mandanam nākṛitīnām.*

This passage occurs, as is well known, in Act I, Scene III, of *Sākuntala*.

These words, it will be readily recalled, are spoken by King Dushyanta in describing the unadorned beauty of *Sākuntala*, when he gets a first glimpse of her at the hermitage of Rishi Kanva. *Srīpati* quotes the passage to illustrate the point that as in *Kāvya* literature the use of *Avyayas* (adverbs) is sometimes of no consequence for conveying the idea intended to be conveyed by a *Vākya* (sentence), for they do not add to the beauty or effect of a passage though occurring in them, so if the difference between the *Jīva* and *Brahma* is negligible, it should not be taken into account. The idea of servant and master, as between them, is, therefore, non-existent. These, however, are not *one* but the difference between them is so slight (*daram alpam*) that such difference ought to be treated as negligible. This is, in essence, the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine of *Srīpati*. Elsewhere he quotes the *Bhramara Kīta* theory to support his view (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4—*Tattu Samanvayāt*). He says :—“ By *Shraddhā*, *Bhakti* and *Dhyāna* in due combination, believe when I say, the *Jīva* will, by meditation, attain *Sivatatva* in the same manner as the *Kīta*, though *different* from the *Bhramara*, becomes the *Bhramara*.” The original passage may be quoted :—

“श्रद्धाभक्तिय्यानयोगादेवेहि ॥” इत्यादौ भ्रमरकीटवत् परमेश्वरोपासनात्मक ध्यान-  
ज्ञानवशात् जीवस्य शिवतत्त्वप्राप्तिरुपदेशात् ॥

“*Shraddhā bhakti dhyāna yogādavēhi*” *ityādan*  
*bhramara kītavat paramēśvarōpāsanātmaka dhyāna gnāna*  
*vasāt jīvasya Sivatatvaprāptih upadesāt.*

*Pranavārthavivaranam* is another work quoted by *Srīpati*. It is mentioned in connection with the derivation of the word “*Māya*” in I. i, 3. I have been unable to trace out this work. There is a work called *Pranavārthaprakāsika*, which is a commentary on the syllable

*Om* according to the Advaita Vēdanta by one Brahmā-nandayōginathēndra. (See Madras *T. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, i, A. R. No. 193 (e) at page 326.) The work mentioned by Srīpati may be one of this kind and this suggestion may perhaps be not open to doubt, for there is a Saiva work called *Pranavapanchāksharīyantra* which treats of *Om Nama Sivāya* as a *yantra*. (See Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5417, page 4215.) There is, however, a well-known dispute as to whether the mystic syllable *Om* forms part of the aphorisms in Bādarāyana's *Brahmasūtras*. A popular treatise on this subject is the *Pranavadarpana* by Srīnivāsāchārya, son of Srīsaila Tātācharya and Lakshmi and pupil of Srīnivāsadhvarin of Kaundinya gōtra. This is a work by a Srīvaishnava scholar who sets down the Srīvaishnava viewpoint in it and that is that the syllable *Om* does not form part of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. (Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 4932, page 3726.) This view has been contested by the Madhva-Vaishnavas and their standpoint is summed up in *Pranavadarpanakhandanam* by Vijayīndratīrtha, which is a criticism of Srīnivāsāchārya's above quoted work. (Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 4798, page 3588.) According to the followers of Madhvāchārya, the syllable *Om* is part of every *Sūtra* of Bādarāyana, and is so for the reason that his *Sūtras* are definite in their decisions and as such not open to discussion.

Among other works cited by Srīpati in the course of his commentary is the *Sivagnānachandrōdaya* by one Paramasivārādhyaswāmi. I have been unable to trace out this work and its author. Another writer referred to by Srīpati is Paramānanda Ārādhyā, who is spoken as a teacher even greater than Ekōrama Siddha Bhagavat-pādāchārya, the *guru* of Srīpati. The identity of this writer is also not certain. Paramānanda Tīrtha, a writer on Saiva Vēdanta, well versed in both Telugu and Sānskrit, is known to Telugu literature. He styles himself by the alternative name of Paramānanda Yati. Under the first of these designations he wrote the *Sivagnānamanjari*,



a Telugu work on the Saiva Vēdānta in the popular Dvipada metre. In this work, he calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Under the name of Paramānanda Yati, he wrote the *Upadēsakramamu*, another Telugu work, which is in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupil on some of the principles of Advaita Vēdānta. In this work also he calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Similarly, in a third work, called the *Uttaragītavyākhyā*, which is a commentary on the *Uttaragīta*, which is an episode in the Asvamēdha Parvam of the *Mahābhārata*, Paramānandatīrtha calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Thus, there seems little doubt that Paramānanda styled himself *yati* and *tīrtha* just as it suited him. Evidently, he treated the terms as synonymous, which they actually are. He was probably a *Sanyāsīn* of the Saiva School. His last mentioned work is written in conversational Telugu and is stated to have been composed by him to correct the many errors into which previous authors had fallen in their interpretation of the *Uttaragīta*. [See Madras *T. C. of Telugu MSS.*, II, p. 592, No. 194 (*d*); p. 596, No. 195 (*b*); p. 747, No. 264 (*b*).] Another work by the same writer—Paramānandayatīndra—is *Paramānanda-satakamu* which consists of 111 verses in the Kanda metre, in praise of Vishnu and Siva and treating of the Advaitic oneness of the world. Two other *Satakas* by him are *Dattātrēya Satakamu* and *Sampangimauna Satakamu*. [Madras *T. C. of Telugu MSS.*, Part III, pp. 173-177, R. Nos. 54 (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*).] The practical question remains whether we could identify this Paramānandatīrtha or Paramānandayati with the Paramānandarādhya mentioned by Srīpati. It has not been possible to fix the age of Paramānandayati *alias* Paramānanda Yōgi and so it is difficult to state whether he came after or preceded Srīpati. Bearing the fact that Srīpati describes him as being even greater than Ekōrama Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya, it is, in the present state of our knowledge of both of these writers, impossible to identify them.

### Popularity of Sripati's Commentary.

Srīpati's commentary seems to have had a wide vogue both in Northern and Southern India. It was evidently studied with some care among Benares *pandits* who followed the Vīrasaiva tenets. There is at least one well-known work in which there is internal evidence of this fact. The *Lingadhārana Chandrika*, the work referred to, does not mention by name Srīpati's *Bhāṣya* but it is undoubted that the author of this work was well acquainted with the contents of the *Bhāṣya*. This highly popular work was written by Srī Nandikēśvara Swāmi and has latterly been edited with a commentary called *Sara* by Pandit Mahāmahōpadhyāya Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi Sarma Misra and published at Benares by Kāśinātha Sāstri, a resident of Ambigēri village and Adhyaksha of Nandikēśvaramatha, with the sanction of the Swāmis—so we are told in the title page of the work itself—by the Kāśi Jangamavātika Visvārādhyapītha. (See edition published in 1905 at the Medical Hall Press, Benares.) In the *Bhūmika* to this work, we are told that this work was written by Nandikēśvara Swāmi to support the Vēdic origin of Lingadhārana after examining many ancient works on the subject. The difficulties in the work were, we are informed, explained by H. H. Rājēśvara Swāmi of the Jangamavātika Visvārādhyapītha and it was published by Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi with the *tīka* entitled *Sāra*, mentioned above. There can be hardly any doubt that Nandikēśvara was its author as the colophon to Chapter II actually mentions his name. It is also stated in the *Bhūmika* that the work had once been without a *tīka* and that the *tīka* was added by Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi for the benefit of all Vīrasaivas. As regards Nandikēśvara himself, we have little or no information of value. He is mentioned in the work as the son of Mahēśhāchārya, who, we are told, was the son of Basavēśvarāchārya. (See colophon at the end of the work, page 311, lines 2-9.) Nor is there any clue to his date. Among the authorities mentioned in the work by Nandikēśvara, in

support of his views, are:—*Makutāgama*, *Vīrāgama*, *Siddhānta-sārāvali*, *Siddhānta-sikhāmani*, *Lingapurāna*, *Skānda Purāna*, *Padma Purāna*, *Mahābhārata*, *Gīta*, *Taittirīya Upanishad*, *Svētāsvatara Upanishad* and the *Sivagīta*. As will be seen from what has been stated above, with the exception of *Makutāgama* and *Siddhānta-sārāvali*, all these works are cited by Śrīpati in his *Bhāshya*. Of the two excepted works, the *Siddhānta-sārāvali* contains the important teachings found in various Saivāgama works, and it is the work of one Trilōchana Sivāchārya. His date is not definitely known though it is undoubtedly a work later in date than Śrīpati. There is a commentary on this work (*Siddhānta-sārāvali*) by Ananta Sivāchārya. (Madras D. C. of Sānskrit MSS., XI, Nos. 5554 and 5555.) The *Makutāgama* is one of the several Saivāgamas known to Sānskrit literature. The *Āgamapurānanāmānukramanika* mentions it in its opening verse, which begins with *Kāmika* and other Āgamic works. (Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS., XI, page 4218, No. 5420.) The work itself is well known. (*Ibid.*, p. 4255, No. 5464.) Some parts of it deal with the conduct of various religious festivals in Siva temples. One such portion of it, known as *Sivōtsavādivishayah* cites in its colophon this work as its authority. (*Ibid.*, pp. 4306-7, No. 5533, at page 4307.) The very nature of this work shows that it is a late one and cannot be posterior to Śrīpati, though the festivals, etc., mentioned in it may themselves go back far into antiquity.

That the *Lingadhārana Chandrika*, which openly admits that it is based on ancient works, appears to owe much to the commentary of Śrīpati on the *Brahma Sūtras*, especially, I. i, can hardly admit of any doubt. All the Purānas supporting Lingadhārana appearing in the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* are to be seen in Śrīpati's commentary as well. These are tabulated below:—

Work or text quoted	Sṛīpati's Bhāṣya (Present Edition)	Lingadhārana Chandrika (Edition 1905)
(a) <i>Kaivalya Upanishad</i> ..	Page 10, Lines 21-23.	Page 12, Lines 8-12.
(b) <i>Sarvalingāni stāpayati- pāni mantram.</i>	Page 8, Line 9.	Page 28.
(c) <i>Sarvānana Sirōgrīva</i> from <i>Svētāsvatara Upanishad.</i>	Page 8.	Page 31.
(d) <i>Vrihīn prōksheti vrihīn vahanti.</i>	Page 14.	Page 29.
(e) <i>Ēsho'sau paramahamsō bhānukōtipratikāṣate.</i>	Page 57.	Page 25.
(f) <i>Tadādīmadhyānta vihīna- mēkam, etc. Umāsahāyam paramēsvaram prabhum, etc.</i>	Page 10.	Page 12.
(g) <i>Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham Krishna pingalam, etc.</i>	Page 54.	Page 8.
(h) <i>Dhaharam vipāpam para- vāsmabhūtam, etc.</i>	Page 8.	Page 4.
(i) <i>Tasmāt dhāryam mahālin- gam pānimantrēti, etc.</i>	Page 14.	Page 58.
(j) <i>Agnēyōṣhta kapālo amā- vāsyāyam.</i>	Page 14.	Page 61.
(k) <i>Yachchandāsām Rishabhā visvarūpāha, etc.</i>	Page 8.	Page 105.
(l) <i>Pavitrānte vitatam Brah- manaspate, etc.</i>	Page 70.	Page 124.
(m) <i>Mantra sabdasya gaunā- rthatvāt ikshyat adhi- karane, etc.</i>	Page 14.	Page 68.
(n) <i>Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraha.</i>	Page 13.	Page 38.

That even certain of the maxims quoted in the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* should be the same as those found in Sṛīpati's commentary is not a little strange. Thus :—

<i>Nyaya quoted</i>	<i>Srīpati's Bhāṣya</i> (Present Edition)	<i>Lingadhārana Chandrika</i> (Edition 1905)
(o) <i>Nishūdashthapatinyāya</i> ..	Adhyaya I, Pada III, Sutra 34, Page 154, Line 33.	
(p) <i>Sandigdāhē vākya shēshāt</i> ..	Page 15.	Page 63.
(q) <i>Nishūdashthapatinyāya</i> ..	Adhyaya I, Pada III, Sutra 15, Page 143.	Page 76, Line 3 in the Commentary.

The only possible inference that can be drawn from the above parallelism is that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* has borrowed much—though without direct acknowledgment—from Srīpati's *Bhāṣya*. As the writer of a popular text-book, the author of the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* may not have deemed it quite necessary to cite his authority, the more so as the original sources—assiduously collected in the first instance by Srīpati—are referred to by him. In any view of the case, the practical identity of the authorities cited by both makes it impossible to resist the conclusion that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* is the borrower and not *vice versa*. The vast differences that exist between the manner of treatment adopted by these two writers—Srīpati and Nandikēśvara—would seem to distinctly prove that Srīpati is the original writer and that Nandikēśvara is the borrower. Finally, it may be added that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika*, the work of Nandikēśvara, should be distinguished from the *Lingadhāranadīpika*, which is a dissertation on whether the wearing of the Linga is obligatory or optional in the case of a Vīrasaiva and *Lingadhārana Lakshanam*, which enjoins the wearing of the Linga by Vīrasaivas after performing the necessary purificatory initial ceremony. (*Ibid.*, pp. 4262-3, Nos. 5473 and 5474.)

### Philosophical Standpoint of the Work.

Srīpati writes in a simple and easy style. His mastery of Pānini is visible in almost every page of his work. His

varied learning and profundity of thought are conspicuous in his *Bhāṣya*. He is, as may be expected, highly critical of the views of his opponents but it must be said to his credit that he nowhere does any injustice to them in propounding their views before attacking them. The really distinctive part of his writing is the statement of views current in his own times among the most progressive Vīrasaivas with regard to the everlasting theme *Tatvamasi*. He combats the view primarily of Rāmānuja, against whom apparently his work is intended, though Sankara and Madhva also claim fair attention at his hands. His philosophical standpoint is summed up in the two or three alternative phrases he uses to describe the nature and contents of his work :—

Visēshādvaita.

Dvaitādvaitābhidhāna.

Bhedābhēdātmaka.

Visēshādvaita Siddhānta Sthāpaka.

The author refers frequently to the Pāsūpata school but only to differ from it. The reason is very simple. The Pāsūpatas, like the other older Saiva schools, expound the dualistic point of view, while the Vīrasaiva school, as expounded by Srīpati, holds to the *bhedābhēda* doctrine.

### Srīpati's Criticism of Sankara.

Srīpati refutes the position of Sankara and his doctrine of Māya at length. His argument is too long to summarize here. But it may be stated very briefly to clearly indicate the standpoint taken by Srīpati in regard to Sankara's views. In Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4, *Tattu Samanvayāt*, Srīpati strongly combats the doctrine of the unreality of the world as propounded by Sankara. His bleak philosophy of negation he rejects at every step. He says that if the world is to be assumed to be real only for the purpose of *vyavahāra* and not for *pāramārthika*, then the doctrine cannot be accepted to be true. What kind of truth is it that is confined to *vyavahāra*? What kind of truth is it that is

only applicable (*gamyatvam*) to *vyavahāra*? And what kind of truth is it that is outside (*bādhita*) *vyavahāra*? What is this truth which is both truth and not truth? What is this nomenclature which is divorced from Cause and Effect? What is this truth which is the semblance of truth and yet not truth? What sort of object is it which has no basis in Cause? (He answers :—) Therefore the first view is not true, because if Brahma is anything other than *vyavahāra*, Brahma is beyond what is assumed, is unnecessary and is redundant (*ativyāptihi*). This results in muteness as between *guru* and *sishya*. That is, further discussion is unavailing or impossible. So the first Sūtra, *Athātho Brahma jignāsa*, falls to the ground. He then passes on to deny *nirvisēṣhatvam*, as being inexplicable to everybody. He then vehemently attacks *Nirvisēṣhamata* as:

स्मार्तान् सर्वमतभ्रष्टान् जगन्मिथ्यात्वं साधकान् ।

गणिकाचार संपन्नान् पाषण्डान्परिवर्जयेत् ॥

*Smārtān sarvamatabhrashtān jagannmithyātva sādhakān  
Ganikāchāra sampannān pāṣandān परिवर्जयेत्.*

Accordingly he states that that system of philosophy cannot prove acceptable to persons seeking salvation through the Vēda. (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 20, line 28, page 71.)

### Criticism of Ramanuja and Pancharatra Agama.

Rāmānuja's system is referred to in the work as *Visishtādvaita* and refuted as such. The *Pāncharātra Agama* is also severely criticized by Sripati in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 3, *Sāstra yonitvāt*. Rāmānuja's system of *Visishtādvaita* is criticized in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 20, *Asmin nasyacha tadyōgam sās̥thi*. The former may be taken first. Rāmānuja, as is well known, gives expression to the views of the Pāncharātras or Bhāgavatas, an old Vaishnavite sect, whose doctrine is expounded in the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and the *Bhāgavata-purāna*, as well as in the special text-books of the sect. The tenets of the Bhāgavatas, as set forth by Rāmānuja, diverge considerably from those of the *Brahma-Sūtras* on which he has

commented. For, according to him, individual souls are not identical with God ; they suffer from innate unbelief, not ignorance, while belief or the love of God (*bhakti*), not knowledge, is the means of salvation or union with God. Mādhava in his treatment of Rāmānuja's system in his *Sarvadarsana Saṅgraha* also deals with the Pāncharātra.

### Pancharatra Agama Assailed.

Srīpati disputes at length the *Pāncharātra Āgama* criticism that the studying of *Siva-Purāna* and worshipping Siva according to it, will certainly result in sin, because *Siva-Purāna* is a *tāmasa-purāna*. As against this position, Srīpati argues that there is no evidence for this from the Srutis. This is, he says, an invention (*kalpitha*) of the Prachchanna Bauddhas (*i.e.*, *Nirvisēsha* Advaitins) and is groundless. Since Vyāsa is the author of both the *Siva* and *Vishnu Purānas*, does the *tāmasatva* extend to both of them or only to *Siva-Purāna*? If to the latter only, that position cannot be accepted as true. Then, again, does the *tāmasatva* extend to the author's (Vyāsa's) works only or both to his works and to himself? If it only applies to his works and not also to him, that position too cannot be accepted. Then, again, if Vyāsa, the author, as a *Sātvika* created the *Vishnu-Purāna*, then, it cannot be held, he became a *tāmasa* when he created the *Siva-Purāna*. In the *Rig* and other Vēdas, both Rudra and Agni, who are treated as synonymous, have been praised. This being so, even the Vēdas, which thus praise Siva under these forms of Rudra and Agni, should be termed *tāmasa*. This Prachchanna Bauddha invention cannot, therefore, be believed. Statements of this kind are, he says, baseless because of want of evidence in their favour. Srīpati also points out the inconsistencies between the statements made in the *Pāncharātra Āgama* and the *Matsya-Purāna* and remarks that in a case of this sort the *Pāncharātra Āgama* cannot but be held as lacking in authority. Apparently during Srīpati's time, the disputation over Hari and Hara had reached its



climax. An argument of the kind that Śrīpati urges against the votaries of Vishnu is indicative of rival feelings in the matter. The joint worship of Vishnu and Siva in the form of Harihara, declared in the well-known Davangere inscription dated in 1224 A.D., (E.C. XI, Davangere 25) was apparently limited in practice. That this question of superiority and inferiority lasted much longer than the period to which this inscription belongs, is clear from Haradattāchārya's work, *Hariharatāratamyam*, which treats, in Sanskrit verse, of the superiority of Siva over Vishnu. (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, X, Nos. 5121 and 5122.) Haradattāchārya was also the author of *Chaturvēdatātparya Sangraha*, which purports to give briefly the essence of the four Vēdas and is in praise of the worship of Siva as the Supreme God. (*Ibid.*, No. 5077.) Haradattāchārya is specifically referred to by Śrīpati in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 26, line 22, page 83, in connection with his exposition of the *Gāyatri* doctrine, where Haradattāchārya's authority is quoted in support of his own position that the *upāsana* *dēvata* of *Gāyatri* is Siva and not Vishnu.

The term *Prachchanna Bauddha* used by Śrīpati in describing the followers of Sankara is worthy of note. It is a term that has been made popular by the Madhva writer Nārāyana Panditāchārya as a description of Nirvisēsha Advaitins. He uses the term in his *Madhva Vijaya*, a work of the 14th century, almost contemporaneous with Madhvāchārya. The sloka deserves notice, the more so as it sums up a long disquisition on how Sankara, starting with the idea of pulling down the doctrine of Buddha, himself fell an easy victim to it. In this disquisition, Nārāyana Panditāchārya points out how Sankara adopted the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism to suit his own Nirvisēsha Advaita theory and remarks that the variation being only a transparent one, his theory has become renowned as the *Prachchanna Bauddha* theory, *i.e.*, the theory of the hidden Bauddha. That is, *Nirvisēsha Advaita* is, in his opinion, nothing but *hidden Buddhism*. This sloka may be quoted in full:—

असत्पदे सन्सदसद्विविक्तं मायाख्यया संवृत्तिमभ्यदत्त ।

ब्रह्माप्यखंडं बत शून्यसिद्ध्यै प्रच्छन्नबौद्धोद्यमतः प्रसिद्धः ॥

*Asatpadēsan sadasadviviktam māyākhyayā samvrit-  
thim abhyadatta.*

*Brahmāpyakhandam bata sūnya sidhyai Prachchanna  
Bauddhoyam atah prasiddhah.*

(See *Madhva Vijaya*, Sarga I, Sloka 51.)

It is possible that this description of Nirvisēsha Advaitins of Nārāyana Panditāchārya was borrowed from him by Srīpati. It might well be, however, that it was part of the current dialectical language of his time and as such adopted by Srīpati.

### Examination of Visishtadvaita.

Srīpati's criticism of Rāmānuja's *Visishtādvaita* may now be briefly considered. The followers of Rāmānuja are thus described :—

सदाशेषि शेषवत् व्यवस्थापक संयुक्ताद्वैत पाञ्चरात्रादिवत् ॥

नचाङ्गाङ्गित्वेन सावयवत्ववादिनः ॥

*Sadāsēshi sēshavathva vyavasthāpaka samyuktādvaita  
pāncharātrādivat. Nacha angāngitvēna sāvayavatva  
vādinaha.*

(Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 1, line 14, page 20.)

He says :—The Ātman is anxious to join the blissful Brahman. This is the central topic of *Visishtādvaita*. But, says Srīpati, this is un-Vēdic, i.e., contrary to the teachings of the Vēdas. Bhatta, Bhāskara and other previous Āchāryas, at the time they propounded their doctrines, discarded this part of the argument. Their reasoning was that *Visishtam advaitam*, i.e., being both simultaneously *Visishtam* and *advaitam* is *yukti virōdham*, i.e., opposed to reasoning, being in fact contradictory to each other. When the term *visishtam* is used, is it used as related to *visēshana* and *visēshya* or as separated from them? If not related, then *advaita*—the quality of being one—does not result. He then applies the *Danda purusha sambandha nyāya* and suggests what follows from it. The man who carries a stick in his hand

is called by the *combined* name of Dandi, though he and the Danda (stick) he carries are two different objects. Because he is related to the stick as its carrier, he is to be called by this single conjoint name of Dandi, affixing the *Visishtapratyaya*; both are co-related, not separate. An ordinary man, *i.e.*, one who carries no *Danda*, calls the man who carries one, a Dandi. These two are two different persons, *i.e.*, the man who carries a Danda and the man who calls him a Dandi. Hence *Advaitva* is not proved. The point is thus pressed home that *Visishtādvaita* is against all reason. The ordinary man without a Danda, the man with the Danda, and the Danda itself are three different objects, and there being no union of the Danda and the body of the man who carries it, there is no *advaitva*. As the Danda and the man have nothing physically in common between them, just as a pillar (*Sthambha*) and a man (*Purusha*) have nothing in agreement between them as to their physical attributes, the doctrine of *Visishtādvaita* results in untruth. At all times Danda and Purusha are different. So long as there is no (physical) union between them, they are as different as the pillar and man. For, we cannot say, with any show of reason on our part, that pillar and man are the same. This doctrine of *Visishtādvaita* fails to fully explain the *Visēshana* and *Visēshya*; nor does it show how they can be compromised. As these are not compromised, there is no smell of *advaita* here. Therefore, *Visēshādvaita* is, according to the *Srutis*, the only way to salvation.

### Objections against Dvaita.

We may now pass on to *Srīpati*'s objections to *Madhva* and his system. There are at least five specific references to the latter in this work. The first occurs in *Adhyāya* I, *Pāda* II, *Sūtra* 1 (page 20, line 14):—

सदा घटपटवज्जात्यन्त भेदवादिनः ॥

*Sadā ghatapatavannātyanta bhēdavadīnaha.*

Here the expression *atyanta bhēdavadīnaha*, *i.e.*, those who insist that there is the greatest difference between

Jivātma and Paramātma, refers to the followers of Madhva, the expounder of the Dvaita Vēdānta.

The second reference occurs in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 39 (page 235, line 25):—

द्वैत भागवत पाञ्चरात्रादि वैष्णवमत ॥

*Dvaita Bhāgavata Pāñcharātrādi Vaiṣṇava mata.*

Here the term *Dvaita* refers to the followers of Madhva's *Dvaita* system, as they are among the chief adherents of Vaishnavism. Srīpati in referring in this passage, to Vaishnavas, says: "The followers of (Madhva's) Dvaita, Bhāgavata, Pāñcharātra and other Vaishnava systems say" etc.

The third reference to Madhva's system occurs in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 41 (page 237, line 27):—

किञ्चित्सूत्रे श्रुत्येकदेशप्रामाण्यं द्वैतनिरासाद्वैतनिरासाच्च व्यवहियते । भागवत पाञ्चरात्र मध्वादि वैष्णवानां जगत्कारणेश्वरस्य शरीरत्वं परिग्रहात् घटपटादिवत् अन्तवत्त्वं विनाशत्वं बालद्वैतवादिनां ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषताङ्गीकारात् ॥

*Kinchaitat sūtrē śruttyēka dēsa prāmānya dvaita-nirāsādvaita nirāsācha vyavahriyatē । Bhāgavata Pāñcharātra Madhvādi Vaiṣṇavānam jagatkāranēśvarasya sarīratva parigrahāt ghatapatādivat antavatvam vināśatvam bāladvaitavādinām brahmanō nirviśēṣhatāṅgīkārat ॥*

Here the system of *Madhva* is directly referred to by name.

The fourth reference is to be found in Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra 40 (page 273, line 5):—

गौणत्वेन सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयो निर्दिष्टः । तार्किक मध्वादि केवल भेदवादिनां बौद्धादिवत् सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयाभावात् । तन्मतं सुतरामसङ्गतम् इति सूत्र सूचित सूक्ष्मार्थः ॥

*Gaunatvēna sarva śruti samanvayō nirdishtaha । Tārkika Madhvādi kēvalabhēdavadīnām Bauddhādivat sarva śruti samanvayābhāvāt । tanmatam sutarām asangatam iti sūtra sūchita sūkshmarthaha ॥*

Here the descriptive phrase *Tārkika Madhvādi kēvalabhēdavadīnām* (i.e., among those who thus strictly maintain are the eternally disputing followers of Madhva and others). The term *Tārkika Madhvas* may be taken as equivalent to the modern popular description of Madhvas as "Tatvādis", i.e., those who maintain the

doctrine of essential difference between the *Jīvātman* and the *Paramātman*.

The fifth and last reference to Madhva's system is to be found in Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra 18 (page 263, line 16):—

मध्वाद्वैत क्षणक तार्किकादयो जीवानां विभुत्वाङ्गीकारात् तन्निरसनार्थं एत-  
दधिकरणप्रारंभः ॥

*Madhvādvaita kṣhaṇaka tārkikādayō jīvānām vibhu-  
tvāṅgikārāt tannirasanārtham ētadadhikaranaprāram-  
bhaka.*

The reference to the followers of Madhva is self-evident at the very beginning of this quotation.

From these references to Madhva's system we can easily grasp Śrīpati's attitude towards it. His own theory being styled *bhēdābhēda*, i.e., both *bhēda* and *abhēda*, a theory for which he seeks support from the *Srutis*, he is anxious to prove what he means by *bhēda* and *abhēda* as he understands these terms. He does not agree with the *bhēda* doctrine in full as propounded by Madhva. He, however, admits that there is temporary or transient difference between *Jīva* and *Īsa*. Accordingly, in the first Sūtra, he points out that though he agrees with Madhva only to a certain extent in his doctrine of difference between the *Jīva* and *Īsa*, he does not go the whole length of it with him. The transient difference is, in his view, restricted to the time required for the *Jīva* working out his emancipation after which he becomes *Īsa*, because according to the *Srutis* the *Jīva* is, he says, naturally eternal and full of good qualities.

Commenting, again, on Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 39 (*Adhishtānā nupapaththescha*, page 235) he endeavours to prove that he differs from Madhva and other Vaishnava schools who hold that the Creator of the world has bodily lineaments. He cannot, he says, accept this position as such a view would attribute to the Creator the passions (*Rāga*, *dvēsha*, *duhkha*, etc.), which, he says, is not in accordance with the *Srutis*.

Commenting next on Sūtra 41 (*Antavatvam asarvagna-  
tāvā*, page 237), he goes on to prove that Brahman neither

has such bodily form as would be liable to destruction nor is there such a difference between the *Jīva* and *Īsa* as is postulated by those who hold the Dvaita, Bhāgavata, Pāncharātra and other schools of Vaishnava thought. According to the latter, Brahman has bodily form though not made of flesh and blood but of *gnāna* and there is difference between *Jīva* and *Ātma*. These systems of thought, says Srīpati, do not, generally speaking, accord with the truth as propounded in the *Srutis* throughout. Also, their views lead to confusion—rather they confuse themselves. If they were fully informed with the truth, they would not, he adds, propound such a theory. Therefore, their views should not be accepted.

Next, in discussing Sūtra 40 (*Amsādhikarāna*, page 272) dealing with the difference between *amsa*, the original *Jīva* and *amsi*, its representative in the world, he says that the view of Madhva and others who maintain strictly that the *Jīva* has a separate existence from the *Īsa* is utterly improper inasmuch as it is not in consonance with the teachings of the *Sūtras* as a whole. The *Jīva* has not, he protests, the smallness, the distinctiveness and the subordination to *Īsa* which is postulated by these schools nor is it a reflection or an image of the *Īsa* as is represented by them.

Finally, commenting on Sūtra 18 (*Utkrāntigatyādhikaranam*, page 263) dealing with the passing of the *Jīva* from the world, he enters his protest against Madhva's view that the *Jīva* leaves the world after death on its march to *Svarga* (Heaven) or to *Naraka* (Hell) according to the good or bad it has done in this world, and returns back again to this world. *Jīva*, he says, always goes back to its natural exalted position after death as the Vēdas declare; therefore they cannot go back to the world as is suggested by Madhva. He adds that this *Adhikarāna* is against the view of Madhva.

### Srīpati's Exposition of Viseshadvaita.

Srīpati's exposition of his own position—*Viseshādvaita*—is contained in different parts of his work. In

Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4, *Tattu Samanvayāt*, for instance, he develops it at some length in criticizing Sankara's *Nirvisēśhādvaita*. If *vyāvahārika sathyathva* and *pārmārthika mithyāthva* of the world is admitted, then ultimately why should not the *mithyāthva* of both *Jīva* and *Brahman* be accepted? Such acceptance of *mithyāthva* would be against the *Srutis*. Such a position is not, he says in effect, supported by the *Srutis*. Therefore, he urges that the position of the Prachchanna Bauddhas (*i.e.*, Nirvisēśha Advaitins) that the world is unreal except in the *vyāvahārika* sense, though in accordance with their Māyāvāda doctrine, is against the *Srutis*, reasoning and experience, cannot be accepted. This, he adds, is the public declaration (*ghantā-ghōsha*) of the Sruta Saivas, *i.e.*, Vīrasaivas. According to *Nirvisēśhādvaita*, *Nirvisēśham Brahman gnānam agnānam va*. That is, is Nirvisēśha Brahman to be understood as *gnānam* (comprehensible) or *agnānam* (incomprehensible)? If incomprehensible, it is against the Nirvisēśha Siddhānta itself, for it declares that *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, i.e.*, everything is Brahman. If comprehensible, it becomes *Savisēśham, i.e.*, it becomes qualified. *Gnāna* is eternal; also eternally qualified. Therefore, even in Mukti, *prapancha* is eternal. In Mukti, if it is declared all qualities are absorbed, even *gnāna* would be absorbed. We thus reach a mutually destructive (or contradictory) position; there is neither object (*i.e.*, Brahman) for *gnāna* to lean on (*nirālambana*) nor the knowledge (*gnāna*) by which the object (Brahman) is to be attained. Having started with the Brahman and its qualities, we thus arrive at a position which negatives both Brahman and qualities. This is *pramēya viruddham, i.e.*, against the very hypothesis put forward.

In Adhyāya IV, entitled *Phalā Adhyāya*, Pāda IV, Sūtra *Anāvritthi Sabdāt Anāvritthi Sabdāt*, page 495, Śrīpati amplifies his statement of *Visēśhādvaita*. All the four Vēdas, the Upanishads and the Purānas, he says, declare that Mōksha or the realization of *Sivatatva* is the highest aim of all religion. He thus states how this object is attained :—

मूर्तामूर्तब्रह्मोपासनादेव ब्रह्मतत्त्वप्राप्तिः ॥

*Mūrthāmūrtha Brahmōpāsanāt ēva Brahmatva prāptih.*

ब्रह्मवित् ब्रह्मैव भवति ॥

*Brahmavit Brahmaiva bhavati.*

ब्रह्मलोकशब्देन शिवपदमेव अभिधीयते ॥

*Brahmalōka sabdēna Sivapadamēva abhidhīyatē.*

By adherence to *Bhēdhābhēdātma* *Visēshādvaita* and the practice of *Shatssthalā*, on the analogy of the *Bhramara* and the *Kīta*, *Sivatatva* is attained :—

तस्मादुभयवेदवेदान्तोदित भेदाभेदात्मकविशेषाद्वैतलब्ध षट्स्थलपरशिवोपासनादेव ।

षट्स्थल षड्विधलिङ्ग उपासनात् भ्रमरकीटवत् मूर्तामूर्त ब्रह्मतत्त्वप्राप्तिः ॥

*Tasmāt Ubhaya Vēdavēdāntōdita bhēdābhēdātma Visēshādvaitalabdha Shatssthalā Parasivōpāsanāthēva.*

*Shatssthalā-shadvidha linga upāsanāt Bhramara-kītavat mūrthā-mūrtha brahmatatvapraṁptih iti.*

By *upāsana*, *dhyāna*, *dhārana* and *gnāna*, the earthly sheath is cast off and *Sivatatva* is attained :—

परशिवब्रह्मतत्त्वप्राप्तिरिति घंटाघोषः ॥

*Parasiva Brahmatvapraṁptih iti ghantāghōshah.*

### Doctrine of Shatssthalā.

As will be seen from the above, the doctrine of *Visēshādvaita* is closely connected with the doctrine of *Shatssthalā*. This doctrine of *Shatssthalā* is referred to by name by Sripati in his work. First, in *Adhyāya I*, *Pāda I*, *Adhikarana ii*, *Sūtra 3*, *Sāstra yōnitwāt*, he writes :—

ब्रह्मान्तस्सविशेषात्मक सृष्टिस्थितिलय वाचक कायक मानसिक भेदात्मक षट्स्थल परशिवब्रह्मोपासनात् परशिवब्रह्मतत्त्वमेव प्राप्तित्वं व्यपदिश्यते ॥

*Brahmanah savisheshātma srishtisthitilaya vāchaka kāyaka mānasika bhēdātma Satsthalā Parasiva Brahmōpāsanāt Parasiva Brahmatvamēva prāptitvam vyapadis-yatē.*

Again, in the same context, he says :—

“सर्ववेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्वदन्ति” इति—भेदाभेदविधायक वेदान्त वाक्यानां सर्वजगदुभयकारण षट्स्थल परशिवब्रह्मपरत्वं । तदुपासनात् ब्रह्मत्वसिद्धि रिति ॥



“*Sarvē vēdā yatpadamāmananti tapāmsi sarvāni cha yadvadanti*” *iti bhēdābhēda vidhāyaka vēdānta vākyaṇām sarva jagadubhayakāraṇa Shatsthala Parasiva Brahma-paratvam. Tadupāsānāt Brahmatva siddhiriti.*

He thus explains what *Shatsthala* means :—

श्रवणमननविशिष्ट ज्ञानानुगतनिधिध्यानासनात्— षट्स्थल परमशिवसाक्षात्कारे तादात्म्ये परमकारणं निर्दिश्यति ॥

*Sravana manana visishta jñānānugata nidhi dhyānāsanāt shatsthala paramasiva sākshātkārē tadātmyē paramakāraṇam nirdisyathi.*

In *Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Adhikarana iii, Sūtra 4, Tattu Samanvayāt*, he adds :—

तस्मात् काम्यकर्मनिषेधपूर्वक निगमागमोभयवेदान्तोचित वर्णाश्रमोचित निखिल-कर्मनुष्ठान संपन्नचित्तशुद्धिलब्ध षट्स्थल परशिवोपासनस्य परशिव ब्रह्मत्वप्राप्तिः—इति घंटाघोषः ॥

“*Tasmāt kāmya karma nishēdha pūrvaka nigamā-gamōbhaya Vēdantōchita varnāshramōchita nikkhila karmā-nushthāna sampanna chittashuddhilabdha Shatsthala Para sivōpāsānasya Parasiva Brahmatva prāptiriti ghantā-ghōshaha.*

According to *Srīpati*, *Shatsthala* is the connecting link between the *Ātma* and *Brahman*. The *Ātma* attains *Brahmatva* by *Gnāna*. *Gnāna* is obtained by *drashtavya* (closely examining the truth), *shrōtavya* (by hearing the *Smrithis* by guru's *upadēsa*), *mantavya* (by meditation), and *nidhidhyāsita* (by firm concentration). If *Gnāna* is obtained in this manner, the result is the *Jīva* becomes *Sambhu*. The words of *Srīpati* are :—

तस्मात् जीवो भवेत् शम्भुः किमिवत्कौट विचिन्तनात् ॥

*Tasmāt Jīvō bhavēt Sambhuh krimivat kēta vichintanāt iti, etc.*

That is, the *Jīva* attains *Sivatatva* through *Gnāna* as the *Kīta* becomes the actual *Bhramara*, *i.e.*, on the analogy of the *Bhramara-Kīta* theory. The six positions of approximation to *Sivatatva* according to him, are :—*Sravana, Manana, Gnāna, Nidhi, Dhyāna* and *Āsana*.

Correspondingly there are, he says, six lingas:—*Ātmalinga*, *Bhāvalinga*, *Jyōtirlinga*, *Prānalīnga*, *Upāsānālinga* and *Dhyānālinga*.

A treatise, entitled *Shatsthala-nirnaya*, deals with this doctrine at length. It sets out the six positions in the progress of the aspirant aiming at the attainment of freedom from the bondage of *Samsāra* through the grace of Siva. (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.* XI, Nos. 5546 and 5547.) Beginning from Basava himself, *Shatsthala* has been the eternal theme of Vīrasaiva writers, who often call themselves *Shatsthala Brahmanvādins*. Many works in Sānskrit and Kannada have been written to elucidate this particular doctrine by leading Vīrasaiva writers. The doctrine has also received attention from the Vīrasaivas of the Tamil country. Thus the *Gurulingasāngama Paramarahasya Sadattalam*, by an unknown author, is known. Here *Sadattalam* is the Tamil form of *Shatsthalam* (Madras *D.C. Tamil* III, No. 1414). Another work *Sadattalakkattalai* (*Shatsthalakattalai*) explains the six talas (*Sthalas*), viz., *Battatalam*, *Mahēsattalam*, *Pirasādattalam*, *Prānalingasthalam*, *Charanattalam* and *Aikkiyattalam*. (Madras *D.C. Tamil*, No. 1417).

### Connection between Jaimini Sutras and Badarayana Sutras.

To understand the position of Srīpati among the commentators of Bādarāyana, we have first to determine the place of Bādarāyana in the Hindu philosophic system. Though the philosophical spirit is found markedly developed in the *Rig-Vēda*, its most brilliant literary exposition is to be found in the Upanishads (700—500 B.C.). Jacobi has suggested that the Lokāyata, Sāṃkhya and Yōga philosophies had definitely developed by 300 B.C., though not the others. This view, however, based as it is on the mention made of them in the *Arthasāstra*, has not won universal acceptance. Thus Dr. Keith, who suggests circa 300 A.D. for the *Arthasāstra*, a date later than the

period proposed by others, is rather inclined to the view that we should, in the state of our present knowledge, "content ourselves with the belief that between the dates of the chief Upanishads and the third and fourth century A.D., there proceeded an active stream of investigation, which we have only in its final form." After the period of the Upanishads, the task of systematizing the ideas of the earlier thinkers was gradually taken up and in course of time erected into definite systems of thought—called *Darsanas*—each taught in a philosophic school, in which there was a regular succession of teachers, who expounded and possibly developed its particular body of doctrine. After this development had gone on for some time, the desire to fix in a definitive form the doctrines of the school should have exhibited itself, which should have led to the composition of the *Sūtras*. These *Sūtras* have been framed on the principle of concise aphoristic rules, which were intended to be committed to memory. A common purpose ran through the whole of the *Sūtras* of a particular school, and this was from the first taught by oral exposition. When this exposition ceased—long after the *Sūtras* were framed—attempts were made to crystallize the traditionary teaching in written comments. The oldest comments which have come down to us contain internal evidence that they do not represent an unbroken tradition that had been regularly handed down from teacher to teacher from the original exposition. Later arose independent works within each school, which, while recognizing the authority of the *Sūtras* pertaining to it and conceding that in them lay its essential doctrines, sought the privilege of expounding their contents, without, however, contradicting them. According to Dr. Keith, the *Sūtras* of the different schools—the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*,<sup>8</sup> the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa*, the *Nyāya*

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<sup>8</sup> Dr. S. Das Gupta, in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, page 68, derives the word *Mīmāṃsa* from *man*, to think—rational conclusions. Apte derives it thus: *mī*, to measure and *mān*, to inquire. A more satisfactory derivation seems to be from *mī*, to fix; and *mā*, to measure, mark off or limit. *Mā* in its causative

and the *Vaisēshika*—should have been redacted at a time when they were yet in close contact with each other, and for this reason, there is no real chance of determining their dates even relatively. In his view, they probably were composed, as they stand, at “no very great distance of time from one another”. Jacobi, however, thinks that the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* and the *Vaisēshika* are, perhaps, the oldest, while the *Nyāya* and the *Brahma-Sūtras* were composed after the nihilistic school of Buddhism but before the Vijnānavādin idealism, say between 200 and 450 A.D. The *Yoga-Sūtras*, he assigns, on the other hand, to the period after the Vijnānavāda School and the Sāṃkhya to a later date. Dr. Keith suggests that Jacobi has post-dated the nihilistic Buddhist School by a century with the result that he has had to post-date the Vijnānavāda School also by a century. He suggests “the fourth century at latest” to the Vijnānavāda School. Dr. Dasgupta, whose view is not accepted by Dr. Keith, thinks that the *Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* were probably written about 200 B.C., while the *Nyāya-Sūtras* existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C., though he suggests that some at least of the present *Sūtras* were written some time in the second century A.D. As the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana make allusions to the *Vaisēshika* doctrines and not to

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form means to cause to be measured; to mete out. *Mīmāṃsa* would thus mean the measure by which proof is measured out. Madhva in his *Anuvyākhyāna* derives it thus: *mīyatē anēnēti mānam*, the measure by which we measure the proof (see *Anuvyākhyāna*, I. 1). Madhva quotes in the same work the Smṛithi text: *mānanyāyaistu tatsiddhyai mīmāṃsā mēya shōdhanam* (*Ibid.*, I. 1). What is proof? Where there is doubt, trying to completely remove it is *prama*. The *lakshanas* of words should be made known and the doubt removed completely. That is *prama* or *pramāna*. This is set out in *Brahma Turka*. Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha in his commentary on Vyāsarāya's *Nyāyāmṛita* quotes Madhvāchārya's definition *Mīmāṃsā mēya shōdhanam* and explains the word *mēya* as meaning *aparōksha gnānārthatvēna sākshāt vishaya kartavyam*, i.e., making visible by the aid of evidence (from the *Sruti*) that which is not visible to the naked eye.

*Nyāya*, Mr. Bodas suggests that the *Vaisēshika-Sūtras* should have been written before the *Brahma-Sūtras*, while the *Nyāya-Sūtras* came later. Dr. Dasgupta thinks that the *Vaisēshika-Sūtras* were written before Charaka (80 A.D.), for the latter not only quotes these *Sūtras* but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the *Vaisēshika* physics. He, indeed, holds that there are weighty grounds for supposing that the *Vaisēshika-Sūtras* are probably pre-Buddhistic. Dr. Dasgupta has argued that the *Vaisēshika* is really an old school of *Mīmāṃsa*, older than that represented in the *Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras*. Whether this is so or not, there is some ground for the belief that while the subject-matter of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* is from the nature of what it deals with considerably old, the *Sūtras* in which that subject-matter came to be cast, are contemporaneous with the *Sūtras* of the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa*. That these two sets of *Sūtras*—*Pūrva* and *Uttara*—are nearly of the same date may also be inferred from the fact that three out of the six leading teachers whose names are mentioned in the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa* appear also in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*. Dr. Keith, who notes this point, also suggests that these works are, since they mention the views of the authors whose names are attached to them, the products of the schools named after them rather than of themselves. While the topics treated in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* are referred to in the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa*, the latter never refers to the *Sūtras* of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*. Again, the views of certain of the teachers mentioned in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* on topics covered by the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa* are given in the latter—notably of Jaimini himself and of Ātreya—which shows that the opinions of these teachers were held in high esteem on questions pertaining to the most crucial problems of the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa*. This fact conclusively proves that quite apart from the nature of the topics dealt with in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* and *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa Sūtras*, the great teachers mentioned in them were interested in the topics of both the *Mīmāṃsas* and that

the division of the *Sūtras* into *Pūrva* and *Uttara* was one dictated by the necessities of the situation. In the one case, it was the reconciliation of Vedic texts bearing on sacrificial rites, and in the other of Upanishadic doctrines touching on the relationship between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. In the one philosophy is subordinated to ritualism, in the other ritualism is subordinated to philosophy. They seek each other's aid to achieve their own objectives; the one does not deny the right of the other to its own individual existence or to expounding its own individual philosophy, however slight or great it might be. Though inter-related in one sense, they are, in another sense, independent of each other. Both pre-suppose systematic enquiries, though the one deals with ritual and the other with Brahman knowledge and the means to attain it. The commentators of the one show a mastery of the other which is eminently impressive and some of them have written commentaries on both.

### Do the two Mimamsas form one whole ?

The question whether the two *Mīmāṃsas* should be treated as parts of one whole is one on which a difference of opinion prevails. In commenting on *Brahma Sūtras* I.1.1, Sankara says that the word *atha*, *then*, denotes immediate sequence or *anantarya* and not *adhikāra* or beginning of a new topic. It presupposes something antecedent. The antecedent, according to Sankara, is *Sādhana Chatuṣṭaya*, the four-fold discipline of *vivēka*, *vairāgya*, *śatasampat* and *mumukṣhatva*. It is only when a person has passed through this discipline that he is entitled to enquire into Brahman. The word *atha* therefore declares, according to Sankara, that *Brahma-jignāsa* is subsequent to the acquisition of this four-fold discipline. The word, accordingly, does not, in his opinion, refer to the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*. If these four conditions exist, a man may engage in *Brahma-jignāsa*, either *before* or *after* entering on an enquiry with active religious duty as set forth in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa*. The word *atah*, therefore, which follows *atha*, premises,

according to Sankara, the reason for the *jignāsa*. The reason is that the fruit of all actions is transitory. Good actions lead to heaven, but heaven itself is transitory. The knowledge of Brahman gives final release. Thus, the highest that the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* can point to as attainable is held to fall far too short of what is required for final absolution. Rāmānuja takes a different view. To him also the word *atha* indicates sequence. But the antecedent condition, according to him, is the study of the *Karmakāṇḍa*, or ritualism of the Veda. After the understanding of works, the *jignāsa* into Brahma follows. The word *atha* indicates that the subject of *jignāsa* is Brahman. The person who has followed the *Karmakāṇḍa* knows that the fruit of mere works is limited and hence his desire to know Brahman for obtaining final release. His view is that since the fruit of works as taught in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* is limited and transitory, and that of the knowledge of Brahman as taught in the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa* is unlimited and eternal, Brahman should be known after the knowledge of works has previously taken place. According to Rāmānuja, the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* of Jaimini and the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa* of Bādārayana form one body of doctrine which should be studied in their due order. This view of Rāmānuja has been elaborated by later Vishishtādvaita writers. Thus in the *Adhikarana Sārārthadīpika* by Mangāchārya Srīnivāsa Sūri, a disciple of Samarapungavāchārya of Vādūlagōtrā, we have this point — the oneness of the *Mīmāṃsa* as a *Sāstra* — urged with great force. The work provides us with a summary of the contents of the various *Prakaranas* — or the topical subdivisions of the two *Mīmāṃsas* — and shows clearly their interdependence. (See Madras *D.C. Skt.* X, No. 4853.) Similarly in the *Pūrvōttara Mīmāṃsaka-Kanthyam*, we have the oneness of the two *Mīmāṃsas* put forth in great detail. (See *ibid.*, Nos. 4930 and 4931.) Srikantha is even more explicit than Rāmānuja. He says that the word *atha* denotes succession and not mere commencement or auspiciousness. The latter is the view of Madhva and the

former of Vignānabhikshu. The pre-requisite, according to Srikantha, is a knowledge of the *Karmakānda*. After a study of the Vēdas, one should enquire into Dharma as taught in the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā* and then into Brahman. The Karma and Gnāna *conjointly* produce release; hence first Karma should be learnt and then the Vēdānta. Para-Brahman should be enquired into after completing the enquiry into Dharma. *Atah* gives the reason. As Dharma has been investigated, *therefore* one should investigate Brahman to obtain final release. Vallabha's view is directly opposed to that of Sankara. According to Vallabha, *atha* denotes the commencement of a new topic (*adhikāra*). He says that Karma should precede *Brahmajñāna*; knowledge of Brahman does not, in his view, result in cessation of activity. Even *jīvanmuktas* perform, he says, all Karmas. In fact, the Karmas performed by the knowers of Brahman alone are such as lead to purely good results. Nimbārka takes a similar view. According to him a person who has read the Vēda and whose mind has been assailed by doubts as to the fruits of actions and who therefore has studied the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā* in order to remove such doubts and has thereby obtained a clear idea of Karma, its nature, the proper method of performing it and its fruits and whose mind has been drawn away from them by their transitory character, should try to acquire a knowledge of the Brahman. It will thus be seen that except Sankara, most of the commentators agree in interpreting I.1.1. as meaning that a previous study of the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā* is necessary before the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* can be taken up, both forming one complete whole.

### View of Sankara.

Even Sankara, it will be seen, does not entirely *taboo* the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā*; he only suggests that it might or might not be studied, as its inadequacy for obtaining final release makes its previous study unnecessary. Sankara elsewhere puts forward the same view. Despite this, attempts have been made to reconcile these two apparently irreconcilable



systems of philosophy, notably by Surēśvarāchārya in his *Sambandha-Vārtika*, which is an expansion, as it were, of the introductory part of Sankara's commentary written on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* with the set purpose of showing the connection that exists between the two *Mīmāṃsa* parts. Sankara, in this commentary, states that the chapter on rituals is intended to point out special means for him who, knowing that there is a soul in relation to a future body, seeks particular means to attain the desired and to avoid the undesired, as affecting such future body. Later, he adds that the use of knowledge in connection with the ritual of the horse-sacrifice is that those who are not accorded the privilege of performing it, can yet attain its reward by the knowledge in question as declared by the *Sruti* by such texts as "by knowledge or by ritual" and "this too wins the worlds". It cannot be said that the knowledge is only with reference to the rite, for the words of the *Sruti* "whosoever does the horse-sacrifice or who knows it as such," are alternative, and occur in a context dealing with knowledge. Since, even in the case of other rites, active acquisition is spoken of, it is evident that their fruit can be got from knowledge. And the horse-sacrifice is the highest of all rites, for it has for its fruit the attainment of the unmanifest (*samashti*) or the manifest (*vyashti*) self. Further, its enunciation here at the beginning of the science of self is intended to show that all rites conduce to births and deaths. *Srutis* speak of the fruit being hunger, which is the same as death. It cannot be said that regularly prescribed rites do not produce fruit with a view to births and deaths, for *Srutis* speak in general terms of the fruit of all actions. (See Sankara's *Commentary on the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, Introductory part).

#### View of Suresvara.

Surēśvara suggests that ritual is an indirect means to liberation, since it purifies the soul and helps towards the acquisition of knowledge. Surēśvara says that the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* declares that the fruit of the

horse-sacrifice can be obtained by the mere knowledge of it by those who are privileged to perform it. This knowledge cannot be said to be included in the ritual itself, since the *Srutis* speak of rituals and knowledge as alternative means. An equal reward is obtained by the doer of rituals who performs the horse-sacrifice itself; the declaration of fruit is not a mere explanatory passage, much more than so as it is specifically prescribed. If (says the opponent) no more than this is your explanation of the context, then the object is easily gained even if it occurred in the ritual portion of the *Srutis*. Tell me then why this passage should occur in the knowledge portion. It is as an incentive to the acquisition of knowledge that it is declared that horse-sacrifice, though the greatest of sacrifices and though combined with knowledge of itself, is nevertheless productive of bondage (births and deaths). How else can aspirants of liberation strive to know the self,—people who have known only too well the meanness of the fruits derived from all rituals and who do not seek any means other than the knowledge of the self? “You may freely say that the fruit of all rites with special objects is bondage; but since necessary rites have no fruit why not say that their fruit is liberation?” Not so; for *Srutis* speak of all rites in general as bearing fruit. Further, passages like “By rites one attains the world of the *manes*” refer to the fruit of necessary rites alone. If it be said that, since they have fruits, necessary rites are also rites with special objects, we say it is not so; for necessary rites have purification as their aim while the aim of rites with special objects is the enjoyment of pleasure. There is purification even in rites with special objects, but that is for the sole sake of securing enjoyment. For the Kingdom of Indra cannot be enjoyed with the body of a man or of a pig. Since in the case of necessary rites, purification is most important, the enjoyment of fruit is not contradictory thereto. But, in comparison with the purification of intellect, enjoyment is considered perishable. For this reason and by virtue of passages like “This self” etc., people try to know the

supreme state by the contemplation of *Sruti* passages and by renouncing all worldly attachment. Regularly prescribed rites render only indirect help by way of purifying the mind, being not inconsistent with the knowledge of self. But they are not direct means like the knowledge of self. They therefore who, giving up all rites and free from attachment, throw off all taints such as passion etc., and direct their intellect to the Supreme Self, realize their own self within themselves (*Sambandha-Vārtika*, stanzas 1133-1134). Surēśvara thus shows an advance on Sankara, developing as he does the view that ritual is a means of liberation, though not so effective as knowledge. This view nearly approximates to the Dvaita position that Karma must lead to Gnāna; rather that Karma which does not lead to Gnāna is no Karma.

According to Madhva, *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa* is part of *Mahā-Mīmāṃsa* (see Madhva's *Commentary on Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, VI, 3). Madhva quoting in his *Gītātātparya* the undermentioned *Sruti* text, suggests that *Mīmāṃsa* is of three different kinds :

*Mīmāṃsā trividhā prōktā*  
*Brāhmī daivīcha kārmikī*  
*Brahma tarkancha Mīmāṃsām*  
*Sēvēta gnāna siddhayē*  
*Vaidika gnāna vairūpyāt*  
*Nānyat sēvēta panditāha || iti ||*

This suggests that *Mīmāṃsa* is of three kinds: *Brahma Mīmāṃsa*, *Daiva Mīmāṃsa* and *Karma Mīmāṃsa*. These (three different) *mīmāṃsas* should be studied through the Brahma Tarka method in order to realize the true knowledge. The true knowledge of Vēda consists in knowing all these diverse phases of knowledge. No other method should be had recourse to by a wise man. Madhva holds that the three kinds of *Mīmāṃsa* should be reckoned as *Traividya*. He who does not accept this *Traividya* cannot be called a *Vēdāvādi*. He who adopts the *Traividya*, realizes Parama Vishnu. Thus, it would seem, according to Madhva, that these three kinds should be treated together.

Evidently their interpretation should be on the basis of *Tattu samanvayāt*. If this be so, Jaimini *Sūtras* should be held to be subject to the same mode of interpretation, for they are part of the *Traividya*. The word *Mīmāṃsā* seems to have the derivative meaning of intensification or individualization in the text *Aththātha ānandasya nīmāṃsā bhavati* (*Taittirīya Upanishad*, II, 8, quoted by Madhva in his *Commentary on Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, III, 4).

### Truth underlying the modern view.

There thus seems some ground for Jacobi's suggestion that the two *Mīmāṃsas* are interrelated, though this cannot mean, especially when we remember the *Sabarabhāṣya* and the commentaries of Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhatta on it, that the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* have not a philosophy of their own. The interpretation of *Brahma Sūtras* I. 1. 1 above-mentioned pre-supposes a connection between the two *Mīmāṃsas*, though such connection need not necessarily deny to either its own philosophy. This mode of approach may possibly reconcile the views of Dr. Keith with those of Jacobi on this point. The position taken by the earliest commentators known on the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* helps to confirm this view. Thus of the three early commentators, leaving out of account Hari and Bhartramiṭra, of whom little is known, the Vṛttikāra, who is quoted by Sabarasvāmin (I. 1. 5) introduces discussions as to the validity of knowledge and its different forms, though the *Sūtras* themselves do not go much beyond exalting the Vedic injunctions as the source of the necessary knowledge and deny the validity of perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma. Dr. Keith even suggests that it is legitimate to resume that the Vṛttikāra indulged also in metaphysical discussions. The Vṛttikāra has been assigned by Dr. Keith to a date not later than the fourth century A.D., though, if we have to put back the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* themselves to a date much earlier than 200 A.D., we may have to refer the Vṛttikāra also to a date proportionately earlier.

Sabarasvāmin, who evidently came shortly after the Vṛttikāra and drew largely on his writings, discusses at length the nature of the soul, though he is usually laconic when dealing with the *Sūtras* themselves. About his time the *Mīmāṃsa* enters, in the words of Dr. Keith, "into the whole field of philosophy, while maintaining its primary duty of expounding the rules by which the rituals can be reconstructed from the *Brāhmanas* and the *Samhitās*." Sabarasvāmin was commented upon by a Vārtikakāra<sup>9</sup> who is referred to by Prabhākara. Prabhākara probably lived about the seventh century A.D., and was anterior in date to Kumārila, who criticises him in his works (I. 2. 31; I. 3. 2; 1. 4. 1). Dr. Keith has adduced satisfactory reasons against the traditionary statement that Kumārila was the *guru* of Prabhākara and that they were contemporaries. According to him, at least half a century, if not a century, separated Prabhākara from Kumārila. The suggestion, however, that the *Bṛihati*, "the great" commentary on Sabarasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*, "seems to have passed comparatively early into oblivion" is not quite borne out by the evidence available. There is hardly any doubt that for long after the time of Sankara, the *Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* as commented upon by Sabarasvāmin and elaborated by his commentator Prabhākara in his *Bṛihati*, were actively studied in Southern India, special grants of land being made for its propagation. Thus in a lithic record, dated in the third year of the Chōla King Parakēsarīvarman, "who took the head of the Pāndya,"—identified with Āditya Karikāla II, who ruled about the middle of the tenth century A.D.,—we are told that the

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<sup>9</sup> The term *Vārtikakāra* denotes literally the writer of an explanatory gloss which explains the meaning of that which is said, of that which is left unsaid, and of that which is imperfectly said. A work that explains what is said or but imperfectly said and supplies omissions is termed a *Vārtika*. The term is particularly applied to the explanatory rules of Kātyāyana on Pāṇini's *Sūtras*. Accordingly, Kātyāyana is commonly known as Vārtikakāra. Here, of course, the *Vārtikakāra* is a different person.

grant of land by a village assembly functioning in the present Kumbakonam taluk, Tanjore district, was made as a *bhattavritti* to those who expounded the *Prabhākaram* in the Nāgēśvara temple at Kumbakonam, where the inscription can still be seen (*M.E.R.*, No. 233 of 1911).<sup>10</sup> Kumārila Bhatta, often styled merely Bhatta, the more famous commentator, has still a large following in the modern South Kanara district. His followers call themselves *Bhattas* and their philosophy goes by the name of *Bhātta-mata*. The chief point to note in regard to Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhatta is that they both agree with Sabarasvāmin in holding that the individual soul, though derived from the absolute Brahman, has an independent existence for ever thereafter. They thus not only declare that the *jīva* is immortal but also definitely reject the theory of Māya.

So far about the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* and their relation to the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras*.

### The Earliest Commentators on Brahma-Sutras : Those referred to by Sankara.

Among the earliest commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* was Bōdhāyana. Though Dr. Thibaut has identified him with the author of the *Kalpa Sūtra*, the better opinion

<sup>10</sup> The name *Prabhākara* occurs in certain other inscriptions, but the references in those cases appear to be to persons who were evidently named after the original *Prabhākara*, the Mīmāṃsa teacher. Thus, a *Prabhākara Bhatta* is mentioned in three inscriptions of the time of the Chōla king Rājādhirāja I as a Brāhman resident in Āryadēsa. His wife was a devotee of the Siva temple at Tiruvorriyūr, near Madras. These inscriptions are dated in the 3rd, 30th and 31st years of the reign of Rājādhirāja I (1018-1051 A.D.). Accordingly they range in date from 1021 to 1049 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 112, 132 and 155 of 1912). Again, in an inscription at Vijayapadmanābhapur, Berhampore taluk, Ganjām district, dated in the reign of Padmanābha Ananga Bhīma of the Kēsari dynasty (13th century A.D.), Samasta 5, Mina 29, Vaisākha Bahula 1, Wednesday, is recorded the gift of Laddigām and other villages, under the name of Vijayapadmanābhapura, to *Prabhākara Bhatta*, Misra and another. (Rangacharya, *Inscriptions in Madras Presidency*, I, Ganjam District 80, quoting *Mackenzie MSS.*, XIV). These instances appear to

to-day seems to be that the two are different and that they lived in widely separated ages. Sankara in his *Bhāshya* frequently mentions "another commentator" whose name is nowhere disclosed (I. 1. 25; I. 1. 27; I. 1. 31; I. 2. 13; I. 3. 2; I. 3. 13; I. 3. 17; I. 3. 19; III. 3. 39; III. 3. 57; III. 4. 42; IV. 3. 7-14). Gōvindānanda, one of his commentators, suggests that the reference is to the *Vṛittikāra* mentioned by Rāmānuja, and Dr. Thibaut has accordingly proposed to identify him with Bōdhāyana (*S.B.E. Vēdānta-Sūtras with Sankara's Commentary*, Introduction XX and XXI). There is really no authority for this proposed identification. In some parts of his *Bhāshya*, Sankara refers to more than one teacher, as in I. 3. 19, where it is said that "some teachers are of (a different) opinion". Again, in I. 3. 19 it is stated that "others again, and among them some of our own are of opinion" etc. Then, again, it is said in III. 3. 19 that some commentators (in the plural) "are of opinion" etc. Next in III. 3. 57, he says that "some commentators here establish the conclusion" etc. Sankara evidently does not agree with their conclusion. Finally, in III. 4. 42, he remarks that "some teachers, however, are of opinion" etc. Thus Sankara had evidently more than one commentator before him when he noted the above differences between himself and them. As Sankara refers to Sabarasvāmin and Upavarsha by their names [see his commentary on III. 3. 53, where Sabara is referred to twice, once by name and another time as "the author of the (*Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsa*) *Bhāshya*", and Upavarsha, as a commentator of both the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsa* and the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa Sūtras* (*Ibid.*, III. 3. 53 and I. 3. 28)], the references to the "other commentators" may, perhaps, be taken not to include them, the more so as they relate entirely to topics connected with *Sārīraka-Mīmāṃsa*. Who these may be it is not possible even to speculate. Gōvindānanda, one of the commentators of Sankara,

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indicate that the name of the great Mīmāṃsa commentator still continued to be remembered in India between 11th and 13th centuries A.D.

suggests in his gloss on Sankara's *Bhāshya* on the *Chchān-dōgya Upanishad* (III. 10. 4) that Sankara had followed Dramidāchārya (or Dravidāchārya) in certain respects. Whether this Dramidāchārya is one of those referred to by Sankara and is identical with the person of the same name quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Bhāshya*, is difficult to determine in the present state of our knowledge.<sup>11</sup> Dramida, however, is one of those who is mentioned with others by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasangraha* as an authority for his own work. This acknowledgment shows that in the interval between Sankara and Rāmānuja there had come into existence a number of writers on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, who are, however, at present nothing more than mere names to us. Whether any of these can be related back to a date anterior to Sankara and as such taken to be included in his

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<sup>11</sup> Dr. Thibaut in his translation of the *Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary of Sankarāchārya* (*loc.cit.*, Introd. XXI. f.n. 1), says that the name is sometimes given as *Dramida*, and sometimes as *Dravida*, and suggests, basing his opinion on that of Pandit Rāma Mīra Sāstrin of the Benares College, that the former is the correct one. There appears to be authority for both the forms. In a Sānskrit-Kannada record on the four faces of a pillar set up in the courtyard of the Rāmalingēśvara temple at Rāmēśvaram, Proddatur taluk, Cuddapah district, the Rāshtrakūta king, Krishna III (*Duradanka-kāra*) registers a gift of land and taxes to that temple and incidentally states that the king's general took Kānchi from the "knavish Dramidas" (*M.E.R.*, No. 383 of 1904). The country is called *Dravida-dēsa* in a record dated in Saka 1439 or 1517 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, No. 87 of 1912) and also in a copper-plate grant (*M.E.R.*, 1912-13, No. 8). In a Prākrit record found at Amarāvati, Sattenapalle taluk, Guntur district, the gift of an upright slab at the foot of a *mahāchaitya* by one *Damila-kanha* (*i.e.*, Dramida-Krishna) and *Chula-kanha* (Kshuda-Krishna) and his sister are registered. A Sānskrit-Grantha record dated in Saka 1445 (= A.D. 1523) in the reign of the Vijayanagar king Krishnarāya, found at Nagalāpuram, Ponneri taluk, Chingleput district, records a gift for the recitation of the Sānskrit *Vēdas* and the *Drāvida-Vēda* (*i.e.*, the Prabandha) and the exposition of the *Vēdānta*. The Tamil part of Southern India is commonly known as *Drāvida-Vishaya*. (See Hultzsch, *Report on Skt. MSS.*, III. 59, under *Saubhāgya-Ratnākara*, end verses.)



general description of "other commentators" is also difficult to say. A fair inference from the known facts is that long anterior to Sankara there had been well-known commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and that there had come into existence, after him, other commentators who were themselves succeeded by Rāmānuja.

### Those mentioned by Bhaskara.

Of these, Bhāskara deserves special mention. His date is not yet definitely settled. As he is not referred to by Sankara, but mentioned by name and criticized by Rāmānuja, the upper and lower limits of his age may be fixed between the beginning of the 9th century A.D. and the middle of the 12th century A.D. He may probably be put down to circa 1000 A.D., as some time will have to be allowed for his attaining that extent of celebrity for his views as to be specially quoted and refuted by Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāshya*. That this date is not by any means a mere conjecture will be evident when it is remarked that he has been identified with Bhāskara Bhatta, son of Kavi Chakravarti Trivikrama Bhatta, mentioned in the Nasik copper-plates.<sup>12</sup> These plates state that Trivikrama Bhatta belonged to the Sāṅdilyagōtra and that his son Bhāskara Bhatta was honoured with the title of *Vidyāpathi* by King Bhōja. King Bhōja, who is said to have thus honoured Bhāskara Bhatta, has to be identified with the famous Paramāra King of Malwa who bore that name. According to the latest view, King Bhōja lived about the middle of the 11th century A.D.<sup>13</sup> Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi will

<sup>12</sup> See *Bhūmika* to Bhāskarāchārya's Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* edited by Pandit Vindhyēsvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, I to III, Chowkhambā.

<sup>13</sup> Bhōja's date has been variously assigned by scholars. Thus, according to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, he ruled from 997 A.D. to 1050 A.D. (*Early History of Dekkan*, 214-215). Sir Ramakrishna assigns to him "about fifty-three years". Dr. Vincent Smith, however, says that "he reigned gloriously for more than forty years" and fixes him between 1018-1060 A.D. (*The Early History of India*, 410-411). Apart from the length of his reign, a later date seems

accordingly have to be set down to about the third quarter of the 11th century A.D. Corroborative of this inference is the statement made by Bhāskarāchārya, the author of *Siddhānta Sirōmani*, who mentions Bhāskara Bhatta

nearer the truth, for, as suggested by Dr. Bühler and Dr. Zachariæ, some time has to be allowed, if the *Navasāhasānka Charita* referred to at length by them is to be believed; for King Sindhurāja, the father of Bhōja, appears to have reigned for a fairly long period of time before Bhōja actually came to the throne. The *Prabandhas* followed by Sir Ramakrishna do not allow any period of rule to Sindhurāja which is now held to be without warrant. Indeed Bühler and Zachariæ definitely state that "it is necessary to place the beginning of Bhōja's reign further down than is usually done" (*Indian Antiquary*, June 1907, 172). As tradition states that Bhōja ruled in all for 55 years, 6 moons and 3 days, it is possible that this lengthy period includes his years of office as Yuvaraja under Munja and Sindhurāja. Munja began his reign before 974 A.D. and his death occurred in one of the three years 994 to 996 A.D. Sindhurāja, his younger brother, succeeded him and he may be allowed—judging from the active life led by him as detailed in the *Navasāhasānka Charita*—a period of rule commencing from 997 A.D. and ending probably with a year or two before 1019 A.D. which is the first definite date we meet with in Bhōja's life. That year marks the defeat which the Chālukya King Jayasimha inflicted on the confederacy of seven kings led by Bhōja, who was obliged to take to flight (*Balagami* inscription dated 1019 A.D. See *I.A.*, V. 17; *E.C.*, VII. Shikarpur 125). If this suggestion proves acceptable, Sindhurāja may be set down to 997-1017 A.D., Bhōja following him and ruling from about 1017 A.D. to about 1072 A.D. This would mean a reign of about 55 years for Bhōja, the period fixed by tradition. At least three land grants of Bhōja are known. These are:—(1) The Ujjain copper-plate land grant, dated in Vikrama Samvat 1078, Chaitra Sudi 14, corresponding to 30th March 1021 A.D.; (2) Land grant of his Karana of the Rāja Mrigānka, dated in, Saka Samvat 964, or A.D. 1042-1043; and (3) Land grant dated 4th bright half of Māgha of Vikrama Samvat 1176, two years earlier than the Ujjain grant or A.D. 1019. (For these grants, see *I.A.*, June 1907, 170; and September 1912, 201-203.) Besides these, Bhōja's defeat and flight are mentioned in the *Balagami* record dated in 1019 A.D. Thus, there can be no question he ruled from about 1019 A.D. to 1043 A.D. But if tradition is taken into account, as most scholars have done, he should be held to have ruled, as before suggested, from 1017 to 1072 A.D.

Vidyāpathi and claims him as his ancestor in the sixth degree. As this Bhāskarāchārya states that he was well versed in *Smṛitis* and *Srutis* and styles himself Kavi Bhāskara (*Srauta smārtha vichāra sūra chaturō nissēsha vidyānidhi*, etc.), it has to be conceded that Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi's family was hereditarily one well known for its learning. It is interesting to note that this Kavi Bhāskarāchārya's name is actually reminiscent of Bhatta Bhāskara Vidyāpathi's name as it occurs in the colophons to the *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya*, wherein it appears as Bhāskarāchārya (*Iti Srī Bhagavad Bhāskarāchārya pranītē Sārīraka Mīmāṃsabhāshyē*, etc.). What is more important is that Kavi Bhāskarāchārya states that he himself was born in Saka 1036, which corresponds to 1114 A.D., that Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi was his ancestor in the sixth degree, and that he wrote his work *Siddhānta Sirōmani* in his 36th year. Allowing twenty years for a generation, Kavi Bhāskarāchārya should have come about 120 years after Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi, which means that the latter should have flourished about 120 years before Kavi Bhāskarāchārya's birth. This works out to 994 A.D. (1114 A.D. minus 120 years, which gives us 994 A.D.). From this, it would seem to follow that Bhatta Bhāskara Vidyāpathi lived through the reigns of the Paramāra kings Munja, Sindhurāja and Bhōja, the last of whom is said to have honoured him, quite late in his (Bhāskara Bhatta's) life with the valued title of *Vidyāpathi*. This last fact is mentioned by Udayana, the author of the well-known work *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* (see p. 35, line 5). In this work, Udayana writes thus of himself :—*Brahmaparinatērīthi Bhāskaragōtrē yujyate*. A little later he adds :—*Bhāskara tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra*. Since Udayana says he wrote his *Subōdha Kusumāñjali* just past Saka 906 (A.D. 984), he must have been a younger contemporary of Bhāskara. If this is conceded—and it has to be, as Udayana states he was of Bhāskara's *gōtra*—then Bhāskara should have been much earlier than Saka 906. Udayana adds that Bhāskara wrote his *Bhāshya* after he became a great

proficient in learning. And he mentions that when he had advanced in his age, and had attained great renown, Bhōja conferred on him the title of *Vidyāpathi*. This should have occurred before Bhōja's death, the latest known date for which is 1072-1073 A.D. On these grounds, Bhāskara, the author of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras*, will have to be differentiated from Bhatta Bhāskara, the teacher who was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, who has been identified above (see pp. 45-46) with the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*. As will be seen, the latter belongs to the third quarter of the 12th century A.D. and thus came about a century after Tridandi Bhāskara, surnamed Vidyāpathi, the author of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras*. The author of *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* also went by the name of Trikāṇḍa Mandana Bhatta Bhāskara (see *Bhūmika* to his work in the Ānandāsrama Series).<sup>14</sup> The title *Tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra* affixed to Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi the author of

<sup>14</sup> In the *Bhūmika* referred to, it is stated that this Bhatta Bhāskara lived before Mādhavāchārya, the author of the *Sarvādarsana Sangraha*; for he mentions Bhatta Bhāskara in his *Sankara Vijaya* (Sarga XV, sloka 80) as having disputed with Sankara. This is an anachronism. It will be seen that according to the inscriptions mentioned at pages 45-46 of this Introduction, he was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, between 1181-1183 A.D. Tradition assigns him to 950 A.D., evidently confusing him with his namesake who lived during the reign of King Bhōja. In a verse which occurs at the end of his commentary on the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, it is said he lived in *Nishpāvakē Sākē*, which Professor M. Seshagiri Sastri read as *Nishpāpakē Sākē*, thus changing Saka 1410 into Saka 1110. This change of reading (of *va* into *pa*) can be supported on three grounds:—(1) It gives a more intelligent meaning to the verse than the one assigned to it by Dr. Burnell; (2) it makes Bhatta Bhāskara, the author of the *Taittirīya* commentary anterior to Mādhavāchārya, the author of *Sarvādarsana Sangraha*, which tradition avers; and (3) the date Saka 1110 corresponds to 1189 A.D. which would only mean that Bhatta Bhāskara, who was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, in 1181-1183 was still living in 1189 A.D. when he wrote or finished his commentary on the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, which *prima facie* seems quite acceptable.

the commentary on the *Brahma Sūtrās*, shows that he should have been a *Sanyāsin* of the *Tridandi* order. Since he styles himself *Bhagavat* in his colophons, there can be no doubt, as to this. A *Tridandi* is a *sanyāsin* who has renounced all worldly attachments, indicating such renunciation by carrying in his right hand three long staves (*danda*) tied together so as to form one. Such a *sanyāsin* is said to have obtained command over his mind, speech and body, or rather over thought, word and deed (*cf.* *Manu*, XII. 10). A *Tridandi* is usually distinguished from an *Ēkadandi*, more commonly called *Hamsa*, who carries a single staff, which is said to represent his *kāya* or body, which he has, by undertaking his vow of *sanyāsa*, thrown off. This staff is buried with him, when he dies and is sainted. The *Ēkadandi* class of *sanyāsins* is, according to Hārīta, divided into four orders: *Kuñchakō*, *Bahūdakō*, *Hamsa* and *Paramahamsa*. The last of these is often designated *Parivrājaka*, literally one who has renounced the world and wanders from place to place. Judging from Bhāskara's long and detailed criticism of the status of *Paramahamsas*, whom he takes as typical of the *Ēkadandi* class, and the praise he bestows on that of the *Tridandis*, when commenting on the *Sūtra Sarvāpēkshā cha yagnādisrutērasvavat* (III. 4. 26), it would seem that he belonged to the *Tridandi* order of *sanyāsins*. He plainly suggests that the status of the *Tridandi*, with the right to wear the *sikha* (tuft of hair on the head), the *yagnōpavīta* (the sacred thread) and the rest, is a much superior one to that of *Paramahamsas*, who though they are supposed to renounce everything belonging to the world—including all *karmas*—are still in the world and move in it and have much to do with it. This is probably the reason why Bhāskara came to be known—if Udayana is to be believed—as *Tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra*, the espouser of the doctrine of the *Tridandi* class.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The fundamental difference between *Tridandis* and *Ēkadandis* is in regard to the performance of *karma*. The former is only a *Phalatyāgi*, i.e., one who has given up the fruits of his *karma*, while

In commenting on the Sūtra *Utpaththya-sambhavāt* (II. 2. 42), Bhāskara holds, with Sankara, that it refers to the Pāncharātra doctrine and not to the Sakti, as is suggested by Ānandatīrtha and Nimbārka. He, however, defends the Pāncharātra doctrine, definitely arguing against the views of Sankara. He holds that Pāncharātra is not against the *Srutis*. Vāsudēva is *upādāna kārana* and *Jaggatu* is *nimitta kārana*. Pāncharātra sets down the relationship between these two *kāranas*. This is exemplified in *dēvārchana*, *dhyāna*, *samādhilakshana* and *karmagnāna*. In none of these four is there anything against the *Srutis*. *Dēvārchana* is the worship of Vāsudēva-rūpa; *dhyāna*, the

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the latter is not only a *Phalatyāgi* but also a *Svarūpatyāgi*, i.e., one who has also given up his physical body. The *Ēkadāndi* is, in fact, taken to have given up everything, both *karma* and its *phala*. He accordingly shaves the tuft off his head, gives up his *yagnōpavīta*, etc., which signify *karma*, and completely transforms himself in his physical appearance. He no longer is of this world; he is a true *sanyāsīn*. On the other hand, the *Tridāndi* being only a *Phalatyāgi*, retains his connection with the world and as such he is bound by *karma*. He accordingly wears the *sikha* (the tuft of hair on his head), the *yagnōpavīta* (the sacred thread) and performs his *nitya-karmas* just like a householder. He is, however, subject to the discipline of his order in regard to other matters. Among the Visishtādvaitas (Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas of both sects, Vadagalai and Tēgalai) *sanyāsīns* are wholly of the *Tridāndi* order, while among the Smarthas and Madhwas (i.e., Advaitins and Dvaitins) they are entirely of the *Ēkadāndi* class. It is interesting to note that Bhāskara, the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* was a *Tridāndi*. He not only preceded Rāmānuja in point of time but also belonged to Central India. These facts coupled with the references that are to be found in *Manu*, *Hārīta*, etc., it would seem that the order of *Tridāndi* is quite an ancient one and has been in considerable vogue both in the north and south of India for ages long anterior to Rāmānuja. Of Rāmānuja, it was foretold in the *Vṛiddha Pādma Purāna* that he would be a sage of the *Tridāndi* order and restore the lost faith to its original brilliancy. It is said that Tanka, Bharuchi, Guhadeva, Dramila, Yāmunāchārya and others referred to by Rāmānuja belonged to the *Tridāndi* order. Tradition, as recorded in the Vadagalai *Guruparampara*, states that Rāmānuja became a *sanyāsīn* of this order and, what is more, converted his former guru,

meditation in Sankarshana-rūpa; *samādhi* (Sūkshma-rūpa) in Pradyumna; and lastly, *karmagnāna* is seen in the Sthūla Aniruddha-rūpa. These being exemplified in Pāncharātrāgama, it is not against the *Srutis*. This Sūtra accordingly is devoted to the consideration of the characteristics of the *sakti* which is implicit in the Pāncharātrāgama. Hence the invented statement (*kalpana*) that Pāncharātrāgama is against the *Srutis* is false (*anupaṣannam*). He quotes the Chchandōgya text: *Adhigamanōpādānējyāsvādhyāya yōgaihi Bhagavantam Vāsudēvamārādhyā tamēva pratipadyata* and says that what is stated to be against the *Srutis* is really well known to them. Accordingly, he holds that the suggested contradiction is a mere invention.

Yādavaprakāsa, also into one such after making him renounce formally the *Ēkadandi* order to which he belonged by undergoing once again the *chaula* (tonsure) and *upanayana* rites and then assuming at his (Rāmānuja's) hands the *Tridandi* staff and the orange-tawney robe. It is said that before he could renounce the *Ēkadandi* order he felt he should undertake, by way of penance, a circumambulation of the holy places of the Earth, for which he was too old. In these circumstances, he was advised to go round Rāmānuja *once* and seek re-initiation at his hands. 'This done, he was made a *Tridandi* and duly invested with the insignia of that order. (See *Prapaṇnāmṛitam*, *Rāmānujāchārya Divya Charitai*, etc.) According to the *Prapaṇnāmṛitam*, since he had all his life carried on a tirade against *Tridandins*, criticising their religious life and observances, Yādavaprakāsa was commanded by Rāmānuja to compose a work on the duties of *yatis*, reconciling all the conflicting passages in the *Smṛithis*. Agreeing, Yādavaprakāsa, who had been renamed Gōvinda Jeer, wrote, it is said, the *Yati Dharma Samuchchaya* in eleven chapters, a work which has survived to this day.

The *Tridandins* are thrice referred to by Manu in his *Laws*, once in Chapter IX dealing with the *Duties of Kings* and twice in Chapter XII dealing with *Transmigration* (IX. 296, page 395; XII. 10-11, page 485). The first of these shows the rigour with which the three kinds of discipline to which the *Tridandin* was subjected were insisted on. Each constituent part of his three-fold discipline was, it would seem, important for the maintenance of each of the other two. Manu says:—"Yet in a kingdom, containing seven constituent parts, which is upheld like the triple staff (of an ascetic), there is no (single part) more important (than the others) by reason of the

That Tridandi Bhāskara had in view some of the previous commentators is made plain in the opening verse of his own *Bhāskya*, which reads thus :—

जन्मबन्धविनिवृत्तिकारणं ब्रह्मसूत्रमिदमुद्धमौयतः ।

श्रोतृचित्तक्रमलैकभास्करं बादरायणमृषिं नमामि तम् ॥

सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनात् ।

व्याख्यातयैरिदंशास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये ॥

This verse explains why Bhāskara undertook the task of composing a new *Bhāskya*. He says that he bows down to Bādarāyana, whose genius produced the *Brahma Sūtras* to relieve people from the bondage of birth. Bādarāyana, he says, is like the Sun (Bhāskara), who dispels the darkness of the minds of those who pray for such relief. Then he adds: "Embodying the teaching of the *Sūtras*, I make known my own meaning of them in the interpretation (*vyākhyātam*) I offer. I am interpreting (the *Sūtras*) because I am desirous of removing the doubts caused by my several predecessors (*vyākhyātam yairidam sāstram*) because such doubts ought to be removed (*tannivṛttayē*)." The use of the plural (*yairidam*) indicates more than one previous commentator. Bhāskara should, therefore, be

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importance of the qualities of each for the others." This three-fold discipline is thus described in Chapter XII. 10-11 :—"That man is called a (true) *Tridandin* in whose mind these three, the control over his speech (*vāgdanda*), the control over his thoughts (*manōdanda*), the control over his body (*kāyadanda*), are firmly fixed." As Bühler suggests, though this verse (XII. 10) gives the usual description of a true *Tridandin* as an ascetic who holds three staves (*danda*) tied together, according to it, this outward sign avails nothing. That man only deserves the name *Tridandin* who keeps a three-fold control (*danda*) over himself. The maintaining of the three-fold discipline over himself is more important than carrying the triple *danda*, which signifies him. The fruit of this three-fold discipline is described in the next verse (XII. 11) as final liberation. It says :—"That man who keeps this three-fold control (over himself) with respect to all created beings and wholly subdues desire and wrath, thereby assuredly gains complete success " *i.e.*, final liberation. As to the duties of the *Sanyāsin*, see Bühler, *Manu*, VI, 33-97 ; also *Vishnu Purāna*.



taken to suggest that he is controverting not only Sankara,<sup>16</sup> his immediate predecessor in the field, but also some of Sankara's own predecessors, from whom he evidently differed in certain respects. Though he generally agrees in the matter of the text of the *Sūtras* with Sankara, Bhāskara differs from him sometimes, as, for example, in I. 2. 19; II. 2. 18; II. 2. 31; II. 2. 38; III. 4. 46; IV. 3. 5; etc. Not only are there differences in regard to the text between the two but Bhāskara does not also agree with Sankara in his conception of the general import of the *Sūtras*. Bhāskara's standpoint is that of *Bhēdābhēda*,<sup>17</sup> while Sankara's is that of a confirmed Advaitin. In commenting on the Sūtra *Ātma krutē parināmāt* (I. 4. 25), Bhāskara criticizes at some length Sankara's statement postulating Adhyāsa on account of which everything is destructible. This, he suggests, is nothing more than naked Mahāyānism of the Bauddha system. He says:—*Tathācha vākyam parināmasihsyādivadati vigītam vichchinnamūlam mahāyānika Bauddha gāthhitam māyāvādam vyāvarnayantō lōkān vyāmōhayanti*. He thus very plainly states that what is postulated by Sankara is manifestly contained in the Bauddha system of Mahāyānism. Thus saying, he adds, Sankara is making people lose themselves in Buddhism. Again, commenting on the Sūtra *Vaidhar-myāchcha nasvapnādivat* (II. 2. 29), Bhāskara states that those who follow the Bauddha system are Māyāvādis and that they are among those who are with justice rejected by the Sūtrakāra. He says:—*Yētu Bauddhamatāvalambinō Māyāvādinastēpyanēna nyāyēna Sūtrakārēnaiva nirastū vēditavyāha*.<sup>18</sup> His own position, Bhāskara makes plain in

<sup>16</sup> Bhāskara's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshyam*, edited by Pandit V. P. Dvivedin, *Bhūmika*, 9.

<sup>17</sup> Pandit V. P. Dvivedin quotes Bhattōji Dīkshita's *Vēdānta tatva vivēka tikā vivarana* in support of this description of Bhāskara's standpoint. Bhattōji Dīkshita calls Bhāskara a "Bhēdābhēda vēdānta siddhānta vādi." See Pandit V. P. Dvivedin's Edition of Bhāskara's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshyam*, *Bhūmika* 9, f.n. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Among King Bhōja's possible contemporaries were Rāmapāla (1084-1130 A.D.) and Gōvindapāla (1175 A.D.). During their

his comments. Thus, while explaining the Sūtra *Adhikanti bhēdanirdēsāt* (II. 1. 22), he states that the *jīva* is different from *para*, for the *jīva* cannot be said, he says, to create himself and destroy himself. But he is only different from *para* up to a particular stage. The indeclinable *thu* in the Sūtra, according to him, applies to both sides—*bhēda* and *abhēda*. He then asks: “*Nanu bhēdābhēdau katham para-spara viruddhō sambhavētām*” and answers the question thus: *Naisha dōshaha*. And he quotes the following ślōka:

*Pramānataschētu pratyate kōvirōdhō ayamuchyatē* <sup>1</sup>

*Virōdhēchavirōdhēcha pramānam kāranam matam* <sup>11</sup>

This may be broadly set down thus: That authority which we set down in support, how can we postulate of it that it is in contradiction with our own view; an authority which is quoted in support of an argument, if it proves it without contradicting it, then alone will it be universally accepted as an authority (*pramānam*).<sup>19</sup>

Similarly, in commenting on the Sūtra *Nasthānathōpi parasyōbhayalingam sarvatrahi* (III. 2. 11), Bhāskara reiterates his position.

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reigns, Buddhism, though declining in Hindustān, was flourishing in the Pāla dominions, the monasteries of Magadha being crowded with thousands of residents. Rāmapāla was, according to inscriptions, followed by five kings. It was during the reign of Indradyumnāpāla (1197 A.D.) that the Pāla kingdom was subverted by the Muhammadan invasion led by Kutb-ud-dīn's general, Muhammad, the son of Bakhtyar and the Buddhist monasteries destroyed (Vincent Smith, *The Early History of India*, 419). Buddhism was accordingly still a dominant religion in India about 1150 A.D., when Bhāskara lived and wrote.

<sup>19</sup> An authority is usually quoted to support and not to contradict the position taken. An authority is sought for only when there is *anumānam*, i.e., doubt as to the authenticity of the position taken. Cf. the following quoted by Ānandatīrtha as from the *Mahākaurma*, when commenting on the Sūtra *Sāstra yonirvāt*:

*Nischayāt sādhayēt artham pramānāntara mēvacha*!

*Sruti smriti sahāyam yatthu pramānāntaramuttamam*!

*Pramāna padavim gachchēt nāthra kāryā vichāranā* ||

*Purvōttarāvīrōdhēna kōtrārthō abhimatobhavēt*!

*Ityādyamūhanam tarkāha shuṣhka tarkāntu var jayēt* ||

This Sūtra, he says, deals with the *jīva* in its condition of sleep (*suptāvastha*) and its relation to *Brahman* in that condition. Of course, it is stated in connection with the Sūtra *Īkshīter na sabdam* and the following Sūtras that *Chētanam* is *Brahman* and that it is the chief cause for the creation of the world. Therefore, that *Brahman* is the chief *Sat* (in *Chētana*) is established. What is explained in this Sūtra is what is the result of such a combination. This may be admitted. It is also proved that *Brahman* is of a *bhēdābhēda rūpa*. Now, it is to be understood clearly whether the *bhēdābhēda rūpam* is to be meditated upon or whether all which appears to be different is one in its entirety (*Samastha bhēdamabhinnam sallakshana bōdharūpam upāsyam*). This is the question that is considered in this Sūtra. The fact is that *Brahman* is *nirguna*; but according to those well versed in *Sāndilya Vidya*, this *Brahman* is *saguna*; and therefore it has to be proved whether *Brahman* is *saguna* or *nirguna*. Here and there, it can be clearly seen as proved that *Brahman* is to be meditated upon as *saguna*. The *pūrva-pakshin* raises the doubt whether *Brahman* is to be meditated upon as one of *sākāra* or *nirākāra* or in a form which is a combination of both, and also as having a bodily form (*prapanchātmanū cha*). At any rate, it is but right that the actual form should be meditated upon. Amidst so many doubts, it is stated in the Sūtra *Nōbhayaṅgam Brahmōpāsyam prapanchākārēna sākāram nirākāram cha* (neither both forms nor the form of the *prapancha* consisting of *sākāra* or *nirākāra*). For the word *lingam* means *lakshana*, *chinha* (characteristic symbol), etc. Truly, the formless form of *Brahman* should be meditated upon as being *Shuddhakārana-rūpa*. For it is stated in the *Sruti* text *astūla mananva hrasva miti iti*, there is no such form of *Brahman* as the *prapancha* form. Because the essential (*svāthasya*) form of *Brahman* is an entire, undivided (*kūtastham*) and everlasting (*nityam*) form. This is declared by the *Sruti* text *Ekamēva advitīyam*, etc. Afterwards *Brahman* assumes a secondary form, at times, on account of certain changes (*vikāra*); when the changes

disappear, that form ceases to exist and Brahman assumes its original state of oneness. Therefore, in conclusion, the *nirākāra* form of Brahman, i.e., the *kāraṇa-rūpa*, is the one to be meditated upon. Therefore, the *svarūpa* of Brahman in whom the worldly form is also combined, should be meditated upon. It is said that such a form should not be worshipped, for in this Sūtra it is clearly stated—

*Naprithivyādi sthānatōpi parasthōbhayalingiṭha* ।

*Svathō abhinnavāt āganthukatvāchcha* ॥

(Brahman has no material or worldly form; and therefore he has no two different forms; he himself being undivided and incapable of any division, cannot have two different forms.) The mundane form of Brahman (as declared in the Upanishads) is simply for namesake (*nāmarūpa panchaka*); it is not his real form (*na prapanchātmakam Brahman*) just as the ocean is not a mere collection of water (*yatha samudrātmaka samudra iti*). Then, if it is asked how does it reach (the "collection" in the end), the answer is that as throughout the Vedānta it is said that the *nishprapancha Brahma* (*nishprapancha Brahmōpāśyam*) should be meditated upon, therefore such a form only should be meditated upon. In the *Sruti* text *asabdamasparsya marūpamavyayam । sa yēsha nēti nēti ātmā sthūla miti cha*, the material form of Brahman is denied. The whole of this comment shows that Bhāskara holds *bhēda* as a transient state of Brahman and *abhēda* as his permanent state.

In commenting on the Sūtra *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvritti sabdāt* (IV. 4. 23), Bhāskara after mentioning the classes of people for whom "no return" is prescribed in the *Srutis*, says that they go to Brahma-lōka and thus attain the state from which there is no return (*na cha punarāvartatē*). They reach, he says, Sūrya's abode and there unite with Brahman (*sā sambhūtaḥ*) in his *virāt* form (*Vairāja sarīra*); there they become equal to Brahman. There, all the worlds, all the *Vēdas*, all the *Dēvas* are united (*sā sambhūtaḥ*).<sup>20</sup> So, it is said in the *Mantrāvarṇa* (Upanishad):—*Prachāra chakri parivardhamānē tarantīmam*

<sup>20</sup> *Sa*=*saha*, together, and *sambhūti*=join or unite with,

*tushita trishitā bhuvanāni visva*, etc., which states that while the wandering wheel of time keeps turning, the *ātma* crosses over these material worlds of the universe. Then having realized his own *ātma* (*tadantharātman prathamam prāpya*), he realizes Paramātmā (*tataha paramātmānam pratipadya*) and in his company enjoys (*ēkībhūya Brahmanā mōdate*). The union here suggested, looking to the *chaturthi vibhakti* used (*Brahmanā*) and not *panchami* or *saptami*, is one of company and not *aikya* with Brahman. The use of the word *mōdate* as the finite verb also suggests that the released *ātma* enjoys *in company with* Brahman and does not find *aikya* in him. This shows that there is, according to Bhāskara, no union with Brahman in the sense of *aikya* but only the privilege of being in company with Brahman and there, in his world and in his presence, enjoying perfect bliss, along with Brahman.

#### Commentators mentioned by Ramanuja.

In the opening part of the *Srī-Bhāshya*, Rāmānuja makes it plain that it is based on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti*. Referring to Bōdhāyana, he says :—*Bhagavad Bōdhāyana-kritam vistīrnam Brahma-Sūtra vrittīm pūrvāchārya samchikshipustanmatānusārēna sūtrāksharāni vyākhyāsyante* (I. 1). This statement may be taken to record the fact that Rāmānuja's commentary is written in accordance with the abridgments made by former teachers of Bōdhāyana's lengthy gloss (*vritti*). There was evidently more than one such "abridgment" of Bōdhāyana available for use by him in his time. By whom these had been composed, it is not clear. Rāmānuja refers at the same time to a *Dramida-Bhāshya* (I. 1. 1 and below). That the author of the *Vritti* and the author of *Dramida-Bhāshya* are different seems also evident from his work, for he refers to both in almost consecutive sentences and the context shows that they are being referred to by him as absolutely different authorities, one supporting the view of the other. He also refers to a *Vākyakāra*, whose identity is not easily established. (Four times in I. 1. 1 and again in I. 3. 14.)

The *Vākyakāra* appears to be quoted as supporting the *Sūtrakāra* in certain places. We know the latter is none other than Bādarāyana but the identity of the *Vākyakāra* is not so easily made out. He cannot obviously be the same as the *Vṛttikāra*, as the latter is quoted by the latter term. Some light is thrown on this point by the *Prapañca-hridaya*, which has been issued in the Trivandrum Sānskrit Series (No. XLV). From its contents, this work has to be assigned to a date posterior to Sankara who, though not mentioned by name, is probably meant to be referred to under the respected title of *Bhagavatpāda*. As its name indicates, this work is a sort of encyclopædia. Among other things, it mentions, besides the *Brahma-Sūtras*, a *vṛtti* on it by Bōdhāyana, called *Kṛitakōṭi*, and an abridgment of the latter by Upavarsha. It is not a little curious that this work, while it mentions Bhāskara's *Bhāshya*, which belongs, as we have seen above, to the 12th century, makes no reference to either Rāmānuja or to Srīkantha. This apart, it is a question if Upavarsha, the author of the abridgment of Bōdhāyana, is referred to by Rāmānuja as *Vākyakāra*. It is possible that one of the "abridgments" of Bōdhāyana available to Rāmānuja in his time was that of Upavarsha, who, however, is not mentioned by him in his *Bhāshya*, though, as we have remarked above, he is twice mentioned by Sankara in his *Bhāshya*. There is no means of knowing what other "abridgments" of Bōdhāyana, Rāmānuja had before him when he wrote his *Bhāshya*. In one place, Rāmānuja refers to the *Bhāshyakāra* (I. 1. 1). Who this is, it is difficult to say, though Dr. Thibaut identifies him with Dramidāchārya, the author of the *Dramida-Bhāshya*. Similarly the *Vākyakāra*, mentioned above, is identified by Dr. Thibaut with Tanka, who, as referred to below, is mentioned by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasangraha*. It is not possible to say if these identifications are correct. As Rāmānuja actually quotes from the *Bōdhāyanavṛtti*, Rāmānuja must be held to have had either the text of Bōdhāyana himself before him, or to be merely quoting him from the "abridgments" available to him. There is some

ground for the belief that Rāmānuja did know Bōdhāyana first hand, for tradition states that he had to journey as far as Kashmir to secure the text of Bōdhāyana. Hence possibly the direct references to the *Vrittikāra*, meaning the author of the *Vritti*, i.e., Bōdhāyana himself, in other parts of his work (I. 1. 10 ; I. 2. 2 ; I. 3. 7 ; and I. 3. 32) as distinguished from the *Vākyakāra*, in the several places quoted.<sup>21</sup> As has been mentioned above, Rāmānuja refers to a Dramidāchārya (II. 2. 3) and quotes from him. He is doubtless "the author of the *Dramida-Bhāshya*", who is twice referred to by him in his *Bhāshya* (I. 1. 1 and II. 1. 14). Rāmānuja also quotes Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (II. i. 15) and Yādava-prakāsa (*Ibid.*). The latter may be identified with the person of the same name, who, according to tradition, was his own teacher. The latter should accordingly be taken to have composed a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which, in some respects, was from a point of view different from that of Rāmānuja.

#### Those mentioned by Ramanuja's Commentators.

In his *Vēdārthasangraha*, described as his first work, Rāmānuja mentions not only Bōdhāyana, but also Tanka, Dramida, Guhadēva, Kapardin and Bharuchi.<sup>22</sup> Of these, quotations from Bōdhāyana and Dramida appear in the *Srī-Bhāshya* but not from the others. Commentators on Rāmānuja's *Bhāshya*, however, state that they base their works not only on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti* but also on Tanka and the other authorities mentioned by Rāmānuja. Thus,

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<sup>21</sup> The difference between *Vrittikāra* and *Vākyakāra* may be noted here. *Vrittikāra* literally means the writer of a gloss or a critical commentary, while *Vākyakāra* signifies one who explains the meaning of a sentence. To carry on a dispute about the meaning of a sentence is to engage in a *Vākyārtha*, which, in its derivative sense, means a disputation. Accordingly *Vrittikāra* would indicate a critical commentator, while *Vākyakāra* would suggest a person who merely explains the writings of another person.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted twice by Rāmānuja in his *Srī-Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1.

Ranga-Rāmānuja in his *Mūlabhāva-prakāśika*, a commentary on the *Srī-Bhāṣya* (see preliminary verses), states that his work is based on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti*, in an abridged form, and on the teachings of Tanka, Dramida and others. He also says that he presents Bōdhāyana's work for modern students with a view to show where he differs from Sankara. Sundararāja-dēsika, author of *Brahma-Sūtrabhāṣya Vyākhyā*, a commentary on the *Srī-Bhāṣya*, likewise states that his work is based on Tanka, Dravida, Guhadēva and Bōdhāyana (see introductory part). A similar statement is made by the author of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya Sangraha Vivaranam*, which is a short exposition of the *Srī-Bhāṣya* (see opening verses). Srīnīvāsadāsa, author of *Yatīndramatadīpika*, a work embodying the main principles of Rāmānuja's system, makes a similar acknowledgment and mentions amongst his chief authorities Bōdhāyana, Guhadēva, Bharuchi, Brahmanandī, Dramidāchārya, Sriparāṅkusanātha, Yāmuna, Yatīsvara, etc. (see introductory verses). Finally, Srīnivāsadīkshita, in his *Virōdhavarūthini-pramāthini*, states that he follows the *Bōdhāyana Vritti* (see opening verses). It is possible that all these later writers are only repeating the names of these different authorities from Rāmānuja's *Vēdārtha-sangraha*, for some at least of them belong to quite modern times, when they cannot have had direct access to them. (See for these different writers Madras *D.C. of Skt. MSS.* X, pp. 3737, 3748, 3749, 3758, 3759, 3773 and 3787.) While we know that Bōdhāyana was the author of a *vritti* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and Dramida was the author of a *Bhāṣya* on the same work, we do not know if the rest of those mentioned above were writers of similar *vrittis* or *Bhāṣyas* on that work. From the mention made of them in connection with the *Brahma-Sūtras*, it has to be presumed that they were commentators of one kind or another on it. Since they are approvingly referred to by Vaishnava writers, it might be suggested that they wrote from the Vaishnava standpoint. It is worth while, at this point, to note what Rāmānuja states as to how he came to write his



*Srī-Bhāṣya*. At the commencement of his work he remarks that Bādarāyana's work, which, he says, "was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads," had been "well guarded by the teachers of old" but whose meaning had been "obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions." Hence, he undertook the composition of a new *Bhāṣya*, about which he expresses the hope: "May intelligent men daily enjoy that (the nectar of the teaching of Vyasa) as it is now presented to them in my words." These pious wishes of Rāmānuja show that during a long period anterior to himself—indeed long anterior to Sankara—there had come into existence a plethora of commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, who had, by their interpretations, obscured the real meaning of the *Sūtras*. His own commentary was intended to restore Bādarāyana's meaning, in the light of Bōdhāyana's *Vṛitti*. None of those mentioned by Rāmānuja and his commentators has survived, except that of Bhāskara of which MS. copies have come down to us. (See Madras *D.C. Skt. MSS. XX*, Nos. 4687 and 4688.)

#### Those referred to by Madhva.

Madhvāchārya refers only once in his *Bhāṣya* to the commentators who had preceded him. This reference occurs in his comments on I. 1. 5, where, adverting to the word *Asabda*, he says, that "other (commentators)" — *itara siddham*,—have put upon it an interpretation which cannot be justified. It is a characteristic feature of Madhvāchārya's writings that he never refers to any of his opponents by name, though he is found criticising their views. In his *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, for instance, Madhvāchārya refers to disputants of the opposite school, but does not name any of them specifically. In the opening verse of the *Nyāyasudha*, Jayatīrtha says that Madhvāchārya did not refer to any of the previous commentators on Bādarāyana (*anyaihi anyathā vyākhyātini Brahmasūtrāṇi*), because they did not, in his opinion, convey the right meaning attaching to his *Sūtras*. The suggestion seems

to be that he ignored them and wrote his own commentary. This statement of Jayatīrtha has to be understood in a restricted sense, for Madhvāchārya, though he does not mention the names of those prominently associated with the rival schools, is ever at pains in criticising their views at almost every stage in his many works. A careful reading of his own comments on I. 1. 5 itself and a comparison of the same with those of Sankara and Rāmānuja shows that he is referring to these two, though he does not name them.

### Other Commentators and their Works.

Among other commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, whose writings have actually come down to us, are the following :—Nimbārka, Srikantha, Kēsava Kāshmīrin, Vallabha, Vignānabhikshu, Baladēva and Suka.

### Nimbarka and His Date.

Of these, Nimbārka has been assigned by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, on the basis of a rough approximation, to the middle of the twelfth century, his death being fixed at 1162 A.D. Since he shows, in some respects, strong resemblances to Rāmānuja's views, he may perhaps be put down at least a century later, if not more. There is the greater reason for assigning a later date to him, for his theory is a kind of *Bhēdābhēda*, which presupposes the existence of a strong *dvaita* school of thought at the time he propounded his teaching. Nimbārka, in his exposition of I. 1. 4, asks the question, Is Brahman describable by words or not describable by words? If he is describable by words, what will become of those passages which declare that Brahman is not describable by words? If he is not describable by words, what will become of those passages which say that he is describable? To remove this objection, says Nimbārka, we take our stand on the theory of *Bhēdābhēda*. Therefore the Omniscient, the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe, the Brahman possessed of inconceivable energies, is apprehended through the authority of scripture alone, and is

separate from everything and also inseparable from everything. He is the lord Vāsudeva. He is the object of our enquiry in this *sāstra* and in him alone all diverse scriptures of the world find their complete reconciliation. This is the settled conclusion (*siddhānta*) of all the *Upanishads*. Since Śrīkantha refutes the view of Nimbārka (see comments of Śrīkantha and Nimbārka on III. 3. 27-30), it has to be presumed that Nimbārka preceded Śrīkantha. Since, as we have seen above, Śrīkantha lived about 1270 A.D., Nimbārka should be taken to have lived some time before that date. How many years before Śrīkantha, Nimbārka actually lived, we have no materials at present to determine. But his lower and upper limits are fixed by Rāmānuja and Śrīkantha, that is, between *circa* 1138 and 1270 A.D. Pandit Vindhyēshvara Prasāda Dvivedin has assigned Nimbārka to a date between 1041 and 1199 Vikrama Era, or 985 and 1143 A.D. This seems clearly inadmissible, judging from the independent evidence that has been adduced above for the date of Śrīkantha and the impossibility of making Nimbārka anterior to Rāmānuja, to whom he owes intellectual allegiance.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Pandit Vindhyēshvara Prasāda Dvivedin in the introduction to his edition of Nimbārka's *Bhāshya* (see p. 3, f.n. 3) quotes the following from the concluding part of the *Bhaviṣyad-Purāṇa* :—

*Vishnuṣwāmi prathamātō Nimbādityō dvitīyakaha |*  
*Madhvāchārya strīṭiyastu turyō Rāmānujastatha ||*

It is needless to say that this order of chronology is wholly at variance with what we know as a fact about the dates of Rāmānuja and Madhva, both from tradition and inscriptions.

The *Sampradāya-dīpa* describes the birth of Madhvāchārya as having occurred in the reign of Kumārapāla, King of Gujarat, in Western India. Kumārapāla was anointed to the throne, according to Mērutuṅgāchārya's *Prabandha Chintāmaṇi*, in Vikrama year 1199 (A.D. 1143). As we know from inscriptions that Madhvāchārya lived between 1238 and 1317 A.D., this date seems impossible. Kumārapāla became a convert to Jainism in A.D. 1159. (See A. K. Forbes, *Ras Māla, Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat in Western India*, 2 Vols., Richardson, (1856), Vol. I, Ch. 11; see also Vincent Smith, *E.H.I.*, p. 190, f.n. 3).

### Story of Nimbarka's Life.

Nimbārka was a Telugu Brahman by birth and is reported to have lived at Nimba, identified by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar with Nimbāpura in the Hospet Taluk of the present Bellary District.<sup>24</sup> He is described as the

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That Nimbārka was indebted to Ānandatīrtha and not Ānandatīrtha to Nimbārka seems also inferable from a comparison of their commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. Wherever their views are identical, it is generally to be seen that Ānandatīrtha's position is fully supported by argument and citation of authorities whereas Nimbārka's seems but a bare assertion which presumes much on the part of the reader. (Cf. the comments of these commentators on III. 2. 11—*Nasthānatōpi paratyōbhayaṅgam sarvatrahi*; II. 2. 42—*Utpatyasambhavāt*.)

<sup>24</sup> See *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 62, quoting MS. No. 706 of the (Bombay) Collection, 1884-1887. At Nimbāpura, there is a Sanskrit-Kannada epigraph of Immadi Praudha Dēvarāya Mahārāya dated in 1450 A.D. This king should be identified with Mallikārjuna, the son of Dēvarāya II. This Mallikārjuna was also known as Immadi-Praudhadeva Mahārāya (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, II, iii, 1600). Sir R. G. Bhandarkar derives the name from *Nimba* and *arka*, meaning *the Sun of Nimba* (see *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 62, f.n. 2). In the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* by Gada, a follower of Viṭṭhala, son of Vallabhāchārya, the founder of the Vedānta system known after him, Nimbārka is referred to as *Nimbāditya*, which is only another form of *Nimbārka* (see *Madras Report on Sanskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, 16). In explanation of the name Nimbāditya, the following anecdote is narrated:—Nimbāditya was engaged in conversation with an Advaitin. As they were conversing long on a theological topic in the evening, the sun set in the west. The Advaitin seeing that the time for the evening ceremony was past, wanted to stop the conversation and perform the ceremony. But Nimbāditya remarked that the sun had not set and showed the sun to his fellow-disputant through a Nimba tree by his supernatural powers (*Ibid.*, p. 16, f.n.). This story suggests an apocryphal attempt at explaining a personal name. In the *Bhaktimāla* the following story, which is a variant of the one given above, is narrated:—Once upon a time, a Dandin—evidently an ascetic of the *Tridandi* Order—arrived at Nimbārka's house and was welcomed by him. Asked to partake of his hospitality, he agreed. But

son of Jagannātha, a Bhāgavata, and Sarasvati. In the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* of Gada, a disciple of Vitthala, son of Vallabha, Nimbāditya is said to have been instructed in the Vaishnava religion by God Pānduranga, the presiding deity at Pandharpur. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, pp. 14-17.) It may be inferred from this statement that he was an ardent devotee of this deity and that he made Pandharpur his head-quarters. His followers are now to be found widely scattered all through Northern India, though they are especially numerous in Bengal and in Mathura. Nimbārka himself lived at Brindāvan, near Mathura, which accounts for the preference he showed to the Rādhā-Krishna form of Vaishnavism. Nimbārka's commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* is a short one and goes by the name of *Vēdāntapārijāta Saurabha*, copies of which are hardly to be found in the MS. Collections of Southern India proper. In the colophons found in his work, he is styled *Bhagavān* and his work is described as *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsa Vyākya*. Sir Rāmakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar's account of Nimbārka's system is almost exclusively based on his *Siddhāntaratna*, which is also known as the *Dasasloki*, from the ten stanzas of which it is composed. Srinivāsa, a direct disciple of Nimbārka, wrote a commentary, called *Bhāshya Bhāvārtha Prakāsika Vēdānta Kaustubha*, on the *Vēdāntapārijāta Saurabha*, while Harivyāsadēva, a later successor, wrote another on the *Siddhāntaratna*. Kēsava Kāshmīrin, the thirtieth in the list of Nimbārka's successors, composed an independent

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before the things required could be got together, the Sun set and it became dark. The Dandi said: "I cannot take my meal as the Sun has set and it is night now." Nimbārka, it is said, prayed to Śrī Krishna and by his grace Śrī Krishna held his Sudarsana Chakra against the Sun and prevented the Sun from setting. Nimbārka took the Dandi to a Nimba tree near by and having made him to get it up, showed him the Sun that was still shining. The Dandi took his meal and said, "I have dined now; you will become famous from now as Nimbārkaachārya."

commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which has attained some celebrity.

### His System of Vedānta.

Brahman is omniscient, omnipotent and is the storehouse of all excellent qualities. He is the controller of Brahma, Siva and even Time. He is the Cause of the Universe and he is the purport of all scriptural teachings. Karma leads to knowledge; because the performance of Karma kindles a desire to know something higher than Karma itself. All Vedic texts have their unity and reconciliation in Brahman. This is so, because all objects, however different they may be, are one in Brahman. This, again, is so because Brahman is their essence without any difference or distinction and because Brahman is referred to in them all. Is Brahman describable by words or not? If he is, what becomes of the texts which say he is not so describable? If he is not so describable, what becomes of those which say he is so describable? To meet this objection, we—says Nimbārka—take our stand on the theory of *bhēdābhēda*. Brahman is, therefore, separate from everything, while at the same time he is inseparable from everything. He is the Lord Vāsudeva and is the Self of the Universe. All the scriptures find their reconciliation in him. He is the Cause of the Universe, because consciousness is attributed. Therefore Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which is non-sentient, cannot be its cause. Pradhāna is not *sat*; for while devotion to *sat* leads to *mukti*, even the Sāṅkhya philosophy does not teach that devotion to Pradhāna leads to *mukti*. If Brahman is the efficient cause, may not Pradhāna be the material cause, as clay is to the potter? No—says Nimbārka—Brahman is unlike an ordinary human being who wants materials to make his things. He is the all-powerful, highest personage who, by his mere will, thought-power, creates the world. Thus declares the *Sruti*, “He said, ‘May I be many, may I grow forth.’” (*Taitt. Up.*, II. 6). Thus, from the mere wish of Brahman, the world has come into existence.

Brahman is different for *jīva* (individual soul); for that by union with which the *jīva* gets *Ānanda* (bliss) must be different from that *jīva*. The *Sruti* teaches the union of *jīva* with that *Ānanda*. In the text, we read "Verily he is sweet, by perceiving that sweetness one perceives *Ānanda*" (*Taitt. Up.*, II, 7). Brahman is accordingly not only *sat* (existence), but also *chit* (intelligence) and *ānanda* (bliss). Brahman's extraordinary qualities do not belong to the *jīva*. The inanimate world and the *jīva* are thus distinct from Brahman. But as they have no existence independent from Brahman, they are identical with Brahman. They are distinct from Brahman, because they do not possess the extraordinary qualities of Brahman. Brahman possesses the qualities of both the animate and inanimate worlds. Brahman is their essence. These qualities contain in them the rudiments of these worlds and by realizing them, Brahman becomes their material cause.

### Vallabha and His Date.

Vallabha comes next in point of time. He was a Velanāti Brāhman and belonged to the Telugu country. He was the son of one Lakshmana Bhatta and Elamāgāra. He was born in the Vikrama year 1535, or A.D. 1479. (See Yagnēsvara, *Āryavidyāsudhākara*, quoted by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaishnavism, Saivism, etc.*, 77, f.n. 1; see also Gada, *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*, third Prakarana; Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 16; and Muralīdhara, *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita*, *ibid.*, No. 51, p. 23.) His birth would, therefore, have to be assigned to the reign of the Vijayanagar king, Mallikārjuna (1446-1487 A.D.), who was succeeded by Sāluva-Narasimha I, the founder of the Second Vijayanagar dynasty (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, II, iv, 1600-1666). How long he lived is not determined yet. There is, however, a Sānskrit copper-plate record found at Gōvāda, in the Tenāli taluk of the present Guntur District, dated in Saka 1466, or A.D. 1544, cyclic year Krōdi, Sunday, Purnami, in the reign of the Vijayanagar king, Sadāsiva Rāya,

which registers a gift of that village to Vallabhāchārya himself, who is highly praised as a Vaishnava teacher in it. (See *Inscriptions in Madras Presidency*, II, Guntur 825, quoting *Local Records*, Vol. 48, pp. 29-37 and Vol. 42, p. 274 *et seq.*) This inscription would seem to suggest that Vallabha was 65 years old at the time of the grant referred to in it. There is nothing improbable in this, the more so as the inscription bears eloquent testimony to the fact of the great fame that Vallabha had attained by that time. If this be so, he should have lived down to the early years of Sadāsiva Rāya's reign (1542-1570 A.D.) (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, II. iii, 2012). In Gada's *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*, which was written in 1544 A.D., it is stated that at a meeting held at the court of Krishnadēva-Rāya, the Vijayanagar king (1509-1530 A.D.), over which Vyāsātīrtha, the Madhva *guru*, presided, Vallabha defeated the opponents of Vaishnavism. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 16.) The statement is repeated in Muralīdhara's *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita*. This would suggest that Vallabha visited Vijayanagar during the reign of Krishnarāya, the great Vaishnava king. As Chaitanya lived between 1486-1534 A.D., it would seem that he was a junior contemporary of Vallabha, though he died earlier than the latter.

### His Life and Wanderings.

Both the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* and the *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita* give long accounts of the life of Vallabha. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, Nos. 35 and 52, pp. 14 and 25.) The first of these, though an early work—having been written within ten years of the Gōvāda record—is somewhat legendary in character and in parts anachronistic. For instance, Vishnuswāmi is represented to be earlier than Sankara and Rāmānuja posterior to Madhva. But there is no need to condemn it as wholly worthless. Though it might be wrong in regard to particulars relating to others, it might be held to be fairly correct where it gives details



about Vallabha himself. Among the statements made by it in connection with him are that he was a staunch defender of Vaishnavism; that he defended the Vaishnava faith at the court of Krishnadēva Rāya, the Vijayanagar king, with Vyāsātīrtha presiding over the public disputation; that he defeated his opponents there; that he went northwards to Prayāg, near Allahabad, thence to Sthaneshvar, near Haridwar; that he converted one Rāmānanda by performing a miracle (that of breaking a *Sālagrāma* and then reuniting it in its original form); that at the request of one Kēsavabhatta, he commented on the *Bhāgavata* fully; that he also wrote *Bhāshyas* on the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and fifty of the *Upanishads* and taught them to his two disciples Nārāyana and Achyuta; that he then reached Ganges (at Benares) and became a *Tridāndayati*<sup>25</sup> and that he then turned a householder and had two sons Gōpinātha and Vitthalēsvara, the former of whom had a son Purushōttama and the latter had many sons, one of whom was Giridhara.<sup>26</sup> The *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita* adds the statement that Vallabha was god Vishnu

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<sup>25</sup> See page 121 *ante* for the meaning of *Tridandi*. Evidently Vallabha was at first an ascetic of the *Tridandi* order and subsequently turned a householder and begot two sons, who carried on his work.

<sup>26</sup> Besides the two sons, he had a daughter who, it is said, married Lālubhatta, the author of *Lālubhattika*, an incomplete *tika* on the *Anubhāshya*. (There is another *tika* on the *Anubhāshya* by Vrajanātha Gōswāmi, son of Raghunātha.) If Vallabha was born in 1479 A.D. and was still living in 1544 A.D., as the Gōvāda copper-plates suggest, there is scarcely any reason to doubt the correctness of the dates assigned to his son Vitthala. Vitthala is said to have been born in V.S. 1572, or A.D. 1516 and died in V.S. 1642, or A.D. 1586. He is said to have been a contemporary and personal friend of Akbar, the Mughal Emperor (1556-1605 A.D.). At the time of Vitthala's death, Akbar should have been in the 30th year of his reign. Vitthala's son Gōkulanātha is said to have been a contemporary of Jahangir, the son of Akbar, who ruled between 1627 and 1658 A.D. A study of the above dates for Vallabha, Vitthala and Gōkulanātha show that there is nothing *prima facie* wrong about them.

incarnate on earth. It also states that he was given birth to by his mother on the way to Benares in the 8th month of her pregnancy and that accordingly, he was, as a child, abandoned by his parents in a forest; but found safe on their return journey. It also gives out the facts that Vallabha began his wanderings in his 22nd year, that Dāmōdaradāsa was his first disciple and that he paid a visit to his maternal uncle at Visākhanagar (Vizāgapatam). It also records, as already mentioned, the success he attained over the opponents of Vaishnavism at Krishnadēva Rāya's court at Vijayanagar. He then went up northwards to Gōkul and Brindāvan, at which latter place he engaged in the constant worship of Sṛī Krishna. Thence he proceeded to Marwar propagating all the while the Vaishnava religion. The miracle of the broken *Sālagrāma* is duly recorded in this work also, which further sets down another miracle. In the course of his peregrination, he met a person—we are told—who was searching for a lost *Sālagrāma* of his. Vallabha, it would appear, made a whole tree appear to the person full of *Sālagrāmas* hanging on its branches, each of which was like the one for which the person was seeking. He next visited Pandharpur and worshipped god Vitthala there and then proceeded to Benares where, in accordance with a divine injunction, he became a married man, taking for his spouse the daughter of one of his own disciples. He had two sons, Gōpinātha and Vitthala, the latter of whom had seven sons, the names of four of whom are mentioned in this work. The sons and grandsons, we are told, constantly preached and propagated the worship of Sṛī Krishna and won adherents to Vallabha's faith.

### His Disciples and Literary Works.

Such are the stories told in the MSS. referred to above. There can be hardly any doubt that Vallabha belonged to the Telugu country, that he was learned and wrote many works, that he travelled extensively to propagate Vaishnavism and that he finally settled down in Upper India. Tradition of a well-authenticated kind states that he lived at Adail, some

eight miles from Allahabad and that he died there. Those who follow his religion are to be found mostly in Bombay, more especially in Guzerat, Rajputana and Muttra. There are, however, a few immigrant merchants in the Madras Presidency who are adherents of Vallabha's religion. Accordingly MSS. of his works are occasionally to be met with in Southern India as well. (See for references to these, Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, Nos. 26-42, 46, 46e, which is wrongly described; also *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5123-5156.) Among these are the following:—*Brahma-Sūtrabhāṣya*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Vyāsa, *Bhāgavatatātvadīpikā*, also called *Tātvadīpanibandhana* or simply *Tātvadīpa*,<sup>27</sup> which fixes the meaning of the *Bhāgavata*, a work very similar in intent to Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāgavatatātparyanirnaya*; *Sannyāsa-nirnaya*, which inculcates the methods of *Sannyāsa*; *Antaḥa-karana-prabōdha*, well described as an apostrophe to the mind in which Vallabha declares that Sṛī Krishna is the Supreme Being and that devotion to him in love and faith brings salvation; *Jalabhēdastōtram*,<sup>28</sup> a work classifying the divine qualities of Vishnu according to the qualities found in certain varieties of water; *Vivēkadhairyaśrayanam*, on the need of wisdom, courage and faith in God for the attainment of salvation; *Sēvāphalam*, which sets forth the advantages to be derived from piety and loving devotion to Lord Sṛī Krishna; and *Bālabōdha*, which deals with the two ways of pursuing the objectives *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*. The *Pushtipravāha-maryāda*, which is attributed to Āchāryachandra, may perhaps be also set down to Vallabha. This work is devoted to the doctrines

<sup>27</sup> Vallabha was the author of only a part of this work. He composed the commentaries on the first three *Skandhas* of the *Bhāgavata*, the rest being done by his son Vitthala as is clear from the colophon to the fourth *Skandha*.

<sup>28</sup> There is a commentary called *Jalabhēdatīka* : *Bhāvapūrṇa*, on this work by one Kalyānarāya (*Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5126).

of the Pushtimārga, the name given to the primary doctrine of Vallabha.

### His ' Anubhashya '.

About his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, a few more words have to be added. It is called *Anubhāshya*,<sup>29</sup> because it is written briefly. Vallabha is said to have written another commentary (*Bhāshya*) of which only a portion is said to be available.<sup>30</sup> Mr. P. S. T. Pāthak, who has edited the *Anubhāshya*, says that he has filled in the gaps found in this work from the fragments of the other commentary he was able to secure. He also states that much of the matter contained in his other commentary has also been incorporated by him in his commentary called the *Bālabōdhini*, which really makes up Vol. II of his edition. Vallabha, however, was not the sole author of the *Anubhāshya*. It is held by some that while the first eleven *Sūtras*—upto and inclusive of *Ānandamayābhyāsāt*—was composed by him, the rest of this work, upto its very end, was written by his son Vitthala. Whether this is so or not, the fact that Vitthala was part author of the *Bhāshya* appears to be acknowledged by him in his comments on III. 2. 34, *Sthāna visēshāt prakāsādivat*. Mr. Pāthak points out that from this *Sūtra* onwards, the *Anubhāshya* upto its end was composed by Vitthala (*Anubhāshya*, II. 47).

This is so despite the fact that the colophons to the work uniformly read that "this work, being a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, entitled the *Anubhāshya*, was composed in accordance with the school of Vēdavyāsa by Vallabhāchārya." Evidently, though Vitthalēsa composed part of the *Bhāshya*, it having been commenced by his father, he composed the colophon in his name, or may be, left the original colophon untouched. This inference

<sup>29</sup> Edited by Pandit Sridhar Tryambak Pāthak, Shastri, Deccan College, Poona, in two Parts, in the Bombay Sānskrit and Prākṛit Series, 1921, of which it forms Vol. LXXXI.

<sup>30</sup> Was this the first commentary written by him of which *Anubhāshya* was a short summary? Cf. Ānandatīrtha, of whose *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya* his *Anubhāshya* is a further exposition,

seems to be confirmed by what he says in concluding his commentary on the IV Adhyāya. Here Vitthalēsa states that he offers this commentary (*Anubhāshya*), which he styles *Bhāshyapushpānjali*, a handful of flowers called the *Bhāshya*, at the feet of his venerable *Āchārya*. He adds : " May he be pleased with this my humble presentation " (see *Anubhāshya*, IV. 4. 22, verse preceding the colophon). Mr. Pāthak correctly suggests that the term *Āchārya* here means *Vallabhāchārya* and not *Vyāsāchārya* as has been suggested by some authorities. As Mr. Pāthak suggests, the word *asmābhiti* indicates that Vitthalēsa carried out the duty of completing the commentary in accordance with the directions of his father and teacher.

A few of the differences observable between Vallabha and Vitthala as commentators may be noted. In the first two Adhyāyas, for which Vallabha was responsible, there are no *ślōkas*. These are a feature in the two other Adhyāyas which Vitthala composed. While long, involved sentences (*dīrgha samāsas*) are to be found in the son's part of the *Bhāshya*, they are scarcely to be seen in the father's. In Vallabha's portion, we have occasional implicit references to previous commentators, but in Vitthala's such references are not to be seen. Vallabha depends for his interpretations on the *Samhitas*, which he frequently quotes ; Vitthala, beyond the references he makes to the *Isāvāsya*, *Gōpālatapani* and a few other Upanishads, hardly ever puts the *Samhitas* to a similar use. Vallabha was evidently a highly learned personage, being greatly proficient in Patanjali's *Mahābhāshya*. In his *Tatvadīpanirnaya* (II. 50), he shows as great skill as Patanjali himself does in his comment on *Sūpakōṣyūpa* in his own *Bhāshya* (I. 3). A point worthy of note in regard to Vallabha is that he made the *Bhāgavata* the basis for his interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. He reads the *Sūtras* in the light of the *Bhāgavata*. The opening part of his *Bhāshya* is much like that of *Bhāgavata*. He takes the following verse from the *Bhāgavata* (VI. 9. 36) and makes it the foundation for his commentary on the sūtra, *Sruteṣu śabdāmūlatvāt* (II. 1. 27) :

“ अर्वाचीन विकल्प वितर्क विचार प्रमाणाभास कुतर्कशास्त्रा कलिलान्तःकरणाश्रय  
दुरवग्रहवादिनां विवादानवसरे ” । *Bhāgavata*, VI. 9. 36.

*Arvāchīna vikalpa vitarka vichāra pramānābhāsa  
kutarka sāstrū kalilāntahkaranāśraya duravagraha vādinām  
vivādānavasarē iti* ।

Though, in his commentary, *Pushtibhakti* (firm faith) is highly inculcated, Vallabha had profound regard for the *Vēdas*. He, however, does not seem to admit that they have any meaning other than what they *prima facie* declare. He does appear to admit, like others, that the *Vēdas* have an inner meaning of their own.

### His Disciples and their Works.

Of the two sons of Vallabha, Vitthala, the younger, wrote the *Bhaktihamsa*, which inculcates the doctrine that the Brahman cannot be reached by knowledge, discussion and learning but only by the devotion of the worshipper and the pleasure and permission of the Supreme Being. Besides completing his father's commentary, the *Anu-bhāshya*, he wrote the *Subōdhini-tippāni*, *Vidvan-mandanam* and the *Sringāra-rasa-mandanam*, *Nibandha-prakāsa*, etc. Another work of his is a commentary called *Pushti-pravāhamaryādavivaranam*, on his father's work *Pushti-pravāhamaryāda*. He also wrote the *Bhaktihētunirnaya*. He besides completed his father's work, the *Bhāgavatatattvadīpika*, as remarked above. On this work there is a commentary called *Bhāgavatatattvaprakāśārnavaḥṅga*, by one Pitāmbara, who was evidently a pupil of Vallabha himself, as he pays homage to him in his work. Srī Krishnatīrtha, author of *Paratattvavilāsa*, was perhaps another disciple of Vallabha, for he mentions the latter in it with great respect. The work itself inculcates the idea that Srī Krishna should be worshipped as the Supreme Being. Gōpīnātha, the elder son of Vallabha, wrote the *Sāadhanadīpika* and some hymns (*sēvā ślōka*). He left a son who died without issue. Giridhara, son of Vitthala, wrote the *Suddhādvaitamārtānda*, which is a standard work on Vallabha's religion. He had a number

of learned disciples, prominent among them being Muralīdharadāsa, Gada and Raghunātha. All these wrote on Vallabha's religion and thus propagated it. Gada<sup>31</sup> wrote in 1554 A.D. the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*,<sup>32</sup> above referred to. It may be described as a general history of Vaishnavism ending with Vallabha. Muralīdharadāsa was a more prolific writer. Among his works are :—*Bhagavannāma-vaibhava*, which treats of the greatness of singing the name of Srī Krishna; *Sēvākalpataru*, which treats of the way in which Srī Krishna should be worshipped; *Bhaktichintāmani*, which treats of the saving efficacy of piety and loving devotion to Srī Krishna as the Supreme Being; *Bhagavannāmadarpana*; and the *Paratatvānjana*, which inculcates the worship of Vishnu under the name of Srī Krishna. This last mentioned work is really a commentary on the *Bhāgavata*, which is represented as an eye-salve to discover the treasure of God. The supreme deity Srī Krishna is to be pleased, according to this work, by rejoicing in singing and hearing of his deeds and qualities. According to the *Pushtimārga*, God is to be approached only by his mercy and with affection for him. But the greatest of all the works of Muralīdharadāsa is the *Bhaktisūtrabhāṣya*, which is a commentary on the *Bhaktisūtra* of Sāndilya. This work is divided into three *Adhyāyas*, each of these, again, being sub-divided into two *āhnikas*. The total number of *Sūtras* is ninety-nine. The work starts with *Aththathō bhaktijignāsā*, in which the word is interpreted in keeping with the highest Vaishnava tenets that *bhakti* (worshipping the Supreme Being) is to be considered the fifth object of humanity, the four others being *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*, and that devotion is better than mere knowledge and contemplation. Muralīdharadāsa, besides, wrote the *Srī Vallabhāchārya-charitra*, which is a short prose work giving the story of the life of Vallabha. This work has already been referred to above. In it Vallabha is represented as an incarnation

<sup>31</sup> Also called Dvivedi-Gada.

<sup>32</sup> Sometimes also called *Sampradāyapradīpika*. (See *Madras T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, i. A, No. 32.)

of Sṛī Krishna. Raghunātha, another disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Bhaktihētuvivṛitti*, which is a commentary on Vitthala's *Bhaktihētunirnaya*, above mentioned. Purushōttama, a disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Suvarnasūtra*, which is a commentary on *Vidvanmandanam*, a work dealing with the tenets of Vallabha's faith. Another Purushōttama, who was the son of Pītāmbara, disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Siddhāntarahasyavivaranam*, which is also a work devoted to the origin and tenets of Vallabha's religion. Among other works expository of it are *Ātmanivēdanam*, which stresses the value of self-surrender to the will of God as a means of salvation; *Haridāsaśiddhānta* by Haridāsa, which inculcates self-surrender to Sṛī Krishna as the way to realization; and *Prēmabhaktirasāyana*, by an unknown author, who was probably a disciple of Vitthala. The last of these sums up the Vallabhite position in characteristic fashion. The *jīvātman* is a part of the *Brahman*. When it is separated from the *Brahman*, the *jīva*'s qualities of *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda*, become invisible to the *jīva*, being lost in worldly life, the *Brahman*, though he is living in him, seems far away. The *Jīva*, though separated from the *Brahman*, may be united with him. This union may be one of the five different kinds:—*Sālōkya*, living with him in the same place; *Sārūpya*, possessing the same form; *Sāmīpya*, living in his vicinity; *Sāyujya*, union with him; and lastly, the rejoicing at the singing and hearing of his deeds (*rāsatīlādīlakshana bhajanānanda*). Closely connected with the doctrine of *Bhakti* as taught in this school is the allied one of *Nirōdha* in relation to it. Many treatises have been written on this topic. Thus, in the *Nirōdhalakshanam*, Pushtipravartakāchārya defines what is indicated by *Nirōdha*,<sup>33</sup> which means complete annihilation, in relation to *bhakti*. Other notable works on the subject are *Nirōdhavivṛitti*, by Lālūbhata *alias* Bālakrishna, and *Nirōdhavṛitti-Samsayavamsachcheda*. The first is really an

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<sup>33</sup> With the Buddhists, *Nirōdha* meant the suppression of pain. In Vallabha's system, it means something quite different.



explanatory gloss on the *Subōdhini*, which itself is a commentary on the tenth *Skandha* of the *Srī Bhāgavata*; and the second is a further commentary on the *Nirōdhavritti*. Bālakrishna was also the author of *Pramēyaratnārnava*, a standard work on Vallabha's religion which has been published in the Chowkhambā Series. Lālūbhata wrote, besides, *Anubhāshya-tīka*, *Nibandha-tīka*, *Subōdhini-tīka* and *Sōdashabandha-tīka*.

### His Indebtedness to Vishnuswami.

Vallabha's system of Vedānta is said to have been based on the writings of one Vishnuswāmi, of whom little credible is known. The *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* of Gada, a disciple of Vitthala, the younger son of Vallabha,<sup>34</sup> describes him as the son of a minister of a king who ruled for some years "after the commencement of the Kaliyuga". It speaks of him as an incarnation of Vishnu. Later it adds that he was instructed in the Visishtādvaita faith by god Vishnu himself, and that Bilvamangala spread his doctrines. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sanskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 15.) Sir Ramakrishna Gopala Bhandarkar quotes Yajnesvara (*Āryavidyāsudhākara*, p. 228) for the statement that Vishnuswāmi was the son of the councillor of a Dravida chief and assigns him to the middle of the thirteenth century A.D., on the basis of Nabhāji's assertion in his *Bhaktamāla*, that Vishnuswāmi's successors were Jnānadēva, Nāmadeva, Trilochana and Vallabha. The first of these three was the author of a commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gīta*, dated in 1290 A.D.<sup>35</sup> This seems too early a date, for this would make Vishnuswāmi practically a junior contemporary of Madhva, whereas the system of Vishnuswāmi, apart from its philosophical aspects, had nothing to distinguish it from Madhva's, except his worship of Rādhā in conjunction with Krishna. Nor is the suggestion of the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* that Vishnuswāmi was taught the Visishtādvaita system by god Vishnu himself

<sup>34</sup> See below, where the work is further referred to.

<sup>35</sup> *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 77.

prove any more helpful.<sup>36</sup> Though Śrīvaishnavism existed before Rāmānuja, Visishtādvaita as a system came to prominence only after him. The date of Vishnuswāmi accordingly would have to be fixed not only after Rāmānuja but also after Madhva. We may not be far wrong if we assigned Vishnuswāmi to about the close of the thirteenth century A.D. What we know of Vishnuswāmi's system is not from his own works but from those of others. Thus the *Sakalāchāramatasangraha* of Śrīnivāsa<sup>37</sup> gives a brief account of it. This is a late work—much later than Vishnuswāmi—and professes to be a history of philosophical systems. According to it, the system of Vishnuswāmi holds that the primeval soul was not joyful, because he was alone, and, desiring to be many, he himself became the inanimate world, the individual soul and the inward controlling soul. These sprang from him like sparks from a burning fire and are his parts. By his own inscrutable power, he rendered the properties of intelligence and joy (*chit* and *ānanda*) imperceptible in the first, and his joy (*ānanda*) alone in the second, while the third has all the attributes perceptible in it. Simple Brahman as such has perceptible joy (*ānanda*) prevailing in it.

### His System of Vedānta.

As will be shown below, the theory of Vallabha is not unlike Vishnuswāmi's, though he enlarges at length on ideas peculiar to himself. According to him Brahman is not only the material but also the efficient cause of the universe. (See Vallabha's *Anubhāshya*, I. 1. 4.) Brahman, according to him, is not merely the Creator of the universe but he is really the universe itself. This is so, because the universe has complete connection with him. Next, he asserts that creation is not a false imagination, for, according to him, the universe is not false. It is verily Brahman (*ibid.*). The texts of the Vēdānta, he says, teach *mōksha*

<sup>36</sup> From the chronological point of view, the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* is a work that has to be used with caution.

<sup>37</sup> Printed in the Chowkhambā Series.

in passages like the following :—" He who knows Brahman verily becomes Brahman "; " the knower of Brahman attains the Highest " (*Tait.*, II. 1. 1.); " he does not come back "; " having known Me fully, he enters into Me " (*Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII, 55). Thus the attainment of Brahman is the highest end of man. The Brahman is not merely the Self of the *jīvas*, but of all. According to Vallabha, then, Brahman is not only the Creator of the universe but he is the universe. But he does not create by allying himself with Prakriti but through his own nature. The Creator of the universe is Brahman ; but that Brahman is not *gauna* but *nirguna* Brahman. If the Creator of the universe were a *gauna* being, then the person devoted to him could not rise higher than his object of devotion and as that being is *gauna* and in the world, his devotee would accordingly remain always in the world. But the *Sruti* declares that the Creator of the universe is Brahman and devotion to him leads to release. If the Creator were a *gauna* being, release would be impossible (*Anubhāshya*, I. 1. 7). Vallabha interprets the first seven *sūtras* of Bādarāyana (I. 1. 5 to I. 1. 11) as showing that Brahman who is *sat* (existence) is also *chit* (intelligence). Because the word *Īkshan* is applied to Brahman, he has to be taken to be conscious intelligence. It follows that Brahman is—and not the unintelligent Pradhāna—the Creator. Brahman, though transcendental, yet by the very declaration that " he thought " and thus created the world, he made himself a subject of perception also. " Though I am unmanifest and transcendental, yet let me, through creating these worlds, become manifest and the object of comprehension. " This is the *īkshan* (thinking) of Brahman which precedes creation. Though Brahman cannot be known by *pramāna* (proofs), yet he is known when he wills. He is both agent and non-agent. Being transcendental, all opposites find a solution in him. To hold otherwise, would go against the declaration in I. 1. 15. This *sūtra* refutes the view that Brahman is non-agent and that creation proceeds from his coming into relation with Prakriti. This is not so.

Brahman creates through his own nature. Brahman is, however, not only *sat* and *chit* but also *ānanda* (joy.) In his view the eight *sūtras* commencing with *ānandamaya abhyāsāt* propound this view. *Ānandamaya* is the cause, according to him, of all the modified forms of *ānanda* that we find in this world. As the *sat-chit* Brahman in his substance is unmodified, though he is the substantial cause of all worlds, so this *ānandamaya* modified is the cause of all diversities of *ānanda* in this world. For the *jīva* to enjoy all blessings along with Brahman, it is necessary to show that it possesses the same attributes as the Brahman, for two things cannot enjoy a common experience unless they belong to the same category. It became, therefore, necessary to prove that the *jīva* is made on the image of Brahman. This the *Taittirīya Upanishad* proves. The *annamaya* (physical body) is built on the mould given by the *prānamaya* (astral body). This, in its turn, is built upon the mould of the *manōmaya*, which again is built on the mould of the *viññānamaya*, which finally is built on the mould of the *ānandamaya*. The *ānandamaya* being Brahman, the *jīva* which is *viññānamaya*, is built on the image of the *ānandamaya* or Brahman, and is fitted to enjoy all blessings along with Brahman. Therefore, this *ānandamaya*, the inmost, is the real agent, and is the *paramaphala*, the highest fruit, reached by the *jīva* and this *ānandamaya* is the topic of the whole of the second *valli* of the *Taittirīya Upanishad*. The whole of this *Upanishad* leads up to this *ānandamaya* as the highest fruit obtained by the knower of the Brahman. Thus *ānandamaya* is the highest Brahman. When a *jīva* comes to know Brahman, it becomes *ānandamaya*. This *ānandamaya* vesture is a superphysical one. The *jīva*, however, is not *ānandamaya*. This is because of the impossibility of its being so. It is true in the state of Brahma-knowledge it enjoys *ānanda*, but it cannot be said to *become* on that account *ānandamaya*. For then the *jīva* would also become the creator of worlds like Brahman; and where would then be the transcendental uniqueness of the Supreme? *Ānandamaya* is the *giver* of bliss to the

*jīvas* and so he cannot be the *jīva*, as there is always a distinction between the obtained and the obtainer, the giver and the donee.

In commenting on I. 1. 31, Vallabha states that the attributes of the *jīva* are not in conflict with those of Brahman, because all the activities of the *jīva* are under the control of Brahman; *āsritatvāt* because of being under his protection. Brahman is the support of the *jīva* also; therefore all the activities of the *jīva* are under the command and control of Brahman. Therefore, *jīva* attributes may be properly said to be the attributes of Brahman. Thus, in his system of Vēdānta, Vallabha states that whatever view you may take—the *jīva* being a part of Brahman, or a combination of certain aspects of Brahman—the part being contained in the whole, the attributes of the *jīva* may be applied to Brahman. According to him, the word *iha* used in the *sūtra* (I. 1. 31) applies to both, *i.e.*, *iha āsritatvāt* and *iha tad yōgāt*. He says that this is so in his own system of Vēdānta—the Brahmvāda system as he calls it. In his system, *jīva* and *Brahman* are real and therefore we can properly say that Brahman is the support and *jīva* the supported. But according to Māyāvāda—the system of Sankara—*jīva* and *Brahman* are identical and so there can be no relation of the support and the supported between them. Similarly the *dharma*s of the principal life-breath may appropriately be applied to Brahman because of *iha tad yōgāt*. *Tad yōga* means *union with that*, the existence of the attributes of *prāna* in Brahman is not incompatible. Because *prāna* is in constant relation with Brahman, the qualities of *prāna* may also be said to be qualities of Brahman.

### Vignana Bhikshu and His System of Vedanta.

The next commentator on the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana was Vignāna Bhikshu, who is more famously known as the commentator on the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtras*. He has been assigned to about the middle of the 17th century. His commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* is known as *Vignānāmṛita*

*Bhāshya*, which is written from the Sāṅkhya standpoint. He is more inclined to theistic than to atheistic Sāṅkhya. His other works, the *Sāṅkhyapravachana-bhāshya*, which has been translated by Garbe, the *Yōgavārttika*, the *Yōga-sāra*, the *Sāṅkhyasāra*, the *Upanishad-bhāshya*, etc., show that he agrees with the Sāṅkhya doctrine as propounded in the Purāṇas, where both the diverse *puruṣhas* and the *prakṛiti* are said to be merged in the end in Īsvara, by whose will the creative process again begins in the *prakṛiti* at the end of each *pralaya*. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, but he remarks that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sāṅkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Īsvara it could explain all facts. (See Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 222-223 ; see also page 220.) He is independent and rational in his interpretation of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. Thus, as we have seen his interpretation of "atha" in I. 1. 1 that it occurs in Sūtra works and indicates the commencement of a new subject, is a thoroughly natural one and one to be expected from him. Though like Vallabha he interprets I. 1. 4 in such a manner as to make Brahman the material cause of the universe, his material cause is wholly different from that of Vallabha. If he treats the Sāṅkhya as an aspect of Vedānta, he makes the Vedānta itself square with the rationalism of the Sāṅkhya. He refuses to admit the *māya* theory of Sankara, for as an ardent exponent of the Sāṅkhya, he adheres to the personal individuality of souls. He, indeed, protests against Sankara's view which, he says, makes Brahman nothing more than the *sūnya* of the Buddhist School.

Vignāna Bhikshu is described as an ascetic who belonged to the Gauda country, corresponding to the modern Northern Bengal. Before he became a *sanyāsin*, he is said to have belonged to the Karnākarnika caste.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Karnākarnika*: A Kāyastha Brāhman. A Brāhman who followed the occupation of a Kāyastha is called a *Karnika*. A *Karnika* means one in a *Karana* or office, i.e., an official. (E.I.,

In the colophons found in his *Bhāshya*, he calls himself sometimes as *Vignānayati* and sometimes as *Vignāna-bhikshu*, the terms *yati* and *bhikshu* being synonymous and meaning an ascetic. He calls his work *Brahma Mīmāṃsa* and not *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsa*. He describes his *Bhāshya* as *ruju Bhāshya*, i.e., true *Bhāshya*. The term *Vignānāmrita-Bhāshya* would seem to indicate a *Bhāshya* of undoubted brilliance and wisdom by Vignāna Bhikshu, there being a play on the word *Vignāna*, the title of the work. In this *Bhāshya* which has been printed in the Chowkhambā Series (Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, 37 and 40), Vignāna Bhikshu refers to another work of his named *Upadēsaratnamāla*, which he calls a *prakaranam*.<sup>39</sup> (See his *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya*, Part I, page 62, line 20.) Copies of this work have not so far been traced. Pandit Mukunda Shastri, the editor of his *Bhāshya*, states that it is inferrable from his works that he wrote a *Gītā-Bhāshya* as well, but copies of it have not so far been found.

From the opening verse of his *Bhāshya*, we learn that Vignāna Bhikshu was the disciple of a *guru* whom he honoured as his Supreme Preceptor (*Antaryāmi Guru*). From this *guru*, Vignāna Bhikshu received enlightenment in Vedānta. At his feet he places his *Bhāshya* as his *guru*-

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1, 77 ; *E.I.*, IV, 104 ; *E.I.*, VIII, 153.) Brāhman Kāyasthas are even to-day in the majority in Upper India. (See Sherring's *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, 305 ; 308.) In Bombay, the Kāyasthas are described as a sub-caste of Brāhmanas. (*Revised Lists of Antiquarian Remains in Bombay Presidency*, VIII, 369.) For Kāyastha Brāhmanas, see *Bombay Gazetteer*, XVI, 41. A Kāyastha-Brāhmana grantee of a gift made by Govindachandra of Kanauj in Samvat 1171 (or A.D. 1115), describes himself thus : "The illustrious Jalhana, the learned, born of a Karnika and resembling Chitrugupta in worth, wrote the grant with delight for his fame." (*E.I.*, IV, 104.) On the subject of the *Origin and Status of the Kayasthas* see *Man in India*, XI, 116-159, where the whole evidence is set out and discussed ; also D. R. Bhandarkar's article on *What is a Kāyastha* in the *Puja Numbers of the Amrita Bazaar Patrika* for 1930 and 1931.

<sup>39</sup> *Lit.* a topic ; in modern parlance, it might be more properly described as a monograph, as it deals with a single topic.

*dakshina*. He churned, he says, the Sruti, Smriti and Nyāya Sāstra with the aid of Brāhmins<sup>40</sup> and the result was the great nectar of knowledge—*Gnānāmṛita*—(*Vignānāmṛita Bhāshya*) which he placed before his guru to win his grace. Kutarkins and Pākhandas (who are compared to *dānavas* and *asuras* of old) are said to have been deceived and defeated by the confusion (*mōha*) caused among them by those who had partaken of the nectar of his *Bhāshya*. Vignāna Bhikshu prays that these also may attain the feet of his *guru*, for their work—like his own—was equally meritorious. Who are the *Kutarkins* and *Pākhandas*<sup>41</sup> whom his *Bhāshya* helped to confound? The false logicians and heretics referred to are obviously those whom he stigmatizes as those who postulate *akhandataya*.<sup>42</sup>

According to the Sruti texts *Brahmaavidūpnoti param, Brahmapēda Brahmaiva Bhavati, Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti*, etc., Brahmagāna is the chief factor for realizing Paramapurushārtha. And the Śruti

<sup>40</sup> *Bhūdvēbhyō* is the word used.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Pākhandā Chandāla yōhō-pāpārambhakayō-mrigīva vrikayō-bhīrurgatāgōcharam*. Kālidāsa, *Mālavikāgnimitra*, V. 24.

<sup>42</sup> The following is a condensed rendering of the opening verses of Vignāna Bhikshu's *Bhāshya* :—

My prostrations are due to him who pervades the universe and in whom everything has its being and by whom all is created.

I bow to him who is in the Supreme form of Chidachidsakti.

I, Vignāna Bhikshu, who having been taught by my holy preceptor (*antaryāmi guru*), who ever remains in my heart of hearts and from whom I received this great enlightenment, to him I tender this *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtra* as *guru-dakshina*.

After having churned the milk ocean of Sruti, Smriti and Nyāya, with the aid of all Brāhmins, the nectar of knowledge (*gnānāmṛita*) came into being. That I place before my *guru* to win his grace.

Let those who partake of this nectar by deceiving the array of *dānavas* in the shape of false arguers (*Kutarkins*) by *mōha* (i.e., confounding them by arguments) and winning (victory) over the large array of *asuras* who masquerade in the guise of *pākhandas*, swallowing it through their meditation and wisdom, attain the feet of my *guru*.



texts *Ātmētyēvōpāsūtha sama ātmēti vidyāth tamēva dhīrō vīgnāya pragyām kuruvīta Brāhmaṇa iti*, etc., declare that Brahman should be meditated upon in the form of *ātma* according to the *vidhi* prescribed in Srutis. Then arise the questions: (1) What is Brahman (*Kim Brahma*)? (2) What is the state of Brahman (*Kim Brahmata*)? Is it beyond conception? What is *Brahmagnāna*? And what is the result of realizing *Brahmagnāna*? These questions engage the minds of all *Mumukshus* (i.e., those in search of *Mōksha*). In the Srutis, however, there are seeming contradictions, perhaps due to the differences in the opinions of the Rishis who belonged to different Sākhya. And, therefore, in order to determine that *gnāna*, the help of *Brahma Mīmāṃsa* is desired. Verily, it may be said that in *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* alone, Dharmajignāsa and the ways and means of determining *Brahmagnāna* are dealt with. This is the most important dharma (*ayantu paramō dharmah*): Yoga from which, according to the Sruti, *ātmadarsana* is attained. The *āchārya* says that throughout the Vedānta, what is expounded in the *Sūtra sarva vēdānta pratyayam chodanādya visēshat*, etc. (*If you want to attain Brahmagnāna, you should examine the whole of the Vedānta*) is what is chiefly dealt with in it—the means for the attainment of *Brahmagnāna*. Here some *Kutarkins*, while acknowledging the Vedānta for the purpose of attaining *gnāna*, afterwards discard it. This should not be so. Though generally speaking Dharma has been clearly explained in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* in order to fix *Brahmagnāna*, the *Kalpa Sūtras* set out in brief and in detail the manner of effectuating *Brahmagnāna* (*Brahmagnāna Sādhana*). The Sruti texts *Satyam gnānāmanantam Brahma, Vignānam ānandam Brahma*, etc., determine Brahmasvarūpatva which can be realized by *jignāsa*. It is only in Sāṅkhya Sastra that *jīva chaitanya* principles (*siddham*) are clearly explained. If it is asked what is this *chaitanyam* and what is its form, the reply is that that is verily the beginning of the *Brahma Mīmāṃsa Sāstram*, wherein Bhagavān Vēdavyāsa formulated the Sruti text *Athāthō Brahmajignāsa*.

In commenting on Sūtra, I. 1. 1., *Athāthō Brahma-jignāsa*, Vignāna Bhikshu says that *Aththa* indicates by mere utterance authority and auspiciousness (*adhikāra-vāchaka* and *mangalarūpa*). Authority shows the exact subject that it deals with in particular. *Brahma* is the only subject for discussion as agreed to by others also ; and this is to be proved and established as realized. And all other subsidiary discussions lead to the same Brahman, beyond which there is none other. Hence, finally, *Brahma* alone is realized (*Brahmaiva labdham*). Therefore, realization of Brahman is the sole use for the word *Atha* (i.e., the use of the word *Atha* is to indicate the realization of Brahman).

*Atha* denotes "in the present one" and signifies that the realization of Brahman is fixed as its *avadhi* (limit). Since its *avadhi* is Brahman, the *sūtras* have nothing to do with *Parabrahma*. The word *Athaha* is in the *panchami vibhakti* and since it is in that *vibhakti*, it shows here the limit (*avadhi*). (This is so according to Pāṇini.) Even prior to the realization of *Brahmagnāna*, the word *Athaha* is placed in the *Sūtra* to cast a reflection of the final objective in view, i.e., the realization of the *Brahmagnāna*. Verily at the end of the work, the *Sūtra Anāvrīti Sabdāt Anāvrīti Sabdāt*, concludes with an emphatic application of the word *Anāvrīti*, repeated twice over, showing that the limit (*avadhi*) of the *Sūtra* has been reached. Therefore, *athaha* shows the *pūrva avadhi* or starting limit and *anāvrīti*, the *uttara* or final limit. Thus, by viewing the starting and final limits (*pūrva* and *parānta dvayā avadhāranē sati*), there can be no hesitation on the part of disciples to understand the whole gist of the *mahāvākyas* of the *Mīmāṃsa Sāstra* as accurately limited by the venerable author of the *Sūtras* by the first and the last *Sūtras* (*ādyantāvadhi*). The words *athāthō* and *atha* as stated in the *Smṛiti* texts, as declared by Gōbhilā, well indicate the ways and intentions and the procedural method to be followed in the carrying out of *karma*, just as a torch shows the way out of darkness. That they show anything beyond this *adhikāra* is not correct.

*Brahmajignāsa* means *Brahmanaha jignāsa*: discussion about Brahman and therefore *athaha* indicates the starting point for those disciples who are earnest in their quest for *Brahmagnāna*. Brahman in its secondary sense means Vēda, Hiranyagarbha, etc. It must not be said that Brahmajignāsa is the discussion of Vedic interpretation or discussion of Hiranyagarbha, etc. Jignāsa here primarily means the discussion and establishing of the *Mīmāṃsa Sāstra*. For *jignāsa* is very commonly applied in practice to the discussion of the *Mīmāṃsa Sāstra* as is seen in *Athāthō Dharma jignāsa* which is the *pratignāsūtra* of the *Purva-Mīmāṃsa*. *Jignāsa* suggests that the discussion should go on until the realization of Brahman is attained and this should be done with the aid of the evidence afforded by the Vedānta and that with the aid of *tattu samanvayāt*. From this Sūtra begins *Brahmagnāna jignāsa*. We should not go beyond the limits thus laid down in this and the succeeding *Sūtrās*; if we did so, we would not attain the realization of the Brahman we aim at as our objective. While this is so, *modern* Vedāntins, who are well versed, by reason of their vast knowledge, postulate that *karma* alone will not do, depending on the Sruti text *avidyayā mrutyum tīrthva vidyayāmrutamasnute iti* (absolve yourself of *avidya* by *karma* and then, being liberated from the clutches of death, pass into the region of celestial bliss through the realization of *vidya*, i.e., Brahma-*vidya*). They say that after getting freed from the hands of death by the performance of *karma*, one should begin the discussion of Brahman in order to realize *Brahmagnāna*. Therefore it is, they add, that *Brahmajignāsa* should be undertaken. And they further state that the word *kartavya* should be understood in the Sūtra, which they would read fully thus: *Athathō Brahma-jignāsa kartavya iti*.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Vignāna Bhikshu quotes *Upakramōpasamhāra*, etc., appearing in *Anandatīrtha*, I. 1. 4. He refers also to *Sādhana-chatushtaya* and considers *Sanyāsa* at length. *Sanyāsa* is, he says, the giving up of sixty-four *karmas*; but a man wishing a son should follow them. If so, how to reconcile these statements? According to Vignāna Bhikshu,

At the end of I. 1. 1. Vignāna Bhikshu says that in the *Brahmasūtras* there are no data for *Jīva-Brahmaikya*, for it is said in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. '*Brahmasūtra padaischaiva hētu madbhīhi vinischitaihi iti* (*Bhagavad-Gita*, XIII. 4), from which it will be seen that it declares that in the *Brahmasūtras* the subject-matter dealt with is only *Brahman*, which is its chief topic of discussion. While this is so, to postulate *Jīva-Brahmaikya* as its chief subject of discussion would be contradictory to the meaning attaching to the *Mahāvākya* (I. 1. 1.). In the shape of *Sūtras*, in certain *Adhikaranas*, it has been aptly stated, without ambiguity, that *Brahman* is the residue left over (*Brahmasēshatayaiva*). In all the *adhikaranas* of the *Brahmasūtras*, *Jīvatatva* is clearly explained with adequate proofs, until the *jīvatatva* reaches *Brahmatatva* (*Brahmasēshatayaiva*) as its final stage. And in the *adhikaranas* explaining the *prānatatva*, the *jīvatatva* is discussed at length. At any rate, even though the meaning of the *Mahāvākya* is that *Brahman* is declared as equal to *Ātman* (*Brahmātmataiva*), the *Ātman* being spoken of in terms of *Brahman*, yet the argument is overthrown that *Ātman* is *Brahman* itself (*Brahmatvēnaiva ātmatva-mākshiptvam ityāśayaha*). Though in the *Sruti* text *Brihat-vāt Brahmanātvātcha ātmā Brahmeṭi gīyata iti*, the words *Ātma* and *Brahma* are used to denote the same meaning

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this is the *Pratignā Sūtra* which begins the work. It fixes the *vidhi* (*samadamādi*, etc.). It states how *Brahmagnāna* is to be attained. It should not be interpreted in a manner not warranted by the wording (*viparītārthakalpana*). It does not suggest we should give up all *karmas*—*Sarvakarmatyāga*—and then begin *jignāsa*. Vignāna Bhikshu defines *Bhikshu* as *Ātmannevātmanābhudhya nāstyā*. He quotes:—

*Sarvaparigraha avyaktalingō vyaktascha charēt bhikshu samā hitaha.*

*Tridandam kundikāmchaiva sūtram chāpi kapālikam*

*Jantūnām vāranām vastram sarvam bhikshu idam tyajēt.*

(*Vishnu Dharma Vākya, Paramahansa Prakarana.*)

A *Paramahansa* should abandon the following:—tridanda, kundika (kamandalu, i.e., waterpot), yagnōpavīta, kapālika (begging bowl made of skull), and raiments of cloth worn (already) by others. (See Vignāna Bhikshu's *Brahmasūtra-Bhūshya*, I, 1, 1.)

(*arthaikyā*), in our opinion (*asmin matē*) the defect in the Sūtra cannot be doubted. (As in the Sūtra *Athāthō Brahmajignāsa*, the word *Brahma* is only used, without either *jīva* or *ātma*, the defect cannot be doubted.) Because the subject dealt with is only *Brahman*; the intention being to obtain Brahmagnāna, though there be a residue of karma left over. As is propounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*: *Brahmanyādhāya karmāni sangam tyaktvā karōti yaha lipyatē na sa pāpēna padmapatramivāmbhasā*, V. 10.),—he who assigning all karma in Brahman, without desire of any fruit, will be quite free from all misery, just as the lotus leaf, though in the midst of water, does not stick to any particle of it. This affords support to our statement.<sup>43</sup>

Commenting on Sūtra I. 1. 2, Vignāna Bhikshu states that *Jagat* is *nitya* and that *Parabrahman* is possessed of *Sakti* and that he has no *vikāra*. *Parabrahman* joins *Prakriti* and *Purusha* and creates. He is the author of *vikāra* but is not himself touched by *vikāra*. *Jagat* is *upādānakārana*, which *Prakriti* and *Purusha* utilize for creation through *Parabrahman*. *Parabrahma rūpa* has many *gunas* (*atyanta sammisrarūpēna*), far removed from *Prakriti* and *Purusha*. *Parabrahman* is *akhandā*; and *Brahman* is different from *vyavahāra*. There is no *Sruti* text for *ēkatva*. It cannot be accepted that *abhēda* is merely for *upādāna* purposes and that after Brahmagnāna is obtained, there is no *bhēda*. There is *bhēda*. *Kēvala aikyatva* is nowhere postulated. In *Bhēda vākyas*, there is considerable means to *mōksha* promised. If *mōksha* is to be gained, that is to be obtained only by the person who has the sense of *bhēda*. *Mōksha* is only for such a *gnāni*. *Abhēda vākyas* are all included in the *bhēda vākyas* and not independent of them. *Avidya* cannot be removed by *abhēda gnāna* by itself. *Abhēda gnāna* can by itself never remove *avidya*, which is the cause of misery. By *bhēda* being abused,

<sup>43</sup> *Vignāna Bhikshu* may be briefly described as *Ātma-Brahmaikyā Bhēdavādin*. He may also be spoken of as *Samavādabhēdin*, i.e., one who holds that *Jīva* and *Brahman* are *sama*; but he holds that the *Jīva* does not find *aikyā* with *Brahman*.

Sruti texts declaring *bhēda* are not lost. Some are for *bimbavāda*; while others are for *pratibimbavāda*. By *agnāna*, it is said, *bhēda* is seen; this is wrong. Srūti also declare doubt. *Svapna* and *jāgrata* are terms in opposition; similarly, *bandha* and *mōksha* are also in opposition in Srutis and Smritis. That which *gnāna* signifies is *akhandā*—Jīva and Brahma *akhandā*; it is a means to *bandha* and not to *mōksha*. However much the Mukta may think of Brahman by himself—*ēkānlhakarana*—a Mukta is an *amsa* and not *amsī*. There is space in a pot (*ghata*); if it is broken, it becomes one with the space without it. There can be no difference between the two. Though *ghata* looks separate, *amsa* and *amsī* are not different; similarly, *jīva* is always keeping the Paramātma in his mind and can meditate on him and not become *aikya* with *Paramātma*. The *antahkarana* of *jīva* is *Paramātma*; the *Paramātma* is different. *Jīva* cannot therefore become one with *Paramātma*. Even Kapila and others have expressed in *bhēda* form what is declared definitely as *bhēda* in the Sruti. The following texts are taken from the *Kapila Sūtras* :—

- (1) *Janmādi vyavasthathā purushabakūtvam.*
- (2) *Upādhibhēdhē apēkasya nānāyōga ākāsasyēva ghatā-dibhihi.*
- (3) *Upādhirbhidyatē natu tadvañ.*
- (4) *Ēvamēkatvēna parivartamānasya naviruddhya dharmādhyasaha.*
- (5) *Nā-advaita sruti virōdhō jātiparatvāt iti.<sup>44</sup>*

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<sup>44</sup> The following is a translation of the above Sūtras :—

- (1) Since *Janma*, etc., are eternal; so *jīvas* are innumerable.
- (2) On account of a certain disguise which is not true, the same is seen in many forms with different combinations just as the space in a pot is seen as different from the space outside.
- (3) When disguise is removed, the real is seen to undergo no change.
- (4) When the real one undergoes several series of changes, there can be no change for the real one.
- (5) The *virōdhas* seen in the *Advaita* srutis do not refer to class (*jāti*) distinctions.

Ātma is one. Though the various disguises (*upādhis*), in the form of *janma* and *marana*, do not refer to unaffected *chaitanyas*, as proved by the Srutis and the Smritis, these *chaitanyas* are always in their respective places. The terms "He is born", "He is dead", etc., do not refer to them. *The chaitanyas are innumerable and are not undivided like continuous Ākāśa.* This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*. In the Srutis, *bhēda* is declared and if *abhēda* is also to be declared from them, then it must be settled by *tarka*.

In *bhēda* if we are to understand *abhēda*, it (that matter) can only be decided by *tarka*, says Kapilāchārya. But you should not postulate *upādhi* to Brahma and lightly discuss *abhēda*. Of course, the Srutis afford much ground for doubt. From the second *Sūtra*, we infer that though *upādhi* is true, it gives no change for the *ātma* by its combination. The Real is always above *upādhi* (i.e. *upādhi* cannot affect the Real). From the third *Sūtra*, we learn that *upādhi* is itself different in nature ; *upādhi* itself cannot in any way affect the *jīva* towards its birth, death, etc. The idea that "I am included in all" belongs to the *jīva*. The difference seen through *upādhi* is transitory and of a *viruddha* (contradictory) nature, because on the destruction of *upādhi*, the real becomes undisputedly manifested. In the fifth *Sūtra*, the chief *ātma* is throughout declared one. The Srutis say that the *jīvas* are many as seen in their classes and are different ; but *ātma* is throughout one. In order to declare the mutual differences inherent in *jīvas*, their ordinary qualities (*lakshanas*) are mentioned by the Srutis. Finally, the Srutis declare the *lakshana* of the Supreme (*Parairlakshnaya*) as being the same. Similarly, throughout the *Sāṅkhya*, this *vishēsha* (peculiarity) is maintained. *Sāṅkhya* like the *Brahma Mīmāṃsa* plainly declares the *vibhāga lakshana* in terms of *amsa* and *amsī* as a constant one, just as sparks of fire are to the fire itself (*agni visphulingavat amsāmsi bhēda vibhāgalakshanō vakshyate*). In the *Sūtras avibhāgāni drishtatvāt*, etc., though the unity (*aikya*) of *ātma* is considered to be of an

insignificant kind, at the time of final realization (*bandha mōkshādi vyavastha*) the *ātma* is given a higher place than the *jīva* (i.e., a greater weight than the *jīva*). Though the Srutis point to difference on account of *upādhi* to the *jīva*, yet in the Sruti text *Niranjanah paramamsāmya-mupaiti yathāgniragnau sanskshiptah samānatvam anuvrajēt*, it is also declared that the *jīva* will attain a position of *paramasāmyatva*, just as fire when thrown into fire assumes an equal form. In the same way, even though the *jīvātma* is equal to the *Paramātma*, the *yogis* declare that at the time of *Mōksha*, difference will still exist in the form of equality (*mokshakālēpi bhēda ghatitam sāmyam srūyate*) and there is nothing more of the *upādhi*.

As we have seen, Vignāna Bhikshu couples the first and the last Sūtras of the *Brahma-Sūtras* when commenting on IV. 4. 22. In commenting on the latter, *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvritti sabdāt*, he again insists on the limit (*avadhi*) prescribed by it. Those who realize Kārya Brahma or enter that Parabrahma form in order to enjoy everlasting bliss do not return to birth (i.e., they have no re-birth) because they have no further re-births. If it is asked why, the reply is *Sabdāt Brahmālōka abhisampadyate na cha punarāvartate iti*, etc., which is a clear authority (for the position). The previous statement that the *jīva* would have to experience further misery is untrue, because he has no other thing to enjoy except endless bliss in Brahmālōka, which is eternal and free from all misery. Those who meditate upon Kāraṇa Brahma also will at once realize Brahman and there will not be the remotest cause for their coming into existence again. This is declared in the Sruti texts. For it is said in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* by Śrī Krishna :—

आवृत्तमुवनाल्लोकाः पुनरावर्तिनोऽर्जुन ।

मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

(भगवद्गीता—८-१६.)

*Ābrahmabhuvanāllōkāh punarāvartinōrjuna ।*

*Māmupētya tu Kaunteya punarjanma na vidyatē ॥*

(*Bhagavad-Gītā*, VIII, 16.)



(Oh Arjuna ! When one reaches the home of bliss finally in order to realize Me, there is to him no such thing as a return to birth.)

It must not be apprehended that there will be further cause of birth after reaching Vishnulōka, for it is said by Srī Krishna himself to Arjuna that there would be no such further cause for birth. Therefore, there is no contradiction. Hence it is that Bādarāyana expressly uses the words *Anāvṛitti sabdāt anāvṛitti sabdāt* in a comprehensive and emphatic manner repeating the words twice over. The whole of the *Brahma Mīmāṃsa* has been here brought to an end in a very sententious manner by Bādarāyana. The quality of *chētana* (consciousness) is that it is always desirous of seeking *gnāna* and it consists of *māyākṣhya nija sakti* (i.e., it possesses an inherent power called *māyā*), by which *Sarvēśvara Brahman* manifests himself to the world in the form *upādhi* consisting of *klēsa* and *karma* and their results. With this, he, in combination with *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa* and their mutual interactions, brings into existence Mahat and the rest of the creation, though in the same way as a spider, which puts out from its body its finest fabrics and finally inheres into itself the whole of what it has put forth ; he himself entering into creation, sustains it by his power ; through Prakṛiti establishes it ; through Karma gives the fruits thereof just like a Maharaja, who doles out the fruits of their labour to his servants, gifts for meritorious service rendered or punishment for mistakes committed by them ; and finally at the end draws everything into himself in the form of *upasamhāra* (i.e., destruction) and remains alone himself just as a vast ocean is seen with its series of waves undergoing change every moment in the form of transformation effected by Mahēndrajāla. So in *pralaya*, though the universe is seen in the vast ocean as a mere speck, thus proving that the world is different (*bhinnam*) from the vast sheet of water, yet the Sruti says *Sarvaṃ khalvidam Brahma tatjalāni iti*, meaning thereby that there is no difference between them. The apparent difference that is seen is mere *Vāchārambhana* (i.e., mere

expression and no more) just as the waves of the ocean and bubbles in the water which last but a moment. This is like *mahēndrajāla* (i.e., jugglery). All living creatures in the world are so many rays of the sun, so many particles (*amsa*) of the Brahman, and are therefore subordinate in character to him. Therefore, *Prakṛiti* and *jīva* behave as quite subordinate in character to Brahman and are both unreal and unrealizable just like things seen in the dreams and hence untrue. Also, Brahman himself being environed by *Māya* and being both separate and combined with *jīva*, manifests himself in an extraordinary manner and yet is unaffected by faults. Hence he behaves quite independently and as the chief Ātma of the *pañcavimsati tattva*<sup>45</sup> in the *jīva*. Like the threads which woven lengthwise and breadthwise form a cloth, he (Brahman) having joined the *Jīva*, as *Kārya* and *Kāraṇa*, makes the *Jīva* the *bhōktā* (the enjoyer of the fruits). *Jīva* being a lifeless *jada*, he remains manifest in the *jada* in the form of *prāṇa* under the name of *anātmā*. This same *Paramātmā* is termed *Parabrahman* throughout the whole of the *Vēdānta*, as the essence of all its truths and he is realizable through *samādhamādi sādhana* by wise men, who keep mentally meditating on him — *samamātmā iti, sō aham iti*. Finally, realizing that it is not *jīva* but only an illusion created by *Māya* which pervaded him, he on the disappearance of the influence created by *Māya*, enjoys *Brahmasākshātkāra*. Then *avidyā*, *karma*, *dharma* and *adharma* and all other causes of worldly miseries entirely leave him and he becomes a *Mukta*, as the *Sruti* says:

*Nathasya prāṇā utkrāmanti iti* (to him there is no expiration of life).

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<sup>45</sup> Literally, the twenty-five elementary principles of creation. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy so-called enumerates twenty-five *tattvas* or true principles. Its chief object is the final emancipation of the twenty-fifth *tattva*, i.e., the *Purusha* or Soul, from the bonds of this worldly existence by conveying a correct knowledge of the twenty-four other *tattvas* and by properly discriminating the soul from them.

On the other hand, the *jīva* who is environed by *Māya* (*Māyā jīva*) meditates upon that same (*Māya*) form of Brahman. He who out of his incapacity is unable to meditate upon that form of *Māyātirikta Brahma* (Brahman form free from *Māya*) has to go through *archarādi mārga* through the merit of his meditation upon *apratīkāḷambana upāsana* and thereby reach out of the environments of *Brahmānda* and go to *Māyā Sabala* form of *Kāraṇa Brahman*, who is *Hiranyagarbha*, and entering in him, out of the grace of *Paramēśvara*, assume the *līlāvātāra* form in the end and enter into *Parabrahma* form, for it is said :—

उपक्रमोपसंहार वभ्यासापूर्वताफलम् ।

अर्थवादोपपत्तिश्च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यं निश्चये ॥

इति बृहत्संहितायां.

*Upakramōpasamhāra vabhyāsa apūrvatā phalam ।*

*Arthavādōpapattischa lingam tātparyā nischaye ॥*

(*Brihatsamhita.*)

This is the gist of all the *Vēdānta* in its symbolic devotion. Since Brahman is the one that remains in the end, it has to be held that it is what is proved by the whole *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*, in which is embodied the *jīvatattva* in its entirety, without whose help *Pūrvamūlāmśa* and its proofs would be rendered useless. It must not be said here that Brahman being stated to be *akhanda*, that it contradicts the principles of *jīvatattvanirūpana*.<sup>46</sup> For if it were so, the *Pratignā Sūtra* at the beginning (*Athāthō Brahma jignāsa*) ought to have been *athāthō Jiva-Brahmaikya jignāsa iti*. There would have been no necessity for a second *pratigna* to consider *Brahman* and *jīva* as *akhanda* (i.e., undivided). For what is this *akhandata* in Brahman (i.e., indivisibility of Brahman)? If *Brahman* and *jīva* were *akhanda*, why is it that throughout the *Sūtras* it is nowhere seen clearly (that it is so). How could such a thing be invented as a matter of grace (*dayā*)? And therefore such an invention is

<sup>46</sup> This is the Advaita argument. If Brahman is *akhanda*, then the Advaitin would say that there is no place for the *jīva*. This cannot be conceded, says Vignāna Bhikshu. In that case I. 1. 1. would have been, he suggests, differently worded.

contradicted by Mumukshus, who accept only what is clearly enunciated in the Sruti and leave off that which is left unsaid as contrary to it (*Katham sraddhadhīran iti dik*).

Commenting on *Sūtra* I. 1. 1, Vignāna Bhikshu discusses at length the main principles of his interpretation. He says that *abhēda* is *avibhāga lakshana*; there is therefore *sāmya* between *jīva* and *Brahman*. The *Sūtra* does not clearly state that *jīva* is one with Brahman in the *akhandā* form. But it clearly states that *jīva* and *Brahman* are radically different, as acceded to by the *Sūtras* *adhikantu bhēdanirdeśāt*, etc. Even the *Amsa* *Sūtras* treat of the terms *jīva* and *Brahman* in terms of *Amsa* and *Amsī* (the part and the whole). And, therefore, we have also to understand in the same way in the *Brahma Mīmāṃsa siddhānta*.

Even the *Sūtrakara* Bhagavān Vyāsa holds in the *Sūtra* that *Brahman* and *jīva* are in the same relation as the father is to the son in the *Amsī bhava* and *Amsa*. And, therefore, *jīva* and *Brahman* can never be said to be one like *ākāśa*.

The *Sāṅkhya* says that *Mōksha* is the result of the *gnāna* which the *jīva* attains in recognizing the *svarūpa* of *Brahman* when it loses the sense of *aham*. *No more am I (ahambuddhādī nivartitobhavatī)*. According to the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*, the ego (I) vanishes and the *jīva* sees Brahman before him and says "I am before that Brahman who is my *Ātma* and therefore I see him alone as my *Ātma*; I see no other."

According to the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*, the *jīva* realizes that form of *ātmavā* whereby it enables it to call itself "I am in the same form as Brahman. I can enjoy bliss as Brahman does. I am a subordinate of *Īsvara*" (*Īsvara paratantra*). This is the fundamental difference that exists between the present day wrong interpreters (*Kulalpakānām*) who state that *jīva* and *Brahman* form a single *akhandātma*, and the followers of the *Sāṅkhya* and *Naiyāyika* schools who consider that *jīva* and *Brahman* are different from each other in the forms of *sēsha* and *sēshi* (the remainder and the whole) in two (different) forms.

In the same way, according to the reasoning in the *Yama Purāna*, the Sruti texts *yēshata ātmāntaryāmyamrutah*; *sama ātmēti vidyāt*; *tatvamasi*; etc., are thus interpreted: *Jīva* and *Brahman* differ so far as to be divided as *amsa* and *amsī*. Therefore, how can these two be called as one and the same? Being *amsa* and *amsī* in their true forms, the words *tat* and *tvam* remain different from each other.

According to the Sruti text *Tantvōpanishadam puruṣham pricāchāmi* (I ask that Aupanishad puruṣha thus), the Vedas deal with *Brahman* and *ātma* as their subject; so also declare the Smritis. Thus while *Brahman* and *ātma* differ from each other as *amsī* and *amsa*, how can *ātma* become finally one with *Brahman* (*Brahmātmatāvagati phalakatvāt*)? *Ātma* results in attaining Brahmatā as the result of *gnāna*. But not as the Sruti says:—*Na cha tadātmyamidam sarvaṃ sa ātmēti*: I am not one with Brahman but have attained a state of equality with Brahman; for the equality with Brahman has already been obtained. According to the Sruti texts *Aitadātmyam iti*, etc., which say that Brahman is the ultimate form of *prapancha* in its *svarūpa*, the question arises whether the character of Brahman is divided from *prapancha*. Take *ghata* (pot) and the *mrid* (earth), which it is in another form; it cannot be said that *mrid* is the *ghata* form. The answer is that *mrid* is not the form of *ghata*, in its character. Similarly *chētana* is not of the form of *ātma*; because *chētana* represents the whole and *ātma* a part. Therefore in the expression *tatvamasi*, the word *tat* denotes the all-pervading form of Brahman, and *tvam* denotes merely the part (*i.e.*, the *jīva*); this shows the division of the part from the whole. This is the difference that prevails in the expression *tatvamasi* and shows the difference between *tvam* and *aham* (yourself and myself)<sup>47</sup> both in their form and in their meaning (*sabdarthatvāt*). The terms “Myself” and “My” (*aham* and *mama*) do not convey the relationship of “master”

<sup>47</sup> Cf. with *Sankara Bhūshya*, I. 1. 1.

and "servant" (*svasvāmi*) as between them and therefore in the *Pāṭanjali Sūtras* in the Sūtra, *Svasvāmi saṅkhyōs-svarūpōpalabdhihētu samyōga iti*, the term *samyōga* means the result of combining one with the other, *sva* with *svāmi*. And therefore in the Sruti texts, *Atthathā ātmā dēsa, atthathā ahamkāra dēsa*, etc., a repetition is seen. In the *Sāṅkhya Kārika*, such a repetition is not seen—*nāsmi, namē, nāham*, etc.,—which plainly shows a clear difference between *sva* and *svāmi*. According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārika*, *ātma* in its entirety is prohibited from becoming one with Brahman (*sva svāmyasya pratiśēdhat iti*). But *ātma* claims equality with Brahman (*tēshām ātmatōchchatē*). The fact of the *jīva* addressing *Īsvara* in terms of "You" and "I") cannot possibly maintain the unity of *jīva* with Brahman as it would be a clear contradiction. By using the terms "You" and "I" (*Tvam* and *Aham*) in addressing *Īsvara*, a meaning contradictory to unity is implied. If the *jīva* gives utterance through its mouth to the words (*Tvam* and *Aham*), it is clear that the *jīva* addresses one before him (Brahman) who is quite different from himself. Such addressing establishes the truth that Brahman and *jīva* are different. To indicate this difference between Brahman and *jīva*, the terms *tvam* and *aham* were used by the Guru in the text *tatvamasi*. The Sruti texts *Nānyatōsti drashtā srōtā mantā bōdhya*, etc., point out that it is none other than *Paramātmā* that the *jīva* perceives before him and that it is none other from whom he hears. All this clearly shows that *jīva* and Brahman are as servant (*karthru*) and master (*svasvāmi*). While this is so, *ādhanikas* (modern teachers) while determining the meaning of the expression *tatvamasi* say that the expressions *tvam* and *aham* denote *jīva* only; and on the basis of the Sruti texts like *kōna ātmā*, etc., interpret the meaning just as they please, following in this the common usage, though the interpretation is not one warranted (by the text). In this world, if one asks, "*kōham*" (who am I), the answer appears to be "*amukasthvam asi*" (thou art this self) and nothing more. In our opinion, the expressions

*tvam* and *aḥam*, from the very nature of the meanings attaching to them, without contradicting (*nahīyate*), imply two different agencies, similar in form (*sāmānyarūpēnaiva*), conveying to the understanding two different beings with their respective characteristics. This is in conformity with the general usage current in the world.

However, though the expressions *tattvamēva* (That thou art) and *tvamēvatat* (Thou art that) are expressions mutually interchangeable (*paraspara vyatīhāra vākya*) and appear to expel a conclusive dissimilarity in meaning (*vaidharmya*) and a clear difference (*bhēda*), still in order to release the *jīva* from all the burdens of the *samsāra*, through meditation and *upāsana*, and to realize *Paramātma svarūpa*, the two different forms of *ātma* and *Brahman* are clearly explained without contradiction in *sva* and *svasvarūpa*, as postulated in the Smṛiti texts *Echchāpyēvam sakalam jātam api sarvam pratishthitam ; sa ēva jīvaha sukha duhkha bhōktā*, etc., which plainly indicate that it is the result of the meditation on Brahman in his undivided form (*avibhāgēnōpāsanaṁ vidadhāti*). This is in accordance with the Smṛiti texts<sup>48</sup> *Vibhēda janakē gnānē nāsam ātyantikam gatē ; ātmanōbrahmanābhēdam asāntam kimkarishyati*, etc., which declare that one who meditates upon God with the knowledge that he and Brahman are different from each other and who by his knowledge is able to distinguish between *dharma* and *adharma* and who, by his attachment to his carnal body, which attachment is completely expelled by the true knowledge of Brahman, which he gains in the end, will at no time again speak of the *jīva* and Brahman as *avibhāga* (undivided), all cause (for such postulating) having been removed. Again, in the *Gautami Tantra* is the declaration *Yadi jīvah parāt bhinnaha kāryatāmēti suvrata, achitvameha prasajjēta ghatavat panditō mata*, which says that if the *jīva* is entirely different from *Parabrahman*, *para* meaning *ananta*

<sup>48</sup> Vignāna Bhikshu quotes the *Vishnu Purāna* in support of his position.

or unending, then at the time of *pralaya*, according to the declaration of the Advaita Sruti texts, even a lifeless *ghata* (jar) would behave like an animate *jīva* and become capable of independent action. In such a case, according to the Smṛiti texts *Kṣhētragnam chāpi mām viddhi*<sup>49</sup> (understand that I am the knower of all the source of origin) etc., *amsa* and *amsī* would then have to be interpreted as indivisible. This results in a great contradiction inasmuch as the difference between the terms *amsī* and *amsa*, as explained in I. 1. 3 in terms of *Brahman* and *ātma* will be rendered meaningless and we will have to interpret *śakti* and *śakta* as indivisible and this is obviously contradictory (*dīk*). Those who are Tārīkikas (logicians) usually ignore that characteristic of indivisible unity (*avibhāga lakṣhaṇa bhēdamapi*), and consider only for the sake of meditation that *ātma* and *Brahman* are different terms (*Bhēda vākyāni*) and thus in their opinion the Sruti texts which censure *bhēda* (difference between *ātma* and *Brahman*) are rendered inapplicable. A mutual contradiction is thereby made to arise, so that finally in the *Pāramārthika* stage, where meditation enables the realization of Brahman, the position reached is one of *Bhēdā-bhēda*, which renders the meaning of the Sruti texts fruitless; and for this reason, the *bhēda* Sūtras which champion the *bhēda* position (*bhēdasādhaka*)<sup>50</sup> *Adhikantu bhēda nirdēsat*, etc., which declare *bhēda*, conclusively prove that *jīva* and *Brahman* assume the divided condition (*vibhāga rūpa*) of *amsa* and *amsī*. And therefore throughout, from the beginning to the end, continuously, the *jīva* and *Brahman* prove to be two distinct forms naturally, eternally and truthfully, divided from each other and the idea that *jīva* and *Brahman* are one and indivisible (*i.e.*, without a division between them) and that the *jīva* becomes one with the *Brahman* through an accidental change, is only a characteristic mode of expression (*Vāchārambhana mātramiti visēshaka*). This is generally what the defenders of

<sup>49</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIII, 3.

<sup>50</sup> *Bhēdasādhaka bhēda sūtrēshu*, etc.



Brahmādvaita declare when they speak of “*ātma* being one with *Brahman*”.

This is further dealt with in the third *Sūtra* (*Tattu samanvayāt*) where the difference caused by the mutual contradictions of the Brahmadvaitins is clearly explained and the fact that the *jīva* is absolutely different from *Īsvara* (*Jīvād atyanta bhinna ēva Īsvaraḥ Brahmasabdārtha iti*) is the meaning conveyed by the term *Brahman*. This is the final conclusion (*iti siddhaha*). And in that this is the greater peculiarity, *viz.*, *māya*, which is quite different from *jīva*, is the chief cause of creation, etc., of the world. And accordingly it is always Brahman's will to inculcate into *Māya* the power of such creation. And therefore the word *aisvarya* implies the prime meaning of the term *Brahman* in which exists the state of his being the Lord (*Īśasya Īśatvam*) (over Prakṛiti, Jīva, Sṛiṣṭi, etc.). This *śakti* is the distinguishing property of Brahman, which he controls in *ananta aīsvarya*. All these peculiarities are the characteristics of Brahman. The *Sruti* texts *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma; tadēva Brahmatvam viddhi; nēdam yadidamupāsate; sākshīchēta kēvalo nirgunasya; athāta ādēso nēti nēti; akartachaitanyam chinmātram sat*; etc. declare the above truth. In the *Smṛiti* texts *Gnānamēva parambrahma gnānam bandhāya neshyate, gnānātmaka midam visvam nagnānāt bhidyatē param*, etc.,<sup>51</sup> according to Audulomi, in the *Sūtra* that will be referred to below, the *chit* in *ātma* forms but a part of the whole *Parabrahman* and therefore *jīva* and *Brahman* are relatively as *tanmātra* and *ātma*<sup>52</sup> *i.e.*, the part and the whole. Some logicians hold the invented view that *ātma* is enveloped in *Śakti* (*upādhi visishte śaktim*), from which they argue that on account of *vyavahāra*, Brahman is independent of his will

<sup>51</sup> *Gnāna* is *Parabrahman* himself; *gnāna* desires absolution from *bandha* (ties of this world); this universe is of the form of *gnāna*; there is nothing else greater than *gnāna*.

<sup>52</sup> A primary or rudimentary atom. *Cf. Jīvō alpaha* in contradistinction to *Brahma stūla*,

and *ātma* is subordinate. In this way, the *jīva* and *Brahman* behave in the relationship of *sva* and *svāmi* (servant and Lord). This idea is the result of foolishness (*avivēka*). In the same way, the terms *paramātmā*, *paramēsvara* and other (similar) expressions are said to mean peculiar states of *Chaitanya* with varied *sakti*; for it is said in the Smṛiti<sup>53</sup> texts—

वदन्ति तत्तत्त्वविदः तत्त्वं यद्ज्ञानमद्वयम् ।

ब्रह्मेति परमात्मेति भगवानिति शब्दयते इति, etc. ॥

अनादिरूपश्चिन्मात्रम् इति, etc. ॥

*Vadanti tat tatvavidaha tatvam yadgnānamadvayam ;  
Brahmēti Paramātmēti Bhagavān iti sabdayatē iti, etc. ;  
Anādirūpaschinmātra iti, etc.*

These texts declare that the very idea of birth as being due to any cause is contradictory to the Smṛitis. *Chaitanya* is not a mere characteristic of *ātma*; but it exists in an indivisible manner as substance and its property (*dharma* and *dharmi*) and is called *Chaitanya* (*dharmā dharmi vibhāga sūnyaschētanak*) just as a luminous body is connected with its luminosity (*tējōdravyam prakāśikam prakāśa iti*), always co-existing with each other in such a manner as to be declared to be almost one, agreeably to the maxim “So significantly small as to merit being ignored” (*lāghavādēkatvasyaiva nyāyatvāt*).

Briefly put, the viewpoint of Vignāna Bhikshu is that the *Brahma-Sūtras* do not aim at establishing the *aikya* of *jīva* except to state his relationship to Brahman as its final goal. It starts with *jignāsa* and ends with *anāvṛitti* (*idam śāstram jīva nirūpana param na bhavati*). As the work starts with the Sūtra *Athathō Brahmajignāsa*, it relates purely to the discussion of attaining Brahmvādhi. It is for this reason that the last Sūtra also discusses the Brahman in bringing the argument to a close. All those who are experts in differentiating *ātma* from Brahman (*tātparya grāhaka lingānām*) realize that in order to know Brahman, the aid of the *Sāṅkhya Sāstra* is necessary. It is only *Sāṅkhya*

<sup>53</sup> *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, I. 2, 11,

*Sāstra* that expounds the theory of *jīvatattva* and in that *Sāstra* alone, can it be studied and understood. That would also enable us to get a proper insight into the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. But for these purposes, a knowledge of the *Sāṅkhya Sāstra* would be of little use. If the *Sāṅkhya Sāstra* is neglected, *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* also becomes useless. If the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* treats of *karma*, the *Sāṅkhya* treats of *gnāna*; <sup>54</sup> the one being complementary to the other. According to *Sāṅkhya Sāstra*, at the end, the *Adhikāri* attains *sāyujya* by achieving *Brahma rūpa* and not by *Brahma aikya*. *Brahma sabda* is imbedded, says Vignāna Bhikshu, in the *Sāṅkhya Sāstra*; when that word is used, it should, he says, be understood as indicating *jīvatattva* according to the *Sāṅkhya Sāstra*. <sup>55</sup> Therefore, it must not be held that the *jīva* should be understood in terms of *Brahmānda* in its entirety (*akhandatayā*); for such an interpretation would become contradictory (*vaiyarthyam*). This is, he says, the whole gist of the *Brahma-Sūtras* taken as a whole. This being so, to interpret the first *Sūtra Aththāthō Brahmajignāsa* as meaning *jīva-Brahmaikya jignāsa* would be against the avowed object of the *Sūtras* (*pratigna sūtram yujyate*). Mumukshus cannot go any other way than this; in fact it is unthinkable that they should. *Aikya* being taboo, then, *Brahmatva* is obtained, according to Vignāna Bhikshu, by *sālōkya* and *sāyujya* by *sahavāsa bhōga mātra*. This is rendered clear by his comments on IV. 4. 21, *Bhōgamātra sāmyalingāchcha*, which he interprets as postulating only *sahavāsa bhōgamātra*,

<sup>54</sup> C<sub>1</sub>. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 39 :—

*Yēshā tē abhikṣitā sāṅkhyē buddhīryōgē tvimām srunu ।  
Budhyā yuktō yayā Pārtha karmabandham prahāsyasi ॥*

Commenting on this *śloka*, Ānandatīrtha, in his *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, explains the word *Sāṅkhyam* as meaning *gnānam* and quotes the following *Bhagavadvachana* from the *Vyāsa Smṛithi* as his authority for this interpretation :—

*Suddhātma tatva vignānam sāṅkhya mityabhidhīyata iti.*

<sup>55</sup> In *Sāṅkhya*, *Brahma* stands for 2; *Pranava* for 1; *Vēda* for 4. *Tattva* for 25; and so on.

i.e., the happiness of living nearby. He suggests that Brahmatva is attained by *sarvavyāpakatva*. This is the *phala* aimed at by *jīgnāsa*. This *Sūtra* says beyond this point he cannot attain to the great powers of creation, etc. Those are reserved to Paramēśvara only. According to Sruti text, *Sōsnute sarvān kamān saha Brahmanā*, Parabrahman is an object of adoration by those who attain Brahmatva (*Srutau Brahmanā parabrahmanōpāsyaṇa ityarthaha*).<sup>56</sup> Vignāna Bhikshu approvingly quotes the *Bhagavad-Gītā* text, *Sarvam samāpnōshi thathōsi sarvaha* (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, XI. 40). It is not said, he says, that *Parabrahma mūrti* (*svarūpa*) has been attained and that

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<sup>56</sup> *Bhāgavata*, II. 9. 20, wherein the *avadhi* is thus fixed:—  
*pumsām maddarsanāvadhihi*. The full text is as follows:—

वरं वरय भद्रं ते वरेशं माभिवाञ्छितं ।

सर्वं श्रेयः परिश्रमः पुंसां महर्शनावधिः ॥ २-९-२०.

*Varam varaya bhadramtē varēsam mābhivāncchitam |*  
*Sarva srēyah parisrāmaḥ pumsām maddarsanāvadhiḥ ||*

This may be translated thus:—"The highest object that one should aim at to attain eternal bliss as the result of his exalted penance is to obtain my grace in my very presence, which is the limit of the highest reward." The *avadhi* is the attaining of the presence of *Brahman*. Vijayadhwaja, the commentator on the *Bhāgavata*, comments thus: *maddarsanamēva sarvasrēyasām phalam iti*. It is "*labhate Brahmadarsanam*" and not "*labhate Parabrahmadarsanam*" that fixes the *avadhi*. Vijayadhwaja belonged to the Pejavar Mutt, one of the eight Udupi mutts. He was eighth in succession to Sṛī Madhvāchārya in that mutt,—his predecessors being Adhōkshaja, Kamalāksha, Pushkarāksha, Amarēndra, Vijaya and Mahēndra. From Mahēndra there were twenty successors, the svāmi in 1923 being Visvamānya. Visvamānya died during the life-time of his guru Visvagnya. His disciple is now the svāmi of this mutt. Since Vijayadhwaja was eighth in succession from Madhvāchārya, allowing twenty years for each successor of his, Vijayadhwaja should have come about 160 years after Madhvāchārya. Since Madhvāchārya was still living about 1276 A.D., we may have to set down Vijayadhwaja to about 1436 A.D. This would bring him down to the middle of the fifteenth century A.D. We may not be far wrong if we set down Vijayadhwaja to about the beginning of the sixteenth century.

*akhilakārya kāranatva* has been attained by the *mumukshu*. Hence, *jagadvyāpāra* is denied to him (*jagadvyāpāra nāsti*). *Īsvara rūpa* is of two kinds—Brahman and Parabrahman. While Brahmatva may be reached, Parabrahmatva cannot be reached by the *mumukshu*. And Brahmatva is attained by *sālōkya* and *sāyujya*, by enjoyment in company with Brahman (*sahavāsa bhōga mātra*). After the completion of that *bhōga* by such *kārya Brahmani* (i.e., those that have attained to Brahman status through work—such work having been accomplished for the purpose of obtaining such *bhōga*)—*tatbhōga samāptyanantaram*—they secure release, i.e., absolution from returning to re-birth (*punarāvritti janma nāsti*). Because, it is so declared: *Brahmalōkamabhisampadyatē na cha punarāvartate na cha punarāvartate iti sabdaprāmāṇyāt*. But a *kārana Brahmani* who thinks that there is a greater bliss to which he is entitled commits sin, as the result of which, he will have to return to re-birth, being ousted out from the status of Brahman (*utsargiki*). This is the prime difference—between *kārya Brahmani* and *kārana Brahmani*. Those that attain *kārana Brahmatva*, to them there is no *punarāvritti*. This is a settled fact (*apunarāvrittir niyatā*). According to Vignāna Bhikshu, therefore, there are two kinds of Brahmatva—*kārya* and *kārana*. Those who attain the first, attain to bliss only temporarily ; and those who attain the second, enjoy eternal bliss.

Vignānabhikshu's settled view is that *jīva* may attain to Brahmatva but not to Parabrahmatva. He postulates two kinds of Brahmatva: *kārya* and *kārana*. He describes the *jīva* in terms of Brahman. Ānandatīrtha, the other great teacher who postulates duality, holds that from Brahman to the barest green grass (*Brahmādi trinānta paryantam*) belong to the class of *jīvarāsi* dependent on Parabrahman. These *jīvarāsis* are further divided off into different classes, which may, through the grace of Parabrahman, attain to Brahmatva. Ānandatīrtha describes *jīva* under three heads: (1) *Dēva*, (2) *Mānusha*, and (3) *Dānavāh*.

त्रिविधा जीवसंघास्तु देव मानुष दानवाः ।  
 तत्रदेवामुक्तियोग्या मानुषेषूत्तमास्तथा ॥  
 मध्यमामानुषा येतु सृतियोग्यास्सदैवहि ।  
 अधमा निरया यैव दानवास्तुतमोलयाः ॥

(महाभारत तात्पर्य निर्णये, १. ८७-८८.)

*Trividhā jīvasanghāstu dēva mānusha dānavāḥ ।*  
*Tatra dēvāha muktīyōgyā mānushēshu uttamāsthathā ॥*  
*Madhyamā mānushā ētu sritiyōgyāḥ sadaivahi ।*  
*Adhamā nirayā yaivā dānavāstu tamōlayāḥ ॥*  
 (Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya, I. 87-88.)

*Jīvas* are divided into three classes: *dēvas*, men and *rākshasas*—of these, *dēvas* are always fit for *mukti*; superior men are also so; those of the middle class are subject to *srishti*, *sthithi* and *laya* in succession; and inferior men will continue for ever in *tamas*.<sup>57</sup>

Vignāna Bhikshu in commenting on IV. 4. 22 *Anāvṛitti sabdāt anāvṛittisabdāt* further quotes the following verse from the *Bhagavad-Gītā*:—

आब्रह्मभुवनाङ्गोकाः पुनरावृत्तिनोऽर्जुन ।  
 मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

*Ābrahma bhuvanāṅlōkāḥ punarāvartinō Arjuna ।*  
*Māmupētya tu Kauntēya punarjanma na vidyate ॥*

and says that naturally there is no *āvṛitti* from Vishnulōka. But there is *āvṛitti* (yet) from Vishnulōka to those who did not believe the confidential word (*vissmaranēna āptavākyē*) *māmupētya*, i.e., that they are near me.<sup>58</sup> By *mām*, etc., here is meant that the *jīva* has reached Paramātmā and is near him. To those who believe that they

<sup>57</sup> In *Vishnu Tattva Nirnaya*, Jayatīrtha designates the two opposing theorists of Dvaitins and Advaitins as *Bahujīva vādins* and *Ēkajīva vādins*. See T. R. Krishnachar's *Vishnu Tattva Nirnaya*, Kumbakonam Edition, page 12, line 1.

<sup>58</sup> *Māmupētya*: This is interpreted by Vignāna Bhikshu *mām-ityanena Paramātmāna ēva uktatvāt*, i.e., what is meant by "me" is *Paramātmā*. *Māmupētya* is thus taken in its literal sense *mām+upa+yētya*, i.e., approaches near to me, i.e., having reached me, he shall not have any return. Vignāna Bhikshu is for *sālokya* and *sāmīpya* and not *sāyujya* in the sense of *aikya*.

are *near* Paramātmā, there is no *āvritti*; but to those who disbelieve in being *near* me but assume that they are one with me (by *aikya*) there is *āvritti*. These are disbelievers in the *āpta vākya* pronounced by Sri Krishna. The *Kāraṇa Brahmani* of Vignāna Bhikshu fall under this category of disbelievers in the *āpta vākya*; and the *Kārya Brahmani* are believers in the *āpta vākya*.

Vignāna Bhikshu is thus a dualist: he postulates *jīva* and Parabrahman; he denounces *aikya*; he suggests that *mōksha* is attaining *sālōkya* and *sāmīpya*; and he limits the import of *sāyujya* to *sāmīpya* and not *aikya*. In keeping with these views are the sentiments expressed by him in the *mangalācharana ślōkas* appearing at the end of his work. These may be thus set down:—

While Brahman and the rest have been unable to explain clearly Brahma-tattva in this Vedānta Sāstra, my attempt and labour in trying to expound it clearly is a daring attempt (*sāhasam*), which "Lord, I beseech you to overlook" (*Bhagavān chchantumarhasi*). But my attempt cannot afflict my spiritual intellect with misery even to the smallest extent, while my mind is all engaged in meditating upon Thee who is ever revelling in the ocean of bliss free from all worldly fever and who is without beginning or end.

Even if it is said that some amount of fault (*aparādha*) is attaching to me, whether I am conscious of it or not, because of making this attempt, even in that case, 'Thou art the sole agent in me for all that, for we are like so many puppets moved by strings (*dāruyantra samā vayam*).<sup>59</sup>

Even if I acknowledge that I have committed any fault I disown it because the doer of it is the *chidātmaka* (pure consciousness) in me, who, lacking wisdom, has prompted me to that which consists of *dharma* and *adharma*.

I pray that the Lord may grant me absolute absolution from all misery for this holy service of mine—in trying to expound the *sāstras*, out of my pure will.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha :

यथा दारुमयी योषा नरस्थिर समाहितः ।

इङ्गयत्यङ्गमङ्गानि तथाराजनिमाः प्रजाः ॥

(आनन्दतीर्थ-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य)

Yathā dārumayī yoshā narasthira samāhitah ।

Ingayati angamangāni thathā rājan imāh prajāha ॥

(*Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* quoting from *Mahābhārata*,  
*Śāntiparva*, *Mōkshadharmā*.)

It will be seen from the above that Vignāna Bhikshu writes as a confirmed dualist. He does not pray for mōksha but only for the absolute remission of all misery. This is entirely in keeping with his repudiation of the *Jīva-Brahmaikya* theory.

Vignāna Bhikshu refers to *Purvāchāryas* when commenting on I. I. 2, where he propounds the view that *Purvāchāryas* hold that *Paramātmā* is *bhōkta-purusha*. As already remarked in the same context, he adversely criticises the *Advaita* teachers by describing them as *kukalpakas* (I. 1. 2). In this connection he refers to them as "present-day people" and disapproves of their representation that *mukhya-ātma* and *gauna-ātma*, which according to him are fundamentally different, are one. He styles their argument as a wrongly invented one. He claims that the followers of the *Sāṅkhya* and *Naiyāyika* systems consider and hold as proved that *ātmātva* consists, in its essence, in the acquired grade of quality attained by the *ātma—chaitanya phala yōgyatā rūpa mātram*. There can, he remarks, be no contradiction to this statement.

### Baladēva and His Works.

Baladēva is another commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. He interprets them from the *Dvaita* point of view, though he follows Chaitanya, the great resuscitator of *Vaishnavism* in Bengal. Baladēva's preceptors were Rādhādāmōdara and Pītāmbara, of whom the former belonged to the *Kanyakubja* country. His commentary is known as *Gōvinda Bhāshya*, so called after Lord *Gōvinda*, at whose command it is said to have been composed. It is mentioned in the introductory part of one of Baladēva's works (the *Siddhāntaratna*) that the *Bhāshya* was made known to him by Lord *Gōvinda* in a dream. This statement is re-affirmed in the *Siddhāntatippani*, another of his works, as well. Either for this reason or otherwise, Baladēva was also known as *Gōvinda* or *Gōvindaikāntin* and had the title of *Vidyābhūshana*. There can be hardly any doubt that he based his interpretation primarily on that of



Ānandatīrtha. Thus in his *Bhāshya*, Gōvinda refers to Ānandatīrtha and states that he follows his doctrine of *Dvaita* in accordance with Chaitanya's view. He later wrote, in support of his *Bhāshya*, another treatise called the *Siddhāntaratna*, also known as *Gōvindabhāshyapīṭhika*, which means *An Introduction to the Gōvinda Bhāshya*. This is a work in eight chapters on the *Dvaita* system of Vedānta from Chaitanya's standpoint. Three of the chapters in it are devoted to the rejection of the *Advaita* system. To explain the meaning of this work, Gōvinda wrote a commentary on it called the *Siddhāntaratnatippāni*. In this last-mentioned work, he refers to one Pratāparudra Gōpālādāsa, a king of the Utkala country, and to the latter's *guru*, who was one of his own ancestors. Another work which he wrote is *Krishna Chaitanyāmṛita* (see *Madras T.C. of Sanskrit MSS.*, IV, i. B, No. 2989 (a) and (b); also No. 2990; *Madras D.C.* IX, Nos. 4649 to 4657), which sets out the essence of Chaitanya's teachings. A fourth work that has been assigned to him is the *Pramēya Ratnāvali* which is highly popular in Bengal. MS. copies of Gōvinda's *Bhāshya* are met with largely in the Ganjam District of the Madras Presidency, which is close to Orissa and Bengal where the system of Chaitanya is predominant.

### His System based on Chaitanya's Teachings.

Chaitanya was, according to one set of authorities, born in 1486 A.D. and died in 1534; according to another, he is said to have been born in 1485 and died in 1533. His family belonged originally to Orissa and subsequently emigrated to Navadvip in the Nadia District of Bengal. The system of Ānandatīrtha had been largely followed in parts of the Orissa country for over two centuries before the birth of Chaitanya and had spread north-westwards to Benares, Prayag and Gaya. The Gayas had embraced it long before the birth of Chaitanya. Naraharītīrtha, after whom the Uttarādi Mutt, the chief Mutt of the Madhvas, is named, belonged to the old Kalinga

country. Through his influence—he was evidently a Minister and wielded some political power—Madhvaism soon spread to Puri, the great religious centre of Orissa, from thence it pressed on to Bengal where it laid the foundation, first for the cult of Vishnusvāmi and later for that of Chaitanya. Vishnusvāmi developed the Krishna part of Madhva's religion, while Chaitanya carried it still further by including in it Rādhā as well. Otherwise, there is really little to distinguish the Vishnusvāmi and the Chaitanya cults from Madhvaism. Two Madhva writers prominently stand out in the work of popularizing Ānandatīrtha's religion in Bengal prior to the rise of Chaitanya. These are Vishnupuri, who lived in the thirteenth century and Mādhavēndra Puri, in the fifteenth century. Vishnupuri, by his famous work *Bhaktiratnāvali*, also called *Bhāgavad Bhaktiratnamāla*, made the themes of the *Bhāgavata Purāna* not only popular but also beloved of young and old in Bengal. This work is really a treatise on Bhakti based on a number of stanzas taken from the *Srī Bhāgavata*. In the colophon found in it, it is stated that Paramahansa Vishnupuri was its author and that he was the disciple of Srī Purushōttama (*Srīmanpurushōttama charanāravinda kripā makaranda bindu prōṇmīlitha vivēka*, see *Madras D.C. of Sānskṛit MSS.*, XI, No. 5144, pp. 3942-3944).<sup>60</sup> Mādhavēndra Puri appears to have been an equally popular teacher. He made the religion of Krishna better known among the people and won a large and influential following. Among those who became his disciples were some who moulded the religious life of Chaitanya.

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<sup>60</sup> In the *Madras Catalogue* quoted, this work of Vishnupuri and his other works are included under the head "Vedānta: the Philosophy of Vallabha". As will be seen, this is not a correct representation of Vishnupuri's philosophical position. Vishnupuri was really a follower of Madhva and his work is a development of the idea underlying Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya*. His *guru* Purushōttama was evidently a Madhva ascetic and the title *Paramahansa* assumed by Vishnupuri indicates that he also belonged to the ascetic order.

### Chaitanya's Indebtedness to Madhvaism.

Chaitanya may thus be said to have begun his religious life as a Madhva and to have developed some aspects of Madhva's religion on his own lines. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find Chaitanya's first initiator into the mysteries of the *Bhakti* cult was Īsvara Puri, the Madhva *guru* at Gaya. The significance of this initiation, which occurred in 1508 A.D., will be readily imagined when it is stated that the worship of Krishna is to this day the predominant cult at Udipi, the centre of Madhva's cult. From the day he was initiated by Īsvara Puri, Chaitanya became an ardent devotee of Krishna and dedicated the rest of his life to his service. Chaitanya's principal assistant in spreading his religion was Nityānanda, another Madhva *Sanyāsin*. Finally, we have to note that the teacher who, in 1510, initiated Chaitanya into *Sanyāsa* was Kēsava Bhārati, who was also a Madhva *guru*. Among the principal places visited by Chaitanya in his grand pilgrimage of India were Srī Kūrmam, Simhāchalam, Srīrangam and Udipi,—all places specially sacred to Madhvas. At Srī Kūrmam are the inscriptions of Naraharītīrtha, the direct disciple of Ānandatīrtha, the founder of the Dvaita system, dated in 1281 and 1294 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 290 and 291 of 1896; see also *E.I.*, VI, 260-68.) Among the other places mentioned as having been visited by Chaitanya in his tour is Vidyānagara, which has been generally identified with Rajahmundry, which at least seems doubtful. Chaitanya was born in the year in which Sāluva Narasimha I usurped the Vijayanagar throne, and 1534 A.D., the year of Chaitanya's death, falls in the reign of the Vijayanagar King Achyuta (1530-1542 A.D.). The forty-eight years of the lifetime of Chaitanya are accordingly covered by the reigns of the greatest Vaishnavite kings of the Vijayanagar Kingdom, *viz.*, Sāluva Narasimha I (1486-1499 A.D.); his son Sāluva Narasimha II (1493-1509 A.D.), which period includes those of the usurper Narasana Nāyaka (or Vīra Narasimha I) and his son Vīra Narasimha II; Krishna

Dēva Rāya the Great (1509-1530 A.D.); and Achyuta Dēva Rāya (1530-1542). Vijayanagar was, during this period, the most flourishing centre of Vaishnavism in Southern India and Chaitanya could not have missed it—the more so as it was located in the famous Kishkinda of Purāṇic fame—in his travels down south. As Vijayanagar was long known as Vidyānagar, the *Vidyānagar* of Chaitanya's chroniclers will have to be identified with Vijayanagar. As Rāmānanda Rāya is, however, said to have been Governor of Vidyānagara on behalf of Pratāpa-Rudra, the king of Orissa, it has to be concluded that the chroniclers have by a mistake made him the Governor of Vidyānagara, the capital of the Vijayanagar Empire instead of describing him as the Governor of a *province* of the Empire of Vijayanagar.<sup>61</sup>

#### Baladeva's Commentary based on Anandatīrtha's.

It will thus be seen how close was the contact between Chaitanya and Madhva teachers of eminence of his time. Like Ānandatīrtha, who was the first to stress the importance of the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* (see his *Bhāgavata Tātparyā Nirṇaya*), Chaitanya and his followers based their teaching on the *Bhāgavata*. Ānandatīrtha was probably the first to rest the practical part of religion on the *Brindāvan-līla* as it is set down in the *Bhāgavata*, though he did not go beyond it. Chaitanya developed it by making devotion to Krishna—in conjunction with Rādhā, evidently under the influence of the religious systems of Nimbārka and Vallābha—his exclusive cult. With these close associations with Ānandatīrtha's system of thought and teaching, there will be little difficulty in appreciating the position of Chaitanya and his followers in the philosophic approach they

<sup>61</sup> Rāmānanda Rāya was evidently a poet. There is a drama in five acts, called *Jaggannāthavallabhanātakam*, having for its plot the love-story of Rādhā and Śrī Krishna, attributed to him. In it, he describes himself as the son of Bhagavadānandarāya and states that he wrote the work at the instance of King Gajapati Pratāpa-Rudra Dēva. (See *Madras T.C. MSS.*, V, i. A. R. No. 4198, pp. 6192-6194.)

make in interpreting the everlasting theme of *Tattvamasi*. There is current a tradition that Chaitanya himself wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* but such a work has not come down to us. But the commentary of Baladēva *alias* Gōvinda, above mentioned, is from the Chaitanya viewpoint, though admittedly it is based on the *Bhāṣhya* of Ānandatīrtha. Baladēva could not, having regard to the indebtedness of Chaitanya to Ānandatīrtha's School, have materially departed from it. Hence the frank confession in the introductory verses of certain of his works (see *Siddhāntaratna* and *Siddhāntaratnatippanī*) that his interpretation is based on Ānandatīrtha's as understood by Chaitanya.

### Date of Baladeva.

The date of Baladēva has to be fixed with reference, first, to the period of Chaitanya, after whom he came, and, secondly, to the time of Pratāpa-Rudra Gōpāla Dāsa, King of Utkala (Orissa) country. The lower limit is fixed by the date of Chaitanya's death, 1533 A.D., while the upper limit has to be fixed with reference to the period of the king of the Orissa country mentioned above. This king was evidently a later king of that Province, who is not otherwise known to history. We may not be far wrong if we tentatively set him down to the beginning of the eighteenth century—a century after the time of Pratāpa-Rudra Dēva, the Gajapati king who was the opponent of Krishna Dēva Rāya, the great Vijayanagar king.<sup>62</sup> This would give sufficient time for the period covered from the death of Chaitanya to the rise of Baladēva. Mr. Sewell, in his *List of Antiquities*, mentions a grant by one Pratāpa-Rudra-Nārāyana-Deva dated in 1728 A.D. found at the Jagannāthasvāmi temple at Balaga in the present Chicacole Taluk, Ganjam District.

<sup>62</sup> An inscription of this Pratāpa-Rudra is to be seen at Śrī Kūrmam dated in Saka 1425 (=1503 A.D.), see *M.E.R.*, No. 346 of 1896. Pratāpa-Rudra's minister Bhattāchārya Sārvabhauma is said to have been converted by Chaitanya to his religion. It was the first great event in the career of Chaitanya as a religious teacher

Evidently there was a line of kings of the old Gajapati dynasty who set up some sort of rule in a part of their ancient kingdom down to the eighteenth century A.D.

### Suka and His Commentary.

Suka is still another commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. His work is known as the *Suka-Bhāshya*. This work is known in print in the Telugu script, having been printed in 1892, at Bangalore. Copies of this edition are difficult to secure to-day and there is, so far as is known, no other edition of it. In the *Avatārika* to the Telugu edition, it is mentioned that the MS. copy from which it was printed was originally in the possession of one Mr. Venkatachalayya, a follower of the *Bhāgavata-matha*, who was many years ago *Amildar* of Dodda Sira, in the present Tumkur District, Mysore State. Its existence having come to the knowledge of Srī Krishnānanda Svāmi of the Smārtha-matha—*alias* Bhāgavata Sampradāya-matha—of Talakād, in the Mysore District, he requested Mr. Venkatachalayya to make a present of the MS. in his possession to the *Bhāgavata-matha*, which he did. Sri Krishnānanda Svāmi subsequently directed that a copy of the MS. should be made and from it, the Telugu edition was, it would seem, printed by order of the Svāmi. These facts are vouched for in a *Srīmukha* granted by the Svāmi to Mr. Venkatachalayya, which is found printed in the introductory part of the Telugu edition. In this *Srīmukha* it is also mentioned that Sukāchārya was the first *guru* (*mūla guru*) of the Bhāgavata-matha at Talakād and that its original image of Srī Venugōpāla Mūrti in it had been worshipped by him and that *Srī Bhāgavata*, which is the essence of all Vēdānta, has been its *Siddhānta grantha* from time out of memory. Also, that the *Suka-Bhāshya* composed by the first *guru* Sukāchārya, had been the *Bhāshya* accepted by the *matha* and that the MS. containing it had been lost in a theft that had occurred at the *matha* in the time of Srī Krishnānanda Svāmi, the first of that name and the predecessor of the

*Svāmi* of the same name who issued the *Srīmukha* above referred to. Since then *Srī* Krishnānanda Svāmi II had been on the look-out for a copy of the *Bhāshya*, which at last he found in the possession of Mr. Venkatachalayya at Dodda Sira. The further statement is made in the *Srīmukha* that Mr. Venkatachalayya's Telugu MS. was itself a copy of a grantha palm-leaf MS. found at Ten-Tirupati, a place in the Tinnevely District of the Madras Presidency, where it was found in the possession of a follower of the *Bhāgavata-matha*. The *Srīmukha* is dated in the cyclic year *Khara*. *Khara* corresponds to 1854 and 1914 A.D.

The question arises who is this Suka, or Bhagavad-pādāchārya Sukāchārya as he is termed, after whom the *Bhāshya* known as *Suka-Bhāshya* goes and when approximately did he live and where. The materials for answering these questions are not ready. The *Suka-Bhāshya* itself does not afford any definite clue as to the date of its composition. Nor are the legendary tales connected with the name of Suka of a character to enable us to infer anything certain about him or his date. That Suka is claimed as the founder of the *Bhāgavata-matha*—also called *Smārtha-matha*—at Talakād and that his *Bhāshya* is taken to represent the views of that *matha*, we have seen above from the *Srīmukha* referred to. Of this *matha* at Talakād and its *Svāmis*, the following information has been brought together and published in the *Mysore Gazetteer*<sup>63</sup> :—

There is a *Smārtha matha* of the *Bhāgavata-Sampradāya* at Talakād presided over by a *Sanyāsi* of the name of Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi. A village named Koppala, a few miles from Talakād, belongs to this *matha*; and from this circumstance the *matha* is sometimes called *Koppala matha*. The Svāmi is said to be descended in spiritual succession from Padmapādāchārya, the immediate disciple of Sankarāchārya, the three Svāmis that came after Padmapādāchārya being Vishnu Svāmi, Kshīra Svāmi and Krishnānanda Svāmi. In apostolic succession to the last, after a long interval came Abhinava Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi, whose disciple was Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi. The disciple

<sup>63</sup> *Mysore Gazetteer* (1930 Edn.), V, 848-49.

of the latter is the present Svāmi. The god worshipped in the *matha* is Gōpālakrishna. The agent of the *matha* possesses a manuscript containing the Sthalapurāna and certain quasi-historical matters relating to Vijayanagar, the Talakād chiefs and the Mysore kings. He has also two palm leaves containing copies of two inscriptions which register grants to the *matha* by Mādhvamantri and by a Talakād chief named Chandrasēkhara Wadiyar in Saka 819 and 916 respectively. The former inscription is printed as T.-Narsipur 47. There is an anicut or dam across the Cauvery near Talakād which is known as Mādhvamantri-Katte, the Mādhvamantri who built it being supposed to be Vidyāranya. The manuscript referred to above contains a verse giving Saka 816 as the date of the construction of the dam by Mādhvamantri, nearly 500 years before Vidyāranya's time. The Mādhvamantri who built the dam is probably identical with the Mādhvamantri of the Goa plates (see *M. A. R.* for 1909, para 91), who was a contemporary of Vidyāranya. With regard to the Talakād chiefs, the manuscript informs us that the first chief Sōmarāja Wadiyar, who received a few districts as an Umbali from Vidyādēva Rāja of Ānegondi, ruled from Saka 785 to 837. It was the second chief, Chandrasēkhara Wadiyar, who is said to have ruled from Saka 838 to 915, 78 years, that made the grant to the *matha* in Saka 916. Other Talakād chiefs are stated to have reigned for 91, 86, 84, 76, 85 and 87 years each. These statements are enough, in the opinion of Rao Bahadur Narasimhachar, to show the valueless characters of the manuscripts.

Though this is so, there is no need, in the present state of our knowledge, to reject the whole tradition relating to the *matha* as incredible. The succession given above is: Padmapādāchārya; Vishnu Svāmi; Krishna Svāmi; Krishnānanda Svāmi; after a long time from this last came Abhinava Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi; his disciple was Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi; his disciple was Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi, the present presiding *guru*. The order of succession given in the *Srīmukha* quoted above is nearly the same: Sukāchārya; Gōvindabhagavadpādāchārya; Srīpadmapādāchārya; Vishnusvāmi; Kshīrasvāmi; Srī Krishnānandasvāmi I; Abhinava Bālakrishnānandasvāmi; Srī Krishnānandasvāmi, who issued the *Srīmukha*. Thus these two lists exactly tally except for the addition of the names of Sukāchārya and Gōvindabhagavadpādāchārya in the beginning, and they evidently embody a tradition that need not



be thrown away. It will be noticed that Suka is claimed in the *Srīmukha* as the *guru* of Gōvindabhagavadpāda, who was the *guru* of Sankarāchārya and the disciple of Gaudapādāchārya, the *paramaguru* of Sankarāchārya and the author of the *Kārika* on the *Mandūkyōpanishad*. It is also noteworthy that Srīpadmapādāchārya, to be identified with Padmapāda, a disciple of Sankarāchārya, is claimed as the successor of Gōvindabhagavadpāda. Finally, it is equally worthy of note that Vishnusvāmi is claimed to be Padmapāda's successor in both the lists. This Vishnusvāmi has to be identified with the founder of the Vishnu cult which exalted the Rādhā-Krishna worship and which in later times was absorbed by the sect associated with the name of Vallabhāchārya. The teaching of Vishnusvāmi, as is well known, found full exposition in the *Krishna Karnāmrīta*, written by Līlāsukha Bilvamangala, who hailed from what is now Travancore.<sup>64</sup> This work had such an influence on Chaitanya that he is said to have based his own system of teaching on it. As a matter of fact, Vishnusvāmi differed little from Ānandatīrtha in his teaching and the fact that Chaitanya was indebted as much to Vishnusvāmi's as to Ānandatīrtha's teachings shows that their general drift was the same except for the special stress that Vishnusvāmi laid on the Rādhā-Krishna cult. To-day if Vishnusvāmi's cult has practically disappeared, it might be said to be due to its absorption by Vallabha in the north and Ānandatīrtha in the south.

Suka also figures in a MS. giving the succession list of the Sankarāchārya Mutt.<sup>65</sup> This list starts with Śiva as the first occupant, with Vishnu, Brahma, Vasistha, Sakti, Parāsara and Vyāsa following one after another in regular

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<sup>64</sup> A disciple of Padmapāda was Krishna-Līlā Sukha, the author of *Srīchinha Kāvya* which narrates the story of Krishna. Durgāprasāda-yati, a student of Krishna-Līlā Sukha, wrote a commentary on the work. (See Madras *T.C.M.*, V, A.R. No. 4156.) According to Durgāprasāda-yati, Padmapāda lived at Kōdandamangalam.

<sup>65</sup> See *Sringeri Guruparampara*. Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, No. 2, p. 99.

succession. After Vyāsa, came, it is said, Suka, who was, it is recorded, followed by Gaudapāda, Govindabhagavad-pāda, Sankarāchārya and his successors. In Gōvīndanātha's *Sankarāchārya Charita*, this order of succession is repeated and Suka occupies the identical position in the list set out in it.<sup>66</sup> It will be seen that the Suka referred to here is the son of Bādarāyana, a person quite different from Suka, the author of the *Bhāshya*. That Suka, the son of Vyāsa, is not altogether a mythical personage is shown by the reference to him in Sankarāchārya's *Bhāshya*. In IV. 2. 14, Sankarāchārya quotes a passage from the *Mahābhārata* to show Suka obtained his release.

In the *Suka-Bhāshya* all the colophons read alike and state that it was composed by "the other Suka"<sup>67</sup> who was the incarnation of the Bhagavat Bādarāyani Sukāchārya, i.e., Suka, the son of Bādarāyana, the famous author of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. This Suka should therefore be called rightly the second or the later Suka, who was regarded as the incarnation of the original Suka who appears in the Mutt lists referred to above. This Suka II describes himself as the incarnation of the original Suka, the son of Bādarāyana<sup>68</sup>; as of the Srīvatsa gōtra; of unfaltering austerity; famous for every kind of knowledge; *Paramahansa*; guru of gurus (*paramaguru*); one who has an ascertained knowledge (of Brahman); *Srīmadbhāgavata rāddhānta* (i.e., one who has conclusively demonstrated the truth of the holy *Bhāgavata*); and Bhagavatpādāchārya (i.e., the occupier of the sanctified seat of office as head of Mutt). In one of the invocation stanzas (see stanza No. 4) he pays homage to Srī Gopālakrishna, the first and original guru of the Mutt, an avatār of Srī Krishna and his subsequent followers, Nārāyana and other Paramahansas, and to his own immediate guru, he says he

<sup>66</sup> Seshagiri Sastri, *Report* No. 2, p. 102.

<sup>67</sup> He is spoken of as "Aparāvatāra" in which *Apara* means another, second, additional, later, posterior, etc.

<sup>68</sup> *Srīvatsakulatīlaka*,

undertakes the writing of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras*.<sup>69</sup>

Suka quotes more than once a previous work of his called *Sruti-gītā-Bhāshya*. (See for example his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, II, 1. 10, *Svapakshadōshāchcha*). The *Sruti-gītā* forms part of the tenth canto of the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, which is perhaps its most popular canto. The present writer has in his possession a fragment of a MS. commentary on the *Bhāgavata* in which the *Sruti-gītā* is presented with a Sanskrit-Telugu commentary. The author's name is not mentioned in it. Whether this is the work of the Suka referred to in the *Suka-Bhāshya*, it is impossible to say. But it recites at its commencement the following verse with which the *Suka-Bhāshya* also begins:—

तं वन्दे परमाचार्यं पादुकीकृतमन्मथम् ।

शुकशास्त्रगुरुं सीतारामार्यं मनुजाकृतिं ॥

*Tam vandē Paramāchāryam padukīkritamanmatham ।*

*Sukasāstragurum Sīthārāmāryam manujākṛitim ॥*

In ending this canto the MS. ends with the invocation *Srī Sītārāmābhyānnamah*, an invocation which marks the beginning and end of each *adhyāya* and each *pāda* of the *Suka-Bhāshya*. These may be accidental resemblances, for the *Suka-Bhāshya* is entirely in Sanskrit and it is probable that the *Sruti-gītā Bhāshya* referred to by Suka in his *Bhāshya* was also composed by him entirely in Sanskrit. As has been shown above, Vallabha based his commentary on the *Bhāgavata* and Ānandatīrtha also laid stress on the *Bhāgavata*. An analysis of Suka's *Bhāshya* shows that Suka's use of the *Bhāgavata* is fairly wide. The largest number of citations, however, seem to be from the 10th canto which, considering its importance, seems natural.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> The commentator Krishnāchārya interprets "the other Paramahamsas" as referring to Brahma, Nārada, Vyāsa and Sukāchārya.

<sup>70</sup> The five *adhyāyas* 29 to 30 in the Tenth Skandha of the *Bhāgavata* are called *Rāsapanchādhyāyi*, because they deal with the *Rāsakṛīda* of Śrī Krishna. There is a commentary called *Visuddharasādīpikā* on this particular part, by Śrī Misra Nārāyanapāda. (*Madras Tri. Cat. of MSS.*, V. I, C. R. No. 4996, pp. 6884-87.)

The 2nd, 7th, 11th and 12th are also referred to often. It may well be asked why this stress on the *Bhāgavata*? Suka says in commenting on I. 2. 17, *Sarvōpanishad sārabhūtam Śrīmadbhāgavatam*. We may compare this statement with what, in his *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, I. i, Ānandatīrtha says:—*Brahmasūtra Mahābhārata Gāyatrī veda sambandhascha ayamgranthah*. Again, Ānandatīrtha observes in his *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, III:—*Sarva-vēdētiḥāsānām sūram sūram samudritam | satu samsrūvayā-māsa Mahārājam Parīkshitam ||* : In *Bhāgavata* you find the essence of the essence of the Vēdānta. Such essence was related by Suka to Mahārāja Parīkshit. In commenting on III. 3. 1, *Om sarvavedāntapratyayam*, etc., Suka states that the *Bhāgavata* is *sarvavedāntapratyaya*. Again, commenting on III. 3. 6, *Upasamhāra*, etc., Suka says that all Purāṇas point to *bhēda* only. If so why select only *Bhāgavata*? Because it is said that “among the eighteen (Purāṇas), the foremost is the *Bhāgavata* (*Dasāshtam Śrī Bhāgavata*)”.

In the *Bhāgavata* school, of which Suka is the chief modern exponent, *bhēda* is the cardinal doctrine and that doctrine is the fundamental basis of *bhakti* as enunciated in the *Bhāgavata*. The second *adhyāya* of the *Bhāgavata* epitomises the whole work. As the saying goes, *dvitīye dvitīyo advitīyaha* : The second verse in the second canto (of the *Bhāgavata*) stands unrivalled :—

“शब्दस्य हि ब्रह्मण एष पन्था ।  
यन्नामभिध्यायति धीरपायैः ॥  
परिभ्रमन् तत्र न विन्दतेऽर्थान् ।  
मायामये वासनया शयानः ॥

(श्रीमद्भागवते, २-२-२)

*Sabdasya hi brahmana ēsha panthā ।  
Ennāmahidhyāyati dhīrapārthaih ॥  
Paribhraman tatra na vindatērthān ।  
Māyāmayē vāsanayā sayānaha ॥*

*Srīmadbhāgavata*, II. 2. 2.

This may be broadly translated thus :—

The prime meaning of the word *Brahman* points directly to Viṣṇu, according to the *Śruti* text *Brahmasabdasya*

*Vishnavāvēva* (the meaning of *Brahma* is the all-pervading Vishnu); but the ignorant *jīva* roams about without knowing the exact manner of realizing him, because he himself is enveloped in the covering of *Jīvāchchādika-māya*, beyond which he is unable to see Brahman, being in want of (Brahma-) *gnāna*.

The suggestion here is that *bhēda* is the doctrine taught in the *Bhāgavata* and that without a realization of *bhēda*, *gnāna* (i.e., right knowledge) is impossible. Hence the attempt made by Suka at every step in his *Bhāshya* to differentiate the *jīva* from *Īśa*. That doctrine is as fundamental to his position as a Bhāshyakāra as to the *Bhāgavata* itself on which his interpretation is based.<sup>71</sup>

Suka, the *Brahma-Sūtra* commentator, should, in view of what has been stated above, be deemed a later person of the same name, who reckoned himself an *avatār* of the original Suka, the son of Vyāsa. Neither from the particulars he gives of himself nor from the internal references contained in his *Bhāshya* is it possible to fix his date with any degree of certainty. That he was posterior to Ānandatīrtha seems fairly inferable from the fact that he follows Ānandatīrtha in his comments. At any rate, it cannot be doubted that Suka, the Bhāshyakāra, was actually indebted to Ānandatīrtha's commentary. He quotes in I. 1. 1, while trying to explain what goes to make a *Sūtra*, the verse quoted by Ānandatīrtha: "*Alpāksharam asandigdham sāravadvisvatōmukham । Astōbhamanavadyancha sūtram sūtravidō viduhu*", etc., which is not cited by any other commentator. Like Ānandatīrtha, Suka allows that women, Sūdras and those that are servants of Brāhmanas (*Sthri sūdra Brahmandhu*) are entitled to hear the *Bhārata* and other epic works (cf. Ānandatīrtha's

<sup>71</sup> A more modern attempt to show that the *Brahma-Sūtras* have their parallels in the *Srīmadbhāgavata* and that the latter is but a commentary on the former, is that of Pandit Haridās Vidyāvāgīśa Bhāgavatāchārya's *Brahma-Sūtras* in Bengali, with the *Bhāgavata-Bhāshya* which has been translated into Bengali. This topic is further referred to below.

*Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1 and Suka's *Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1, pp. 43—45). Again, like Ānandatīrtha in I. 1. 1, Suka in his *Bhāshya* says that Srī Nārāyaṇa having been approached through prayers by Brahma, Rudra and others, declared that he would incarnate in the house of Parāśara and be born as the son of Parāśara and Satyavati, and destroy all the ill-informed and ignorant-minded people and manifest himself in the person of Krishnadvaipāyana (Bādarāyana) and exhibit to the world—through his works (*Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*) which would explain the gist of all the Vedas and Vedānta, and through his *Brahma-Sūtras*, which would unmistakably declare the essence of the *Vedas*—that Krishna, who in his undivided form is Nārāyaṇa, is the Brahman (*Suka Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1, p. 35—36; cf. with Ānandatīrtha in I. 1. 1). Again, in discussing I. 1. 1, Suka in his *Bhāshya* says that *Brahmajignyāsa* should be undertaken only in order to know who is to be approached by *upāsana* for realizing Mōksha and out of whose grace such Mōksha is obtainable as the result of *upāsana*. Suka says that the deity of *upāsana*, according to Bādarāyana, is no other than Srī Krishna, the undivided form of Srī Nārāyaṇa, who is extolled throughout the *Srīmadbhāgavata* (Suka's *Bhāshya*, p. 246). This seems also an echo from Ānandatīrtha, who, in his *Anuvyākhyāna* (I. 1. 1), quotes the last two *Sūtras* of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa* (*viz.*, *Sa Vishnurāhahi* and *Tam Brahmētyāchakshate*) which indicate that the Brahman who is to be meditated upon to realize Mōksha—the Mahāpurushārtha—is Vishnu, who is the Brahman about whom we are to conduct the *jignyāsa* mentioned in *Uttara-Mīmāṃsa*, I. 1. 1.

Suka's view-point is that *jignyāsa* is only for "Mōkshalābha", *i.e.*, obtaining Mōksha through knowledge obtained by *jignyāsa*. This is the position of Ānandatīrtha, who under I. 1. 1 states that the attaining of Mōksha through the grace of Parabrahma-Vishnu is the only objective aimed at by *jignyāsa*. (*Parasyabrahmano Vishnōh prasādādīti vā bhavate*, *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 1; cf. Suka's *Bhāshya* I. 1. 1: *Mōkshōpāyabhūta Bhagavadbhaktirēva*

*ētaḍ sāstrasya viśhayah tādviśa bhaktidvāra mōkṣalābhayēva prayōjanam.*)

Suka, in I. 1. 2, says that some authorities enunciate that Brahman is *Nirvisēśha*, and that expressions which describe Brahman as *jagadjanmādikārana*, etc., are to be understood as indicating no *lakshana*. It is not possible, he states, to establish a Parabrahman who is devoid of *lakshana* and at the same time capable of *srishti*, *sthithi* and *laya*, which are his chief characteristics. According to Suka, Bādarāyana's view is that Brahman should be recognized by the characteristics indicated in the Sūtra *Janmādyasya yathah*, creation, protection and destruction, which are the chief characteristics by which Brahman should be understood. This is, he adds, the essence of all the Vedānta (*Sarvavēdānta sāram*). This view closely follows Ānandatīrtha's in I. 1. 2, where in declaring *Brahma-lakshana*, he quotes from the *Skānda Purāna*:—*Srishti sthithi samhāra niyamana gnānāgnāna bandha mōkṣhā-yathah ; utpaththi sthithi samhāra niyati gnānamavrutiti ; bandha mōkṣhancha purushāth yasmāth sa Harirēkarātiti Skānde*. This has to be compared with Suka's words: *Utpaththi sthithi laya samānārthah praveśa niyamanādīnām sthithirantharbhāvanaprutha upadeśah*. This is to support his view that the chief *lakshanas* of Parabrahman are known through the *lakshanas* of creation, protection and destruction and He cannot therefore be without *lakshanas*. Parabrahman in the form of Srī Hari is the sole Lord to grant, out of His grace, Mōksha.

If *Nirvisēśha* Brahman is postulated, the result of *jignyāsa* would prove to be nothing ; on the other hand, a contradictory result will be attained (*viparīta phalā-nēva drashtavyāni*).<sup>72</sup>

In parts of his comments on I. 1. 2, Suka follows the actual wording of Ānandatīrtha. Thus, the following is from Ānandatīrtha's comment as found in the *Anuvyākhyāna*:—*Janmādasīyēti tēnaitad viśhnōrēva svalakṣhanam*,

<sup>72</sup> This is the gloss of Krishnāchārya, the commentator of *Suka Bhāṣya*, see *Suka Bhāṣya*, page 49.

*asyōdbhavādi hētutvam sākshādēva svalakshanam.* This might be compared with the following from Suka's comments on the identical *Sūtra* (I. 1. 2):—*Jagadjanmādi kāranatvam parabrahmanō lakshanam bhavatīti prāhajanmādyasya iti.*

Again, Ānandatīrtha in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, commenting on I. 1. 1, says in ascribing to Brahman *paripūrṇaguna*:—*Brahmasabdōpi hi gunapūrtimēva vadatyayam.* This may be compared with Suka's words in I. 1. 2: *Gunagana paripūrtatvēna saviśēshatvamēva hi param Brahmana upadisyatē.* Again, Ānandatīrtha in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, in commenting on I. 1. 1, says, in describing Brahman as possessed of countless *gunas*:—*Athōnantagunam Brahma nīrbhēda mapi bhāvya.* This may be compared with Suka's words in I. 1. 2:—*Aparimēyatvāt bhutananta parama mangala guna gana paripūrtatvēna saviśēshatva mēva hi param Brahmana upadisyatē.*

Again, Ānandatīrtha quotes in support of his interpretation of *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 3, the following from the *Skānda Purāna*:

ऋग्यजुस्सामाथर्वाश्च भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम् ।  
मूलरामायणंचैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥  
यच्चानुकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रम् प्रकीर्तितम् ।  
अथेन्यो ग्रंथविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रम् कुर्वतम् तत् ॥

*Rigyajussāmātharvāscha Bhāratam pāncharātrakam ।*  
*Mūlaramāyanamchaiva sāstramithyabhidhīyatē ॥*  
*Yachchānukūlamētasya tachcha sāstram prakīrtitam ।*  
*Athōnyō granthavistāro naiva sāstram kuर्वartma tat ॥*

This might be compared with Suka's commentary on I.1.3, where he thus quotes the first half of the above two verses:—

ऋग्यजुस्सामाथर्वाख्य भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम् ।  
यच्चानुकूलमेषाम् तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥

*Rigyajussāmātharvākhyā Bhāratam pancharātrakam ।*  
*Yachchānukūlamētiēshām tachcha sāstram prakīrtitam ॥<sup>73</sup>*

<sup>73</sup> Here *ētiēshām* is wrongly put down for *ētasya*, thus making the subject singular and the pronoun plural.



Suka quotes this as a well-known "Vachana" without pointing to the source from which it is taken. Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Skānda Purāna* as his source.

Suka next quotes the *Sruti* text, *Yo brahmānam vidadhāti pūrvam yōvai vēdāmscha prāhinōti tasmai iti*, which is found quoted already by Ānandatīrtha in the opening part of his work *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, where he proves that Vishnu imparted the knowledge of all the Sāstras to Brahman in order to show that he formed the source of all knowledge—*Sāstrayōnitvāt*.

Similarly, what Ānandatīrtha says in I. 1. 2, *Janmādasya yathak, abhignā sarvagna*, etc., is repeated by Suka in his comments on I. 1. 6.

Again, when commenting on II. 2. 44, *Vipratishēdhāchcha*, Suka quotes the following verses in support of his view without mentioning the source from which they are taken :

त्वं हि रुद्र महाभाग मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥

अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि विपरीतानि दर्शय ।

प्रकाशिकुरुचात्मानम् अप्रकाशं मां कुरु ॥ इत्यादि.

*Tvam hi rudra mahābhāga mōhasāstrāṇi kāraya ॥*

*Atathyāni vitathyāni viparītāni darsaya ।*

*Prakāśi kuruchātmanam aprakāsan cha mām kuru ॥*  
*ityādi*, etc.

This might be compared with the following from Ānandatīrtha's *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, I. 48-49, where he says he quotes as from the *Varāha Purānam* the following :—

त्वं च रुद्र महाबाहो मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥

अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि दर्शयस्व महाभुज ।

प्रकाशं कुरु चात्मानं अप्रकाशं मां कुरु ॥

*Tvamcha rudra mahābāhō mōhasāstrāṇi kāraya ॥*

*Atathyāni vitathyāni darsayasva mahābhuj ।*

*Prakāsam kuru cha ātmanam aprakāsam cha mām kuru ॥*

Though Suka gives the verses slightly differently, there can be no question that he has taken them from Ānandatīrtha.

Next, in commenting on *Sūtra* I. 1. 15, *Taddhētu vyapadēsāchcha* (identical with Ānandatīrtha's I. 1. 14), Suka

quotes the identical *Sruti* (Taittirīya) text referred to by Ānandatīrtha :—

कोहोवान्यात् कः प्राप्यात् ।

यदेष आकाश आनन्दो नस्यात् ॥—(तै. २-७)

*Kōhyēvānyāth kah prānyāth ।*

*Yadēsha ākāsa ānandō nasyāth ॥*

—(Taitt. 2-7.)

Then, in commenting on Sūtra I. 1. 16, *Mantravarnikamēvacha gīyatē*, Suka quotes likewise the same *Sruti* texts as Ānandatīrtha, *Brahmavidāpnōti param* and *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*, practically copying Ānandatīrtha's commentary *ipsissima verba*.

Further, in commenting on I. 1. 18 (corresponding to Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāshya* I. 1. 17, *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha*), Suka gives the *Sruti* text quoted by Ānandatīrtha: *Adrisyē Anātmē Aniruktē Anilayanē abhayam pratishṭām vindatē aththasō abhayam gatō bhavati*.

Likewise, in his comments on I. 1. 20, *Asminnasyacha tadyōgam sāsti* (Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāshya*, I. 1. 17), Suka quotes the *Brihat Samhita* text, *Sirōnārāyanapakshō dakshina savya ēvacha* etc., which occurs in Ānandatīrtha's comments on *Brahma-Sūtrā* I. 1. 15, *Mantravarnikamēvacha gīyatē*. It should be noted that this quotation occurs in the same *Adhikarana* in both the commentaries —i.e., *Ānandamayādhikaranam*. In Suka, this quotation practically ends his comments on I. 1. 20 and with it he ends *Ānandamayādhikarana*. Suka argues that if Brahman has *avayavas*, then he cannot be described as one not possessing *avayavas*, *gunas*, *ākāra*, etc.

Again, in his comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 26, *Chchandōbhīdhānān nētichēt nathathā chetōrpanā nigadāthathāhi darsanam*, corresponding to Ānandatīrtha's comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 25, Suka quotes the same *Sruti* text *Chētōrpanārtham vinigadyate*. Similarly, the *Purushasūkta* text quoted by Ānandatīrtha under *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 26, *Bhūtādīpada vyapadēsōpāpaththe schaisam*, is enlarged by Suka who quotes in full the same text

under his comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 28, *Upadēsa bhēdānnētichēnnōbhayasmīnnapya virōdhāt*.

In I. 2. 19, *Antharyām adhidaivādhi lōkādhiṣṭu tad-dharmavyapadēsāt*, Suka follows Rāmānuja in adding *lōkādhi* (where *lōkādhi* is omitted by Ānandatīrtha), but follows Ānandatīrtha's interpretation, quoting the same *Sruti* text, though he quotes it at greater length. (See Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* I. 2. 18.)

Similarly, Suka's I. 2. 20 follows Ānandatīrtha's I. 2. 19.<sup>74</sup>

Again, Suka's comment on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 21, *Anthastaddharmōpadēsāth*, is but a reflection of the comment of Ānandatīrtha on I. 1. 20, the corresponding *Sūtra* and on I. 1. 21 *Bhēda vyapadēsāchcha* in the same *adhikarana*—*Antastatvādhikarana* of Ānandatīrtha and *Antarādhikarana* of Suka.

Though Suka adopts *bhēda* throughout, he is careful to avoid anything approaching Ānandatīrtha's theory of *tāratamya bhēda* as among *jīvas*. Ānandatīrtha holds to *pancha bhēda*, which are fundamental to his system. Suka, however, accepts only *jīvesa bhēda* and *jīva prakṛiti bhēda*.

We may now sum up and note the points in which Suka and Ānandatīrtha agree and those in which they appear to differ. First, as to the points on which they agree:—

(1) *Sāstrasya nityatvam* [i.e., Sabda (Veda) is eternal].

(2) *Jagatjanmādikāranam Nārāyana ēva* (i.e., Vishnu is the cause, etc. of the world).

(3) *Āta sāstrayonitvam tasyōktam*, i.e., Vishnu can be understood only through the proofs manifested in the *Sāstra*.

(4) *Tatascha Parabrahmanō Nārāyanasya nikhila jagatjanmādikāranatva rūpa lakshanam siddham* (i.e., Parabrahma Nārāyana is the sole possessor of the characteristic

<sup>74</sup> But Suka reads I. 2. 20 thus: *Na cha Smārtha matha dharmābhilāpāṣcharīraschya*. Ānandatīrtha and Sankara, however, take *scharīraschya* with the next *Sūtra*. In this Suka agrees with Rāmānuja and Śrīkantha. But Śrīkara agrees with Sankara and Ānandatīrtha.

of *jagatjanmādikāranatva*, i.e., creation, protection and destruction. This is the established fact throughout the *Sūtras*).

Next, as to the points on which Suka and Ānandatīrtha differ, we may note the following :—

1. In his interpretation of I. 1. 11, *Gati sāmānyāt*, Suka says that those who practise Bhakti in the nine forms mentioned in the *Bhāgavata* are on a level. This is a departure from Ānandatīrtha, who holds that there is *tāratamya* among the nine different kinds of faithful devotees. They are not put by Ānandatīrtha on an equal footing as is done by Suka. Suka holds that these are all equal in Mōksha—*tasmādanyatamāpi navūnāmāpi bhaktīnām mōksharūpaphalasya samānatvāt*. Ānandatīrtha holds :—*Mōkshaye laye tāratamyam dēvūnāmāpi drishyatē* (see *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, I). Suka repeats the equality of all *bhaktas* of whatever nature, among the nine different kinds, in Mōksha, in I. 1. 12 :—*Tasmāt sravanādīnām tāratamyam nāstīti siddham*. We ought to compare this with what Ānandatīrtha says in his *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya* (I. 51.) :—*Nirdōshatvam tāratamyam muktānāmāpi chōchyate*, in which both faultlessness and gradation among Muktas is clearly postulated.

2. Suka holds there is *bhēda* as between *jīva* and *Īsvara* ; but not as between *jīvas* themselves. Ānandatīrtha holds that there is difference between *jīvas* as well.

Suka, in commenting on I. 1. 18, *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha*, stresses the remark that there being many *Sūtras* referring to *Bhēda*, such as *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha* (I. 1. 18) ; *Bhēdavyapadēsāchchānnyaha* (I. 1. 22) ; *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha* (I. 3. 4) ; *Bhēdasrutērvailakshanyāchcha* (II. 4. 17) ; *Bhēdānnētichē-nnaikasyāmāpi* (III. 3. 2) ; *adhikantu bhēdanirdēsāt* (II. 1. 22), etc. in the *Brahma-Sūtras*, critics, not properly understanding their *bhēda* import, exercise their verbal ingenuity for interpreting them from the *abhēda* point of view, through their ardent love of mere contradiction. Suka hints that even in the *Sūtrakāra*'s time there was observable this tendency towards

*abhēda* and consequently to do away with that tendency, the Sūtrakāra specifically introduced into the *Brahma-Sūtras* this species of *Sūtras* establishing the *Bhēda* view-point.

Suka, in commenting on I. 2. 14, says that the Jīva is a *Sākha* of Īsa and not his equal. The *Bhāgavata*, according to him, is devoted to the demonstration of the difference between *Jīva* and *Paramātman* in their respective *svarūpa* (I. 2. 17). Jīva is *jīva*; and *Paramātman* is *Paramātmā*; both will not and do not undergo any transformation in any kind of manifestation (I. 2. 18). Both Suka and Ānandatīrtha think that there is *bhēda* in *svarūpa* between Jīva and *Paramātman*, a point in which they fundamentally differ from Sankara, who holds that both are one in manifestation and *svarūpa*; only in manifestation it is *vyavahāra*. Again, commenting on III. 3. 19, *Samāna evaṇchā bhēdāchcha*, Suka says that *bhēda* does not extend to the different *avatāras*. All *avatāras* are *samāna* in *svarūpa* like gold and jewels made out of gold (*kanaka* and *makuta*), though they seem different as between themselves. This is in accordance with the view of Ānandatīrtha. Commenting on III. 3. 25, *Vēdhādhyartha bhēdāt*, Suka says that Jīva can approximate (in *guna*) as far as Parabrahman. *Tatra jīva lakshanam sarva Vēdhādhikam Parabrahmani nōchyate*. *Adh* denotes that Jīva can get to Brahman. But why does not the Jīva become part of Parabrahman? Because only *deha sārūpya* is possible and Brahman becomes, through *mantras*, *Vasa*. The term *Vēdha* has been used and not *Brahman*. This is to show that assimilation with Brahman is not possible. Commenting on III. 4. 39, *Athasthvoithara jyāyō lingāchcha*, Suka comments that, to those who are imbued with Bhakti and Yoga and who deserve the best, there shall be *sama darsana*. Commenting on III. 4. 40, *Tadbhūta*, etc., Suka says that this *Sūtra* suggests the grant of *samatva* to those who approach the Brahman with humility. "To those who show themselves as humble servants of mine (*Srī Haridāsa bhavābhyah*), I give them *my own rūpa* (*tadrūpabhāvam*) as declared in the *Sruti*." *Bhēda* between

*jīva* and *Īsa* thus seems the fundamental basis of Suka's *Bhāṣhya*.

In keeping with this view of the dependence of the *jīva* on the *Īsa* is the doctrine of *Mōksha* propounded by Suka. Commenting on IV. 4. 17 *Jagadvyāpāra varjam*, Suka asks : Does the *mumukshu* attain all the eight qualities of Paramātmā, such as *Jagadvyāpāra*, etc., after attaining realization (*mukti*)? The answer is *Jagadvyāpāra varjam*. He attains Brahmatva—excluding the eight qualities. He is a *paratantra*, subordinate to Paramātmā. He gets *mōksha* because of the grace of the Almighty (*Bhagavat prasāda labdhasya mōkshasya pratyagātmana sannihitatva-masti*). This lack of *jagadvyāpāra* shows the *mumukshu*'s *paratantratva*.

Commenting on IV. 4. 21, Suka winds up by saying that the *mumukshu* enjoys bliss *in association with* (*sākam*) Parabrahman. This is the objective of the desire of the *jīva*.

Suka, however, finds some difficulty in holding strictly to his view that there is no *bhēda* as between *jīvas*. At one point, he appears to evade the issue. Thus, though he quotes, while commenting on I. 3. 43 *Sushruptyut-krāntyōr bhēdēna*, texts from the *Bhāgavata* indicating *bhēda* between *jīvas*, he does not identify himself with them. He simply passes them by, saying that there is *bhēda* between *jīvas* and *Īsvara*. In places like this, *jīva paraspara bhēda* seems to be tacitly denied by him. He appears to quote these texts only to establish *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. According to him, none but Parabrahman can be the Lord of the Universe. However, Suka, in commenting on III. 2. 40 *Pūrvantu Bādarāyaṇō hētuvyapadēsāth*, states that Nārāyaṇa grants *phala* to *jīvas* in keeping with the merit of their past actions (*Nārāyaṇāt tattat jīvānām tattat pūrvānugunyēna phalam bhavātīti nīschētavayam*). This would seem to indicate that *tāratamya* as between *jīvas* would seem to be recognized by Suka, though he does not enlarge on the topic. This is a rare statement; usually he propounds *bhēda*

as only between *jīva* and *Brahman*, but does not enlarge on differences between *jīva* and *jīva*.

In commenting on I. 1. 13 *Ānandamayōbhyāsāt*, Suka closely follows the reasoning adopted by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*, when explaining *charama sabda* in I. 1. 25 *Jyōtishcharanābhīdhānāt*.<sup>75</sup> In his comments on the latter, Jayatīrtha raises the issue whether *charama sabda* is applicable to Parabrahman or to the *Jīva* and answers by saying that it is applicable only to the former. In dealing with the identical point when commenting on I. 1. 13, Suka sets down the same view and concludes by saying that in this *Sūtra* (I. 1. 13) it is *Paramātman* only that is primarily contemplated and that there is not even a distant suggestion that there is *abhēda* between *Jīva* and *Īsvara* (*tasmāt iha sārīratvāsya Paramātmānyēva paryavasānāt na jīvēsvara abhēda prasakti gandhōpi iti nischīyatē*).

Suka's interpretation of I. 1. 13, *Ānandamayōbhyāsāt*, bears also evident traces of adoption of the phraseology used by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāyasudhā* on the same *Sūtra*. Suka opens his argument thus :

“ सर्ववेदान्तसारे पुरुषविधोऽन्वयोऽत्र चरमोऽन्नमयादिषु ॥ ” इति. अत्रत्य चरम शब्दस्य आनन्दमयपरतया तैत्तरीयके श्रूयते ॥ श्रु ॥ “ तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् अन्योन्तर आत्मानन्दमय ” । इति सर्ववेदान्तसाराम्नात चरम शब्दपर्यायभूतेनात्रत्यानन्दमयशब्देन किं परमात्मैवोपदिश्यते ? आहोस्वित्परस्मादात्मनोऽन्यजीवः इति विचिकित्सायामुत्तरत्र “ तस्यैष एव शारीरआत्मे ” ति शरीरशब्देन जीवस्याभिधानात्स एवात्रोक्त चरमशब्दपर्याय भूतानन्दमय शब्दाभिधेयः ॥ इति कृत्वा यश्चरमस्त्वमिति अस्मिन्नर्थे पर्यवसानात् जांवेश्वराभेदश्च सिद्ध इत्येवं प्राप्ते प्रतिब्रूमः ॥ परमात्मैवेहानन्दमयोभवितुमर्हति, कस्मात् ? अभ्यासात् ॥ परमात्मनि खत्वानन्दोऽभ्यस्यते । अभ्यासो नाम आवृत्तिः तथा हि आनन्दमयं परमात्मानं प्रस्तुत्येव श्रूयते ॥ रसोवै सः ॥ रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वा आनन्दी भवीत ॥ इति अत्ररसशब्देनानन्दमयो परमात्मैवोच्यते ॥ . . . .

<sup>75</sup> *Charama Sabda* has to be differentiated from *Charamaslōka*, which has a large literature associated with it in Sri-Vaishnava philosophy. See *Charamaslōka tātparyadīpikā*, see *Madras Catalogue of Skt. MSS.* IV, i. C. page 3665(b); R. No. 3665(b), etc. In the *Rahasyatraya* of Sri Vēdāntāchārya, we have a treatise on the three great principles of Sri-Vaishnava religion : *Ashtākshara*, *Dvaya* and *Charamaslōka*, see for a commentary on it, *Madras Tri. Cat. of MSS.* V, 1. Skt. C. p. 6718, R. No. 4714.

तस्मात् परमात्मन्येव बहुकृत आनन्दोऽभ्यस्यते ॥ तस्मात्स एवेहानन्दमय शब्दे नावगम्यते ॥ न तु जीवः ॥

Compare this with Jayatīrthā's comments in his *Nyāya-sūdhā* on the same Sūtra :—

गुणवाचिनस्त्वानन्दादयः ते गुणिनि ब्रह्मणि वर्तितुं नार्हतीति अन्यत्र प्रसिद्धाः ॥ गुणि-  
गुणिनोरभेदस्त्व हि कुण्डलाधिकरण एव साक्षात्सूत्रकृता वक्षते ॥ तैत्तिरीयके स वा एष पुरुषोऽ-  
न्नरसमय इत्यादिनाऽन्नमय प्राणमय मनोमय विज्ञानमयानन्दमयाः पठ्यन्ते ॥ तत्र संशयः ॥  
किमेतेऽन्नमयादयः परमात्मैवा उत तदन्यः कश्चिदिति । सर्वत्र ब्रह्मशब्दश्रवणात्तस्य च विप्र-  
एषावन्यत्रप्रयोगात् । किं तावत्प्राप्ते ॥ अन्य एवान्नमयादिशब्दार्थ इति ॥ कुतः अन्नमयादि  
शब्दा हि विकारवाचिनः ॥

Thus, Suka concedes : (1) *Jīvōsa bhēda*, i.e., that jīva and Īsa are different ; (2) *Jagat satyatvam*, *Sāstrasya nityatvam* ; (3) Jīva can attain to the *sārūpya* of Paramātman ; (4) Equality in *svarūpa* as between *avatāras* (III. 3. 19) ; and (5) Both hold that Parabrahman is *Nirguna* in so far as he is held to be absolutely free from *satva*, *rajas* and *tanmō* gunas ; but he is held to be full of *ānandādi sadgunas* in regard to which he is described as *gunapūrna*. But Suka does not agree with Ānandatīrtha in assigning *tāratamya-bhēda* among *jīvas*. Suka, however, holds with Ānandatīrtha that Paramātman is one, in all his multifarious forms ; there being no *bhēda* between his *avatāras*.

From what has been set out above, it will be conceded that Suka came long after Ānandatīrtha. How long after, it is not possible to state definitely. But seeing that the position assumed by Suka, though basically identical with that of Ānandatīrtha, is still one somewhat at variance from his, it might be suggested that it is an attempt at producing a *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* to suit the special position of the Bhāgavata school represented by him. The tradition of this school was evidently one of *bhēda* but not probably *bhēda* of the logical type propounded by Ānandatīrtha and propagandized with zeal by his school. The Smārtha or the Bhāgavata matha of Talkād claimed Suka's *Bhāshya* as its own possibly for two reasons : (a) to provide a *Bhāshya* for itself and its adherents, which seemed a necessity seeing that other leading *maths* had their own ; and (b) to suggest that though



it followed the *bhēda* theory in its interpretation, it differed in certain respects from the theory as worked out by Ānandatīrtha. These differences, though they do not go to the root of the matter, are possibly thought of to be material enough to justify the claim of a separate school. It is possible too that it adheres to quite an ancient tradition. However this may be, these considerations would suggest a date for Suka, the *Bhāshyakāra*, far removed from Ānandatīrtha. While Suka follows closely the latter's *Bhāshya* and as might be expected holds fast to his cardinal doctrine of *bhēda*, he agrees to differ from him in certain other phases of his doctrine. Considerable time should have elapsed between the two for Suka to attempt at popularising such a radical departure from the *bhēda* view propounded by Ānandatīrtha. Probably we may not be far wrong if we premised that a couple of centuries divides the one from the other. If Ānandatīrtha belongs to the 13th century A.D., Suka may, perhaps, be set down to at least the 16th century. His criticism of the Advaita position would induce one to shift him to the next century even. In it, he envisages a fully developed Advaita attitude. Suka's language is also quite modern ; he quotes sparingly from the *Srutis*, except where he takes from Ānandatīrtha and the Telugu part of his *Srutigīta* is almost conversational in character. This apart, the type of *bhakti*—utter dependence on God in a spirit of humility—would also seem to signify a late date. Judging from the criticisms he offers on the Advaita School of his time, which is referred to by him at different points of his *Bhāshya*, Suka's work should, if anything, be advanced by perhaps another century. Thus Suka, in fact, holds up devotion to Vishnu of a somewhat extreme type as the ideal to be aimed at by those desirous of *mōksha*. While commenting on I. 2. 5 *Sabda vishēshāt*, he says that in order to realize *mōksha*, Bhagavān Nārāyana alone should be resorted to as the sole bestower of *mōksha* to those who meditate on him (*Āmnāyō vishēshitaḥ Paramātmanōnyatra mumukshūpāsyatva mapahasati*,

*tasmādbhagavānnārāyana ēva mumukshūpāśyatvēna pratipattavyaha*). He approvingly quotes in this connection, in support of his position, *Bhāgavata*, IX. 9. 21, *Avismitam paripūrṇa kāmam*, etc. Quite in keeping with this standpoint is his summing up of the import of the first five *adhikaranas* of the first *Adhyāya*. Of these five *adhikaranas*, Suka says:—Parama Purusha Bhagavān Nārāyana alone is the one to be meditated upon and discussed, in order to realize *mōksha*, as he is the sole Lord of creation, protection and destruction as declared throughout the Vedānta. In commenting on I. 4. 3, *Tadadhīnatvāttadārthavat*, Suka writes thus referring to the Advaita position:—*Tava mate Brahma vyatirikta vastvabhāvāt*; *yadyakasmādbhēdam parikalpya sāstrāni pravartēran tadā tēshām bhrānta pralāpa vishēsho vyarthāyayasascha prasajyatē tasmādashyaiva tayōrbhēdaha*. This shows that Suka belongs to the post-Sankara period. Commenting on II. 1. 7, *Asaditichēnnapratislēdha mātravāt*, Suka says:—Those that argue that *visva* is *mithya* are rejected here. *Adhyāsa* in Brahman is what is not supported by the *Vēda*. It is against *Sruti* texts: *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni*, etc. *Jagat* is therefore *satya*. Otherwise, *Sruti* texts will be rendered mutually contradictory. *Brahma satyatva* will end in *Brahma mithyatva*. Both *adhyāsa* and *Brahman* will become *satya*. Thus the *adhyāsa* theory will end in no satisfactory solution (*anavasta*). This will be the result of predicating that *visva* is *mithya*. Therefore *jagat* is *satya* and *nitya*. Hence it is stated in the *Bhāgavata*:—*Satyavratam satyāparam trisatyam satyasya yōnim nihitancha satyē satyasya satyamiti* (Canto X). Again, commenting on II. 1. 8, *Apūtan*, etc., Suka adds if *jagat* is *mithya*, then *mōksha* which we aim at is also rendered *mithya*. All the Sāstras are thus rendered *asamanjasa*. It would be folly to predicate *mithyatva*; for it is destructive of all *bhakti*. Thus all meditation will be rendered futile.

In II. 1. 9, *Natudrushtāntābhāvāt*, Suka next observes that when meditation goes, *mōksha* will become impossible. The *Kīta* becomes *Bhramara* by meditation and the

fear of *Bhramara*. Similarly the *jīva*, by meditation on Brahman, can attain *Sārūpya*—the *rūpa* that it meditates on. According to the opposite theory (*asanmata*) if everything is unreal, then the example of *Bhramara* and *Kīta* would be unreal. The final result of *sārūpya*, i.e., Brahmatva, would be thus rendered unreal, so that the doctrine itself becomes untrue (*asamanjasa*). Commenting on II. 1. 10, *Svapaksha dōshāchcha*, Suka says:—Your own view-point is false. If *śarīra* is *asatya*, then *jīva* and *Īsvara* being one and both within bondage, there will be no such thing as father, teacher, son, disciple, etc., thereby resulting in *mahādōsha*. Therefore, such a view-point is extremely faulty. This is made clear in our *Srutigītā Bhāshya*.<sup>76</sup> Next commenting on II. 1. 11, *Tarkāpratishṭānādapi*, Suka says that those who leave the *Vēdas* and base their argument on mere logic, find it impossible to establish their doctrine. Vaiseshikas base themselves on logic but hold that there is *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. Others basing on logic, go a different way and try to establish a doctrine which cannot carry conviction (i.e., that *visva* is *mithya*). Commenting on II. 1. 12, *Anyadhānumēyamitichē dēvamāpyanirmōksha prasangaha*, Suka says that if *jagat* is *mithya*, *śarīra* is denied. If *śarīra* is denied, then the *śarīra*-less *ātman* postulated by the doctrine presumes he is already *Brahman* and as such has attained *mōksha*. Hence *mōksha-sādhana* for him is needless (*asat*). Commenting on II. 1. 13, *Yētēnasishtā-parigrahā apivyākhyātāha*, Suka says that the doctrine of the *nirīsvara* Sāṅkhyas is also contradicted here. Suka follows the reading of Rāmānuja in II. 1. 18 *Asadvyapadēsānnē*, etc.—which *Sūtra* is split into two by Ānandatīrtha and Suka. But in interpreting the *Sūtra*, Suka quotes the very *Sruti* text cited by Ānandatīrtha—*nāsadaśinnō sadā-sāththadānīm*. The strong criticism that is offered by Suka

<sup>76</sup> This work has been quoted more than once by Suka in his *Bhāshya*. See text above in regard to Suka's *Bhāshya* on it. *Srutigītā* is a part of Canto X of *Bhāgavata*, in which *jagat satyatva* is established.

of the Advaita position and the rest of his criticism of that standpoint as briefly indicated above would seem to indicate that he probably wrote long after the Advaita position had become fully established. The cumulative effect of all available evidence—historical and philosophical—would seem to suggest that he belonged to the 16th, if not indeed, to the 17th century.

Though he follows Ānandatīrtha in upholding the *bhēda* doctrine, Suka differs from him largely in his readings of the text of the *Brahma-Sūtra*, thus showing that he only adopts as much as is necessary for his purposes and no more. Thus unlike Ānandatīrtha, but like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Śrīkara, he retains the *Sūtra* I. 1. 9, *Pratignāvirōdhāt*. Rāmānuja interprets the *pratigna* here referred to as the statement made in the *Chchāndōgya* text (VI. 1):—Through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Nimbārka follows him in this interpretation as well and both use it to reject the Pūrvaapakshin's argument that *sat* is the Pradhāna. If the Pradhāna were the cause, says Rāmānuja, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it, for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradiction. Nimbārka's comment is not only brief—just a line—but also merely turns into aphoristic form what Rāmānuja had said before him. Quoting the same text as Rāmānuja, he remarks that to suggest that the cause is a non-sentient being cannot prove acceptable. (*Kincha ekavidyā na tu sarvavidyā na pratignā virōdhādapi na achētana kāranādāha sādhu*). Suka, with whom *Brahma Tarka* occupies a place wholly subordinate to *Bhakti*, does not refer to Pradhāna in this connection except for the evolution from the *Bhāgavata* of the text *Yanmāyayā gahanayā* (*Bhāgavata*, IV. 7. 30) in his comment on *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 6, *Gaunaschēnnātma sabdāt*. On this text, he adds the remark that though Prakriti looks as the more prominent thing, Paramātman is the cause. (*Tataschāyamabhigna sabdah prakritēmukhya ēva bhavati*,

*tēna cha paramātmaiva gamyate tasmājjagatkāranatva rūpasya paramātma lakshanasya na kāchitkshatikh*). Later, when he comments on I. 1. 9, *Pratignā virōdhāt*, Suka omits all mention of Prakriti and proceeds:—Unless one meditates according to the Sāstras, there is no realization of Mōksha to him. Why? *Pratignā virōdhāt*, i.e., it is opposed to the declared sayings (of the Upanishads). If at all any one can realize Mōksha, then, he could do so only in accordance with the texts: No one that does not duly meditate on Me with all his heart and soul, he cannot realize Me, through My grace, through knowledge and through the grace of My Lakshmi (*Bhāḡavata*, X. 72. 11); No one that does not duly become a suppliant of Mine will be eligible for realizing Me (*Bhāḡavata* X. 51. 43); “Know it for certain, O Kauntēya, no faithful servant (*bhakta*) of Mine will come to ruin” (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, IX. 31.). Thus these *pratignas* (avowed statements) of Parabrahman will be contradicted. Therefore, in this way, should one with faith in him meditate upon and worship the immeasurably powerful Almighty. Such is the interpretation put—from the Bhakti point of view—by Suka on this *Sūtra*.

Suka treats the *Pasupatyadhikarana* and *Uthpathyadhikarana* as one single *adhikarana* and calls it *Pasupathyadhikarana*. In this he differs from the other commentators.

*Sankara* thus arranges these sets of *sūtras*:—

II. 2. 33-36. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam in which the systems of Sugata and Vivasana (i.e., Buddhist and Jaina) systems are rejected.

(Naikasminnasambhavāt; Evancha ātmā kārthsnnyam; Nacha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyah; Antyāvasthitēschōbhayannityātvādvavishah.)

II. 2. 37-14. Patyadhikaranam.

Patyurasāmanjasyāt; Sambandhānupapaththēscha; Adhishthānānupapaththescha; Karanavachchēnnabhōgādi-bhyah; Antavattvamāsarvagnatāva.

The Pasupati and Nirguna doctrines are rejected.

## II. 2. 42-45. Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam.

Utpatyasambhavāt; Nachakartuh karanam; Vignānādibhāve vā tadapratishēdhah; Vipratishēdhāchcha.

Bhāgavata doctrine is rejected.

*Rāmānuja's* arrangement is as follows :—

## II. 2. 31-34. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam.

Naikasmin, etc. .. II. 2. 31.

Evanchā, etc. .. II. 2. 32.

Nachaparyā, etc. .. II. 2. 33.

Antyāvasththē, etc. .. II. 2. 34.

Sugata and Jaina doctrines are rejected.

## II. 2. 35-38. Pasupatyadhikaranam.

Patyura, etc. .. II. 2. 35.

Adhisthānā, etc. .. II. 2. 36.

Karanā, etc. .. II. 2. 37.

Antavattva, etc. .. II. 2. 38.

*Rāmānuja* omits the *Sūtra Sambandhānupapaththescha*. This adhikaranam, in his view, rejects the Pāsūpata doctrine.

## II. 2. 39-42. Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam.

Utpatyasambhavāt .. II. 2. 39.

Nachakartuh karanam .. II. 2. 40.

Vignānādi, etc. .. II. 2. 41.

Vipratishēdhāchcha .. II. 2. 42.

Bādarāyana establishes, according to *Rāmānuja*, the Bhāgavata doctrine in this adhikaranam.

*Anandaśīrtha* adopts the following arrangement :—

## II. 2. 33-36. Naikasmin adhikaranam.

Naikasmin, etc. .. II. 2. 33.

Evanchā, etc. .. II. 2. 34.

Nacha, etc. .. II. 2. 35.

Antyāvasthitheschōbhayanityatvādvāisheshāh, etc. II. 2. 36.

The Syādvāda mata (*i.e.*, Jaina system) is rejected.

## II. 2. 37-41. Patyuradhikaranam.

Patyurasam, etc.	..	II. 2. 37.
Sambandha, etc.	..	II. 2. 38.
Adhisthā, etc.	..	II. 2. 39.
Karana, etc.	..	II. 2. 40.
Antavattva, etc.	..	II. 2. 41.

The Pāsupata system is rejected.

## II. 2. 42-45. Utpatyadhikaranam.

Utpatya, etc.	..	II. 2. 42.
Nacha, etc.	..	II. 2. 43.
Vignā, etc.	..	II. 2. 44.
Viprati, etc.	..	II. 2. 45.

The Sakti doctrine is rejected.

*Nimbārka* has the following arrangement :—

## II. 2. 33-36.

Naikasmin, etc.	..	II. 2. 33.
Antyāvasthi, etc.	..	II. 2. 36.

The Jaina doctrine is rejected by Bādarāyana in these four sūtras.

## II. 2. 37-41.

Patyur, etc. to Antavattva, etc.

The Pāsupata system is rejected.

## II. 2. 42-46.

Utpatti, etc. to Vipratishēdha, etc.

The Sakti doctrine is rejected.

Nimbārka follows Ānandatīrtha, his commentary being nothing more than the noting down of the conclusions arrived at by Ānandatīrtha, the argumentative portion being almost entirely omitted. This is one of the Adhikaranas which unmistakably shows that Nimbārka came after Ānandatīrtha and not *vice versa*.

Vallabha styles sūtras 33-36 as the Naikasminnasambhavādityadhikaranam and includes the following sūtras under it :—

Naikasminnasambhavāt	.. II. 2. 33.
Evancha, etc.	.. II. 2. 34.
Nachaparyā, etc.	.. II. 2. 35.
Antyāvasthi, etc.	.. II. 2. 36.

According to Vallabha, Bādarāyana in these *sūtras* rejects the Vivasana, *i.e.*, Jaina, doctrine.

II. 2. 37-41. Patyurasāmanjasyadhikaranam.

Patyurasāmanjasyāt	.. II. 2. 37.
Samban, etc.	.. II. 2. 38.
Adhishtāna, etc.	.. II. 2. 39.
Karana, etc.	.. II. 2. 40.
Antavattva, etc.	.. II. 2. 41.

According to him, Bādarāyana rejects in these *sūtras* Anīvara Tārikavāda, *i.e.*, the system that postulates that there is no creating Lord.

II. 2. 42-45. Utpaththisambhavādhikaranam.

Utpattisambhavāt	.. II. 2. 42.
Nachakartuh, etc.	.. II. 2. 43.
Vignānādi, etc.	.. II. 2. 44.
Vipratishēdhāchcha	.. II. 2. 45.

Bādarāyana here rejects, according to him, some parts of the Bhāgavata system.

Vallabha simply states the conclusions of Sankara in a few sentences, often using Sankara's words and phrases.

*Suka* exhibits these identical *sūtras* thus :—

II. 2. 32-35. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam.

Naikasmīnsambhavāt; Evanchātmākārthasnyam; Nachaparyāyadapyavirōdhōvikārādibhyah; Anthyāvasthitēschōbhaya nityatvāDavisēshah.

According to him, the Jaina system is rejected in these *sūtras*.

II. 2. 36-44. Pasupathyadhikaranam.

Pathyurasāmanjasyāt; Sambandhā n upapaththeh; "Adhishtānānupapathescha"; Karanavāchēnnabhōgādibhyah; Anthavathvamasarvagnathāva; Utpatyasambhavāt; Nachakarthuhkāranam; Vignānādibhāvēvātadapratishēdhah; Vipratishēdhāchcha.



The Pāsupata system is, according to him, rejected in these *sūtras*.

Suka thus is unique in his division of the *sūtras*; in place of three he has only two *adhikaranas*. The first of these he styles *Ekasminsambhavādhikaranam*, following Sankara and Rāmānuja; the second he calls *Pasupatyadhikaranam*, in which he combines the *sūtras* which go to form the *Patyadhikaranam* and *Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam* of Sankara and *Pasupatyadhikaranam* and *Utpathyadhikaranam* of Rāmānuja. As will be seen, *Pasupatyadhikaranam* is the name given by Suka to the two sets of *adhikaranams* combined by him. In regard to the subject-matter, in the *Ekasminsambhavādhikaranam*, Suka agrees with the rest of the commentators in suggesting that in them Bādarāyana rejects the Jaina system. In the next *adhikaranam*, Suka does not agree with Sankara and Rāmānuja in the view that there is any reference in the *sūtras* comprising it to the Bhāgavata system. He treats the whole as one *adhikaranam* and applies it to the Pasupati system. In this he partly agrees with Ānandatīrtha and Nimbārka, who suggest that there is no reference to the Bhāgavata system in these *sūtras*. Ānandatīrtha divides the *sūtras* forming it into two *adhikaranams* and styles them *Patyuradhikaranam* (II. 2. 37 to 41) and *Utpatyadhikaranam* (II. 2. 42-45) in which the Pāsupata and Sakti systems are respectively rejected by him. Suka, it will be seen, is unwilling to divide these *sūtras* into two *adhikaranams* and to treat the second set of these *sūtras* as applicable to the Sakti doctrine. He suggests that all these *sūtras* form only one *adhikaranam* and that they all refer exclusively to the Pāsupata system which, according to him, is rejected by Bādarāyana. Why he does this will be apparent when it is stated that Suka belongs to the Bhāgavata school and is loath to admit there is any discussion of that doctrine with a view to its rejection in these *sūtras*. One other remarkable feature of Suka's commentary in this part of his work is that he does not quote any *ślōkas* from the *Bhāgavata* to

support his position from II. 2. 32 to II. 2. 42. In commenting on II. 2. 44, *Vignānādibhāvēvā tadapratishēdhaḥ*, he quotes three slōkas from the *Bhāgavata* (IV. 2. 28; IV. 2. 29 and IV. 2. 30), in which it is stated that those who follow Śiva are Pāshandas; that they are opposed to the Vaishnava faith; that they adhere to customs not in keeping with accepted sanctions (*nashṭa saucha*); that they are bigoted; that they wear *jata*, *bhasma* and *asthi*; that they assume the *Sivadīksha*; and that they worship deities opposed to the *dēvatas*, find fault with Brāhmanas, and that thus they derive the title *Pāshandas*, etc. These quotations are intended to support Suka's position deduced from this *sūtra* (II. 2. 43) that those who are possessed of wisdom derived from *gnāna vignāna vairāgyādi guṇas* should reject a system like that of the Pāsupatas which makes fun of the *Vēdas*, the *Brāhmanas*, the *Yagnapurusha*, etc. Apart from these three quotations from the *Bhāgavata* to buttress his position against the Pāsupatas, the only other slōka quoted by Suka from that work occurs in the next *sūtra* (II. 2. 44) *Vipratishedhāchcha*. This slōka (IX. 9. 30) is quoted to support the position that the Pāsupata system should be discarded. The slōka *Tathēti rāgnābhihitam sarvalōka hitassivaḥ | dadharāvahitō Gangām pāda pūta jalam harēḥ ||* suggests the adoration of Śiva in an entirely different aspect. (Let it be so; and so saying God Śiva, who is the bestower of happiness on the whole world, at once took on his head the waters of the Ganges in order to be free from all pollution as its waters poured forth from the sacred feet of Hari).<sup>77</sup> He is represented as the friend of all kinds of people (*Sarvajana hitachintaka*), of those who follow the *Purānas* and *Upanishads* and those who are opposed to them. Śiva is thus associated with both. This position is supported further by Suka by a text, whose source is not disclosed

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<sup>77</sup> The reference is to the story of Śiva purging himself of all sin acquired by his connection with those not friendly to Vishnu. By his act of receiving Ganga on his head, he became "sinless".

by Suka himself but which is actually found quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Mahābhārata Tātparyā Nirṇaya* as taken by him from the *Varāha Purāna*.

त्वं हि रुद्र महाभाग मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥

अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि विपरीतानि दर्शय ।

प्रकाशं कुरु चात्मानमप्रकाशं च मां कुरु ॥

*Tvam hi Rudra mahābhāga mōhasāstrāṇi kāraya ॥*

*Atathyāni vitathyāni viparītāni darsaya ।*

*Prakāśam kuru chātmānam aprakāśam cha mām kuru ॥*

etc.

(Oh illustrious Rudra! bring to light false doctrines exhibiting untruths, falsehoods and contrary teachings. Extol your own greatness ; and keep me hidden from my antagonists.)

This was, Suka says, given as a command to Śiva by Vishnu in order to hide himself from coming into contact with people possessing the *tāmasa* quality and to inculcate the doctrine (of the Pāsūpata system) in the world that Paśupati is the sole lord of the Universe to those who disbelieved in the greatness of Nārāyaṇa. Since Paśupati is thus kind to all, Śiva is described to be *sarvalōkahita*.

Thus, while Suka differs from Ānandatīrtha in his grouping of the *sūtras*, he agrees with him in securing the *Bhāgavata* position, by suggesting that there is no reference to it in the *sūtras*. His adoption of the quotation from the *Varāha Purāna* shows that he is, as customary with him, following Ānandatīrtha in his interpretation, wherever possible, of the *sūtras*. Incidentally, the particular *ślōkas* quoted by him from the *Bhāgavata* show that he is quite a late commentator.

There is evidence to believe that Suka, the commentator, was an author who came subsequent to Vijayadhwaṇa, the author of *Padyaratnāvali*, the leading *Madhva* commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. Suka incorporates in his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, the identical *ślōkas* from the *Bhāgavata* which Vijayadhwaṇa has linked the *sūtras* with in explaining the *ślōkas*. To put the matter in another way, while Vijayadhwaṇa has quoted certain

*sūtras* from the *Brahma-Sūtras* in explaining a particular *śloka* in the *Bhāgavata*, Suka has, in his turn, taken the self-same *ślokas* to explain the *sūtras* when writing his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. In a word, the key to Suka's interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras* is to be found in *Vijayadhvaṇya*. Vijayadhwaṇya was an ascetic *guru* of the Pejāwar math, one of the eight maths of Udipi, founded by Ānandatīrtha. He probably lived about the sixteenth century. Suka, who follows his methodology, must be ascribed to a date posterior to him—say by about a century or so.

Suka treats I. 4. 1, *Ānumānika mapyēkēśhāmitichēnna sarīra rūpakavinyastha grihītēḥ darsayatīcha* as two *sūtras* dividing it thus:—(1) *Ānu...grihītēḥ* and (2) *Darsayatīcha*. All the other commentators—Sankara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Ānandatīrtha, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Vignāna-bhikṣu and Śrīkara—combine these two *sūtras* into one. Suka makes the first part the *pūrvapakṣa* and in the second part establishes the *Siddhānta*, finally fixing that there is *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. In developing the argument, he follows Ānandatīrtha. In treating the first part as helping to set down the *pūrvapakṣa* argument, he adopts Sankara's position, while in fixing the *Siddhānta*, he follows Ānandatīrtha. Suka, in fact, follows Ānandatīrtha in his *pada*, though he does not explain *ka* in *rūpaka* in the first part of this *sūtra*. *Ka* is, as aptly pointed out by Ānandatīrtha, quoting Pāṇini, evidence of *inferiority*—inferiority of the *jīva* to *Īsvara*. The *jīva* is not *rūpa* but *rūpakā* of *Īsvara*, i.e., inferior to *Īsvara*.

Following Rāmānuja, Suka, again, treats II. 1. 11 and II. 1. 12 as two different *sūtras*, whereas Ānandatīrtha and Sankara read them together as one *sūtra*, though there is a slight difference in the reading of the latter. Such variations, however, are common among commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, as will be seen from the tables of comparison given in an Appendix to this volume (see Appendices). As this matter is considered at some length below, it is unnecessary to pursue it further here. The point to note is that

though Suka agrees with Ānandatīrtha generally, there are occasions on which he differs from him as from the rest of his predecessors. A few other *sūtras* in the commentaries in which Suka follows Ānandatīrtha either in his interpretation or in re quoting the *Sruti* texts quoted by him may be simply noted :—I. 1. 1, *Athāthō brahmajñāsa* ; I. 1. 5, *Gaunaschēnnātma sabdāt* ; I. 1. 15, *Taddhētu vyapadēsāchcha* ; I. 1. 18, *Bhēda vyapadēsāchcha* ; I. 1. 20, *Asmin nasyacha tadyōgamsāsti* ; I. 1. 29, *Prānastathānugamāt* ; I. 1. 31, *Sāstradrushstyātūpadēsō vāmadēvavat* ; I. 2. 19, *Antaryāmyadhidaivādhilōkādishu taddharmavyapadēsāt* ; I. 2. 20, *Nacha smārtha matāddharmābhilāpāchchārīrascha* ; I. 4. 1, *Ānumānik mapyēkēshāmitichēnna sarīra rūpaka vinyastha grihītēh darshayati cha* ; I. 4. 7, *Trayānāmēva chaiva mupanyāsaḥ prasnascha* ; etc.

### Suka Bhashya Tika.

A few words may be added about the writer of the *Tika* on the *Bhāshya* of Suka. The name of the writer of the *Tika* on this *Bhāshya* is Krishnāchārya (see *Suka Bhāshya*, p. 232). He belonged to the family of one Rāmakrishnāchārya (*anvayasambhūta*). He was of the Gārgya gōtra. His name appears as *Krishnamāchārya* on p. 1 of the *Suka Bhāshya*, but this seems a mistake for *Krishnāchārya*. He calls his work *Sarvavēdāntasāra Mīmāṃsa Bhāshya Chandrikā*, in which only the more difficult passages or contexts are explained by him. The date of Krishnāchārya is not known. Among the verses forming the *Mangalaslōka* of his commentary are two (4 and 5), which seem to be but echoes of two *slōkas* of Jayatīrtha's *Mangalaslōka* in his *Tatvaprakāśika*, a commentary on Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*. The following are the *slōkas* of Suka :—

एतद्भाष्यान्वयाच्छुद्धयेन्ममेयं गीरसत्त्वपि ।

अप्याविलंहिरथ्याम्भो गङ्गासङ्गाद्विशुद्धयति ॥४॥

येषांस्वान्तं भवेत्तान्तं महानिर्वृतिवीक्षणे ।

तत्कृतेतान्नुसंक्षिप्य क्रियते भाष्यचान्द्रिका ॥५॥

With these, compare the two following *ślōkas* taken from Jayatīrtha's work (*Tatvaprakāśika* I. *Mangalācharana ślōkas*).

अथ तत्कृपया ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यं यथामति ।

व्याकुर्वे श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थमुखनिःसृतं ॥६॥

गङ्गासङ्गेन नैर्मल्यं रथ्याद्विर्लभ्यते यथा ।

वाचो विशुद्धिसिद्धयर्थं सङ्गम्यन्ते गुरोर्गिरः ॥७॥

The following similarities between the two sets of *ślōkas* may be noted :—

(1) The words used by Jayatīrtha are reproduced, for example, *rathyāmbho* and *gangasangād visuddhyati* in Suka appear in Jayatīrtha as *rathyādbhiḥ* and *gangāsaṅgēna nairmalyam*.

(2) The governing idea in both is the same.

Krishnāchārya's *ślōkas* seem to be an adaptation of Jayatīrtha's and not *vice versa*.

As we know Jayatīrtha lived in the 14th century, it has to be inferred that Krishnāchārya came after Jayatīrtha. How long after, it is not possible to determine. As Suka himself is a late commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, his commentator should have come some time after him. In any case, he cannot be much older than the 17th century A.D.

### Srikantha.

It has been mentioned above that Srikantha, the author of the *Bhāṣya* known after him, lived about the third quarter of the 13th century A.D. His *Bhāṣya* admittedly outlines the Śaiva Visishtādvaita Siddhānta. (See his comments on II. 1. 22, *Adhikantu bhēdanīrdeśāt*.)<sup>78</sup> He

<sup>78</sup> In the course of his comments on this Sūtra, Srikantha writes :  
*Nanu 'tadananyatvam' ityabhēdapratipādanāt 'adhikantu' iti bhēdapratipādanāt | prapancha brahmaṇōḥ bhēdābhēdaḥ sādhitō bhavati chēt—na, bhēdābhēdakaḥ paṇam visishtādvaitam sādhayāmaḥ | na vāyam brahmaṇaprapanchayōratyantamēva bhēdāvādināḥ ghaṭapatayōriva tadanyatva parasarutivirōdhāt | na vā atyantabhēdāvādināḥ suktirajata-yōrivaikataṛamityātveṇa, tatsvābhāvika guṇabhēda parasaruti virōdhāt | na cha bhēdābhēdāvādināḥ, vastu virōdhāt | kintu sarīrasarīriṇōriva*

identifies Śiva with Parabrahman, thus subordinating all other deities to Śiva. (See I. 1. 17-20; I. 2. 5; I. 2. 8; I. 3. 2; III. 2. 35-36; III. 3. 15-17; IV. 4. 9; etc.) The superiority to Śiva is sought to be established by him in his commentary on III. 2. 35, *Tathā'nyapratishēdhāt* and in III. 2. 36, *Anēna sarvagñatatva māyāmaśabdādibhyaḥ*. At the same time, he endeavours to avoid the extreme, irreconcilable points of view. Thus, in commenting on II. 3. 42 *Apīcha smaryate*, though he protests against the view of some that the Vēdas establish the supremacy of Vishnu, he remarks that matters of this kind are best left undiscussed (*avichārita ramanīyam*). While the very position occupied by Srīpati differentiates him from Srīkantha, it is clear that Srīpati was well acquainted with the *Bhāṣya* of Srīkantha. Often the verbal similarity is so great as to make one infer that he had Srīkantha's work before him as he wrote his own. But there is, however, enough evidence in Srīpati's own work that he was no mere literary imitator or a common verbal copyist. He adopts the arguments of Srīkantha for his particular purposes but he goes his own way whenever Srīkantha's theory is opposed to his own. In some places, Srīpati expands the arguments of Srīkantha though he does thus only to suit his own object, *i.e.*, for elaborating his special interpretation of the *Sūtras*. The following *sūtras* may be quoted in illustration of this observation :—III. 3. 29 and 30; III. 3. 32; III. 3. 33; III. 3. 34; IV. 1. 3.; IV. 2. 13; IV. 3. 14 and IV. 3. 15.

In III. 3. 32, the *Chchāndōgya* text merely referred to by Srīkantha is actually quoted by Srīpati, while the very words of Srīkantha are adopted in places. The adaptation is, however, subject to the qualification that it is limited to his own needs; for Srīpati refers to Lingadhāraṇa as a necessary qualification. Though it is only mentioned in one place, Lingadhāraṇa should be taken, he says, to be

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*guṇaguṇinōriva cha visishtādvaita vādinah | prapancha brahmaṇōranan-  
yatvam nāma mrudghatayōriva guṇaguṇinōriva kāryakāraṇatvēna  
visēṣhaṇa visēshyatvēna vinābhāvarahitatvam ||*

prescribed throughout as a preliminary qualification for *upāsana*. All this is of course foreign to Śrīkantha.

On the other hand, the deviation is sometimes very wide. Thus in *Sūtra* II. 1. 4, Śrīkantha says :—*ataḥ satyagnūnānandarūpāt Brāhmaṇō asya (prapanchasya) vailakṣaṇyam siddham*. Commenting on the same *Sūtra*, Śrīpati taking the opposite view, says *athō Brahma pradhāna yōḥ navailakṣaṇyam ityāḥ*. In some cases the illustrations used by Śrīkantha in one *Sūtra* re-appear in Śrīpati's commentary under another. Thus the illustration of the *gōvu* and the *mahisha* in II. 1. 4 in Śrīkantha appear in II. 4. 18 in Śrīpati. Commenting on II. 1. 4, *Navilakṣaṇatvādasya tathēvancha sabdāt*, Śrīkantha states that Paramātmā being *satyagnūnānandarūpa* and being the *kāraṇasrishti*, is also *kāryarūpa*. This is mutually contradictory. Looking at *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*, there seems all the difference between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* as between *gōvu* and *mahisha*. (That is, the cow cannot be buffalo any more than *kārya* can be *kāraṇa*.) Śrīpati in II. 4. 18 *Vaiśhyēttu tadvadastadvādaḥ*, states that the *ātma* in accordance with the *nyāya kāraṇaguṇāḥ kārye parisamkrāṃanti iti*, etc., enters the *jīva* and giving himself the *sarīra* made up of the *pancha bhūtas*, meditates through the *jñānēndriyas*, and the *bhāva* of *bimbapratibimba* and becomes himself the *kartru*. The Advaita argument that holds that the *jīva* is *Īsvara* and that the *jīva* and the *Īsvara* are *abhēda* from the *aupachārika* point of view only, is accordingly held to be like the invented argument which holds that the elephant is the horse and is as such unacceptable to us (*asamanjasa*). Therefore *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara* in Śrīpati's view has to be accepted, as the opposite view is an obvious contradiction of several *Śruti* and *Smṛiti* texts (*pratyakṣa śruti smṛiti virōdhāt*). Similarly, the example of the *tatāka* appearing in Śrīkantha under *Sūtra* III. 3. 29, *Gatearthavatvamubhayadhānyadhātī-virōdhak*, re-appears in Śrīpati under III. 3. 30, *Upapanna-sthallakṣanārthopalabdhērloka-vachcha*. But Śrīpati, however, does not reverse the order of these *sūtras* as Śrīkantha does nor does he use the example of the king and the subject in commenting on III. 3. 29.



### Chief Commentators in Chronological Order.

Summing up, we may now note, in chronological order, the names of the chief commentators whose works have actually come down to us and whose systems are still studied with religious interest :—

Sl. No.	Name	Probable Date	Description of System
1	Śankara	.. 788-820 A.D.	<i>Nirviśeshādvaita</i>
2	Bhāskara	.. circa 1000 A.D.	<i>Bhēdābhēda</i>
3	Rāmānuja	.. circa 1140 A.D.	<i>Viśiṣṭādvaita</i>
4	Ānandatīrtha (Madhva)	1238 A.D.	<i>Dvaita</i>
5	Nimbārka	.. 1250 A.D.	<i>Dvaitādvaita</i>
6	Srikantha	.. 1270 A.D.	<i>Saiva Viśiṣṭādvaita</i>
7	Srīpati	.. circa 1400 A.D.	<i>Bhēdābhēdātma</i> <i>Viśiṣṭādvaita</i>
8	Vallabha	.. 1479-1544 A.D.	<i>Suddhādvaita</i>
9	Suka	.. circa 1550 A.D.	<i>Bhēdavāda</i>
10	Vignānabhikṣu	.. circa 1600 A.D.	<i>Ātma-Brahmaikya</i> <i>Bhēdavāda</i>
11	Baladēva	.. circa 1725 A.D.	<i>Achintyabhēdābhēda</i>

As has been remarked above, there had been commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* before Śankara, though Śankara does not mention by name those whom he actually refers to. If Rāmānuja is any guide in the matter, it is possible that most, if not all, of these commentators, including Bōdhāyana and the rest of those mentioned in the *Vēdārtha Sangraha*, were Vaishnavas. This seems a plausible inference, for Śankara quotes or refers to them mainly to record his dissent from them (see *ante*, page 115). There is thus some ground for the belief that the *Brahma-Sūtras* were first commented upon by some Vaishnava writers who professed a form of modified monism. This shows that the *Brahma-Sūtras* were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists, though Bādarāyana himself was more a theist (*Brahmavādin*) rather than an absolutist (*Advaitin*) or a dualist (*Dvaitin*).<sup>79</sup> This view

<sup>79</sup> The alternative names for the work referred to below show its original Vaishnava character :—

(1) *Brahma-Sūtrāṇi* : Trivikrama Panditāchārya in his *Vāyu Stuti* :—*Rartham lōkōpakluptyai guṇa gaṇa nilayaḥ sūtrayāmāsa*

is supported by the fact that we have no writer earlier than Gaudapāda who propounded monistic theories as he did nor any commentator prior to Śankara, who interpreted the *Brahma-Sūtras* from the strictly monistic standpoint as he did. Gaudapāda himself does not refer to any other writer of the monistic school, nor even to Bādarāyana, while Śankara states in ending his commentary on Gaudapada's *Kārika*, that the Advaita teaching was recovered from the *Vēdas* by Gaudapāda. It is remarkable that Śankara should attribute such recovery to Gaudapāda and not to Bādarāyana. These facts seem to more than justify the suggestion of Mr. Das Gupta that "as the pure monism of the Upanishads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the *Upanishads* as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such *Upanishads* as the *Svetāsvatara* and the like. The epic *Sāṅkhyā* was also

*kritsnam| yōsō Vyāsābhīdhānaḥ tamaḥ maharahaḥ Brahmasūtrāṇi kṛitva* || (2) *Krishna-Sūtrāṇi* : Ānandatīrtha in his *Nyāya Vivarana* :—*Kṛitvābhāshyānubhāshyeham apīvēdārtha satpatēḥ | Krishnasya Sūtra-anuvyākhyā sauyāya nivrutīm chatu ||* (3) *Hari-Sūtrāṇi* : Śankarashanātīrtha in his *Jayātīrtha Vijaya* :—*Adūshyamānyai Harisūtra bhāshyam*, etc. (4) *Vyāsa-Sūtrāṇi* : Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-sūtra Bhāshya* :—*Atha tatkrupayā Vyāsasūtrāṇi chakāra Bādarāyanah*. (5) *Urukrama-Sūtra*, where *uru* stands for Vishnu. (Cf. *Urukrama-Gītā*, the name for the *Bhagavad-Gītā* or *Krishna-Gītā*.) Ānandatīrtha in his *Aitarēya Bhāshya* :—*Paramasya Vishnōḥ mähātmyam varnitam Urukrama Sūtrēshu | Urukramasya sahibindu ilthha Vishnō-pade param madhva utsāh || Rig Veda, I. 4. 8.* (6) *Vēdānta-Sūtrāṇi* : Nārāyana Panditāchārya in *Madhva Vijaya* :—*Vēdānta sūtrāṇi kṛitānta vīttamō bhāshyādasau sishya ganāya sumsadi ||* (7) *Uttara mīmāṃsā-Sūtrāṇi*. (8) *Vishnu-Sūtrāṇi* : Ānandatīrtha in his *Gītā-Bhāshya* :—*Vishnu mähātmya lesaya vibhakasya cha kotidhā | Tasyāpyanantadhātasya | Punasyāpihyanantadhā | naikamsya samamahātmya Sṛi Sēsha Brahma Śankara iti varnitam Vishnu Sūtrēshu*. (9) *Bhēda-Sūtra* : Ānandatīrtha in his *Vishnutatva Nirṇaya* says :—*Vishnōsarvōtmatvantu Bhēda Sūtrēshuvarnitam vishēshēna nantu kṛipayā Vēdavyāsenā ||* (10) *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsa* : Śankara and Rāmānuja call it by this name. Jayātīrtha in his *Nyāya Sūtra* says :—*Imāni sārīraka mīmāṃsa sūtrāṇi iti vadan vyākhyānan akurutam*,

the result of this dualistic development'' (*Hist. of Ind. Philosophy*, I. 422). Accordingly Mr. Das Gupta inclines to the view that the dualistic interpretations of the *Brahma-Sūtras* are probably more faithful to the *sūtras* than the interpretations of Śankara. This view is not, as may at first be supposed, at variance with that of Dr. Thibaut who has remarked that while the interpretation of Śankara is nearer to the teaching of the *Upanishads* than to that of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana, the system of Rāmānuja is in some important points closely related to that of the *Sūtras* (*Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarāchārya*, introduction, cxxvi). For Rāmānuja's system is, in its fundamental aspects, but a development of the view of Bodhāyana, perhaps, the earliest of the Vaishnavite commentators of the Ekāntabhāva School. It is his theory or rather teaching as embodied in his interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras* that Rāmānuja avowedly sought to restore for the benefit of the world. If this view is founded in sound reasoning, as it seems to be, then Bodhāyana should be accounted one of those Vaishnavas who may perhaps be identified with the followers of the Ekāntabhāva and who are represented as having professed that form of Vaishnavism which is enunciated in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. If the *Gītā* was not actually a product of the Ekāntika Vaishnavas, it was at least thoroughly representative of the views held by them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the *Brahma-Sūtras* should be referred to in the *Gītā* and spoken of as expounding, with the aid of cogent reasoning, the religion taught by it. (See *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIII, 5.) This view renders the reference in the *Gītā* to the *Brahma-Sūtras* a perfectly natural one and not a mere interpolation as has been sometimes suggested.<sup>80</sup> The late

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<sup>80</sup> A possible reference to the *Brahma-Sūtras* may also be traced in *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII, 7, which may be thus rendered :—"There is naught whatsoever higher than I, O Dhananjaya. All this is woven in me as rows of pearl-like letters are in the *Sūtra*." As regards the word *prōtam* appearing in this verse, Ānandatīrtha quotes the phrase *ōtam prōtam patavat* occurring in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, V. 8. 11, commentary on I. 3. 10, *Akṣharādhikaraṇa*. Where the

Mr. Telang assigned the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to the third century B.C. On independent grounds Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar has come to the conclusion that the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is not later than the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era. (See *Vaishnavism, Saivism, etc.*, 13.) Writing more recently Dr. Das Gupta has found himself unable to accept the view of Professor Jacobi, who suggesting that the references to Buddhism contained in the *Brahma-Sūtras* are not with regard to the Vijnāna-vāda of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) but with regard to the Śūnya-vāda, and this doubt makes the *Brahma-Sūtras*, a post-Nāgārjuna (100 A.D.) work. Dr. Das Gupta definitely controverts the contention that Śūnya-vāda was peculiar to Nāgārjuna or had not been already a well-developed doctrine long before Nāgārjuna. He holds with Dr. Satishchandradityābhushaṇa that both the Yogāchāra, *i.e.*, Vijnāna-vāda system and the system of Nāgārjuna evolved from the *Prajñāpāramitā*. "Nāgārjuna's merit," he says, "consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of Śūnya-vāda; but so far as the essentials of the Śūnya-vāda are concerned, I believe that the Tathata philosophy of Asvaghōsha (100 A.D.) and the philosophy of *Prajñāpāramitā* contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nāgārjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the *Mahāyāna Sūtras*. Even in such later times as that of Vāchaspati Miśra, we find him quoting a passage of the *Sālistambha Sūtra* to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of *prabītya samutpāda*. (See Vāchaspati Miśra's *Bhāmati* on Śankara's Bhāṣya on *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. ii.) We could interpret any reference to Śūnya-vāda as pointing

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word *Sūtra* is used by itself, it should be taken to indicate the *Brahma-Sūtra* and not any other *Sūtra*. (See Ānandatīrtha's commentary on *Bṛihad. Up.*, VI. 1). Cf. also the following from the *Vāyu Stuti* of Trivikrama Panditāchārya :—

*Astavyastam samastāsrutigata madhamai ratnaṭpūgam yathāndhahai |*  
*Rartham lōkōṇpakluptyai guṇagananilayaḥ sūtrayāmāsa kṛtsnam ||*  
*Yō'sau Vyāsābhīdhāna stamahamaharahaḥ bhaktīlastvatprasādāt |*  
*Sadyō vidyōpalabdhyaḥ gurutama magurum dēvadēvam namāmi ||*

to Nāgārjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way." Dr. Das Gupta accordingly holds that the reference in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to the *Brahma-Sūtras* clearly points out a date prior to that of Nāgārjuna. He suggests that "its date could safely be placed so far back as the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C." He is thus inclined to place the *Brahma-Sūtras* slightly earlier than the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. There is, so far as could be seen, no evidence that could be urged against this conclusion. There is thus reason to believe that the reference to the *Brahma-Sūtras* in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is a genuine one and that both these works belonged to one and the same class of religio-philosophic teachers who, though Vaishnavas, tended towards some form of modified monism. From a text-book of monistic Vaishnavas, the *Brahma-Sūtras* soon became a text-book of other monists as well. The fundamental reason why it came to be recognized a work as important to Vaishnavas as to others was that its very aphoristic form gave scope for its interpretation in a manner acceptable to all who believed in the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*, while, at the same time, professing allegiance to Vishnu or Śiva as the case may be.

### Other Commentaries Current.

The above are among the most well-known commentators on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. There are some others which are not equally famous; one of these is the *Brahmasūtravṛtti* by Dharmābhatta, who describes himself in the colophon to his work as the son of Rāmachandrāya, who was, it is added, a disciple of Mukundāśrama (Madras D.C. IX, No. 4689, p. 3492). His interpretation evidently follows that of Sankara. (See his comment, for example, on I. 1. 1, where he refers to *Sādhana-chatushtaya*, which is the discipline prescribed by Sankara.) Another is the *Śārīraka Sūtra Bhāṣya* by Srimath Chinmayamuni, who was, before he became a Sanyāsin, called Venkaiya. He also follows Sankara.

His work is now under examination, on behalf of the Mysore Palace authorities, by Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer, an erudite Vedāntic scholar.

### Other Supplementary Commentaries.

There are, besides, numerous other commentaries, independent and other, based in the main on the interpretation of one of the three leading commentators—Sankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha. Only a few of these need be referred to here. Thus, there is the *Brahmasūtra-vritti*, also known as *Brahmatatva-prakāśika* by Sadāśivendra-Sarasvati, which, though an independent commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, follows the viewpoint of Sankara (*ibid.*, No. 4690, p. 3493). A similar work is *Brahmasūtrabhāṣhya Vyākhyā*, only a fragment of which is known. The author was probably a disciple of one Rāmānanda (*ibid.*, No. 4692, p. 3495) and a follower of Sankara's system. Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* has had considerable attention, by way of elucidation, bestowed on it by a long succession of teachers. Their works are really commentaries on the commentary of Sankara. The *Panchapādika* (otherwise called *Brahmasūtrabhāṣhya Vyākhyā*) by Padmapādāchārya is a work of this kind. An explanatory gloss on it is the *Panchapādikavivaraṇam* by Prakāśātman. A further gloss on this latter work is the *Tatvadīpanam*, otherwise known as the *Panchapādika-vivaraṇa Vyākhyānam* by Akhandānandamuni. Another commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* is Advaitānanda's *Brahmavidyā-bharaṇam*. Advaitānanda was a disciple of Rāmānandatīrtha, who was himself a disciple of Bhūmānanda. A similar commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* is the *Bhāṣhyaratnaprabha* by Gōvindānanda (Madras D.C. IX, No. 4679, p. 3482). The *Śārīraka-nyāya-vivaraṇam* is a fourth commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* by the famous Ānandagiri (*ibid.*, No. 4683, p. 3485). Appaya Dīkshita's *Śārīraka-nyāya-rakṣhā-maṇi* is a further commentary on this last work (*ibid.*, No. 4086, p. 3488). As is well known, Ānandagiri's work is a commentary on the *Bhāmati* by Vāchaspati-Miśra, which is

itself a commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣhya*. A gloss on this latter work is the *Bhāmati-Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as the *Vedāntakalpataru* by Amalānanda. A further commentary on this last work is the *Vedāntakalpataru-Vyākhyā* or *Parimala* by Appaya Dīkshita. These different works attest to the popularity enjoyed by Sankara's *Bhāṣhya* and the interest taken in elucidating it to a growing circle of readers. Rāmānuja's *Srī Bhāṣhya* has had even greater attention bestowed on it. A commentary on this work is the *Tattvatīka* by Vedāntadēsika, another is the *Nyāya-prakāśika* by Meghanādri, son of Nātha (or Nāthamuni); a third one is the *Mūlabhāvaprakāśika* by Rangarāmānuja; and a fourth one is the *Śrutapradīpika* by Sudarśanasūri, who describes himself as the disciple of Varadāchārya. Sudarśanasūri also wrote a more exhaustive commentary on the *Srī Bhāṣhya* called the *Śrutaprakāśika*. A gloss explanatory of a portion of this last-named work (I. 2 to I. 4) by one Varadavishnusūri is well known, besides a commentary on the whole of that work by one Śuddhasattva-Lakshmanārya. A fifth commentary on the *Srī Bhāṣhya* is by Sundararājadēsika. It is called *Brahmasūtravyākhyā*, without any alternative name attached to it. A somewhat independent commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, though mainly in support of the *Srī Bhāṣhya*, is the *Tattvamārtānda* by one Srīnivāsa, son of Srīnivāsātātārya (Madras D.C. X, No. 4894). It is largely based on Rāmānuja's work and is written in support of it, criticising the *Chandrika* of the Madhva guru and writer Vyāsayati, who lived in the reign of the Vijayanagar King Krishnadeva Rāya (1509–1530 A.D.). In the same way, Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāṣhya* has had a number of commentaries written on it. Ānandatīrtha himself wrote a shorter commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, called the *Brahmasūtra Anuvyākhyānam*. This is in verse and follows his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣhyam*. He also wrote another work called the *Brahmasūtrānubhāṣhyam*, which sets out briefly in verse the substance of the conclusions intended, according to him, to be

taught by the *Brahma-Sūtras*.<sup>81</sup> Ānandatīrtha also wrote an explanatory gloss on his *Aṇuvyākhyānam* and this work goes by the name of *Aṇuvyākhyānanyāyavivaraṇam*.<sup>82</sup> On Ānandatīrtha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, a commentary called the *Tattvapradīpika* was written by Trivikrama Panditāchārya.<sup>83</sup> It was eclipsed by the *Tattvaparakāśika* of Jayatīrtha, better known as Tīkāchārya (Madras D.C. X, No. 4813).<sup>84</sup> Another commentary on it, called the *Dīpika*, was composed by one Jagannātha-yati (*ibid.*, No. 4814).<sup>85</sup> On the *Aṇuvyākhyānam*, Padmanābhatīrtha wrote the *Sanyāyaratnāvali*, of which MS. copies are known.<sup>86</sup> But it was elbowed out by Jayatīrtha's famous work, the *Aṇuvyākhyāna-tīka*, better known as the *Nyāya-sudhā*.<sup>87</sup> On this work of Jayatīrtha, there is a further commentary called the *Nyāyasudhāvyaākhyānam*, or *Parimāla*, by Rāghavendra-yati, a disciple of Sudhīndra.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> A short work in four adhyāyas consisting of thirty-two verses. Edited by Krishnāchār and printed at the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay.

<sup>82</sup> All these works of Ānandatīrtha have been printed and published by the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay.

<sup>83</sup> Printed by Abaji Ramachandra Savant at the Rāma Tatva Chāpkhāna, Belgaum.

<sup>84</sup> Printed by Abaji Ramachandra Savant at the Rāma Tatva Chāpkhāna, Belgaum.

<sup>85</sup> Jagannātha-yati was a disciple of Raghōttama, who remains sainted at Tirukkōyilur, South Arcot District. His work has been edited by S. Gopālakrishnāchārīār, under the auspices of the late Hon. P. Chentsal Rao, C.I.E., and printed at the Grove Press, Teynampet, Madras (1900).

<sup>86</sup> The *Sanyāyaratnāvali* is mentioned by Rāghavendra-yati in his work entitled *Parimāla*, which is a commentary on the *Nyāya-sudhā* of Jayatīrtha. (See *Parimāla*, comment. on II. 1. 1, where it is thus referred to:—*Sanyāyaratnāvalyuktām tāvadūdan vyanakti*. Evidently this work was still ardently studied by scholars during the time Raghavendra-yati flourished.

<sup>87</sup> Edited by Krishnāchār and printed at the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*



There are numerous other works bearing on the topics discussed in the *Brahma-Sūtras* but these need not be referred to here. Nor is it, again, necessary to refer works which while belonging to one system of thought seek to examine the component ideas of another. Nor again to the commentaries that exist on these latter works. Works of this type are many and often of great interest. It ought to suffice if we noted that all these have for their primary basis the text of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which they seek to interpret in the light of their own systems of thought.

### Style of Srīpati.

The style of Srīpati is usually simple though on occasions, on account of the involved sentences employed, it is rendered somewhat difficult. Evidently he was a teacher, accustomed to make lengthy discourses to his students. Striking examples of these involved sentences, indicating the habit of a *guru*, can be easily quoted. Thus, the opening sentence explaining IV. 4. 11 is one in point. The sentence with which the commentary on II. 4. 18 starts is even a better one. Other examples are to be found included in the comments under I. 4. 16, III. 3. 19 and III. 1. 20. Many more could be easily quoted. Another characteristic feature of Srīpati's writing is the extensive use he makes of maxims (*nyāyas*), a long list of which will be found arranged in the alphabetical order at the end of this volume. Of the sixty-nine found there, I have been able to trace only five in Sankara's *Bhāṣya*. These are the *Arundhatī nyāyaḥ* (I. 1. 8 and I. 1. 12); *Andhaparampara nyāyaḥ* (II. 2. 30 and II. 2. 37); *Chchatri nyāyaḥ* (III. 3. 34); *Biṣāmkura nyāyaḥ* (II. 1. 36 and III. 3. 9); and *Arthisamarathō vidvānadhikriyate* (I. 3. 25). Against the sixty-nine *nyāyas* used by Srīpati, Sankara is found to use only about twenty-five. Rāmānuja quotes the *Śākhāchandra nyāya* (I. 1. 13) and the *Nishadhā-shtapati nyāya* (I. 3. 14). Ānandatīrtha finds no occasion for the use of any *nyāya*. His method of quoting apposite texts from *Srutis* and *Smrithis*, under each *Sūtra*, perhaps,

did not necessitate the seeking of the aid of popular *nyāyas*. Of *nyāyas* and the limitations within which they could be used, Manu says :—अधार्मिकं त्रिभिर्न्यायैर्निगृह्णीयात्प्रयत्नतः, *Adhārmikam tribhirnyāyair nigruhṇīyāt prayatnataḥ*, Don't try suddenly to provide a rule of action, when you aim at an *adharmā* (Manu, 8. 310). A *nyāya* thus should not be used to help in the formulation of an *adharmā* plan of action. It has its place where there is uncertainty, as there is need for reason there. As the *nyāya* goes, *Sandigdhe nyāyaḥ pravartite iti nyāyaḥ*, a *nyāya* quoted by Srīpati.<sup>89</sup> A few of these *nyāyas* quoted by Srīpati may be noted here :

<i>Agnīndrasālā nyāya</i> ,	<i>Nishadhāshtapati nyāya</i> ,
<i>Ayaskāntasūchī nyāya</i> ,	<i>Bījāmkura nyāya</i> ,
<i>Andhasandhyā nyāya</i> ,	<i>Bhramarakīta nyāya</i> ,
<i>Arthāsamarthō vidvānadhi-</i>	<i>Rātrisatra nyāya</i> ,
<i>kriyate iti nyāya</i> ,	<i>Sākhāchandra nyāya</i> ,
<i>Gōbalivārda nyāya</i> ,	<i>Saudhasaupāna nyāya</i> ,
<i>Chchāgapāśu nyāya</i> ,	<i>Samaksha pravāha nyāya</i> ,
<i>Nadīsamudra nyāya</i> ,	etc.

What Srīpati quotes as the *saudhā saupāna nyāya* appears elsewhere with the name of *Sōpānārōhana nyāya* (see *Bhāmati*, I. 3. 8). Of these several *nyāyas* found in Srīpati's *Bhāshya*, the *Nishadhāshtapati nyāya* is quoted thrice; the *Sthulārundhatī nyāya*, 12 times; the *Bhramarakīta nyāya*, 18 times; the *Ayaskāntasūchī nyāya*, 5 times; and the *Lōharasādi nyāya* and the *Nadīsamudra nyāya*, each four times. *Chchatri nyāya* (III. 3. 34), *Jalasarkara nyāya* (IV. 2. 13), *Sandēhe vākyaśēshāt* (III. 3. 7), *Gunōpasamhāra nyāya* (II. 3. 7) and *Patasankōcha vikāsa nyāya* (II. 3. 11) are other *nyāyas* quoted by Srīpati that may be referred to here. The utility of some of these *nyāyas* in the field of Hindu law has been referred to by Prof. Berriedale A. Keith (see *Karma-Mīmāṃsa*, 97-107). Among those referred to by legal text-writers is the *Nishadhāshtapati*

<sup>89</sup> This *nyāya* is found in Jñānōttama's comment on *Naish-karmyasiddhi*, IV. 3. Akin to it is the *nyāya sandigddham saprayōjanam cha vichāra marhati*, *Ibid.*, I. 29.

*nyāya* for validating adoption by a Śūdra (see *ibid.*, p. 103). The object of quoting, in this extensive fashion, these well-known maxims is to prove the position taken up by him. They are apposite to a degree where they are applied to and the appeal made to them seems thus well justified. Śrīpati's criticism of opposing views is usually direct and delivered with great effect, the reasons being stated in categorical form, appropriate texts being quoted for the positions taken. The question and answer is not seen, though the use of the formal terminology of objection and answer, such as *nanu*, *na*, etc., is quite frequent. Neither the point criticised nor the point made out is, however, ever in doubt. The dialectical skill displayed is undoubted, while the extensive range of studies of the author is manifest on almost every page of his writing. His knowledge of Śaiva literature seems to have been intimate. A part of his methodology in dealing with an adversary's view is to closely analyse it and set down its constituent parts under specific heads and deal with them successively in succinct fashion. Good examples of this method are to be found in the comments under I. 1. 4, I. 1. 5, I. 4. 22, II. 4. 16, III. 3. 63, where each point is disposed of under the heads of *na ādyaḥ*, *na dvitīyaḥ*, *na tritīyaḥ*, etc. This mode of treating analytically the point at issue is reminiscent of Jayatīrtha (circa 1350 A.D.) who uses it very effectively indeed in his *Nyāyasudhā*. Anticipating objections that might possibly be advanced against a view propounded and meeting them in advance is also a fairly common characteristic of the author. This is usually done by the use of words or phrases like *kathamithyā-śankāyām*; *kutaḥ* (see III. 3. 19; III. 3. 20; III. 3. 23; III. 1. 11), *kimbhavati* (IV. 4. 17), etc. His frequent use of the following words and phrases seems to indicate an unusual fondness for them:—*durnivāraḥ*; *anivāryam*; *vidvat ramanīyam*; *tadēva ramanīyam*; *dattānjali prasangaḥ*; *ghantāghōsha*; *avichārīta ramanīyam*; *śūnyavāda sāmvrājya prasangaḥ*; *rādhadhāntaḥ*; etc. (I. 2. 1; I. 1. 5; I. 1. 4;

I. 1. 2; I. 2. 19; I. 3. 8; I. 3. 25; I. 3. 38; I. 3. 43; I. 4. 1; I. 4. 28; II. 1. 4; II. 1. 8; II. 1. 9; II. 2. 37; II. 2. 40; II. 2. 42; II. 2. 44; II. 3. 16; II. 3. 28; II. 3. 34; II. 3. 44; II. 3. 50). In his style, in the nature of authorities quoted by him, and in the purposes aimed at by him, Srīpati differs from his chief predecessors—Sankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha.

### An Outline of Sripati's View.

We may now pass on to consider Srīpati's *Bhāṣhya* under certain convenient heads for a better understanding of its contents. In what follows, the mode of argumentation adopted by Srīpati is closely followed and care has been taken to set down in a non-technical manner his views on the fundamental points raised by him. This is intended to be no more than a mere outline, the reader being referred to the work itself for a fuller understanding of it.

### The Nature and Object of Jignyasa.

In commenting on I. 1. 1, Srīpati remarks that Parāśara embraced the Mahā-Pāśupata diksha. His son was Vyāsa. He was the author of the *Sūtras*. He enunciates the first *Sūtra* to remove some doubt. Is Brahman existent or not? In the *Vēda*, in one place it is stated there was originally nothing existent and in another that Brahman was existent. There is a conflict thus between these two views. Does "non-existent" mean "not visible to the eye," or that it would be visible hereafter some time after we get the vision for it through the knowledge of Brahman? For we do not know by experience that any man who has once died has ever come back. Further there is the saying: To the body which has been burnt to ashes, where is the re-birth? Therefore, by all means contract debts and drink ghee (*i.e.*, enjoy in boundless fashion life without the fear of having to pay for it even in another life).<sup>90</sup> Further the

<sup>90</sup> *Bhāsmūhūtasya dēhasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ |*

*Tasmāt sarvaḥ pravartnēna riṣam kṛtvā ghṛitam pibēt ||*

Compare the above with the doctrine of the *Chārvāka Siddhāntu*,

mixture of lime and saffron creates red colour. Similarly on this earth, inanimate and animate beings are created and destroyed, from *samyōga* and *viyōga* of five elements, *prithvi* etc. This is improper, as such a thing is not within our experience. If this were so, then, why not create beings by cutting off a part of the body of human beings or animals? It is seen that Īśvara has located in cowdung and the like life-matter (*jīvatvam*) in an unseen form.<sup>91</sup> And even to a Mahārāja who is provided with every source of happiness, there appear suddenly mental and physical anxieties, diseases, etc., which reduces him to poverty and misery and finally kills him. The conclusion is thus arrived at that it is Īśvara that allots to us these results of the fruit of our actions done in our previous births, be they good or bad. So *Jīva* and *Sarīra* are not different. This is one view. Another Vēdic view is that *Sarīra* is not eternal, whereas the *Jīva* is. If the *Jīva* is eternal, there is no need for a Creator. Thus there are three views:—(1) Brahman is existent; (2) Brahman is non-existent; and (3) *Sarīra* and *Jīva* are not different.

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attributed to Brihaspati as formulated in the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* :—

*Yāvadjīvam sukham jīvēnnāsti mrutyōragōcharaḥ |*  
*Bhasmūbhūtasya dēhasya pinarāgamanam kula iti ||*

<sup>91</sup> This saying recurs in Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* more than once. The belief underlying it is treated as an exception to the general maxim *Sadruśāt sadruśōdbhavaḥ*, which literally means *Like produces like*. This maxim, according to Hindu writers, does not enshrine a fixed principle. Jayanta Bhatta thus denies its truth on the ground that scorpions are produced from cowdung, in his *Nyāyamanjarī* (*Vizianagram Sanskrit Series*, Edn. 1895, page 466) :—*Nachaisha niyamō lōkē sadruśāt sadruśōdbhavaḥ | Vrischikādēḥ samutpādō gōmayādaḥ sadruśatē ||* This belief regarding the scorpion is found in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I. 4. 30, and is used as an illustration by Sankarāchārya in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 16. Rāmānuja also uses it. Udayana quotes it in his *Vritti* on the *Kusumāñjali*, II. 2. while Haridāsa remarks that a scorpion can be produced from cowdung as well as from a scorpion. Of course, the modern view, as propounded by writers on biogenics, is that "life can only come from the touch of life." See Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāñjaliḥ*, II. 81.

And there are three different kinds of discussion (*Vādabhēda* or *Jignyāsa*):—(1) *Vidhi*; (2) *Mantra*; and (3) *Artha Vāda*. *Sruti* is thus of three different kinds. In this three-fold division, the offering of *Jyōtishtōma* and other sacrifices with the desire to obtain *Svarga* is *Vidhi Vāda*. In *Mantra Vāda*, worship (*upāsana*) is essential. In the same way, *Artha Vāda* consists in offering praises to God (*Stōtras*).

To *Jīvas*, according to their past *Karmas*, God allots on their birth their respective meeds of joy and sorrow (*Sukha* and *Dukkha*). If this were so, there would be no need for *Jignyāsa*. The reading of *Upanishads* would also prove of no utility; even *Yagnas* would not be necessary, since they all treat of *Artha* and *Kāma*, the realization of desires. Such a proposition requires consideration, *i.e.*, we should endeavour to ascertain its truth or untruth. Hence the need for *Jignyāsa*. *Jignyāsa* is necessary to establish the ultimate truth and set at rest the doubt.

About what are we to undertake a *Jignyāsa* for? Is it for the purpose of establishing that Para-Śiva (Brahman) is in *Sarīra* or *Śarīra* in Para-Śiva. There is no truth in the first; for it is said that *Satyam gnānamanantam Brahma*; Brahman is all-truth (*Satya*), all-wisdom (*Gnāna*) and eternal (*Anantam*). *Eka ēva Rudro na dvitīyāya tastō*, "Only there was one Rudra and no second," here only one Rudra is mentioned. Again *Rudra ēkatva māhuh*, Rudra alone is said to have existed; *Rudrō vai śāśvatam vai purāṇam iti*; "Rudra is eternal", "Rudra is ancient", etc., are statements contained in hundreds of *Sruti* texts. These go to show that Para-Śiva is true Brahman. The termination "Aham" refers to the Self inside the *Śarīra* who reflects outside and no other second. The fruit of *Jignyāsa* is that which could be elucidated by *Jñāna* becomes *Jñāna*. Accordingly is Brahman one that could be elucidated or not? If he could be elucidated, then he is different, which is against hundreds of *Sruti* texts. If he could not be elucidated, then *Jignyāsa* becomes a vain matter, *i.e.*, a discussion of no value. Because, it is

said that *Ajāmēkām lohita śukla krishṇām*, there is only one, never-born, and which is alone, and which appears in red, white and black colours. Inside there are two: *Īśa* and *anīśa* (the chief and the subordinate), *gnā* and *agna* (the knower and the ignorant). Thus says the *Vēda* in different places. In this way, to understand that *Śarīra* has no end would be of no avail, for it would end in *mukti*. Thus it is also stated in one place in the *Vēda*. *Ayamātmā Brahma* "This Ātma is Brahman", *Tatvamasi* "That Thou Art" and other sayings occur elsewhere. Jīva and Brahman are identical and one. But *Aham pratyaya* is used in some places, thereby denoting *bheda pratibhāsa* (i.e., difference between Jīva and Brahman). This creates the doubt, why should it not be so, i.e., why should they not be identical? This *Aham pratyaya* does not really indicate a difference but shows as if there was a difference and thereby weakens the argument of *Svayam prakāśa* of Brahman, i.e., weakens the position that Brahman is self-evident by his glory. *Aham pratyaya* also weakens the power of self-knowing Brahman by bringing him into the orbit of never-ending Avidya, and drags him into the smaller sphere of man, which is much less than that of Brahman. This is a misnomer. This leads to a discussion from which no salvation is possible, i.e., the argument ends in the destruction of the discussion. Further just as darkness and light are different and are opposed to each other in their characteristics, those who stick to the one-sided argument, viz., *Yatho vācho nivartanta* and other sayings of the *Vēda*, according to which Brahman cannot be perceived even mentally, it comes to this that there can be no use in beginning the discussion of the *Vēdānta Sāstra*. If this doubt arises, we answer it thus:—It should not be thus viewed because we have to say this: It is meet we should begin the study of the *Mīmāṃsa Sāstra* which deals with the Dvaitādvaita doctrine which is in conformity with the essence of all the *Upanishads*. You may ask why? If Brahman is real, he can be seen physically and perceived mentally through the aid of the evidences afforded by the Āgama. Because it is said

“There is only Rudra and none others.” This is said in many *Āgamas* and *Vēdas* so that the evidence afforded by them are put as Sūrya, Chandra, Seasons, Ocean and Time—all these are guided by the Will of God and denote their own *Dharma* (i.e., nature). In this world those blessed with wealth, knowledge and all kinds of conveniences, still have not got what they seek after. While those who have none of these conveniences, at some time or other, they obtain what they desire for. This shows plainly that God administers over these (human affairs) by His existence. This is sufficient ocular proof of His existence (*lit.* He can be physically perceived). In the world we find cars, towers, storeyed mansions, enclosures (probably fortifications) and the like which are the production of man’s intelligence. In a similar manner, there is Paramēśvara who is assumed to be the maker of the animate and inanimate worlds. Some say that just as by the combination of chunam and saffron, a reddish appearance is created to the eye, in the same way, by the combination of the earth with the other four elementals, the animate and inanimate creation comes into being of its own accord. This, however, is not true. It is not within the experience of anyone—i.e., nobody has borne testimony to—such a combination of the earth and the four elementals producing the animate and inanimate world consisting of domestic animals, birds and *feræ naturæ* (wild animals). If it is asked why we should not assume that it is possible to visualize the animal, human and other creations in the same body, with their different qualities in it, then we have to suggest that this is against human experience. It is known to experience that we have to attribute to Īśvara the creation of countless hidden beings (i.e., worms) in a lump of cow-dung<sup>92</sup> just in the same way that we have to attribute even to a mighty king who though he never for a moment desired mental or physical anxieties and old age, death or poverty, yet we see him subject to these calamities. In the same way, it is certain that *Jīvas*

<sup>92</sup> See footnote 91, on p. 233 *ante*.



realize happiness or discomfort according to their previous good conduct or bad conduct, according to the awards of an Īsvara. But it may be asked if there are not men in this world who do not enjoy happiness in place of the misery that they should experience and *vice versa*—as in the case of those coming under the heads of thieves and adulterers—we would answer that this is a part of *Dharma Mīmāṃsa* which it is unnecessary to discuss here. It would therefore seem to follow that the argument of Kapila and Kanāda that this world originates out of *jada* (i.e., inanimate matter) is without foundation. In the *Sruti* text it is stated:—*Asadvā idamagra āsīt*. The use of the *asad* herein has to be interpreted as indicating that there was an infinitesimally small world, because the word *āsīt* is subsequently used. If it is not so construed, there would be contradiction as in the further part of the same *Sruti* the following words occur:—*Tato vai sadajāyata*. These words (“*From that Sat came out*”) show that the above interpretation is the correct one. Here in this *Sruti* text the word *asat* is used. Why cannot it be taken to mean that *From nothing Sat came into being*? This would be like saying that a pair of horns have come out of the head of a rabbit; that flowers are growing in the sky; or that an impotent person has borne children. Therefore what has been said at first is the truth, and this is supported by Bādarāyana in his *Sūtra*, *Asaditi chēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7).

He has sufficiently expounded *Asat* in this *Sūtra* as meaning *that infinitesimally small matter*. What is Brahman? And how is it clearly understood and how are doubts relating to it cleared by going into the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas*? It is for clearing doubts and for realizing Brahman from the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas* that Jignyāsa is needed. Brahman is possessed of endless power and is the sole cause of the visible and the invisible worlds and is the author of worldly attractions (*paśu*) and bondage (*pāśa*), of *Sakala* and *Nishkala* (the faulty and faultless), of *Sthūla* and *Sūkshma*; he exhibits himself as *Chit* and *achit*; he

is possessed of endless good qualities (*anantakalyāṇa-guṇa*); he is all happiness. What is *Jīva*? It is endless (*anādi*); from birth bound down by *Māyā* (*Māyāpāśa-baddha*); eternally kept in family ties of no consequence (*ghōra apāra niśāra samsāra vyāpāra*); always subject to *tāpatraya* (three kinds of passions); and consequently always subject to birth and death (*nānā śarīra pravṛśa nirgama*). Also, it is ever immersed in self-pride (*abhimāna viśiṣṭa*), which results in desires and anger (*kāma krōdha*) leading to *sukha* and *dukkha* (i.e., happiness and sorrow). The *Jīva* is the abode of all (this) happiness and misery (*Sukha* and *Dukkha*). This is *Jīvātman*. The *Jīva* and Brahman appear to possess mutually contradictory qualities; both are beginningless (*ajanya*) and both are eternal (*avināśi*). Are both these one or different is the doubt raised in our minds?

In the *Vēda* (i.e., *Upanishads*) since texts like *Tatvamasi*, *Aham Brahmāsmi*, *Brahmavid Brahmayaeva bhavati*, etc., etc., occur denoting *abhēda* between the two (i.e. Brahman and *Jīva*), it is not meet to distinguish between the *Jīva* and the Brahman as being different from each other. To so distinguish between them would be wrong. The texts above quoted would be rendered meaningless if we distinguished between them, though Brahman is described as possessed of *saviśēshatva* and the *Jīva* is described as possessed of *parichchēdatva*, the *Jīva*'s qualities being *Māyāpāśabaddha* (i.e. Brahman is possessed of never-ending good qualities and the *Jīva* is ever subject to alterations in the forms of *Sukha* and *Dukkha*, *Janana* and *Marana*, etc.). When *Māyā* leaves him, the *Jīva* will be one with the Brahman—agreeably to the *Upanishadic* texts mentioned below. *Ghaṭa* (the pot) is indestructible (matter); but the *Jīva* is in the *ghaṭa* and can obtain liberation by coming out of the *ghaṭa*. And when it comes out, it joins Brahman influenced by *ātma-jñāna*, as it is said, *Sa ātma nēti nēti, asthūlam, ananvam, adīrgham*, etc., in the *Upanishads*. These are qualities of the Brahman which cannot be kept in bondage (*parichchēdatva*). So Brahman is fully described in the

*Upanishads* as being quite free from the touch of all worldly connections—*Sthūla sūkshma prapancha vyāvṛtta*. Therefore such a Brahman should be discussed and understood.

Srīpati opines that the first *Sūtra* should be answered affirmatively. He says *Brahmajigynāsa yuktah*, i.e., it is meet to discuss the nature of Brahman. In support he quotes texts such as :

*Brahmavid āpnōti param; Gnātva śivam śāntam atyantam yēti; Īśam gnātva amritā bhavanti; Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati panditah; Śiva ekōdhye-yah śivam karaḥ; Sarvam anyat parityajya; Ksharam pradhānam amrūtāksharam haraḥ; Ksharātmanā vīkshate dēva ēkaḥ; Tasyābbhidhyānādyōjanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūya-syānte visvamāyā nivrittih; Tamakratum paśyati vītaśōkō dhātu prasādān mahimānam īśam; Gnātva dēvam muchyatē sarvapāśaiḥ*, etc.

By discussing the nature of such a Brahman according to Vēdic and Upanishadic texts, *Brahmagnāna* is obtained : to know that the *Jīva* is not different from Brahman. After knowing this, the *Jīva* will be rid of all bondage created by worldly ties. There will be extinction of sorrow and finally the *Jīva* will obtain *paramapurushārthatva*, which is *Para-Śivatva*, i.e., *Para-Brahmatva*.

Srīpati starts with Brahmatva and arrives at Para-Śivatva. So this Brahman is Para-Śiva, i.e., Paramaśiva.<sup>93</sup>

It is significant that Srīpati calls his work *Brahma-mīmāṃsa*, etc., and not *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsa*, etc. The former is in accordance with Ānandatīrtha's designation; while the latter is the designation of Sankara. Why Srīpati does so will be evident when we remember that he accepts the dualistic theory up to a limit, whereas Sankara does not. Sankara advisedly designates his work *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsa* because he identifies in argument *Śārīra* (the human or individual Soul) with the

<sup>93</sup> Cp. *Parōsi Nārāyaṇayēva nānyathā* in *Mahābhārata*, *Udyoga Parva*, where *Para* means "above all".

*Brahman*.<sup>94</sup> Śrīpati's three points are:—*Samśaya*, Doubt ; *Vishaya*, Subject ; and *Prayojana*, Result. The result of discussing of Brahman is to know that he is no other than *Jīva* and to break off the curtain separating them is the object of the *Jignyāsa*.

There is difference between *Bhramara* and *Kṛta*, between *lōha* and *rasa*. When the *bhrānti* is gone, then the *kṛta* becomes *bhramara*, *rasa* becomes *lōha*. In the same way, *Tatvamasi* and the like texts in the *Upanishads* expound the view that there is no difference between the two—the *Jīva* and the Brahman, *i.e.*, they will be one when the screen of *agnāna* is removed.

It is very clearly stated in the *Srutis*, without the least doubt, that just as all rivers, as stated in *Sruti* texts like *Yatha nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre astam gachchanti nāmarūpe vihāya | tathā vidvānnāmarūpad vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣhamupaiti divyam iti*, enter the sea and become one with it, losing their separate individualities and names, similarly a wise man—after obtaining wisdom—gets himself free from his name and form and gets into *parā* and *parama puruṣham*, *i.e.*, the highest effulgent Self, *i.e.*, Brahman. So it is that all *Srutis* declare that *Jīva* is capable of attaining to *Brahmatva*. This cannot well be otherwise—this is not said for the sake of formality ; else all the abovenamed *Upanishadic* texts will not have spoken the Truth. Not only that ; they will also have differed from the primary teaching of the *Īkṣhyātūdhikaraṇam* (I. 1. 5). And we will also be vainly troubling our mind for a thing of no consequence with a matter from which we cannot obtain liberation (*Mōksha*). But every *Sruti* text states that there is *Mōksha*.

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<sup>94</sup> *Sārīraka*.—From *Sārīra*, which means relating to the body ; hence, the incorporate or embodied spirit ; human or individual soul. *Sārīraka*, therefore, means relating to the body ; corporal ; incorporate, embodied (as the soul). *Sārīraka* is the inquiry into the nature of that spirit (*i.e.*, the embodied spirit), a term adopted by Sankara and Rāmānuja for their *Bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-Sūtras*,

Srīpati next passes on to formulate how he differs from Sankara. According to the Upanishadic text *Aham ajnaḥ*, etc., which means "I am ignorant," etc., whereby the *Jīva* says that he is environed by bondage of attractive bodily (worldly) ties. If such a thought as *Aham ajnaḥ* is entertained by the *Jīva*, even as the result of ignorance or otherwise (*māyāpāśa baddha*), then it would amount to this that the Brahman, who is *nirviśeṣa* (i.e., attributeless) is bound by *māyōpādhi*, i.e., ignorance or illusion, which cannot be explained how it could be, while the *Vēda* explains, *Yas sarvagnas sarvavit iti, Pragnānam Brahma iti*, etc., i.e., that the *Jīva* who is all-knowing and who is a *prāgna*, how can he fall into ignorance (or become subject to illusion). If this were conceded, one would be falling a prey to confusion of thoughts as regards the qualities of Brahman and the *Jīva*. If *avidyā* is conceded, there is no chance of attaining *Brahmatva* (*Brahmatva bhanga*). If Brahman is really subject to *avidyā*, and if *avidyā* is also one of the entities, then there will be the fallacy called *anyōnya āśraya*. (That is, *Brahman* will have been associated with *avidyā* and *avidyā* with *Brahman*, which is mutually contradictory).<sup>95</sup> Further, the *Sruti* text goes: *Aprāṇo hyamanāśśubhraḥ*. As Brahman is said to be devoid of mind (*manaḥ*) and life (*prāṇa*), how can such a Brahman be subject to the influence of *Māyā*? Here Sankara's theory that *manaḥ* and *prāṇa* disappear at one stage, is disputed. Srīpati asks, at such a stage how can Brahman be subject to the influence of *Māyā*? In reply, if we admit that the *Jīva* is subject to ignorance (i.e., *Māyā*), then we have to admit that there is something else *beyond Brahman* (*Brahmānantara*) to remove this ignorance (*Māyā*). If so, unsettledness (i.e., confusion) will prevail. The *Taittirīya* text *Vāchārambhāṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrīttikētyēva satyam* and other similar Upanishadic texts, state that

<sup>95</sup> *Anyōnya āśraya* (*anyōnya āśrayaḥ*).—This is a term in *Nyāya* which treats of the fallacy of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect. The term suggests mutual or reciprocal dependence, support, or connection.

the world forms the body of Īśvara, *Prapanchasya tādātmya-bōdhakatvam vidhīyate nācha mithyātvam*. This means that the world cannot be unreal as it forms the body of Īśvara, which again is clearly formulated by the Sūtra *Tadananyatva mārāmbhāna śabdādibhyah*, which states that the world which was created was brought into existence in his own (bodily) form. If there is untruth in this Sūtra is the body untrue or Īśvara Himself untrue? Not the first—not the body; not the second—because the *Sruti* says *Sadēva sōmyēda magra āsīt*, i.e., that Being existed originally (from before the creation). If we now accept that there was some one else also, then we will be forced to admit that the Advaita doctrine is contradicted (*bhanga*). Therefore, just as darkness and brightness prevail, we have to admit that *bhēda* and *abhēda* co-exist. Because the two forms, *Dvaita* and *Advaita*, seen in Īśvara, in the forms of *Śarīra* and *Aśarīra*, always exist as the subjects of discussion. Therefore, those holding the tenets of *Nirviśēśhādvaita* will find that *Adhyāsa* (*Agnūna*, i.e., *Māyā*) is not clearly made out. Therefore, Advaitins cannot hold that *Vyavahāra* is only true so long as we are in the world and not after we have left it. This process of reasoning is fallacious. Because if *Abhēda* is accepted by us, as urged by them, the *Bhēda* enunciated in the *Sruti* text, *Dvā suparnau sayujau sakhāyau iti*, cannot be explained easily. If exclusively *bhēda* is accepted, then the *abhēda* enumerated in *Sruti* texts like *Tatvamasi*, etc., cannot be met. Therefore to meet the arguments of all the *Srutis* taken together, the only natural way open is the enunciation of the doctrine of *Dvaitādvaita*, which will be in accord with both sets of *Sruti* texts. If we belittle *Sruti* texts in any way, we will only be stultifying ourselves. By so belittling *Sruti* texts, we will be approaching the domain of Buddhism, which denies the authority of the *Vēdas*.

Vēdic texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*, etc., declare that the world and the creatures in it have been created by Brahman. This proves that the world consists

of both Dvaita and Advaita consisting of cause and effect, as expounded by the Sūtra, *Pratignā siddherlingamāśmarathyaḥ*, etc., and the two Sūtras following it (I. 4. 21-22). In these Sūtras the different tenets of the three doctrines of the Vedānta philosophy (*Bhēda*, *Abhēda*, *Bhēdābhēda*) are clearly explained. And subsequent Sūtras like *Ubhaya vyapadēsāttvahi kuṇḍalavat* (III. 2. 26) establish the fact that the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine is the only doctrine that can be pointed to as not being open to any objection and as one not suffering from any contradiction. Agreeably to this view, it is explained in the *Sūta Samhita*, *Bhēdābhēdastathābhēdō bhēda etē matāstrayaḥ iti*, etc. Also in the *Mahimnastava*, it is thus declared: *Dhruvam kaschid brūte sakala maparastva dhruvam idam parō dravyūdravyaḥ iti*, etc. Thus according to some, everything is true and eternal; according to others, everything is unreal—both material and immaterial.

#### Harmonising Sruti Texts.

Srīpati suggests that there is need for reconciling these conflicting texts. He proceeds to show that the same want of harmony between *Sruti* texts is to be seen. He quotes the *Sruti* text, *Yatō vāchō nivartanta*, etc. [Those (*Jivas*) who are bereft of the good grace of the *guru*'s blessing have no salvation.] This is seemingly against the text *Ānanda Brahmanō vidvān nabibhēti kutaschana*, etc. (One who knows Ānanda Brahman is never afraid of the world.) These seemingly contradictory texts can only be harmonised by *Jignyāsa*. To prove that *gnāna* obtained by *Gurukāṭāksha* leads to the knowing of Brahman and that all other ways lead away from the path leading to the knowledge of Brahman as known to experience, is, says Srīpati, confirmed by the *Taittirīya* text, *Brahmavidāpnōti param, Brahma vid Brahmaiva bhavati*, etc. (He who knows Brahman will reach Him and he who knows Brahman will also become Brahman.) But then, there are texts which declare that just because one knows the *Vēda*, one cannot exactly find that great Being, the Brahman. Srīpati quotes texts like (a) *Na vēdavin manute tam bruhantam*;

(b) *Naishā tarkēṇa mati rāpanīyā*; (c) *Tantvōpanishadām puruṣham pruchchāmi*; and (d) *Sāstra yōnitvāt*, which declare that Brahman is not possible of understanding through any faulty (or imperfect) sources. He holds that he is understandable only through the aid of the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda*, which harmonises the meaning of every *Śruti* text relating to *Brahma-Mīmāṃsa* (*Sarva śruti samanvita Brahma-Mīmāṃsa*). It is therefore meet, he says, that a beginning should be made for *Brahma-Jignyāsa*.

#### Meaning of *Atha*.

Having thus laid the foundation for his doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, Śrīpati next proceeds to interpret the word *Atha* as meaning *anantara*, i.e., *afterwards* or *then*. He says he does not accept the interpretation that it refers to *adhikāra*, which is the interpretation of Ānandatīrtha. Ānandatīrtha says that *atha* refers to *adhikāra anantaram*, i.e., *after a man is qualified for Jignyāsa*. Though Śrīpati, following Ānandatīrtha, quotes the Mangalaśloka, *Omkārascha atha sabdascha dvāvētau Brahmaṇō gurōḥ | kaṇṭham bhittvā vinir-yātau tasmāt māṅgalikāvubhau*, he interprets the word *atha* differently. Ānandatīrtha interprets the word in the sense of *adhikāra anantaram*, i.e., after the student has obtained the necessary qualification of being in a position to assimilate the knowledge relating to Brahman. Śrīpati says that because the word *Jignyāsa* is in the *Sūtra*, the word *atha* need not mean *adhikāra*, because *Jignyāsa* means *Vichāra lakṣaṇatvāt*, that is, *knowing after understanding*. That is, Śrīpati suggests that entering into understanding, for knowing is itself *adhikāra* and so there is no need for further *adhikāra*. From the word *Jignyāsa*, we have to infer that the inquirer has the desire placed in him (*adhikṛita*) to know the Brahman. Therefore *atha* need not necessarily mean *adhikāra*. *Jignyāsa* has included in it *Vichāra adhikāra*. The desire to know the Brahman is sufficient *adhikāra* and that is implied in the word *jignyāsa*. Then to what does *Atha* refer? It refers to the prerequisite in one who wants to know the Brahman. One who has not the determination



(*dīkṣha*) to know Brahman, after freeing himself from the three kinds of worldly sins (*malatraya*) arising from *manas*, *vāk* and *kāya*, cannot know the Brahman. That is, freeing oneself from the sins arising from these three worldly sources is the prerequisite for knowing the Brahman. That is, one should purge himself of these three kinds of sins before he can desire to know the Brahman. “Atha” (“Then”) therefore means “when” one has qualified by purging himself from the three kinds of sins called *malatraya*. Śrīpati’s interpretation is summed up by him in this dictum : *Deva-dhāraṇa*. The term “Athāthah” implies that when the remaining conditions (*sēshalakṣhaṇa*) are fulfilled, “then” *jignyāsa* commences. What are the *sēshalakṣhaṇa*? They are the destruction of the *malatraya*—the sins caused in association with *kāya*, *mānasa* and *vācha* and when one has destroyed these three sins, he reaches the fourth stage—*gnāna*—for *jignyāsa*. *Dharma*, *Brahma* and *Sāstra* in the Vēdic texts imply *karthru*, *karma* and *phala*, i.e., Cause, Action and Effect. Even though he has carried out his various duties in his former birth, yet to attain the Brahman, he ought to carry out the rules set down in the *vidhis* (i.e. *Vēdas*) in connection with *bhōjana* (food) and *gamana* (conduct). He who aspires to *Mōksha* should have carried out the above rules of conduct for *malatraya vidhvamsa*, so that he might be qualified for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. This is what has been fixed in the *vidhis* (*Vēdas*) as the requisite qualification for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. For it is said in the *Taittirīya Upanishad* about the desire of the disciple who wishes to receive wisdom about the Brahman :—*Yadētat chchandāsām rishabhō viśvarūpaḥ | chchandōbhyō dhyamrutāt sambabhūva. Samēndrō mēdhayā spruṇōtu. Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam śarīram mē vicharshaṇam, jihvā mē madhumattamā karṇābhyām bhūri viśruvam. Brahmanah kōśōsi mēdhayāpihitah śrutam mē gōpāya iti.* May the Lord Śiva who is the *Rishabha*, i.e., the greatest of all prosodies, the Lord of all Vēdic lore, who pervades the world in the form of the *vṛśa* (*viśvarūpa*), grant me that *mōksha* which is obtained by the enlightenment afforded

by Vēdic knowledge, for which (purpose) I wish to undergo this *deva-dhāraṇa* (*Lingarūpa Sivasya dhāraṇa*). May Lord Śiva grant that the *deva-dhāraṇa* will purify my whole body purging it of all sins, purifying my tongue, and making it more sweet, purifying my ears by the sound of the Vēda passing through them and by this means (*i.e.*, purification) grant me the *bhakti* and *gnāna* (faith and wisdom) required and protect me by making me fit to reach the Brahman. By the use of the word *dēva-dhāraṇa*, a doubt may arise as to the meaning intended to be conveyed by it; whether it is the outward (*bāhya*) *linga-dhāraṇa* or the mental (*antar*) *linga-dhāraṇa* or the *praṇavalīṅga-dhāraṇa*.<sup>96</sup>

In texts like *Tvam dēvānām paramanḥa daivatam*; *Tasmāt dēvāḥ Śiva smrutāḥ*; and *Dēvyāyutam dēvāyutam yuvānam*, etc., the word *dēva* indicates no other than *Paraśiva*, as it generally signifies in the *Vēda*, and is adopted to mean it in *āchāra*, as there are no other evidences in the *Sāstras* to show that any other deity is meant in this connection. According to its root meaning, the word *dhāraṇa* means the agency through which, as an easy means, salvation is reached. Therefore it becomes *dēvadhāraṇo bhūyāsam*, which means that as I wish to attain to Brahman, let me also be joined to those who are fit to understand Brahman by wearing him symbolically. Thus I become the wearer of *linga—tasmāt mām mēdhayā samyōjayatu*. Then come the words *Bhūyāsam*, etc. *Bhūyāsam* denotes the necessity for wearing the *linga*. *Linga-dhāraṇa* also implies the wearing of the *Praṇava* symbols, for texts like *yōvēdādau svarāḥ prōktō*, *chchandōvrishabhatvam*, *tatvamasi*, etc., apply only to *Paraśiva* and also the *viśvarūpa* (*i.e.*, form of *Viśvarūpa*) is also applied to *Paraśiva* only, because in the *Ashtāṅga yōgas*, the followers of the *Vēda* (*vaidikas*) meditate only on Him as the chief object of worship.

The *Pūrvapaksha* argument in this connection is thus developed by *Srīpati*: By the use of the word *viśvarūpa* in the *Rik* (quoted above), the *Brahma-linga* referred to therein is none other than *viśvarūpa*, except that both appear

<sup>96</sup> *Praṇavaḥ* means the sacred syllable *Aum*.

as separate entities and *Dēva-dhāraṇam* (mentioned in the Rik) means that they are both combined in one by the process of wearing (*yōgāt*). If it is not so divided, then the word *Gōpāya* used in the Rik will go without any meaning (*asambhavāt*). And also the word *bhūyāsam*, which is used in a benedictory sense, will also have no meaning. But *Linginam chakriṇam drishtvā* and such other texts like *linga madhyē jagat-sarvam ; tat prāṇēśvantarmanasō lingamākuḥ ; jyōtirlingam bhruvōr madhyē nityam dhyāyēt sadā yatīḥ ; lingam Brahmaiva kēvalam*, occurring in the *Atharvāna* (*Vēda*), *Sāma* (*Vēda*), *Rudra* (*Samhitā*), *Hamsa* (*Samhitā*), *Katthavalli* (*Samhitā*), etc., which say that *Śiva Parabrahman* is explained (*upadēsāt*) to be *Linga-rūpa*, prohibit the outward wearing of the *linga* (*Linga-dhāraṇa*). And also texts in the *Taittirīya*, *Kaivalya*, *Kathavalya* and other *Smrithi* texts lay down that *Daharam vipāpam paravēśma bhūtam hritpundarikam virujam viśuddham*, i.e., internal *linga-dhāraṇa* (*antarlinga-dhāraṇa*) is necessary. Also in other *Sākhya* (i.e., *Samhitas*) *Bāhya linga-dhāraṇa* is not explained, while other texts, such as *Visvādhiko Rudro maharshih tvam dēvēshu Brāhmanāt ; tvam dēvānām Brāhmanānām adhipatiḥ ; vishnuḥ kshatriyānām adhipatiḥ*, etc., state that the unrivalled *Śiva* is greater than the *Viśva* and is the lord of gods and *Brāhmaṇas*, while *Vishnu* is only the lord of *Kshatriyas*. Thus it is said in the *Āgamas* of which *Śiva* is the author, such as *Kāmika* and *Vātula*. There is no support for the views expressed in *Manu* and other *Smrithis* and *Purāṇas* which are opposed to those made in the *Kāmika* and *Vātula āgamas*. Moreover, in the 6th and 8th *adhyāyas* of the *Yajurvēda* treating about *Tripura Samhāra*, from the words beginning with *Tēshām asurānām tisraḥ pura āsīt* and ending with the words *So abravīt varam vriṇa ahamēva paśūnām adhipatiḥ asau*, etc., it is suggested that *Brahma*, *Vishnu* and other *Dēvas* are brought under the category of *paśu* and *Śiva* himself is described as *Paśupati : Brahma Vishṇvādi dēvānām paśutvaṃ śivasya paśupatitvam*. This means that the wearing of *Śivalinga*, *Bhasma* and *Rudrāksha*, which are the symbols of *Śiva*

(*Saiva lānchhana*), are necessary. In this world, therefore, the worshipped and the worshipper (*ārādhya* and *ārādha*), the lord and the servant (*prabhu* and *bhrutya*) are seen in separate existence (*i.e.*, separately existing). So it follows that *bāhya linga-dhāraṇa* is found to be a necessary procedure. In order to overcome the ties of bondage created by friendship and enmity and the animal nature of the *jīva*, a *mumukshu* (one who desires *mōksha*) and a *bhakta* should wear the symbol of protection of *pati lānchchanūtmaka paraśivēśhṭa linga-dhāraṇa* (the symbol of the remover of sins in the form of Paraśivalinga). This goes without saying. In the *Kāmika* and other *āgamas* expounded by Śiva, it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* should be throughout life (*i.e.*, that the *linga* should be worn throughout one's life) which shows that when one is already invested with one Karma (*i.e.*, *vidhi*), no other Karma binds him.<sup>97</sup> On the basis of this reasoning, there is no room for one who carries out the *Upāsana Krama* of *Poundarīka* and other *Śrauta* and *Smārta* observances, for observing other Karmas. When one is invested with the *dīksha* (*i.e.*, *śivadīksha*), he is absolved from observing the *sūtaka* and other obsequial restrictions (*sūtakūdi nishēdha darśanēna*), as also with the performance of the *Sāpinda* and other (*i.e.*, subsequent) ceremonies (*Sāpindyaūdi uttara-karmaṇām vaiyarthya prasangāt*). After the *Saiva dīksha* is over, the invested is absolved from *jīvatva* and *prētatva*, for he is, by such investiture, absolved from the Karmas (*āśrama dharma*) to which he was bound from his birth in his caste (*svajātya*); being from the time of such investiture subject to *its* duties and responsibilities, he is freed from the restrictions imposed by being born in his caste. By this investiture there is no fear of his falling again into *Vēda bāhya mata* (*i.e.*, entering into the limits prescribed by the *Vēda*).<sup>98</sup>

<sup>97</sup> This argument is again and again urged by Śrīpati: while one is subject to one *vidhi*, he cannot be subject to another.

<sup>98</sup> Śrīpati's argument may be summed up thus: Previous to *dīksha*, one is subject to the restrictions of the caste into which he is born; after the *dīksha*, he becomes a new person and is subject only to the restrictions imposed by the *dīksha* ceremony.

Even such great sages like Vāsishta, and other great Brahmanishta Rishis and Muktas are found to have been observers of *jyōtishkṛtōma* and other duties. As stated by Manu and other *Smṛiti* writers, *Yadvaikincha Manuravadat tat bhaishajam*, the medicine prescribed by them for removing the disease of worldly attachment, should be strictly followed. But it may be asked, Brahma and others have not undergone, as required by the *Smṛitis*, *Āgamas* and *Purānas*, the *linga-dhāraṇa dīkṣha* and consequently what use is there in it? The answer is that they have *mōksha* through *Sraddhā*, *Bhakti* and *Dhyāna* in a combined form. And as it is said in texts like *Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyu mēti, nānyaḥ pantaḥ vidyate ayanāya, gnānādevatu kaivalyam, nānyaḥ pantaḥ vimuktayē*, etc., *mōksha* is available by reason of wisdom (*gnāna*). It is said in the text, *Mōksham ichchēt Janārdanāt* (all wealth may be desired through Īśvara and all *mōksha* through Janārdana), which shows that Janārdana only is the giver of *mōksha* and not Śiva. To meet this argument, it is said *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*. Here the *ladanta*<sup>99</sup> verb (*sthāpayati*) is opposed to the above view. Also, this is against the views of other *Smṛitis*, because the verb *sthāpayati* denotes from its root meaning *sthāvara linga sthāpana*, i.e., the establishing of a *sthāvara linga* on the body. Such a *linga* being held in the hand with the uttering of the prescribed mantra (*linga-pāṇinām abhimantritam pāṇi-mantram*), invests a man with pure thought. Then arises the objection if one is thus invested with pure thought, then there is no need for investing him with *bāhya linga*. The answer is that just as the *lānchhana*, the insignia of a king, such as *svētachchatra* (white umbrella), etc., are not seen in servants, so certain of the emblems of Śiva, such as *Garalabhakṣhaṇa* (poison swallowing) and *Bhujaga-bhūṣhaṇa* (serpent-decoration), on account of their terrifying character, are impossible of being worn by others. Just as there is no authority for adopting the *mangalācharaṇa* (*ōmkāra*) in the

<sup>99</sup> *Laṭ* is a technical term used by Pāṇini to denote the Present tense or its terminations.

beginning, for there is no Vēdic support for such adoption, just as one who worships Śiva in his *saguṇa* form is unable to worship him in his *nirguṇa* form also, and just as all people who wish to attain their desires worship God only in his temple, similarly the wearing of the *linga* (*linga-dhāraṇa*) seems to be (apparently) against the prevalent (received) procedure of the *Srutis* and *Smritis* as they do not permit any scope for it. If it is said that this principle is also objected to as enumerated in the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti*, then our reply would be in the words of the text: *Lingadhāraṇa rādhadhāntastu prātyakṣhika sruti smṛityāgama purāṇētiḥāsa vihitatvēna lingadhāraṇasya agnihōtrādivat vaidikatvam siddham iti*, etc. (It is as decided a fact that *linga-dhāraṇa* is in accordance with the teachings of *Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Āgama*, *Purāṇa* and *Itihāsa* as the *agnihōtravidhi* is in accordance with the prescriptions laid down in the *Vēda*.)

Atha means After Diksha.

Therefore it is that only after initiation by means of the (Śiva) *dīkṣha* (*tat dīkṣhānantaram*) that one should undertake *Brahmajignyāsa* (*Brahmajignyāsa vidhīyate*). Śrīpati thus suggests that he has established that *atha* means *dīkṣhānantaram*, i.e., after the DIKSHA and not AFTER OBTAINING ADHIKARA (as suggested by Ānandatīrtha).

The Vēdic text *Yat chchandāsām rishabhō visvarūpaḥ* denotes that the unlimited Śiva assumes a limited form to enable those who are his Bhaktas to worship him. Upanishadic texts like *Nārāyaṇe nidhanapatayē namaḥ*, etc., denote that the all-pervading *linga* is in everything including Nārāyaṇa, the lord of all people devoid of riches (i.e., people who seek *mōkṣha* at the hands of Nārāyaṇa). Therefore Śiva is also found pervading Nārāyaṇa. Texts like *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, etc., therefore, refer only to *linga-dhāraṇa*, the wearing on the body of the all-pervading Śiva. This statement is again supported by the texts of the *Svētāśvatara*, *Atharvaṇa siraḥ* and other *Upanishads*: *Prāṇchōham pratyanchōham* (I existed at first; I exist ever after). It is also said in the *Kathavalli* and

*Hamsa Upanishads* and in the *Linga Purāṇa* and other works: *Tat prāṇēśvantarmanasō linga māhuḥ*; *Lingē sushuptiḥ*; *Lingam Brahma sanātanam*; etc. The light existing in the internal mind (i.e., inner consciousness) is called *linga*; the *sushupti* (i.e., the dreamless sleeping state) is in the *linga*, i.e., the *Jīva* in a dreamless state of sleep is (verily) the *linga*, i.e., they, *Jīva* and *Linga*, are one in that state; the *linga* is *sanātana* (i.e., everlasting), etc. The attributeless form of Brahman (*Nairūpapada Brahmapada* as opposed to *Sōpapada Brahmapada*) denoted by the *linga* is just like a form having all the limbs, such as *kara*, *charaṇa*, etc., and is therefore to be understood as synonymous with a Brahman having form. That is to say, the Brahman who has no attributes has to be understood as equivalent to Brahman with attributes and having a body and all limbs. That is, the unlimited Śiva is worn on the body in a limited form; though the unlimited Śiva has no form or attributes, he has to be conceived as possessing both when worn as *Linga* on the body.

If the text *amrutasya dēva-dhāraṇa bhūyāsam* is divided into *dēva* and *dhāraṇa*, then according to the *Apāramitādhikaraṇa Nyāya*, the word *Dēva*, owing to contact with the body on which the *linga* is worn, not only means "to protect" the wearer (*gōpāya*) but also, by being in contact (*samyōgārthakatvēna*), means also the giver of *Mōkshapada* to him (*amrutapada vāchya-mōkshasya*). If this is not understood in this sense, it will not satisfy the importance of the text appearing in the *Sankara Samhitā*: *Lingāṅga sanginō vatsa punarjanma navidyatē, Yugapat gnānasiddhisyāt tatho mōksham avāpnuyāt iti*, etc., i.e., the wearer of the *linga* will have no more births, but will attain wisdom and final release. The text, *Sarīram mē vicharshaṇam*, states that the wearing of the *linga* on the body makes the *Jīva* to constantly think and meditate on the *Lingarūpi* Śiva (whom he is wearing) instead of (being distracted by) the many enjoyment-yielding objects of the external world.

Then the *Smṛiti* texts *Atyāśramastha sakalēndriyāni; Atyāśramī sarvadā sakrudvā japēt; Vratamētat pāśupatam paśupāśa vimōkshāya; Vratamētat sāmabhavam; Tat samācharēt mumukshuḥ napunarbhavāya; Tēshām evaitām Brahmanidhyām vadeta śirōvratam; Tasyēti kathitā hyarthā prakāśante mahātmanām*, etc., occurring in the *Kaivalya*, *Atharvāna sīrah*, *Kālāgni Rudra*, *Mundaka* and other *Upanishads*, state that only he who adopts the *pāśupata vrata* is eligible for the teaching of *Brahmanidhya* (*Brahmanidhyādhikāritvōpadēśāt*). Therefore *linga-dhāraṇa dīksha* is decidedly to be imparted to one who is desirous of learning *Brahmanidhya* (*Linga-dhāraṇa dīkshitasyaiva Brahmanidhyādhikāritvam siddham*). If the objection is urged that in the *Kaivalya* and *Svētāśvatara Upanishads* there are no texts prescribing *linga-dhāraṇa*, and that it is quite enough for one who is initiated in the *Pāśupata vrata* to smear himself with the *Bhasma* only (*Bhasma-dhāraṇa*); then, it may be stated, that is not so. For, one initiated in the *Pāśupata vrata* should also wear the *linga* as part and parcel of his body in the same way as *bhasma-dhāraṇa*. For it is said:—

*Lingāṅga sanginām chaiva punarjanma navidyatē  
Yēsha pāśupatō yōgaḥ paśupāśa nivrutlayē  
Sarva vēdāntasārōyam atyāśrama iti śrutiḥ.*

Whoever wears the *linga* on his body will have no further births; this wearing of the *linga* is the *Pāśupata yōga*, i.e., the joining of the *linga* with the *anga* or body in order to destroy the animal-nature created by bondage (*paśupāśa*) in man. This is the gist of the whole of the *Vēdānta* and this is the *Atyāśrama* which is declared in the *Śruti*.

Further it is said: *Parabrahmābhidham lingam paśupāśa vimōchakam; yō dhārayati sadbhaktyā sa pāśupata uchchyatē.*

The *linga* which is named after *Parabrahman*, and which removes the ties of bondage and releases the faithful wearer (from the same) is called *Pāśupata*.

*Sarīra tritayā bhaktyā lingam paraśivātmakam, yō dhritvā vicharēt bhūman sa pāśupata uchchyatē.*



Whoever wears the *linga* of the Para Śiva form out of pure mind, physically and mentally, and walks about in the world—he is called a Pāśupata.

*Lingam Sivō bhavēt kshētram angam samyōga āśrayaḥ, tasmāt lingānga samyuktō yōpi sō atyāśramī bhavēt.*

*Linga* becomes Śiva; *kshētra* becomes *anga* (i.e., body); both these being combined become *lingānga*, i.e., *linga* and *anga*; one who becomes *lingānga* becomes *atyāśramī*.

*Brahmachāri grihasthōvā vānaprasthō yatistu vā, yastu lingānga samyuktaḥ sa yēva atyāśramī bhavēt.*

Be he a *Brahmachāri* or a *grihastha* (householder) or *vānaprastha*, or a *yati* (i.e., *sanyāsi*)—whoever combines in himself the *linga* and the *anga*, he is said to have become *atyāśramī*. (The words *Pāśupata* and *atyāśramī* are synonymous with *lingadhāri*. So these words explain each other.)

Further, in the *Sāmajaṅgishīya śākhā* and in the *Sadānandōpanishad* it is stated: *Antardhārāṇo śaktō vā hyaśaktōvā dviṣṭottama, samskritya guruṇā dattam Śaiva lingam urasthaṭē, dhāryam viprēṇa muktyartham yēvam vēdāntinō viduḥ.*

Whether a Brahmin is to wear the *linga* internally or not, he should accept the *linga* given by his *guru* after consecration and wear it on his bosom in order to obtain *mukti*—as declared by the Vēdāntins.

Further, in the *Aiśvarya śākhā* of *Atharvaṇa Vēda*, it is said: *Yō vāmahastārchita lingamēkam parātparam dhārayatē satatam vipraḥ kshatriyō vā | Tasyaiva labhyaḥ paramēśvarōsau niranjanam paramam sāmyam upaiti divyam.*

One who keeps in his left hand the *linga*, the greatest of the great, be he a Brāhmaṇa or a Kshatriya, him only the all-pervading and great Īśvara will join with all his glory.

From these texts it is seen that *dhyāna* and *dhāraṇa* (contemplation of his glory and wearing his *linga*) of Paramēśvara should always be possessed by a *mumukshu*, i.e., one who wishes to attain *mōksha*.

Again, in the *Rudrādhyāya* it is stated: *Adhyavōchat adhivaktā prathamō daivyo bhishag ityanēna*, etc., which means that Para Śiva only can keep away (i.e., ward off) the flow of birth, death and *samsāra* and can effectually prevent them (from recurring). Therefore it is explained by the Vēda Purusha in the *Rig*, *Yajur* and *Sāma Vēdas* that only one who wears the *linga* will be capable of obtaining release from the bondage of *paśu* and *pāśa* (*paśupāśa vimōchakatvam*, i.e., the release from the subordinate state of animal bondage).<sup>100</sup>

Again, in the *Rigveda* occurs the text: *Ayam mē hastō bhagavān, Ayam mē bhagavatātārū | Ayam mē viśva bhēshajō, Ayam Sivābhimarshaṇaḥ || Ayam mātū Ayam pitā Ayam jīvātur āgamāt | Idam tava prasarpaṇam subandha rēhi nirīhītyanēna ||*

This text states that the *linga* that is kept in the hand is the Vēda Purusha and that *Sivābhimarshaṇa* is the touching of the *Śhāvara-linga*. And therefore the combination of the two (the Vēda Purusha as represented by the *linga* and *Sivābhimarshaṇa*) makes Śiva to be in touch with the wearer (of the *linga*).

The same thing is said in the *Vātūla Sruti*:—

*Dhārayēt yastu hastena lingākūram Sivam sadū | tasya hasta sthitam viddhi matpadam sapadām padam iti*, which may be thus translated: “He who always places in his hand the *linga* form of Śiva, knows that he has in his hand my presence, of great wealth.” “Just as a ball of iron thrown into the fire acquires all the properties of the burning fire, the man who wears in his hand my world-curing *linga* form will be possessed of all my properties.”

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *Bhāgavata*, Canto V, where the word *pāśatantyam* occurs. This word describes men as animals drawn by their nose-strings. Cf. also the following: *Sarve vahāmo balim Īśvarāyatē prōtū nasīva dvīpadē chatuspādah*, occurring in the *Bhāgavata*, Canto V, Adhyāya 1: We, two-legged animals, carry a bodily sacrifice to that great Lord just as the four-legged *paśu* is dragged along with a string in its nose to the sacrificial fire.

So it is said in the *Kāmika Āgama*: *Ayam mē hastō bhagavān iti*, which means "This Almighty God is in my hand".

From this *mantra*, it follows that the *Vēda Purusha* is firmly held in the hand of one who wears the *linga* (*Linga-dhriti*). That is, he who wears the *linga* has the presence in this body of the *Veda Purusha*.<sup>101</sup>

In the *Yajur Vēda* (Ashtaka I, Part iv) it is said, *Yāte Rudraśśivātanū aghōrā pāpakāśini | Tayā nastam vāsanta mayā girisāntā abhichākāśih itī || Triyambakam yajāmahe sugandhim pushtivardhanam | Urvāruka miva bandhanāt mruthyōr mukshīya māmrutāt itī ||*

Again, it is stated: *Sōmārudrā yuvāmētānyasmai visvā tanūshu bhēshajāni dhattam avasyatām munchatam yanno asti tanūshu baddham kruta mēnō-asmāt itī*, etc.

The meaning of these texts is given in the *Linga Purāṇa* as follows:—*Yā tē Śivātanū rudra linga mangaladāyakam | Lingam Śivatanuḥ prōktā mūrtir ghōrā tanuḥ smrutā || Apāpesu cha bhaktesu tayōr madhyē Śivā tanuḥ | Kasatē paramēśasya śishtāstē lingadhārinah || Tayāsanta mayā sankhya kārūnya linga rūpayā | Abhichātāśih tanuvā girisāntā abhiraksha mām || Triyambakam virūpāksham lingam brahmasanātanam || Yajāmahē dhārāyāma sugandhim pushtivardhanam | Urvārukam yathā bandhāt mruthyōr mukshīya māmrutāt | Prathamāshṭhē Yajurvēdē prāśnē charama samgnike || Linga dhārānamākhyātam Vēda punsam mahātmanām | Sōmā Rudrā yuvāmētānyasmai asmabhya mēvahi || Visvāni bheshajānishtha prānabhāvātmakāni cha | tanūshu dēhatritaye baddham māyāmayātmakam || Kritam yadēnoduritam manō vākkāya karmajam | tadasmadasmata sthūrnām mukhyatō vāsyā*

<sup>101</sup> The *mantra* theory is that if the person who wears in symbolic form the deity who is to be worshipped, meditates on that form uttering the *mantra*, and the name of the deity, in the particular form prescribed, he finally attains absorption into that form. This is described in the following text:—*Mananāt trāyatē yastu mantra ityabhidhīyate | tasmāt mantrēṇa tanmūrtim bhaktipurvēṇa dhīyatām*. (See *Tantrasāra Āgama* on *Dhyāna*.)

*tamyuvām ॥ Munchyantam kripayā samyak pramōchayatam  
īśvarau ॥*

In the same work (*Linga Purāṇa*) it is said that Paramēśvara has two forms :

*Rudrō vā ēsha yadagni tasyaitē tanu vau  
Ghōrānyu sivānyayiti.*

Rudra has two forms, one a fearful-looking and the other a serene-looking one; therefore the words *Rudra* and *Sōma* imply these two forms of Śiva, *Ghōra* (the fearful) and *Aghōra* (the serene-looking).

In the Vēdic text, *yuvam* means "yaus" (plural) and *asmē asmabhyam* (third person) means belonging to us and *viśva* means the whole universe. All these forms are as medicines (or cures) for the disease of mundane miseries (*bhavarōgaharāṇi*). *Ishta*, *prāṇa*, *bhāva*, *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* are the signs which will cure *bhavarōga*. That is, that *Ishta linga*, *prāṇa linga*, *bhāva linga*, *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* and other symbols are the cures for mundane ills. That is, the wearing of the *linga* and *rudrāksha*, and the smearing of *bhasma*, etc., on the body will protect a man from *anūdyavidyāvāsitam*, that is, the ills of former existence. The wearer will be released from all the ties of this world (*muchyatam*).

In the *Sruti* text, *Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam*, etc., the two forms of Īśvara are established. He who is combined with Umā is Sōma (or Īśvara). His body is made of the Five Upanishads and a beautiful form, capable of removing all the ills of family bondage (*samsāra dukkham*). "You two, Umā and Sōma, being on our body in the form of *Ishta* and other (*linga*), which being worn (*dhārayitva*) and never leaving our body, will destroy all the ills which have their origin in *malatraya* (*malatrayātmaka*—that is, *manas*, *vāk* and *kāya*)." For it is said in the *Sruti*: *Viśvādēvān vidushā vēditavyam śaivam lingam pradhrutam sarvavēdaiḥ tadātma siddhyai munibhiḥ mukta kāmair kantiḥ hastē mastakē vā bhavati dhāryam ॥* That *Sivalinga* which, according to all the Vedas,

signifies the Lord of the Universe as is known to the wise, and whose wearing is supported by the *Vēdas* should be worn by those who wish to attain their desires, on their bodies, either in the neck, or on the hand or on the head. As this is so stated in the *Sāma Vēda*, therefore, the wearing of the *Śivalinga*, which is a cure for all worldly miseries, must of necessity be adopted by all who desire salvation (*mumukshubhiḥ*).

In his *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi*, Rēṇukāchārya interprets the *Rigvēda* mantra *Pavitramte*, etc., in the light of *lingadhāraṇa* (*Lingadhāraṇa paratvēna nirdēśāt*). He thus interprets the *Rigvēda* mantra referred to:—The *linga* is named Brahman. The lord of Brahma is Īśvara. Therefore the *linga* is said to be the purifying agent (*tat-pavitram*). By being in contact with it, the body becomes purified. The Rik, therefore, says *Pavitramtē vitatam Brahmanaspatē*, i.e., the body coming in contact with the *linga*, will purify the wearer. Therefore such a *linga* is necessarily to be worn for obtaining consecration by a Śaiva who would be faultless. A body devoid of such consecration (*dīkshārahita*) will never attain salvation (*uttamapadam*). Just as failing to perform *Sandhyā-vandana* is counted as a religious omission and a sin, so is a person who has not been consecrated in due form accounted a sinner. Again, it is said, “a *bhakta* who does not wear the *linga* on his body until the moment of his death, the food that he takes daily is (no other than) the flesh of his own body.” He who does not keep on his body the *linga*, his body is as useless as that of a corpse. Therefore the wearing of the *linga* is as important as maintaining a sacrificial fire throughout one’s life. Just as a piece of burnt wood found in a cremation ground is prohibited from being used for other purposes, so is one who does not wear the *linga* on his body disallowed from observing every rite prescribed (*sarva karma bahishkeritah*). Thus it is stated in the *Vātūla*, *Skānda*, *Laingya* and other texts which treat of the failure to wear the *linga*. Next as to *bhūyāsam iti*, it should be taken to mean *mēdhāvī-bhūyāsam*, i.e.,

*Brahma-varchasvī-bhūyāsam*, i.e., that which causes one to possess the brilliancy of Brahman. Here, the meaning applicable to *āsam* in the text *Ahamēkaḥ prathamamūsam iti*, "I alone at first existed," should be given to *āsam* in *bhūyāsam* (*bhū + āsam*). If that is done, there is here *vidhyarthōpapattēḥ*. That is, by means of the *vidhi* (the prescribed ceremonial), the result follows. Therefore the wearing of the *linga* (after the *dīksha*) is testified to by the *āchāra* that has prevailed from yore (*ahamēkaḥ prathamamūsam iti*). Failure in securing such a consecration will prevent the warding off of the eternal three-fold sins (*malatraya*) of the three-fold physical body (*sarīra-traya*). The function of consecration is also a Vēdic one. In the *Vātūla*, it is stated:—*Vaidikatvam yathāvakshyē sarvavēda pramānataḥ | Vēda vēdānta siddhatvāt vaidikam linga-dhāraṇam || Vēda vēdānta sāstrēshu purāṇēshvāgamēshu cha | Brāhmaṇasya samākhyātam lingadhāraṇam iti ||* I declare that *linga-dhāraṇam* is a consecration (of the body) rendered necessary by the *Vēdas* as the same is affirmed by all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*. In all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*, and *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas*, *linga-dhāraṇa* is stated to be necessary for a *Brāhmaṇa*. In the *Yajur-Vēda* generally and *Taittirīya Samhita* in particular, the statement is affirmed:—"To those who aim at *mōksha*, *linga-dhāraṇa* is spoken of as a necessary consecration." The same is understood from *Chchandas* and *Vēda*, where it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* came to be born from *Anrita* (ambrosia). In the *Linga Purāṇa*, it is said:—

*Indrastu Paramaiśvaryaśālī Sūmba strilōchanah, mām mēdhayā pragnayā cha spruṇōtu prīṇayatvatha, amrutasya mōkshalābhāya sarvadēhēshu sarvadā, dēvasya lingarūpasya śivasya paramātmanah, dhāraṇam tad dhritiriyasya dēvadhāraṇa ishyate, tasmāt sarīrammēlōke vicharshana makilbisham, jihvā mē rasanā bhūyāt madhurālāpabhāshinī, karṇābhyām śrōtrayugmena bhūrivyaśruvamasmyaham || Brahmanah pārvatīśasya kōśōdhishtānamevahi, asēriya yadā lōkē pragnayā mēdhayā vritah, śrutam tatśravanādīni mē gōpāya prayatnataḥ, ityādīnā ||*

In the *Linga Purāṇa*, the *linga* consecration is stated as absolutely necessary to protect the body spiritually. In the *Smritis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, it is said that to triumph over this world, is this consecration rendered necessary. No Rishi will feel any doubt to this procedure of consecration nor object to it as it is sanctioned by the *Vēda*. Therefore no other procedure is stated to be the right one by the *Vēdas*.

In the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti*, it is stated that the wearing of the *linga*, *chakra*, etc., should not be allowed as it is objectionable (*nishēdhaḥ*). Such a statement cannot be accepted and followed (*navidhēyam*), because Vēdic support is the one important thing and there is support for *linga-dhāraṇa* in the *Vēda*. In the *Vēda*, it is stated *uditē juhōti* (offer the sacrifice at the appearance of the sun) and *anuditē juhōti* (offer the sacrifice just before the appearance of the sun on the horizon) in expressions which are contradictory to each other. In this instance, the two expressions belong to two different branches (*sākhā*) of philosophy, one to the Māyāvādins (*dhūrta smārta māyāvādins*) and the other to their opponents. These two schools are not in favour of each other. They make use of their own invented groundless arguments (*kalpita nishēdhāḥ*) to support their ideas and discard those of their opponents. Their statements carry as much credibility as the one which says that there is a lotus flower (growing) in the sky. Similarly *tapta linga-dhāraṇa* has, it has to be inferred, as much truth in it inasmuch as it is un-Vēdic.

Since the word *Chakri* is put on a par with the word *linginam* and its wearer is put on a level with the wearer of the *linga*, an examination of the relative positions of the *tapta lingi* and the *śrauta lingi*, with the aid of *Srutis*, *Smritis*, *Purāṇas*, *Āgamas*, etc., is rendered necessary. Such an examination proves that the latter is the superior of the two. Therefore *tapta linga-dhāraṇa* would be a procedure outside the purview of the *Vēdas*. There are two ways adopted in the wearing of the *linga*: one *śrauta* and the other *aśrauta*. The former is called in

the Śaiva religion *suddha linga-dhāraṇa* (*Shadadhva suddha linga-dhāraṇa*); and the latter is called the *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa* (*aśrauta taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*). The Vīra-śaivas being *śrautas* and followers of the Vēdamārga only, are prohibited from having recourse to *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*, which is stigmatised as sinful (*pratyavāyah mahānbhavēt*). This is so stated in the *Siddhānta Āgama*. Just as one who maintains a sacrificial fire of one particular kind finds it unnecessary to maintain a sacrificial fire of another kind, though the maintenance of both of them may be in accordance with the *Srutis* (*ubhayōḥ śrautatvāt*), and just as one who has begun the performance of one *karma* finds himself unable (being prohibited) to begin the performance of another *karma*, agreeably to the Vēdic injunction, similarly in adopting *Śaiva dīkṣha*, two conflicting methods of *linga-dhāraṇa* would be irregular and opposed (to Vēdic procedure). Such a condemned procedure should not be simultaneously adopted in a matter of life-long *dīkṣha* like *linga-dhāraṇa*, as the procedure presented on the analogy of the Pāñcharātrāgama (as to *taṭṭa linga-dhāraṇa*) is not Vēdic.

For one who wears the *linga*, there is no kind of pollution caused: pollution arising from birth and death, just as in the same way one who has installed the sacrificial fire need not observe the pollution arising from birth or death. He can continue during that period the worship of the *linga* without any break. And therefore one who wears a *linga* throughout his life will always be a consecrated person and as such will have no need to observe such pollution. As stated in the Vēdic text *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, that is, the wearer of the *linga* is always under the spell of purity for the very reason he wears it on his body. Because it is said in the *Parāśara Smṛiti*, the *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi* and other works that the worshippers of Śiva and the installers of the sacrificial fire—these two classes of people—and a Brahmachāri, that is, one who has been invested with the sacred thread, and a Sanyāsi are not subject to any kind of pollution. Again, it is stated in the same works that a woman who is fond



of always worshipping the *linga*, one who is confined (*sūtaki*) and one who is observing the courses (*rajasvalā*) are a crore of times purer than the sun, fire and the wind (*ravi*, *agni* and *vāyuḥ*). Further, the same works lay down that neither at the time of birth nor at the time of death should Śivapūja be abandoned. These statements prove that the body which bears the *linga* on it is never polluted and is quite free to offer worship to the *linga* at all times without a break.

Next is the fact that customs contrary to these texts exist do not take away from their validity. (The customs lack support and so cannot be held to nullify the texts.) The validity of the *Śrauta* rules is not affected by the existence of customs sanctioning the offer of animal sacrifices at the Jyōtishṭōma, Atirātra and Paundarika rites, the partaking of animal food and the drinking of *Surā* (Sōma juice) at them, and the enjoyment of conjugal felicities by Brahmachārins during day time with *dāsīs*—though these are manifestly against the morals of the world and against *āchāra* as declared in the *Srutis*.

Next, as Śaivas are thus free from pollutions of these five kinds—birth, death, rajasvalā, etc. (*pancha sūtakābhāvē*)—they are superior to the four *Varnas* (*Varnachatusṭayātītatva*). It is just that the food touched by them should be partaken of. To say—as some say—that those who follow the Vēdic injunctions should not have intercourse with Lingadhāris who, following the Śaiva Sāstras, do not observe the five kinds of pollution, is not correct. (The suggestion is that such a statement is lacking in support.) For it is said in the (Śaiva) *Siddhāntas*, *Āgamas* and other authorities that just as one during the time the sacrificial fire is being installed need not observe (the pollution resulting from) the courses of his wife, similarly one who wears on his body the *linga*, which he worships of his free will (*i.e.*, with sincere devotion) is unaffected by pollution. Just as the tongue should not be touched by the hand for fear of pollution but still the *mantra* pronounced by the tongue is still very holy and produces holy results, so a Śaiva has no

pollution for the very reason that he wears the *linga* on his body. According to the *Vēda*, he will never become polluted even if he is touched by others. After the Śaiva Diksha is undergone, there is no such thing for a man as *Prētatva* and *Jīvatva* (i.e., he is absolved from these two kinds of pollutions). Though it is declared that the performance of ceremonies pertaining to birth and death are not necessary any further after Śaiva Diksha, it is wholly incumbent upon Śaivas to observe the other rites which are prescribed for them in the Śaiva *Āgamas*. For it is said in the *Sankara Samhita*, *Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi* and other authorities that those who worship Sṛikanṭha constantly, according to the rules prescribed for each caste (*Svajāti-vihitam dharmam*), are as holy as Mahēśvara himself (*tē vai Māhēśvarāḥ smrutāḥ*), while the worship offered by those who adopt modes of worshipping Him not prescribed for them, is not accepted by Him. Śiva formerly proclaimed that every *varṇa* should practise what was prescribed for it; those who transgress the rules (laid down) would show lack of faith and become sinful. Just as those who transgress the orders of a king become punishable, those who transgress the ordinances of Śiva are liable to the punishment of being thrown into Naraka (*Narakastathā*). Śambhu ordered Sāmba to punish those who transgressed His ordinances; therefore every one should strictly hold fast with wisdom and faith to those ordinances and worship Śankara. With them (those who adhere to His ordinances) He becomes much pleased. Therefore one must become possessed of wisdom and good practice until one's death. Even though he attains wisdom, he should not leave the *karma*, which is the source for yielding good results. Also, good practices enable a man to appear holy and adorable. And one who is destitute of good practices, becomes blameworthy in the eyes of society and the world. Just as eyes and limbs are mutually combined in obtaining wisdom, in view of good results these limbs should be so used as to produce the best fruits desired. Therefore to protect the ordinances of Śiva, one should become a *bhakta Sivavratī*,

i.e., staunch and faithful *Siva-vrati*, and surrender himself to Śiva (*Śivārpaṇa*) by offering to Him all wise acts done by him, strictly following the path of the *Vēda*. This is what has been stated in detail in the *Śaṅkara Samhita* and the *Siddhānta Sikkhāmaṇi*.

Though nothing immediately useful may result in one's own favour in the case of one who acts in accordance with the ordinances of Śiva, yet he should not travel beyond the right path just as a subject would not break the laws of his king. After obtaining Śiva Dīksha, one should strictly adhere to it and act up to Śiva's ordinances. For it is laid down in the *Sruti* text *Bhūshāsmādvātaḥ pavatē iti*, out of fear, blows the wind. Even the Wind and the Sun Gods blow and shine forth (respectively) in great fear and with due reverence to the ordinances of Śiva, for fear that if they broke even by a little the laws of Paramēśvara, they would be putting themselves in a position in which they would be causing inconvenience to the whole world, and preventing those in it from performing the *karmas* they have respectively to discharge. What need is there to speak of the mere men who are blessed with little wisdom? In the *Linga Purāṇa* it is said :—"We, Brahma and all others, are like quadrupeds (*paśavaḥ*) and you our Lord or *Pati*. Therefore you are called *Paśupati*." So saying all the Gods wore on their bodies the *Śivalinga* and they all became *Pāśupalas*, i.e., they accepted the Lord Śiva as Paśupati. And so the Lord Śiva is the chief object of worship for Brahma and other Gods. And they wear on their bodies the *bhūti* (sacred ashes) and *rudrākshaki* (the sacred *rudrākshi* beads) and the *linga*. And Śiva, looking at the faithful Gods, Brahma, Vishnu and others, decorated with *sphatika mālā*, killed Tripurāsura and protected them. This proves that *Śivalinga-dhāraṇa* was accepted by Brahma and the other Gods. It is also stated in the *Śaṅkara Samhita* of the *Skānda Purāṇa* :—Brahma, Vishnu and others among Gods and Gautama and others among Rishis ever wear on the best part of their bodies the *Śivalinga* : Hari suspended the *linga* on his chest; Brahma

wore it on his head ; and thus wearing the *linga* they went to their own places. In this world, the *linga* is actually seen worn in the temples of Anantapadmanābha, Viṭṭhalēśvara, and Narāyaṇa—in the hand, on the head and other places respectively. So nobody can have in this world even the suspicion of a doubt about *Linga-dhāraṇa*, i.e., the wearing of the *linga*.

*Srutis* say that the chief qualification that one should possess for *Mōksha* is the union (*yōga*) of *śraddhā*, *bhakti* and *dhyāna*. But according to some, it is *dhyāna* and *gnāna* that secure salvation. There is therefore no necessity according to them for wearing the *linga* on the body (such wearing after the *Diksha* ceremony standing, in the opinion of *Srīpati*, for *bhakti*). There is absolutely no use of such a doctrine as this (*na kinchit prayōjanam iti*). In the *Srutis* it is stated that freedom from the bondage of worldly illusions (*Visvamāyā nivṛttiḥ*) will be obtained by constantly praying for *Śiva* (*tasya abhidhyānāt*), by wearing on the body the symbol of *Śiva* (i.e. *Lingadhāraṇa yōjanāt*) and meditating on the qualities of *Śiva* (*tatvabhāvāt*). By this, declare the *Srutis*, the sight of God (*Sākshātkāra*) will be finally secured and instantaneously all *māyā* will be removed (*sakala māyā nivṛttiḥ*). By lessening the authority of the *Sutis* (*Sruti sankōchē*), we are setting it at naught (*mānū-bhāvāt*).

Even Bhagavān Vyāsa has explained the three-fold nature of *upāsana* (I. 1. 32) *Jīva mukhya prāṇa lingān-nēticēnnōpāsāt traividhyā śritatvād iha tad-yōgāt*, whose meaning is thus explained with the aid of the *Skānda Purāṇa* :—Meditation (*mānasōpāsanam*) should be done in the mind (*hrīdayē*) or at heart (*dahara*), either by the uttering of the *Panchākshari*, *Gāyatri* or *Rudrasūkta*. This kind of meditation is called *Vāchakōpāsanam*. The next kind of meditation is by holding the *Śivalinga* in the palm of the hand or (kept concealed) in the grain or in the fire. This kind of *upāsana* is called *Kayakōpāsanam*, done out of *śraddhā* and *bhakti*. Thus, in this way, every initiated person (*Dvija*) should worship with three-fold purity

(*trikaranaiḥ*). This done, he will attain *mukti*. This is the Vēdic method; and there is no other method (of obtaining *mukti*). For it is said:—A great man (*mahātma*) thinks of the same (thing) in his word, mind and action in the same way.

So, those who offer sacrifice in their minds (*mānasa yagna*) without being duly initiated, and without wearing on their body the *linga* externally, derive no benefit from it, for such *mānasa yagna* (without the contact of the *linga*) will not have freed them from the three-fold sins of the body (*malatrāya dhvamsābhāvāchcha*). Just as the previously initiated person only is qualified to chant the *Vēdas* and to perform the *Sandhyāvandana* every morning, so according to the *Sāstras* he who wears the *linga* on his (external) body is alone entitled to *Śivādhyāna* and *Sivagnāna* (i.e., meditating on Śiva and acquiring full knowledge of Him).

Just as fire is necessary to prepare food, so the external wearing of the *linga* (*bāhyāngasya linga-dhāraṇa*) is absolutely necessary to enable one to internally meditate on Śiva (*antar dhyāna*). If such a procedure is not adopted, the previously quoted authorities—*Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Āgama* and *Purāṇas*—will be of no use and everything will be un-Vēdic (*Vēda bāhyatva prasangāt*). For it is declared by *Manu*, *Gautama* and other *Smṛiti* writers that he is a *dhyāna yōgi*, who during meditation is found to possess on his body the *Śivalinga* (*Śivalingānga-samyutah*) and who repeats the *mantra* by his mouth, who meditates in his mind, who wears on his external body—i.e., on his head—the *linga*, who puts on the necklace of Rudrāksha and holy ashes and who keeps his tuft of hair (*śikhā*) on his head—for these are the characteristics of a twice-born person (*ētād Brāhmaṇa lakṣaṇam*). This procedure—of wearing the *linga*—is one in accordance with Vēdic requirements and hence is not opposed to the *Vēda*. It is stated: *Mōksha-michchēt Janārdanāt iti*.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> This is from the *Skānda Purāṇa* and the full text is as follows:—*Aham bhōgaṇaḥ prādō vatsa mōkshadastu Janārdanaḥ*, which may be thus translated:—Dear boy, I can give every felicity in life, but as for *mōksha* you should go to Janārdana.

Janārdana (*i.e.*, Nārāyaṇa) alone can give *mōksha* and He alone should be worshipped by those who wish for it. This, however, is not so. For there are *Sruti* texts like the following:—

*Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya ॥*  
*Īsam gnātvā amrutatvamēti ॥*  
*Gnātvā Śivam śāntimatyantamēti ॥*  
*Īsam gnātvā amrtiā bhavanti ॥*  
*Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ ॥*  
*Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraḥ ॥*  
*Tasyābhidhyānāt yojanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē*  
*viśvamāyānivorittiḥ ॥*  
*Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē ॥*  
*Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ ॥*  
*Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt ॥*  
*Tamakratum paśyati vītaśōkaḥ ॥*  
*Dhātuh prasādāt mahimānamūsam ॥* etc.

These and other like *Sruti* texts show that Nārāyaṇa is not a god of the Brahmans (*Brāhmaṇa dēvatā*) and *Smritis* which contradict *Srutis* cannot be accepted as authoritative (declarations). Even such *Smritis* also state that *mōksha* is to be attained by the worship of Śiva through generations. For it is stated in the *Skānda Purāṇa*:—

*Sāṅkhyayōgasahasrēṇa janmanā Dvaitagō bhavēt ।*  
*Tanmatasya sahasrēṇa Sauravam matamaśnutē ।*  
*Tatsahasrasamabhyāsāt Gāṇapatyamato bhavēt ।*  
*Tatsahasrēṇa bhūlokē Vaiṣṇavam matamīryatē ।*  
*Tadvaiṣṇavasahasrēṇa Śākto bhavati sarvadā ।*  
*Tatsahasrāt mahābhāga Saivasāmānya uchyatē ।*  
*Tatsahasrēṇa viprēndra Vīraśaivamatō bhavēt ।*  
*Tēnaiva muktimāpnōti nūnyathā bahuyatnataḥ ॥ iti.*

If one practises Sāṅkhya-yōga for a thousand generations, he becomes a Dvaita; if he practises a thousand years more, he will then attain to the *Saurava mata*;<sup>103</sup> by practising for a thousand generations, one of the *Gāṇapatya*

<sup>103</sup> *Saurava mata* denotes the worship of the Sun.

*mata*;<sup>104</sup> after practising a thousand years that *mata*, he becomes a Vaishṇava; if he continues practising a thousand years that *Vaishṇava mata*, he becomes a *Śākta* religionist; after practising for a thousand years that religion, O Mahābhāga, he becomes a Sāmānya Śaiva; and after practising for a thousand years that religion, O Prince of Brahmans, he then becomes a Vīraśaiva. Thereby (i.e., by becoming a Vīraśaiva) he obtains *mukti*; and not by any other means in spite of any number of attempts.

It is heard from the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa* that those who obtain *Vishnusārūpya* (form of Vishnu)—such as Sivaśarma and others who entered the Vishṇu-lōka—have finally to obtain their *mukti* through the worship of Śiva.

It is also stated in the *Mahimnastava*, in the part beginning with “*trayī sūnkhyam*” and ending with “*tvamasi payasāmarnaiva iva*”, etc., that, considering all religions, one’s own as well as others (*svamatānyamatāni nirūpya*), it is proved that Śiva is the final goal for everybody to reach (*Śiva ēva sarvēśhām prāpyasthānam*). It is also heard from the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa* that even Vyāsa, after removing his shoulders and planting the same (in the ground), got himself, with his disciples, initiated in the *Sāmbhava Dīksha* and thus became qualified for obtaining *mōksha*.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>104</sup> *Gāṇapatyaḥ* is a worshipper of Gaṇēśa. *Gāṇapatyam* is the worship of Gaṇēśa.

<sup>105</sup> There is a reference here to the story of a disputation between Vyāsa and a Vīraśaiva saint, in which the former was defeated by the latter who, in consequence, had to acknowledge the superiority of Śiva over Vishṇu. And, as a mark of such victory, Vyāsa had to sever his right shoulder, the same being planted in the ground. A lithic representation of what is popularly called *Vyāsana tōlu* is to be seen in certain parts of the country—for instance, at the gate of the village of Kunthūr on the banks of the Cauvery, not far away from Kollegal, on the road to Talkad. A banner of the Murugharājendra Mutt has on it a representation of this *Vyāsana tōlu*. There is a Basavēśvara temple at Kunthūr, close to which is a slab on which is an inscription dated in Saka 1467 (=A.D. 1545). This inscription

In the text *Sarvalingam sthāpayati*, the verb *sthāpayati*, though it indicates the meaning in the sense of the present indicative mood, of doing something ordained (*vidhyarthōpattlēḥ*) yet it can be used without any objection (*bhēdadōśhaḥ*) in many different ways. It is stated in the text (of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa*) *Āgnēyō'shṭā kapālo amāvāsyāyām itivat*, on Amāvāsyā day, on the *kapāla*, *Agni* must be worshipped. This injunction that *Agni* must be worshipped on the *kapāla* on the Amāvāsyā day is not observed by all, because such a thing is not easily possible. Yet such a thing is imagined to have been done. In the same manner, though the word *sthāpayati* means "installing in the earth", yet the meaning of the *Sruti* text implies that it might be applied both to installing in the earth and in the hand as evidenced by (*Sruti*) injunction and by practice.

It must not be supposed that *linga-dhāraṇa* becomes effective only by installing the *linga* in the hand, and by meditating (on it) and worshipping (it). It is found that *pūja* is effected by meditation (through the mind) in addition to what is done by the hand, as the word "hand" (*pāṇīśabda*) is not directly connected with *pūja*. The suggestion of some writers that the word *pāṇimantram* is the equivalent of *pāṇinā abhimantritam* is not acceptable to us, for if we take the secondary meaning of the word *mantra* (*mantraśabda*) then it results in the violation of the *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇam*. (*Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa virōdha prasangaḥ*, that is, *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* of the *Brahma Sūtras* I. 1.5.) The meaning of this *mantra* is very clearly explained

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records a grant to the Mahānandīśvaramaṭha at the place. Another inscription dated in 1512 A.D. records a gift of taxes in the village for providing food and clothing to fifty Wodeyars of the Śivāchāra sect, who were connected with the Sālūra Śāntadēvara-Sīmhāsana (*M.E.R.*, Inscription Nos. 21 and 23 of 1910). The temple of Mahādēva or Mahālingēśvara at Kundathūru (the ancient name of Kunthūr) goes back to the time of the Western Ganga King Nītimārga, who has been assigned to 850 A.D. (See *M.E.R.*, No. 24 of 1910.)



by Bhagavān Vēdavyāsa in the 21st chapter of the latter part (*Uttarabhāga*) of the *Linga Purāṇa* as follows:—

*Yajurapyāha sarvaṃ vai liṅgaṃ sthāpayatīti cha |*  
*Tasmāt dhāryam mahāliṅgaṃ pāṇimantrēti mantrataḥ ||*  
*Pāṇau liṅgaṃ vinikshipya dīkshākālē gururḥ śivam |*  
*Yēna smarati tanmantram pāṇimantram vadanti hi ||*  
*Pavitratvāt mahēśasya śivasya pratipādanāt |*  
*Pavitrīkaraṇāt pumsām pavitramiti kathyatē ||*  
*Ataḥ sarvēśhu kālēśhu dhārayēt liṅgamuttamam |*  
*Gachchan tishṭhan upaviśan śayānō'pyanyathāpi vā |*  
*Suchirvāpyaśuchir vā'pi liṅgaṃ sarvatra dhārayēt ||*  
*Lingadhārī sadā śuddhō nijalingam manōharam |*  
*Archayēt gandhapushpādyaṇi karapīṭhē samāhitāḥ ||*  
*Nityāni karmabrindāni tathā naimittikāni cha |*  
*Sivārpaṇadhiyū kuryāt samyak gnānābhivriddhayē ||*

The *Yajurveda* also declares *sarvaṃ vai liṅgaṃ sthāpayati*, i.e., the *liṅga* is installed; that is, the *mahāliṅga* is installed in the palm of the hand by chanting the *pāṇi-mantra*. When one keeps the *liṅga* in the palm of his hand during the period of the *dīksha* and meditates upon the Holy Guru Śiva by (uttering) the same *mantra* (whereby he is sanctified), he is said to have uttered the *pāṇi-mantra*. By uttering what *mantra* in the name of Lord Śiva one becomes purified, that *mantra* is called *pavitra* (i.e., the sanctified *mantra*). Therefore at all times such a sacred *liṅga* should be worn (on the body). Even while going along, standing or sitting in one place, or sleeping or in any other condition (or state), while in a state of purity or impurity, the *liṅga* should be worn alike at all times. A *lingādhārī* is always pure and he should always worship his loving *liṅga* by offering sandal, flower and other materials, keeping it in the palm of his hand (*karapīṭhē*). This he should adopt from day to day both in (the performance of) his *nitya* and *naimittika karma* (i.e., *karma* performed daily and on special holy occasions), and he should make over his deeds in the name of (Lord) Śiva in a spirit of self-renunciation (with a view) to improve his wisdom. Can one, who is stung by a mere scorpion or the

like and dies, be expected to possess the power of swallowing the deadly *kālakūta* poison (*i.e.*, the poison churned out of the ocean and drunk by Śiva)? Can one, who runs away at the sight of a rope, frightening himself that it is a serpent, be expected to wear (as a necklace) the cobra? If it is said that there is no proof whatever for the wearing of the *linga*, that there is no authority for the wearing of the *Śivalinga*, the smearing of the *bhasma* (sacred ashes) and the putting on of the *rudrāksha* beads by *mumukshus* (those desiring *mōksha*), like the servants of a king wearing his badges, the answer is that the argument underlying these questions is one that cannot be accepted (by us). Devotees (*bhaktas*) for attaining their own *sāyujya* (*Śivatva*) put on (their bodies) the signs *bhasma*, *rudrāksha* and the *Śivalinga*, according to (religious) ordinances (*vidhi*) of Śiva Himself that they should be so worn and that the omission of them would entail sin. As in this world we see that the king's emblems are given to his servants for their wearing them agreeably to his directions, similarly the *Vēdas*, *Sāstras*, *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas* direct the adorning of one's body with the *Śivalinga*, *bhasma* and *rudrāksha* according to the ordinances of Śiva. Agreeably to these directions we see people putting them on, thus making known the facts that they wear the cobra on their body, and swallow the poison (that Śiva wore and Śiva swallowed). Brahma, Viṣṇu and other devotees are proved to have worn the *Śivalinga*. As the *Linga Purāṇa* says:—

*Śivāgnāpālānārthāya śivabhaktaśśivavratī* |

*Linga rudrāksha bhasmāni śivachinhāni dhūrayēt* ||

*Rājāgnōllanghanāllokē yathā dandō vidhīyatē* |

*Śivāgnōllanghanād dandō rauravam narakam tathā* || *iti*.

A Śivabhakta in order to carry out the ordinances of Śiva, should wear the *linga*, *rudrāksha* and *bhasma*, the symbols of Śiva; else, just as one who transgresses the orders of a king is punishable by him as may have been ordained, one who disobeys the commands of Śiva is punishable by being consigned to *Naraka*. If it is asked how

the Nirguṇachaitanya (*Brahman*) could be obtained by the worship of the Saguṇa who is illusionary (*mithyābhūta*), the reply is that it is possible to do so according to what is mentioned in the *Kaivalya*, *Svetāsvatara* and other *Upanishads*, which declare that *Nirguṇa sarva sākshi chaitanya* could be obtained only by means of *Saguṇōpāsana*. Thus it is stated:—*Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram Prabhūm Trilōchanam Nīlakantham praśāntam* <sup>1</sup> *Dhyātva munirgachchati bhūtayōnim samastaśākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* || *iti*.

By meditating on Nīlakantha, the supreme three-eyed Lord, helped by Umā, the holy saint will obtain Śiva, the origin of all created beings (*bhūtayōnim*) and the remover of all darkness about Himself (*tamasaḥ parastāt*). There is the further text of the *Rudrasūkta*:—*Sthirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugruḥ*, etc., which says that the bodily form of Śiva is an eternal one. Not only is such an eternal form of Śiva to be thought of as ordained while installing Lord Śiva in the temples (at consecration time) but also such a form should be thought of as ordained when meditation takes place by the *gāyatri* and *mantrāṅganyāsa* and *karanyāsa* take place and during *dhyāna* and the consecration of wells (*kuṇḍa*) and *maṇḍapas*. If it is not so accepted—i.e., if Śiva's eternal form is not so accepted—all religious actions, such as the offering of sacrifices and mantras, and the fruits thereof, etc., will prove in vain. Therefore for Brahmadevī, consecration by *Sāmbhava dīkṣa* is the only mode of qualifying.

In the (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) text beginning with *Yasyaitē'shtāchatvāriṃśat samskārah* and ending with *Brahmaṇaḥ sāyujyam salōkatām āpnōti*, all *karmas* including the ceremony of impregnation (*garbhādāna*) are conveyed (*prūpaka*) to Paramēśvara to remove all sins. (These are *janmasamskāra karmas* and not *Brahmasamskāra karmas*.) Again, according to the texts, *Vidyānchāvidyāncha yastadvēdōbhayam saḥ* || *Tēnaiti Brahmanit punyakkritaijasascha* || *Satyēna labhyastapasā hyēsha ātmā samyaggnānēna brahmacharyēna nityam* || etc., which speak of the collection

of ceremonies required to be carried out for (attaining) *gnāna* (*gnāna karma samuchchaya*), it is meet that these ceremonies should be carried out after *dharma jignāsas* i.e., after *janma karma vidhi*, *gnāna karma vidhi* (should be carried out). Then, as to *janma karma samuchchaya*, another text states: *Tadyathēha karmachitō lokah kshīyatē* | *Ēvamēva amutra puṇyachitō lokah kshīyatē* || etc., which means that the results of *karma* are not everlasting. Therefore, as mentioned in the text, *Parīkshya lōkān karma-chitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdamāyāt nāstyakritaḥ kritēna* || a Brahman must distinguish between rituals which lead to *nirvēda* (i.e., *vairāgya*) and those which do not and then follow those which lead to it. In the text *Śāntōdānta*,<sup>100</sup> etc., it is declared that he should adopt such rituals whereby he will acquire the quality of becoming *śānta*, *dānta*, *uparata*, *titikshu* and *samāhita* by which he can see himself as well as others around him like himself. Then, as is said in the text *nacha punarāvartatē*, he no more will be born. Thus, he acquires thereby *mōksha* (or eternal bliss) as suggested in the above (quoted) texts.

Is *Brahma jignāsa* to be begun after practising the *sādhana chatuṣṭaya* (i.e., *śāntō dānta*, etc.)? If it is said that *linga-dhāraṇa* is also a *karma* giving no eternal result and is thus of no utility, (our answer is) that (it) is not so. Because in the text *Nāstyakrutaḥ kritēna*, only *prākṛuta karma* is mentioned to be of no value and as not productive of *mōksha*. But in the texts of the *Taittirīya* and *Śvētāśvatara Upanishads*, *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇōbhūyāsam* || *Tasyābhidyānāt yōjanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyaśchānte viśva-māyānivrittīḥ* || *Vratamētat sāmभवam tat samācharēt mumukshuḥ na punarbhavāya* || and *Sarvalīngam sthūpayati pāṇimantram pavitram* || etc., the wearing of the *Sivalīnga*, meditation, etc., are stated to be *aprākṛuta karma*, i.e., *karma* fit for only attaining *mōksha*. The *prākṛuta karmas* such as *garbhādhāna*, etc., included in the twenty-four mentioned, are only preliminary rituals leading to the four

<sup>100</sup> *Śāntō dānta uparata titikshuḥ samāhītō bhūtrā ātmanyēva ātmānam paśyēt*,—*Bṛihad, Upanishad*, VI. 4. 23, (See note on p. 568.)

primary *sādhana*s (*sādhana-chatusṭaya*). Therefore to obtain the qualification necessary for a knowledge of Brahma-vidya (*Brahmavidyādhikāritva*), the above (mentioned) *prākruta karmas* should be undergone and it is only then that one becomes eligible for a knowledge of Brahma-vidya through this *aprākruta karma* (i.e., *linga-dhāraṇa*). This *aprākruta karma* is the means for obtaining *mōksha* according to the *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* and *Samaksha jala nyāya*, as they (*prākruta* and *aprākruta karmas*) follow one another for their utility (*paramparā sādhanatvam yuktam*).<sup>107</sup>

According to the *nyāya sandigdha vākya śēshāt*, in the text *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam*, the qualification for initiation into *Brahmavidyā* is unequivocally stated.

<sup>107</sup> *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* and *Samaksha jala nyāya* are two well-known popular maxims. The former is the maxim of the magnified *Arundhati*, the smallest of the seven stars of the constellation, invisible to the naked eye; the latter is the maxim of the water rushing in your presence. The *Sthūlārundhati nyāya* is sometimes called *Arundhatī darśana nyāya*; which Apte explains as the maxim of the view of the star *Arundhati*. Col. G. A. Jacob quotes it in his *Laukikanyāyanjali* (I. 5) as *Arundhatipradarśana nyāyaḥ*—the maxim of the pointing out of the star *Arundhati*. The idea, according to him, in this maxim is that of gradual instruction on the principle of the *Adhyārōpāpavādanāyāḥ*. The following explanation of Sankarāchārya will make its use clear:—

*Arundhatīm didarśayīṣuḥ tatsamīpasthām sthūlām tārām amukhyām prathamam Arundhatīlī grāhayitvā tām pratyākhyāya paśchāt Arundhatīmēva grāhayati.* I. 1. 8; I. 1. 12.

To know the star *Arundhati*, after discerning the bigger stars which are near to it but are unimportant and understanding them as *prathama* (first) *Arundhati*, you should go to the next (star) which is near to them and understand that that alone is *Arundhati*.

*Arundhati* is the morning star personified as the virtuous wife of Rishi *Vaśishṭha*, and is one of the *Pleiades*—the cluster of seven stars situated in the neck of the constellation *Taurus*. It is said that this star—*Arundhati*—is not visible to persons whose end has approached.—See *Hitōpadēśa*, I. 76.

The *Samaksha jala nyāya* suggests that one should infer that the water which is flowing before one's eyes in a particular manner has been flowing in that way and will flow through in the same way finding its own limit.

It is, therefore, held that the *sādhana-chatusṭaya* exemplified above, detailing the collection of *karmas* (intended) for obtaining *gnāna* is, according to the *Srutis*, held to be entirely doubtful. For, according to the text in the *Sankara Samhita* beginning from *Nityānitya vichāravān iha paratrāpēkshitārtharatih*, etc., and ending with *Na tyaja prāṇalingam tvam yāvajjīvam pratignayā | Punarbhavō na tē vatsa vidyatē matruyōnīshu iti*. (Do not give up the *Prāṇalinga* so long as you are alive; my son, if you keep it on, you will have no more births again out of your mother's womb, etc.) This shows that *linga-dhāraṇa* is held to be a consecration in addition to the *sādhana-chatusṭaya*. After this last (*i.e.*, *linga-dhāraṇa*), *Brahmagnānōpadēśa* takes place. *Tato Brahmagnānōpadēśavidhiḥ nirdiśṭaḥ*. This is so according to the *nyāya Sandigdhe nyāya sēshūt*, *i.e.*, the maxim which allows that where a doubt arises, it should be settled from the sense of the remaining part of the syllogism.<sup>108</sup>

The same explanation is given by Rēṇuka Bhagavat-pādāchārya, according to the text beginning from *Piṇḍatā piṇḍavignānam* ending with *Ētāni śivabhaktasya kartavyāni prayatnataḥ*, etc., appearing in the *Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi*.

If, then, it is said that as by *linga-dhāraṇa* itself *mukti* can be easily acquired, why trouble oneself with enquiries (*jignāsa*) into the *Upanishad Sāstra*? We answer that it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Ātmā vārē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaḥ || Vēdānta śravaṇam kuryāt || Yōgam samūrabhēt ||* etc. From these texts it follows that it is incumbent on even those who are free from the ties of the illusionary world (*mūyāpāśa vimuktānāmapi*), until they are quite free from all bondage and until they receive enlightenment to follow the ordinances of God

<sup>108</sup> Variants of this *nyāya* appear in Jnānōttama's comment on *Naishkarmasiddhi*. In IV. 3, the form *sandigdhe nyayaḥ pravartata iti nyayaḥ*, which Col. Jacob translates into *When there is doubt, reason comes into play*. Akin to it is the *nyāya sandigdham saprayōjanām cha vichāra marhati*, which occurs in Jnānōttama's comment on I. 29. (See Jacob, *Laukikanyāyānjali*, II. 81-82.)

(*Paramēśvarāgnā pālanasya kartavyatva śravaṇāt*). If not (if the divine ordinances are not so observed), there is every cause for *kāma*, *krōdha* and other passions (*arishaḍvarga*) entering the body again and taking away the *lingagnāna*. For it is declared in *Sruti* texts like:—*Āsuptēḥ āmritēḥ kālam nayēt vēdāntachintayā | Dadyāt nāvāsaram kinchit kāmādīnām manāgapi* || Utilize all your precious time from your birth until your death and even in your dreams in thinking over what is said in the Vedānta. In the meantime do not give heed in the least to other worldly attractions around you even in your thought.

By doing this—*linga-dhāraṇa* in addition to *Brahma-jignāsa*—there will be a death protection (*ubhayavidha balāt*) and a double attainment of the object (*ubhayasiddhivat*). *Linga-dhāraṇa* as well as *Brahma-jignāsa* are (therefore) not in opposition with each other (*na virōdhaḥ*) just as the practices (*vidhi*) involved in the sacrifices *Soutvāmani*, *Brihaspati*, *Agnichayana* and *Vājapēya*, are doubly protected by the practices of the one occurring in the practices of the other. Just as in the *Jyōtishṭōma* sacrifice, *linga-dhāraṇa* should not, as a *prākṛuta karma*, be taken to be the cause leading to *mukti* as a matter of course, as it is manifestly contradictory to the *Srutis* above quoted. Also, in all probability the hearing of the *Srutis* will not be a cause to lead the disciple to *mukti*. If double protection is thus obtained—i.e., *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahma-jignāsa*—such double protection will prove the chief cause of absolution from the bondage of *māyā* (*māyapāśā nivrittāu mukhya kāraṇatva*). Else *Brahma-jignāsa* as a *Śāstra* will become an inconsistent discussion (*asambhava prasangaḥ*). Then all the trouble taken in using one's proficiency will have been spent on uprooting the very foundation of the subject.

Just as the sacrifices offered on the *darśa* (new moon) and *purnamāsa* (full moon) through *vṛhi* (grain) by sprinkling consecrated water on it, are calculated to obtain *svarga*, similarly all the *karma* done previously as *sādhana-chatusṭaya* is offered as an oblation to *Paramēśvara*

(*Paramēśvarārpita*). Together with this oblation, the knowledge of Śiva (*Sivagnūna*) and the wearing of *Śivalinga* (*śivalinga-dhāraṇa*) are both calculated to bring about the attainment of *mōksha*. Where is the authority for both *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahmavichāra Sāstra* to come in regular succession (*kramanīyama*) for the attainment of *mukti*? In the sacrifices at *darśa* and *pauruṣmāsa*, the performer is the same throughout; but in the case of *linga-dhāraṇa* and *Brahmavichāraṇa*, the *kramanīyama* does not apply to a single person or agent. If the doubt is cast that therefore the two cannot be compared with each other, then it is answered that the *Taittirīya*, *Śvētāśvatara*, *Kaivalya*, *Jābāli*, *Kaṭhāvalli* and other *Srutis* above quoted bear full testimony to the fact that the twice-born who adhere to *Sivōpāsana* are bound to act up to the *kramanīyama* mentioned above. In the *Sruti* text *Yō vai svām dēvatām atiyajātē prascūyai dēvatāyai chavatē na parām prāpnōti pāpīyān bhavati* ॥ it is laid down that he who disregards his own deity will be considered to have committed a religious sin. As it is stated in *Manu* and *Parāśara* :—

*Brāhmaṇūnām Śivō dēvaḥ Kshatriyāṇām tu Mādhaveḥ<sup>1</sup>*  
*Vaiśyanām tu tathā Brahmā Sūdrāṇām suranāyakaḥ ॥*  
*Brāhmaṇō Bhagavān Rudraḥ Kshatriyaḥ paramō*  
*Hariḥ<sup>1</sup>*

*Pitāmahastathā Vaiśyō vriśhalastu Purandaraḥ* ॥ etc. Śiva is the direct, supreme God of the Brāhmaṇa. In the *Sruti* text *Apāma (sōmam amrutā abhūma)* ॥ Let us drink *sōma* juice and become immortal, which means, according to the *Smṛiti* text, *Abhūta samplavasthūnam amrutatvam hi bhāvīyatē* ॥ that those who do not die in the *Pralaya* are immortal on account of the drinking of the *sōma*. Similarly, *amrutasya dēvadhāraṇam*, i.e., one who wears the *linga* becomes immortal by this *vidhi* (i.e., consecration). The idea sought to be impressed is that those engaged in a sacrifice, become immortal by the drinking of *sōma*; similarly, by the consecration of the *linga*, the person consecrated becomes immortal. Both do not die at the *Pralaya*.



Therefore in order to obtain the *Brahmagnāna* about the true form of Paśupati (Śiva), *Vēdānta vākya vichāra* is necessary. For it is said in *Sruti* and other texts:—*Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah sō'nvēshṭavyaḥ sa vijignāsitaavyaḥ* That Great Being who is the Lover of truth (*satyakāma*) and who is the Lover of mental resolve (*satyasankalpa*) should, after incessant *jignāsa*, be sought out.

Also in the following text:—*Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaavyaḥ* ||

O, you disciple! you must see that *Ātmā*, you must hear about that *Ātmā*, you must understand it and must meditate on it. Thus is the procedure about the *Brahma-jignāsa* stated in *Sruti* texts. And who is it that is to be sought by *jignāsa*? As to this, it is said in texts like the following:—*Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*! *Sa Ātmā sa vignēyaḥ*, etc., from which it follows that wherever *Ātmā* is referred to, it is only Para Śiva that is to be inferred and not any other.

The compound *Brahma-jignāsa* should be understood as *Brahmanah+jignāsa*, as *karmāṇi shashṭhi* and not as *śēsha shashṭhi*, because *jignāsa* is desired and not anything other than Brahman, for if Brahman is taken along with other things, then the direct desire to know Brahman will be disregarded. In all discussions where firm decisions have to be arrived at, no matters unconnected with the prime object should be discussed. For if other matters of less importance be discussed, then there will be mistakes committed. By inserting the word *kartavya* in the *sūtra* (*Athātō Brahmajignāsa*), how is the mistake in a faulty discussion removed? In the text *Vishnuruṇpāmśur yashṭavyō'jām*, etc., the suffix *tavya* denotes that it is necessary that *jignāsa* must be undertaken and not be omitted.

In *mahāvākyas* like *Tattvamasi*, *Ayamātmā Brahma*, etc., though the words are open to free discussion, yet there is nothing omitted, which need be supplied. Nor do they require any discussion to understand their meaning. Therefore, any word that we might supply

should satisfy the full meaning of the *sūtra* combined with the *Sruti* (*Śrutisūtrayōḥ aikyārūpyūṛtham adhyūhārah*).

The ordinance (*vidhi*) relating to *Śravaṇa* not having been accepted, and the benefit to be derived from it—as the ordained method—not having been obtained, there is no other unusual method possible. In all matters in which final decisions are necessary, the general meaning should enable us to decide them finally. This is in accordance with the universal experience of the world. Nor should we assert that *Brahma-sākshātkāra* could very easily be caused to be attained. What ought to have been obtained by enquiry having been obtained by the act of wearing the *linga*, and thus *Brahmagnāna* having been obtained, where is the necessity for adopting the *Vēdānta-śravaṇa* method for obtaining *Brahmagnāna*? Therefore, it may be asserted that there is no particular method (*niyamavidhi*) to follow for obtaining *Brahmagnāna*. Accordingly, it is not said that *Brahmagnāna* could be obtained without the help of a *guru*, by whom *Brahmagnāna* is to be imparted. For it is said in the *Sruti* text:—

*Parīkshya lōkān karmachītān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdamūyāt  
nāstyakrutāḥ krutēna ॥*

*Tadvignānārtham sa gurumēva abhigachchēt samit  
pāṇiḥ śrōtriyam Brahmanishikham ॥* etc.

Having examined the world and having looked at the people doing their *karma* for obtaining the intended fruits thereof, a Brahmin should become free from the bondage of worldly desires. Having determined to seek knowledge he must go (out from his house) to find out the *guru*, keeping in his hand the *kuśa* grass (*samit pāṇiḥ*), ready to hear and understand the sacred *Brahman*. Thus, to understand *Brahman*, the ordained method of going from one's house to the gates of the *guru's* residence should be adopted, without which *Vēdāntagnāna* cannot be supposed to be acquired. By dispensing with one method for knowing the Brahman, we cannot get by one single process what has been ordained to be acquired from both the methods. The argument is that *linga-dhāraṇa* should be

combined with *śravaṇa* through a *guru* to obtain *Brahma-gnāna*. It ought now to be evident that *linga-dhāraṇa* is a method definitely laid down for knowing the Brahman (*linga-dhāraṇasya nityatvamastu*). The conclusion is that *linga-dhāraṇa* is as much a necessary qualification for knowing the Brahman as seeking a *guru* to know the Brahman through *śravaṇa*.

If it is asked that out of the three rules explained by Jaimini<sup>109</sup> under which rule this—*linga-dhāraṇa*—should be set down, we answer that it comes under all the three rules (*vidhi trayēṇa siddhatvāt*). The necessity for *linga-dhāraṇa* is strongly supported by all three *vidhis* (mentioned). *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇo bhūyāsam*, etc., comes under *apūrva vidhi*. *Lingadhāraṇasya sarvalingam sthāpayati*, etc., comes under *niyama vidhi*, because *tāntrika taptalinga śūla damaruka śankha chakrāṅka nishēdhapūrvaka śrauta bhasma rudrāksha lingadhāraṇa svīkārāt* comes under *niyama vidhi*. The text *Yaśchchandasām*, etc., states that all the texts which support *lingadhāraṇa* have been agreed to and adopted by the all-knowing Vyāsa, Durvāsa, Rēṇuka, Śvēta, Upamanyu, Dadhīchi, Kumbhasambhava and other ancient (*pūrva*) Āchāryas who have duly worn the *linga* and obeyed the ordinance and respected it. We always go according to the method supported by *Sruti*, *Yukti* and *Anubhūti* (i.e., Veda, usage and experience).<sup>110</sup> Like the Buddhists, we do not deny or disown Brahman though the argument adduced from *yukti* (*yuktimātrūpalāpinah*).

Accordingly in the *Sūtra*, the word *Atha* means:—

*Nigamāgama ubhayavēdānta pratipādita bhakti kriyā gnāna kāṇḍatraya vihitā sthūla sūkshma chidachit prapañcha prakāśaka śatsthala paraśiva sākshātkāra kāraṇa bahu-janma krita śivārpita yajana yājana tapōdhyānādyanēka-puṇya pūrva phalaka śarīratraya gata malatraya*

<sup>109</sup> *Apūrva*, *niyama* and *parisankhyā vidhis* of Jaimini are called the *Jaimini sūtra vihitā vidhitraya*.

<sup>110</sup> *Anubhūti* in Nyāya philosophy means knowledge derived from four sources: namely, direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge, see *Bhāṣhā parichchēda*, 51-52.

*dhvamsaka kārūṇya kalyāṇa kaivalya vibhūti traya  
pradūyaka aṣṭāvaraṇa pañchāchūra sadguru karuṇā  
katāksha labdha śakti pātūdyavachchinna paraśivēśhṭa  
linga-dhāraṇātmake pāśupata dīkshānantaryam iti.*

Here if the word *Atha* gives the meaning of "After"—after the *pāśupata dīksha*—then the idea as to when *jignāsa* is to be undertaken, is conveyed. If that be so, what is the necessity for the use of the word *Atha* in the *Sūtra*? The answer is afforded by the *Sruti* text:—*Apāma sōmamamrutā abhūma*, etc.

Even original (*prākruta*) *karma* is yielding its daily fruits, as indicated in *Sruti* texts like:—*Omityēkāksharam Brahma* || *Asāvādityō Brahma* || *Nārāyaṇaḥ param Brahma* || *Annam Brahma* || etc. From texts like these, it is seen that there are several modes of meditation (*upāsana*). How then is it that the wearing of the *linga* can enable one to attain *mukti* (*paraśivēśhṭa linga-dhāraṇāt muktiḥ sambhavati*)? To remove this doubt and to fully confirm the importance (*dviḍhīkaraṇārtham*) of *linga-dhāraṇa*, the word *Atha* is used in the *Sūtra*. Further, the results of *prākruta karma* are *anitya* (not lasting) as determined by several texts, such as:—*Punyachitōlōkaḥ kshīyatē*, etc. Several other texts prove that certain *Srutis* which lay down the principles of *vidhi* (*bahu prakaraṇa paṭhitūyāḥ*) are much stronger than the *Srutis* which detail daily *karma*. Therefore the *Sruti* text *Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam* is much stronger in principle than the others. For it is seen from *Sruti* texts like the following:—*Śiva ēkōdhyēyaḥ śivam-karaḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya* || <sup>111</sup> *Ēka ēva rudrō na dviṭyāya tasthē* || *Asamkhyātāḥ sahasrāṇi smaryatē nacha driśyatē* || *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇūnām adhipatiḥ Viśṇuḥ Kshatriyūnām adhipatiḥ* || *Brāhmaṇūnām Brāhmaṇaiḥ āśrīyatē* || etc., that Śiva is the deity prescribed for worship by the Brahmans. Also, in *Sruti* texts like *Yōvai svām devatām atiyajātē prasvāyai dēvatāyai chyavate napaṛām prāpnōti pāpiyān bhavati* || etc., which state that he who

<sup>111</sup> *Śvētāsvatara Upanishad*, IV. 18.

desecrates the worship of his own deity incurs sin, for it is clearly said in *Manu*, *Parāśara* and other *Smritis* :—

*Brāhmaṇānām Śivō dēvaḥ Kshatriyānāmtu Mādhavaḥ |*  
*Vaiśyānāmtu tathā Brahmā Sūdrāṇām suranāyakaḥ ||*  
*Brāhmaṇō Bhagavān Rudraḥ Kshatriyaḥ paramō Hariḥ |*  
*Pitāmahastathā Vaiśyo vṛishalastu Purandaraḥ ||* etc.

These texts prove that Vēdic Brahmins have for their deity Śiva.

Devadharana Necessary for Jignyasa.

Again, the *Sruti* text *Apāma* (*sōmamamrutā abhūma*) etc., which agrees with what is enunciated in *Smṛiti* texts like :—*Abhūta samplava sthānam amrutatvam hi bhāvyaṃ*, etc., which state that those who go to *mukti* after the dissolution (*Pralaya*) of the world is complete, must be considered to have entered the Abode of All and become eternal. Accordingly the *vidhi* of *Dēvadhāraṇam*, though fixed by reason of a general requirement (*sādhāraṇakāraṇa-tvēna*) eventually leads to final bliss (*amrutatva*).

Therefore, in order to definitely know the *Paśupati svarūpa Brahman*, the enquiry into Vēdānta (*Vēdāntavākya vichāra*) must necessarily be undertaken after *dēvadhāraṇa vidhi*. This means that *dēvadhāraṇa vidhi* is necessary for *Brahma-jignāsa* and that both are necessary to attain the knowledge of the Brahman. Accordingly the *Sruti* text thus enunciates the *Brahma-jignāsa vidhi* :—*Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah so'nvēshṭavyah sa vijignāsitavyah || Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyah śrōtavyah mantavyah nididhyāsitavyah ||* Also in the *Sruti* text *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyante sa Ātmā sa vigneṇyaḥ ||* etc., the word “Ātman” is definitely intended to have no other meaning than *Paraśiva*.

Here in the *Sūtra*, *Brāhmaṇō-jignāsā* etc. is *karmani shasṭhi* and not *śēsha shasṭhi*, because we must take it to have been used in the genitive case as a prescribed *vidhi* and not as a *jignāsa* that could be treated lightly and as used in the *śēsha shasṭhi* (*jignāsyōpēkshitatvāt śēsha shasṭhī parigrahaṇē*). Therefore *Brāhmaṇō-jignāsa*

should be considered as *sambandha sāmānya nishṭhatva* which method determines the idea of Brahman as an important (*pradhāna*) result. Some say that in this *Sūtra* the word *kartavya* need not be understood (as a necessary addition). If this word is not supplied, then the *Sūtra* which suggests that there is a definite object to be gained (i.e., Brahma knowledge through *jignāsa*), will end in a fruitless discussion (*nishprayōjanānuvādē dōshābhāvāt*). But if one asks how will the mere supplying of the word "*kartavya*" remove all doubt, then we answer that according to the *Sruti* text *Vishṇurūpāmśu yashṭavyō ajāmitvāyē* etc., in which the suffix *avya* shows that what cannot be attained in any other way can be attained in this particular way. Similarly in the texts *Tattvamasi*,<sup>112</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>113</sup> etc., wherein also the mode of discussion is involved, such a suffix as *avya* should be understood and supplied. For this *Sūtra* is one which should be discussed and then a decision arrived at according to the *Vidhyapēkshitanyāya* (which lays down that a prescribed rule should be followed before arriving at a conclusion) and therefore a common verb which will satisfy both the *Sruti* and *Sūtra* should be supplied. Therefore the word *jignāsa* should be taken to mean the discussion which is intended to determine the *bhēdābhēda vichāra* denoted in the *mahāvākyas* such as *Tattvamasi*, etc.

To state that *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyaḥ syanda-mānāḥ samudrē* || *Brahmavid Brahmaiva Bhavati* || *Gnātṛvā Śivam śāntim atyantamēti* || *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyātē ayanāya* || etc., etc., enunciate the unity of the *Brahman* and the *jīva* and make such unity the chief characteristic (*lakṣhaṇa*) of both is un-Vēdic, because by so doing we would be leaving out of consideration their primary meaning. Such an interpretation will end in the contradiction of the *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇam*.

<sup>112</sup> *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, VI. 8. 7 and VI. 9. 3.

<sup>113</sup> *Brihad. Upanishad*, IV. 5. 19; *Māndūkya Upanishad*, I. 2.

Further *Sruti* texts like *Tamēvam viditvā atimri-tyumēti* || *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyatē ayanāya* || *Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* || etc., enunciate that only a dual method of worship of God Śiva (*bhinnātmōpāsakasyaiva*) will bring unity with God. *Sruti* texts like *Tarati śōkam Ātmavit* || *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ* || etc., assuredly lay down that a dualistic mode of worship only should be adopted.<sup>114</sup> And only he who adopts such a dualistic mode of worship as is laid down in the *Sruti* texts referred to, realizes the duality that exists between *Ātma* and *jīva* (*Sruti-vihitātmōpāsanasya bhinnātmā vishayatvam siddham*). But the *parisankhyā niyama*<sup>115</sup> *vidhi* is not always applicable. Nor does one who adopts a separate form of worship (*sādhana*) obtain unison with God (*samuchchitya prāptyabhāvāt*). To one who follows a different mode of adoration, *Vēdānta vichāra* is impossible throughout his life. It will result in sin (for him to attempt it). Also, is it necessary for one who wants to attain unity with God that he should be a *Sanyāsi* or an *Asanyāsi*; (we answer) he need not be the latter, for it is impossible for him (*aśakyatvāt*); nor need he be the former, for he must be one who rigidly follows all the conditions that bind a *Sanyāsi*. It is said in the *Chchāndōgya* text, *Brahmasamsthaḥ amrutatvamēti*, no one else except he who follows strictly the *mukti sādhana* can attain Brahman (*amrutatva*). For it is said in the *Sruti* texts like:—*Sampūrvatishtatēs samāpti vāchitvasya agnishtōma samsthē* || etc. The phrase *Brahma samsthā* referred to in the *Chchāndōgya* texts means no other form except that of Brahman (*ananya vyāpārarūpatvāt*), as stated in the

<sup>114</sup> The idea is that *aikya* results only when there is the relationship of *pūjya* and *pūjaka*, *upāya* and *upāsaka*.

<sup>115</sup> *Parisankhyā* in the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy means exclusion or limitation to that which is enumerated or expressly mentioned, so that everything else is excluded. *Parisankhyā* is opposed to *vidhi* which lays down a rule for the first time, and to *niyama* which restricts the choice to an alternative which is expressly stated when several such alternatives are possible.

*Atharvaṇa* text :—*Tamēvaikam jñātha ātmānam anyā-vāchō vimunchatha* ॥ Understand him alone definitely as Ātma and leave away all other words. Texts like *Āsuptēḥ ānṛutēḥ kālam nayēt vēdānta chintayā* and others occurring in the *Srutis*, declare that one should never employ any means other than the prescribed *vidhi* which alone will lead to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, this is the chief *vidhi* prescribed. In the *Kaivalya Chandrōdaya*, in the *Yadvatō Vidyādhivat-adhikaraṇa*, the Paramāradhyas have been stated to have attained the Brahman without any means other than the one above described. From the expression *parisankhyā vā śravaṇādishu sambhavēt*, it would seem that sometimes the *parisankhyā vidhi* may also be employed to attain the knowledge of Brahman. But such a method is not always to be taken as the chief one of the three *vidhis* mentioned.

Object of Jignasa is Brahman.

Therefore in this *Sūtra*, the chief matter for consideration being the knowledge of Brahman as the desired result, the object is, therefore, according to the *Srutis*, Brahman alone. It should not be supposed that this desired knowledge of Brahman may be obtained by any other method as suggested by the word *kartavya*. (It is hinted that the *vidhitraya* should be adopted for the purpose.)

Brahman is not always attributeless (*Sa-lī Brahmanō na nirviśēshatvam*). If he is ever attributeless, what is left to one to enquire about Brahman? The *Sruti* text goes :—*Parūsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikiḥ gnāna bala kriyā cha* ॥ The Brahman to be discussed and known has always two forms, corporeal and incorporeal (*mūrtāmūrta-tvam*). *Sruti* texts like *Dvēvāva Brahmanōrūpē* ॥ *Tadādi madhyānta vihnamēkam vibhum chidānandamarūpa madbhutam* ॥ *Umāsaḥāyam paramēśvaram prabhūm trilōchanam Nīlakanṭham praśāntam* ॥ *Dhyātva munirgachchati bhūta-yōnim samastasākshim tamasah parastāt* ॥ etc., sufficiently well declare that such (both) forms (of Brahman) should be thought of. Else the meaning intended by the *Sruti* texts



would be abridged and thus we will not be respecting the authority of the *Sruti*.

The Theory of Nirvisesha Brahman.

Some (Vēdāntins) say that if the truth about Brahman is to be realized, if one is to obtain freedom from *paśu* and *pāśa* (i.e., worldly ties), he should be understood as *nirviśesha Brahman* and not as *saguna Brahman*. (In the text *nirviśesha Brahmagāna* is referred to as opposed to *saguna gnāna*, i.e., *saguna Brahmagāna*). The qualities of Brahman are always spoken of as of a conflicting kind, as enunciated in texts like *Athāta ālēsō nēti nēti* || But in the text *Ētaḥ vai tadaksharam gūrgyasthūla mananva hrasva* || etc., the Immortal (*Aksharam*) is stated to be devoid of quality of every kind. In texts like *Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma* || *Nēha nānāsti kinchana* || etc., it is said that Brahman has no equal (*advitīyatva*). Similarly in texts like *Sākshī chētā kēvalō nirguṇascha* || etc., it is said that Brahman should be understood as *guṇanishēdha* (i.e., devoid of all *guṇas* or qualities). It should not, however, be so understood. Because all the *Srutis* decidedly taken together declare that Brahman has both the *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms and that he should be understood as such. No qualities of Brahman (*Brahmadharmāṇām*) should be set aside (*anishiddhatvāt*). Likewise is the import of the *Sūtra* (III. 2. 21) *Prakrutaitāvatvam hi pratishēdhati tatōbravīti cha bhūyaḥ* || etc., which declares that Brahman should be considered as having *ānanda* of an exceptional quality (*anyathā ānandādīnām*). Even texts which declare the oneness of Brahman such as, *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*, etc., state that prior to *srishṭi* (creation), there was this unrivalled One. So the *Sruti* texts that declare Brahman as *nirguṇa* evidently include Brahman possessing all qualities (*sarvagnatādishu*). The word *guṇa* is used (here) in connection with Brahman as meaning “devoid of *satva* and the rest of the three *guṇas*”, and so should not be taken as denoting “without attributes” (*guṇa śabda prayōgābhāvēna satvādi guṇatrāyābhāva paratvāt*). Similarly other *Sruti* texts like *Yas sarvagnas sarvavit* || (He

(Brahman) who is all wisdom and all-knowing) etc., also contradict the statement that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*.

The ancient Āchāryas (*Pūrvāchāryas*) possessed of Vēdic knowledge, such as Rēvaṇa Siddha, Marula Siddha and others, affirm that prior to Creation, there was no manifestation of either *Vyakta* or *Avyakta* (the Seen or the Unseen). Therefore it is that we suggest that all the *Srutis* (*Brahma vākyas*) which refer to the Advaita Brahman, simply mean that the all-knowing Brahman, the great unrivalled Being who has no second, alone existed at first and not that the Brahman is attributeless. Thus states the *Svētāśvatara*:—*Yadā tamastan nadvāna vātriḥ na san nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* || Similarly the following text from the *Atharva-śīras*:—*Ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmicha bhaviṣhyāmicha nānyakkaschin mattō vyatiriktaḥ* ||

Then, again, the text goes:—*Nānyat kinchanamishat* || etc. These texts show that running through the whole of the Vēdānta is the idea that, on the analogy of the maxim that all roads lead to a common meeting point, prior to Creation, all was in that One (Brahman) without a second. And that unrivalled Brahman when he was about to bring about Creation, was possessed of several ideas (*bhūva*) about it. Thus declare the *Srutis*:—*Sō 'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya*" etc., in an undivided (*abhēda*) sense. That is, before Creation, everything was in Brahman without a division. And it must be understood that all the *Sruti* texts mean that Brahman was in an undivided condition. For it is said in texts like *Aitadāmtyam idam sarvam* || *Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ* || *Ātmaivēdam sarvam*" etc. These and other similar texts declare that Brahman, out of his own free will, was in a position to bring about the Creation of *Viśva*, and was both the *kārya* and *kāraṇa*: in an undivided form (*abhēdascha*) just as the earth and the earthen pot.

In the *Atharva-śīras*, we have *Ēka vīgnānēna sarva-vīgnāna pratignā cha* || *mām yō vēda sarvān vēda* || etc. "He who knows thoroughly one thing well can claim to

understand about all other things" and that "He who understands Me can understand all the rest." So after knowing the underlying truth of *Sivatatva*, all other truths are thoroughly proved (*siddhamiti siddham*).

Before Creation the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of *Jagat*, i.e., Prakriti, did exist. If so, how can Brahman be said to be the unrivalled One without a Second? It is explained thus:—Just as the magnet possesses the property of attracting to itself iron and just as fire is never free from its burning property, so *Īśvara* was with this (*Īśvara*) *śakti* and was accordingly the One Unrivalled without a Second. For it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Tād-ātma śaktim svaguṇair nigūḍhām* || *Parāśya śaktiḥ vividh-aiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyā cha* || etc., that the *Paraśakti*<sup>116</sup> of *Śiva* is His own and not apart from Him as He is declared by the *Āgamas*, *Srutis* and *Purāṇas* and therefore the *mumukshus* (those who aim at *mōksha*) should not agree to the un-Vēdic statements about the illusion of the world (*Jaganmithyātva*) as propounded by the Advaitavādins. And also the text *Nēti nēti* of the *Sruti* should not be understood to mean that Brahman is entirely without a corporeal body (*niravayava*). In the *Sruti* text *Sthirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugra* || etc., it is stated that the worldly sports (*prākṛita paramaśivaṭīla*) etc., exhibited by the auspicious forms of *Śiva* (*mangala vigraha*) are eternal (*nityatva śravaṇāt*), though this is not to be understood in the same sense as those holding the *Samyuktādvaita* (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*) and *Pāṇcharātra* tenets profess it, which explains the rule governing the double nature of Brahman in being both the Remainder and the Whole and his being constant in the different parts of his body (*śēshi śēshatva vyavasthā* of Brahman and his *angāṅgatvēna sāvayavatva*). If we agree to the latter view, then we have to admit that the *jīva* should enjoy happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*dukkha*).

<sup>116</sup> *Paraśakti* : *Para* means pre-eminent, and *śakti* is the active principle of a deity regarded as his wife.

Texts like *Ākāśavat sarvagataścha pūrṇa* ॥ and hundreds of other texts as well, contradict such a view. Nor do we hold the tenets of the *Sadāghaṭaṭavannūtyantabhēda-vādinah* ॥ i.e., those who ever hold that *jīva* and Brahman are constantly as apart as *ghaṭa*—a pot—and *paṭa*—a cloth. Because *Sruti* texts like *Yēnūśrutam śrutam bhavati* etc., solemnly contradict such a declaration. Nor do we discuss according to the opinions of *rajju-sarpa vādins* who hold that everything is one in Brahman and explain that the world is an illusion (*Ēkatara mithyātva vādinah*).

In *Sruti* texts like *Satyakāmas satyasankalpa*, it is declared that Īśvara is naturally possessed of infinite good qualities (*ananta kalyāṇa guṇah*). Also, texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē* “from whom these creatures came into being”, show that Brahman was the material cause for the creation, etc., of the world.

Again, texts like *Ēka vighnūnēna sarvavighnūna pratignū*, declare that the *upāsana* Brahman is possessed of both *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms. And therefore naturally all the *Sruti* texts go to prove that they should be understood in consonance with the view of *Bhēdābhēda vāda* and all the other views above referred to be held to be contradictory to the import of the *Srutis*. This is the whole established truth (*Bhēdābhēdāvādina iti vāddhāntah*). *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvan ajā vīsānīsan | pradhāna kshētragnapatir-guṇēsah* ॥ explain that the quality of Śiva is unrivalled, having no second and that He is the Para Brahman, the All-knowing and that His qualities are incomparable with those of others as stated in the *Srutis*. This proves that the *jīva* is naturally bound down by the rope of *avidyā* i.e., illusion (*svābhāvīkā vidyāpūṣa baddha*) and is possessed of *jaḍa*, *jaḍatva* and *sarvānubhava* (stupefaction, liveliness and all experience).

If it is asked how Paramaśiva, who is in all (*sarvādhish-thānasya*) and who is all-pervading (*sarvavyāpakasya*) can possess the two forms *Mūrtāmūrta*, it is answered that just as *Prakṛiti* presents herself in the form of sky (*mahat*), in the form of the earth (*jagat*), etc., and is the

cause of all *guṇatraya* and also keeps her *chidrūpa*, so Paramaśiva, on the one hand, exhibits himself in the form of the Wind which can be felt and on the other, without form, by pervading all through the world and without being seen. And He also exists in the *pradhāna*<sup>117</sup> form all pervading the sky (*mahat ahankāra kalākāla Vāyurūpēna*) while the *chidrūpa*, the *Prakriti*, exhibits herself in such forms as light (*tējas*), water (*salila*) and earth (*prithvī*). What is not possible for Paramaśiva who is possessed of the power to do all things seemingly impossible (*aghataṇāghatana śakti*) and is possessed of infinite powers ?

In *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyascha vai namōnamah* and numerous other texts of the *Srutis*, it is declared that He is possessed of such powers. Also in the *Saivāgamas* and in certain parts of the *Vēda*, it is said *Śaktēḥ sankōcha-bhāvēna srishtēḥ pūrvam Mahēśvaraḥ | Niramśō nirguṇas-chēti vēdāntēṣhu pragīyatē || Śaktēr vikāsabhāvēna hyananta-guṇavān iti | Prōchyatē Bhagavān Rudraḥ paśupāsa-pramōchakah || Mūrtāmūrtasvarūpēna yathā Vāyur virā-jatē | Sadāśivastathā bhāti sarvānugrahakārakah || Mūrtā-mūrta jagadrūpā yathā māyā tathā Sivāḥ | Mūrtāmūrta-svarūpaḥ syāditi vēdāntaḍiṇḍimah || Ētad vēdāntahridayam agnātva mōhitāḥ parē | Śrutērapārtham kurvanti lōkē paṇḍitamāninah ||* But in certain other less prominent texts of the *Vēda*, a view contradictory to the above is suggested, but it is not to be taken seriously by the learned. *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* are not opposed to each other just as light and darkness are (*na tamah prakāśavat bhēdābhēdō viruddhah*). But is it that light and darkness are to be taken as co-existing at the same time or coming (one after another) as day and night by difference of time? The reply is it is not the first (of the two states above mentioned); though they appear to exist simultaneously like *rūpa*, *jāti*, *śabda*, *artha*, *guṇa*, *guṇi*, *maṇi*, *prakāśa*, etc., without opposing each other. In the dualistic world (*dvaita prapancha*), in *ghaṭassanghaṭōbhāti*, etc.,

<sup>117</sup> Controlling form of *Prakriti*.

the name and the form (*nāma rūpa*) are seen, and people appreciate it conjointly. The name and the form co-exist and could be seen simultaneously by those who love it (the object). Similarly the existence of *Prakṛiti*, both in the form of cause and effect (*kārya kāraṇatvēna*), could be seen co-existing simultaneously in the form of *chit* and *ānanda* in an undivided, single (*Advaita*) form. If such a thing is not admitted or agreed to, then, according to the maxim *nahidṛiṣṭēṛ anupapannam nāma* (i.e., is it likely that that which is seen by the eye is not seen by it?), a contradiction results. And also it will be just as an illusionary mirage (*maru marīchikādivat bhrānti mātram*) and there will be neither fulfilment of the desired object (*artha siddhi*) nor of action (*kriyā siddhi*). Not the second, for in *Dvāsuparṇa* and other *Sruti* texts it is clearly seen that during *samsāra-daśa*, the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are seen to exist separately (*jīva-brahmaṇōṛ bhēdaḥ*).

Many other *Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasi*, etc., rightly declare that at the time of release there is unity (*Mōksha-daśāyām abhēdascha yuktamēva*). In *Satya kūma* etc., and other *Sruti* texts, it is declared that the world should not be considered as true temporarily for practical purposes only (i.e., *na vyavahāramātra satyatvam*), just as the magical and illusory appearance of silver in a shell (*aindra-jāla śukti rajatavat*), but that it must be accepted of Para-brahma Śiva that the hidden actions of Creation, Existence and Destruction co-exist in Him as the Reality (*Tirōdhūna kāmasya satyatvam*). There is nothing here that could be falsely attributed; because while the cause is real, the action ought, as a rule, to be real. If it is supposed that it is right to start admitting for purposes of discussion (*jignāsa*) that Brahman is *nirviśēsha* and *nishkriya*, no discussion about such a Brahman can arise. For in such a Brahman, a false attribution of illusory truth is conceived and a false existence of Brahman in whom the chief material cause of the world (*pradhāna satva*) is understood to be existing, is predicated. If such a thing can be accepted as correct, then the text *Yanmanasā namanutē*

*yēnāhur manōmatam* | *Tadēva Brahmatvam viddhi* | *Nēdam yadidamupāsātē* and other texts which state that attributes, though inconceivable, are admitted by the power of expression, will be contradicted. So it is that Brahman is extolled and worshipped in the *saguṇa* form (*saguṇōpāsanasya*) by the use of expression (*vāk*) and by the use of organs of sense (*indriya*)<sup>118</sup>; if we do not accept this, then we reach the contradictory position (*asambhava*) that for *gārudamantra*, for the use of which (for casting a spell) the magician and the spell are both required, it is enough if we have either of them—either the magician or the spell, which would not help to attain the objective.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, throughout the *Vēda*, *Vēdānta*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* which deal with *bhakti*, *kriyā* and *gnāna* (faith, action and knowledge), it is declared that Brahman should be understood as *saguṇa Brahman*. But if it is to be taken as *māyā* (*kalpitam*), then it would be like washing off our hands of the above i.e., *Vēda* etc., (*dattāñjali prasaktissyāt*).

Further, if *avidyā*, which is not existing (*asatī*), is to be assumed as existing, for argument's sake, in Brahman (*Īśvara*), just as an artificial (*kṛitrīma*) *sāligrāma* is assumed to be an object of holy worship,<sup>120</sup> who could be expected to have

<sup>118</sup> Lit. an organ of sense or faculty of sense. In *Vēdānta*, *manah*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *chitta* and *chētana* are said to be the five internal organs. The total number of organs is, therefore, 15, each presided over by its own ruler, or *niyantru* (administrating agent). Advaitins do not admit *chētana* as a different organ, as the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman* is a postulate with them.

<sup>119</sup> Here both magician and the spell are of the *saguṇa* class and the resulting third issuing from their combination is of the *nirguṇa* class.

*Gāruda* is a charm against snake poison; see *Kādambari*, 51 (Bombay Edn.).

<sup>120</sup> The commentator suggests that *Avidyā* is an artificial assumption on the part of Sankara and his followers in regard to Brahman and is no more efficacious than an artificial (*kṛitrīma*) *sāligrāma* can be an object of holy worship on the part of a pious *bhakta*. *Avidyā* is as artificial an assumption in regard to Brahman as an artificial *sāligrāma* can be to a pious worshipper. *Sūnya Brahman* is as efficacious as a *kalpita sāligrāma* to a *bhakta*.

*bhakti*, *sraddhā* and *viśvāsa* in such a Brahman or in such a *sāligrāma*? Again, how can that Māyā (*kalpita*) Īśvara be deemed capable of granting all the results that the worshipper wants by his faithful meditation and adoration? If this is not so, the text *Mātrudēvō bhava*; *Pitrudēvō bhava*; *Āchāryadēvō bhava* and other *Sruti* texts which prescribe the (prevalent) method of worship will become incomprehensible, meaningless (*i.e.*, *asambhāvyam*). Thus in an Īśvara to whom *chaitanya*<sup>121</sup> is wrongly attributed, Īśvaratva will prove illusory (*viśiṣṭeśvaratvam na syāt*), as in a rope mistaken for a serpent, there is no cause for fear (*bhayamapi na syāt*).

Those who are expert in the knowledge of things invisible (*aparōkṣa vidyāvatāmapi*) are said to be feared by even the Heavenly planets such as the Sun. In texts like *Bhīṣhāsmāt vātaḥ pavatē (bhīṣhōdēti sūryaḥ)*, *Gnā gnav dvan ajāvīśānīśau*, *Ajō hyēkō jushamāñō'nuṣētē jahātyēnām bhuktabhōgām ajō'nyaḥ*, etc., the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are stated as never having had a birth, which appears to be an invention (*kalpitatvāt*) and hence not Vēdic (*avaidikaḥ*). Moreover, what are the unimpeachable evidences to prove Brahman is attributeless (*nirviśēsha*)? Unless we can clearly understand and prove that *śabda* is not inseparable from Brahman and that Brahman has no separate existence by itself and unless we understand that *śabda* has the power to describe the qualities of Brahman and that *śabda* has the quality of pervasion (*vyāpti*) and that Brahman is completely unassociated with *śabda*, Brahman cannot be (described as) attributeless (*nirviśēsha*), for the knowledge of being attributeless (*nirviśēsha*) cannot remove absolutely the doubts and contradictions regarding the knowledge of Brahman. Unless we make sure that there is a pot (*ghaṭa*) in the house, we cannot definitely state whether there is a pot in the house or not. In the same way, unless we make

<sup>121</sup> In Vēdānta philosophy, *chaitanya* means the supreme spirit considered as the essence of all being and source of all sensation.



sure of the qualities of an object and of its existence or its contrary, we cannot say anything about the object itself. Have we to understand Īśvara to depend on his own qualities (*dharma*) or depend on qualities which are beyond himself or on qualities which are contrary to them? Just as a pot (*ghaṭa*) is understood by its qualities, similarly the *Ātma* is understood by the qualities of Dēvadatta. A lover of Truth (*satyakāma*) will never fail to realize Brahman (*Brahma sākshātkāra*). The superiority of Īśvara cannot be stated to be apart from Īśvara Himself. Therefore it may be decidedly declared that it would be as improper to state that a tangible object is possessed of no properties, as to make the statement that "my mother is a barren woman".<sup>122</sup> Such a statement will destroy all investigation (*vyavahāra*), rendering it nugatory (*ayukta*).

### Sabda and Brahman.

In the *Sruti* text *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ* etc., which states that Parabrahman must be made an object of sight as the result of wisdom, it is declared that Parabrahman should be caused to be viewed by the mental eye through the process of hearing the holy teachings.<sup>123</sup> Such a process will go without any meaning if the *pūrvapakṣa* argument (*viz.*, that *śabda* is not different from Brahman) is accepted. From the root *śru*, is derived the word *śravaṇa*, to hear; from the process of hearing through the recitation of the *Vēda* and through the teaching of the *guru*, the result (derived) enables the mental capabilities of the disciple to cultivate knowledge (*gnāna*); and this helps to the determining and understanding of Brahman. Texts like *Vēdārtham śruṇōti* etc., should not be construed as "he hears the meaning of the *Vēdas*" (*i.e.*, carelessly, without applying his *gnāna* to it), whereby the actual meaning of the root of the word (*dhatōśśaktiḥ*) has not made any impression

<sup>122</sup> The declarant being the son of the "mother" referred to.

<sup>123</sup> The sound entering into the ears makes the mental eye to open its lids.

on him (*i.e.*, the disciple), *i.e.*, made him enlightened as to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore this act of hearing has two aspects (*lakṣhaṇa*), *viz.*, the *śakti* of producing a knowledge of Brahman in the disciple and not producing any impression at all on him.

In expressions like *Vīṇānādam śruṇōti*, etc., even though the person who hears shows a great deal of pleasure, he may be utterly ignorant of the nature of the song ; or its innate qualities (*bhāvas*) ; thus though he hears the sound of the *vīṇā*, it gives no opportunities to him to obtain the full benefit of it. Because the sound does not give him the power (*śakti*) for such understanding. Though he can appreciate the sound which he hears, yet he cannot clearly explain the words of the song and their denotation. In texts like *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*, though the meaning of the words forming the text may be understood, yet their full force may not be grasped by the disciple. Because he may be incapable of right knowledge (*āpūta pratipattiḥ*). Not that such a comprehension of right knowledge is impossible to obtain after learning from a *guru* (*adhyayana gnāna*). Even then just as the *bhramara* and the *kīṭa* who merge into each other by the natural removal of *avidyā*, similarly the good grace of the *guru* is capable of removing all *avidyā* out of the pupil and make him possessed of the supreme knowledge. Therefore sound (*śabda*) has that power (*śakti*) to remove ignorance through the means of the law of hearing (*śravaṇa vidhi*). Thus it is that in the text beginning with *Sahōvācha navā'rē patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyōbhavati* and ending with *ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyōbhavati*, we have the truth nunciated for us that we can attain to the highest realization of human effort (*parama puruṣārtha*)<sup>124</sup> through the *Ātma* after

<sup>124</sup> Parama + puruṣa + artha : in which *puruṣārtha* means any one of the principal objects of human life,—*Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mōksha* ; human effort or exertion. Hence, *Parama-puruṣārtha* : What might be attained to by the highest human effort—self-realization.

being possessed of that knowledge; and this is capable of giving us extreme happiness (*niratiśaya sukha*). Similarly texts like *Ātmani vighnāta idam sarvam viditam* | *Ētāvāt arē khalu amrutatvam*, etc., declare that the only way (*upāya*) to know Brahman is through *Ātma-gnāna* and that all the means employed are only towards that end. This is the firm declaration of the truth. And therefore such *Ātma-gnāna* ought necessarily to be obtained by those who seek that realization. Towards that end, the only course open is through *śrōtavya* (i.e., through hearing, as a pupil does from his *guru*). This is the firmly established truth. *Sabda-gnāna* creates an extraordinary spirit of inquiry and reasoning in regard to the qualities of the Brahman. As is enunciated in texts like *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham prichchāmi* || *Na vēdavin manutē tam bruhantam* || *Naishā tarkēṇa matir-āpanēya* || etc., Brahman cannot be too clearly brought under understanding for want of sufficient independent evidence (*mānāntarābhāvāt*).

The text *Drashtavya*,<sup>125</sup> etc., declares that "you must see him". The result of attaining knowledge through the practices of Vēdic adoration (*sādhanas*) is the attainment of Brahman by visually seeing him (*drashtavyam*). That is the purpose of inquiry (*tachchā vichāritam*). The discussion (*jignāsa*) was not meant merely to end in meditation, and making certain the mere existence of Brahman. After knowing the Vēdānta expressions (*vākya*) and being possessed of the knowledge (of Brahman), it must result necessarily in self-realization (*ātma-sākshātkāra*) as a true effect. Else there is no use of simply seeking after an object and not finding it.

No object can be clearly understood without its qualities being clearly described, so that they might be perceptible to the mental eye. In the text *Ardham antarvēdi minōti ardham bahirvēdi ityatra*, etc., the *lakṣhaṇa* of the words

<sup>125</sup> *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. (See *Brihad. Upanishad*, II. 4. 5.)

which describe the qualities, is to be noted. The words *antarvēdi* and *bahirvēdi* describe the *sāla* (i.e., the sacrificial spot). Again, in the texts *Jātaputrā*,<sup>126</sup> *Krishṇa kēśō agninā adhītē* ||<sup>127</sup> etc., the first denotes the *vidhis* to be observed at particular ages in the case of a son born to one; and the second, the nature of the fire before which the *adhyayana* is carried out; the words used establish the qualities and through them create the *gnāna* and *karma* (knowledge and acts) relating to them. In the text *Uchchairūruchākriyata*, etc., in which the word *rugādi*<sup>128</sup> signifies not merely the hymn (which the collection of the words make) but also the action (*kriya*) underlying it.

Again, in the text *Yāvatō'śvān pratighriṇṇyāt*, etc., the words used express the natural qualities (*nijārtha lakṣhaṇa*) of the horses<sup>129</sup> (which are specially intended for the sacrifice). And in texts like *Nēkshētōdyantamādityam* ||<sup>130</sup> *Nārshēyam vrinātē* ||<sup>131</sup> etc., the words used indicate the particular qualities of the rising sun and the girl of the Rishi, and convey to the mind the particular idea intended without taking into consideration certain other things. In the text *Na kalanjam bhakshayēt*<sup>132</sup> which prohibits heavenly bliss (*purushārtha*) to those who partake of tobacco, what is implied is that the man who transgresses the prohibition, though with a good motive, not only by so doing loses the heavenly bliss, but also renders himself utterly sinful. There is decidedly no separation between the body and *ātma* (*na cha vyāvṛuttyabhāvaḥ*). Even though the body and

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<sup>126</sup> *Jātaputrā*. *Jātaḥ* denotes a son, male offspring; in dramas, often used as a term of endearment; *Atra jāta kathayitvam kathaya*; *Uttararāma Charita*. "Dear boy", "Oh, my darling", etc.

<sup>127</sup> Lit.—He is performing the *adhyayana* before the sacrificial fire raised by the Krishṇa Yajurveda method.

<sup>128</sup> Lit.—A hymn of the *Rig. Vēda* as opposed to *Yajus* and *Sāman*. In Pānini, it denotes a collection of words.

<sup>129</sup> The reference is to a horse sacrifice where the horses, before sacrifice is offered, are tied up.

<sup>130</sup> That is, "Don't look at the rising sun."

<sup>131</sup> That is, "Don't marry this Rishi's daughter."

<sup>132</sup> That is, "Don't eat tobacco."

*ātma* appear to be distinctly separate from each other, yet really they are not so. And it is clearly in the perceiving of the connection between these two that *mōkshasādhana gnāna* (the knowledge which leads to *mōksha*) exists. In regard to the texts *Dvā suparnau* ॥, *Dvē Brahmanē* ॥, etc., the underlying truth is different from what it actually appears to be externally. Both being the same, the truth of the two can be rightly understood by trying to understand them by discussion as prescribed by the *vidhi*. In trying to find out the real truth regarding the Paramātma, the knowledge of the *Ātma* is also clearly understood. This follows as if it were a *niyama vidhi*.<sup>133</sup> Here the word *ātma* is used in the sense of Paramātma only. Again, texts like *Idam sarvam yadayamātmā* ॥ *Ātmani vignātē idam sarvam vignātam*, etc., declare that if the word *ātma* is thoroughly understood, everything else is clearly understood. The first of the above texts declares: *All consists in Ātma*.

In interpreting the *samanvaya sūtra*,<sup>134</sup> Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya<sup>135</sup> states that the word *śrōtavya* should not be understood as merely *ātmagnāna vidhi*, i.e., the method by which the knowledge of *Ātma* is obtained, for it includes the power (*śakti*) to realize Brahman (*Brahma sākshātkāraśakti*). Also, by *śravaṇa* what is intended is that we should seek the knowledge of Brahman for realizing it, not to obtain knowledge which is opposed to it. Therefore, the method of discussion (*vichāra*) should not be one by which a wrong meaning is sought. By *śravaṇa*, it is intended to acquire (*āgamika*) the triple effect of *adhikāra vishaya* and *phala*. This is what this *Sūtra* is intended to affirm (*nirṇaya*).

Therefore, in the *Sūtra Athātō Brahma jignāsa*, in order to satisfy the doubt arising as to the nature of the

<sup>133</sup> A rule or precept which lays down or specifies something which in the absence of that rule would be optional.

<sup>134</sup> That is, *Tattu samanvayāt*, I. 1. 4.

<sup>135</sup> He was evidently the *guru* of Śrīpati Paṇḍitāchārya. His authority is quoted at the end of I. 1. 4, up to which he is said to have written a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*.

discussion, the word *kartavya* should be understood and supplied. This continued effort at discussion is necessary to attain the intended result (*phala*) by the help of the *sāstras*. By the word *jignāsa*, the nature of discussion (*vichāra*) should be understood.

### Prakriti and Pratyaya.

If it is said that the word *jignāsa* does not possess the *śakti* of knowing *Prakriti* and *Pratyaya* (i.e., the material cause of the world and the co-operative cause of the world), then it is replied *jignāsa* gives a collective (*samudāya*) knowledge of both the topics (*lakṣhaṇās*) i.e., *Prakriti* and *Pratyaya*. By the use of the same *pratyaya*<sup>136</sup>, the mode of discussion is understood to be through *Jahallakṣhaṇā*.<sup>137</sup> By the use of the word *Prakriti*, *Sādhyagnāna*<sup>138</sup> (knowledge to be proved) is intended to be conveyed through *ajahallakṣhaṇā*.<sup>139</sup> By some the co-operative causes (*pratyaya lakṣhaṇā*) are understood to be as *siddha-gnāna* (perfect knowledge), though they are yet to be demonstrated (*sādhyā-gnānā*) and they hold that they come under the category of *jahallakṣhaṇā*. It is necessary, in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge, that the *sādhana-gnāna* should be possessed in a determined manner. Śāmbhavānanda and Śivānanda very much take the view that both *prakriti* and *pratyaya lakṣhaṇās* must be correctly understood. Here some are of opinion that *prakriti* and *pratyaya* are one and the same (*prakriti pratyaya samudāya ēkaiva lakṣhaṇā*). In expressions (*vākyē*), the *lakṣhaṇā* is not invisible. In the two expressions *Ardham antavēdi minōti ardham bahirvēdi* etc., and *Visham bhunktē*, the

<sup>136</sup> In *jignāsa*.

<sup>137</sup> In this kind of *lakṣhaṇā*, a word loses its primary sense but is used in one which is in some way connected with the primary sense, as in the familiar instance *gangāyām ghōṣaḥ*.

<sup>138</sup> *Sādhyagnāna* means knowledge of the major term in a syllogism; the predicate of a proposition.

<sup>139</sup> A kind of *lakṣhaṇā* in which the primary or original sense of a word used elliptically does not disappear as *kuntāha pravīsanti = kuntadhārīṇaḥ puruṣāḥ*.

actual *lakṣhaṇās* are clearly seen. The expressions clearly convey the meaning. Even though the collective causes (*samudāya śaktyabhāvēpi*) cannot describe the co-operative causes, yet the co-operative causes (*pratyaya*) can be rightly comprehended. *Sāchājahati*,—this is called *ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* kind. By looking at one particular form, it should not be said it is devoid of other forms. Because it is not the truth (*tasya aprāmāṇikatvāt*). In the expression *chhatrinōgachchanti*, are included both those who hold the umbrella and those who are without it. It does not merely mean that they are simply going; the words convey the idea that they are going and also holding the umbrella. The speaker wishes to convey in detail the *lakṣhaṇā* of those who are going without omitting the essential objects with which they are connected (*i.e.*, umbrella they are carrying). Instead of omitting the details, the act of going is expressed so as to convey the full form (*rūpēṇa*) in which they are going, *i.e.*, in different ways, some holding the umbrella and others without it. Again, in the expression *Kakēbhyaō dadhi rakshyaīām* etc. (let the curds be protected from crows), the act of protection and the several crows approaching the curds are referred to. The meaning is not that the curds should be lost (*upaghātakatvāt*). Whenever a course of conduct is enunciated, the mutual ones are also implied. Courses of action which are contrary to each other are not to be understood thereby. Because the course of conduct referred to definitely describes what it is without any misconception (*bhinna vrittīyupasthitatvāt*). When the primary meaning of a word is to be taken into account, its secondary signification ought not to be taken. Where *ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* has to be considered, there both the *lakṣhaṇās* (*i.e.*, *jahallakṣhaṇā* and *ajahallakṣhaṇā*) ought to be accepted. When only the primary meaning is required to be taken into consideration, we have to understand the chief thing, the secondary idea being neglected. In the example *Gangāyām ghōshamatsyau* etc., as the village is seen, it is clearly understood that *ghōsha* cannot be taken to convey the

sound arising from the noise of the river. Because thereby the whole idea will have to be wrongly understood. It is the firm idea that can (enable us) to realize the nature of an object. In fact, the word *jignāsa* is more instrumental (*tantrēṇōpāttam*) in conveying the primary idea to the mind. Whenever such reasoning is employed through *ajahallakṣhaṇā*, the word *jignāsa* should be in fact understood in the collective sense. Whenever, in a discussion, we have to arrive at a firm conclusion, both the methods should be employed to know the collective idea. Knowledge is a thing that is to be obtained only after knowing the *pratyaya* and *prakṛiti lakṣhaṇās*, in a collective sense. In conclusion, even in places where a long discussion is involved, the primary meaning of each word is largely taken into account. In all *jahallakṣhaṇā*, the *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* are both understood in a collective sense to secure the knowledge of Brahman. Since each expression (*śabda*) has a particular power (*śakti*) supporting it, we must understand the meaning of the *śabda* in such a way as to have its primary and not its secondary meaning. How then can Brahman be expected to possess only one form without attribute (*śakti sambandha*) when all the expressions have got two-fold views? On certain occasions, the secondary meaning (*lakṣhaṇā*) and its respective attribute ought to be considered, and in such places the primary meaning need not be thought of. In conclusion, when expressions are joined to other words to convey their secondary meaning, in those cases they should be considered as *vākya lakṣhaṇā*. Therefore, in *sāstras*, *vyavahāra* is said to be the expression of a meaning of a word other than the primary one attaching to it. While *prakṛiti* is thus understood, the *lakṣhaṇā* (or secondary) use should be taken in the collective sense. When the secondary meaning is thus taken, then Brahman can never be understood to be one without attribute. When there is difference in the collective sense, that which is connected with it should also be different. Also, it is not possible to impart



a settled conviction, through the mode of *lakṣhaṇā* discussion.

Then, any attempt to obtain a settled knowledge by both modes of discussion (*jāhalakṣhaṇā* and *ajāhalakṣhaṇā*) is bound to prove useless (*vyartha*). In the example *Chhatrinō gachchanti*, one is apt to understand that those who possess umbrellas are going even though some may be without theirs. Again, in the example *Gangāyām ghōṣhamatsyau* etc., of the two ways of understanding, only one is right, *viz.*, one indicating the existence of the village on the Ganges. It should not be taken to mean the sound of the flow of the Ganges. Here the collective (*samudāya*) as well as the sense conveyed by each part making the collective sense (*samudāyinaḥ*) ought to be considered as different in sense. Unless we know the properties of all things, it is not possible to have a comprehensive knowledge, which can only be had by the *jāhallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion. In reality, the discussion is attended with different kinds of difficulties if we are to obtain a comprehensive view. To obtain the desired comprehensive view, a settled knowledge of each of the component parts should be secured. By the word *jignāsa*, it is to be understood that the *śabda* has got the clearly described power (*śakti*) of the component parts (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*) in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. Though the component parts are different from each other in the properties of the different matters, yet, in the final conclusion, their relationship conveys a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. When an expression can clearly convey to the mind the properties of matters, such an expression is called *Vākya lakṣhaṇā*, a characteristic expression. So by the *Jāhallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion, we should not understand merely difference (*bhēda*) between objects. In the expression *chhatrinō gachchanti*, the actual truth should be considered collectively. Even though among them there are people without umbrellas, in a collective sense the expression is used to denote their going with the addition of the umbrellas. Therefore, while one mode

of discussion by *Jahallakṣhaṇā* is adopted, the *Ajahal-lakṣhaṇā* knowledge also is liable to be impressed on the mind. In the *Guhādhikaraṇa*,<sup>140</sup> Manchana Paṇḍita<sup>141</sup> establishes thus the text *Ritam pibamtau*, etc.:—The character of drinking (*pibat*) and not drinking (*apibat*) is expressed by the *Ajahallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion to convey a collective idea.

At any rate, in the *Lingasamudāyādhikaraṇa* Parama-śivārādhyā Bhattāchārya has commented in his work named *Kaivalya Prakāśa* that whenever several causes and effects are to be discussed in determining all the internally situated attributes of Brahman, the adoption of both *vrittis* (i.e., *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā vrittis*) is not contradictory. The object in view always possesses the two-fold qualities contained in *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya lakṣhaṇās*. Therefore, the *ajahallakṣhaṇā* mode of discussion should not be disregarded in all discussions where the properties of the component parties are the chief causes to determine the collective knowledge of Brahman. Else a decided knowledge cannot be had and therefore in the expressions *Chhatrinō gachchanti* and *Gangāyām ghōshamatsyau*, to have a collective knowledge we must know the component parts making up the *samudāya*, i.e., those possessing the umbrellas and those not possessing them, and also the sand made by the flow of the Ganges through its banks and also the actual village *Gangāyām ghōsha*. Then only the collective knowledge can be clearly comprehended. Let it be granted. The *śabda* clearly explains the characteristic attributes of a subject and thereby gives a definite knowledge of that object. This is done by the *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā* modes of discussion, where *Prakṛiti* and *Pratyaya* are generally the subjects of discussion. Having so far admitted that the material cause of an object is to be understood in all its properties, we should also clearly discuss

<sup>140</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, I. 2. 11-12.

<sup>141</sup> The expression *Manchana Paṇḍitīyē* used in the text indicates probably a commentary by Manchana Paṇḍita on the *sūtras* quoted,

and understand the properties of the co-operative cause of the same object. Paramaśivārādhyā Swāmi, in his work known as *Śivagnāna Chandrōdaya*, clearly describes that only such settled knowledge should be possessed through discussion by the two different modes. It should not be admitted that in having a firm knowledge about *Prakṛiti* itself is sufficient. Else there will be a contradiction of the knowledge according to the other mode of discussion—*ajahal-lakṣhaṇā*. In the expression *Gangāyām ghōṣha matsyau*, if we consider only one method of discussion by *jahal-lakṣhaṇā vṛitti* instead of both, then, a thorough knowledge cannot be had.

Enough has been said of *Jahat* and *Ajahat lakṣhaṇā* modes of discussion. It is sufficient if it is borne in mind that a firm knowledge should be possessed regarding *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*. To possess a firm knowledge, all facts connected with the matter should be proved beyond all doubt. It is not sufficient if only certain facts are clearly understood. It must not be presumed that a firm knowledge has been obtained without fully understanding the properties of the matter. A real desire to know about a matter is not sufficient. Whenever a matter is very difficult to understand, that matter is likely to be treated with reluctance. Sometimes we much desire to understand incomprehensible things just as a bereaved widower (*vidhura*) expresses his love for his lost wife (*i.e.*, yearning for a thing he cannot get). Although much desired, knowledge cannot be had of incomprehensible things. Therefore all attempts ought to be made to clear all the doubts before knowledge could be had of a particular matter. All connected knowledge about the material cause should be acquired. In no other manner can the power of understanding be developed except by discussion about the properties of *śabda* and by pursuing a correct mode of enquiry on the approved lines. A firm knowledge can only be said to have been arrived at when we have determinedly grasped the truths underlying each subject. Unless the

co-operative cause and the connected attributes are fully known, we cannot have an independent knowledge. In the expression *Gaurmitya* etc., even though a cow is dependent on its protector, yet by various proofs (*lakṣhaṇa*) it can be admitted that it can live independently. Therefore, the material cause can be thoroughly understood only after grasping the truths connected with co-operative causes, which are the result of the two *lakṣhaṇās* (*jāhat* and *ajāhat lakṣhaṇās*). It is not right to study at first the co-operative cause of matter to know the truth, nor collectively (*samudāyēna*) but the material cause must be studied after discussion and removal of all doubts without presuming at any step a knowledge not acquired. In determining the word of a *Sruti* text, even though it is inferred to be very easily understood, both the methods of argument (*jāhat* and *ajāhat*) should be used for thoroughly understanding the *lakṣhaṇās* of *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*. It is never right to try to have a collective idea by inferential deductions either of *prakṛiti* or of *pratyaya* or any of the attributes of either as it is likely that it would yield a contradictory meaning.

In the text *Saktūn juhōti* etc., the accusative case, the object of action (of throwing into the fire)<sup>142</sup> is implied, for obtaining the right result. Also, in the text *Havishyam abhyāhārayati* etc., for the accusative and the instrumental cases, the objects of action and bearing are implied, which denote both the material and the co-operative causes (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*). Also, in the expression *rathō gachchati* etc., where the object of a *vyāpāra* (i.e., motion) is implied, the result of moving is to be understood. In the expressions *jānāti*, *ichchati*, *dvēṣṭi*, *yatatē*, etc., we have to understand each verb according to the root meaning, which is the meaning of the *prakṛiti* as well as the result (or the *phala*) which the words imply. In the expression *naśyati* etc., the agent that is capable of destroying is denoted. Therefore in knowing the meaning of the word, the object which is the agent to produce the result is to

<sup>142</sup> By saying *Svāhā* and throwing the oblation into the fire.

be understood. In the commentary of Dūrvāsa<sup>143</sup> on *Kārakavrittīlakṣhaṇa*, *buddhi* and *kṣhētragna* occurring in the text, *Ritam pibantau* etc., in the *pūrvapakṣa* part of *Guhādhikarāṇa*, are proved to be agents. In the expressions *aśmā lutīṣhati*<sup>144</sup> and *kūlam pīpatīṣhati*<sup>145</sup> etc., only the nature of the act that is about to happen is implied and not any agency that is impelling its happening. Then, the doubt arising as to whether an inanimate object can itself accomplish an act is to be determined according to the (Pāṇini) Sūtra *Dhātōḥ-karmanassamāna kartrūkādichchāyām vā* etc. By the use of the expression, it is not intended to show that a lifeless object can desire or has a discretion. Lifeless objects have not such desire but are subject only to external forces. It is clearly proved in Patanjali's *Bhāṣya* that whenever an expression is used ascribing agency to lifeless objects, then such expression should be understood as being dependent on external forces and not possessing by themselves any desire. According to the maxim, *Gauṇa mukhyayōḥ mukhyē kāryasampratyayaḥ* etc., in such expressions as the above, the secondary meaning should always be understood instead of the primary, because a desire is naturally attributable to an animate and not to an inanimate agent. In *Ikṣatyadhikarāṇa*, Dūrvāsa Bhagavadpādāchārya also agrees with the above view in regard to (the interpretation) of *kūlam pīpatīṣhati*. Even though the co-operative causes (*pratyaya*) are to be understood clearly, yet they are not primarily responsible as *prakṛiti* is the primary cause. But according to the expression *lakṣhaṇayā prakṛityaiva*, it is only to understand *prakṛiti* (the primary cause) that we have to clearly understand *pratyaya* (the co-operative causes). If we ignore such co-operative causes, even though they are negligible, we cannot arrive at a correct conclusion. Causes which are

<sup>143</sup> The text has *Dūrvāsīyē*, which denotes a work of which Dūrvāsa was the author.

<sup>144</sup> A stone is about to fall from the mountain peak.

<sup>145</sup> The river is about to overflow cutting the banks.

contradictory cannot lead to a correct conclusion and should not be enquired into unnecessarily. As correct knowledge (*gnāna*) is the chief thing sought for, all attempts ought to be made in availing (ourselves) of the co-operative causes and the materials pertaining to them. In endeavouring to arrive at a correct knowledge, the desire should be to find out the correct method and the objects which would lead us towards it. Until we are possessed of such a method, every attempt should be made to search it out. We have to aim at its realization by a strenuous search (*anvishan*). Realization is the chief object of correct knowledge, which ends in the attainment of salvation (*mōksha sādhana*), failing which every endeavour at personal effort (*purusha pravritti*) will be fruitless (*nishphala*). It is to secure correct knowledge that matters are enquired into. The sole subject of such a knowledge is the realization of *mōksha* (*mōksha sādhana*), of Brahmagnāna and the same is based on the discussion of the *Sruti* texts. The seed of discussion lies in the method of enquiry. When the teacher (*Āchārya*) goes on teaching his disciple through discussion about *mōksha sādhana*, he must clearly understand from the teacher *Prakritiyartha gnānam* by frequently clearing himself of the doubts arising in regard to the subject-matter under discussion and of the matters which enter into it (*vishaya vishayī bhāvēna*). The nature of the enquiry on the part of the disciple should be such that all the materials should be thoroughly sifted after grasping them and the established truths should be possessed by him. This is the chief object of *jignāsa*. Both *prakriti* and *pratyaya* should be thoroughly understood, not by merely touching their outer fringes but in such a way as to ward off all doubts relating to them. Without such a view in mind, discussion is undesirable. The subject sought for by discussion must be certainly realized. Therefore the view has been propounded by Paramānanda Ārādhyā<sup>146</sup> that both

<sup>146</sup> Evidently a teacher who was considered an authority even greater than Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavadpādāchārya, the *guru* of Sripati, referred to already and in the next sentence below.

the modes of discussion—*jahat* and *ajahat lakṣhaṇā*—should be employed to understand the nature of *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*. This view is also admitted and agreed to by Ēkōrāma Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya<sup>147</sup> and hence must be fully adopted.

### Brahmatva of Śiva.

The mode and object of *jignāsa* apart, how is the Brahmatva of Śiva to be established? How are we to declare Śiva as Parabrahman? *Śivasya Parabrahmatva kathanam*. Here, in the texts,

*Asad vā idam agra āsīt | tatō vai sadajāyata ||*

*Amūlamanādadhāram imāḥ prajāḥ prajāyantē ||*

*Na kadāchit anīdriṣam jagat ||* etc.

in asserting that the world (*jagat*) was in an unmanifested condition previously (*asadvā idamagra āsīt*), it is suggested that in coming into existence, it (*jagat*) did not require an agent. The text *Jyōtishtōmēna svargakāmo yajēta*,<sup>148</sup> etc., bears witness to the fact that in regard to sacrifices, etc., there is one who is *kartru* (i.e., sacrificer) and another *Phaladātru* (who is the giver of the fruits thereof). When Īśvara is actually existing (*sadbhāve*), if he is to be treated in the opposite sense (i.e., as non-existing), there results a contradiction and there will be no satisfaction attained. As the existence of Īśvara is not acknowledged, it has to be admitted that the agent himself is his own maker of the result. If in the world it is seen (as we witness) that the enjoyment of happiness and misery is attributed to the sovereignty of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara kartrutva*), then inequality and mercilessness will be deemed his offsprings and thus we will have to admit that the sovereignty of Paramēśvara is overthrown with the result that not even the smallest benefit can be gained from Īśvara. Or, if inanimate actions (*jaḍa karmaṇām*) which are done by *jīvas* are seen yielding fruits, then, even though the All-knowing Īśvara is existing, the doubt arises as to whether

<sup>147</sup> *Guru* of Sripati Paṇḍtāchārya.

<sup>148</sup> The desire of attaining *Svarga* is effected by performing the sacrifice of *jyōtishtōma*.

an inanimate object like a pot can attain the result of securing the fruit or when the existence of *Īśvara* (*Īśvaratva*) is admitted, whether He alone can be described as the giver of the fruit. As between the texts

*Ātmā vā idamagra āsīt ॥*

*Brahma vā idamagra āsīt ॥*

*Hiranyagarbhassamavartatāgre bhūtasya jātaḥ  
patirēka āsīt ॥*

*Om ityēkāksharam Brahma ॥*

*Asāvādityō Brahma ॥*

*Namaṣtē vāyō tvamēva pratyakṣam Brahmāsi ॥*

*Gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatīm havāmahē ॥*

*Viśvasmāt Indra uttarah ॥*

*Ēkō havai Nārāyaṇa āsīt na Brahmā nēsānō nāgnish-  
tōmo nēmē dyāvūprithvī ॥*

*Atha purushōhavai Nārāyaṇōkāmayata prajāḥśrujā iti ॥*

*Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē ॥*

*Sadēva sōmya idamagra āsīt ॥*

*Ēkamēvādviṭīyam Brahma ॥*

*Manōvai Brahmēti ॥*

*Chakshurvai Brahmēti ॥*

*Śrōtramvai Brahmēti ॥*

*Kham Brahma ॥ Kam Brahma ॥ Annam Brahma ॥* etc. considerable mutual discrepancies are observable. While such is the case, the doubt arises as to how Brahmatva can be attributed to Śiva alone.<sup>149</sup>

If the attribution of Brahmatva to Śiva is thus rendered doubtful, the answer is that it cannot be so doubted. For in *Sruti* texts like *Agr̥ṣhōmīyam paśumālabhēta ॥ Dvīpādū-  
schatushpādāscha paśavaḥ ॥* etc., four-legged and the two-legged animals are stated to be *Paśu*, (i.e., animals offerable as sacrifices at rites). Also, in other *Sruti* texts such as *Chchāgasya vapayā mēdaso anubrūhi*, etc., a goat (*chchāgaḥ*) is declared to be a symbol of *Paśu*<sup>150</sup> (an animal

<sup>149</sup> This is the *pūrvapakṣa* argument propounded for determination.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. *Sarvē vahāmō balim Īśvarāya ōtānasīva dvīpādē chatushpādah ॥ Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, V. i,



that could be offered as a sacrifice at rites). In the same way, we have to understand Śiva as Brahman (*Śivasya Brahmatvam grāhyam*).

Therefore in the text *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē* etc., it is said that Paramēśvara is the cause of creation, etc., of the world, which is the primary *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. *Īśvaratva* (or supreme overlordship) cannot be claimed by Hiranyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Kālarudra, who possess but detached portions of *Triguṇātmaka śakti* which is the characteristic of Brahman.<sup>151</sup> Therefore the Sūtrakāra has the Sūtra *Janmādyasya yataḥ*, for each of them partakes of one detached part of the *kartrtva* in the creation of the world. Therefore none of them can be deemed to be the chief Creator. In the *Brahmōttarakhaṇḍa*, it is said :—*Yasyāgnyayā jagatsrashtā Virinchih pālakō Hariḥ । Samhartā Kālarudrākhyō namastasmai pinākinē ॥ iti*. It thus follows that creation and other powers connected with it and their control is held to be in Śiva only. Moreover, in texts like *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyīnantu Mahēśvaram । Tasyāvayava bhūtōttam vyāptam sarvamidam jagat ॥* etc., it is said that *Māyā* is to be understood as chief *prakṛiti*, and *Māyīnam* should be understood as *Mahēśvara* and *Māyā* is therefore said to be subject to the control of Paramēśvara. And therefore Paramēśvara is said to be all-independent (*svatantra*) keeping under his control *Māyā*, Brahma, Viṣṇu and Kālarudra, who are but the *aṁśa* (part) of *Śakti* and hence form part of the all-pervading world.

Thus we read in the following texts occurring in the *Atharvaśiras* :—*Dēvāhavai svargam lōkam agaman । Tē dēvā rudram apruchchan kō bhavān iti । Sō'bravīt ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmi cha bhaviṣhyāmi cha nānyaḥ kaschana matto vyatiriktah*, etc., which declare that Śiva alone is beyond the changes relating to the *trikālas*—past, present and future ; that he is in the heart of all ; that

<sup>151</sup> Brahman possesses in himself the three qualities of *satva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, while Hiranyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Kālarudra possess only one of these qualities in the order mentioned.

he is the cause of everything; that he is the chief object of all utterances; that he is supreme over all things; that he dominates all beings and that he is Brahman (himself). In the *Kaṇva śākhā*, in the text *Yahprithivyām tiṣṭhan iti*,<sup>152</sup> no one else other than Śiva is declared to be Brahman and possessed of the *Asṭamūrti*<sup>153</sup> form beginning with *Prithvī*. All other divinities including *sankha* and *chakra*, though they possess the powers of creating the past (*bhūta*) and the future (*bhautika*) cannot be stated to possess *Īśvaratva*.

It should not be said that *Asṭamūrtatva* beginning from *Prithvī* is also possessed by Viṣṇu in all its forms. It is not so, because Śiva alone stands famous with the title of *Asṭamūrti* and is also reputed to be at the heart of Viṣṇu. It would not therefore be correct to say that both Śiva and Kēśava are at the heart of all beings and pervade them. Both do not possess the same bodily form. Though both are independent in controlling the world's creation, stability and destruction, if both are said to work concurrently (or simultaneously), then the world will be subjected to the danger of dissolution.

*Sruti* texts like *Sōntarāt antaram prāviṣat; Diśaścha antaram prāviṣat; Yō Rudrō agnau, yō apsu yō ōshadhīshu yō Rudrō visvā bhuvanānyāvivēśa tasmai Rudrāya namaḥ iti* and hundreds of others bear witness to the fact that Śiva alone is *sarvātmaka* and *sarvāntar-yāmin*. And also in the text beginning with *yō vēdādau svarāḥ prōktaḥ* and ending with *yah paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*, etc., the endings *akāra*, *ukāra* and *makāra* which are the symbols of Brahma, Viṣṇu and Kālarudra, are held to dissolve in Mahēśvara. Therefore *Brahmatva* (state of being Brahman) cannot be claimed by any other (than Śiva). Moreover, the text beginning with *Īśānassarva-vidyānām* and ending with *sadāsivōm* bears testimony to

<sup>152</sup> *Bṛihad. Upanishad*, III. 7. 2.

<sup>153</sup> The eight-formed, an epithet of Śiva, the eight forms being five elements—earth, water, air, fire and ether—and the Sun, the Moon and the sacrificing Priest. (See *Amarakōśa*, I. 35.)

the fact that He alone is stated to be the chief object of meditation through *pranava*<sup>154</sup> and hence He alone is Brahman. And also in the *Svêtāśvatara* text *Tam Īśvarānām paramam mahēśvaram tam devatānām paramanḥa daivatam | Patim patīnām prathamam purastāt vidāma dēvam paramēśam īdyam || iti*, it is definitely declared that Īśvara is the sole controller of Brahma, Viṣṇu, (Kāla) Rudra and others and that there is no other Lord known who is above Him. In the *Yajurveda* text *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitā matīnām janitā dēvo janitā prithivyāḥ janitāgnēḥ janitā sūryasya janitēndrasya janitātha Viṣṇōḥ ||* the word *Sōma* should not be taken to mean *sōmalata* (the sōma plant) but as meaning that He is the sole cause of creation, beginning from Buddhi down to Viṣṇu. The sōma plant being an inanimate object, it has no power of causing creation. Texts like the following appearing in the *Atharvāṇa śikhā*, *Dhyayītēśānam pradhīyitavyam sarvamidam Brahma Vishnu Rudrāstē samprasūyantē || Sarvāṇi chēndriyāṇi saha bhūtāḥ nakāraṇam kāraṇānām dhyātā kāraṇamtu dhyēyaḥ ||* and the text beginning with *Sarvaiśvarya sampannaḥ sarvēśvaraḥ sambhūrākāśam adhyē dhruvam sarvādhikam*, and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ Śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya || iti*, enunciate that the seeker of salvation (*mumukṣu*) should meditate solely upon Śiva, giving up meditation on other prohibited deities.

*Sruti* texts like *Utāmrutatvasyēśānaḥ || Sarvamidam Śiva ēva vijānīhi | Suddhō niranjanō vibhur advayam Śivamekam Śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā savignēyaḥ Sivō advaitaḥ || Ēka ēva Rudrō nadvītīyāya tasthē | Nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ | Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharṣiḥ || iti*, and others declare that Śiva alone is without a second and hence He alone is Brahman. Moreover, in the text beginning with *Umā sahāyam* and ending with *Sabrahmā saśivaḥ sahariḥ sēndraḥ sōkṣharaḥ paramassvarāt*, we are told that Śiva is the agent of all cause (*kāraṇa*) and action (*kārya*) and therefore the

<sup>154</sup> The sacred syllable *Aum*.

attribute of Brahmatva is apposite only in his case. In the text *Annam Brahma*, etc., mere praise is bestowed on Brahman by mentioning his name. Moreover, in the text *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ, sarvam khalvidam Brahma* || and in the texts :—*Trishu dhāmasu yadbhōjyam bhoktā bhogascha yadbhavēt* ! *Tēbhyō vilakṣaṇaḥ sākṣhū chinmātrōham sadāśivaḥ* || *Mayyēva sakalam jātam mayi sarvam pratishthitam* ! *Mayi sarvam layam yāti* || *tadbrahmā'dvanyam asmyaham* || *iti*, and in others of similar import in which the word "Brahma" is used, it has to be taken as only synonymous with the word "Śiva" just as the words "hand", the "arm" and the "palm" which signify the members of the body are synonymous with the body itself. Moreover, in the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, in the text beginning with *Sarvam hyētat Brahmā'yamātmā Brahma sō'yamātmā iti*<sup>155</sup> and in the text *Śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā savignēyaḥ* || *iti*,<sup>156</sup> it is clearly declared that the whole creation, etc., of the world is due to no other than Śiva (*advaita Śiva*) and from the beginning to the end He alone is held to be the Brahman, the sole cause of all. If Śiva is not held to be the sole cause, as declared by all the *Srutis*, and the Creator of the world and its Destroyer and if it is admitted that there is another Īśvara, then plurality of Īśvaras results and a contradiction of all the *Srutis* will be produced, besides opposition to every known system of belief. Thus Jaiminiāchārya, the most proficient in Vēdāntic knowledge, explains in his treatise called *Vēdapādestava*, that every Vēdic text is in a manner applicable to Śiva (*Śivaparatvam*). Similarly, Jyōtirnātha, Ghantānātha, Bhīmanātha, Bhaṭṭa, Bhāskara and others, who have reached the other side of the ocean of knowledge of the four *Vēdas*, who have established their reputation as *Vēdamārgapratishṭhāpanāchāryas* and who have condemned the false systems of thought promulgated by the Pāṣaṇḍas,

<sup>155</sup> *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2.

<sup>156</sup> *Atharvaśirasi*.

Pāncharātras, Bauddhas, and Advaitins, declare as follows, establishing the *Parabrahmatva* for Śiva:—*Mahādēvō dēvaḥ sakala jāgadārādhyā charaṇaḥ trayīmārgō' mārگاḥ kumata-matavrittīpramathanāḥ*। *Tayōr yōvā brūtē vṛjina manayōr asya nidadhē Śivasyānghrim vādīpralayadahanōham nṛipasaḥ* ॥ *iti*. Therefore in the *Sāstras* the word *Brahma-jignāsa* is pointed out to mean the method of enquiring into the *svarūpa* of Śiva. Thus in determining who is the chief cause of creation, etc., the word "Brahma" is, in the *Sāstras*, generally taken to stand, for the sake of *vyavahāra*, for Śiva, as is stated in the *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1.).

In the texts *Brahmavidāpnōti param* ॥ *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati* ॥ *Śiva ēko dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya* ॥ *iti*, *Śiva* means *śivam karōtīti śivamakaraḥ*.<sup>157</sup> Here the chief object of meditation is pointed out. Therefore, it is meant to establish that salvation (*Śivaprāpti*) is obtained after being freed completely from all ties of bondage. It must not be doubted how salvation (*Śivaprāpti*) could be the final realization without again coming into existence.

According to the *Bhramarakīrtanyāya*, it is clearly seen that the actual *krimi* undergoes a change which turns it into the *Bhramara*. It is also seen that a drop of water naturally undergoes a change and finally turns itself out into a beautiful pearl. What is the good of learned men wrongly interpreting bondage (*bandha*) and falsehood (*mithyātva*) in such changes? Moreover, if it is to be said that illusory belief is removed by actual knowledge, then in accordance with the maxim of the desert and the mirage (*marumarīchikānyāyēna*)<sup>158</sup> we have to answer, it is not so. The traveller through his ignorance and the vast extent of the desert believes in the existence of water and after a time convinces himself of the actual truth that the sight is only an illusory one and that there is actually

<sup>157</sup> He who bestows happiness is Śiva.

<sup>158</sup> *Maru* means desert; *marīchika*, a mirage. Rays of light falling on a sandy wilderness destitute of water bring on an appearance of a mirage.

to water. Because perfection (*samskāra*)<sup>159</sup> is always gained through *Smṛiti*<sup>160</sup> and sin is removed by meditation on Śiva, just as sorrow is banished by being consoled by the beloved, doubts are cleared by proofs and the *pūrvapakṣa*<sup>161</sup> is displaced by the *siddhānta*<sup>162</sup>.

Again, in texts like *Ajāmēkāṁ lōhitām śukla krishnām ti*, etc., where *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is represented to be the chief cause of the world (*Jagat*), Brahman is represented as being subject to several changes<sup>163</sup> in the cause of the world (*Jagat*). If it is said that *atha atah ubrahma jignāsa iti*, we have to say, it is not so; because such a statement will contradict the *Sruti* and the correct meaning of the term *jignāsa*, interpreted in accordance with *Sruti*, will be lost. Also, in the *Sruti* text *Nōpāsyau prakṛiti jīvanu iti*, the meditation of both *prakṛiti* and *jīva* as different entities is denounced. As *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is naturally devoid of independent powers, the *Sruti* texts which attribute the cause of the world to *Pradhāna* should be understood as making *Pradhāna* subordinate to Śiva and not independent of him, just as the expressions of the *Sruti*, *Sastram chchinatti*<sup>164</sup> and *Śrōtram śhrūṇōti*<sup>165</sup> denote that they (the instrument sword as well as the organ ear) are subjected to the agents possessing them, inasmuch as they themselves are inanimate. Therefore *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) is incapable of being the cause of the world, but subordinate to the *kartrtva* of Śiva. As the *Sruti*

<sup>159</sup> Here this word would seem to indicate grace or perfection rather than purification.

<sup>160</sup> That is, well-directed action according to the *Smṛiti* (traditional Law).

<sup>161</sup> The starting point of a debate; the first statement.

<sup>162</sup> Final decision.

<sup>163</sup> The text has *Vikāritva prasangāccha*. According to Pāṇini, the term *mayat pratyaya* is used to denote three kinds of existence: (1) *tādātmyārthē*, (2) *vikārārthē* and (3) *prāchuryārthē mayat tridhā*, i.e., affirmation, change and pervasion.

<sup>164</sup> *Lit.*—The instrument (sword) hits

<sup>165</sup> *Lit.*—The ear hears.

text lays it down, *Māyāmtu prakritim vindyāt māyīnamtu mahēśvaram*<sup>166</sup> *iti*, Māyā is always subordinate to Śiva.

### The Attributes of Brahman.

Srīpati next passes on to set down the attributes of Brahman. Before beginning to comment on I. 1. 2 *Janmādyasya yataḥ* (*From whom the origin and so on of this universe proceed*), he remarks that agreeably to the maxim that the realization of the object (*vastu*) is dependent on accurate description (*lakṣhaṇa*), which is subject to correct proof (*pramāṇa*),<sup>167</sup> this *Sūtra* is intended first to describe the characteristic attributes of Brahman and then to repudiate *nirviśeṣatva* and *saviśeṣatva* and finally to expel doubts and contrarities. The accurate character of Brahman that we are to discuss is accordingly described (in this *Sūtra*).

In the *Taittirīya* text *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē, yēna jātāni jīvanti yatprayantya bhisamviśanti tadviṣṇū-sasva tadbrahmēti*, the subject-matter of this *Sūtra* is dealt with. The purport of this *Sūtra* may be summed up as follows: *Prayanti mriyamāṇāni santi*, ultimately to undergo destruction; *abhisamviśanti*, back into that complete whole.

While, in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman was understood in an uncertain (*sandigdihē*) manner through assumptions, now, in this *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman is discussed at length by means of illustrations and examples. When by assuming doubtful cases, Brahman is discussed, then creation and so on cannot be taken to exemplify the chief characteristic marks of Brahman. Here, in this *Adhikaraṇa*, such causes as have not been discussed previously,

<sup>166</sup> *Lit.*—Understand that Prakriti is Māyā and Mahēśvara to be māyīnam, i.e., the controller of Māyā. Māyā is also designated as Mahāmāyā, Avidyā, Niyati, Mōhinī, Prakriti, Vāsana and Tavēchcha. (*Yajurveda*).

<sup>167</sup> *Lit.*—Mode of proof, a means of arriving at correct knowledge. The Naiyāyikas recognize only four kinds of *pramāṇa*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. The Vēdāntins and Mīmāṃsakas add two more, *anupalabdhi* and *arthāpatti*, while the Sāṃkhyas admit *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

are clearly explained by means of illustrations. *Janma ādih yasya iti tadguṇasamvignānē bahuvrīhiḥ*. Here, the word (*Janmādyasya*) should be construed as a *bahuvrīhi* compound by which the characteristics (of Brahman) are explained. Also, while trying to understand these characteristic marks (of Brahman), we see arising from them their different parts in a collected form and these present to us the thought of another object suggesting a different meaning. To prevent this suggestion, the Sūtrakāra has particularly used the words *janma ādi asya iti*. The intended thought not having been conveyed by the characteristics of the different component parts, the Sūtrakāra in order to convey the exact idea of the object has used both the masculine and the feminine genders of the words *janma ādi asya iti*. Throughout, for fear of heaviness being caused by the increase of letters, the Sūtrakāra has used a neutral form of expression. Even here, the term *Brahman* is understood. The word *tat* should also be understood and supplied. Then the *Sūtra* would be thus divided *Janmādi asya yataḥ iti*.

The word *Janmādi* embodies the five-fold creative acts of *śṛishti*, *sthiti*, *laya*, *tirōdhāna* and *anugraha* (i.e., creation, protection, destruction, disappearance and rewarding); *asya* indicates Him who sports in bringing into play the *chit*<sup>168</sup> and *achit*<sup>169</sup> worlds (*prapancha*); *yataḥ* implies Brahman, from whom arises out of his infinite powers, never-ending manifestations in a natural way. *That is the Brahman* (as described above) that is envisaged by the *Sūtra*. By the word *Asya* is meant that part of the *chētānāchētana*<sup>170</sup> world which is made manifest to the physical vision. Therefore, the word *yataḥ* denotes Brahman as the chief cause of the five-fold acts of *janma*, etc. (i.e., creation, protection, destruction, disappearance and rewarding). And therefore as the creation and so on consisting of these five-fold acts is

<sup>168</sup> *Chit* means understanding, thought or perception, i.e., the world of perceptions.

<sup>169</sup> *Achit* means material i.e., the material world.

<sup>170</sup> I.e., the material world and the world of perception.



ascribed to Paraśiva Brahman by the *Srutis*, all beings (*jīvas*) are enjoined to meditate on that Brahman. To Brahman who is the chief cause of everything, the doing, undoing and doing otherwise,<sup>171</sup> are all within his powers. In the *Sruti* text *Yatōvā*, etc., the expression *abhisamviśanti* denotes *āvirbhāva* and *tirōdhana*, i.e., manifestation and disappearance. When Brahman is understood, all inconclusive reasoning will be at an end. When Brahman is not understood, there will be no attempt (made) to enter into (discussion). Therefore, in such circumstances, how are the objects as well as their characteristics to be sought for and understood? The answer is that all kinds of inconclusive reasoning will no more exist when, after being duly initiated by *Sāmbhava dīkshā* and duly taught by a *Guru*, the superficial knowledge regarding *Lakshya* (Brahman) and *Lakshana* (his characteristics) are thoroughly established after discussion. The first topic (*vishaya*)<sup>172</sup> of this *Adhikaraṇa* is : If Brahman is stated to be possessed of no characteristic marks that could be described within this manifested world, then, how could his overlordship and agency be understood? Is it by his nature, which is all-pervading throughout the world, by his having any particular form, by his possessing no form, by his *śakti* exhibited through *Prakṛiti* as his reflected agent (*pratibimba*) or by the pretended (*kalpita*) overlordship ascribed to him? The answer is that in the case of Brahman in whom all powers are invested and who is attributeless (*nirguna*), who is inseparable (*niravayava*) and eternal (*nityatvāt*), such a thing (as *kalpita īśvaratva*) never occurs. Much less does such a Brahman, with separated members and possessed of a pretended overlordship, which is false, at all occur. In the texts *gnā gnau dvau ajau-īśānīsau* and *na kadāचित् anīdriṣam jagat iti*, etc., both

<sup>171</sup> *Karthum akarthum anyathākarthum samartha* *Īśvaraḥ* is a common phrase indicative of the vast and unlimited powers possessed by Brahman of doing, undoing and doing otherwise—in a manner other than we expect. See *Kathāsaritsāgara*, XXII. 51.

<sup>172</sup> *Vishaya* means the first of the five members of an *Adhikaraṇa* ; the topic or subject to be explained,

the world and living beings are stated to be existing for ever. If so, how can Paramēśvara be described as their chief cause? If he is the cause, then their prior creation is improbable. Therefore the revered Sūtrakāra denounces the *Pradhāna Vaishṇava mata* as being contradictory to the *Srutis* and *Smritis* which hold the doctrine of *jīvōtpatti* as the chief thing in the manifestation of *Prakṛiti*.<sup>173</sup> But if it is accepted that it (the *jīva*) was not created, there arises a contradiction to what is declared in the *Sruti* texts *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante iti*, etc., and also to what is stated in the texts from *Asadvā idamagra āsīt, Tatō vai sadajāyata*, etc., to *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt, Nasannachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ, iti*, etc., which declare *asat-kāraṇa*, *satkāraṇa*, and the contradictory *sadasatkāraṇatva* and *paraśiva-kāraṇatva* and many (other) mutual discrepancies. The *Pūrvapaksha* or the *prima facie* view is thus stated:—The cause of the *jagat* cannot be (attributed to) Paramēśvara, for he is *nirguṇa*. If it is thus to be taken, then how should he be understood to be as he is indescribable in relation to the world (*jagadvilakṣhanatvēna*)? Or, again,

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<sup>173</sup> Śrīpati in quoting the text *Na kādāchit anūdrīṣam jagat* (lit. there was never a world which was different from this—the present one) stresses the Bhēda viewpoint, which is essentially based on the Sāṅkhya system of the eternity of this world. The double negative in the text is to be noted as affirming its truth in a striking manner.

The *Pradhāna Vaishṇava mata* referred to by Śrīpati is the pre-eminent Vaishṇava School, i.e., *Viśiṣṭādvaita Viṣṇupradhāna mata* as opposed to *Śivapradhāna mata*, the school that makes Viṣṇu the predominating deity as opposed to the school which makes Śiva the predominant deity. In commenting on I. 2. 32. *Amananti chainamasmin*, Rāmānuja states, “*Paramātmā Puruṣhōttama ēva*”, i.e., Paramātmā is Puruṣhōttama. Paramātmā occupies the centre of the *Sarīra*, which is of the form of the three worlds, and obtaining *upāsana* from the *jīva* and satisfied with his offerings, grants him his own *svarūpa*. Ānandatīrtha’s conception of Viṣṇu differs somewhat from that of Rāmānuja. The greatness of Viṣṇu, according to Ānandatīrtha, is based on a footing of *tāratamya* (i.e., gradation) as between Viṣṇu and the other deities, a point not recognized by Rāmānuja. The latter holds *Sarvam Viṣṇumayam jagat* as opposed to *Sarvam Śivamayam jagat*.

should he be understood as pervading all over or as having a form or having no form whatever? It cannot be the first, because it contradicts his all-pervading power; and also being faultless and unsupported by anything, he cannot be called to be the Creator any more than the wheel of a potter (*kulāla*) and the loom of a weaver (*kuvinda*) can be said to create the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the cloth (*pata*). It cannot be the second, because it will have to be considered that the pot is different from the potter's wheel, which opens the subjects of *ādhāra* and *ādhēya* (the supporter and the supported). It cannot be the third, as it is not possible to create (*kalpana*) formless space (*niravayava ākāśa*), for Brahman, who has a body (*sāvayava*) which, as before, also leads to the discussion of a contradictory subject. Not the fourth, as a formless (Brahman), it is not possible to create a world of *sāvayava*, i.e., one conjoined to form. For it contradicts the *Sruti* text *Nishkriyam nishkalam śāntam niravadyam niranjanam*, etc. Or if we acknowledge a new birth for *satyagnānānandātmaka Paraśiva*, then even *jagat* becomes *satchidānandātmaka*. If we do not accept that, then the birth, etc., for the world become false (*anruta*) and the world which is bound with paralysing sorrow will cease to exist. Moreover, it will be just as clay undergoing several changes. If Brahman is the chief cause, can he be said to be either the efficient (*nimitta*) or assumed (*upādāna*) cause or can he be described as both included? Further, whether Brahman could be stated to possess the three-fold creative powers (of creation, preservation and destruction) or Prakriti? Not the first; as regards his being the efficient cause, the *Sruti* texts proclaim *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma; Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*, etc., which contradict the Advaita texts. Not the second; because according to the *Sruti* texts *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* *Ēkamēva advitīyam Brahma* declare that there can be no other than what is declared as being the chief cause. Not the third; because both are as opposed to each other in nature as light and darkness. If we accept the chief cause as being due to Prakriti, then, being *achētana* and *asatva*,

it would be attributing that cause to an inanimate object just as the potter's wheel. Thus, therefore, the cause (suggested) is improbable. There will be contradiction between the two. Moreover, if the *Sruti* texts *Ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt* | *Ānandāddhyēva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyantē* | *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt* | *Nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* || etc., which proclaim that Brahman is Ānanda (or bliss), are interpreted otherwise, then the whole discussion of Āgama will end in mutilation and unsettlement. When such a thing happens, there will result a discussion about many Brahman. Then even the cause of creation cannot be definitely ascribed to such a Brahman, who is the form of virtue. If we should admit that Brahman is the cause of creation, etc., just as milk is the cause of butter and curd, then a contradiction arises regarding Ānanda in Brahman. If it is admitted that Brahman is subject to changes (*vikāritva*) just as gold undergoes changes in turning it into ear-rings, etc., then it should be admitted that Brahman is also subject to changes. For the world which was stated to be in the form of *asat* originally, if we should admit that it is just as illusory as a rope mistaken for a serpent, then why should we not admit rabbits as possessing horns<sup>174</sup> (i.e., an impossibility)? Therefore, it cannot be asserted that *prapañcha* was originated. But yet in consonance with the ancient maxim *Adhyārōpāpavādābhyām nishprapañcham prapañcha itī*<sup>175</sup>

<sup>174</sup> *Saśastringa* or hare's horn is a phrase used for denoting anything impossible; an utter impossibility. (See *Bhartrihari*, II. 5.)

<sup>175</sup> This maxim is briefly described as *Adhyārōpāpavāda*, the method of the illusory attribution followed by its withdrawal. This is a *nyāya* peculiar to *Vēdānta*. The two terms *Adhyārōpa* and *apavāda* are thus explained in the *Vēdāntasāra*.—"Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal; as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake." "The withdrawal is the assertion that the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, which is an illusory effect of the Real; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect of a rope is nothing whatsoever but the rope." In what follows, *Sripati* explains the object of this *nyāya* "in order that their disciples might understand and fulfil

it has to be accepted as held by the previous Āchāryas (*Pūrvāchāryas*) in order that their disciples might understand and fulfil the fundamental truth of the *Vēdas*. Yet it is possible to state agreeably to *Sruti* texts like *Ajāmēkāṁ lōhita śukla krishṇām iti*, etc., that the *achētana māyā*<sup>176</sup> is the cause of the world's creation as it is the material out of which creation is evolved.<sup>177</sup> But if it is asked why not it be due to *Māyā* which is wrongly ascribed to Brahman or its reflection of the *satva guṇa* of Brahman, then, we declare (as our doctrine) that the cause of the world's creation is only *Shaṭsthaḷa Śiva Parabrahman*, who is *Sachchidānanda* (all-glorious) and *Sarvādhishṭha* (all-pervading) and to him only is Creation rightly attributable.

the fundamental truth of the *Vēdas*." In order to describe the Brahman, the *guru* attributes to him or superimposes on him, certain qualities which in reality do not belong to him, and then afterwards withdrawing them, teaches that what is left is the Brahman. When the Advaita Vēdāntin speaks of the origin of the world, he does not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expression is called false imputation (*adhyārōpa*). It consists in holding for true that which is false, in accommodation to the intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding the true view, the false imputation is withdrawn, and this withdrawing is called rescission (*apavāda*) (See Sadānanda's *Vēdāntasāra*, Poona Edition (1929), p. 2; Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāyāṇjali*, II. 2-3). *Adhyārōpa* is thus the act of attributing falsely, or through mistake, the properties of one thing for another; considering through a mistake, a rope which is not really a serpent, to be a serpent, or considering Brahman which is not the real material world, to be the material world.

<sup>176</sup> The text quoted is *Śvēt. Upa.*, IV. 5. *Achētana Māyā*: Inanimate *Māyā*, i.e., unconscious *Māyā*, for *Māyā* is inoperative by itself, i.e., without the volition of Brahman. *Māyā* in Advaita Vēdānta means illusion by virtue of which one considers the unreal universe as really existent and as distinct from the Supreme Spirit. In Sāṅkhya philosophy, it means *Pradhāna* or *Prakriti*. *Mahā-māyā* means worldly illusion which makes the material world appear really existent.

<sup>177</sup> The text quoted is interpreted by the Vēdāntins as referring to *Prakriti* consisting of *Tējas*, *Ap* and *Anna* and means that this world is one never to be born (originated) and consists of Fire, Water and Earth.

According to texts like *Apāṇi pādōham achintya-śaktiḥ pasyāmyachakshuḥ saśruṇōmyakarnaḥ* । *Aham vijānāmi viviktarūpō nachāsti vēltā mama chitsadāham* ॥ *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma* । *Satyātmaprāṇārāmam mana ānandam* । *Sarvāṇi havā imāni bhūtāni ākāśūdēva samutpadyantē* । *Ākāśam pratyastam yanti* । *Ākāśō ha vai nāmarūpayōr nirvahitā tē yadantarā sa ātmā* ॥ Brahman, though devoid of bodily form and all desires, yet is regarded to be the chief agent for all phenomenal changes. In the *Sruti* text, *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma*, etc., the word *Ākāśa* denotes the pervasive power of the *Chitsakti*, not the worldly sky, because the worldly sky which is lifeless (*jada*) has no such power for acting. Brahman is *satya* personified. In the text *Ritam satyam (param Brahma purusham krishṇa pingalam* । *Ūrdhvarētam virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* ॥)<sup>178</sup> the supreme spirit, Brahman, is described as the Divine Law, the Truth, the Supreme Being who is Soul of the Universe; in colour, admixture of red and black; of superior virility; possessing an innumerable number of eyes; and omnipresent. By the word *prāṇa* is meant the power of bearing all the worlds of the *Chitsakti* in which Parabrahman delightfully sports. By the word *manah* is meant the incalculable power of *Parāśakti* in which Brahman feels his joy without the assistance of any external causes. Also the Wind who has no bodily form yet exhibits his power in shaking the big trees as though possessing a body. Also the soul (*jīva*) who has no bodily form, yet, during dreams, experiences the world in its creation and sees it. While such agencies are empowered with such vast powers, what can be stated of him (Parabrahman) who is of *aghaṭita ghaṭanū sāmartyaḥ*, i.e., possessed of the capacity of bringing together things that cannot easily be expected to be brought together? For it is impossible to imagine an all-glowing form (*prabhākarasya*), even though it be for a moment, as

<sup>178</sup> *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*, XII, 23.

a bodiless form. Such being the case, there can be no mistake in imagining both a bodily form and a spiritual form (*mūrtāmūrta*) for Mahēśvara who is (represented) in the all-auspicious form of an image, in order that he might bestow his bountiful powers on his *bhaktas*, just as the hardened ghee melts by the (application of) warmth to it. The *Sruti* text, *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta iti*,<sup>179</sup> states that this world is just like the froth collected on the top of the waters of the sea at the time of its (the world's) creation, existence and destruction, though it consists of a modified form of the sea-water; similarly the inconceivable power of Paramēśvara in finding materials for the creation of the world is only a part of his power, as enunciated by the *Sruti* in the text *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni tripādasyamrītamdivi iti*.<sup>180</sup> Therefore, just as the vast Space (*mahadākāśa*) is, as the holder of the Wind and the other elements,<sup>181</sup> for that very reason the cause of their creation, Paramēśvara possessing inside himself the several worlds, is the cause of their creation. *Sruti* texts such as *Lingamadhye jagat sarvam lingabāhyāt param nahi iti*, suggest the same conclusion. Also texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante iti* state that Parabrahma Śiva is only the instrumental or efficient cause of the world (*nimitta kāraṇa*).<sup>182</sup> The expression *yatprayanti* (occurring in the same text) also denotes that Parabrahma Śiva is also the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*). Therefore he is said to be possessed of the indivisible character of efficient and material causes (*nimitta and upādāna kāraṇas*); not merely one of these two causes. Nor can it (the Cause) be said to be either false attribution (*Adhyārōpatvam*) or unreality (*Mithyātvam*). In the texts *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau iti* etc.,

<sup>179</sup> *Chchānd. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

<sup>180</sup> *Rig-veda*, Purushasūkta.

<sup>181</sup> *Prithvī, Ap, Tījas, Vāyu* and *Ākāśa* are the five elements referred to.

<sup>182</sup> *Nimitta kāraṇa* as opposed to *Upādāna kāraṇa*. The text quoted is *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

the *jīva*, like Paramēśvara, is spoken of as having been never born. If it is said that, according to the *Sruti* text *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante iti*,<sup>183</sup> Paramēśvara is the generative cause of the Panchamahābhūta also,<sup>184</sup> it is not so; because long before Creation, Paramēśvara had contained in him all the *jīvas* and He only as Cause brought them out—just as a granary in which all the grain is stored (*kusūla dhānyavat*), is capable of being emptied out (from time to time). Even though the *Srutis* mention creation and non-creation, they do not state anything contrary (to this). In the texts of the *Sruti* and the *Smṛiti*: *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram | Tasyāvayava bhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat* ||<sup>185</sup> *Mamāivāmsō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtas sanātanaḥ* etc.,<sup>186</sup> Paramēśvara is said to be *nirguṇa* only when he, prior to Creation, contracts all his powers (and draws them within himself). Thus *Nirguṇa Sruti* texts like *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam iti*<sup>187</sup> declare restricting Paramēśvara's *nirguṇatva* to that period (that is, before Creation). *Saḡuṇa Sruti* texts like *Īkshyāṃ chakrē* etc., however, declare the expansion of his powers at the time he is about to Create the world. But if it is said that Paraśiva Brahman, who is of the form of *Satyagnānānanda* and, is subject to change (*vikāra*) just like the potter's earth in regard to the Creation of the world, then, according to the *Sruti* text *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt*, *māyā* will become the material (*upādāna*) cause of the world and Paramēśvara the efficient (*nimitta*) cause of the world. Then if it should be doubted how *chidātmaka* Paraśiva could be credited with the fabrication of an irrational world (*jaḍa-prapañchakalpanam*), the answer is in the words of the *Sruti* text *Yathōrṇanābhiḥ srujatē gṛhṇatē cha iti*,<sup>188</sup>

<sup>183</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>184</sup> *Panchamahābhūta*: *Prithvī, Ap, Tējas, Vāyu* and *Ākāśa*.

<sup>185</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>186</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XV. 7.

<sup>187</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, VI. 19.

<sup>188</sup> *Mundakōpa.*, I. 1. 7.



which declares that as a living spider lets out of its womb a lifeless thread and constructs therefrom its (web), there exists in Paramēśvara a power for accomplishing that which is unaccomplishable. There is no wonder in this. Therefore, it is that it has been already exemplified that there is identity in the cause of the rational and the irrational and Paramaśiva and the material world. That this is the Vēdic doctrine is demonstrated in the clearest manner (as clearly as the ringing sound of a bell) by the *Sruti* text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* । *Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta iti* । etc. If we accept the theory of false attribution (*adhyārōpāpavāda*), then, we will be contradicting many *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* । *Ēka-mēvādviṭṛyam Brahma* । *Sa īkshata bahu syām prajāyēyēti* । *Ēkōham bahusyām prajāyēya* । *Dyāvāprithivī janayan dēva ēkaḥ* । *Dvāsuparnā sayujau sakḥāyau* । *Prādhāna kshē-tragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsārabandhaṣthiti mōkshahētuḥ* । *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣa-mupaiti divyam* । *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* etc., and finally enter into the precincts of the Bauddha religion<sup>189</sup> and thus get outside the pale of Vēdic religion.

To say that the rational and irrational (*jaḍa* and *ajaḍa*) are identical and that the world is illusory and false (*ādhyāsikatvōna mithyātvaṁ*) is vain (*tuchcham*). If this be so, does this same principle hold good in any other place? In that case, is the world to be taken as *ātmā* in *anātma* form or *anātma* in *ātmā* form? It is not the first; because the existence of the serpent seen previously being true, the deception (*bhrānti*) comes into being whether it is a serpent or a mere rope. In the same way, the world being true, without admitting its existence, a separate view of *ātmā* will have to be held, which is not acceptable to us. Such a contradiction nowhere exists. Nor is it the second.

<sup>189</sup> Because the Bauddha religion rejects all *Sruti* texts. Bauddhas and Jainas are not infrequently termed *Vēdanindakāḥ*, i.e., those who reject the divine character of the *Vēdas*.

By attributing in *anātma* the existence of *ātmā*, we would be attributing falsity to Brahman. Thereby many errors will result. If we do not admit what was actually seen previously and go on arguing, then, on the basis of the *bījāṅkura nyāya*,<sup>190</sup> as the doubts arise, the conclusions will also prove doubtful, thus stranding us in confusion. Or, according to the doctrine that whatever is perceived is not real, in the world which is seen by the eye, how can any attribute be applied to it (*i.e.*, what is seen by the eye)? In the case of the serpent, the false attribute of the serpent in such a thing (as the rope) is irresistible. Moreover, Brahman and the world being without a beginning or an end, if we were to adopt the doctrine that the world is unreal, *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* etc., will be contradicted. Such a view would also result, it would seem, in contradictory conclusions in regard to purposes and reasons and the discussion would be frustrated by incongruity between the first and the last (*i.e.*, between the proof and the thing to be proved). Then there will be the undesirable conclusion of Brahman being unreal (*mithyā*). This is also because of illusory sight. If we do not say that what we see is false, Brahman cannot, in this world, be experienced by perception. Moreover, it will be contradictory to the declared meaning of the *Sruti* text that the *ātmā* could be perceived materially as an image visibly (*aparōksha*) thrown backwards (*pratyagātma*). If the Self is not to be taken as a material image thrown backwards, as Brahman, then the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman cannot be accepted. *Smṛiti*, *Sruti* and *Purāṇic* texts like *Kaschit dhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikshat || Tarati śōkam ātmavit ||*<sup>191</sup> *Ātmā-*

<sup>190</sup> The maxim of an eternal series of seed and shoot. It takes its origin from the relation of mutual causation which subsists between seed and sprout—*seed* being the cause of the *sprout*, which in its turn is the cause of the *seed*. This maxim is used in those cases where two things stand to each other in the relation of both cause and effect. See Sankarāchārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, II. 1. 36 ; III. 2. 9.

<sup>191</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 3.

*vā'rē drashtavyaḥ* ॥<sup>192</sup> *Driśyatē tvagriyā buddhyā* ॥ *Paśya mē yōgamaiśvaram* ॥<sup>193</sup> *Sivātmakam idam sarvam* ॥ *Sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ* ॥<sup>194</sup> etc., declare that Brahman can be clearly perceived. If we do not admit that Brahman is capable of being seen, in conformity with usage (*vyāvahārika*), we will have lost our stand in the argument (*niradhiśtāna bhanga prasangaḥ*) and this will result in a delusion (on our part). Therefore we should not admit the existence of false attribution (*i.e.*, illusion).<sup>195</sup> If it should be admitted on the basis of an invented *Sruti* text that the untrue appearance of *Māyā* (*māyābhāsēna*) leads to the existence of *jīva* and *Īśa* and if we also accept the falsity of the world, then in view of the existence of *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts *Gnā gnau dvāu ajātvīśānīśau* ॥<sup>196</sup> *Mamai-vāmsō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtas sanātanaḥ* etc., a great contradiction results.

Because it is inconsistent to predicate of *pradhāna* (*Māyā*)<sup>197</sup> which is irrational (*achētana*) that it can possess the power of creating *jīva* and *Īśvara*, which are rational (*chētana*). Also such a view is contradictory to the *Sūtra Antavatvaṃ asarvagnatā vā*, II. 2. 41. And such a view will lead to the destruction of the traditional doctrine (*krītanāśa*) and result in the fabrication of a new doctrine (*akrītābhyaḡama prasangaścha*). If it is to be admitted that the power of *Paramēśvara* has been vested in *Pradhāna* to create the world, then it results in the admission that *Pradhāna* is the chief cause of the world's creation, which is against the Vēdic and other *Sruti* evidences, such as *Sa īkshata* and other texts enunciated in the *Īkshatyadhi-karana* (see I. 1. 5).<sup>198</sup>

<sup>192</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4.

<sup>193</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XI. 8.

<sup>194</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, IV. 2. 9.

<sup>195</sup> The text has *adhyāsa*, which literally means *false attribution*.

<sup>196</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>197</sup> *Prakṛiti*.

<sup>198</sup> For the text *Sa īkshatēmē nu lōkā* etc., see *Āitarēyōpanishad*,

Consequently the doctrine of *pradhāna jagatkāraṇa* stands repudiated. Alternatively what is *mithyā*? Is it *asatva* (unreal) or *anirvachanīya* (indescribable) or *bādhyatva* (objectionable). It is not the first, because then the *Vēda* will become unauthoritative (*aprāmāṇya*); nor is it the second, for fear of the argument becoming dumb (*i.e.*, reaching a stage when argument becomes unavailing); nor is it again the third, because how could it be objectionable? Does the objection apply to the counterpart (*pratiyōgitva*)<sup>199</sup> of prohibition, past, present and the future (*traikālika nishedha pratiyōgitvam*)? Or is it the impossibility of comprehending by knowledge? It is not the first, for the world is actually true (*i.e.*, real) by its existence, proving fulfilment of a desired object (*arthasiddhi*) and fulfilment of a desired action (*kriyāsiddhi*) and without having a beginning or an end, it cannot be said that it was not existing in the past. As it can be experienced by direct perception, it cannot be said that it is not being directly perceived to-day. As it existed in its rudimentary condition even at *Praḷaya* (deluge) in the form of *vēdarāśi* (collection of sounds),<sup>200</sup> it cannot be ruled out as being non-existent in the future. Nor is it the second, because the sages were capable of irradiating their minds with the world even at *Praḷaya*, as it existed formerly.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> *Pratiyōgin*: This term means opposing, counteracting, impeding, etc., or related or corresponding to, being or forming a counterpart of anything. It is often used in works on Nyāya; a *ghaṭa* is the *pratiyōgi* of *ghaṭābhāva* (*Yasyābhāvō vinakshyātē sa pratiyogi*).

<sup>200</sup> *Vēda* signifies not only spiritual knowledge but also sound. Cf. *Śabda-Brahman*, which means the *Vēdas*; spiritual knowledge consists in words, knowledge of the Supreme Spirit, or the Spirit itself. The *Vēdas* are said to be *apauruṣhīya*, "not human compositions", being supposed to have been directly revealed by the Supreme Being Brahman and are called *Sruti*, *i.e.*, what is heard.

<sup>201</sup> That is, sages could by their meditation make the world as it existed before *Praḷaya*, when there is no material world in existence, to manifest itself before their minds.

It should not be said on the basis of the *dagdhapaṭa-nyāya*<sup>202</sup> that they who are liberated while living (*jīvan-muktas*) are yet subject to the pleasures of the body and the sensory organs,<sup>203</sup> and are led by such (bodily) influences, for it is possible to say that even though one is devoid of illusion (*bhrānti*), yet in a big sandy desert, the sight of a mirage induces him to think of the actual existence of water. Similarly, the burnt cloth (*dagdhapaṭa*) appears like cloth itself, for there is not in it the quality of preventing (or warding off) moisture. In the world, even though there is no actual water to quench one's thirst, the illusory sight of mirage exhibits such a property (*dharma*) in contradiction to the actual fact (*ayōgyatvāt*). Therefore for those who are liberated from the world—*jīvanmuktas*—even though they possess the knowledge of differentiation (of sensory organs and the pleasures created by them) (*bhēdagnāna*), yet they are absolutely free from the thrills of the body (*i.e.*, thrills to which the body is subject as the result of imagining bodily pleasures) hunger, thirst, etc. If it be said that as in this world the destruction of a protecting stick (*daṇḍanāśēpi*) destroys the power for movement possessed by a person using it, so the destruction of *avidyā* will remove the effects of the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, *avidyā*

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<sup>202</sup> *Dagdhapaṭanyāyaḥ* :—The maxim of the burnt cloth. When a piece of cloth, or a leaf is thrown into the fire and consumed, its outline is still visible in the charred remains; and this the Advaita Vēdāntins use to illustrate the unreality and unsubstantiality of all phenomena. See Nrisimha Sarasvatī's commentary on the *Vēdāntasāra*, pages 55 and 56. The burnt covering looks like the actual covering. The maxim suggests that when the soul is liberated by the burning away (*i.e.*, destruction) of the body covering it, it joins Brahman and is absorbed into it. See also Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāyanjali*, I. p. 29.

<sup>203</sup> The words are *Dēhēndriyādi*, which signifies the body and the organs of sense or the faculty of sense. In the Vēdānta, there are four *indriyas* recognized : *manah*, *buddhi*, *ahankāra* and *chitta*. They are spoken of as the four distinct organs, the total number being 14, each presided over by its ruler, *niyantru*.

being like a screenlike obstruction—the material cause of the illusion—it (has to be remarked that it) is not right to say so. Verily it has been said in the work of Dūrvāsa (*Dūrvāsīya*):—

*Anādyavidyayā baddham Brahma tat kālākāraṇam ।  
Svāvidyayā samsarati muktiḥ kalpitavākyataḥ ॥  
Ēvam pralāraṇam sāstram sarvamāhātmyanāśakam ।  
Upēkshyam śivabhaktaistu śrutiśmritivirōdhataḥ ॥  
Kālāpagūdayam mukhyaḥ phalam vai mukhyatastamaḥ ।  
Gnānanāśatvasiddhyartham tadeva hi nirūpitam ॥  
Tadanyadaiva samsiddham vidyāvidyānirūpaṇaiḥ ।  
Tanmāyikatvakathanam purāṇēshu pradarśyatē ॥  
Tathaindrajālāpakshēpi matāntaramidam dhruvam ।  
Nāsti śrutishu tadvārta dṛśyamānāsu kutrachit ॥  
Vāchārambhanavākyaṇām tadananyatvabōdhanāt ।  
Na mithyātvāya kalpyantē śivōpādānakāraṇāt ॥  
Gnānārtham arthavādaśchēt jagat-srīṣṭyādikāriṇi ।  
Saktīeranangīkaraṇāt vidhimāhātmyayōr na tat ॥  
Apavādārthamēvaitadārōpō vastutō na hi ।  
Driḍhapratītisiddhyartham iti chēt tanna yujyatē ॥  
Mukhyārthabādhakam nāsti kāryadarśanataḥ śrutēḥ ।  
Aindrajālākapakshēpi tatkartrtvam tadīritam ।  
Māyādīnām cha kartrtvam śruti sūtrair na bōdhyatē ।  
Akartrtvam cha yat tasya māhātmyagnūpanāya vai ॥  
Viruddhamadhyārōpāya na yuklēḥ kasya kāraṇam ।  
Māyikatvam purāṇēshu vākyaārtham upapadyatē ॥  
Tasmād avidyāmāyātvakathanam mōhanāya vai ॥<sup>204</sup>*

Then it is said (in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*):—

*Asatyamapratīṣṭham tē jagadāhur anīśvaram ।  
Aparasparasambhūtam kimanyat kāmahaitukam ॥<sup>205</sup>*

Then, again, the *Linga-Purāṇa* says:—

*Sēśvarādvaitabhāvē tu sarvam Śivamayam jagat ।  
Gnānāt vikalpabuddhistu līyatē na svarūpataḥ ॥  
Bhinnatvam naiva yunjīta Śivōpādānataḥ kvachit ।  
Ēvam vaidikasiddhāntam sēvyam nānyaditi śrutiḥ ॥ iti.*

<sup>204</sup> From the *Dūrvāsīya*.

<sup>205</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XVI. 8.

The *Dūrvāsīya*, above referred to, says that the statements that *Avidyā* which has been endlessly tied to Brahman, is the cause of Time, and that *Mukti* naturally evolves round one's own *Avidyā* are invented statements. A *Sāstra* that proposes in this manner absolutely to deliver one out of *Avidyā* is only destroying all its sacredness. Such a *Sāstra* should be discarded by all *Sivabhaktas* as contradicting all *Srutis* and *Smritis*. Perdition is the chief result for those who think that Time is a mere passing away (i.e., that perdition awaits those who discard the evolution of Time).<sup>206</sup> It is thus ascertained that such a thing<sup>207</sup> will result in the destruction of *Gnāna* (knowledge).

Therefore, the other view is completely attained by those who are experts in the science of *Vidyā* and *Avidyā*. That it (Time) is *Māyā* is proved from the *Purāṇas*. Those who hold other tenets call it as *Aindrajaḷa* (illusion) for nowhere in the *Srutis* has it been seen so said. The text of the *Srutis* explaining the sentences *vāchārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadhēyam*, etc. (in the *Bṛihadāraṇyakaōpanishad*)<sup>208</sup> does not mean anything that would make one understand that there is any agency beyond *Śiva*, so as to enable them (those who hold other views) to invent *Mithyātva* (i.e., *Avidyā*). If *Arthavāda* (explanation of the *Srutis*) is meant for obtaining *gnāna*, then

<sup>206</sup> There seems to be a reference to the adherents of the Advaita doctrine here. Sankara does not accept Time; it is, according to him, an illusion, *Nityatvam* being included in *Satyatvam*. Commenting on *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 1, Sankara observes:—*Ihatubhūtam Brahma-jñāsyam nityāvṛttatvā na puruṣa vyāpāra tantraṁ | chōdanā pravṛttibhēdāt... Nityānitya vastu vivēkaḥ ihāmutrārtha bhōga virāgaḥ* || *Kāla* is not, according to Sankara, the Supreme Spirit regarded as the destroyer of the universe, a personification of the destructive principle. See Chap. X of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, where Sri Krishṇa says that he is himself *Kālaḥ kalayatāmahaṁ*; *ahamēvā-kshayaḥ kālō*, etc., (Of calculators of Time am I; I am also everlasting Time) *Bhagavad-Gītā*, X. 30; 33.

<sup>207</sup> That is, such denial of Time.

<sup>208</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

the *Śakti* of Śiva should be set down as the chief cause for the creation, etc., of the world. If such a view is not agreed to, then there is neither any binding character nor sanctity attaching to the *Srutis*. No refutation (of this view) can be established as in fact such a refutation cannot be made. If it is sought to establish a firm conviction that there can be no refutation of this view, then it should be understood that such a refutation does not exist.

Throughout the *Srutis* there is no other contradictory view to the chief one which shows that all results proceed from Śiva (*kārya darśanataḥ*). Even if it is said that it is due to *Aindrajaḷa* (illusion), then also it (the result) is established as being due to the *Śakti* of Śiva (*tatkartrutvam*). The direct agency of *Māyā* is nowhere mentioned in the *Srutis* and *Sāstrās*. The non-agency (*akartrutva*) of *Māyā* is stated to describe its exact virtues. To say anything contradictory should not be the skill of knowledge (*i.e.*, the aim of knowledge should not be to propound contradictory views). Under whose direction *Māyā* acts is well established in the expositions of the (texts of the) *Purāṇas*. Therefore to speak of *Avidyā-Māyā* is simply (to create) perplexity (or mere folly).<sup>209</sup> It is said (in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*)<sup>210</sup> that "the universe is without truth, without a basis, they say, without God; brought about by mutual union and caused by lust and nothing else." The *Linga-Purāṇa* states:—In the event of correct knowledge developing on the lines of *Sēśvarādvaita*, *i.e.*, oneness of *Īśvara* with the world (*i.e.*, identity of *Īśvara* with the world), then the whole world will be perceived to be made of Śiva (or full of Śiva, *i.e.*, consisting of Śiva). Any

<sup>209</sup> To create a delusion of mind which prevents one from discerning the truth.

<sup>210</sup> Chap. XVI. 8. This verse is, it will be seen, quoted by Śrīpati in support of his view, without comment. This is so, because it is in itself a denunciation of the view that this universe has come about haphazardly.



knowledge formed which cripples the main thought leads not to the (realization of the) true form (or its natural state).

Nowhere in the *Sāstras* should you form a dualistic view beyond Śiva as the Supreme Cause. The *Sruti* says that no other view should be established in Vēdic *siddhānta*. Thus it is not meet to conclude the discussion on the basis of the Avidyā-Māyā (theory) of which (the theory of) Jīva-Īśvara is a reflection (*Avidyā-Māyāpratibimbīta jīvēśvaravādō na yuktaḥ*).<sup>211</sup>

The body which is perceptible through the knowledge that it is "I", could it be a reflection of *avidyā* (illusion)? Could it be a reflection of *antaḥkarana* (mind)? Or could it be *chaitanya* (consciousness) which is inseparable from *antaḥkarana*, which (again) is inseparable from *avidyā*? Or could it be that Īśvara, a reflection of Māyā, which is inseparable from him? Or could it be that both of them (Īśvara and Māyā) are naturally subject to *upādhi* (a virtuous reflection)? Or could such an *upādhi* be *māyā*, *avidyā*, or *antaḥkarana*? At any rate it is not gross *upādhi* (*sthūlōpādhi*), for it is unable to travel into the higher regions, because it is said *Kāryōpādhirayam jīvaḥ kāraṇōpādhir īśvaraḥ iti*—this jīva is the effect and Īśvara is the cause. It does not hold good in the case of *pratibimba* (reflection). Because, it is said that Brahman is formless (*nīrūpatvēna*) and Māyā is *asat* (unreal). Therefore there can be no *pratibimba* (reflection) of such a thing (*i.e.*, a formless or an unreal thing). It must not be said that it is the *pratibimba* of water in the sky (*jalākāśa pratibimbavat*). Things are invented as we fancy them; there can be no reflection for a formless sky (*nīrūpasya ākāśasya pratibimbāsambhavāt*).

Even if such a falsified reflection is assumed, then, it would be only *bhrānti* (delusion). It cannot be said

<sup>211</sup> Śrīpati's position is that the theory of Avidyā - Māyā is unnecessary to postulate the position that *jīva* and *Īśvara* is one, for, according to him, *jīva* and *Īśvara* are already one in Śiva. Avidyā has to be postulated if Māyā is to be assumed.

that as the image of the sun is seen reflected in water, likewise the reflection of the air is also seen in it. An image that is seen in a mirror through reflection cannot be actually seen (when it is removed); likewise it would not be meet to postulate that we could see a reflection of Brahman who is all-pervading. In which (the latter) case it could not be said that the all-pervading nature connected with Brahman can be possibly reflected. Even if it were possible, the sun's disc (*prabhāmaṇḍala*) is incapable of exhibiting such a reflection.

Moreover, both in the *Sruti* text *Guhām pravishṭau paramē parārdhē*<sup>212</sup> and in the *Sūtra* *Guhām pravishṭāvāthmānau hi taddarśanāt*,<sup>213</sup> it is laid down that *jīva* and *Īśvara* live together in the same place (*ēkatra*). But such a thing cannot be accepted as right, because *bimba* and *pratibimba* could not be lodged in the same place. Further, if *māyā* and *avidyā* are assumed to be *bimba* and *pratibimba* and *jīva* and *Īśvara*, in the event of the destruction of *māyā* and *avidyā*, can it be they (*jīva* and *Īśvara*) have attained *mōksha*? If that view is accepted, then *mōksha* is the destruction of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Then we will be entering into the precincts of the religion of Pāṣaṇḍa Bauddha, (*i.e.*, heretical Buddhist faith). Then, according to the saying *Ātmahananānān apurushārtha iti*,<sup>214</sup> *mōksha* will have to be understood as being self-destruction (*apurushārthatva*) which is absurd, when *jīva* and *Īśa* come into destruction, then no one will seek the benefits of *Paralōka* (*i.e.*, the next or future world). Then, one who is desirous of *mōksha* will no longer attempt for it.

<sup>212</sup> *Kaṭhavalli* (*Kaṭhōpa.*), III. 1. The full text is *Ritam pibantau sukrutasya lōkē guhām pravishṭau paramē parārdhē, iti*. Sankara begins his comment on *Brahma-Sutra* I. 2. 11 with this quotation from the *Kaṭhavalli*, remarking "Thus the *Kaṭhavalli* reads," etc.

<sup>213</sup> *Brahma-Sutras*, I. 2. 11.

<sup>214</sup> It is a common saying suggesting that self-destruction results in the non-realization of any one of the four principal objects of human life, *i.e.*, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*.

Both existences being false, every one will have to be contented with the present world. Then, when nobody attempts (*mōksha*), emancipation (*niivritti*) will be removed. Every one will think that there is no binding for the virtuous and the wicked. Both being false and without any difference, nobody will enter into it (*mōksha*), while this view prevails, the right path will not exist. The *jīva* will have no more to be considered as *pratibimba*. Then the *Sruti* text which begins with *Sa ātmā iti* will have to end by saying *Na tattvamasi*. The objects that are reflected in a mirror, such as fire, etc., shall have, as cause and effect, no effect whatever. Then great contradiction will arise from the *Sruti* text of *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* regarding the text *Yō vighnānē tishṭhan iti*.<sup>215</sup> When the *pratibimba* (reflected image) is affected by *Māyā*, there will be no unity of *jīva* (and *Īśvara*) and there will be no more *bandha*, *mōksha*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, etc. Thus, therefore, the argument on the side of *pratibimba* cannot be availed of with advantage.

If we accept the argument that neutral objects (*jaḍa*) are also capable of possessing *chaitanya* (life), then even *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (pot and cloth) will have to be considered to be possessed of *jīvatva*. Therefore even though undivided, the same objection holds good and therefore it is not meet (to accept it).<sup>216</sup> The *Sruti* text goes: *Ēkadhā bahudhā chaiva dṛśyatē jalachandravat iti*. It appears in one way and in several other ways just as the moon is reflected in water. This text strengthens the evidence in support of the view put forth. According to the maxim that an object that is compared to anything cannot possibly bring out all the points in the object with which it is compared to, Brahman is, by his universal existence, perceived to be generally so

<sup>215</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.

<sup>216</sup> That is, even if *jaḍa* and *chaitanya* are taken as inseparable from one another, then too the same objection that neutral objects like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* cannot be possessed of *jīvatva* holds good,

existent. According to the *Smṛiti* text *Māyābhāsēna jīvēsau karōti iti*, the reflection of *Māyā* makes and unmakes both the *jīva* and *Īśa*. We cannot postulate any invented opinion. The text *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīsau iti*<sup>217</sup> is greatly contradicted if the above view (that *jaḍa* is possessed of *chaitanya*) is held. The compound *Māyā* is made up of *mam śivam ayatīti māyā*, i.e., all that which proceeds towards *Śiva* to join Him is *māyā* [*Maḥ* (मः) signifies *Śiva*; and *Yah* (यः) signifies one who goes or moves]. From the root *Aya Paya* which means *to go*, comes the word *Māyā*. The *Praṇavārtthavivarana* quotes in the *Nighaṇṭu* from which we learn that *makāra* (the letter *ma*) includes “*Śambhu*, *Brahma* and *Chandra*”. In the *Sruti* text *Akārō Brahmā Ukārō Viṣṇuḥ Makārō Rudraḥ*, the word *Māyā* means the *Śakti* of *Paraśiva* (*Paraśiva Śaktiḥ*). And this *Māyā* flashes from the light proceeding from *Paramēśvara* and exhibits itself in the form of *jīva* and *Īśa*. Thus it is established in two different forms. If this is not so, all the *Sruti*s are contradicted. As stated before, there is no misconception in understanding that *Satya* and *Ananda* (on the part of *Paramēśvara*) are the causes of the creation of the world. For they are the prime virtues of *Paramēśvara*, just as the red hot iron keeps both its heat and light (i.e., they two being its properties). Therefore it is possible to say that the world is capable of being the agent for creation just as a pot, etc. (*ghaṭādivat*) are, i.e., just as the pot or other like thing is the outcome of the earth of which it is made and is capable of being made into a pot. Anyhow creation of the world, etc., are entrusted to *Prakṛiti*. But subsisting in different receptacles cannot be said to be equal to the *svarūpalakṣaṇa* of *Brahman*; yet under the will of *Paramēśvara*, it is the cause of creation. While it is understood as different from the properties of

<sup>217</sup> *Gnā* is the wise and *Agna* the ignorant. The wise and the ignorant are proved to be both lord and the servant—*ajāvīva* represents the *Brahman*, the happy one and *anīśa*, the unhappy one, *Anīśatvamcha Duḥkhitvam*.

Īśvara, the quality of being different (*bhinnatva*) is only an incidental quality (*atastha lakṣaṇam*).<sup>218</sup> Without transgressing (or violating) the original idea, it comes to mean separate property (*pratyēka lakṣaṇam*), generally known as *jagat janmādikatvam*, i.e., the property of creating the world. It has only a property for creating; it has not got the property of destruction and should not be so understood. An agent which is a cause for creation has, at no time, the power of destruction. Till then (upto the time of destruction) the cause for which it is the agent, creation and existence (*utpatti sthiti*), should be agreed to as being its natural properties. The material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) alone is not the entire property (of Śiva).<sup>219</sup> Yet according to the maxim that Prakriti is always subject to changes (*vikāra*), it does in no case come in the way of the conception of establishing unity (i.e., it does not contradict the conception of unity). Brahman, though different from Prakriti and its quality of being the material cause, yet sustains both. Just as the potter in producing a pot and a king in his royal position, so in the same way we have to understand the power of creation and existence as material cause in Prakriti. As regards *svarūpa lakṣaṇa*, the natural characteristics (of Brahman) as enunciated in the *Sruti* text *Satyam gnānamanantam Brahma iti*,<sup>220</sup> Brahman is in *Satya*, *Gnāna* and *Ananta*, i.e. Truth, Wisdom and Eternity. *Satya* etc., are his *svarūpa* (natural characteristics). This is a mere truism (*satyavādē*). Though the world appears not to be from its character a separate thing proceeding from Paramaśiva, yet its realization consists in knowing that it is one with Paramaśiva, in his natural and inseparable characteristics (*Śivasvarūpam abhēdē*). In other words, it is the chief characteristic (*guṇa*) and form (*bhāva*) which should be

<sup>218</sup> That property or *lakṣaṇa* which is distinct from its nature, and yet is the property by which it is known, e.g., *gandhavatvam* in the case of *Prithvī*.

<sup>219</sup> Śiva has other properties also; of his properties he has endowed Prakriti with the quality of being *upādāna kāraṇa*.

<sup>220</sup> *Taitti. Upa., Brahmāṇḍavalli, II. 1.*

understood as existing in association with Śiva at all times. But if it is said that it can also exist independently of Śiva, it is not so. For, wherever a material is demonstrated, there its property also is seen combined with it. Whenever an object is to be explained by an exhibition of it, then its property should also be understood as co-existing along with it. For example, if one asks, "In this stellar sphere, who is the Moon?" the answer is "That body which exhibits light over a large tract of space, that is the Moon." Else, it cannot be proved in any other way by evidence except by its power of luminosity. Nor can any other body be made to assume the characteristics of the Moon, possessing its luminosity. Nor can it by any other way be explained to one who had never seen it, to bring to his knowledge the form of the Moon, in reply to his question. In reality, all controversies end in establishing the chief properties contained in the objects exactly in the same proportion as they are seen existing everywhere. That object is realized by enumerating its characteristics. In this world all objects possess their properties in their entirety and not in their divided parts. And nobody has had experience of their existence in the latter condition. Therefore the mere existence of (certain) properties in an object enables one to explain it through examples. The words *Satya*, etc., primarily denote the thing (or object) Brahman (*Brahmapadārtha*). The thing Brahman, therefore, does not include all the thousands of things related in the *Srutis*.<sup>221</sup> Though there are actually existing several of them, if it is asked how these several of them could be understood to be as one undivided whole (*Akhaṇḍa bōdha*), the answer is we have to understand it from its characteristics. For it is said in the *Śivādvaita Prakāśika*:—*Hyupāyastu vaiśiṣṭyamakhaṇḍa chandra-pratipattau tachcha virōdhāt chandrē na jāyatē. Sattvādivākyaē tvanantādi padair vaiśiṣṭyam bādhyata iti ētēna sēvanādi lakṣaṇasya nākhaṇḍārthakatvam | sēvanāvanūdīnām*

<sup>221</sup> That is, we should understand that Brahman is one though it comprehends many. This leads the commentator to *Akhaṇḍa*, etc.

*samuaāya rūpatvēna akhaṇḍārthatvābhāvāditi* ॥ While everything is seen under the influence of the luminosity of the Moon, it cannot be said that that luminosity is not proceeding directly from the Moon itself. While Truth and other expressions are endless in number, including the descriptions of such things as are of a contradictory nature, yet it should not be held that different characteristics show different objects other than Brahman. A close examination of the nature of such different characteristics on the whole proves that there is no other one undivided thing (*akhaṇḍārthatvābhāvāt*).

Therefore, it is held as disproved that by the mere enumeration of the characteristics of an object, it cannot be admitted that what we mean by the entire object (*Akhaṇḍārtha*) is expressed. However, that single characteristic denotes a particular object in a particular disputation; the characteristic was never intended to convey the meaning in only one sense. The expressions *Satya*, etc., used in a particular sense for conveying a particular meaning cannot be held to convey different meanings. While a word is capable of conveying several shades of meanings according to its characteristics (*lakṣhaṇa*), we cannot hold without contradiction that what has already been expressed is the only way in which it could be interpreted. It does not thereby contradict its original characteristic (*na cha vaiyarthyam*). By the word *Satya* is denoted that it does not include *Asatya*. By the word *Gnāna*, all lifeless things are excluded,<sup>222</sup> and the word *Ananta* (endless, eternal) includes all things limited in time. These words always avoid contradiction, difference in interpretation and redundancy. By the word exclusion (*vyāvṛttik*), what is to be inferred? Is it exclusion from Brahman or not? If it is the first (*i.e.*, Brahman), all the *Srutis* that declare unity (*aikya*) are contradicted; if it is the second, then the same appearing as a different one, shows uselessness (or unproductiveness) (*vaiyarthyam*). If it is said that in the same there should be

<sup>222</sup> *Gnāna* is restricted to the *Chaitanya* world and does not extend to *Jada*.

both *pratiyōgi* and *anuyōgi* (being counterpart of a thing and being united with it), and the power of pervading all over (*pratiyōgyanuyōgi karaṇa vyāpakādi*) then such a word is of no use. Nor can cause be then said to be a separate *Dharma* (characteristic). In this way, if while contradictions point to difference in Brahman, the same expressions denote the contradictory sense which is of no use. With this very idea, it is said in the *Sivādvaita Prakāśikē*:—*Sangrahaḥ aviśiṣṭam aparyāyānēkaśabda-prakāśitam ēkam | vēdāntanīṣṭhitam akhaṇḍam pratipēdirē iti* || In short, that is the only one which is *aviśiṣṭam* (not capable of being distinguished), *aparyāyam* (not capable of being otherwise interpreted) and *anēkaśabdaprakāśitam* (which many words display as the only one); which the Vēdanta particularly reveres and salutes, that undivided One, forms its sole fixed subject. Therefore it is declared that *Satya*, etc., form the chief characteristics of Brahman.

If it is said that according to the text *Yatō janma tat Brahmēti*, etc., that it is to the original (*Ādyasya Brahmanah*) four-faced Brahma, that these characteristics apply, then it is replied that it is not so. For it is contradictory to the *Srutis*, *yukti* (reason), and *anubhava* (experience). Then, what is meant by the *Ādyatvam* (beginning) as applied to *Chaturmukha* (the four-faced Brahma)? Is it in reference to *sarvakāryāpēkshayā* or *chētanāpēkshayā*? Not the first; for the text *Ātmana ūkāśah sambhūtaḥ iti*<sup>223</sup> refers to *Bhūtasrishti* (the whole class of *bhūtas* taken collectively) which is stated to be the first among the created. It must not be said that *Bhūta srishti* is after *Hiranyagarbha srishti*,<sup>224</sup> for *Hiranyagarbha* who embodies the spiritual character of *srishti* in its entirety cannot be supposed to have been subsequent to *Bhūta srishti*. Therefore *Bhūta srishti* cannot be earlier than *Hiranyagarbha srishti*, as there is nothing to prove such a thing. If *Bhūta srishti* is, notwithstanding, taken to be earlier in

<sup>223</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>224</sup> *Hiranyagarbha*; Name of Brahman as born from a golden egg.



order to have a knowledge of the characteristics of Brahman, then, it results in no consequence. Daśaratha and Vasudēva are considered to be the parents of Rāma and Krishṇa for certain purposes; and if this is acknowledged to be so, then *Sarvagnatva*<sup>225</sup> cannot be established in Rāma and Krishṇa. As in the case of Rāma and Krishṇa, Chaturmukha is much higher than the one represented as his originator. The *Sruti* text goes:—*Vishṇūrēva hiranyagarbhōtpattiḥ iti*. From Vishṇu only is *Hiranyagarbha srisṭi*. This is also to be similarly understood. Other *Sruti* texts declare:—*Yō dēvānām prathamam puraścīt | Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ | Hiranyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* ||<sup>226</sup> *Sa nō dēvaḥ śubhayā smṛityā samyunaktu* || The meaning of the first of these texts is as follows:—The Maharshi Rudra is greater than the *chidachit prapancha* and far beyond the universe (*Viśvasmāt*) and also the All-knowing author of the *Vēda* (*Sarvagnatvādinā*). Then as to the second text, Paramaśiva is the first of all Dēvas, Indra, etc. Śiva produced out of his will *Hiranyagarbha* and the four-faced Chaturmukha in the form of Prakṛiti and taught him all the spiritual knowledge, *Vēda*, etc., out of his favour. Let that Śiva protect us, out of His unlimited grace, by disentangling us from the entire bondage of *samsāra* and granting us that *paramānanda svarūpa* as the result of the spiritual knowledge derived from the *Vēdānta* and the *Āgama*, and bring us into unity with Him. Accordingly texts like *Yō dēvānām prathamāschōḍbhavaścha Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* and *Hiranyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam* || should be held to denote that *Hiranyagarbha* came into *srisṭi* as the result of creation by Mahēśvara. Such a meaning cannot be held to be unreasonable.

However, there is the text of the *Mahōpanishad*:—*Ēkō ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsīt | Na Brahmā nēśānō nāgnīśhōmau nēmēdyāvā prithivī iti* || *Nārāyaṇa* was the only one who

<sup>225</sup> Omniscience.

<sup>226</sup> *Mahōpa.*, I. 12.

existed (before the creation). Neither Brahma nor Íśvara nor Agni nor these others (pointing to them) nor the sky nor the earth existed (before the creation). It is here shown that Nārāyaṇa alone was above all existent as the Supreme Spirit, the greatest, before the creation. And then there is the text *Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē | Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē iti* || From Nārāyaṇa was born Brahma and from Nārāyaṇa was born Rudra, which proves that Nārāyaṇa is the All-Cause of everything. And then it is also stated, in the text of the Upanishad, *Atha kasmāduchchyatē Brahma brihantō hyasmin guṇāḥ* <sup>227</sup> *iti*, from whom else could Brahma in whom are so many of the greatest good qualities (*brihantō guṇāḥ*) have been born; whereby for Him (Nārāyaṇa) alone is ascribed the fullest good qualities. Again, according to the text *Tadēva Brahma paramam kavīnām* <sup>228</sup> || to the all-knowing Brahma and others, *He* (Nārāyaṇa) alone is Para Brahman. Further in the text, *Ajasya nābhāvadyēkam arpitam (yasmin viśvāni bhuvanāni tasthuḥ)*.<sup>229</sup> In the navel of the Unborn, one chief stock took its origin and in it the whole universe and the worlds existed. Again, in the text *Antas-samudrē manasū charantam Brahmānvavinda daśa hōtāram-arnē iti*<sup>230</sup> || While under the ocean, He (Nārāyaṇa) was going about thinking, Brahma and the ten sacrificial agents were born. It is said that the quality of lying in state in the ocean has been ascribed to Him (Nārāyaṇa) by the learned through usage, and it applies to Him only in particular.

In texts like *Na sannachāsaschchiva ēva kēvalaḥ* <sup>231</sup> | *Brahma Vishṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyante* <sup>232</sup> | *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt iti*,<sup>233</sup> the reference rightly is to the same

<sup>227</sup> *Agnivēśhma.*

<sup>228</sup> *Mahōpanishad*, I. 6.

<sup>229</sup> The full text is not quoted by Śrīpati Paṇḍita. It is quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* wherein he asserts that *Vishṇōr hi lingam*, that Vishṇu alone is Linga. (*Rik. Sam.* 10. 82. 6.)

<sup>230</sup> *Taitt. Ār.*, III. 11. 1.

<sup>231</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

<sup>232</sup> *Atharvaśiras.*

<sup>233</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

One, according to the *Chchāgapaśu Nyāya*. By the compound word, *gachchantīti gauriti*, what is meant is that which moves about, *i.e.*, cattle. Though it might convey a different meaning, yet it is understood to be a cow for ordinary purposes. Similarly, the word Brahman, though it implies the four-faced Brahma, Praṇava Brāhmaṇa, etc., yet, it is understood to signify only Nārāyaṇa, who is distinguished by all auspicious and good qualities and attributes. If he is, by *Yōgarūḍhi*,<sup>234</sup> stated that he is the sole cause of creation, etc., of the world, and to him only it could be well applied—*i.e.*, the cause of creation—then we say, that “Vishṇu has no such Brahmālakṣhaṇa in so being the cause of creation” (*i.e.*, He shows no characteristic of Brahma to be the cause of creation). Because Vishṇu Himself is stated to have been born subsequent to the *Sūkshma srisṭi* (subtle creation), his creation being the first of the *Dēvādi srisṭi* (*i.e.*, creation of Dēvas and others). For we see in the *Rig-Vēda*, the birth of Vishṇu described in the text *Vishṇuriththā paramasya vidvān jātō brihannabhipāti tritīyam* || *iti*. The meaning of this text is this: *paramasya*, *mahēśvarasya*; *ittham bhāvēna*; *vidvān*, *vēttā*; *brihat*, *Vishṇuḥ*, *Ādi-Vishṇuḥ*; *jātassan*; *tritīyam*, *Kailāsam*; *abhipāti*, *rakshati*; *brihat śabdēna*, *Ādi-Vishṇurēva vyapadiśyate*. Mahēśvara, thus thinking out of His mind, Vishṇu being born, controls the third part (of the creation) consisting of Kailāsa; the word *Brihat* here is to be understood as meaning *Ādi-Vishṇu*.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>234</sup> *Yōgarūḍhi*: When it is used in regard to a word, it means having an etymological as well as a special and conventional meaning, *e.g.*, the word *Pankaja* etymologically means “anything produced in mud”; but in usage or popular convention, it is restricted to some things only produced in mud, such as the lotus; *cf.* the word *ātapaṭra*, parasol.

<sup>235</sup> One of the meanings of the word *Brihat* is *Vishṇu*. *Brihat* literally means *large* or *great* and it applies to Vishṇu. He is held to be possessed of an immeasurable or all-pervading body. It is from the root *briḥ* which means *grow* or *shine*, and from it is derived *Brahma* and *Brihat*, where the root idea is *growing* or *expanding* or *shining everywhere*.

In texts like *Namō Viṣṇavē brihatē karōmi* | *Brihattē Viṣṇō Sumatim bhajāmahē iti* || <sup>236</sup> there is no ground for leaving out of account the existing evidences in support of the statement that the Eternal Paramēśvara is the sole author of the creation and ascribing invented proofs for the position that Viṣṇu is the author of the creation. But some timid people may question, with doubt, how could one who has no birth at all, have been born? In the text of the *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad* we read, *Rudra yattē Dakṣiṇam mukham tēna mām pāhi nityam iti* || It is here said that Mahēśvara alone is termed as *Ajāta*. And therefore the statement that Śambhu is the creator of Ādi-Viṣṇu is right. It is also seen in the following text of the *Yajur-Vēda*:—*Sōmah pavatē janitā matīnām janitā divō janitūgnēḥ janitā sūryasya janitēndrasya janitōtha Viṣṇō iti* || As also in the text of the *Atharvaṇa Vēda*:—*Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyītavayam sarvamidam Brahma-Viṣṇu-Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti* || Śiva alone is the sole cause of creation. Further the text *Śiva ēva kevalaḥ* implies that Śiva alone is the author of *Sanātana sriṣṭi* <sup>237</sup> (i.e., *Eternal Creation*). Also, in the text *Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā*, <sup>238</sup> where Brahma is described as derived from Nārāyaṇa (creator), it must be understood as referring only to subsidiary creations (i.e., after the original). For, it is thus supported in the *Vāyavya Samhitā* of the *Saiva Purāṇa*:—*Trayastē kārapātmānō jātāḥ sākṣhān mahēśvarāt* | *Charācharasya viśvasya sargasthyantahētaḥ* | *Pitrā niyamitāḥ pūrvam trayōpi trishu karmasu* | *Brahmā sargē Haristrānē Rudraḥ samharanē punaḥ* | *Tadāpyanyōnyamātsaryāt anyōnyūtiśayārthinaḥ* | *Tapasā toshayitvā tam pitaram Chandraśēkharam* | *Brahmā Nārāyaṇāt pūrvam Rudraḥ kalpāntarē 'srijat* | *Kalpāntarē punar Brahmā Rudra Viṣṇu*

<sup>236</sup> *Rig-Vēda*.

<sup>237</sup> As opposed to *Sūkṣhma sriṣṭi* above spoken of.

<sup>238</sup> Add here *jāyatē* which is omitted. A quotation from the *Mahōpanishad* (*Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*). The name *Nārāyaṇa* is not ordinarily mentioned as too holy for mention.

*jaganmayah* । *Vishṇuścha bhagavān tadvat Brahmānam asrujat punaḥ* । *Nārāyaṇam punar Brahmā Brahmānam cha punar Bhavaḥ iti* ॥ Moreover, texts like *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sēndraḥ sōksharah* *Paramassvarāt iti*, etc., and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts declare that Brahman is beyond the Trinity (*Mūrtitraya*). Likewise, in the *Nārāyaṇa* and other *Upanishads*, *Nārāyaṇa* is not so stated, i.e., as being beyond the Trinity. The *Māndūkya* (*Upanishad*) text :—*Prapanchō-paśamam śāntam Śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē sa Ātmā sa vignēyah* <sup>239</sup> । *Śivō dvaitaḥ iti* ॥ and the text *Dhyāyē-tēśānam pradhyaṇitavyam* । *Sarvanidam Brahma Vishṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti* <sup>240</sup> ॥ and other texts fully prove Śiva to be beyond the Trinity and therefore for Him alone does Parabrahmatva hold good. Likewise, it is said in the *Ānūsāsanika* (*parva* of the *Mahābhārata*):—*Sō'srijat dakṣiṇāt angāt Brahmānam lōkasambhavam* । *Vāma pārśvāt tathā Vishṇum lōkarakshārtham Īśvaraḥ* । *Hridayāt kālarudrākhyam iti* ॥ Here the creation of Rudra is referred to as being Kālarudra and not Śiva. Else, a timid (*bhīru*) man may doubt as to how an unborn one (Śiva) could have been born, being contrary to the *Srutis*. Nor can the birth of Vishṇu be taken to be an *avatar*. For it is against the *Sruti* texts above quoted (*Sruti* texts such as *Vishṇuritthā*, etc.).

Moreover, in the *Atharvaśiras* (*Upanishad*) there is the text :—*Akāraṇam kāraṇānām dhyātā kāraṇam tu dhyēya iti*, where the termination *tu* signifies the peculiar *lakṣhaṇa* referring to Sambhu, which is beyond the reach of all others. But in the *Sruti* text (*Ēkō*) *Nārāyaṇa āsīt iti*, whereby *Nārāyaṇa* is to be taken not as always existing but born as only the first incarnation after the *Sūkṣma srishti*. (Vishṇu belongs to the future and not to the present or the past.) In texts like *Śaktēr āsīt Parāśaraḥ iti*, etc., on the basis of the *Chhāgapaśu nyāya*, the words *Sadātmā*, *Nārāyaṇa*, etc., only signify Śiva, and none others, for it is supported by the texts occurring in the *Kaivalya*—*Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*, and *Sa ēva Vishṇuḥ*

*sa prāṇaḥ sa kālō'gniḥ sa chandramāḥ iti.* Also, in the *Atharvaṇaśikhā*, we have the words of Śiva Himself:—*Ahamēkaḥ prathamam āsam vārtāmi cha bhaviṣhyāmi cha nānyaḥ kaśchin mattō vyatiriktaḥ iti* <sup>241</sup> In the *Harivamśa*, it is said:—*Yāni nāmāni Gōvinda tava lōkē mahīyatē tānyēva mama nāmāni nātra kūr्या vichāraṇā iti* ! Here Śiva says to Krishṇa that whatever the names by which Gōvinda is distinguished, those are the very names of Śiva also. Jaimini, Bhaṭṭa, Bhāskarāchārya and others who were well versed in the *Vēdas* and also in the full and established meaning of the four *Vēdas* have laid down that Parabrahman is none other than Śiva alone. Also, in the *Sūta Samhitā* it has been stated by Vyāsa that Śiva only is Parabrahman, in whom complete *Brahma-lakṣṇa*, such as creation, protection and destruction are combined and that this is indisputable. Further, the following *Sruti* texts:—*Dhyāyītēśānam pradhyaītavayam sarvamidam Brahmā Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē* ! *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitāmatīnām* ! *Kṣharam pradhānam amrutākṣharam haraḥ kṣharātmanā-vṛṣatē dēva ēkaḥ* ! *Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām Īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānām Brahmādhipatir Brahmanōdhipatir Brahmā Sivō mē astu Sadāśivōm* ॥ *Ēkō hi Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ* ! *Ya imān lōkān īṣata īśanīyuh jananīyuh. . . . yassarvān lōkānīṣata īśanībhiḥ paramaśaktibhiḥ* ! *Yēśhāmūṣē paśupatiḥ paśūnām chatuṣpadāmuta cha dvipadām* ! *Prapañchōpaśamam śāntam Sivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē* ! *Nidhanapatayēnamaḥ* ! *Nidhanapatāntikāya namaḥ* ! *Sarva-bhūtadamanāya namō manōnmanāya namaḥ iti* ॥ and many like collections of other *Sruti* texts establish that Śiva alone is the chief cause for the creation of *jagat*, etc. (*Jagadjanmādiḥlutva vyapadēśāt*). One alone shines in his all-effulgent nature without lessening any part of his character, creating the world under the name of *Bhava* by his *Rājasa* quality; protecting the world under the name of *Mruda* by all his *Sāttvika* qualities;

<sup>241</sup> I was the only one who was at first; who prevails now; who is going to exist in future and there is none other beyond me.

and destroying all the creation under the name of *Hara* by all his *Tāmasa* qualities and being overlord in all his three-fold qualities, keeping in himself his own *Śakti* intact. Verily it has been said in the *Mahimna-stava* :—*Viśvōtpattau Bhavāya namōnamaḥ* । And therefore also in the *Saivāgama* it is said :—*Sarvagnatā triptir anādibōdhaḥ svatantratā nityam alupta śaktiḥ । Anantaśaktischa vibhōr vidhignāḥ śaḍāhur angāni mahēśvarasya । Yadbhaktasthalam ityāhuḥ tat sarvagnatvam chyatē । Yanmāhēśvarakam nāma sā triptir mama śāṅkarī । Yat prasādābhidham sthānam tadbōdhō mē nirankuṣaḥ । Yat prāṇalingakam nāma tat svātantryam udāhritam । Yad asti śaraṇam nāma hyaluptā śaktiruchyatē । Yadaikyasthānamūrdhasthā hyanantā śaktiruchyatē । Ētadangasthalam dēvī guhyāt guhyatamam param iti ॥*

Thus are established all the characteristics, such as *Sarvagnatva*, etc., and *jagadjanmūdi kāraṇatvam* (creation, etc., of the world) in *Śiva* alone and in none else.

### Siva as Para Brahman.

Having thus discussed the attributes of Brahman and establishing them, *Srīpati* proceeds to deal with the source of all knowledge relating to him. Commenting on 1. 1. 3, *Śāstra yōnitrāt* (*Because the Śāstra forms the source—of the knowledge relating to Him*), he initially remarks that texts like *Asya mahatō bhūtasya niśvasitam ētadrigvēdō yajurvēdassāmavēdaḥ iti*—These *Rig*, *Yajur* and *Sāma Vēdas* which are the result of the inhaling breath of that Great Being, form the subject-matter of this *Sūtra*. In other words, *Śāstra* is the source of all authority. For *Śāstras*, such as the *Rig Vēda*, etc., the source and cause is *Śiva*. The *Sruti* text goes *Śivō māmēva pitarah iti*,<sup>242</sup> I am the Father (cause) to whom *Śiva* is referred. Therefore *Nigama* and *Āgama* are paramount authorities, *Śiva* being the chief cause of creation, etc. Here the *Srutis* determine the applicability. Texts like the one quoted above prove *Paramēśvara* to be the chief source (cause) for the

*Vēdas*. Texts like *Vāchā virūpa nityayā iti* prove the eternity of the *Vēdas*. The question whether we could appropriately say that Paraśiva Brahman is the chief cause for Nigama and Āgama is one open to discussion. In the *Smritis* it is said *Anādinidhinā nityā vāgutsrishiṭā svayambhuvā* | *Ādau vēdamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ iti* | From that *Svayambhū*, came out that ever-existing and eternal speech, which was in the beginning the effulgent *Vēdas*, wherefrom all took their origin. Here the *Vēda* is stated to be eternal. This shows that the birth of Paramēśvara is not true (*apramāṇya*). He had no birth of a Pauruṣhēya character (*i.e.*, He had no human origin). And, therefore, if it is said that the *Vēdas* also are equally as eternal and unaffected by the three kinds of time (*traikālikābādhyatvam*), then we propound the following *Siddhānta* :—If it is said that the *Vēdas* exist by themselves, it would be against the *Śruti* text *Śivō mānēva pitarāḥ*. And also in the fourth part of the *Sāma śākhā*, it is mentioned that they (the *Vēdas*) are stated to have been possessed of *angas*, *śarīra*, *gōtra*, *varṇa*, etc. These denote that the former (portion) treats of the first creation and the latter generally treats of the (subsequent or succeeding) creations. Those (the former) form their characteristics denoting a cause showing a sign (of *srishiṭi*). Texts like *Ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ iti* <sup>24</sup> state that the sky and the other elements were created by the order of Paramēśvara as the sole cause. If so, how can the *Vēdas* be called *Svayambhūtam*, *i.e.*, without origin (*apauruṣhēya*)? The *Smritis* enunciate a similar position in the text.

*Ashṭādaśānām ētāsām vidyānām Brahmavartmanām* |  
*Ādikartā Śivassākshāt sūlapāniriti śrutiḥ* ||  
*Sādyōjātēna Rīgvēdam Vāmadēvēna Yājusham* |  
*Aghōrēna tathā Sāma Puruṣhēnātvatharvaṇam* ||  
*Īśānēna mukhēnaiva kāmikadyāgamām tathā* |  
*Janayāmāsa viśvēśaḥ sarvasiddhipradāyakaḥ* ||  
*Vimarśarūpiṇī śaktiḥ Śivasya paramātmānaḥ* |  
*Nigamāgamarūpā syāt sarvatattvapraśāsinī* ||



*Tasmāt vēdāgamārthēshu yaḥ kuryāt bhēdabhāvanām ।  
Sa sahasrakulam ghōrē narakē patati dhruvam ॥ iti.*

Therefore Paramēśvara is the sole cause for bringing to light, in continuation, the former and latter parts of Nigama and Āgama, by means of that *Śakti* that is inherent in him. And in him lies all the power of bringing to light every kind of knowledge. Therefore there is no contradiction between *Sruti* and *Āgamas* with regard to whether Paramēśvara is born or not born (*janyatva* and *ajanyatva*).<sup>244</sup> Further, *Sruti* texts like *Nasannachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ । Nānyat kinchanamishat । Nēha nānāsti kinchana । Natu- tat dvitīyamasti ॥ iti* enunciate clearly that none other created the Vēda and that it is eternal. If it is then asked how such statements ought to be reconciled, then we say that *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma । Sarvō vai Rudraḥ ॥ iti*, etc., distinctly hold out that Brahman is the sole Creator of *charāchara prapancha* (the living and the lifeless world). If so, these contradict the other set of *Sruti* texts, according to which the world is stated to be unreal (*mithyāparatvam*). As to this, we say that that is wrong; because even prior to the time that creation became manifest, the world was existing in a very shortened (*sam- kuchita*) form (*rūpa*) in the *śakti* of Mahēśvara himself, therein containing all the elements of Nigama and Āgama and others as if in the form of a seed ready to sprout up. *Śakti* and Paramēśvara are never different, for it is said in the *Sruti* text:—*Parāsyā saktir vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhā- vikiḡ gnānabalakriyā cha ॥*<sup>245</sup>

Moreover, if it is doubted, as to how Vēda could be called Eternal, when it is simply a resonant sound implying *śabda*, *buddhi* and *karma* (words, knowledge and actions) and only lasting for a limited time in its three forms of

<sup>244</sup> Some *Srutis* hold He was and some others that He was not born. Śrīpati's view is that He was not born. If that is so, there is really no contradiction in the *Srutis* on this point.

<sup>245</sup> This is the last line in the *Chchāndogya* text beginning with *Apāni pādō javanō grihitā* and ending with *svābhāvikiḡ gnānabala- kriyā cha* which is all that is quoted by Śrīpati above.

existence, then we say there is no reason for any such doubt. We say this, on the basis of the maxim *Kāraṇa-satyatvē kāryasya satyatvam*, the cause being true, the effect also should be quite true. It is indisputable that *Śakti* in Paramēśvara, which is the cause for all the *Vēdas*, is Eternal, from which it follows that the effect (of that *Śakti*) also should likewise be Eternal. Lord Mahēśvara's statement that Brahman is *nitya-mukta buddha* and *śuddha* by *svabhāva* and is manifest at any moment and intimate with all is verily true. But that statement which people put forth attributing *rāga*, *dvēsha* and *pāśabaddha*, qualities which are exhibited by *Pauruṣhēya*, is untrue, because it is only a statement of the ignorant with evil thoughts. Therefore the *Vēdas* are decidedly eternal. Moreover, the *Vēdas* having determined to extol Paramēśvara and none else, they keep constantly praising Paramēśvara regarding his unending eternal propitious qualities and like so many poets continuously extol him without a break.

Further, the smearing of the Bhasma (sacred ashes) is heard of in the *Vēdas*. In the text of the *Śvētāśvatarōpanishad*, *Triyāyusham Jamadagnēḥ Kaśyapasya triyāyusham* । *Yaddēvānām triyāyusham* । *tanmē astu triyāyusham iti* ॥ <sup>246</sup> the word *triyāyusha* is interpreted to be *tiryakpuṇḍra*, a triple cross-wise or horizontal mark. In the *Yajurveda*, we read :—*Mānastōkēti mantrēna mantritam Bhasma dhārayēt* । *Urdhvaḥ puṇḍram bhavēt sāma madhya puṇḍram yajūmshi cha* । *Adhaḥ puṇḍram Richas sākshāt tasmāt puṇḍram triyāyusham* ॥ *iti*. Further, in the *Bōdhāyana śākhā* the following occurs :—

*Tāni vā ētāni rudrākshāṇi yat trayō vēdū dhārayanti tasmāt dēvā dhārayanti* । *tasmāt tāni dhārayan gachchan tishṭhan khādan svapan unmishan nimishan hasan sarvāṅgyē-nāmsi tarati Rudrōbhūtvā Rudrō bhavati iti*. For what causes the *Vēdas* put on like Rudra and become Rudra Himself, the Bhasma and Rudrāksha, for the same reasons

the Devatas also wear them and so they are wearing them while going, while standing, while eating, while sleeping, while sitting, while meditating, while laughing—in all conditions. From this we see that *Rudrāksha dhāraṇam* is also prescribed (in the *Smritis*).

Also, in the *Rigvēda* text *Ayam mē hastō Bhagavān* || *iti*,<sup>247</sup> what I have in my hand is Thyself, O Lord, *Yā tē Rudraśśivō tanūh aghōrā pāpakāśini* <sup>248</sup> || *iti*, etc. which state that the Vēdapurusha wears the Śivalinga according to the *Vēdas*. Further in various hymns of praise is seen the text *Jagatām patayē namaḥ* <sup>249</sup> | *Namō hiraṇya-bāhavē namaḥ iti* <sup>250</sup> and others.

Therefore in weighing all the *Śrutis* and *Smritis*, it is seen that in the *ātma Śakti* of Paramēśvara which is the embodiment of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara ātmaḥ śakti*), is observed to be the principal figure referred to in all the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas*.

Again, if the doubt is expressed how Mahēśvara could be said to be the author of the *Vēdas*, when Chaturmukha (the four-faced Brahma) is plainly said to be the sole author of the *Rik*, *Yajus* and *Sāma Vēdas* according to texts like *Shadḍōtā vai bhūtō prajāpatiḥ idam sarvam asrijata* | *Ruchō yajūmshi sāmāni* | *iti*, etc., then we contradict such a doubt and state that it is not so. For it is said in the *Śrutis* that long prior to the creation of Hiraṇyagarbha, that Vēda had its origin, according to the texts *Yō brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvam yō vai vēdāmscha prajāpōti tasmai* <sup>251</sup> | *iti*, etc., which state that long before Brahma was created, the creation of the Vēda took place and then those *Vēdas* were taught to Brahma after he came into existence. This decidedly proves that Hiraṇyagarbha got all the Vēda tutored by Paramēśvara and therefore Paramēśvara is alone stated to be greater than all others.

<sup>247</sup> *Rigvēda*.

<sup>249</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XVIII. 13.

<sup>251</sup> *Śvēta Upa.*, VI. 18.

<sup>248</sup> *Rudrachamaka*.

<sup>250</sup> *Rudrachamaka*.

Accordingly, *Śruti* texts like *Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt* | *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *Hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* | *Sa nō dēvaḥ śubhayā smṛityā samyunaktu*<sup>252</sup> : *iti*, state that the supremacy of Paramēśvara extends absolutely over the creation of Hiraṇyagarbha and *chidachit prapancha*. Moreover, the sages Upamanyu, Dadhichi, Gautama, Dūrvāsa, Reṇuka, Dāruka, Sankharsṇa, Gōkarṇa and others also observe that the all-knowing power (*sarvagnatva*) consists in knowing decisively what all is contained in the Vēda and the Vēdānta. If it is questioned how such *Sarvagnatva* could be found only in Paramēśvara and not with others, the reply is that we should not doubt it (*i.e.*, such *sarvagnatva* in Him alone). Because such a power can also be obtained to a small extent (*kinchit*) by the good grace of Paramēśvara through meditating on and worshipping Him. And therefore there is no contradiction (here). Comparing the brightness of the Sun with skylight, the light being the same, the intensity of it is seen to a large extent in the case of the Sun. In the same way, though every *Śruti* describes Paramēśvara as the sole *Kartru* (Lord), he is also the Sole Being of supreme knowledge (*Sarvādhika gnāna upapadyate*). Because one who knows everything in the *Śāstra* is by far superior to the one who has merely just entered (on its study). Therefore, no one can be said to be *Sarvagna* or *Sarvāntaryāmi* or *Sakalajagadvyūpaka* other than Paramēśvara Himself, for these six qualities, such as *Sarvagnatva*<sup>253</sup> and others, cannot be a property owned by Him (Paramēśvara) in common with others (*i.e.*, nobody can show these qualities with Him).

Further, if it may be asked, "Where is the need for this Sūtra in application as the previous Sūtra alone establishes for Paramēśvara *Jagadjanmūdikāraṇātva*, *Śāstrakāraṇātva*, *Sarvagnatva*, etc.?" The answer to this

<sup>252</sup> *Mahōpanishad*, X. 19. 1.

<sup>253</sup> These six qualities are:—*Sarvagnatva*, *Sarvāntaryāmitva*, *Sakalajagadvyūpakatva*, *Sarvādhikagnānatva*, *Sarvasāstrapraṇētrītvā* and *Sarvavastvabhāśakatva*.

question is "It is not so." For in the previous *Sūtra*, the subject relating to Paramaśiva possessing the above powers was mentioned only by way of introduction subject to the proviso that it might later be discussed at length with a view to establishing the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva. To remove the doubt (that pertaining to the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva), this *Sūtra* has been set down by Bhagavān Vyāsa under the heading *Śāstrayōnitvāt*. This means *Śāstram nigamāgamātmakam yōniḥ pramāṇam yasya tathātvaṭ*. He that is proved by the *Śāstras* through the testimony of Nigama and Āgama as entitled to Brahmatva, He is called *Śāstrayōniḥ*. Therefore, nothing can be said in the following *Adhikaraṇas* contradicting this *Adhikaraṇa* regarding the Brahmatva of Paramaśiva. That no other alternative meaning could be attached to this *Sūtra* (*Śāstrayōnitvāt*) is plain from what is suggested in this *Sūtra* itself. No further *Adhikaraṇa* is, therefore, necessary to explain this (point). (There is nothing further to be said on the topic discussed in this *Adhikaraṇa*.)<sup>254</sup> If anybody raises the objection that it is not possible to know the All-powerful Brahman as being Paramaśiva alone through the *Vēda* and *Vēdānta Śāstras*, without other proofs, then, we say, that texts like *Tam tvaupanishadam puruṣam pruchchāmi* | *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam*<sup>255</sup> | *Naishū tarkēṇa matirūpanēyā*<sup>256</sup> | *Ritam satyam param Brahma puruṣam kṛishṇa-pīngalam* | *Ūrdhvarētam Virūpāksham Visvarūpāya vai namaḥ*<sup>257</sup> | *Pradhānakshētragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsāra mōksha sthitibandhahētuh*<sup>258</sup> || *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*<sup>259</sup> *iti*, etc., state that Para Brahman is the sole subject treated of in these *Sūtras*. And again a number of *Sruti* texts like *Na chakshushū grihyatē nāpi vūchū* | *Tam tvaupanishadam*

<sup>254</sup> Śrīpati suggests that this *Sūtra* is self-contained and exhaustive to a degree.

<sup>255</sup> *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

<sup>256</sup> *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

<sup>257</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 11.

<sup>258</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

<sup>259</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

*purusham pruchchhāmi* || etc., postulate without a shadow of doubt as to who Para Brahman is and how he is to be understood. The former goes to prove that Brahman cannot be understood through the *Vēdas*, nor can he be realized by the sight nor through expression. But texts like *Yan manasā na manutē yēnāhur manōmatam*<sup>260</sup> | *Yatō vāchō nivartantē aprāpya manasā saha* | *Ānandam Brahmanō vidvān na bibhēti kutaschanēti*<sup>261</sup> and others prove again that the power of creation and the All-knowing Power is confined only to Him who can be understood by discussion of the *Sāstras*. The *Siddhānta* is that none other than Brahman is the sole cause of the creation and He is established through the *Upanishads* and other *Sāstras* and no others are so described. He who is so described is alone Para Brahman.

Texts like *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam*<sup>262</sup> | *Naishū tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā* | *iti*,<sup>263</sup> etc., state that there are no other sources from which Brahman can be determined or understood which are not contradictory.

In the text *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham pruchchhāmi* | *iti*, it is laid down clearly that the *Upanishads* alone describe Brahman in a manner which harmonizes with the *Vēdānta Sāstra* through *Tarka* and *Vēdānta*, which are the sole materials for its proof. If it is postulated that Para Brahman can be known from other sources besides the *Vēdānta Sāstra*, then we say that it is not so. The *Siddhānta* then is that Brahman is only proved by the *Upanishad Sāstra* as being (*Jagajjanmādikāraṇa*) the Creator and chief cause of the Universe and He alone is the subject-matter of all the *Vēdas*. Texts like *Nāvēdavinmanutē tam brihantam* | *Naishū tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā*<sup>264</sup> | *iti*, etc., state that

<sup>260</sup> *Kena Upa.*, I. 6.

<sup>261</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 4.

<sup>262</sup> *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

<sup>263</sup> *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

<sup>264</sup> *Taitt. Brā.*, III. 12. 9.

<sup>265</sup> *Katha Upa.*, II. 9.

Brahman cannot be understood by any other means. Also from the Upanishadic text *Tam tvaupanishadam purusham pruchchhāmi | iti*, it is to be understood that Para Brahman is understood by the knowledge obtained from the *Upanishads* alone by the help of the *Vēdānta Sāstra* and *Tarka* (Logic). But nothing other than the *Upanishads* can lead one to know Brahman. Just as in bringing into existence a chariot, a pandal, a turret, a storeyed structure, the skill of different persons and agencies employed on them is shown, it cannot therefore be said that only one person was the author in producing so many different kinds of work.

In the case of Brahman who is *satyasankalpa* and *satya-gnāna*, *anantādisvarūpa* and *dharmagnāna*, He can be said to be the sole creator of the two worlds (*Jagadubhaya*). And therefore the *Vēdas* correctly hold without any doubt that he can be fully understood only by that source (*Vēdānta*). The text *Yatō vāchō nivartantē | iti*,<sup>266</sup> and other like passages, which are observable in the *Upanishads*, describe all the more His infinite qualities in manifestation. Else, the text *Brahmavidāpnōti param | iti*<sup>267</sup> and the like which enunciate the view that He who knows well Brahman can realize Brahman, will be contradicted.

In the *Smritis* and in the *Matsya* and the *Śiva Purāṇas*, it is stated that Śiva is of a *tāmasa* nature:—

*Agnēḥ śivasya mähātmyam tāmasēshu prakalpyatē |*  
*Rājasēshu cha mähātmyam adhikam Brahmāṇō viduḥ ||*  
*Sāttvikēshu cha kalpēshu mähātmyam adhikam Harēḥ |*  
*Tēshvēva yōgasamsiddhāḥ gamishyanti parām gatim | iti.*

And therefore in the *Matsya Purāṇa*, *tāmasatva* is attributed to *Śiva Purāṇas*. Similarly, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in the verse beginning with *Sattvāt sanjāyatē gnānam* and the one ending with *Bandham mōksham cha yā vētti buddhiḥ sā Pārtha sāttvikī || iti*.<sup>268</sup> It is made clear that only those possessed of *sāttvika buddhi* are eligible for *mukti*. Also in the

<sup>266</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 4.

<sup>267</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>268</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIV. 17 ; XVIII. 30.

*Pāncharātra Āgama* the statement is found :—*Agnēḥ Śivasya mātmyam tāmāsam mōhakārahakam । Tayōrupāsānādēva pratyavāyō bhavēt dhruvam ॥ iti*. It is established from this that *Śiva Purāṇas* wherein Śiva is chiefly described are *tāmāsa* (in character).<sup>269</sup> If it is asked how passages like these could be reconciled with the above proofs, wherein Śiva is extolled, and how He can be called Para Brahman, agreeably to the teaching of the *Vēdānta*, then the answer is, that there is no ground for any doubt of this nature. For there is no clear proof anywhere in the *Sruti* to the effect that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of a *tāmāsa* character. And the invented (*kalpita*) statement of the Prachchanna Bauddhas cannot be admitted as a proof (of the alleged *tāmāsa* character of the *Śiva Purāṇas*). Moreover, Vyāsa being the author of the *Purāṇas*, is it the subject-matter treated therein (in the *Purāṇas*) of a *tāmāsa* nature or is it Vyāsa, the author himself, being of a *tāmāsa* nature, 'found opportunity to impart a *tāmāsa* character to the *Śiva Purāṇas*? It cannot be the first, because the *Rig Vēda* and all other *Vēdāntas* declare Rudra as the chief subject and even if they are considered as of a *tāmāsa* nature, then the whole *Vēdānta* becomes spurious (*apramāṇya*) and enters into the limits of the Bauddha āgama.<sup>270</sup> Nor can it be the second, in which case, even the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, of which the author is Vyāsa, is liable to be called one of a *tāmāsa* character. Nor can it be the third, for Vyāsa could not have been the author of the same *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, which is said to be of a *sāttvika* nature and also of *Śiva Purāṇas* which are said to be of a *tāmāsa* nature, for which there is no sufficient evidence. Vyāsa is stated to be the author of all the *Purāṇas* which are stated to be the essence of all the *Vēdas* and *Vēdānta*. Then in the *Matsya Purāṇa* it is seen that *Mātsyam kūrman tathā laingyam saivam*

<sup>269</sup> This is the Pūrvapaksha argument.

<sup>270</sup> That is, it will deny Brahman altogether, denying as it does wholly the authenticity of the *Srutis*.



*skāndam tathaiva cha* | *Āgnēyam cha shaḍētāni tāmasāni nibōdha mē*. Then, again, we have texts like, *Āgnēḥ śivasya mahātmyam tāmasam mōhakāarakam* | *iti*; *Yatra yatra Jagannātham Mukundam Viṣṇum avyayam* | *Vadanti tāni śāstrāṇi sāttvikāni matāni vai* | *Yatra yatra hyumānātham Sankaram Bhairavam Yamam* | *Durgām Gaṇapatim kālam yāni tāni vadanti cha* | *Tāmasāni muniśrēṣṭha phalāni vividhāni vai* | *Pancha pūjāścha dēvāmścha tathā dēvīm Sarasvatīm* | *Vadanti yāni śāstrāṇi rājasāni matāni vai* || *iti*.

There are other texts as well of a similar kind in the *Matsya Purāṇa*, the *Harita Smṛiti*, the *Pāncharātra* and other *Āgamas*. All these declare that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of a *tāmasa* nature. If so, then the doubt arises, how could Śiva be entitled to Para Brahmatva, beyond being only one of the Trinity and entitled to the Rudra Dharma (of destruction) which is of a *tāmasa* nature? Such a statement should not be taken as evidence of *tāmasatva*, because the *Matsya Purāṇa* itself having already been stated to be of a *tāmasa* character, the statements appearing in such a *Purāṇa* cannot be admitted as proof (for the *tāmasa* nature of *Śiva Purāṇas*). Again, in the *Pāncharātra* and other *Āgamas*, a contradictory statement is seen stating that Agni is of a *rājasa* character, as in texts like *Brahmēndra Sūrya Chandrāgni parā rājasa sambhavāḥ* | <sup>271</sup> *iti*, etc. There is, therefore, a contradiction between the statements made in the *Matsya Purāṇa* and the *Pāncharātra Āgama*. They both, therefore, become necessarily *apramāṇya* and cannot be held to be proofs (of the *tāmasa* character of the *Śiva Purāṇas*).

Further, texts such as, *Brāhmaṇūnām Agnir agrē prathamō dēvatānām* | *Yāvajjīvam agnihōtram juhuyāt* | *Archata prārchata* | *Triyambakam yajāmahē* | *Antar ichchhanti tam janē* | *Rudram parō manīṣhayā gridhnanti jihvayāsasam* | *Yō vai svām dēvatām atiyajatē* | *iti*, etc.,

<sup>271</sup> This contradicts the statement of the *Matsya Purāṇa* that the *Āgnēya Purāṇa* is of a *tāmasa* character.

clearly state that Rudra and Agni should be chiefly worshipped, else one is to be considered sinful. Also the statements in *Sruti* text like *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ*; *Vishṇuḥ kshatriyānām adhipatiḥ* | *iti*, etc., clearly explain that if one does not duly worship his own deity, then he will have to undergo *naraka*, for failing to do as prescribed. This proves that if the worship of Rudra and Agni is not carried out, it will end in the casting of oneself out of the four castes (*varṇa chatushtaya*). Therefore such invented statements, which contradict the Vēdic principles, should not be agreed to by those who dispute with the aid of the *Vēdas*.

The *Sūtra* text, *Attā charāchāra grahaṇāt*<sup>272</sup> and *Sruti* texts like *Yasya Brahma cha kshatram cha ubhē bhavata ṍdanah* | *iti*, etc., clearly show that *samhāra* (or destruction) is held to be the characteristic of Para Brahman. If that view is not accepted, then it will end in *abrahmatva* for Vishṇu.

Texts<sup>273</sup> like *Rudrō vā ēsha yadagni stasyaitē tanuvau aghōrānyāśivānyēti* | *Aghōrēbhyō' tha ghōrēbhyō* | *iti*, etc., declare that Īśvara by His Aghōra face creates and protects, being the chief agent and by that fearful form of his face, he destroys the creation, which proves that He alone is the chief cause of the three functions of Creation, Protection and Destruction and hence Para Brahmatva is His.

Moreover texts<sup>274</sup> such as *Yā tē Rudra śivā tanūr aghōrā pāpakāśinī* | *iti* and others declare that Paramēśvara showed his beautiful form comprising of *śuddha sāttvika* character under the Śiva Śarīra form, through prayers (offered by his devotees).

Further, texts like *Prapanchōpaśaman*<sup>275</sup>, *śāntam Sivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē* |<sup>275</sup> *Umāśahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam* | *iti*

<sup>272</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, I. 2. 9.

<sup>273</sup> *Rudrachamaka* of the *Yajurveda*.

<sup>274</sup> *Rudrachamaka* of the *Yajurveda*.

<sup>275</sup> *Kaivalya Upa*.

and others state that Śiva alone keeps his mildest form of *sāttvika*, while the most cruel form of the *tāmasa* character applies only to Kāla Rudra. It is well known from the *Vēda Sāstra* that even Kāla Rudra is of a higher order than Viṣṇu, because Kāla Rudra belongs to Śivāmśa. The *Srutis* also support the same view.

In texts like *Parāt parataram Brahma tatparāt paratō Hariḥ* | *Yatparāt paratō Īśaḥ tanmē manaḥ śivasan-kalpamastu* <sup>276</sup> *Ajāmēkām lōhitaśuklakrishṇām* | *iti*, etc., Paramēśvara is described as having the triple qualities of the *prākṛita śakti*.<sup>277</sup> And therefore if Nārāyaṇa is held to possess the *sattvaguna* character of Brahman, the argument becomes fallacious, and *aprākṛita Para-Brahmatva*<sup>278</sup> as described in all *Vēda Sāstras* will become disproved.

According to the *Jābālōpanishad*, the text *Sukla-dhyānaparāyana* | *iti*, lays down that one who is desirous of *mōksha* (*mumukshu*) should meditate only upon the bright and pure Rudra (*i.e.*, possessing the *sukla* form, *i.e.*, white complexion). Again, in the *Sūta Samhitā* and the *Sūta Gītā*, the following text is found :—

*Asti Rudrasya viprēndrā antaḥ sattvam bahistamaḥ* |  
*Viṣṇōrantas tamaḥ sattvam bahirasti rajōgūṇaḥ* ||  
*Antarbahiścha viprēndrā asti tasya Prajāpatēḥ* |  
*Rajasā lamasā krāntau Brahma-Nārāyaṇau khalu* ||

Also in the *Śiva Dharma Sāstra*, it is observed :—

*Antaḥ sattvagunōpētō bahistāmasasamyutah* |  
*Suddha sāttvika ityuktah Sankarō lōkaśankarah* ||  
*Antastāmasasamyuktō bahiḥ sattvagunānvitah* |  
*Suddha tāmasa ityuktō Viṣṇuśśākshāt Sriyaḥpatiḥ* | *iti*.

These texts prove that Īśvara belongs to a higher order than Brahma and Viṣṇu. Further, from the following passage occurring in the *Sūta Samhitā*, *Śivarahasya khaṇḍa* :—

<sup>276</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XII. 2.

<sup>277</sup> Brahmatva fully supported by the *Vēdas*.

<sup>278</sup> Brahmatva not supported by the *Vēdas*.

*Daśa Saiva purāṇāni sātत्वikāni vidur budhāḥ ।*  
*Sraddhēyāni dvijavaraiḥ tēshām dharmāstu tatra yat ॥*  
*Sattvam śuddham samādishṭam sukha gnānūspadam*  
*tu yat ।*  
*Vidyōpadēshṭā yōgibhyaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasannibhaḥ ॥*  
*Na nidrāti Śivāḥ kvāpi Brāhmaṇādhipatiḥ Śivāḥ ।*  
*Bruvantyēvam purāṇāni Brāhmaṇānām kathāḥ śubhāḥ ॥*  
*Daśa Saiva purāṇāni himsā dōshaparāṇi cha ।*  
*Vaiṣṇavāni cha chatvāri tāmasāni munīśvarāḥ ॥*  
*Kṣatriyaṇām śrutā dharmāḥ tēshu taddēvatā Hariḥ ।*  
*Tamaḥ kṛishṇam udāsīnam kūlakṛityaviśārudaḥ ॥*  
*Nidrālasya pramāḍādi panchadhā syāttu tāmasāḥ ।*  
*Nidrālasya pramāḍādyāḥ tadgunāḥ parikīrtitāḥ ॥*  
*Kṛishṇō Viṣṇuḥ smṛitaḥ śēshaśūyī bhakti vimōhakaḥ ।*  
*Ētēshu kṣatriyaṇām cha dharmā vipṛā udūhritāḥ ॥*  
*Brāhmē tu rājasē vaiśyadharmaiḥ sarvatra sammatē ।*  
*Duḥkhāspadam raktavarṇam chanchalam cha rajōmatam ॥*  
*Guṇatrayasamāyuktam āgnēyam sauram ēva cha ।*  
*Tasmāt Saivāni vipṛāṇām purāṇāni hitāni vai ॥ iti,*

it is seen that only *Śiva Purāṇas* are of an absolute *sāttvika* character. Moreover, if it is argued that *Śiva Purāṇas* are of ancient origin treating of matters going back to previous *kalpas*,<sup>279</sup> then, it should be held as being inconsistent. For it is said in the *Matsya* and other *Purāṇas* :—

*Purāṇam sarva sūstrāṇām prathamam Brahmanā*  
*kṛitam ।*  
*Anantaram tu vaktṛēbhyō Vēdāstasya vinirgatūḥ ॥*  
*Purāṇam ēkamēvāsīt śatakōṭipravistaram ॥ iti.*

<sup>279</sup> The argument may be thus amplified :—If *Śiva Purāṇas* are of ancient origin and can be held to treat of matters going back even to previous *kalpas* and be held at the same time as not treating matter of the present *kalpa* and thus become inapplicable to the latter, then such an argument becomes inconsistent. The *Śiva Purāṇas* cannot be both ancient and unauthoritative.

The *Purāṇas*, whose first author was Brahma, were latterly, about the end of the *Dvāpara Yuga*, abridged by *Vēdavyāsa* into 4 lakhs of verses (from *Satakōṭi* verses). Similarly it is said in the *Dharma Samhitā* :—

*Brāhmanam ēva kritē chādyē purāṇam śruti sammatam ।  
Aṣṭādaśavidham tasya kritam kōṭi prabhēdataḥ ॥ iti.*

And therefore the *Śiva Purāṇas* cannot be held to be old or as belonging to *kalpāntara*. Moreover, if it is held that according to the *Mātsya*, *Kūrma*, *Varāha*, etc., *Purāṇas* that *Nārāyaṇa*, because by his *avatars* of *Matsya*, *Kūrma* and *Varāha*, removed all the evil opponents on the face of the world and established righteousness and therefore that He alone should be reckoned as bearing a *śāttvika* character and that He alone is entitled to that character, then we say that it is not so. Because in the *Kūrma Purāṇa*, in the chapter treating of *Ēkādaśi*, it is said :—

*Ēkādaśyām tu madhyānḥ māghamāsē Mahānataḥ ।  
Sarvalōkahitārthāya viśham bhuktvā tataḥ Śivaḥ ॥  
Śivayōgēna tadrātrau sthitvā chandrakalādharaḥ ।  
Parivēśhita Viśṇuvādīn drishṭvā tatpādasēvakān ॥  
Upōshita mahābhaktūn dvādaśyām Nīlalōhitaḥ ।  
Samudramathanōdbhūta sudhāpānārthamādarāt ।  
Āgnūm chakrē Mahādēvaḥ sarvalōka bhayāpahaḥ ॥ iti.*

From which it is learnt that *Paramēśvara*, with his unrivalled prowess did perform the *kālakūṭa bhakṣhaṇa* and bring about the destruction of *Andhakāsura*, *Jalandharāsura*, *Tripurāsura*, *Vyāghrāsura*, *Gajāsura*, *Sūrapadmāsura*, and others and thereby relieved the whole world of evil perpetrators. Accordingly, it is said in the *Purāṇas* and *Āgamas* that the *Ēkādaśi Vrata* should be strictly observed both by the *Śaivas* and the *Vaishṇavas*. It is also said in the *Śiva Dharma Sāstra* :—

*Saiva Vaishṇavayōrgṛāhyam ēkādaśyām upōshaṇam ।  
Nandīśa Viśṇupramukhā yatō vratamathācharan ॥  
Sēsham pradhānam Smārtānām ēkādaśyām upōshaṇam ।  
Sāyam pradhānam Śaivānām Vēdamargaikavartinām ॥ iti.*

And further in the *Siddhāntāgama*, it is said :—

*Pradōsha vyāpinī Śaivī samyak ēkādaśī smritā ।  
Nānyā śaivaiḥ parigrāhyā śaiva śāstraika śūsanāt ॥ iti.*

Also it is said in the *Vīrāgama* :—

*Sarvēśhām Vīraśaivānām śrauta smārtānūvartinām ।  
Pradōsha vyāpinī grāhyā sāmyagēkādaśī Śivē ॥  
Śaivavratānām śarvēśhām sāyamprādhānyamēva hi ।  
Anyathācharaṇē dēvi pratyavāyō mahān bhavēt ॥ iti.*

Moreover, even though the *Padma* and other *Purāṇas* proclaim the greatness of Viṣṇu, even in them the qualities of Śiva are greatly extolled. Then why not those *Purāṇas* also be said to be possessed of *tāmasa* character.

In the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, it is said<sup>280</sup>:—*Traiguṇya-kātmakā Vēdā nīstraiguṇyō bhavārjuna । iti.* Even the *Vēdas* are of a triple character (i.e., *Sattva*, *Rājasa* and *Tāmasa*). Therefore the *Srutis* constantly describe the trinitarian character of God (*mūrti-traya*). And if it is said that therefore the triple character is what is to be understood from the *Vēda*, then, we say it is not so. For it is said in the *Srutis*, *Vāchā virūpa nityayā । iti*, from which it follows that though the *Sruti* is immortal, the character of the *Vēdas* is likewise trinitarian. Moreover, *Sruti* texts like *Śivam praśāntam amṛitam Brahma-yōnim । iti* declare Śiva as the most *sāttvika* (*parama sāttvika*) of the triple character described in the *Vēdas*. And the other qualities apply to the different classes of duties of the *sthūla* and *sūkshma* characters confined in the trinity, as explained in the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yōga Śāstras* and by which *Paramēśvara* should be meditated upon and worshipped. No other meaning should be attached. Further what is the meaning to be attached to *tāmasatva*? Should we understand that it (*tāmasatva*) indicates the origin of *tamōguṇa* (i.e., ignorance) or does it mean that it is co-related with the other two (*sattva* and *rajas*) *guṇas*? Or does it mean that it is independent of the other two *guṇas*? Or is it completely devoid of the other two *guṇas*?

<sup>280</sup> In the current version of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the verse runs “*Traiguṇya vishayā vēda*” etc., see *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 45. Elsewhere, Śrīpati adopts the latter reading; see text, p. 42. For the reading *Traiguṇyakātmaka*, see text, p. 41.

or trying to change the character of the other two *guṇas*? Or does it really describe *tāmasa* only as being the chief character, and as being above the other two? It cannot be the first; because Paramēśvara, who is himself above all the triple qualities and from whom the *Vēdas* exuded, would assume a transcendent character (*anītyatva*) and become subject to delusion and human weaknesses. And *Vishṇu* and other *Purāṇas* which treat about *chit* and *achit prapanchas* and the triple qualities of *Vishṇu* would also have to be treated as of a *tāmasa* character. *Tāmasa* cannot be attributed to one only among many of the same nature. Nor can it be the second, because all the qualities of God are of such a nature that *Tamōguṇa* cannot be seen prevailing as a prominent character. Nor can it be said that it is the third. In the *Sruti* text *Yadā tamastanna divā na rātrir nasan nachāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ* 1 *iti*, Śiva is proclaimed to be ever pure without even a speck of *tāmasa* character about him. Nor can it be the fourth, because it is said in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*: *Asṭadaśa-purāṇānām kartā Satyavatīśutaḥ* 1 *Ākhyānaischāpyu-pākhyanaiḥ gāthābhiḥ kalpaśuddhibhiḥ* 2 *Purāṇasamhitām chakrē purāṇārthaviśāradaḥ* 1 *iti*. Out of the 18 *Purāṇas* composed by Vyāsa not one of them can be classed as belonging to *tāmasa* character. Else if one is of a *tāmasa* character, all must be of the same (*tāmasa*) class, according to the maxim of equal justice (*tulya nyāya-tvāt*). Nor can it be the fifth. If Rudra is by reason of his function of destruction, for which he is responsible, to be described as possessing a *tāmasa* character, as declared in all the *Sāstras*, then it is urged that it is not so. Because *Vishṇu* will then be rendered devoid of the function of destruction which he is said to possess by reason of *Īśvaratva*.<sup>281</sup> By the very act of destruction, Rudra cannot

<sup>281</sup> *Īśvaratva* denotes the three-fold function of creation, preservation and destruction (*sriṣṭi, sthiti* and *laya*). If the argument is that Śiva is to be given the whole power of destruction, *Vishṇu* would lose it and his *Īśvaratva* would be gone and he would be reduced to *anīśvaratva*.

be called to possess a *tāmasa* character. If it so happens, then there will be a gradation of character for which there is no proof. Even such proofs would be involved in *tāmasa* character. The Vēdic text *Yā tē Rudra śivā tanūḥ*<sup>282</sup> prohibits the body of Śiva from containing even a particle of *tāmasa* character. Again, according to the text, *Traiguṇyavishayā vēdāḥ*, Śiva cannot be held to perpetrate any action purely of a *tāmasa* character against his *sāttvika dharma*. Moreover, if *tāmasa* character largely predominates in a particular *kalpa*, then, all works done in that *kalpa*, such as *Brahma Purāṇas*, etc., would have also to be invested with *tāmasa* character, because in those *Purāṇas* also Śiva and his character are greatly extolled. Such a suggestion is not seen throughout the *Śāstras*, according to which even the present Kalpa of Brahma which is called *Śvēta Varāha Kalpa*, should have been characterized as invested with *tāmasa* character, for which no proof is forthcoming. This Kalpa which is called the 28th one, is the one in which Vyāsa as the author of all the *Purāṇas*, is to preside. It is said thus in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*:—*Vaivasvatāntarē tasmin dvāparēshu punaḥ punaḥ | Vēdavyāsayatītāyām ashtāvimśati sattama || iti*. From this it follows that all the current *Purāṇas* were dedicated to Vyāsa as their promulgator. It is further said therein *Purāṇasamhitām chakrē Purāṇārthaviśāradaḥ || iti*. It follows that all the 18 *Purāṇas* have been in the order of their birth (*utpattikrama*) dedicated. And it is further said:—*Ētad vaiṣṇava-saṁgnām vai Padmasya samanantarām || iti*. Such are the works that were then existing. The Rāma, Krishṇa and other *Avatāras* have had their origin in the family of Raghu. The sacrifice offered by Daksha and its destruction (by Śiva) is far remote from the present Kalpa. As regards the present Kalpa and the *Purāṇas* composed during its currency—i.e., the 18 *Purāṇas* done by Vēdavyāsa—these treat of both Śaiva and Vaishṇava *Purāṇas*. And

<sup>282</sup> The text of the *Rudrachamaka* (Namaka Chamaka) continues thus:—*Yā tē Rudra Śivā tanūḥ aghōrā pāpakāśinī | tayā nastanvā vāsantā mayāgirisantā ivākasīḥ*.



therefore it is of no consequence to argue about the *tāmasa* character or otherwise of the respective *Purāṇas* in comparison with the ancient and antiquated ones of the previous Brahma Kalpa. Moreover, the act of making *Purāṇas* was ordained by Brahma in each Kalpa, denoting therein the respective events that took place in it. For example, in the Padma Kalpa, the story of Mārkaṇḍēya and Paramēśvara has been narrated, showing how Paramēśvara was graciously pleased with Mārkaṇḍēya and blessed him. Similarly, in the present Kalpa, the events regarding the *avatāras* of Rāma, Kriṣṇa, Varāha, etc., have been fully narrated, while those of Kālākūṭa Bhakṣhaṇa and Dakṣādhvara Dhvamsa and others have been merely referred to for the sake of comparison. All the Paurāṇikas agree in that statement and opine that it is of no consequence whatever to dwell upon the contradictory character of the events (of the different Kalpas) appearing in the *Purāṇas*. As each Kalpa is completed, a great distance of time intervenes between it and the preceding one. Then the question of determining how far the events are of a *sāttvika* or *tāmasa* character is not possible of solution after such a distance of time.

Nor can it be the sixth. Rudra, though connected with the ghastly form of destruction, yet has a form which is capable of being reduced to a most attractive form by the meditator. Therefore *tāmasa* character cannot be attributed to Paramēśvara. So it is said in the *Kaivalya Sruti* text:—*Umāsaḥāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam । Dhyaṭvā munirgachchhati Bhūta-yōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt ॥ iti.* From which it may be deduced that a certain person, Dēvadatta by name, though he may be tainted by *tamōguṇa*, is seen in public by his *tāmasa* behaviour. That very person, meditating upon Paramēśvara, will ultimately become quite free from his *tāmasa* nature and become quite bright, by his wisdom, through the blessing of Paramēśvara. Further in the text:—*Sthirēbhir angaiḥ pururūpa ugrō babhruḥ śuklēbhiḥ pipiṣe hiranyē ॥ iti,* the word *śukla* denotes that Śiva is completely made of *sattva* character.

Again, in the text *Lōhita śukla krishṇām* ॥ *iti*, Īśvara is said to be made up of *śukla* or *sattva* character. Therefore in all these *Purāṇas* wherever Viṣṇu is extolled to be the greatest, there also Viṣṇu is represented as being of a *tāmasa* character. Then how can Viṣṇu by his incarnations have destroyed the whole Yādava family, if he had not that *tāmasa* character in him? And how can he have exhibited himself so as to cast delusion on the Daityas when he assumed the highly deceptive forms (*mahāmōhākhyā Puruṣharūpa*) of Buddha and Jina as narrated in the *Purāṇas*? It is said in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* :—

*Ityuktvā Bhagavāmsṭēbhyō mahāmōha śarīrataḥ ।*

*Samutpādya dadau Viṣṇuḥ prāha chēdam surōttamāḥ ॥*

*Māyāmōhēyam akhilān daityāmsṭān mōhayishyati ।*

*Tatō vadhyā bhaviṣhyanti vēdamārga bahishkrutāḥ ॥ iti.*

From which it follows that if Viṣṇu had not the *tāmasa* character in him he could not have put on that *mahāmōhākhyā* form which is that *Mōhinī* form of female beauty.<sup>283</sup>

Moreover, Viṣṇu in order to finish that important task, exhibited all the *tāmasa* nature in him and brought it about. Hence he too is possessed of *tāmasa* character to a great extent, though he is not chiefly made up of it. In the same way Rudra, who has a large share of destruction to carry out, has a larger extent of *tāmasa* character in him. But if it is asked "Can it not be said that he is possessed of *tāmasa* character because of the work he does?", then the answer is, "It is not so". Just as Viṣṇu assumed the form of man-lion in order to destroy the enemy, so, in the same manner he (Viṣṇu) also should be said to have consisted of *tāmasa* character. As to Śiva, he cannot become subordinated to that predominating *tāmasa* character like all the incarnations of Viṣṇu. If it were otherwise, the evidence afforded by the Vēdic texts would become contradictory. Nor could it be the last. It assumes that whoever

<sup>283</sup> This refers to the incident in the churning of the ocean, when Viṣṇu assumes the form of *Mōhinī*, the goddess of beauty, in order to distract the demons from the nectar which was being distributed. See *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.

destroys, he possesses a *tāmasa* character. But then, should it not be said that he also has one to destroy him? If the answer is in the affirmative, then that agent should be greater than all else. Because he will be the one who destroys all—and independent (*svatantra*)—and one who has no second. And Rudra is possessed of such a nature and is therefore greater than all others, being destroyer of all others. No proof which contradicts this can be accepted. In determining points of this nature that which carries greater harmony and induces less contradiction should be accepted as *sāttvika* proof. As the maxim *Mruduḥ sarvatra bādhyatē* | *iti* (softness is always troublesome) says, nothing can be successfully overcome without *tāmasatva*. In the text *Visvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *iti*, this above maxim is amply proved, and Īśvara is shown to overcome everything by the grace of his *tāmasatva*. Therefore *sāttvika* (character) has ended in one form of *vikalpa*, contrariety. Moreover, if in any of the *Śāstras*, wherever Viṣṇu is stated to be the greater, as in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, and therein Īśvara's *sāttvika* character is also extolled to the same degree, then such *Purāṇas* will have to be characterized as tainted by *tāmasatva*. For example, in the *Padma Purāṇa*, both in the former and latter parts (*Pūrva* and *Uttara Khaṇḍas*), *tāmasatva* is more extolled in the cases of Hari and Hara. Hari is stated to be characterized by more of the *sāttvika* spirit than Śiva by his *tāmasa* spirit. Even the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavata* have to be placed in the category of *tāmasa Purāṇas*, for it is said in the *Bāla Kāṇḍa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*:—*Tvām vai dhārayitum vīra nānyam paśyāmi śūlināḥ* | *iti*. In the *Yuddha Kāṇḍa* it is said:—*Umāpatiḥ paśupatiḥ sarvalōka namaskrutāḥ* | *iti*. And in the *Uttara Khaṇḍa*, we read:—*Ētadastram balam ghōram mama vā tryambakasya vā*.

The travel to Kailāsa and the destruction of Rāvaṇa and Indrajit was mostly due to the grace of Rudra in causing his power of destruction to be given to Rāma for bringing about the end of Rāvaṇa. Even the description of this event should be said to obtain the character of

*tāmasa*. Thus the *tāmasa* character is to be found in Rāma as well. And therefore if *Śiva Purāṇas* are to be dubbed as of a *tāmasa* character, then we enter into the precincts of the Bauddha religion which is beyond the pale of the *Vēdas*. Therefore it is not useful to prolong this discussion.

In the first *Adhikaraṇa* of this work, it has been said, in respect of those who are deeply devoted to Śiva and who are secret devotees, that the word *jignāsa* covers both the phases of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* in respect of *jīva* and *Brahman*.<sup>284</sup>

For the texts *Brahmavit Brahmaiva bhavati | Īśam gnātvā tatra ěkībhavanti ||* (By knowing Brahman thoroughly becomes himself Brahman. By realizing Īśa, becomes one with him) state that the worshipper and the worshipped are not different from each other and they become one.

In the second *Adhikaraṇa*, Brahman is described to be possessed of qualities by which the creation, preservation and destruction have been brought about so as to convey a difference between *jīva* and *Īśa*. But while in the act of destruction, it is described to be just as the river joining the sea and becoming one with the ocean without any difference. In the third *Adhikaraṇa*, Paramēśvara, though he exhibits himself both in different and single forms, yet is known throughout the *Vedānta Āgamas* as one single whole, without any division and that Brahman only is real as a proof thereof.

### Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahman and Other Deities.

This fourth *Adhikaraṇa*, *Samanvayādhikaraṇam*, is begun in order to clear the clouds of doubt and confusion that arise from the study of the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta*, viz., that while Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahman is being declared throughout (as the Supreme Lord) whether Indra, Upēndra,

<sup>284</sup> That is, they realize *Paraśiva Brahman* while in the form of *jīva* (i.e., human form) ; *jignāsa* means the attainment of Śivahood while still in *jīva* form.

Dinēndra or Chandra, or any of the several other deities should be considered as one with Paraśiva or as different from Him. In order to clearly establish this point this fourth *Sūtra* (I. 1. 4.) *Tat tu samanvayāt* (*That but by reconciliation*) is laid down. The word *tat* should be understood to establish that *Shatsthala Paraśiva Brahman*, who is touched upon throughout the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* as the primæval cause of everything (*Sarva kārana vēdānta vēdya pūrva parāmrishta shatsthala Paraśiva Brahmaiva*).

The word *tu* destroys all evidence that is visible to the eye. By the word *samanvaya*, it is clearly taught on the principle of the *Sthūlārundhatīnyāya* that Śiva, who is of the *Aṁśa* of Indra, Chandra, Upēndra, Dinēndra, etc., is throughout the *Śāstras* Supreme Lord.<sup>285</sup>

And therefore the meaning of the *Sūtra* is that on the whole, disallowing all the ocular proofs and taking all the *Vēda-Vēdānta* proofs according to the *Shadvidhalinga-tātparya*, Śiva is *that* (i.e., the chief) *Brahman* (*tat Brahma*). Here the matter for proof is whether the *Sūtra* points out that *Sarva Vēda-Vēdānta* should be depended upon.

*Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* <sup>286</sup> | *Ēkam ēva advitīyam Brahma*,<sup>287</sup> *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* | *Asankhyātāḥ sahasrāṇi smaryatē na cha driśyatē* <sup>288</sup> | *Dēvā ha vai svargam lōkam agaman* | *Tē dēvā rudram apruchchhan* | *Kō bhavān iti* | *So'bravūt* | *Aham ēkaḥ prathamam āsam* | *Vartāmi cha bhaviṣyāmi cha* | *Nānyaḥ kaśchin mattō vyatiriktaḥ* | *Sō'ntarūdantaram prāviṣat* | <sup>289</sup> *Ritam satyam param brahma puruṣam kṛṣṇaṅgingalam* | *Ūrdhva-rētam virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* | *Sarvē vēdā yat padam āmananti* | *iti*, which are of a *bhēdābhēda*

<sup>285</sup> The six ways of proof for fixing an argument are:—*Upakrama* with *Upasamhāra*, *Abhyāsa*, *Apūrvaṭā*, *Phalam*, *Arthavāda*, and *Upapatti*. These are, in logic, collectively known as *Shadvidhalinga-tātparya*. For the *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya*, see ante, page 273, footnote No. 107.

<sup>286</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>287</sup> *Atharva Upa.*

<sup>288</sup> *Atharva Upa.*

<sup>289</sup> *Mahōpanishad*, X. II.

character, denote the purport of *sarva vēda-vēdānta* expressions which speak in favour of Śiva being the Paraśiva Brahman for creation, etc., and for *śaṭsthala*. The great argumentative doubt is whether the word *Samanvaya* includes in its purview deities (like) Indra, Upēndra, etc., and the different forms of God worshipped or whether *Prakṛiti* is meant, of which Śiva is the Overlord.

Perhaps we may argue that Paraśiva is not meant to be the chief Brahman. The *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is: Never at any time can Paraśiva be considered to be Parabrahman; nor do the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* anywhere declare Him to be so. Because the *Vēdas* are entirely devoted to the practice of attaining Brahman, the doubt arises on both sides (regarding Paraśiva being Brahman).<sup>290</sup> Further, the Brahman that could be attained through practice (*Jagad Brahmanoh*) is generally sought by realization through objects and motives (*kārya kāraṇatva*) by several ways and means until *Brahma Siddhi* is attained. Therefore it is not purely on *Vēdānta* alone that one can depend upon for realizing the Brahman.<sup>291</sup> Furthermore, it is also right that the *Vēda* should describe the several kinds of worship and the several deities to be worshipped according to it. For example, in the Vēdic texts :—

*Agniragrē prathamō dēvatānām |*

*Asāvādityō Brahma |*

<sup>290</sup> Śrīpati says that two Brahmas should be considered in two ways *Pratipādita Brahma* and *Vidhipūrvaka Brahma*. That *Para Brahma* should be proved in two ways: (1) through *Śāstra Samanvaya*, and (2) from *Vidhi* or *Āchāra Samanvaya*. Both must coincide.

<sup>291</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha's commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, Chapter II, where the nature of the *Vēda* and the *Vēdānta* are described with reference to the ways and means of attaining the Brahman. Ānandatīrtha distinguishes between the *Vēda*, which, he says, lay down the practice (*Dharma*) to be followed to realize (Para Brahman) and the *Vēdānta*, which, he says, shows the reason why the practice (*Dharma*) should be adopted in order to realize Para Brahman. In other words, the *Vēda* prescribes the course of conduct, while the *Vēdānta* assigns the reason for the same.

*Tadvishṇor ēkam uttamam ।*

*Nārāyaṇaḥ Param Brahma । iti ॥*

And in similar other texts such as :—

*Saishā vichitrā sudriḍhā bahvamkurā svayam guṇa-  
bhinnā ankurēshvapi guṇabhinnā । Sarvatra Brahma  
Vishṇu Sivarūpinī ।*

*Ajāmēkām lōhita śukla krishṇām bahvīm prajāṃ jana-  
yantīm sarūpām ॥ iti ॥ etc.*

Brahman is denoted to be the Supreme Being, declared in all *Vēdānta* as the prime cause and as *Pradhāna-Prakṛiti*. These therefore are the different forms of Brahman as declared throughout the *Vēdānta* and adopted in practice (for realization). Moreover, if the realization of Brahman which is the highest of all attainments, is reduced to mere dependence upon useless things and to what is seen in the everyday world—such as *ayam ghataḥ*, *ayam pataḥ* (this pot, this cloth) etc., which are of a transitory (or destructive) nature, then Brahman becomes a matter of uselessness and one never deserving to be aspired for with so much effort and religious meditation. In order to obviate these two great defects, the *Vēda* prescribes the *vidhi* for working out the realization (of Brahman) as stated in the *Vēdānta*. Or, if it reduces itself to this, *viz.*, that by working through certain prescribed methods, one could realize the Brahman, then, we lay down the following as the *Siddhānta*:—The *Vēdānta* generally treats of Brahman; it also shows how to realize Brahman; and it further lays down the rules of action (required for it). Thus, there is no fault regarding the statements made in the *Vēdānta* because both these <sup>292</sup> are brought about by the actual *vidhi* prescribed by the *Vēdas*. We have to understand the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta* in the following manner. The *Vēdas* prescribe the method of action to realize Brahman under six heads, *viz.*, *Upakrama*, etc. <sup>293</sup> For example, *Sṛuti* texts like *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavyaḥ*

<sup>292</sup> That is *Brahman* and how to realize *Brahman*.

<sup>293</sup> See note 285 on p. 369.

*śrōtavyō mantavyo nididhyāsitaṣṭayaḥ* | <sup>294</sup> *iti* || show the particular way that should be adopted to realize Brahman. In the *Smṛiti* text *Upakramōpasamhārau abhyāsō'pūrvatā-phalam* | *Ārthavādōpapattī cha lingam tātparyanirṇayē* | *iti*, || <sup>295</sup> the several methods which are the ways and means by which Brahman might be realized from the start to the finish are laid down in detail as declared in the *Vēdānta*. And therefore one should start from enquiring and hearing about the method, as laid down in the text: *Agnānāt prabhavam duḥkham gnānam tasya nivartakam* | *Sarvavēdāntavākyaṇām śravaṇam tatpravar-takam* | *Śravaṇam nāma vākyaṇām vaidikānām parātparē* | *Upakramādibhir lingaiḥ kṛita tātparya niśchayam* || *iti*.

Thus *Agnāna* is the cause of all misery and *Gnāna* is the way to get out of it. And this is realized first by initiating an inquiry into and hearing about Brahman. Those statements which bind one to hear and understand that great Brahman described in the *Vēdas* clearly state that one should start by knowing the cause and the effect by inferences. And therefore discussion is the first step to gain knowledge of the chief cause and the final effect. The text *Sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt* | *iti*, <sup>296</sup> indicates the first starting point. Then the text *Sa ya ēśhō'ṇimaitadū-tmyamidam sarvam sa ātmā tat tvam asi* (*Śvētakēto*) | *iti* <sup>297</sup> denotes the final effect. Again, the text *Tattvamasi* is also a subject for discussion and study. Further, the text *Tam tvaupanishadam puruṣham pruchchhāmi* | *iti*, provides the several proofs in the *Upanishad* and the *Vēdānta* to know the Puruṣa (i.e., Para Brahman). Finally, texts like *Yēnāśrutam śrutam bhavati* | *iti*, and *Ēka vighnānēna sarva vighnānam phalam* | <sup>298</sup> *Sēyam dēvataikshata* | *Hantūham*

<sup>294</sup> *Bṛihad. Uṇ., II. 4. 5.*

<sup>295</sup> This follows the usual reading. For a different one, where the words *Ādimadhyānta sangānām* takes the place of *Upakramōpasamhāra*, see Śrī Kumāra's commentary on Bhōjadēva's *Tattvaṇṇakāśa* (Tri. Skt. Series, 68).

<sup>296</sup> *C'ch. Uṇ., VI. 2. 1.*

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid., VI. 14. 3.*

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid., VI. 3. 2.*



*imāḥ tisrō dēvatāḥ anēna jīvēna ātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpē vyākaravaṇi* | *iti*, and others provide for the understanding of *Srisṭi*, *sthiti* and *samhāra*, and other kinds of manifestations and disappearances.

For example, the text <sup>299</sup> *Yathā saumyaikēna mritpinḍēna sarvaṁ mriṇmayam vignātam syāt* | *iti*, provides an instance by way of illustration. Similarly, we have to understand in other places. In the case of Nārāyaṇa, the text *Aṇōraṇīyān mahatō mahīyān* | <sup>300</sup> *iti*, is the beginning. The text *Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ* provides for the final conclusion. Also, texts like *Yaḥ paraḥ sa Mahēśvaraḥ* | *Ambikāpatayē Umāpatayē Paśupatayē namō namaḥ* | *iti*, etc., <sup>301</sup> provide for the study (of the whole meaning of the *Vēdānta*).

Texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* | *iti*, declare that Rudra is the greatest of all and above the whole universe.

Texts like *Parāmrītāt parimuchyanti sarvē* | *iti*, etc., provide for the grasping of the *phalam*, i.e., final realization (result) of the *Vēdāntic* study.

Texts like *Sahasraśīrsham* | <sup>302</sup> *iti*, and others provide for *arthavāda* (discussion of the *Upanishads*).

Texts like *Yasmātparam nāparamasti kinchit* | *iti*, prove for *Upapatti* (argument). Agreeably to this, throughout the *Vēdānta*, the hidden characteristic of Brahman is indicated by the neutral (passive) qualities (*tatastha lakṣhaṇa*) of things. Just as an object is clearly realized by viewing it directly with one's own eyes, similarly the *Vēdānta* as a whole gives for realization the characteristic of Paraśiva Brahman. Therefore there is no contradiction either way. The *Sruti* text *Naishā tarkēṇa matirōpanēyā* | *iti*, <sup>303</sup> declares that Brahman cannot be

<sup>299</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>300</sup> *Katha. Upa.*, II. 20.

<sup>301</sup> *Mahōpanishad*, XIII. 18.

<sup>302</sup> The full text is :—*Sahasraśīrsham dēvaṁ viśvākṣhaṁ viśva-sambhavam* | *Viśvaṁ Nārāyaṇaṁ dēvaṁ akṣharam paramam padam* ||

<sup>303</sup> *Katha. Upa.*, II. 9.

realized by the knowledge obtained through discussion and therefore the three forms of discussion fall to the ground. As through inference it is not possible to realize Brahman or the truth about him, inference ought not to be relied upon. Again, texts like *Viśvam bhūtam bhuvanam chitram bahudhā jātam jāyamānam cha yat | Sarvō hyēsha Rudraḥ tasmai Rudrāya namō astu | iti*, etc., clearly point to the material cause of the world. Also, the text beginning with *Umāsaḥāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum | iti*, and ending with *Sa ēva Viṣṇuḥ sa prāṇaḥ sa Kālōgniḥ | sa Chandramāḥ | Sa ēva sarvam yadbhūtam yachcha bhavyam sanātanam | Dhyātvā tannrityum atyēti nānyaḥ panthā vimuktayē || iti*, sufficiently proves that throughout the *Vēdānta* Paraśiva alone is Brahman and that He alone should be meditated upon in order to realize *mōksha*. Texts like *Yō Rudrō'gnāu | iti*, etc., also declare as the purport of all the *Vēdas* that Śiva is enshrined in all (mundane) things. And therefore He is the subject treated of as the Chief Brahman and declared to be such throughout the *Vēdānta*. This does not conflict with the worshipping of different kinds of deities, high, middle or low (or good, indifferent or bad).

The *Smṛiti* text *Bhēdābhēdātmiḥ śaktiḥ Brahmanishṭhā sanātanā | iti*, states that the chief characteristic inherent in *vahni* (giving light and heat) is that of Brahman. These agencies (such as fire, etc.) are powerless without their respective *śaktis* invested in them by Brahman (as his chief agents). Therefore Brahman possesses power above all these agencies. Just as the father gladdens his heart by the joyous words he speaks to his child and obtains replies from it and feels happy over them <sup>301</sup>—which we generally see and experience in the world—so Brahman imparts his own power among his respective agents—

<sup>304</sup> This idea is found worked up in the *Harikathāmṛitasāra*, 3rd *Sandhi*, in this manner: when a father dresses up his child in a becoming way and feels glad at the sight presented by it, though the child has no idea of it, so Brahman gives his blessings to those who are dependent on Him.

Fire, Sun, Moon, etc.—and points them to the world as his chief agents, who primarily would have been nothing of consequence without his special power (invested in them). This is not merely an antiquated practice but also is current (to-day) among parents who we find saying (to their children) “This is a pot,” “This is a piece of cloth,” in order to give them a clear knowledge of the several objects we perceive around us. Further, just as those who are learned in the *Kāvya*s and *Alamkāras* teach their disciples their views in order that they might grasp the whole meaning by illustrations, all statements made in the *Vēdānta* prove nothing but the existence of Brahman.

Moreover, the realization of Brahman being inevitable anyhow, a knowledge of the *Sāstras* is shown to be of little use, and renders action the only desideratum. Nor does it give the fruit of freeing oneself from bondage. Then, whether bondage is separate from Brahman or one with Brahman will have to be understood. Then, whether it is eternal or illusory (has also to be understood). (It is) not the first, because in that case, *Śakti* will have to be separated from Paraśiva which results in the abandonment of *Advaita*. Nor can it be the second, because human beings, who in fact are subject to the bondage of illusion (*Māyāpāśa*), will not have any chance for absolution (*mōksha*) left for them. For *Māyā* being removed, no attempt is necessary for any one to attain Brahman. Nor even the last one. For Paramēśvara being available at all times, one who wishes *mōksha* will never put forth any attempt by his exertions towards attaining it. Then there will be no difference made between *bandha* (bondage) and *mōksha* (absolution). Then if one asserts that there is no necessity whatever in trying to discuss and understand the *Vēdānta* to know Brahman, then we say, it is not so. Paramēśvara who is ever composed of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) is different from the three *guṇas* themselves. And therefore no sooner the *jīva* is freed from the fetters of the said three *guṇas*, he will be no more separate from Śiva but naturally get embodied with Śiva and become one with him, who is never apart from

*chitsakti*.<sup>305</sup> Even though *Māyāpāśa* (the bondage of illusion) is true, yet *mōksha* need not be despaired of, as it is inevitable. Therefore the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine should be accepted. There is no contradiction in accepting this doctrine. The text *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, and the text *Brahmabhāvanakāmō Brahmavēdanam kuryāt* | *iti*, He who desires to become Brahman should know Brahman well<sup>306</sup> and others like it sufficiently prove the above view.

As *Avidyā* produces *mōha* (delusion) and is absolutely different from *chitsakti* (mental power or intellectual capacity) until the *jīva* is free from *Avidyā*, the practice of religious meditation (*upāsana*) must continue in order that the fetters of *Avidyā* may be broken and Śiva reached.<sup>307</sup> Then what is meant by *release (nivṛttir nāma)* from *Māyā* is to *end oneself by ceasing to be the cause of Māyā* (*Chit śaktau tatkārinībhūta layaḥ*) and becoming one in the domain of knowledge. According to the maxim *Nāśaḥ kāraṇalayaḥ* (destruction is only the cause for displacement from one place to another), it may be argued that the material and the non-material world (*charācchara prapañcha*) being constantly the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*), release from *Avidyā* (illusion) cannot possibly be had at all and therefore even for those who know Brahman, it would not be possible to get themselves freed from the shackles of the bondage of *Samsāra* (*Samsāra pravṛttiḥ sambhavati*). It, however, cannot be argued so. Because the *Sruti*

<sup>305</sup> The *jīva* while not free from the three *guṇas* is separate from Brahman (i.e., in a dual state). There is, therefore, *Advaitahāni*, i.e., abandonment of *Advaita* in that state. When the *jīva* frees himself from the three *guṇas*, he is no longer separate from Brahman, i.e., he loses his duality. The duality goes and he becomes one with Śiva, who is ever with *chitsakti* (i.e., mental power). That is, *Advaita* state is reached when the *jīva* is freed from the three *guṇas*.

<sup>306</sup> In order to become Brahman, know (or understand) Brahman well. When Brahman is well known, you will become Brahman.

<sup>307</sup> Until he breaks the fetters and joins Śiva, he is separate from Śiva. The *Dvaita* doctrine prevails till then. And the way to reach *Advaita* is through *upāsana* or religious meditation.

text *Anīśayā śōchati muhyamānaḥ* । *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati* ।<sup>308</sup> *Nacha punarāvartatē nacha punarāvartatē* । *iti* and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts like it teach that he who fully recognizes Brahman by his knowledge will become Brahman Himself, being freed from bondage for ever. It must not be said that by the mere use of the word Brahman it simply means mere understanding of Brahman and not becoming one with him, as it is not expressly said so. Just as by the mere chanting of a *mantra* one readily becomes cognizant of the deity to whom his offering is directly due, similarly at the very time of the offering of the sacrificial object, which is to be offered simultaneously with the chanting of the *mantra*, in order to secure the complete realization of the fruit of the sacrifice, in the *Vēdānta*, the *prayōga vidhi*<sup>309</sup> thus binds one's action in realizing Brahman. In this instance, the principle denoted in the declaration of the *Vēdānta* is not in contradiction with actual practice. If the doubt is raised as to how the declarations in the *Vēdānta*, which while they do not point to the various stages of development in *karma* which help to attain wisdom, could be held to render the realization of Brahman by merely applying the principles of practice, we reply, it is not so. *Sruti* texts like *Amritasya dēva dhāraṇō bhūyāsam* । *iti* declare decisively and without doubt that by the mere application of the principles of *karma*, such as the wearing of the *Sivalinga* on the body and the holding fast to one's dedication vow (*dīkshā*) will enable one to immediately perceive Brahman and realize him.

Also, texts like *Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaschāntē viśvamāyānivrittih* । *Gnātvā dēvam muchyatē*

<sup>308</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>309</sup> Literally, the principle or method of application. The meaning is that when an oblation is offered in the fire, the deity to whom it is offered is thought of simultaneously. Similarly in the *Vēdānta*, through a particular *karma* (method of action), a particular aspect of Brahman is known and according to the text *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati*, Brahman is attained simultaneously. There is no interval of time between the "knowing" of Brahman and the "attaining" of Brahman.

*sarva pāśaiḥ* | *iti* <sup>310</sup> lay down that one becomes eligible for *mōksha* by closely meditating upon Paraśiva and investing oneself with the *Śivalinga*. According to the *Rātrisattra nyāya* (offering of sacrifices in the night),<sup>311</sup> one who is desirous of *mōksha* should at once adorn himself with the *Rudrāksha* (beads) and invest himself with the *Śivalinga* and dedicate himself with the *Sāmbhava dīkshā* and then get at the *Shaṭsthala Paraśiva Brahmagnāna* in order to realize Brahman. As *Sruti* texts like *Ātmā vā'rē drashtavya* | *iti*,<sup>312</sup> do not clearly prescribe any particular principle for attaining *Brahmagnāna*, therefore it may be said that the principles laid down in the *Vēdānta* may lead one to blind action without actually helping to the realization of Brahman, who is *nirvikāra* (unchangeable). Or even it may be said that because the laws of procedure (*vidhi*) being declared, action is inevitable and therefore one is obliged to act up according to the principles laid down, in order to realize Brahman as a compulsory measure, though Brahman is not changeable. Moreover, in order to attain Brahman, it is not right to see a substitute for meditation acting on the basis of the *Saktu nyāya* <sup>313</sup> as illustrated in the expression *Saktunā juhōti* | *iti* and other texts. In trying to realize Brahman, the never-changeable, it is not right to adopt a different method of application in meditation out of mere jealousy. Whatever be the nature of the principles adopted for attaining Brahman in the different methods according to the *Vidhi*, one who is earnest about realizing *mōksha* should adopt an indisputable method free from contradiction. If it is asked then which is that particular way which is not beset with

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<sup>310</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 8.

<sup>311</sup> According to this maxim all the sacrifices that should have been performed during the day might be performed during the night, if one has been rendered unable to perform them during the day. Otherwise he becomes a *Karmabhrashṭa*.

<sup>312</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 5.

<sup>313</sup> *Saktu* is the flour of barley first fried and then ground and offered in sacrifice.

contradiction, we would answer that the following three methods deserve contradiction. According to the *Vēdānta*, Brahman cannot be realized just as we realize a pot placed in the presence of our eyes. Generally speaking, even though one dislikes (to see it), yet he does see a pot as soon as his eyes catch hold of it and thereby he realizes the object. But in *Vēdānta*, the realization of Brahman must be obtained through the various proofs and inferences drawn by the expressions therein in order to get at a firm knowledge regarding Brahman before actually realizing him. Brahman cannot be realized in any other way. Of course, we find in various sacrificial *Vidhis*, as in the text *Samidhō yajati | iti*, that by way of offering sacrifice Brahman can be realized. Even in such instances, one must have a firm knowledge both in *Vēdānta* and in sacrificial functions in order to realize Brahman as the result of sacrifice. But one should not say that while *Vēdānta* offers *Brahmagnāna* through correct knowledge, that there is not the slightest use of following the *Vidhis* (relating to the offering of sacrifices) on the pretext that knowledge of *Vēdānta* alone is sufficient. While *Vēdānta* provides for a firm knowledge in order to realize Brahman out of sight (*parōksha*), in order to realize visibly (*aparōksha*) one has to apply oneself to the ritual functions (*vidhēḥ upapattiḥ*), which alone will enable him all the more easily to realize (Brahman). It is never possible to attain Brahman by mere knowledge derived from learning the *Vēdānta*. But the *Srauta mārḡa* (the way pointed out by the *Srutis* or *Vēdas*) is only to get at the grace of *Sadguru*, which can only be attained through *upāsana* (meditation) and penance and thereby through the help of the knowledge imparted to him by the *Sadguru*, the attainment of Brahman can at once be had. And this is the only way.

The *Sruti* texts —

*Dhyātvā munir gachhati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim  
tamasah parastāt |*

*Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē  
viśvamāyā nivrittih |*

*Sraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgāt avēhi |*  
*Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati |*<sup>314</sup>  
*Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāsāṁ dahati paṇḍitah |*  
*Gnātvā dēvam muchyatē sarva pāsaiḥ |*<sup>315</sup>  
*Īsam gnātvā amrutā bhavanti |*<sup>316</sup>  
*Ātmanyēva ātmānam paśyēt |*<sup>317</sup>  
*Sambhurākāśa madhyē dhyēyah |*<sup>318</sup>

*Tajjalāniti śānta upāsēta | Iti prāchīna yōgyōpāsava |*<sup>319</sup>  
*iti*, declare that in order to readily obtain *mōksha* as the result of meditation, the knowledge obtained by the worship of Paramēśvara is the chief means. So say the *Smritis* also :—

*Srōtavyah śrutivākyēbhyō mantavyaśchōpapattibhiḥ |*  
*Dhyātvā cha satatam dhyēyam ētat darśana hētavah ||*  
*Gnānam vastuparichchhetti dhyānam tat bhūvakāraṇam |*  
*Tasmāt jīvō bhavēt Sambhuḥ krimivat kīlāchintanāt | iti.*

The above texts show clearly that it is by the method of constant *śravaṇa* and *manana* and the knowledge derived therefrom applied to *nīdīdhyāsana* (the process of meditation and penance) that Paraśiva, who is the Lord of *śatsthala*, can be realized by the *jīva* and become one with him. This is the chief means by which *Śatsthala Paraśiva sākshātkāra* can be obtained. And those who desire the attainment of *mōksha* through Paraśiva should abstain from all pleasures of life, steadily and faithfully act according to the strict ordinances laid down by the *Nigamas* and *Āgamas*, which derive their authority directly from Śiva, and faithfully follow the *karma* in applying them and thus clearing their minds free of all wrong thoughts and dedicate themselves by vow for obtaining Paraśiva.

Such persons only can be in a position to gain the knowledge required for knowing *Śatsthala Paraśiva* and to meditate upon Him to become one with Him. The

<sup>314</sup> III. 2. 9.

<sup>315</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 8.

<sup>316</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 7.

<sup>317</sup> IV. 4. 23.

<sup>318</sup> *Alharnaśiras.*

<sup>319</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.



*Atharvaṇa* *Sikhā* texts *Tad upāśva* (Meditate only on Him) and *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyat parityajya* *iti* <sup>320</sup> (Śiva alone should be meditated upon; Śiva alone is capable of giving *mōksha*; and therefore all others must be renounced), prohibit the meditation upon any deity other than Śiva. And by no other means can he be freed from the bondage of the illusory *Samsāra* (*samsāra māyāpāśa nivṛtṭiḥ*).

Again, texts like *Kṣhāram pradhānam amṛtā-kṣhāram Haraḥ kṣharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ* <sup>321</sup> *Tāsyā-bhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivṛtṭiḥ* *Yadā charmavadākāśam vēśṭayishyanti mānavāḥ* *Tadā Śivam avignāya duḥkhasyāntō bhaviṣhyati* *iti* declare that meditation on Śiva, adorning of the body with Śiva's symbol, and knowledge of Śiva result in the fruit of *mōksha*. <sup>322</sup> And therefore Śiva alone is Parabrahman. Accordingly those who desire *mōksha* must therefore adopt the following six paths as of knowledge epitomised in *śaḍvidha lingātūtparyā* <sup>323</sup> :—*dhāraṇa*, *gnāna*, *dhyāna*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *archana*, <sup>324</sup> according to the *Vēdānta* in order to realize Brahman.

If, in following the maxim *Brahma satyam jagan mithyā* *iti*, the doubt is raised that realization cannot mean anything different from the knowledge derived from

<sup>320</sup> *Atharva Upa.*

<sup>321</sup> *Sūta. Upa.*, I. 10.

<sup>322</sup> Sripati says *Sivādhyāna*, *Sivadhāraṇa* and *Sivāgnāna* will end in *Sivārūpa* (*lit.*—will lead to the *mōksha* called *Sivārūpa*). The *kiṭa* becomes *bhramara*, i.e., the *jīva* assumes the *rūpa* of Brahman.

<sup>323</sup> *Śaḍvidha lingātūtparyā* means of the six means of knowledge. (Here *linga* denotes *hētu* or *kāraṇa*.)

<sup>324</sup> Cf. with the following taken from the *Nārādīya*, wherein it is stated :—*Śravaṇam mananam chaiva dhyānam bhaktistatthaiva cha* *|| Sādhnam gnānasampattau pradhānam nānyadishyātē || Na chaitāni vinā kaśchit gnānamāpa kutaschana*. The following are the six ways of attaining absolute knowledge about Brahman :—*Śravaṇa* (hearing through teaching); *Manana* (repeating); *Dhyāna* (meditation); *Bhakti* (devotion—*Sudrighasnēhasamyukta yathārthagnānatō bhavēt* *| sā bhaktiriti vignāya*, says the *Āgama*); *Sādhana* (accomplishment); and *Gnāna* (firm knowledge). Sripati replaces *Bhakti* and *Sādhana* by *Dhāraṇa* and *Archana*.

realizing thoroughly one's own form (*svasvarūpa*), all the world being nothing but false, and if this is to be the result of discussion of the whole of the *Vēdānta*, then the reply is that it is not so. Because it will lead to contradiction of the *Vēdānta*. If it is asked whether by the term "*Jagan mithyā*" (*The world is false*), it is meant that it is ignorance (*Brahmagnānabādhyatvam*) that prevents the knowing of Brahman; or whether it is *traikālika nishēdha*, i.e., prohibition relating to the three times—past, present and the future—the reply is that it is not the first. For there is no means of prohibition attaching to it as it is impossible. The knowledge of Brahman enables one to free himself from the five elements making the world. For *Sruti* texts such as *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* | <sup>325</sup> *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* | *iti*, <sup>326</sup> declare firmly that the whole world consists of the body of Śiva. Or is, alternatively, agreeable to *Sruti* texts such as *Nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti* | *iti* <sup>327</sup> (*He can see nothing else; he can hear nothing else—but Brahman*). He may be interrupted from becoming one with Śiva through knowledge by the bondage of worldly ties, which he feels and hears. Texts such as *Śivō dātā Śivō bhōktā Śivaḥ sarvam idam jagat* | *iti*, insist on one being absolutely free from worldly ties like *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (cloth) and until he is released from that bondage, he cannot have the knowledge of becoming one with Brahman or be released from the bondage of worldly ties. Therefore the doctrine of *mithyātva* (the falsity of the world) is not suitable (*ayukta*). So long as this doctrine is entertained, the vow embodied in the *Sruti* text *Ēka vighnanēna sarva vighnāna pratignā śrutēḥ* | <sup>328</sup> (*If you know one thing*

<sup>325</sup> *Mahōpa.*, 22-24.

<sup>326</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

<sup>327</sup> *Samādhi* is of two kinds:—(1) *Asampragnā Samādhi* and (2) *Sampragnā Samādhi*. In the former, one loses even the senses of hearing, seeing, touch, etc., but in the latter, he will be feeling the external things—seeing, hearing, etc.

<sup>328</sup> *Chchāndōgya* text (VI. 1. 4):—*Yathā saumyaikēna mr̥tipiṇḍēna sarvam mriṇmayam vighnātam syāt* || (Oh, my dear boy, if you know

thoroughly well, you will be able to know all other things), will have been washed off one's hands (*dattānjali prasaṅgaḥ*).<sup>329</sup> It is stated in the *Srutis* in the form of a vow *Eka vighnānena sarva vighnānam* | *iti*, in order to illustrate the world as the chief material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) for Brahman in regard to *sṛiṣṭi* (creation), etc. Therefore *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* | *Aitadātmyamidaṁ sarvam tat satyam sa Ātmā tattvamasi Śvĕtakēṭō* |<sup>330</sup> *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* |<sup>330a</sup> *iti* declare that the world is composed of Śiva. Therefore the knowledge of Brahman with (belief) in the existence of the world is no contradiction.<sup>331</sup> Even King Janaka and other great men, who knew and realized Brahman, seem to have acknowledged the above truth. Even they thought that realization of Brahman was compatible with belief in the existence of the world. The existence of *Jīvanmuktas*<sup>332</sup> in their carnal bodies, etc., also renders impracticable (the theory of) *Jagad vyavahārā-nupapattiḥ* (when considered) with the exposition (contained) in the *Srutis*.<sup>333</sup> Further it is stated in the *Smritis* generally as a great objection

*Akhaṇḍadvaita bhāṇē tu sarvam Brahmaiva nānyathā* |  
*Gnānād vikalpabuddhistu līyatē na svarūpataḥ* ||

what one ball of earth is constituted of, then you can understand the whole world.)

<sup>329</sup> Literally, giving away with a handful of water, as when making a gift—as prescribed in the Hindu Law relating to gifts.

<sup>330</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, III. 14. 1 ; VI. 15. 3. <sup>330a</sup> *Mahōpa.*, 22-24.

<sup>331</sup> Śrīpati's opinion is that the doctrine of *jaganmīthyātva* is false. In his view, the belief in the existence of the world is compatible with the realization of Brahman.

<sup>332</sup> Those who have realized Brahman but still live in this world to lead people (the followers) to *Brahmagnāna*.

<sup>333</sup> Here Śrīpati combats the theory of Sankara that the world is real only for the purpose of *Vyavahāra*. Śrīpati suggests that this view is impracticable for two reasons:—(1) that the *Srutis* declare against it ; and (2) that the existence of *Jīvanmuktas* makes the theory impossible of belief. The connecting link between the *Jagat* and Brahman is the carnal body. I am Brahman and the carnal body disappears when meditation makes me realize Brahman.

*Bhinnatvam naiva yunjāta Brahmōpādānataḥ kvachit !*

*Vāchārambhaṇamātravāt bhēdaḥ kēnōpajāyātē !*

*Tasmāt Avidyāmātratva kathanam mōhanāya hi || iti ||*

In *Sruti* texts genarally, only censure is heard in regard to the doctrine of *jaganmithyātva*.<sup>334</sup> When knowledge developes to a stage capable of realizing everything as an indivisible Whole, everything is Brahman and nothing else. When comprehension departs from true knowledge, he cannot find absorption in *Brahmasvarūpa*. Never at all entertain division from Brahman. Though the *Sruti* text *Vāchārambhaṇa*<sup>335</sup> speaks of division, it is to be understood as not real, because *Avidyā* is treated in the *Smritis* evidently to delude the minds of those who have a firm knowledge of Brahman. In the *Gītā* it is said: *Asatyam apratiṣṭham tē jagadākuḥ anīśvaram | iti*,<sup>336</sup> the world is not real, nor an established one; nor has it a Lord to rule over it.

Nor can it be the second, for the text *Amūlam anūdharām imāḥ prajāḥ prajāyantē | Na kadāचित् anīdriṣam jagat | iti*, affirms that the world is eternal. Moreover, *Sruti* texts like *Asad vā idam agra āsīt | tatō vai sadajāyata | sadēva saumyēdam agra āsīt*,<sup>337</sup> *Ēkamēva advitīyam Brahma | iti*, and hundreds of others similar to them declare that the world did not exist long before it was created (*srishtēḥ pūrvam prapanchasya sattvāt*). Then, if it is asked, "How can it be affected by the three kinds of time, present, past and future (*traikālika*)," the answer is "It is not so (affected)". Because the *Sruti* text *Asad vā idam agra āsīt* clearly states that the world did

<sup>334</sup> Śrīpati protests that if the *Jagat* is real only for *vyavahāra*, then how can the carnal body be real and help through *karma*, the realization of Brahman? So, he drives home the point, "You have to grant that the carnal body is real" and if that be so, then the *Jagat* is also real. Compare the *Chchāndōgya* text *Vāchārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrīṭtikētyēva satyam ||* What is uttered undergoes *vikāra* (change), which is the result of the final change of *mrīṭtikā*, the earth.

<sup>335</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>336</sup> *Bhag.-Gītā*, XVI. 8.

<sup>337</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

exist before it became manifest in Brahman in the form of an indivisible small particle (*sūkshma rūpa*) with the same name and form and therefore it is termed *asatvam* in the *Smṛiti*. Then the *Sruti* says *Tatō vai sadajāyata*,<sup>338</sup> which means that after creation, it (the world) developed (from its small condition) to such an extent as to appear to be a world different from Brahman, in a divided (*i.e.*, separate) form, assuming a big shape. Furthermore, by the use of the word “*Asat*”, the *Sruti* text grants and pre-assumes the existence of the forms of *ākāśa* (space), *gagana* (sky) and *aravinda* (the earth).<sup>339</sup> It would, therefore, be as correct to ask “Why not a barren woman be possessed of a son” as to suggest that the world never existed but still gave an idea of its existence (*gaganāravindavadabhāva-tvāṅgīkarē vandhyāputrādīnāmapi jagatkāraṇatvam kim na syāt*) by accepting *bhāvatva* (*i.e.*, the state of being in existence through *gagana* and *aravinda*).<sup>340</sup> Moreover, the word *Sadēva* in the *Sruti* text, directs attention (*avadhāraṇa*) to the characteristic idea of the world’s existence in Brahman in an attributive manner (*na savīśeshatva nishēdhaḥ*).<sup>341</sup> And the word *asataḥ* removes the contradiction of the idea which throws delusion (*bhrānti*) on the mind.<sup>342</sup> Then how can the expression *Sadēva saumya iti*, in the *Sruti* text, be taken to mean what is contradictory to actual existence?<sup>343</sup>

<sup>338</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

<sup>339</sup> That is, Śrīpati suggests that the word *Asat* presupposes the existence of space, sky and the lotus (the lotus representing the earth—as a product of earth).

<sup>340</sup> A barren woman cannot possess a child. To think of her possessing a child is inconsistent. So if the world never at all existed, the *bhāvagnāna* pointed out in the *Sruti* is incorrect and hence the *Jagat* did originally exist in an infinitesimal form (*sūkshma rūpa*).

<sup>341</sup> This is opposed to Sankara’s description of Brahman as *nirvisēsha*, without any characteristic attributes. Śrīpati’s view is that Brahman is *savīśesh*, *i.e.*, has attributive characteristics.

<sup>342</sup> It removes the delusive feeling whether the world actually existed or not.

<sup>343</sup> This is another aspect of the criticism directed against Sankara’s view.

The word *agrē* used in the text—*agrē-iti*—denotes the characteristic (*kālavīśēṣaḥ*) of time. The word *āsīt* in the text is the verb which seems to declare clearly the world's existence. The word *āsīt* means existed.<sup>344</sup> The word *Ēkamēva* (in the text) directs attention to the idea (*avadhāraṇa*) of the actual existence (of the world) without leaving anything to doubt. And the word *advitīya* (in the *Sruti* text) clearly shows the double characteristic of Brahman in being the two-fold cause. *Sruti* texts like *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē | iti*,<sup>345</sup> must be understood in the same manner. Then, the *Sruti* text *Viśvūdhikō Rudrō mahārshih | iti*, also firmly declares that there is no contradiction whatever in the three periods of time—past present and future—regarding the world's existence. This is all the secret about it (*Iti rahasyam*).

### Jagad Vyavaharika Khandanam.

Indeed, it is said that the world is true only for purposes of transaction (*Vyāvahārika*).<sup>346</sup> If it is asked, "Is it not the highest truth of spiritual knowledge?" the reply is "It is not so". Then, "What is meant by *Vyāvahāra-satyatva*, Truth only for purposes of transaction? Can it be said that it is assumed as existing only for purposes of discussion (*vyavahāra*, i.e., *vyavahāramātra gamyatvam*) or can it be called *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*, i.e., not true beyond the purpose of *vyavahāra*?<sup>347</sup> Or is it possessed of any secret contradiction within its three or four folds which is inexplicable (*trichatura kakshyābādhyatvam*) or is it possessed of statements contradictory to those made in the *Vēdas* (*tattvāvēdaka pramāṇa viruddhattvam*) or is it incapable of giving any result, if understood as truth (*arthakriyā sūnya pratīti gōcharatvam*)? Or is it knowledge useless for obtaining any good result (*kāraṇa*

<sup>344</sup> *Āsīt* when coupled to *agrē*, suggests "existed at first".

<sup>345</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 2.

<sup>346</sup> Worldly transaction, usage, practical conduct.

<sup>347</sup> *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*—literally, opposed to what *vyavahāra* makes suitable,

*dōsha rahita gnāna vishayatvam*)?" The reply is "It is not the first"; because if Brahman is also assumed as existing for purposes of *vyavahāra* (transaction) only, then it involves an unwarranted stretch beyond the Vēdic truth, (it results in *ativyāptih*); and this results as between *guru* and *śishya* to silence and ignorance.<sup>348</sup> The very starting point of the *Sūtra*, *Athātō Brahmajignāsā* and the underlying truth of *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumya idam agra āsīt* and *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma | iti* are crippled (*i.e.*, prejudiced); like decorating a wall which never existed with pictorial likenesses, everything is reduced to a sophistical argument ending in mere attributive expressions (*Pravrit-tāyāh śruti sūtra phakkikāyā abhitti chitrakarmatāpātāchcha sarvāpīyam phakkikā saviśēshavishayā*). *Nirviśēsha* (attributelessness), however, can never be thought of by anyone in *vyavahāra*, even for argument's sake. It is incomprehensible to any one even as a matter of *vyavahāra*. Hence the whole argument is impeded. When nothing can be seen or understood, such a *vyavahāra* deserves no commendation. Throughout *Vēdānta*, nowhere is *Nirviśēsha* mentioned and such a thing cannot be assumed. And this helps us conveniently. Even such <sup>349</sup> things will have to be understood as merely argumentative.

Then it cannot be the second, *viz.*, *Bādhita vyavahāra gamyatvam*, *i.e.*, not true beyond the purpose of *vyavahāra*. Because the *ativyāpti* of Brahman cannot be prevented (*i.e.*, the unwarrantable stretch of Brahman cannot be prevented).<sup>350</sup> All this taken together leads to contradiction (and not to the Truth). Moreover,

<sup>348</sup> That is, it ends in the cutting short of discussion (*jignāsa*).

<sup>349</sup> Such things as *Nirviśēsha*, which is not mentioned in the *Vēdānta*—*i.e.*, *Vēdas* and *Āgamas* (*i.e.*, *Upanishads*). *Āgama* means only that which is handed down; that which has come down from time immemorial; traditional doctrine or precept; a sacred writing or scripture; the *Vēdas*.

<sup>350</sup> That is, the proposition goes beyond the granted limit of actual truth. The idea is that the argument would lead to something beyond *Brahman*,

all arguments are limited to mundane existence<sup>351</sup> (and to nothing beyond it). Mere arguments with contradictions (such as these) will not avail to prove whether Brahman is *saviśēsha* or otherwise. If so, the characteristics of these contradictory arguments will lead to uselessness (*vaiyarthya*)<sup>352</sup> and what is aimed at is not gained. Everything thought of in argument leads to unreality (*prātibhāsika*) or to an unwarrantable stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāpti*). At any rate, any knowledge which extends beyond Brahman is unreal and contradictory and is a perfect embellishment of mere argument (*parishkāraḥ sādhuḥ*). What finally results therefrom is a perfect destruction of any kind of knowledge to be derived therefrom about Brahman; the antithetical method of argument leads further to incapability of producing better knowledge afterwards, and also makes one lose whatever true knowledge he previously possessed. And such a knowledge finally leads him to be impressed with the conclusion that there is neither a *ghaṭa* nor a *paṭa* (neither a jug nor a cloth). And finally everything ends in stretching to something beyond Brahman. Such a knowledge we discard (*nirākarishyāmaḥ*).

Moreover, granting the truth of the existence of the blueness of the sky, which is the starting point<sup>353</sup> (*i.e.*, foundation) for the argument and holding that Brahman alone is likewise true and nothing else, the means adopted to obtain a knowledge of Brahman in a contradictory manner is just like one mistaking the whiteness in a conch-shell for silver, which leads by an unwarranted stretch to a something beyond Brahman, which is unpreventable.<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> Cf. *Vāchā pravṛitti* and *vāchā nivṛitti*, granted as desired and cancelled as desired.

<sup>352</sup> Literally, unproductiveness.

<sup>353</sup> *Prishṭha*, the word used by Sṛīpati, means *back*.

<sup>354</sup> The argument may be thus set down:—The blueness of the sky is perceived and accepted to be true—in this world of *vyavahāra*. This blueness of the sky is all-pervading. Similarly, the existence of Brahman, who is all-pervading, is accepted as true. This, however, is true only in a limited sense; as much as there



Even for those who possess such knowledge, the realization of Brahman is not only impossible but also their trials for the same will have to stretch beyond Brahman. Inasmuch as the blueness of the sky is not altogether real, it should not be said that a knowledge about such a thing is an unwarranted stretch of the principle (*atiprasaṅgaḥ*). But the *nirviśeṣatva* (attributelessness) and the *mithyātva* (falsity of the existence of the world) both lead to a knowledge which ends in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.<sup>355</sup> Being rid of the world for mere *vyavahāra* purposes, no *lakṣhaṇa* (characteristic) of Brahman remains for argument. To one who wishes to establish *nirviśeṣatva* (a Brahman without attributes) in an opposing manner (*sapratyōgikānām*), we say it is impossible to realize such a Brahman in whom many characteristics are to be found. It would be really impossible to realize the true Brahman if the mere existence of Brahman is granted, holding all that is about him is the result of *Adhyāsa* co-existing with him. The possessing of such a knowledge cannot lead to the realization of Brahman. Such realization

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is real silver in a conch-shell, the mere whiteness makes us believe that silver is there, is taking us beyond the actual fact, i.e., *ativyāpti*. Such a result is unpreventable. In order to attain a firm knowledge of Brahman, it is to be understood that the world is real only for the sake of argument and its existence is not real. The character of knowledge relating to Brahman consists in attaining to a condition which is all light and free from darkness. This Light alone is Brahman. There can be nothing found which is attributeless (*nirviśeṣa*) in this world. Hence the existence of attributeless things is not true. If attributeless things are to be grasped, one has to go by an unwarranted stretch (*ativyāpti*) beyond Brahman—which results in contradiction.

<sup>355</sup> That is, Sṛipati's argument is that we may grant the blueness of the sky for the sake of illustration and argument and also the existence of silver in the whiteness of the conch-shell for purposes of argument but not the *nirviśeṣatva* of Brahman nor the *mithyātva* of the world—for if these two are granted, then the existence of Brahman will be jeopardised or it will take us to something else beyond and other than Brahman.

accordingly is impracticable. If we accept Brahman by his mere *Svarūpa* as co-existing along with *Adhyāsa*, which cannot completely remove the illusion so as to enable us to realize the true Brahman, it will be impossible to realize such a Brahman. But if *Adhyāsa*, which is the infirmity in the whole theory, is removed so as to keep Brahman without *Adhyāsa*,<sup>356</sup> then the *Siddhānta* (theory) becomes confused and ends in contradiction. (That is, the realization of such a Brahman—Brahman separate from *Adhyāsa*—is impossible.) Anyhow, accepting that true knowledge leads to the realization of Brahman, throughout the *Siddhānta*, a Brahman free from *Adhyāsa* is never seen to exist at any time. Therefore such a *Siddhānta* is impracticable and therefore let us not discuss it any more.

Nor can it be the third. For in that case, the realization goes unwarrantedly beyond Brahman. A true knowledge of Brahman cannot be displaced by any doubt or opposition. But a Brahman who is co-existing with *Adhyāsa* is really one who cannot actually be realized and is opposed to true knowledge. In that case, according to the *Siddhānta*, Brahman becomes not real (*prātibhāsika*) but existing only for appearance. This results in *Ativyāpti*, an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.<sup>357</sup> It is within our experience that illusory thoughts run into our minds which are unrealizable and not true—just as the existence of *Gandharvanagara* (or *Gandharvapūram*), the city of the Gandharvas, an imaginary city in the sky, probably the result of some natural phenomena, such as mirage), the

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<sup>356</sup> In Philosophy, *Adhyāsa* is to attribute or ascribe (falsely) the nature of one thing to another.

<sup>357</sup> According to the theory criticized, Brahman cannot exist without *Adhyāsa*. If Brahman cannot exist without *Adhyāsa*, then such a theory cannot help to realize the true Brahman, because the theory goes beyond Brahman. And a knowledge of such a Brahman—unconnected with *Adhyāsa*—cannot be had according to the theory. Accordingly, Brahman exists only in appearance and is not real.

imaginary circle created by a fire-brand (*Alāta-chakra*), and the like, which are actually not in existence. Further, the word *kakshā*<sup>358</sup> employed in the argument is *yuktiparaḥ*, i.e., a mere intellectual trick (or expedient), *kālaparaḥ*, i.e., a mere time-serving one; or *Viparīta-pramāparaḥ*, i.e., a mere perverse proof. It cannot, however, be the first; (*yuktiparaḥ*) in which case the *prapañcha* (world) would appear to be false, which alone would be enough to make the whole argument unreal. That would also become contradictory to the Vēdic view that Brahman is *nirdōsha*, i.e., without fault (or defect). Thus the previous intellectual argument is contradicted by the subsequent one. Nor is it the second (i.e., *kālaparaḥ*); for the long interval of time intervening between the illusory thoughts (*Bhramā-vishaya*) ends in unreality (*prātibhāsikē*) of the object and in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāptiḥ*). Nor is it the third (*viparīta pramāparaḥ*); for the contradictory thoughts overlapping the proofs make the realization of Brahman impossible, and thus the whole becomes a contradiction (*vyāghātāt*). The realization of such an object terminates in not attaining it, i.e., proves infructuous. When the hammer is removed from work, there is no *ghaṭa*; and the intellectual skill employed in the evolution of the three or four folds of intellectual argument (*tri-chatura viparītagnāna*) naturally ends in *ativyāptiḥ*, i.e., in an unwarranted reach beyond Brahman. The hammer instead of bringing the *ghaṭa* into existence has helped to make it disappear on account of the employment of contradictory skill and perverted thought.<sup>359</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> *Kakshā* in Logic means *objection or reply in argument*. Literally, it means a lurking or hiding place. An argument which does not make things plain. The argument of Sankara is described by Śrīpati as using *tri-chatura-kakshayābādhyatvam*, i.e., three or four folds of objection (or contradiction).

<sup>359</sup> The saying is that a hundred strokes by the hammer produces a *ghaṭa* (a pot) out of earth as a hundred strokes of the chisel make an article of the shapeless wood. Śrīpati remarks that Sankara has by the use of his intellectual skill and perverse argument made the hammer not produce the pot, but made it disappear.

Furthermore, in the first instance, the intellectual skill used in the three- or four-folded argument (*tri-chaturābādhyatvē*) has brought in a contradiction which establishes *avyāpti*, i.e., inadequate pervasion of the proposition formulated.<sup>360</sup> (Brahman is full of *gnāna* and of *jyōtisvarūpa*; but when he is to be considered along with *Adhyāsa*, these qualities—*gnāna* and *jyōtisvarūpa*—become contradicted, because *Adhyāsa* is *agnāna* or illusion. Hence *avyāpti* results.) The skill employed in argument, instead of removing *agnāna*, and establishing *gnāna* and developing it, so as to help in the realization of Brahman, has increased *agnāna* and thus made it impossible to know the characteristics of Brahman. It is thus: Is Brahman visible or invisible? If it were visible, there is no more falsity about its reality in existence. But if it be invisible, even a thought of accepting it as granted for the sake of *vyavahāra* becomes incomprehensible (that is to say, that even for the sake of *vyavahāra*, the existence of Brahman cannot be granted). For it is impossible to realize (Brahman), because if it is *seen*, there is no more *mithyātva*; if it is *not seen*, Brahman cannot be existing even for the sake of *vyavahāra*.<sup>361</sup> The mere assuming the existence of a thing which is not seen is impossible (*dussādhyatva*). Nor can *avidyā* be removed, having no opportunity for realizing the object by seeing. The mere idea of existence (*vrittiḥ*) for the sake of *vyavahāra* leads finally to the failure of the attempt to establish the existence of Brahman and ends in ignorance (*agnānatvāt*) and futility. The employment of Brahma knowledge cannot bring (one)

<sup>360</sup> *Avyāpti* means the non-inclusion or exclusion of a part of the thing defined; one of the three faults of a definition. When a *lakṣhaṇa* is predicated of a thing and that *lakṣhaṇa*, though it is true, is not actually found on examination in it, there is *avyāpti*. Thus, a Brāhmaṇa is possessed of *sikhā* (hair on the head) and *sūtra* (the sacred-thread on his body). When, however, this *lakṣhaṇa* is applied to a *Sanyāsīn*, it is found to be otherwise, he being devoid of both, though he is yet a Brāhmaṇa. There is *avyāpti* here.

<sup>361</sup> Literally, the need for a Brahman even for the sake of *vyavahāra* is removed. Śrīpati puts Sankara's argument on the horns of a dilemma.

to that condition (*Brahmatva*). If we accept that a *gunja*—a red berry with a black dot at its top—appears like fire, the burning property of fire cannot be accepted in it. In order to obtain *gnāna* without any doubt, it is not primarily possible to use *agnāna* as the instrument for the purpose. Such *gnāna* which is unable to discriminate between what is the means and what is the thing for which such means should be used proves infructuous (*vyāghātāt*). It is not even capable of recognizing *ghaṭa* from the knowledge regarding *ghaṭa*. *Ghaṭa* and the knowledge relating to *ghaṭa* are one. Moreover, while correct knowledge is the chief means of realizing Brahman, a mistaken idea of division between Brahman and Brahman-knowledge (*gnāna*) is postulated. There is absolutely no need for the employment of such an argument. Where both (*gnāna* and *agnāna*) become important, *gnāna* cannot claim superiority over *agnāna*. Nor can, between *gnāna* and *agnāna*, *gnāna* stand out as proof (*prāmāṇikam*). On the whole, in the loss of one's pervasive nature (*svavyāpakatva*) and one's brilliant nature (*svaprakāśatva*), the way of correct knowledge being lost, *gnāna* finally enters *nirviśēshatva* of Brahman, which is not true. There is no *Chinmātra Brahman*,<sup>362</sup> because, he is really non-existent. Everything thus becomes an illusory argument (*agnānatva prasangūchcha*). Even though *gnāna* is capable of being obtained so as to realize Brahman, *Avidyā* could not be shaken off in order to know oneself in Brahman; because *Adhyāsa* always being in contact with *Chit Brahman* (intelligence), its non-existence could not be proved, without which Brahman cannot be all-pervasive or realizable. Moreover, the double causes of *pravritti* (manifestation) and *nimitta* (instrumental or efficient cause as opposed to *upādāna kāraṇa*), exhibited in Brahman as his two important characteristics (both of them co-existing without separation), lead to the creation of many

<sup>362</sup> Of the *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ananda* folds in Brahman, *Chit* is referred to here.

different meanings (significances).<sup>363</sup> And such meanings when applied to *chaitanya* in Brahman make the idea of *prapancha* contradictory to the starting point, i.e., *vyavahāra satyatva* Brahman and end in non-existence (*vaiyarthya*). Such a non-existent Brahman, who can be seen, is not only a calculated (i.e., deliberate) but also an ineffaceable falsehood — so hard a falsehood<sup>364</sup> that it could not be believed under any circumstances. In trying to establish true knowledge out of *gnāna* and *agnāna* and in trying to prove that true knowledge will lead to the realization of Brahman, the double method of argument, viz., *pravritti* (manifestation) and *nimitta* (efficient cause), was adopted but in the attempt thus made, the chief object (i.e., the realization of Brahman) has been left unrealized, just as between the two objects *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, the importance of *ghaṭa* had been lost. However, without having a firm, true knowledge regarding Brahman, the *nirviśeṣatva* mode of argument regarding *Nirviśeṣa* (attributeless) Brahman has helped to reduce Brahman to void (or emptiness). And all consciousness being different from Brahman, no *vyavahāra* can result. Hence, it (*vyavahāra*) becomes *mithyā* (false). In order to establish true knowledge regarding Brahman and to realize the self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) character of Brahman, the *mithyātva* of Brahman must be given up (*Brahmanāḥ mithyātvam varjanāyam*). To create a *bhēda* which is not in existence (*kalpita bhēdamādāya*) and to argue that the world is only existent for purposes of *vyavahāra*—just as one *Dēva-datta* who never existed—and then to finally arrive at a *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, which can never be realized,—such a method (of argument) should be given up (*varjanāyam*). Just as difference between Brahman and *chaitanya* is untrue, similarly Brahman without attribute is also untrue, for realization of such a Brahman is of no use (*aprayōjakam*) and

<sup>363</sup> The word *artha* used in the text means *object* or *significance*.

<sup>364</sup> The words used are *mithyātvāpādanasya vajralēpatvāpātāchcha*, where *vajralēpa* means a kind of very hard cement. Cf. *Vajralēpa ghaṭitēva*, see *Māl.*, V. 10. For its preparation, see *Varāhamihira's Brihat Samhitā*, Chap. 57.

in this world it is unattainable (*tadasiddhēh*).<sup>365</sup> *Jīva* being an indivisible whole, with Brahman, such a start by postulating *vyavahāra* becomes untrue. The annihilated form of *mithyātva* cannot be stated as belonging to *chid-vishaya* (worldly matter, *i.e.*, matter only for *vyavahāra*). Thus, we have come to the conclusion that a mode of argument which comprises such a knowledge does not help us towards true realization; nor does it help us towards the reality of the world for the sake of *vyavahāra*. As the argument leads us to conclude that all the component parts being different from each other, on account of their differences in characteristics,<sup>366</sup> there is really no *mithyātva* (of the *prapancha*). This leads to the conclusion that the complete divided nature of the three parts (*prapancha*, *jīva* and *Brahman*) proves the *satyatva* of the *prapancha* *i.e.*, the reality of the world (*prapanchasya satyatvam*).

This ends in the inverted position that Brahman is false (*Brahmanō mithyātvam iti viparīta vrittih*).<sup>367</sup> Therefore, this mode of argument has brought us finally to the unpreventable conclusion that the world is real and Brahman is false (*prapancha satyatva* and *Brahma mithyātva*).

Moreover, does *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman really exist or not? In the second case (*i.e.*, if you say that it does not), the *Mādhyamika* (Bauddha) *mata* is entered on. In the first case (*i.e.*, if you say that *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman

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<sup>365</sup> Śrīpati here criticises both the *Advaita* and *Dvaita* view-points combined. If *Advaita* with its *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman is untrue, so is *Dvaita* in its position that Brahman and *chaitanya* (*Jīva*) are different. Śrīpati's argument seems to be that the Advaitin having postulated *prapancha* for purposes of *vyavahāra*, has had to end in Nescience. He suggests that while the Advaitin has, for *vyavahāra*, to grant the *Dvaita* position of *prapancha* being different from Brahman, he has been unable to prove the proposition he started with, *viz.*, a *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, as he has ended in Nescience.

<sup>366</sup> That is, *prapancha*, *chaitanya* (*jīva*) and *Brahman* being different from each other.

<sup>367</sup> That is, Brahman is proved to be false and *prapancha* real.

exists), the way in which the argument by means of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, which are different from each other, is put forward, leads to the utter futility and contradiction of *nirviśēsha*. By the mode of argument employed, i.e., by means of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, the postulated *vyavahāra* (*satyatva*) proves certain attributes in Brahman which cannot be avoided. Starting with the assumption that *Nirviśēsha* Brahman exists, the proof brings out a result which is contradictory to that assumption inasmuch as it points out a *Saviśēsha* Brahman, and reduces finally the argument to the prattle (or raving) of a mad man (*umatta pralāpavat*). The word *asti* (exist) used in the *bhēda* creating argument of *pravritti* and *nimitta*, regarding *chaitanya* (*sattāyāh*), in your philosophy (*tvānmatē*)<sup>368</sup> has ended in the conclusion of *mithyātva* (Nescience).

The assumption of the existence of Brahman ends in the *nirviśēsha* of Brahman and thus makes Brahman non-existent. The skill employed in the argument becomes only useful to prove that the very assumption of Brahman at the starting ends in a contradiction and proves that nothing is existent, because *nirviśēsha* cannot be correlated with the assumption that Brahman exists. If it is said that *pravritti* and *nimitta* are not different from each other, then *samānādhikaraṇa* follows: *Nirviśēsha* and *saviśēsha* should then be treated as possessing a common substratum—or as being in the same category. Formerly some ancients<sup>369</sup> treated *pravritti* and *nimitta* which indicate *bhinnā* (that is, difference), sometimes as *samānādhikaraṇa*. Even they arrived at the same conclusion, committing the same fault.

In assigning a non-existent *dharma* to *pravritti* and *nimitta* and discussing a *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, the identical absurdity (*ayamēva dōṣaḥ*) is arrived at. If Brahman does not exist beyond the assumption (*anativēkē*), then *samānādhī-*

<sup>368</sup> Here, at this final point, Sṛpati addresses the *Advaita* expounder directly by using the word *tvānmatē*.

<sup>369</sup> There is no clue as to who these ancients were.



*karana* is destroyed (*samānādhikarāṇa hāneḥ*). If Brahman exists beyond the assumption (*atirēkē*), the *siddhānta* (conclusion) itself is destroyed.<sup>370</sup>

From this, the hypothesis of a *Nirviśeṣha* Brahman goes without proof; and by its very nature results in contradiction. When the things we ardently seek for are by their very nature impossible of attainment, we should not lay on them an unbearable blame (blemish) and renounce them. By this, according to the *Srutis*, *nirviśeṣatva* is disproved and rendered futile. In such a case, the *Srutis* which are separated from the differences created by *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* (radical form and prefixes and suffixes) would result in want of authority. Indeed, does *mithyā* mean being different from Brahman as *paramārtha* or *aparamārtha* (as the highest or the most sublime truth regarding Brahman or the reverse of it)? In the first case, as *bhēdatva* is accepted as true, the opposite cannot be true, because the destruction (nullification) of the *siddhānta* results therefrom. Nor is it the second; for both the *satya* (truth) and *mithyā* (untruth) even as to the existence of Brahman will be unpreventable. The causes that go to prove the differences in Brahman will be the causes which go to prove his non-existence. The *ghaṭa* cannot in its real state claim to be different from Brahman and in its *mithyā* (non-existent) state claim to be one with Brahman. This *bhēdābhēda* state itself being *mithyā* (non-existent), it cannot go without being called faulty (*i.e.*, it would be faulty to postulate that in its real state the *ghaṭa* is different from Brahman and that in its *mithyā* state it is one with Brahman). The truth of the whole matter is that mutual contradiction and unrectifiable confusion cannot be removed while you only profess to be impartial between *bhēda* and *abhēda* and between *jīva* and *Brahman*. Why don't you accept the *mithyātva* of both of them, *jīva* and *Brahman*?

<sup>370</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Māyāvāda Khaṇḍana*, Section relating to *aṭirēka* and *anatirēka* (Kumbakonam Edn., p. 2).

Not that it is impossible to arrive at such a conclusion on the basis of the *abhēda śrutis*. By the text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, *Brahman* as well as the *jīva* are ever proved. And therefore the existence of *prapañcha* as well as *Brahman* is true. Is *nirviśēsha* an aid or a hindrance to *Brahma* knowledge? If it is the second, the *Siddhānta* falls to the ground. Is *Nirviśēsha* *Brahman* to be understood as *gnāna* or *agnāna*? If it is the second, the *Siddhānta* falls to the ground. If it is the first, then, is *Brahman* *saviśēsha* or *nirviśēsha*? If it is said that *Brahman* is *nirviśēsha*, then it contradicts (*vyāghāta*) your cherished objective. If it is said that *Brahman* is *saviśēsha*, the *Brahman* becomes eternal (*nityatva*). If *gnāna* becomes *nitya*, the argument also becomes *nitya* (eternal), *i.e.*, endless. Similarly even *Muktas* understand that *prapañcha* is eternal.<sup>371</sup> Then, in the *Mukti* state, when full satisfaction has been attained in *vishaya* (*i.e.*, worldly affairs), it cannot be said that the *prapañcha* is *nirvishaya* (*i.e.*, does not pertain to worldly affairs). Then, there will be no state of correct knowledge (*gnāna*). A knowledge (*gnāna*) which describes no object (*i.e.*, nothing), has nothing to support (*i.e.*, no prop or support) and is a contradiction (in terms). A *gnāna*<sup>372</sup> which relates to a past enjoyment (*atīta gnāna*) can no more be desired to be had. In the same way, if out of past enjoyment there is some small particle still left out, we cannot without contradiction call such a small particle left over as *nirviśēsha*. Because such a declaration would end in a faulty observation. Therefore to describe things which are within our experience as *nirvishaya*<sup>373</sup> and *nirāśraya*<sup>374</sup> is vain, for, in the example "I know this is a *ghaṭa*", which can be stated with firmness, without any doubt by

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<sup>371</sup> So real is *prapañcha*.

<sup>372</sup> *Gnāna* is obtained for realizing *Brahman*; it is the highest object that can be aimed at; but if that is not to be aimed at, what is the use of that *gnāna*?

<sup>373</sup> *Nirvishaya*: Having no scope or sphere of action; not attached to sensual objects.

<sup>374</sup> *Nirāśraya*: Without a prop or support,

seeing and handling, it cannot be stated that it (the *ghaṭa*) is not true and that it (the *ghaṭa*) does not exist. It is the height of contemptuous folly (*dhik*) to state that the *ghaṭa* is just like a flower existing in the sky (*gagana kusumavat*) which can neither be handled nor obtained and which has merely to be imagined, having no real existence.

Further, is Brahman matter (*dravya*)<sup>375</sup> or otherwise (*adravya*)? If he is *dravya*, then he should possess its properties or qualities also. Also he will have to be considered along with time, just as the existence of a pot (*ghaṭa*), as to when it came to exist, etc., which becomes meaningless.

Having an idea involving Time, it may be granted as being *Sat*. Even though at certain times certain properties (*guṇa*) are exhibited yet, he (Brahman) possesses no properties (*agūṇa*), which shows an inconsistency. If the existence of *guṇa* is permanently granted, then, *nirviśēshatva* becomes foiled. If *avidyā* (illusion) is granted, it is not possible to establish true knowledge. If Brahman is to be considered as *adravya* (non-matter), Brahman is always co-existent only with *dravya*. For example, *Sruti* texts like *Svē mahimni ! iti*, contradict the argument. Therefore, as Brahman is always co-existing with *dravya*, the *nirviśēshatva* becomes broken down (*bhangāchcha*). Therefore, with the argument, conducted at length, in these ways, with all reasons and proofs adduced for contradicting the first and the second *kakshas*,<sup>376</sup> Brahman, who has no contradiction whatever, becomes contradicted by the remaining two *kakshas*, i.e., the third and the fourth, and the confusion becomes unpreventable. Hence the argument is one to be discarded (as a remote one).

It is not the fourth, because there is no contradiction in the *Vēdas* themselves about the truth and principles

<sup>375</sup> *Dravya* means a thing, substance, object or matter. An elementary substance ; the substratum of properties ; one of the seven categories of the *Vaiśēshikas*. The *dravyas* are nine :—*prithvī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, *ātman* and *manas*.

<sup>376</sup> Cf. *Tri-chatura kakshā bādhyatva* referred to above in detailing the basis of the *Advaita* argument,

relating to Brahman. As to the real nature of Brahman (*tatvādishu*) as revealed in the *Vēdas* and as stated in the *Srutis*, there is no contradiction. The *nirviśēsha* doctrine exhibits the qualities relating to Brahman in a manner contradictory to them (i.e., *Vēdas* and *Srutis*). Such contradictions not only contradict the Vēdic truth, but are also evidently against *Sruti* texts such as :—*Nēha nānāsti*<sup>377</sup> and *Yasmindyauḥ | iti*,<sup>378</sup> etc. These are gravely contradicted and the argument becomes inconclusive thus, viz., that though there is no *prāpancha* actually, it is only assumed for *vyavahāra*.

The thing assumed is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*atirikta*) and it leads into the region of *dvaita* (*dvaitaprasaṅgāt*), though professing that *dvaita* is false (*mithyātva*). And those proofs that maintain the dualistic doctrine contradict his (*advaitic*) own doctrine and establish finally the truth of the dualistic (*bhēda*) doctrine as one to be accepted (*angīkāryatayā*) and thus results an unwarranted stretch (*ativyāptēyascha*) beyond Brahman. Further, if it is asked, whether the characteristics of Brahman are in accordance with the principles of the *Vēda*, or different from them, whether the complete attainment of Brahman could be fulfilled or not, the reply is that if it is not fulfilled, it is contradicting the starting point, according to his (adversary's) argument. If it is realized that the starting point of *prāpanchaka vyavahāra* breaks down under weight of many Vēdic proofs adduced against it, the argument ends in open contradiction. If the world becomes illusory (*asatvi*), the proofs adduced in support of it (by himself) become contradicted. What was stated at first, viz., that *bhēda* (*jīva* being different from Brahman) is *mithyā* (false), is itself established as being consonant with truth, contrary to one's own argument.

Nor the fifth. While such is the case, your attempt at starting with an argument, professing it to be a Vēdic one, to establish to the world *Brahmasatyatva*, has finally ended

<sup>377</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>378</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II, 2. 5,

in the destruction of your argument and in contradiction, and (your) whole labour has been lost—much like the labour that is lost in trying to establish the beauty of a flower hanging in mid-heaven or in representing a pole as a malicious serpent. So you have to retire from gesticulating in the (dialectic) arena. Now, this is the final verdict (*abhiprāya*). Throughout the argument relating to *nirviśeṣha Brahman*, the negative prefix *ni* (in the word *nirviśeṣha*) denotes and establishes *artha kriyā śūnyatvam* (i.e., void of all realization of object) and *artha kriyā śūnyatva bhāva* (incapability of expecting any realization of the object). While so, Brahman is proved to be, by an unwarranted stretch, one beyond himself (*ativyāptih*). *Avidyā* being one never separable from Him (Brahman), the impossibility of realizing Brahman, the yearned object, is proved.

And being Himself inseparable from impurity (*aśuddha*), *vyavahāritva* is not established. When all true knowledge is separated, then, all attributes are gone and there results finally *śūnyavāda sāmrajya* (i.e., the ascendancy of the kingdom of *Śūnyavāda*<sup>379</sup> or Nescience). The differentiation (*viśeṣhitam*) can never exceed the attributes (*viśeṣhaṇa*) of an object (*viśeṣhya*). In order to exterminate *avidyā*, the argument employed denotes that it reaches beyond (*atirichyatē*) the characteristics of Brahman, so that it finally goes to an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*ativyāptih*). Even if the light of knowledge is obtained, yet the non-destruction of *avidyā* renders the result nugatory—the cause not leading to the desired result.

Though the corporeal object is brought to light, the illusion (*avidyā*) regarding the corporeal objects is not removed. Similarly the Self (*svatvam*), even though without selfishness (*svavishayatām vināpi*), brings into the light the *svarūpa* of Brahman and removes *avidyā*. This is the declaration of the *tattva* (truth) (i.e., *siddhānta*).

Moreover, the mere imagining of the existence of the serpent in the rope, which is unreal (*prātibhāsika*), and

<sup>379</sup> The doctrine of the non-existence of anything; the doctrine of a Buddhist sect.

which makes one to fear and tremble, is a result which can only be described as an unwarranted stretch beyond the truth of the actual existing object, causes and effects. When the existing facts are ignored, as for example, in a *ghaṭa* mere thoughts about it are unwarranted stretches beyond it (*ativyāptih*). A multitude of unsettled thoughts (*prachayā vyavahita*) which arise (*utpannēshu*) about a thing cannot give a settled idea regarding it. Such unsettled thoughts for that moment mean evidently an unwarranted stretch beyond that object (*ativyāptih*). No correct result can be realized by such (unsettled) thoughts and action (*kriyā*) taken on such (unsettled) thoughts. Similarly, in *svapna* (dreams), both good and bad sights are seen with indications for the time being of several actions and results, which finally (in the wakeful state) prove as unwarranted stretches beyond actual reality. As regards the *vyāvahārika* objects, of which knowledge ought to be gained by endeavours and by trying to realize them, the fault is of one's own mind (*ātmāśraya dōsha ēva*). For an untoward result that eventuates by the wearing of a *kaṭaka* (gold bangle) or a *makuta* (a crown) or some such thing, cannot be warded off by blaming merely the *kaṭaka* or the *makuta* (when actually the result has already been experienced). In the same way what is seen occurs and is experienced in *svapna* (dreams). Even though they are unwarranted and beyond the stretch of actual facts, yet nothing can be prevented by applying any kind of interruption. While such is the case, in all such cases of illusory knowledge (*prātibhāsika*), where an unwarranted stretch beyond the actual facts is reached, there can be no interruption. Such things cannot fail to occur under such circumstances. While such is the case, in the present instance, your starting at first with the calculated mistake—of imagining for the purpose of *vyavahāra* a serpent in a rope—is but accidental and results in unforeseen consequences (*ākasmika prasangāt*). Such a view is again confirmed by the detailed description of the result of actions seen and experienced in *svapna* (dreams).

Nor can it be the sixth; that is, Brahman cannot be mere light of knowledge free from any cause or fault. Because in examples derived from the conch-shell (*śukti*) throwing the light of silver, in which it is mere illusion, Brahman becomes *ativyāptih* (an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman). In regard to objects about which almost all people have an ascertained knowledge, even though such things are away from their senses of sight, yet it cannot be said that the characteristics of such things are in any way contradictory to those actually pertaining to them.

In texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*<sup>380</sup> | *Ātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ*<sup>381</sup> | *Yasmin dyauḥ prithivī*<sup>382</sup> | *iti*, which refer to the creation of the creatures of the world and the birth of *ākāśa* by *Ātman*, etc., which objects are perceivable only by mental wisdom, it is not possible exactly to say what their characteristics are. Then, the *Srutis*, which are responsible for mentioning *avidyā* as being the root of all ignorance, state that *avidyā* cannot bring into existence the actual knowledge of Truth for realizing Brahman. Therefore Brahman becomes *ativyāptih* (*Brahmaṇi ativyāptēḥ*). That is, *avidyā* is something beyond Brahman. (That is, you are going beyond the *Srutis* in attributing a power to *avidyā* which the *Srutis* do not predicate for it though you are bringing in the *Srutis* to support it. There is *ativyāpti* here.) Therefore it cannot be said that by such proofs Brahman can be realized after being freed from the illusory knowledge of *Māyā* co-existing with him. It cannot be said of the *Upanishads* that the root of ignorance (*avidyā*) has taken its origin in them or that *avidyā* is in Brahman. Those proofs cannot be expected to support such a view. The *Sruti* text *Athāta ādēśō nēti nēti* | *Nāsadāsīn nōsadāsīt tadānīm*<sup>383</sup> | *Purupurastān-*

<sup>380</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>381</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>382</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 5.

<sup>383</sup> *Rig-Veda*, X. 129. 1. This text is quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his comment on II. 1. 18, *Asadvyapadēśāt nēti chēna dharmāntarēṇa vākyaśēṣhāt*.

*nasannāśannasadasat* <sup>384</sup> *iti*, contradicts even whatever was assumed to be as true of Brahman. By describing Brahman in the terms used in the *Sruti* (texts) and interpreting them in a different manner, and describing the world (*prapañcha*) in contradiction to them (*Sruti* texts), you are belittling them (*kinchitkaram*). While Brahman possesses all the characteristics mentioned in the *Sruti* (texts) in a real form, you have interpreted them to show an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (*atīvyaṭīṭh*). It is not possible to say that the arguments used are in one continued form along the path of right knowledge (*gnāna prakāratva*). Even the knowledge about a pot (*ghaṭa*) according to your argument, goes beyond the attributes of correct knowledge (*avyūptih*) about it, and the attributes are not rightly applicable.

Even though Brahman is possessed of *sadrūpa* (good characteristics), you have in some manner (*prakāratvāt*) interpreted a world consisting in Brahman (*Brahmaṇi prapañchah*) in the form of an illusion (*gnāna prakāratvāchcha*) thereby concluding that Brahman only is true and that the world is a mere illusory (*auhyastatvam*) appearance in Brahman just as *ghaṭa* is seen by the eye and taken to be true by its fashioned appearance and that Brahman is really attributeless (*vishayā viśēṣaṇam iti*), which is neither right nor true (*na yuktam*). For this very reason, all the attributes mentioned (in the *Upanishads*) become useless (*vaiyarthya*). The statement that it (*prapañcha*) exists only in appearance and not real (*prātibhāsike*) is only intended by you to make the all-pervading character of Brahman void of truth (*vyāpti vāraṇāchcha*). Therefore, the statement that the *viśva* (world) is true only for the purposes of *vyavahāra* is in clear contradiction to *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava* <sup>385</sup> and hence is called an

<sup>384</sup> Ānandatīrtha, in his *Māyārāḍakhaṇḍana*, quotes this text to prove that the *Advaita* conclusion regarding Brahman being neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *sadasat* and being one inexpressible or having no characteristics—is nothing but *sūnya*.

<sup>385</sup> Literally means *Vēda*, reasoning and experience.



argument of concealed Buddhism and *Māyavāda* (*Prach-channa Bauddha Māyavāda*). And this is the conclusion of *Srauta Saiva Siddhānta* (publicly) declared to the sound of a bell-metal bell (*ghaṇṭā-ghōṣaḥ*).

Moreover, in the grand texts (*mahāvākyaēshu*) of *Tattvamasi*, etc., no *aikya* with *nirviśeṣa Brahman* is taught (*upadiśyatē*). The words *tat* and *tvam*<sup>386</sup> in the *mahāvākya* teach in the sense of (*paratvāt*) *saviśeṣa jīva-Brahma* (i.e., *jīva* and Brahman possessing qualities).

In texts like *Tad aikshata bahusyām* <sup>387</sup> *iti*, the words *tat*, etc., denote clearly Paramēśvara Brahman with attributes (*saviśeṣa*) by whom the creation of the world was effected. If you say that everything is covered in knowledge inseparable from *Māyā* (*Māyāvidyāvachchinna*) and that no *aikyatva* can be brought about between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, who are respectively of little-knowing and all-knowing nature, being far wide from each other as a cow and a dog; and pursue the doctrine further by employing the *jahal* and *ajahal lakṣaṇā* modes of argument, sometimes vetoing and sometimes agreeing with the texts of the *Sruti* and finally saying that "He is Devadatta" who appears as the result of the *upādhi* of *Māyā* (*Māyāvidyōpādhiḥ*), the destruction of which *upādhi* created by *Māyāvidyā* will result in the realization of Brahman, who should be understood to be free from all attributes (*Nirviśeṣaḥ*)—if you ask us to admit the existence of such a Brahman, then, we say, we do not accept such a doctrine; because by your own argument you have arrived at a conclusion that is either an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman or which ends in anything but Brahman (i.e., in Nescience). For texts like *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati* <sup>388</sup> *Brahmakāmō*

<sup>386</sup> Cf. *Aitadātmya* *midam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tattvamasi Svētakēṭō*, where the words *tat* and *tvam* are used in terms of *jīva* and Brahman, with their respective attributes. The text is from the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, VI. 1. 8.

<sup>387</sup> *Chch. Uṇ.*, VI. 2. 3.

<sup>388</sup> *Mund. Uṇ.*, III. 2. 9.

*Brahmavēdanam kuryāt* <sup>1</sup> *Divyam paramjyōtirūpam sampadya svēna rupēna abhinishpadyatē* <sup>1389</sup> *Śiva ēkō dhyēyah śivamkaraḥ sarvaṃ anyat parityajya* <sup>1390</sup> *Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* <sup>1391</sup> *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* <sup>1392</sup> *iti*, teach clearly that Śivatva could be obtained by the *jīva* by duly meditating upon Paramēśvara and praying to Him agreeably to the *Bhramara-kīta nyāya*, the *kīta* being transformed into the *bhramara* through constant meditation of him.

Texts like *Ēsha hi ēva sādhu karma kārayati* <sup>1</sup> *iti*, <sup>393</sup> proclaim that Paramēśvara is capable of getting done all good deeds and conferring all the four states of *mukti* in addition to granting the privilege of residence in the same heaven with himself (*i.e.*, *Kailāsa*). Moreover, *Sruti* texts like those beginning with (the words) *Tudaikshata bahusyām* <sup>1394</sup> *iti*, are contradicted by your mode of argument and the meaning of the *Sruti* text *Ēkavignānēna sarva-vignānam*, etc., <sup>395</sup> is totally shattered to pieces by you. Besides, according to your doctrine, meditation on Paramēśvara will not end in the realization of *sākshātkāra* <sup>396</sup> of Paramēśvara, because your maxim *yad driśyam tan naśyam* (whatever you see by the eye that is destroyable—and not real) leads to *nishprayōjana*—utter futility of all objects, and attaining nothing as the result of *dhyāna* (meditation) and renders it useless; and exhibits Paraśiva Brahman who shines resplendently in his all-knowing and other qualities (*sarvagnatvādī*) and his six kinds of characteristics, exhibited in expressions such as Śiva, Śarva, Śankara, Ānandagnāna, Ananta, etc., powerless, and makes his name a term convertible into *hasta*, *kara*, *pāni* and other

<sup>389</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 3. 4.

<sup>390</sup> *Atharvaśiras*.

<sup>391</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>392</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>393</sup> *Chch. Upa.*

<sup>394</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>395</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>396</sup> Literally, direct perception, apprehension or knowledge.

terms and makes him inexplicable and also exhibits *jīva*, who is entitled to be considered as the indivisible part of that *all-knowing svarūpa of Paramaśiva (akhaṇḍagnāna svarūpa Paramaśiva)* as being both separate and one with him. But if one asks whether *jīva* is different from the *akhaṇḍagnāna svarūpa Paraśiva Brahma* or one with him, it is not the first. For a world composed of (material objects such as) *ghaṭa* (pot), *paṭa* (cloth) and the like which shine as clear objects by the (aid of the) rays of the Sun, cannot be said to be shining by the internal light of the *jīva (sva<sup>397</sup> svabhāsaka prabhākara)* that perceives it. For it is the urge caused by *Paramaśiva* which brought to him the knowledge of the object so perceived. Nor can it be the second. It cannot be said that the mere eyes as the organ of sight have realized the sight of it. Or, if it be said that *jīva* being separated from real knowledge, could acquire the knowledge of the object by experience of sight, we say it is not so. How can it be possible for it to get at a knowledge by its own exertions? Then could it have the power in itself both to lower itself and raise itself (*utkrishṭa* and *apakrishṭa*)? Not the first; for it is against *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*. Nor could it be the second; for meditation as aforesaid is incapable of giving realization on account of its own fault. Nor is it the third, for, according to *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnan dvan ajāvīśānīśau* <sup>398</sup> *Pradhāna kshētrapatir guṇēśaḥ* <sup>399</sup> *Īśānasarva vidyānām Īśvarassarva bhūtānām* <sup>400</sup> *iti*, etc., a great contradiction will ensue as it is opposed to the *Sruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*. The actual realization (*sākshātkāra*) will become impossible, even though the light of knowledge is as clear and effulgent as the light of the Sun (*Prabhākara*) shining in the middle of the sky. And, therefore, if you say that by the knowledge derived from meditation and worship and prayers that

<sup>397</sup> *Sva* here means *jīva*.

<sup>398</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>399</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

<sup>400</sup> *Mahōpa.*, 29.

Brahman could be realized, according to your own argument, it is not possible. But just as the Sun is to the sky, the eyes are to the body for the purpose of realizing Brahman. And there can be no contradiction if the soul of the *jīva*, which has attained purification by the *dīkshā* (initiation) administered by the *guru* (*guru dīkshā śuddha jīvasya*), obtains *sākshātkāra* (i.e., direct realization) of Paramēśvara through his direct grace (*anugraha*). If not, *Śruti* texts like *Gnātṛvā Śivam śāntim atyantamēti* <sup>401</sup> *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* <sup>402</sup> *Ēśhōṇurātmā chētasā vēditavyaḥ* <sup>403</sup> *iti* and hundreds of other similar texts will be rendered useless. Otherwise, in this world, there would be no more such a thing as the imparting of instruction by a *guru* to a *śishya*. Therefore, what has been formerly said, is the declared meaning of all the *Vēdas* and the *Vēdānta*. This is our conclusion (*siddhānta*).

Now, it should not be said—says Śrīpati—that the first four *Sūtras* have given the full purport of the whole work entitled the *Brahma-Sūtra* consisting of four chapters and that it is unnecessary to consider the remaining *Sūtras* of the work. If it is suggested that a consideration of the remaining *Sūtras* is not necessary, then, the reply is that it is not so. The first four *Sūtras*, in Śrīpati's opinion, define in the main *Brahma lakṣaṇa*. In order to bring home clearly and at length the *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa primarily explains in the *Sūtras* that follow that the *śāṅkā* (doubt) of *atīvyāpti* cannot, under any circumstances, exist in regard to Brahman. In commenting on the *Sūtras* immediately following, Śrīpati not only seeks to reaffirm the proposition that the Brahman under discussion is Mahēśvara himself but also refutes the Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita standpoints and Sankara's doctrine of *Jagan-mithyātva*. A very brief reference to these points ought to suffice, in view of the consideration already given to the last of these topics.

<sup>401</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>402</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>403</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

### The Repudiation of Sankhya-Dvaita.

In the next *adhikaraṇa*—*Īkshatyadhikaraṇam*—Śrīpati suggests that Bādarāyaṇa refutes (*nirākarāṇa*) the *Sāṅkhya-dvaita-mata* (i.e., the Sāṅkhya-dvaita doctrine). Just as a magnet draws to itself the needle by its power of attraction, so Brahman draws to himself the *pradhāna* (i.e., world) as he himself is the sole author of creation, etc. Agreeably to this maxim, Bādarāyaṇa repudiates in this *Adhikaraṇa* the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya-dvaita* and establishes that the Brahman under discussion is no other than Mahēśvara, who is both the cause and the effect of the creation of the universe. This *Adhikaraṇa* consists of eight *Sūtras* from the 5th to the 12th. In *Īkshatērnāśabdām*, 1. 1. 5, it is enunciated that Brahman undergoes no change; *Prakṛiti* only undergoes change, just as earth does in the hands of a potter.

So Brahman controls *Pradhāna* by his power. The chief cause for the creation of the universe is (Para) Brahman. *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛiti*, etc., are only materials for him in connection with creation, protection and destruction. Brahma, Viṣṇu and others are ever ready to work according to the will of Paraśiva (Brahman). In the next *Sūtra* (1. 1. 6) *Gauṇaschēnnātmaśabdāt*, the word *ātma*, says Śrīpati, denotes that *Pradhāna* must be looked upon as subordinate (to Brahman) and neither as independent nor as capable of acting of its own freewill just as a servant is never independent of his master, even though he is granted any amount of power and influence. So *Pradhāna*, even though it is described in terms of *ātma*, cannot be independent of Paramēśvara. In 1. 1. 7, *Tan nisṭasya mōkshōpa-dēśāt*, Śrīpati refutes both the Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrines. Śrīpati calls Dvaita as *ghaṭapaṭavat asamspru-ṣṭa bhēdavāda matam*.<sup>404</sup>

<sup>404</sup> In the *Tatvasankhyāna* of Ānandatīrtha, the following occurs:—*Duḥkha spruṣṭam tadasspruṣṭam iti dvaidhēva chētanam | Nityāduḥkhā Ramānyētu spruṣṭa duḥkhāsamastāṣaḥ | Spruṣṭa duḥkhā samastāścha asamspruṣṭa iti dvaidhā | Dēva rishi pitru pā nara iti muktāstu panchadhā ||* Śrīpati's description is a short one based

Srīpati describes Viśiṣṭādvaita as *daṇḍā daṇḍivat angāṅgivat samsrughā bhēda vāda matam*. The doctrine holds *daṇḍā* and *daṇḍi* and *anga* and *angi* (body and its members) as a composite whole though they are seen separate by the eye. Srīpati after refuting these two doctrines establishes that there is no difference between the *jīva* and (Para) Brahman. In 1. 1. 8, *Hēyatvā vachanūchcha*, Srīpati tries to establish that none other than Paraśiva Brahman could claim to be the cause of creation. The *Pradhāna* (i.e., *Prakṛiti*) cannot claim to be its cause as it is lifeless (*jaḍa*) and can only be a material for Brahman. Here he uses two *nyāyas* :—(1) *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya* and (2) *Śākhā chandra nyāya*. *Pradhāna* is only a material to locate the action of Brahman as being the cause in creation. In 1. 1. 9, *Pratignū virōdhāt*, it is suggested that *Pradhāna* cannot be made a cause because it is only *jaḍa*, i.e., a lifeless thing in which no life (*chētana*) can be imagined. Hence it cannot claim the description of *sat*. In 1. 1. 10, *Svāpyayāt*, Srīpati endeavours to show that *Pradhāna* cannot claim to be the cause of destruction. Paraśiva Brahman only is the chief cause of *laya* (or destruction) in the same way as he is the Creator. Paraśiva Brahman is always in the heart of the *jīva* in *sūkshma* form and causes sleep of a very profound kind (*sushupti*). The *jīva* finds its temporary station in Para-Brahman during profound sleep (*sushuptau Sankarē laya iti*) and returns to the world after it awakes. In 1. 1. 11, *Gatī sāmānyāt*, Srīpati points out that Paraśiva Brahman is

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evidently on this text of Ānandatīrtha. Srīpati's description may be thus translated :—Those disputants who hold that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (i.e., *jug* and *cloth*) are quite different from each other, so different that they do not touch each other at any point. Ānandatīrtha's text says :—“The unaffected and the afflicted are the two eternal kinds among the *chētanās* (souls). *Ramā* (i.e., *Lakshmi*) is never afflicted even in the least ; as regards others they are all afflicted, more or less to a degree. Among the afflicted, they are divided into the least touched and the most touched. The least touched are five in number : the gods, sages, ancestors, kings and good men who are eternal *muktas* (i.e., the eternally blessed).” [These are least afflicted by reason of their very subordination to (Para) Brahman.]

above three deities Brahma, Indra and Upēndra and also Chandra, Dinēndra and others and that he is the Chief and Supreme Lord over all and the author of *Srishti*, *Sthiti* and *Laya* as well as the creator of the deities. He quotes the *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad* and states that though Nārāyaṇa is said to have been the only one above all—that there was neither Brahma, Īśa nor Agni nor the Sky nor the Moon nor this world at first, yet, according to the *Kaivalya*, *Kāthavalli* and *Sivādvaita Prakāśika* and the *Atharva Upanishad*, Paraśiva Brahman alone is the Lord above all, the others being his mere subordinates, tied up with the bondage of *Māyā*. Sṛipati quotes in this connection the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the *Atharvōpanishad*. In 1. 1. 12, *Srutatvāchcha*, Sṛipati suggests that all the *Upanishads* and *Vēdas* prove that Paraśiva Brahman alone is discussed in the *Sūtras* and that as he is the One above all, should be understood and realized as the great cause of *Srishti*, *Sthiti* and *Laya*. And this realization is the result of meditation. He quotes the *Śvētāśvatara*, the *Mahimna*, the *Saiva Purāṇa*, the *Śkānda* and the *Siva-Gītā* for establishing this position and impresses it by referring to the *Sthūlārundhaṭī nyāya* and the *Pravāha samudra nyāya*. According to the *Mahimna*, there are three kinds of *yōga*, viz., Sāṅkhya, Pāsupata and Vaishṇava. Each of these three, though they denote different ways of meditation, through different principles, in their final stages, where these three methods meet in regard to the realization of Brahman, they are one and the same just as all rivers finally find their way to the sea. Sṛipati once again dissents from the view that Brahman is attributeless (*nirviśēsha*) and refutes that doctrine and warns *mumukshus* against it (*Sruti sūtra viruddhatvāt na mumukshu grāhyam*). As it is opposed to *Sruti* and *Sūtra*, he says such a view must not be accepted by those who are desirous of realizing the Brahman. Here, in this *Sūtra*, he once again controverts the Advaita view that Brahman is *nirviśēsha*. Sṛipati says that the statement that *prapancha* is false, goes without proof; when the cause is to establish an effect, the world being an effect, it goes without

cause, if Brahman is *nirviśēsha*. If Brahman is *nirviśēsha*, then the world goes without a cause. But the effect, *i.e.*, the world, is seen. So, there is here a contradiction. Thus the *Nirviśēsha vāda* ends in contradiction (*bhanga prasangaḥ*). Passing on to the next *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇam*, Śrīpati, commenting on 1. 1. 13, *Ānandamayōbhyaśāt*, states that in this *Sūtra* Brahman who is in the *jīva* and who appears himself different from the *jīva* finally exhibits himself as all one. Śrīpati points out that the *jīva* is never different from Brahman and he is always *ānandamayah*. He quotes the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, *Āpastamba sūtra* and *Śvētāśvatara Upanishad* and endeavours to prove that the *sthūla śarīra* which stands as a different encasement (*kōśa*) of the *jīva*, finally destroys itself and the *jīva*, being part of Brahman, becomes Brahman (*Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati*).<sup>405</sup> The prefix *mai* in the *Sūtra* indicates the transformation in its several stages of the *jīva*, such as *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manōmaya*, *vignānamaya* and *ānandamaya*, and finally transforms itself into *Brahmasvarūpa*, which is the *ānandamaya* stage. Reaching this is *Mukti*. *Ānanda* being Brahman, the *jīva* will finally attain the state of *Ānandamaya Brahman*. Largely in the *Vēdānta*, Śiva is represented to be Parabrahman. *Ānandamaya* is no other than Paraśiva Brahman. This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*: no other should be said to be *Ānandamaya* except Paraśiva.

He is *rasa* among the *rasas*, *Rasō vai saḥ*. After joining the Brahman of *rasas*, the *jīva* becomes *Ānanda*—so says the (*Chchāndōgya*) *Upanishad*. *Brahmaṇaḥ Śivasyaiva Ānandaśabdō nirnītaḥ*. (To Śiva is applicable both *Ānanda* and *Brahma śabdā*.) The *jīva*, from its *sthūla śarīra* stage, undergoes a series of developments and transformations until it becomes Brahman. Śrīpati proves on the strength of the *Niśrēṇi nyāya*, *Sākhā chandra nyāya* and *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya* that the *jīva* becomes

<sup>405</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.



finally the *Anandamaya Brahman*. Therefore meditation must continuously be carried out until the *jīva* is transferred into the *Ānanda* stage—*Sa ēkō Brahmaṇa Ānandaḥ*.<sup>406</sup> According to the *Hamsōpanishad* and *Kaivālya*, *Kaṭha* and *Tattirīya*, the *jīva*, having cast off its different destructive (*naśvara*) envelopments, will attain to the state of *Paramaśiva* and become one with him, according to the *Bhramara-kīta nyāya*, just as the *kīta* becomes the *Bhramara* by constant, unbroken meditation on the latter. The external sheaths that encase the *jīva* are just like so many earthly coverings (*mruṇmaya ghaṭa ityādivat*), which are liable to undergo change and destruction (*vikārārthakatvamēva*).

Commenting on the next *Sūtra* (1. 1. 14), *Vikārasabdānnēticchēnnaprāchuryāt*, *Srīpati* enquires if *ānandamaya* is to be understood as similarly capable of undergoing further transformation into something else, it should not be so. Because on account of the power of rendering abundant, in fact, abundant to an unlimited extent, the state of *ānanda*, which is the characteristic of *Paramēśvara*, to which state the *jīva* transforms itself. *Srīpati* says that as the *jīva* advances in acquiring more and more *ānanda*, the sorrows and other like characteristics attaching to the *jīva* will lessen and lessen and finally disappear. The *chētana* should not be understood to be on the same footing as the earth, which has to undergo many changes, until it assumes the form of a jug, for earth is only a lifeless thing.

Next commenting on 1. 1. 16, *Taddhētu vyapadēsāchcha*, *Srīpati* remarks that in this world a learned man makes another learned; the wealthy man makes another wealthy; and the self-shining sun and other heavenly bodies make others (on whom their rays fall) to shine. In the same way, *Paramēśvara*, who is *Ānandamaya*, having given *ānanda* to all the *jīvas*, when they are in perfect sleep, makes them feel *ānanda*.

In that state (*sushupti*), Paramēśvara is the cause for all the *ānanda* and he is the agent (*kartā*). Therefore it follows that *Ānandamaya*, who gave the *jīva* all the *ānanda*, is no other than Paraśiva, who is the chief cause (*hētu*). If indeed, Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* (attributeless), then, the granting or securing of *ānanda*, transforming one into *Ānandamayatva* is not possible. If it is said, adopting the reasoning of the Pūrvāchārya (Sankara) that the mere allegation (*adhyārōpa*, attributing wrongly what is not existent) that the world was created without its being truly existent (*nishprapancham prapanchitam*) only for the purpose of *vyavahāra* (for argument's sake), and that Brahman cannot be held responsible for transforming the *jīva* into the state of *Ānandamaya*, then, we say that it is not so. In that case, we will have to understand *vyavahāra* as meaning truly existing and capable of development into a transformed condition after the lapse of time (*kālāntara*). Then the doubt arises whether *prapancha* is of the character of *sat* or of *asat* or incapable of interpretation being a combination of *sat* and *asat*. It is not the first; because at what distance of time, however short, two irreconcilable things like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* can reconcile themselves into one cannot be conceived of by us with any degree of certainty. If we go on trying to establish that there is a common relation between two irreconcilable things, to bring about a reconciliation between them within a particular limit of time, then it is to be understood that such an argument is employed for the time being in terms so as to satisfy only the purpose of the argument (*vaiśāṇṇika*) and not as a matter of truth. Being incapable of establishing the absolute non-existence of *mithyātva* (*vyavahāra* being used), it (the argument) ends in contradicting its own *siddhānta* (*svasiddhānta virōdhak*). *Mithyātva* is a thing which is said to exist in that space and time and counteracting all existence. This finally opposes his own argument and the doctrine held by him (*i.e.*, Pūrvāchārya) ends in *ativyāpti*—an unwarranted

stretch beyond the starting point (of the argument). Nor can it be the second. Being himself the well-known and the indescribable and consisting of *sat* and *asat* (*sada-sadātmaka*) and containing the qualities of both *sadasad*, such a curious thing is unknown (*aprasiddhēh*).

Nor can it be said of Brahman, that he is different from *sat* or *asat* and comprising of the characteristics of *sat* and *asat*. If Brahman is said to consist of *sat* and *asat* combined, then also *ativyāpti* occurs. If it is said that Brahman is absolutely one, consisting of *sat*, then it follows that he is different from the combined characteristics of *sat* and *asat*. Then he can only be said to consist of purely *sat*. If Brahman is said to consist only of *sat*, without any admixture of *asat*, then there can be no kind of *asat* of even the smallest quantity in him. If he should consist of *asat* in him, then *ativyāpti* follows. Therefore, correct knowledge of Brahman is realized when he is understood to be free from *asat* and only as consisting of *sat* in him. Even then if Brahman is understood to be devoid of *Dharma*, then again *ativyāpti* follows in Brahman. But it is said that for the very reason that Brahman is devoid of *Dharma*, it should not be said that results in *ativyāpti*, i.e., is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman. Because the argument becomes unreasonable and ends in unjust conclusion. No conclusion, unless free from faulty inferences, can be considered as final and one capable of realizing *Brahmatva*. So far as there is a decided and correct knowledge regarding the characteristics of Brahman, so far only is Brahman readily realized. The knowledge of Brahman and the realization (of Brahman) are never separated from each other. This is our belief (*matam*). There is no *ativyāpti* in such a realization of Brahman. So long as Brahman is seen in so many different forms of existence, it is not possible to describe Brahman in all the characteristics of the several forms in which he is seen. For example, in texts like *Tattvamasi* etc., hundreds of patently

contradictory expressions are to be found not easily reconcilable. And therefore if Brahman is to be considered as *abhēda* and absolutely one, then it is not possible to easily reconcile all such contradictory expressions found in the *Srutis*; for, even if the expressions are intended to convey the idea of *bhēda*, just as between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, then also it is not possible to avoid *ativyāpti*. While things are patently different, to say that they are one and undivided is to land the argument in *ativyāpti*. Even though silver is seen in the conch-shell, to say that it is not silver but a mere illusory thing that appears like silver is to say that there is no definite description of what is seen. Even though the eye sees objects with several characteristics, to deny that it has no characteristics, is to harm the *siddhānta* sought to be established. Indeed, when we see an article made of silver, we call it "This is made of silver"; thereby we mean that it could not be a thing made of anything else but silver. There is no reason why we should doubt it to be any other thing. Again, when we see another article of a different form and made of silver, we call it "This article is made of silver". Though the two articles are different in form, they are made of the same metal silver, and there can be no *bhrānti* (mistake) in regard about it. We cannot say that for the mere reason of change of form the substance also is different. Similarly, Brahman who exhibits himself in several forms is the same in substance. Thereby the argument that Brahman is devoid of attributes ends in defeat, according to the *Sruti* text *Nēha nānāsti kinchana* <sup>407</sup> which means that Brahman is never void of attributes. If so, by a contradictory argument (*vyāghātancha*) Brahman ends in *apasiddhānta* (in an erroneous conclusion). A Brahman devoid of attributes (*nīrviśēsha Brahman*) is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, an object which is without any attribute cannot be exactly expressed

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<sup>407</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

in any form of its existence. In such a state, Brahman goes without any description, just as a *ghaṭa*, which has not been formed into any shape by which it could be described. Then, it is to be said that the *ghaṭa* appears to be of a black colour (*nīlō ghaṭaḥ*), whereby no comprehension of the object is realized. Now, *bhryānti* is never preventable. An object which appears to the sight cannot be wrongly mistaken to be any other than what it is actually seen to be and consist of those attributes. We cannot describe a thing that has not been actually seen. A matter which is possessed of a particular characteristic cannot be stated to be no matter at all; for it is capable of undergoing changes from one form into another. Similarly Brahman who is the *Ātman* and who takes on several forms to the sight, cannot be said to be devoid of such characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*). If we do not admit the existing characteristics as we see in them, such as the *ghaṭa* in our sight, reading its colour, etc., then we will be forming a wrong conclusion by a wrong mode of argument. We cannot disprove our sight when we clearly come into contact with a particular object; nor can we think of any other object when we have a particular one before us. There can never be any difference between the observations that we make in an object and the actual characteristics that they display. If we did so, we would be making wrong conclusions just as assuming *danda* and *puruṣa* wrongly as (indicating) one (object) only—(i.e., without distinguishing between the two).

Then such a contradictory argument is to be understood as indicating the non-existence of either. But such a thing in Brahman is damaging (*dushṭam*). If Brahman is to be conceived of in the form of an inexpressible one and as possessing characteristics which are contradictory to each other, unless such contradictions exist in him, such a Brahman possessed of *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa* cannot be actually realized or supposed to exist. In your (Pūrvāchārya's) opinion if such a contradiction cannot be removed or reconciled, Brahman

is not clearly established and Brahman, therefore, becomes something else and ends in *ativyāpti*. Accordingly we cannot be prevented from deciding that Brahman can be anything but what you decide him to be—*i.e.*, one possessing a character indescribable and composed of both *sat* and *asat*. The characteristics of *sat* and *asat* which, by your argument, you attribute to Brahman, can never be spoken of as *nirviśēsha* characteristics. Taking *sat* and *asat* on the whole, it is easily arrived at that Brahman is full of attributes, such as a *ghatakalāśa* which consists of a combination of *ghata*, *pala*, etc. It follows, therefore, that what you said to be *abhinna* and *adhyāsa* and just as the appearance of silver in the conch-shell is all untrue and proves only the Brahman with *attributes*. The belief that Brahman is distinguished by *viśēshaṇa* or attributive characteristics cannot be said to limit his unlimited (*viśiṣṭa*) qualities; even if you say so, he is not affected by your so limiting his characteristics.

### The Bhedabheda Theory.

At this point, it might prove useful to obtain a comprehensive view of the *Bhēdābhēda* view propounded by Śrīpati. Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* is to the Vīraśaivas what Rāmānuja's is to the Śrī-Vaishṇavas, Ānandatīrtha's to Sad-Vaishṇavas (or Mādhva-Vaishṇavas) and Sankara's to Smārtas. It came to be written at a time when the Vīraśaivas occupied the foremost position in the religious counsels of the first Vijayanagar Empire. If Vīraśaivism may justly claim to be a revival of the ancient Śaiva faith which became popular amongst the generality of the Western and South Indian people, long anterior to and more prominently since the days of Basava, the reformer, who largely democratised it about the middle of the 12th century A.D., Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* may be taken to represent its higher philosophical aspects. Its chief merit—as any one who reads through it will readily acknowledge—is that it seeks to put Vīraśaivism on a philosophical footing. What Śrīkantha did for Suddhaśaivism, Śrīpati did for Vīraśaivism.

While Sṛīkantha's system has been sometimes interpreted, notably by Appaya Dīkshita, in terms of Sankara's *Advaita*, though he himself styles it *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, it is impossible to so interpret Sṛīpati's. It is *Vīraśaiva* in letter and spirit where Sṛīkantha's is *Śaivite*. It touches on every important article of faith of *Vīraśaivism* and brings it within the philosophic sweep of Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Coming as it did after the efforts of Sankara, Rāmānuja, Ānandatīrtha and Sṛīkantha, it passes in review the first three of these and rejects their standpoints as also of Sṛīkantha, though not in the same open manner as it does the first three, and this for the obvious reason that Sṛīkantha and Sṛīpati were both *Śaivas*, though differing from each other in certain respects. Sṛīpati does not accept the *Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaitism* of Sṛīkantha any more than he accepts the *Advaita* of Sankara. Even the casual reader will be struck with the deep learning, the extensive range of knowledge, the high dialectic skill and the intimate acquaintance Sṛīpati shows of the systems he criticizes at such great length and with such effect. In places, his argumentation is searching and his criticism piercing to a degree. As a philosophical polemic, it is not a mere destructive treatise; it is something more than that. It builds up a system, which seeks to give a broader base to the transcendental aspect of *Vīraśaivism*. What is particularly noteworthy is that he does not put it forth as a mere statement of his own individual views but as one founded on an old and well-established tradition going back to the hoary days of Agastya, the sage to whom all South Indian culture is attributed. This suggestion is of considerable importance, because it enables us not only to determine what authority should attach to the commentary of Sṛīpati but also helps us to fix, within certain tolerable limits, the comparative age of the view-points taken by him and his predecessors in interpreting the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. The *Sūtras* themselves bear eloquent testimony to the fact that there were, at or about the time they came to be composed, different schools of *Vēdāntic* thought, led by well-known teachers, to whom specific references

are made by Bādarāyaṇa. Among these are Āśmarathya (I. 2. 29 and I. 4. 20); Ātrēya (III. 4. 44); Audulōmi (I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45 and IV. 4. 6); Bādari (I. 2. 31; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7 and IV. 4. 10); Jaimini (I. 2. 28; I. 2. 31; I. 3. 31; I. 4. 18; III. 2. 40; III. 4. 2; III. 4. 18; III. 4. 40; IV. 1. 17; IV. 3. 12; IV. 4. 5 and IV. 4. 11); Kārshṇājini (III. 1. 9) and Kāśakritsna (I. 4. 22). If the interpretation of Sankara and Rāmānuja of II. 1. 1 and II. 1. 2 and II. 1. 4 are to be accepted—Ānandatīrtha differs from them in his interpretation of these *Sūtras* as in many others—then, we have to concede that Bādarāyaṇa refers, though without mentioning his name, to Kapila also. Of these teachers, the view of Āśmarathya is, if the interpretation of Sankara of I. 4. 20 is adopted, that the soul stands to the Brahman in the *bhēdābhēda* relation, *i.e.*, it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. This, in other words, means that individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different. This is the *bhēdābhēdāvāda* associated with the name of Āśmarathya. Audulōmi, however, takes a different view. He teaches (I. 4. 21) that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when, obtaining final release, it is merged in it. Sankara commenting on this *Sūtra*, which is devoted to Audulōmi's opinion, says that the individual soul which is rendered restless by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, *viz.*, body, senses and mind, attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the higher self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This opinion of Audulōmi is supported by him by two texts from the *Upanishads*. The first of these is: *Ēvamē vaishā samprasādō*, etc., that serene being arising from this body appears in its form as soon as it has approached the highest high.<sup>408</sup> The second intimates, by means

<sup>408</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12, 3.



of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ*, etc., as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form thus, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great.<sup>409</sup> That is, as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest Person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning assigned to it, follows—adds Sankara—from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison. Vāchaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati*, a commentary on Sankara's *Bhāṣya*, remarks, when writing in this connection that the Upanishadic texts quoted transfer a future state of non-difference to that time when the difference exists. He quotes the following saying of the *Pāñcharātrikas*:—"Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference." Audulōmi's doctrine is known as *Satyabhēdavāda*. Finally, we have the view of Kāśakritsna, who holds that the individual soul is absolutely non-different from the Brahman (I. 4. 22). Sankara in commenting on this *Sūtra* makes it read "the highest Self exists in the condition of the individual soul". That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual, is, he says, evident from the *Brāhmaṇa* passage, "Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms" and similar texts. He also cites *mantras* to the same effect, for instance, "The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names."<sup>410</sup> Where the *Srutis* relate the creation of fire and other elements, they do not—he says—at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul; we have, therefore,

<sup>409</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

<sup>410</sup> *Taitt. Ar.*, III. 12. 7.

he argues, no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. In the opinion of Kāśakritsna, the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Āsmarathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest self, yet intimates by the expression "On account of the fulfilment of the promise which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul—and not the relation of absolute identity." The opinion of Audulōmi, again, clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition, *i.e.*, upon the state of emancipation and its absence. Of these three opinions, Sankara holds that of Kāśakritsna accords with the *Srutis*, because it agrees with what all the *Vēdānta* texts, for example, *Tattvamasi*, etc., aim at inculcating. Only on the basis of his opinion, says Sankara, immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul—as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers—but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason, the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which the *Srutis* speak in some places as analogous to the issuing of the sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two—propounded by Kāśakritsna—is well founded. Having said that, Sankara considers a possible objection to that view. After quoting the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' he states that this might be taken to intimate the final destruction of the soul,

not its identity with the highest Self! "By no means," he replies. The passage means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the *mātras*, i.e., the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connection has been solved, specific cognition which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge'.

Then, Sankara says, if Kāśakritsna's view is, as shown above, in keeping with the *Srutis*, all the adherents of *Vēdānta* must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz., the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. After quoting numerous texts, the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in support of this view, he states that if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire. The *Srutis*, he says, speak of those "who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the *Vēdānta*."<sup>411</sup> He compares the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?'<sup>412</sup> He further notes that the *Smṛiti* also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady.<sup>413</sup>

Finally Sankara winds up the argument by observing that as the individual and the highest Soul differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for

<sup>411</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 6. (*Vēdāntavignāna*, etc.)

<sup>412</sup> *Is. Upa.*, 7. (*Yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūdviṣṇataḥ | tatra kō mōhaḥ kaḥ śōkaḥ yēkatva manupaśyataḥ ||*)

<sup>413</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 54-58.

its object the absolute oneness of the two, it is senseless to insist as some do,—Sankara says—on a plurality of Selves, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave'<sup>414</sup> refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul). And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, *viz.*, *Tat srishṭvā tadēvānuprāviśat*, 'Having sent forth he entered into it',<sup>415</sup> according to which the Creator only entered into the created beings. He then adds that those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the *Vēdānta* texts stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal (while it is really eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman). And, he adds, if they attempt to show that *mōksha*, although effected, is eternal, they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

We thus see Sankara rejecting Āsmarathya's *bhēdā-bhēda* and Audulōmi's *satyabhēdāvāda* and accepting the doctrine of Kāśakritsna, as interpreted by himself, that the highest Soul exists in the condition of the individual Soul and deducing from it the theory of the identity of the *Jīva* and the *Brahman*. Turning to Sṛīpati, we find him interpreting these three *Sūtras* (I. 4. 20, I. 4. 21 and I. 4. 22) in a somewhat different manner. In connection with the first of these, he quotes the *Sruti* texts: *Ātmani vijnātē sarvamidam vijnātam bhavati* (When the Self is known, all this is known); *Idam sarvam yadayamātmanā iti cha*<sup>416</sup> (All

<sup>414</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. (*Brahmavidāpnōti sarvam*, etc.)

<sup>415</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6. (*Asannēva sa bhavati*, etc.)

<sup>416</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 6.

these, wherever they may be that appear to us, are nothing but *Ātmā*); and *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignāna pratignā-siddhēḥ lingam sūchitam bhavati*<sup>417</sup> ('If one is known, all is known' indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement). The statement that "if one is known, all is known" leads to no contradiction, because *Sruti* texts, such as *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*<sup>418</sup> *iti*, etc., explain clearly that all those things, whatever that appear to us, are *jīvas* consisting of the five elements (*bhūta panchaka*) and they came to existence from Brahman. As they are connected mutually as cause and effect, there can be no separation between the two and hence they are relatively connected with each other, and therefore, [according to the maxim *dadhi kshīravat* (curds resulting from milk),<sup>419</sup> a thorough knowledge of the cause of transformation from one state to another will lead to the realization of the whole truth laid down in the text *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam*. And therefore Āśmarathya considers that in order to gain a knowledge of the principles of difference underlying the text *Ēka vignānēna sarva vignānam*, a close study of what is enunciated in the texts *Yasya ātmā śarīram*<sup>420</sup> *iti*, etc., is necessary. Such a study would show the transformation of the *śarīra* into the *Ātmā* (i.e., Brahman), and fulfil the texts *Sarva vignāna pratignā*, etc. In order to clearly point out the close connection that exists between *śarīra* and *ātmā*—which is as close as between the body and its

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<sup>417</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>418</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>419</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Anuvyākhyāna* on the *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣhya*, I. 4. 6, where the phrase *Kshīravat vikāraḥ syāt naiva sa syāddharēḥ kvachit* occurs. Also see Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*, I. 4. 6, where the same phrase is commented upon. For Sankara's view see *Bhāṣhya on the Vēdānta Sūtras*, II. 1. 18, where he maintains as his final conclusion that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible even within hundreds of years ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. See also Sankara's *Bhāṣhya*, II. 1. 24.

<sup>420</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

members (*angūṅgi*)—Āsmarathya, who upholds the *bhēda-vāda* doctrine, considers that a close study into the nature of the difference between *ātmā* and *śarīra* is necessary. In this manner, having considered both the doctrine of *Asamyukta bhēdavāda*, which differentiates between *jīva* and *Brahman* as between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, and the doctrine of *angāṅgivat samyukta bhēda*, which connects the *jīva* with the *Brahman* as closely as the body is related to its members, Āsmarathya demonstrates (thereby) the doctrine of *Suddhādvaita*. Śrīpati next passes on to I. 4. 21, which propounds Audulōmi's view. He interprets the *Sūtra* thus, *utkramishyataḥ, svām vidyōpādhiṁ tyajataḥ, jīvasya ghaṭākāśa, mahākāśavat Brahmbhinnatvāt sarvadā Brahmbhinnatayā jīvōpakramaṇam*. Here the expression *utkramishyataḥ* means *svām vidyōpādhiṁ tyajataḥ*, i.e., abandon the deceptive knowledge inherent in the Self—by which the *jīva* realizes that the Brahman is absolutely identical with the Self, just as *ghaṭākāśa* is quite the same as *mahākāśa*. Therefore by knowing correctly Brahman, all is known and a thorough knowledge of all is possessed by the Self. Thus considers Audulōmāchārya. In other words, as soon as the *Sarpabhrūnti* is removed in the rope, the rope appears quite plain—i.e., simply as a rope; similarly when the deceptive knowledge inherent in the Self is removed, *Brahmatva* is realized. So thinks Audulōmi. In all the *Sruti* texts, such as *Tattvamasi*, etc., the prime object of the teaching is to inculcate the truth of the doctrine that the *jīva* and the Brahman are absolutely one, behaving in the manner of *bimba* and *pratibimba* just as *ghaṭākāśa* and *mahākāśa*. (Just as the space in the pot is the same as the unlimited space outside of it, so the *jīva*, as soon as he is relieved of the ignorance that veils him from the knowledge of Brahman, will realize that he is Brahman. That is, knowledge will make the *jīva* aware of his identity with the Brahman.) Some believe that they—*jīva* and *Brahman*—always exist in this manner. The fact is that in Brahman *jīvatva* is falsely postulated to exist as the *rajju* (rope) is falsely understood to be *sarpa* (serpent). According to the

*Advaita* doctrine, it is pointed out that *adhyāsa* is the chief cause for *bhrānti*, which when removed, Brahman is realized as being identical with the *jīva*. Some conceive the truth in this fashion. Having thus proved the one-sided views of the different argumentators holding different doctrines, the chief *Vēdānta* doctrine is thus set down (in the next *Sūtra*) by the *Sūtrakāra* in a manner which harmonizes every *Sruti* text.

In keeping with this suggestion is *Srīpati*'s interpretation of I. 4. 22. This *Sūtra*, he says, sets down the *siddhānta* of the *Sūtrakāra*. *Kāśakritsna* abides by the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* which is declared by the *Sruti* texts which, without contradicting each other, enunciate in *Dvā suparṇā*, <sup>421</sup> etc., and other texts the *bhēda* doctrine and the *abhēda* doctrine in *Tattvamasi*, etc., and other texts. In order to point out clearly the existence of *bhēda* and *abhēda* between the *jīva* and the *Brahman*, *Kāśakritsna* here declares that all *Sruti* texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*. Therefore the third (variety of) doctrine—of *bhēdābhēda*—is the highest essential truth (*pāramārthika*) declared by all the *Sruti* texts; and so it must be understood. Hundreds of *Sruti* texts declare that during the *Samsāradaśa* (i.e., one's lifetime) *jīva* and Brahman are quite distinct from each other and separate; and that during the *Mōkshadaśa*, *abhēda* is declared to be the established truth. *Sruti* texts like the following :

*Ēsha samprasādōrtha ātmā śarīrāt samutthāya Paranjōti rūpam sampadya svēna rūpēnābhiniśpadyatē* || <sup>422</sup>

*Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya । Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣham upaiti divyam* || <sup>423</sup>

*Dhyātvā munir gachchati bhūtayoṇim samastasākṣhim tamasaḥ parastāt* ||

*Sraddhā bhakti dhyānayōgādavēhi* || <sup>424</sup>

<sup>421</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>422</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.

<sup>423</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

<sup>424</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

*Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati* || <sup>425</sup>

*Brahmavidūpñōti param* || <sup>426</sup>

*Gnātva śivam śāntam atyantamēti* || <sup>427</sup>

*Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya* || <sup>428</sup> *iti*, and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts declare to the same effect.

Then, if it is doubted how at all two sets of *Sruti* texts which hold to two such clearly contradictory views as *bhēda* and *abhēda*, which are as opposed to each other as darkness and light (are to each other), could be summed up in the single word *bhēdābhēda* and that doctrine declared as enunciating the highest essential truth and as containing the *siddhānta* view, we answer (says *Srīpati*) it should not be so doubted. Because there is no proof that the *Srutis* should be taken only to declare an one-sided view (*Ēkaśāprāmānya*). If such an one-sided view is accepted as the truth, the *Srutis* as a whole would become unauthoritative. We must never think that the *Sruti* texts (relating to *bhēda* and *abhēda*) are as opposed to each other as sleep and wakefulness, as darkness and light, as fire and water and as ignorance and wisdom. Then, if we are to accept the mutually contradictory doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, is it on account of the contradictory nature of things; the absence of contradictory causes; the wrong (committed) by adopting only one of these—*bhēda* or *abhēda*; the non-existence of either (*bhēda* or *abhēda*); of either being proved (*bhēda* and *abhēda*); of inconsistency in either of them; of the fruitlessness of either of them; <sup>429</sup> of either of them being not perceptible to the mind; of the absence of difference between them; or on account of the absence of the unity in the *Srutis* referring to them? It is not the first, because *Yat param Brahma sarvātmā viśvasyāyatanam mahat* <sup>430</sup> | *iti*, and other

<sup>425</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>426</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>427</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>428</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

<sup>429</sup> That is, the unrealizable character of either of them.

<sup>430</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 2. 5.



*Sruti* texts show that *prapancha* and Brahman are composed of *dvaitādvaita* in the form of *rādhavādhētvam* (effect and cause). Then *Tamēvabhāntamanubhāti sarvam*<sup>431</sup> | *iti*, and other texts declare the nature of the illuminator and the illumination (*Bhāsyā* and *bhāsakatvam*). Next *Samasta sākshyam tamasah parastāt*<sup>432</sup> | *iti*, and other texts declare the *sākshya* and *sākshitvam*—the evidence and the matter that is evidenced. Finally *Tat srishtvā tadēvānupraviśat*<sup>433</sup> | *iti*, and other texts show clearly the cause of the world's creation and the form by which Brahman is evidenced in the world by his entering into it. While living in the world, as *jīva*, experience of *gnāna* and *agnāna* is seen. In *prakṛiti* (in the original state) the three forms of *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*) are also seen; in *vikṛiti* (in transformed state), *jīva* is seen possessed of a bodily existence, subject to the three states, and of a body formed from the elementary condition of matter (*kāṇādēh*) composed of *pāñchabhautika* (the five elementals), of the nature of *nitya* and *anitya*. It is also seen that coldness and warmth attaching to earth and air are experienced. The dual characteristic of *jahada jahallakṣhaṇa* is exhibited in conformity with the Sāṅkhyādvaita doctrine as exemplified in Mahēśvara in his *ardhanārī* form consisting of *saguna* and *nirguṇa* qualities. With human beings, the existence of fear in respect of *punya* and *pāpa* is seen. With the Sun, the state of brilliancy and dimness is seen.

Nor is it the second. The *Sruti* text *Yadā tamastan-nadivā narātrih nasannachāsachchiva ēva kēvalah*<sup>434</sup> | *iti* and hundreds of other texts show that even before the creation of the world the self-illuminating Paramēśvara existed in combination with *prakṛiti* in the form of darkness (*tamaḥ*). In *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*<sup>435</sup> | *iti* and other *Sruti* texts Śiva, who is Parabrahman and who

<sup>431</sup> *Kath. Upa.*, V. 15.

<sup>432</sup> *Atharvasiras*.

<sup>433</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

<sup>434</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

<sup>435</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

has no second, is represented as the cause for the creation of the world, etc., which is evidence of his *dvaita* character. *Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki gnāna bala kriyācha*<sup>436</sup> | *iti* and other texts point out clearly that as all matter is associated with its qualities,<sup>437</sup> Brahman is naturally possessed of all connected qualities without which creation is impossible just as a gem (*maṇi*) is possessed of its natural lustrous qualities without which it cannot be called by that name.

If we should admit that the *prapancha* is composed of *māyā* and therefore illusory just as a lotus in the sky or horns in a rabbit, then we cannot be prevented from arriving at the manifestly wrong conclusion which is witnessed to by the maxim "my mother is barren". Moreover, *Dvā suparṇā*<sup>438</sup> etc., and other *Sruti* texts distinctly teach that the *jīva* and Brahman are different (*bhēda*), while *Tattvamasi* and hundreds of other texts point to *abhēda*. Therefore, it is right that we should adopt both combined as *bhēdābhēda*. If we only accept one side (of this truth), then we will be shrinking the import of the *Sruti* texts.

Nor is it the third. For *Ēshō anu jīvō hridayē sannivishṭaḥ* | *Ēshō anurātmā chētasā vēditavyaḥ*<sup>439</sup> *Vālāgra śata bhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya cha* | *Jīvō bhāgaḥ savignēyō hridayē sarvajantushu* || *Ākūśavat sarvagatō niramśaḥ* | *Mahāntam vibhurātmānam matvā dhīrō na śochati*<sup>440</sup> *Antaḥpūrṇō bahiḥpūrṇaḥ pūrṇakumbha ivāmbhasi* | *Antaḥ sūnyō bahiḥsūnyaḥ sūnyakumbha ivāmbare* || *Tadādi madhyānta vibhūnamēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam* || *iti* and other texts explain that *jīva* and Brahman possess mental unity (*chittaikatva*). While in their dimensions of *anutva* and *vibhutva*<sup>441</sup> they are distinctly contradictory to each other. Therefore it is but right

<sup>436</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>437</sup> *Dharmāddharmanōriva*.

<sup>438</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>439</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

<sup>440</sup> *Kath. Upa.*, II. 22.

<sup>441</sup> *Anutva* is atomic state and *vibhutva* is the supreme state.

that we should agree to *bhēdābhēda*. Just as a coiled serpent is seen in a contracted form in its quiescent condition, while in motion it is seen in an elongated form, so the mutual contradiction is clear in their dimensions (*parimāṇa*), the object being the same. Also, just as the rays of the Sun proceeding from his disc show a larger area than the disc itself, even though the disc is small, the area covered up by the light appears contradictory in its dimensions on account of the areas respectively covered by them—the rays and the disc from which the rays proceed. And lastly just as a sheet of cloth coiled up appears much shorter in length than it is seen when it is expanded out, the cloth being the same, similarly in conclusion *bhēdābhēda* has to be accepted.

Nor is it the fourth. *Vāchārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrīṭṭikētyēva satyam* <sup>442</sup> | *Sarvam khalvidam Brahmā | Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta* <sup>443</sup> | *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ* <sup>444</sup> | *iti* and other *Sruti* and *Sūtra* texts together denote the characteristic contrasts between Brahman and *prapancha* and cause and effect (*kārya* and *kāraṇa*); by introducing the example of *mrīṭṭikā*, etc., *bhēdābhēda* is clearly pointed out. Similarly in the first *khaṇḍa* of the *Atharvaśiras* text beginning with *Dēvāḥ vai svarga magaman | Tam dēvā rudramapruchchan | Kōbhavāniti | Sō'bra-vīt ahamēkaḥ prathama māsam variāmicha bhaviṣhyāmicha | Nānyaḥ kaschin mattō vyatiriktaḥ |* and ending with *Jyōtīrityahamēka sarvēcha māmēva mām yō vēda sa sarvam vēdā | Sivābhinnatvam* is pointed out. Also, in the second *khaṇḍa* (of the same work), it is stated clearly in the text *Yō vai rudra sa bhagavānyascha Brahmā tasmai vai namō namaḥ | Yō vai rudra sa bhagavānyascha Viṣṇuḥ tasmai vai namō namaḥ* <sup>445</sup> by which Brahma, Viṣṇu, Mahēśvara, etc., are conclusively declared to be the chief cause for *prapancha*, which is the effect. Also,

<sup>442</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>443</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14.

<sup>444</sup> *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. 1. 14.

<sup>445</sup> *Atharvaśiras*.

the *Kaivalya* and *Taittirīya* texts *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sa Hariḥ sēndra śōkshara parīmasvarāt* <sup>446</sup> | *Sa ēva Viṣṇuḥ sa prūṇaḥ sa kālōgniḥ sa chandramāḥ* | *Sa ēva sarvām yadbhūtam yachchabhavyam sanātanam* | *Ritam satyam Param Brahma puruṣam kṛiṣṇa pīṅgalam* <sup>447</sup> | *Ūrdhvan-rētam Virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ* | *iti* state that the work which is the form of effect is seen clearly as not being different (*abhinnatvāt*) from Paraśiva, who is the original cause.

Nor is it the fifth. The *Sruti* texts *Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati* <sup>448</sup> | *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, etc., declare that the *jīva* who is distinct from Brahman will realize Brahman through meditation and worship until he becomes one with Brahman. Here also *bhēdābhēda* is shown to be not contrary to the authorities. Moreover, in the *Sūta Samhitā*, it is said *Bhēdābhēda stathābhēdō bhēda ētē matāstrayaḥ*. In *Mahimna* is seen *Dhruvam kaśchit brūtē sakala maparastāvad dhruvam iti parō dhravyā-dhravyēti*, etc. (Some say that what is experienced at present is true; and all the future is untrue; the remote (*i.e.*, the highest truth) is either existent or non-existent). In *Kūrma* it is said, *Kēchit dvaitam praśamsanti kēchidadvaita vādināḥ* | *Dvayōśśrutyēka dēśatvāt sarva śruti samanvayaḥ* | *Bhēdābhēda matasrautē parigrāhyo mumukshubhiḥ* | *iti* || (Some extol *dvaita*. Some argue in favour of *advaita*; both (these) are partial interpreters; *bhēdābhēda mata* is the one that should be accepted by *mumukshus* (*i.e.*, those who desire salvation) as the doctrine that will harmonize the *Sruti* texts relating to both *dvaita* and *advaita*.) The *Gāthā*, <sup>449</sup> *Nādvaitamaparōkṣham chēnnachidrūpeṇa bhāsanāt* | *Aviśēshēṇa bhātamchēt dvaitam kim bhāsatē kila* | *Dīṅmā-trēṇa vibhātāntu dvayōrapī samam khalu* | *Dvaita siddhivadadvaita siddhistvētāvātā na kim* | *Dvaitēna hīna madvai-*

<sup>446</sup> *Mahōpa.*

<sup>447</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>448</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>449</sup> Literally, verse, especially a religious verse, but not belonging to one of the *Vēdas*.

*tam dvaita gnānē kathamtvidam* | *Dvirbhāvitva virōdhascha dvaita sādho samē ubhē* | *Tathā viśuddha chidrūpa Śiva sarvādhikah smruthaḥ* | *Jagajjanmādi hētuvāt sarvagnatvādi lakṣaṇāt* | *Asangatvāt nirmalatvāt satya kāmādi lakṣaṇāt* | *Dvaitastad aprakriṣṭōpi tadupāsana rūpataḥ* | *Svīkāryam yōgibhissarvaiḥ vēdamārgaika vēdibhiḥ* | *Asau māyāmāyam dvaitam iti chēt tannayujyatē* | *Arihasiddhi kriyāsiddhyōr drisṭatvāt śrutidarśanāt* | *Bhēdābhēda matam chaiva vidhēyam panditaiḥ sadā* || *iti* establishes that the doctrine of *dvaitādvaita* alone is the highest spiritual knowledge (*pāramārthika*). That is delightful (*adīya ramanīyam*). The *Gāthā* quoted by *Srīpati* may be thus translated:—“If *advaita* will not lead to the knowledge that is necessary to realize the Brahman, if *chidrūpa* cannot throw any light, how can it be possible to find out by the rest a true knowledge which will enable the realization of Brahman? The light that is seen only shows the directions in the space but the space and light are one and the same. It is not possible to understand through controversial argument which is the correct one (*i.e.*, the correct knowledge to realize *Brahman*). *Advaita* appears inferior to *Dvaita*; but the dualistic view is not in conformity with nor is it in harmony with the *Srutis*. Therefore the only *chidrūpa* that should be accepted as Brahman is the Almighty Śiva, because He is the sole Creator, the all-knowing, the unassociated, the all-pure, and possessed of *Satyakāma* and other characteristics. And even though he appears to be of a *Dvaita* character as being realizable through meditation and worship, yet *Yōgis* acknowledge that *Srutis* prove *artha siddhi* and *kriyā siddhi* (realizing the cause by the effect). Therefore it is that the learned should accept the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine only as the highest spiritual truth.”

Nor is it the sixth. *Sruti* texts like *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu Mahēśvaram* | *Tasyāvayava bhūtōthkatham vyāptam sarvam idam jagat* | <sup>450</sup> *Ētasmāt jāyatē*

<sup>450</sup> *Śveta. Upa., IV. 10.*

*prāṇō manassarvëndriyāṇicha* | <sup>451</sup> *Vidyāvidyē īsatē yastu sōnyaḥ* | *Pradhāna kshētragnapatirguṇēśaḥ* <sup>452</sup> | *Īśānassarvavidyānām* | <sup>453</sup> *iti* || <sup>454</sup> etc., and hundreds of other *Sruti* texts speak of *Paramātman* and the *prapañchu* in the form *niyāmya* and *niyāmaka* in a reconciliatory manner and as establishing the doctrine of *dvaitādvaita*. And also the text <sup>455</sup> *Īśānassarvavidyānam*, etc., and hundreds of other similar texts also declare the above view.

Nor can it be the seventh. The text *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* | <sup>456</sup> *Gnāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pūṣam dahati panditaḥ* | *Vidyāñchāvidyāñcha yastad vēdōbhayam saha* | <sup>457</sup> *Tēna Brahmavit puṇyakrichcha* | *Satyēna labdha stapasā hyēsha ātmā samyaggnānēna brahmacharyēna nityam* | <sup>458</sup> *iti*, etc., and hundreds of other similar texts declare that *Paramaśiva* can be realized in the *Advaita* form only after following *dhyāna* and *dhāraṇa* practices, according to the *dvaita karmānushṭhāna*, which is the only way for such realization, as the fruit of it. <sup>459</sup>

<sup>451</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 3.

<sup>452</sup> *Sūta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

<sup>453</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>454</sup> Know that *Māya* is *Prakriti* and that *Mahēśvara* is *Māyin*.

Out of his body has resulted this whole universe which pervades everywhere. From him has been created *prāṇa* and all the limbs of the body. Also out of him, *prāṇa*, *manas* and other sensory organs have taken their origin. *Vidyā* and *avidyā* are subordinate to *Īśa*, who is quite free and unconnected and is called *anyaḥ*. *Īśvara* is also the *Kshētragna* and the Lord who sees into the characteristics of all.

<sup>455</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>457</sup> *Īśa. Upa.*, 11.

<sup>456</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>458</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 5.

<sup>459</sup> Know that *śraddhā* and *bhakti* can be obtained only through the practice of meditation in the form of *Yōga*. The wise can get their bondage burnt to ashes only through that correct knowledge got out of the process of churning known as the practice (of meditation). Both *vidyā* and *avidyā* must be understood along with it (*dhyāna yōga*), for then only they (the wise) will have understood Brahman by their virtue, because this *ātman* can be realized only by virtue and by a thorough knowledge through *Brahmacharya* practice followed continuously.

Moreover, if it is asked what is the good of all the trouble taken in discussing the topics of the *Śāstras* which are the end of the *Vēda* in order to cause the realization of *Advaita* Brahman, if such realization can be had only through the practice of *Dvaita karma*, then our answer is, it is not so. According to the *Sthūlārundhatī nyāya*, the realization of Brahman will be caused after the destruction of all evil through actions which are devoid of a desire for fruit. So declare the *Smritis*. In the Vēdic text beginning with *Yasyaitēṣṭā chatvāriṃśat samskāraḥ* | *iti* and ending with *Sa Brahmanas sāyujyam sālōkyam gachchanti* | *iti*, the realization of Brahman is declared for all who are born through the rites of *garbhādhāna*, etc., and after the destruction of all sinful actions. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the worshipper of Paramēśvara being the worshipped Paramēśvara in the state of religious worship (*ārādhakarūpa karmanām arādhya rūpa paramēśvarasya cha prāpya prāpakatvam*). The text *Na cha sarva ētē puṇyalōkā bhavanti* | *iti* which means "these all cannot obtain the *Puṇyalōka*" cannot be taken to mean anything in contradiction to the *Srutis*, in regard to the obtaining of the respective fruits of the different *āśramas*. Because even though actions done with certain desires readily yield the fruits aimed at, actions done without any such desire will still lead to *Paramapurushārtha* after destroying the three-fold sins and the like associated with the three ages of man—youth, manhood and old age (*mānavādi malatrayādi nirmukta*, etc.).<sup>460</sup> If not, in the absence of any such *karmānushthāna*, one cannot have a mental purification. In the absence of such purification, he will not give birth to true knowledge. In the absence of such true knowledge, no realization (*mōksha*) will result. Therefore, what has been said above must be said to be pleasant to the wise.

Nor is it the eighth. For in order to establish this same fact that that all-wise crest-jewel-like (personage), the

<sup>460</sup> *Kaumāram yauvanam jarā.—Bhagavad-Gītā*, II, 13.

most revered Vyāsa, declares, in order to stop the fruitless controversies of vain logicians in their wranglings over *Vēda* and *Vēdānta*, in the fourth *Pāda* of the IV *Adhyāya* under the *Sūtras*, *Abhūvam Bādari rāhadyēvam* and *Bhūvam Jaiminir vikalpāmananāt* <sup>461</sup> | *iti*, that the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine is the sole truth underlying both sets of *Srutis* which seem to be contradictory to each other, and establishes the truth at length under the *Sūtras* which come later on—*Dvādaśūhavad ubhayavidham Bādarāyaṇōtaḥ* and *Tasyabhāvē sandhyavadupapattēḥ* | <sup>462</sup> *iti*—which also establish the fact that the essence of all *Sāstras* is contained in embracing the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*.

Nor is it the ninth. According to the *dvaita* doctrine it is not possible to realize the unity with Brahman (*Brahmaikatva*) agreeably to the *Sruti* saying *samudravat*.<sup>463</sup> According to the *advaita* doctrine, wherein *Saguṇa Brahmatva* and *Īśvaratva* are mere invented *siddhāntas* like the invented theory of *raju sarpa*, the *Vēdas*, *Sāstras*, *Āgamas* and the *Purāṇas* are reduced to mere matters of belief without faith and finally they are reduced to nothingness (*dattāñjaliprasaṅgaḥ*). Thus both these doctrines—*dvaita* and *advaita*—should not be adopted. Also *Anūśayā śōchati muhyamānaḥ* | *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati* |<sup>464</sup> *iti*, and other texts decisively prove that the *jīva*, being tied up in the sorrowful envelopment of the bondage of *Māyā*, becomes ignorant of *Paramaśiva*, and yet after liberation (from such a bondage) becomes *Paramaśiva* himself. Thus, it is said in the *Kaivalya* in the text *Śraddhā bhakti dhyāna yogāt avēhi* <sup>465</sup> | and in the

<sup>461</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 4. 10-11.

<sup>462</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13.

<sup>463</sup> *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpāt vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam* | It is suggested by *Srīpati* that the word *upaiti* here does not indicate *ēkatva* by transformation. *Upaiti* means “will obtain”, i.e., will obtain *divyam paramapurusham*.

<sup>464</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>465</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*



text beginning with *Umā sahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhūm* and ending with *Samasta sākṣīm tamasah parastāt*<sup>466</sup> | *iti*, that meditation done with devotion and faith (*śraddhā* and *bhakti*) regarding Paramēśvara and also being helped by his grace, with the aid of Pārvati, he gets out of the darkness and emanates into the light and through the means of meditation and worship of *Saguṇēśvara* will obtain *nirguṇa Brahma* (*Nirguṇa sākṣi Brahmaprāptiḥ*). In this doctrine (of *bhēdābhēda*), above all doctrines, by the triple application of *bhakti*, *kriyā* and *gnāna*, a three-fold practice exists, which is capable of leading to *mukti* by enabling one to cross the ocean of *samsāra* and obtain unity with the Brahman, which is the essence of both the sets of *Sruti* texts. Therefore, it is only the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* which harmonizes the *Sruti* texts should be accepted. We, however, do not opine that the *advaita* doctrine is devoid of the teachings of *bhakti*, *kriyā*, *gnāna*, *śraddhā*, etc. Postulating *avidyā* as existing in *Īśvara* from the expression *asad* used in the *Sruti* text<sup>467</sup> is like using a false *sāligrāma* as an object of worship. Who at all can be expected to acquire *bhakti*, *śraddhā* and *viśvāsa* for such an *Īśvara*? Nor can an invented *Īśvara*, who resembles a coiled serpent in a rope (*rajjvārōpita sarpa*), though he be propitiated with all the duties involved in the service of worship, be the donor of all the boons required of him?

Nor can it be the tenth. In the text *Dvā suparṇa*,<sup>468</sup> etc., both *vidyā* and *avidyā* are inseparably coupled up as *Śiva* and *jīva* and as constant associates. If the standpoint of the doctrine of *śuddhādvaita* can, without adversely affecting the conception of *advaita* Brahman, be reconciled to *dvaita prapancha*, then the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* opposes the position of neither (doctrine). Nor does the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine, in such a case, contradict the principles of either side (*dvaita* and *advaita*). The *Sruti* text *Ātmā vārē*

<sup>466</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>467</sup> *Asadvā idamagra āsīt—Taitt. Upa., II. 7. Cf. Asaditi chēna pratishēdhamātravāt—Brahma-Sūtra, II. 1. 7.*

<sup>468</sup> *Mund. Upa., III. 1. 1.*

*drashtavyah*, etc., is a clear authority for Vēdāntins that the object of realization is Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman will lead them to the realization (of Brahman). But in texts like *Samidhōyajati*,<sup>469</sup> etc., the expressions (*Samidhōyajati*, etc.) denote that the way to realize the Brahman is through adopting the sacrificial rites known as the *panchaprāyāja vidhi*, by fulfilling which the realization will be attained. By adopting the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine, the double fruits that are the result of the sacrifices of Sautrāmaṇi and Brihaspatisavana, Agnichayana, Vājapēya, etc., carried out conjointly, will be obtained.<sup>470</sup> Also it is stated in the opening *Sūtra*, *Athātō Brahmajignāsa*, as a firm conclusion that after the preliminary rites—according to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*—are finished, *Brahmajignāsa* should be begun in order to realize the double aspect of *bhēdābhēda* doctrine. Moreover, as in the *Sūtra* IV. 4. 12, *Dvādaśāhavat*, etc., Bādarāyaṇa declares his opinion by referring to the example of the *Dvādaśāha*<sup>471</sup> that both ought to be observed (i.e., both *Karma* and *Gnāna*) and establishes in the *Sūtra* next following *Sandhyavat upapattēh*<sup>472</sup> that both the doctrines of *bhēda* and *abhēda* are established; it has therefore to be held that *bhēdābhēda* is the established *siddhānta* according to Bādarāyaṇa. It is also the chief *siddhānta* of Kāśakrītsna and this is without doubt the established *siddhānta*. In *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan*<sup>473</sup> etc. Paramātmā is stated to be in a readily realizable condition

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<sup>469</sup> *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*: *Panchaprāyāja Vidhi*—the law relating to the five principal sacrificial ceremonies.

<sup>470</sup> Śrīpati's suggestion is that the adoption of the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* in the region of *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsa* is equal in result to the performance of Sautrāmaṇi and Brihaspatisavana, Agnichayana and Vājapēya, which have in each case to be conjointly done, if they are (according to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa*) to bear fruit.

<sup>471</sup> A sacrifice lasting for or completed in twelve days.

<sup>472</sup> The twilight is suitable, i.e., the meeting point of day and night is helpful. This *Sūtra* suggests, says Śrīpati, the truth of the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine which is the meeting point of *bhēda* and *abhēda* as *sandhyā* is of day and night.

<sup>473</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7. 9.

when the *jīva* attains the stage of *vignāna*. *Jīva* and Brahman are, therefore, declared to be distinctly separate. Āśmarathya decides on the support of the middle term (*madhya vākya pramāṇam ādāya*). He endeavours to prevent a contradiction arising from the *abhēda Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasi*, etc., by means of comparison (*sādrūṣyēna vārayati*). As for Audulōmi, he argues on the strength of the proof afforded by *Sruti* texts like *Nēha nānāsti kinchana*, etc., and argues on the analogy of the *rajjusarpa* that in the *advaita Brahman* a vision of *dvaita prapancha* is seen without any contradiction arising therefrom. Kāśakritsna having studied, in an inquiring mood, the first, central and last stages of the whole of the *Vēdānta*, establishes a harmonious whole by the aid of the six-fold proofs (*ṣaḍvidha līnga tātparyēṇa*) and concludes that *bhēdābhēda* is the correct and acceptable doctrine and adds that this should be accepted as the chief doctrine of the *Vēdānta* system. In this way the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* is established without any contradiction being established between *jīva* and Brahman.

### The Nature and Character of Mukti.

It is when we come to the discussion of the nature and character of *mukti* that we get a closer idea of the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* as propounded by Śrīpati. Though Śrīpati refers to *mukti* in different parts of his *Bhāṣya*, still it is best to go to IV. 4 to get his considered views on the matter. There, he lays down his conception of the nature and state of *mukti*. Commenting on IV. 4. 5, *Brāhmēṇa jaiminirupanyāsādibhyaḥ*, Śrīpati states that the *Sruti* text, *Brāhmaṇōsya mukhamāśīt* | *Bāhūrādanyaḥ kritāḥ* | *Ūrūtadasya yadvaiśyaḥ* | *Padbhyām śūdrō ajāyata* || etc., declares that Parabrahma Śiva created Brāhmaṇas and others from the different parts of his body—face, shoulders etc. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the created world is devoid of bodily form or divisions. Jaimini infers from texts like *Aprāṇō hyamanāḥ śubhrah*, etc., that even in the *aprākṛita* state of *mukti*, the *Srutis* grant the existence

of higher *śarīra*, *indriya*, *mana* and *prāṇa*. If it is asked how, the reply is *upanyāsādibhyāḥ*, i.e., from allusions made to such things in discussions. Further, from the text *Ya ātmāpahatapāpmā*,<sup>474</sup> etc., which is the utterance of Prajāpati, also, the existence of a bodily form for *muktas* is predicated, just as in the form of Parabrahman, in the various postures of *satya-sankalpatva*, *āsana*, etc. Also, *Sruti* texts like *Jakshan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ*,<sup>475</sup> etc., are found declaring that *muktas* who have acquired the form of Brahman through realization are seen taking part in different pastimes. And, therefore, Jaiminiāchārya declares, on the strength of *Sruti* texts which hint at it, his doctrine that this is the exact state of those *muktas* who realize their form of Brahman. Thus having discussed the doctrine treating of the *muktas* in their realized state of Brahman in their *sāvayava*, *saguṇa*, *saviśēsha* form (*Sāvayavamatra brahmavādimatam upannasya*), Śrīpati proceeds to state the realized form of Brahman in the *niravayava*, *nishkriya*, *nirviśēsha* form. Commenting on IV. 4. 6, *Chiti tanmātrēṇa tadātmakatvāditi Audulōmiḥ*, he says that *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt* | *Ēkamēva advitīyam Brahma* |<sup>476</sup> *Ātmā vā idam agra āsīt* | *Brahma vā idam agra āsīt* | *Satyam gūṇam anantam Brahma*,<sup>477</sup> etc., are considered by Audulōmiāchārya as enunciating that there is nothing beyond Brahman and that Brahman is always in the form of *chaitanya* (i.e., Supreme Spirit considered as the essence of being and source of all sensation) and that form of *chaitanya* cannot be taken to behave in the *jada-prapancha* form. And that, therefore, as *chaitanya* he is during all the three times—past, present and future—the unchangeable (*ēka ēva*) Brahman. Why? The answer is contained in the words *tadātmakatvāt*, because he has had the same form. He is also *adriśyam*, *avyavahāryam*, *alak-*

<sup>474</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

<sup>475</sup> *Ait. Upa.*, I. 1.

<sup>476</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>477</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

*śhaṇam, achintyam, avyapadēśyam*, and in fact he is the essence of all (*ēkātma pratyaya sāram*) as enunciated in *Sruti* texts like *Prapañchōpaśamam śāntam śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā sa vighñeyaḥ* <sup>478</sup> etc.; *Yat tad adriśyam agrāhyam agōtram avarṇam achakshuśrōtram tadapānīpādam*, etc.; *Nityam vibhum sarvagatam susūkshmam*; <sup>479</sup> etc., which declare that Śiva Parabrahman is *Chaitanya* (Supreme Essence of Spirit) only and is never in the form of body and its organs (*śarīra, indriya*, etc.), which statement Audulōmi contradicts.

In this way having stated at length, according to the one-sided views of the *Srutis* regarding *sāvayava* and *niravayava* doctrines respectively, Bādarāyaṇa conclusively states the essence of all the *Vēdānta* as his own opinion, in *Sūtra* IV. 4. 7, *Ēvamapyupanyāsātpūrva bhāvādavirōdham Bādarāyaṇaḥ*. The expression *Ēvamapyupanyāsāt* means, according to hundreds of *Sruti* texts, that both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of existence are seen in Śiva Parabrahman just as the world (*prapañcha*), wind (*pavana*), etc., are seen. *Sruti* texts like *Dvāvēva Brahmanō rūpē mūrtanchā-mūrtamēva cha*; <sup>480</sup> *Tadādi madhyānta vihīnamēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam*; *Umāsaḥāyam Paramēśvaram prabhūm trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam*, <sup>481</sup> etc., support the view of Bādarāyaṇa, the *sarvavēdānta siddhānta nipuṇa* (who excels in all *Vēdānta* systems), that Śiva Parabrahman always consists of two forms (*mūrtā* and *amūrtā*) and therefore the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of existence are not irreconcilable. Why? On account of previous existence. Such texts like *Parāsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvīkē gnāna bala kriyācha*; <sup>482</sup> *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā* <sup>483</sup> and others declare that Śiva Parabrahman consists of *sarvaśaktitva, apahatapāpmatva* and *satyakāmatva* and

<sup>478</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 6.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>480</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 1.

<sup>481</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>482</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>483</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

these are always seen in him. On the strength of the maxim if you are *ubhayabalāt*, you will attain *ubhaya siddhi*, on account of both sets of *Srutis* being strong enough (which speak of *nūrtā* and *amūrtā*), both the forms (*nūrtā* and *amūrtā*) of Brahman are to be accepted. But if we accept, on the other hand, the only proof afforded by the *Sruti* text, *Brāhmaṇo'syamukhamāsīt*, etc., then the proof of the following *Sruti* texts, *Ākūśavat sarvagatasya nityaḥ*; *Antaḥpūrṇo bahiḥpūrṇaḥ pūrṇa kumbhamivārṇavē*; *antaḥśūṇyō bahiḥśūṇyō śūṇyakumbha ivāmbare*; *Kham vāyuh jyōtirāpaḥ prithvī viśvasya dhārīṇī*; <sup>484</sup> *Yat param Brahma sarvātmā*, etc., will be contradicted. Moreover, if Brahman is understood to be *sāvayava* (combined with bodily form) just as a *ghaṭa* and limited as such, then, according to *Sruti* texts like *Tasmād vā ētasmādātmana ākūśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, <sup>485</sup> etc., how can the all-pervading Brahman be said to be the cause of *ākūśa* (ether), etc.? Moreover, the quality of being existent in everything will also be contradicted. His *adhiṣṭhāna* in the world cannot be said to happen, for, if in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*; <sup>486</sup> *Sa yathā saindhava ghaṇo'nantarō' bāhyaḥ krityō rasaghana ēvam vā arē ayamātmānamantaro bāhyaḥ krithyaḥ pragnānaghana ēva*; <sup>487</sup> *Āprāṇōhyamanāḥ śubhraḥ*; *Aśarīram vā vasantam namē priyāpriyē*; etc., <sup>488</sup> we have to accept that Śiva Parabrahman is bodiless (*niravayava*) and attributeless (*nirviśēṣa*) and to conceive of him as consisting of *chit* alone (*chinmātratva*), then, several *Sruti* texts like *Sō'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya*; <sup>489</sup> *Tat srishtvā tadēvānuprāviśat*; <sup>490</sup> *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyanti* | *Yēna jātāni jīvanti* | *Yat prayanti abhisamviśanti* <sup>491</sup>

<sup>484</sup> *Mahōpa.*

<sup>485</sup> *Taitt. Upa., II. 1.*

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>487</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa., IV. 5. 13.*

<sup>488</sup> *Chch. Upa., VIII. 12. 1.*

<sup>489</sup> *Taitt. Upa., II. 6.*

<sup>490</sup> *Chch. Upa., VIII. 12. 1.*

<sup>491</sup> *Taitt. Upa., III. 1.*

etc., are contradicted, because they would deny to Brahman his *lakṣhaṇa* as being the chief cause of creation. Again, according to *Sruti* texts like *Namō hiraṇya-bāhavē hiraṇyavarṇāya*,<sup>492</sup> etc., it is not possible to avoid the contradiction. Therefore, it is but right that we should accept for Parabrahman both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms ; if not the *Sruti* texts relating to meditation in the *mūrtā* form (of Śiva Parabrahman) and also those relating to meditation in the *amūrtā* form, such as *jakṣhaṇa kṛdāṇa ramamāṇa*, etc., which provide for the fruits of realization for those who meditate in the *amūrtā* form, will be mutually contradicting each other. If we state that the *mūrtā* form of Brahman is of an *anitya* character, then the *Sruti* text *Stihirēbhirangaiḥ pururūpa ugraḥ*,<sup>493</sup> etc., will be contradicted as the *Sruti* text (quoted) enunciates that the *mūrtā* form of Brahman is of a permanent character possessing form and different limbs. In the *Sruti* text *Apāṇi pādōham achintya śaktiḥ paśyāmyachakṣuḥ saśruṇōtyakarnāḥ*,<sup>494</sup> etc., the body and limbs are declared to be not necessary for Parabrahman and that even without them, he is capable of doing everything independently, and that everything can be effected by him. Having thus concluded in the *Avibhāgēna drishtvādhikaraṇam* that Paraśiva Brahman will be realized after meditating upon the all-pervading *Amūrtā* (*vyāpaka Amūrtā*) form in order to attain unity, after being free from all disires, Śrīpati says that Bādarāyaṇa proceeds in the *Sankalpādhikaraṇa* (IV. 4. 8-12) to establish that those who meditate upon Paraśiva Brahman of the *Mūrtā* form will also be benefited by unsurpassed (*niratiśaya*) bliss (*ānanda*). For those who meditate on the *Mūrtā* form (of Brahman) will derive the benefit of enjoying by the mere thought of it garlands of flowers, sandal, damsels and such like happiness. How ? So say *Sruti* texts like *Sankalpādēva asya pitarāḥ samutti-shṭhanti* ; *Sankalpādēva asya sarva dēvā gandharvā*

<sup>492</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 18.

<sup>493</sup> *Rigvēda*, II. 7. 17.

<sup>494</sup> *Sveta. Upa.*, III. 19.

*vidyādhārāscha samuttishṭhanti*, etc., which explain the idea of the *Sūtra* that for those who meditate on the form of *Mūrtā* Paraśiva Brahman even the *dēvas*, *pitris*, *gandharvas*, etc., come and wait upon them to attend to their wants. This is the gist of what is meant by the *Sūtra*. *Sruti* texts like *Sa tatra paryēti jakshan krīḍan ramamāṇa sthīr-bhīrvā yānairvā gnātibhīrvā*,<sup>495</sup> etc., declare that those who meditate on the *Mūrtā* Brahman will, having reached the stage of *satyasankalpa*, realize whatever they think of. This is in keeping with the established practice as laid down in the *Srutis*. The doubt arises whether a *mukta jīva* possesses body and limbs or not; or whether he has any settled desire as mentioned above (*sankalpādīni santi na santi*) or not; and if he can achieve his desire, then, can he independently come by it (or satisfy it). Then the (further) doubt arises whether the desire of a *mukta jīva* goes over that of the will (*sankalpa*) of Paramēśvara. The answer is contained in the texts *Atmānam chēdvijānīyā dayam asmīti pūrushaḥ* | *Kimichchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusancharēt*; *Sahavai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayōr-apahati rasti*; *Aśarīram vā vasantam na priyāpriyē pruśyatha*; etc., which, after declaring that while in the carnal body misery cannot be got rid of, in the end—according to *Sruti* texts like *Asmāt śarīrāt samutthūya paranjōti upasampadya svēna rūpēṇa abhinishpadyata*,<sup>496</sup> etc.,—when the soul is released there will be no bodily form for the *mukta*. So say the *Sruti* texts. And therefore the need for any effort (for *aśarīratva*) does not arise (*i.e.*, the released soul loses its bodily form as a matter of course). Moreover, in this world the need arises even for kings and the like to determine to achieve a result and therefore they call for all the necessary attempts and finally they gain their desires. Then, if it is asked, why should one labour so much for *mukti* when it is automatically obtained without any

<sup>495</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 1.

<sup>496</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 3. 4.



exertion by merely desiring it, the answer is, "Yes, by mere determined will, he will attain *mukti*", for, *Sruti* texts like *Sayadi pitrilōka kāmō bhavati*; *sankalpādēva asya pitara samuttishṭhanti*,<sup>497</sup> etc., declare that a *mukta* can have before him even his fathers and others, who are bound to come and stand before him at his mere desire. But the *Sruti* texts do not say that a *mukta* can attain his desires only after attempting and labouring for them. (That is, his mere desire for anything will be satisfied.) This establishes that the position of a *mukta* is one where mere resolves on his part are enough to have them realized. According to *Sruti* texts like *Sa ēkadhā bhavati tridhā bhavati panchadhā, saptadhā*, etc., the *Ātman*, though an undivided one, appears as if it were many and divided (*achchēdasya*); yet, all these (divided) forms denote that one undivided Brahman in his apparently divided form having a seeming body and limbs. The expression *śarīrābhāva* only denotes a reference to the meditation of Brahman in his *niravayava* form.

Moreover, the use of the expression *aśarīratva* denotes the non-existence of a carnal bodily form subject to *karma*. Therefore it is that to a *mukta*, though his bodily form was very much loved by him, while he was in the bondage of carnal existence, it at last becomes to him an object of hate (*apriyahetuḥ*). Thus it is settled that the form that a *mukta* assumes in order to obtain Kailāsa as a *bhakta* is one which is extraordinary and all-effulgent like that of Paramēśvara (*aprākṛita jyōtirmayatvēna paramēśvara śarīravat*), and free from all causes that go to make for unhappiness (*na dukkhaḥetuḥ*). Verily if it is questioned whether agreeably to the *Rājashrutya nyāya* (the maxim of the king and the subject), even though a *bhakta* reaches Mahā Kailāsa in the realized state, he has still a kind of respect for and fear of Paramēśvara as regards the duties of subordination (*pāratantrya*) and worship (*kainkarya*) which are, therefore, the source of fear (*bhayaḥetuḥ*), the answer is that it is not so; for, if that be so, there will be induced a contradiction with *Sruti* texts such as *Ānandam Brahmanō*

<sup>497</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VIII. 2. 1.

*vidvānna bibhēti kutaschana*,<sup>498</sup> etc. This doubt is removed by the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 9) *Atayēva chānanyādhipatiḥ*, "Therefore *Ananyādhipatiḥ*," i.e., "Therefore the lordless state." For the very reason that a *mukta* is (called) a *satya-sankalpa*,<sup>499</sup> he becomes also lordless (*ananyādhipatiḥ*). The state of *ananyādhipatitvam* involves the status of *vidhinishēdhatvam*, i.e., freedom from the prohibitions resulting from ordinances.<sup>500</sup> From the status of *vidhinishēdhatvam* results *apratihata satyasankalpatvam*, i.e., a *satyasankalpatvam* from which he is not beaten back. Therefore, according to the *Srutis*, he realizes *satyasankalpatva* and *ananyādhipatitva*. Therefore, according to the *Sruti* text *Sa Svarāt bhavati*, etc., he rightly becomes *svarāt* [i.e., identified with the self-refulgent (Brahman)]. This is the result of his meditation and worship of the all-powerful almighty Śiva, which has brought him to the stage of *satyasankalpatva* and *sarva-kāmāvāptitva*. And hence to the state of *ananyādhipatitva*. This is according to the *Sruti* text *Śiva ekō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvam anyat parityajya*, etc. *Ananyādhipati* is one who has no other to lord over him—*Śivētarāḥ na vidyatē anyāḥ adhipatiḥ yasya sō ananyādhipatiḥ*. He is not controlled by any other (than Śiva). Therefore he is as independent (*svatantra*) as Śiva (*Śivavat svatantra*) himself. Thus it is said in the *Skānda* (*Purāṇa*): *Sivaikānīṣṭhā prathita kshamāṇām Śivētaradhyāna nishēdhakānām । Trinīkṛita Brahmapurandarāṇām kim dushkritam Sankara kinkarāṇām ॥ iti*, etc.<sup>501</sup> By denoting *ananyādhipatitva* for a *mukta*, he is considered to have attained independence,

<sup>498</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 9. A wise man as soon as he realizes the *Ananda* state of Brahman has nothing to fear.

<sup>499</sup> *Satya*=Truth; and *Sankalpa*=reflection. The reflection of truth.

<sup>500</sup> Brahman is described as *nishēdha sēshaḥ*, i.e., free from all kinds of prohibition.

<sup>501</sup> What sin should Brahma and Viṣṇu have committed for them to treat with such contempt those declared devotees who endued with the exalted quality of forbearance meditate only on Śiva and those (others) who prohibit meditation on any other (deity) but Śiva?

by which is meant that he is no longer a subordinate bound to perform any duty of a binding character. He loses naturally also such duties which have a binding character as they disappear (on his attaining *ananyādhipatitva*). This means that there is no other than Paramēśvara (*na anya Paramēśvara*) to control him, because he will have passed the stage where the flow of births and deaths as ordained by Śiva and the connected ordinances of a prohibitory nature (*vidhinishēdha śāstra patha atītatvāt*) prevails. Why? Because he has turned away from the bonds which enchained his soul (*paśu vyāvṛuttēh*). It is but right that those who are distinguished by sins (*dōsha viśiṣṭānām*) and bound down by the scent of the three desires (*dharma, artha* and *kāma*) should be bound by the ordinances of Śiva for performing *karma*. But, on the contrary, for those Mahātmās, who have assumed the form of Śiva (*Śiva sārūpya dhārinām*), who are never decreasing in their happiness, who are always just like Śiva, who are always all-knowing (*Śivavat sarvagnatvādīnām*) like him, who are devoid of self-love (*abhimāna*) having exhausted it, who are beyond birth, death and fear of misery—for beings with such characteristics, it is no contradiction that they enjoy ever-increasing bliss (*ānanda*) and self-rejoicing according to their own desire (*svātmārāmatvēna svatantratvam avirōdham*). Verily according to *Sruti* texts such as *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridisthitāḥ* । *Atha martyō amritō bhavatyatra Brahma samaśnutē*<sup>502</sup> ॥ *Baddhōhi vāsanā baddhō mōkshasyāt vāsanā kshayaḥ* । *Vāsanātānaram Brahman mōkshaityabhidhīyatē* । *Na mōkshō nabhasaḥ prushṭhē na pātālē na bhūtālē* । *Sarvāśā sankshayē chētaḥ kshayō mōksha itīryatē* ॥ etc.,<sup>503</sup> a *mukta* is understood to be freed from all desires. The experience of a *mukta*, according to

<sup>502</sup> *Kaṭha. Upa., VI. 14.*

<sup>503</sup> When a mortal is absolutely free from mental desire of every kind, he becomes an immortal and thus enjoys happiness along with Brahman. Having been once bound by the bondage of smell (of past good and bad actions), as soon as he attains *mōksha*, he ceases from such bondage of smell (of past good and bad actions). And as

texts like *Kim karōmi kva gachchāmi kim grihṇāmi tyajāmi kim*; *Yan mūyāpūritam viśvam mahat kalpāmbunā yathā*,<sup>504</sup> etc., occurring in the *Muktānubhava Sruti*, is that as he soon leaves this (i.e., on release) he begins to contemplate: "Where shall I go?", "What shall I do?" "Which way shall I follow?", "Which (way) should I abandon?" "I have been all along in this world as a particle of water in the vast ocean (of life)." This shows that he has no other place to aim at in particular. Therefore a *mukta* will keep moving on according to the *Sruti* texts *Sa tatra paryēti jakshan krīdan ramamāṇaḥ sthrūbhirvā yānairvā gnātibhirvā*, etc., by playing about in joy, sometimes with those damsels whom he meets as associates in travelling, in vehicles, sometimes along with some of his kinsmen he meets on the road. For such a *mukta*, can *vyavahāra* be ever applicable to him?

*Sruti* texts such as *Nānyat kinchana mishat*; *Vāchāram-bhaṇam vīkārō nāmadhēyam mrītikētyēva satyam*;<sup>505</sup> *Atō anyathā artham natu dvitīyamasti*, etc., do not indicate that there is any other thing than Brahman. So also, elsewhere, *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmani tishṭhan ya ātmanō antarōyamātmāna vēdayasyātmā śarīram ya ātmānam antarō ayamiti* | *Sa ta ātmā antaryāmyamrutāḥ* |<sup>506</sup> *Antaḥ pravishṭaḥ śāstā janānām*; *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*;<sup>507</sup> *Dvā suparṇā*,<sup>508</sup> etc., declare that the *jīva* and Brahman are different from each other, though *Sruti* texts like *Tattva-*

soon as he attains *mōksha*, all such bondage (of smell) becomes destroyed. Oh Brahman! it is the destruction of that smell of bondage that is called *mōksha*. There is no *mōksha* in the sky nor is it in the lower regions nor on this earth. But *mōksha* lies only in the absolute destruction of all desires.

<sup>504</sup> A *Sruti* called *Muktikōpanishad* is found in the collection of 108 *Upanishads* called the *Ashṭōttaraśatōpanishad* published by Nirṇaya Sāgara Press. It is quoted by Ānandatīrtha (under the identical name of *Muktikōpanishad*) when commenting on *Brahma-Sūtra* III. 4. 49. *Anāvishkurvannanvayāt*. The texts quoted by Śrīpati do not, however, occur in the *Muktikōpanishad*.

<sup>505</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>506</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7. 3.

<sup>507</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9,

<sup>508</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

*masi*, etc., point to *abhēda*. Thus *bhēda* and *abhēda* are referred to by *Sruti* texts, so that it is not possible for Vēdāntins to determine which is the correct way to follow. The *mukta* being thus in a puzzle, if the doubt arises whether *dharma-jignāsa* is the only fit thing, then there is evident the three-fold doctrine enunciated in the next *Sūtra*, *Abhāvam bādarirāhahyēvam* (IV. 4. 10). *Sruti* texts like *Sadēva sōmyēdamagra āsīt* ; *Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma*;<sup>509</sup> *Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti nānyadvijānāti sabhūmā*;<sup>510</sup> *Nēhanānāsti kinchana*,<sup>511</sup> etc., determinately prohibit for the past, present and future *bhēda*. Though *jagat* does not really exist and *jīva*, *Īśvara*, etc., do not exist, yet, for the time being, just as we mistake the rope for the serpent, all that we see is but a mere illusion (*mithyātvamēva*), much like as our imagining that a rabbit has two horns. Thus says Bādari. Therefore in order to bring it thoroughly home to the pupils that the *jagat* is an illusion, the existence of the *jagat* has been invented in keeping with the *Sruti* texts, reasoning (*yukti*) and experience (*anubhava*), and in conformity with the maxims *adhyārōpāpavādūbhyaṁ nishprapancham prapanchata*<sup>512</sup> etc. This seems much like the description of a king born as a son to a barren woman and ruling over a kingdom. That the *jagat* is *mithyā* is the true doctrine of Bādari. Thus, in

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<sup>509</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>510</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 2. 4.

<sup>511</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>512</sup> *Adhyārōpa* in *Vēdānta* means falsely attributing the properties of one thing to another—for example, considering Brahman, who is not really the material world, to be the material world ; and *apavāda* is a refutation as of a wrong imputation of belief. In order to teach what *adhyārōpa* and *apavāda* mean, the teacher exemplifies the case of *jagat*. The *jagat* is seen to be in existence, though it does not exist as a matter of fact. Even the *Srutis* contain fictitious texts in order to exemplify this fact. That is, the *Srutis* have these texts only for purposes of teaching (the non-existence of the world) and not for teaching its existence. The invention (*kalpana*) is for teaching the truth to thousands of disciples and not to testify to their literal correctness. See note 175 on page 320 *ante*.

this way, after pointing out the main points of contradiction in the *Srutis* and also pointing out where they partly stand to reason, Bādari discusses holding the pure *Advaita* (*kēvala advaita*) doctrine that the *jagat* is but an illusion (*mithyā*). In order to contradict such an opinion, the *Sūtrakāra* enunciates the following *Sūtra* in order to establish his own view (IV. 4. 11): *Bhūvam Jaiminīrvikalpāmananāt*. *Sruti* texts like *Jyōtishṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta* ; *Bhūtikāmō vāyuva śvētamālabhēta* ; *Karmachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē* ; *Puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē* ; *Pāpēnāndhō mūkō badhirō śvānō bhavati* ; *Puṇyēna vidyāvān dhanavān bhōgavān bhavati*, etc., show without contradiction that according to the ordinances of God all actions which are devoid of *puṇya* such as *brahmahatya*, *surāpāna*, etc., will certainly lead to *Naraka* and other nether worlds. And similarly all virtuous deeds will surely lead to the enjoyment of experiences in *Svarga* and the like regions. *Sruti* texts like *Yagnēna dāmēna tapasā nāśakēna*, etc., explain clearly that actions done without any particular desire but purely for propitiating Paramēśvara, such as sacrificial offerings done at the *Jyōtishṭōma* sacrifice and the like, will finally purge the *jīva* of all sins and lead to *Brahmagnāna* and salvation (*sādhakatva*). Jaimini considers that the *jīva*, *Īśvara* and the *prapancha* beginning with the *Vēda* (*nigama*), the *Sāstras* (*āgama*) and their innate properties as absolutely eternal (not illusory). Why? *Vikalpāmananāt* ; *vividhaḥ kalpō vikalpaḥ*. To invent in different ways is to mutilate the truth of the *Sāstras*. If *jagat* is granted to be *mithyā*, then we are reduced to the doctrine of the Bauddhas and others. Then the sacrificial rite of *Jyōtishṭōma* and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, or the fruits accorded by the commission of wrong acts such as *brahmahatya* and the like, would not have existed in the least. Therefore, even what is laid down in the *Āgama* as an act to be done will go frustrated. If that be so, then, texts like *Sa ēkadhā bhavati tridhā bhavati panchadhā bhavati* ; *iti*, etc., will prove clear contradictions of the *Srutis* themselves. Therefore, it is the firm doctrine of Jaimini that *jīva*, *Īśvara* and the rest, together with the

*jagat*, are eternal and that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are different from each other. This should be accepted as the *bhēdāvāda* doctrine of Jaimini. In this way, to harmonise these two doctrines, each of which stands partially in agreement with the *Srutis*, and to remove all contradictions between them and to establish the truth, the *Sūtrakāra* gives in the next *Sūtra* his own opinion in the form of the *Dvaitādvaita* doctrine (*dvaitādvaitātmaka svamatam*), which harmonises with the whole of what is said in the *Vēda*, *Vēdānta* and the *Āgamas*. In the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 12) *Dvādaśūhavad ubhaya vidham Bādarāyaṇōtakah*, the attaining of *Parabrahmatva* is established. For what reason is the pure *Advaita* doctrine which is based on *gnāna* and supported only partially by the *Sruti* texts and for what reason, the *Dvaita* doctrine, which substantiates only *karma*, *bhakti* and *yōga*, become mutually contradictory, for the same reason, the whole *Vēdānta* declares as its chief purport that *dvaitādvaita* is what is to be rejoiced at (*abhiprēta*). *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē'stam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktah parātparam purushamupaiti divyam* ||<sup>513</sup> *Brahma-vidāpnōti param* ;<sup>514</sup> *Brahma vēda Brahmaiva bhavati* ||<sup>515</sup> *Tattvamasi* ;<sup>516</sup> *Aham Brahmāsmi* ;<sup>517</sup> etc., declare decisively that *gnānakarma ubhayātmaka ubhayavidham dvaitādvaita matam* as Bādarāyaṇa's doctrine. What *ubhaya-vidham* means is that during the *samsāra* period, both Brahman and *jīva* exist separately in the relationship of *upāsya* (worshipped) and *upāsaka* (worshipper), and their existence as different entities is absolutely true (*pāramārthika satyatvam*). In the state of *mōksha*, they exist in the relationship of the river which winds its way to the sea (*nadī samudravat*) and agreeably to the *bhramara-kēta nyāya*, the *jīva* being naturally released of its *jīva* state, attains that

<sup>513</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

<sup>514</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>515</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>516</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

<sup>517</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10,

all-pervading (*vyāpaka*), undivided (*akhaṇḍa*) and supreme *ākāśa* form (*paramākāśarūpa*) and bears the characteristics of *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda*, and becomes possessed of all that unrivalled, all-knowing quality (*sarvagnatvādi sādharmaṇa guṇākara*), acquires all the *guṇas* of Parabrahman, Paraśiva, Śivaśankara, Rudrēśvara, Mahādēva and others and claims all the terms by which Parabrahman is called. Bādarāyaṇa thus establishes that the *jīva* realizes *Parabrahmatva* by attaining it.

By the term *dvādaśāhavat* it is understood that in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Yathā dvādaśāham ruddhikāmā upēyuh* and *Dvādaśāhēna prajākāmam yājayēt*, etc., the *jīva* acquires the results derived from both the sacrifices (i.e., *Ruddhikāma* and *Prajākāma*) and is enabled to reach the true state of Parabrahman. This is accepted by Bādarāyaṇa. Whereas in *Mantra Sruti* texts like *Dvā suparṇā*,<sup>518</sup> etc., *jīva* and *Brahman* are both described as possessed of different characteristics and whereas only in *Sruti* texts such as *Tattvamasī*,<sup>519</sup> etc., the unity of *jīva* and *Brahman* is also described, therefore, the supreme truth (*paramārtha*) of both of these sets of *Srutis* should be accepted in the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*. As it is declared that all *Srutis* speak nothing but the truth, and as very many *Sruti* texts, *Purāṇas* and *Purvāchūras* bear testimony to, *bhēdābhēda* is the only doctrine that can be accepted as true. If not, if the meaning of the *Srutis* is lessened (*sankōchē*), the proofs (*māna*) will be contradicted and other great Vēdic contradictions will result. It has been pointed out in one of the foregoing *Sūtras*, *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt*,<sup>520</sup> etc., that the *Dvaita* doctrine that *jīva* and *Brahman* are admittedly different from each other, is established as true. At the same time the *Sūtra*, *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*,<sup>521</sup> points to the truth of the *Advaita* doctrine. Similarly in the

<sup>518</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>519</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

<sup>520</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 22.

<sup>521</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1. 14.



*Sūtra*, *Lōkavattu līlakaivalyam*,<sup>522</sup> etc., the sporting character of Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvarasya līlā*) is pointed out. Such *Srutis* as refer to the occasions in which the *Dvaita* character of Paramēśvara is exhibited, have also been pointed out. It has also been explained that the term *kaivalya* indicates the absolute unity of *jīva* and *Brahman*. The truth of texts like *Nēha nānāsti kinchana*,<sup>523</sup> etc., which declare *abhēda*, which means that there is no existence separate from Brahman, has also been clearly established. If it is asked what are we to do with those texts which declare the bodily form (*mūrtatva*) of Śiva Parabrahman, the answer is that they should only be taken merely as the sport (*līlaiva prayōjanam*) of Paramēśvara inasmuch as they serve the useful purpose of indicating to the *bhakta* the way of realization and how to realize *mukti*. Therefore Śiva himself, having assumed the form of a *līla mangala vighraha* (an auspicious sporting image), manifested through his lustre his own true condition (*tattva*) through a material world, and thereby brought into existence through Hiranyagarbha<sup>524</sup> the pervasive nature of his qualities as declared in the *Vēdas*. Therefore a *mumukshu* following the path laid out in the *Vēdas* and meditating and worshipping the *mūrtā* and the *amūrtā* forms of Paraśiva Brahman finally realizes Parabrahman from a bodily form into a bodiless form, and attains *kaivalya mukti* (i.e., absolute unity—unity in its essence) with him, just as ghee which manifests itself in a liquid form when it is in the stage of melting assumes again its original solid hardened (*kāṭhinya*) form, when it is allowed to cool itself. If not, to whom else is it possible to attain to that state of absolute unity with Śiva? *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*;<sup>525</sup> *Hiranyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam sanō dēvaśśubhayā smrityā samyunaktu*;<sup>526</sup> *Yō brahmāṇam*

<sup>522</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 33.

<sup>523</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>524</sup> Name of Brahman as born from a golden-egg.

<sup>525</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

<sup>526</sup> *Ibid.*, XII.

*vidadhāti pūrvam*! *Yōvai vēdāmscha prāhiṇōti tasmai*! *Tamhi dēvam ātmabuddhi prakāśam mumukshurvai śaraṇam aham prapadyē*,<sup>527</sup> etc., sufficiently explain in several ways what has been above stated. And, hence, there could be no room for any manner of doubt. For the text *Sāṅkhya-yogau prithak bālāḥ pravāṇanti na paṇḍitāḥ* etc., applies. It is only those undeveloped young men who praise at length *Sāṅkhya yōga* (which speaks of *Dvaita*); but never so a man of advanced knowledge (*paṇḍita*). Thus *Krishṇa* (i.e., *Krishṇa Dvaipāyana*) himself has given out that the *Dvaitādvaita* doctrine is what, in his opinion, should be preferred. And therefore a one-sided view (either *dvaita* or *advaita* only) is incorrect (*asamanjasa*).

*Srīpati* commenting next on IV. 4. 13, *Tasya bhāvū sandhyavadūpapattēḥ*, says that just as in the *Samanvayādhikaraṇa*, it was mentioned that all *Vēdānta* ends by declaring that *Brahmaprāpti* (realization of Brahman) is the final goal after attaining *Brahmagāna*, so, in the same manner, it has been pointed out by means of the illustration of the *Dvīdaśāha yagna* that in conformity with the maxim that double realization (accomplishment) is obtained, by the strength of double means, and that all *Vēdānta* by the force of its virtuous merits proves the author's own doctrine *bhēdābhēda* as regards *jīva* and *Brahman*. By this means, it is clearly shown that the method of meditation and worship of the bodily (*sāvayava*) form of Brahman will necessarily lead to the realization of the bodiless (*niravayava*) form of Brahman. *Sruti* texts like *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā savignēyaḥ śivādvaitaḥ*; *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuh*;<sup>528</sup> *Ēka-mēva advitīyam Brahma*;<sup>529</sup> *Sa īkshatā īmān lōkān srujāyē jēma satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpāḥ*;<sup>530</sup> etc., declare that after

<sup>527</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 18.

<sup>528</sup> *Atharvasiras*.

<sup>529</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>530</sup> Cf. *Aitarēya Upa.*, III. 1. *Sa īkshata imān lōkān lōka-pālāmscha annamēbhyaḥ*.

he realizes *niravayava* Brahman, he will realize the further characteristics of Brahman, such as his *advitīyatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, etc. As stated in *Sruti* texts like *Tasmāt vā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*,<sup>531</sup> etc., he will gradually thereafter attain the three-fold qualities of becoming part of Supreme (*pradhāna*) Brahman by losing his divided power; by acquiring the Supreme Brahman's power of bringing into existence by his *līlā* this cobweb of a creation consisting of *bhūta* (beings) and *bhautika* (material elements); and during that Supreme Brahman's contracted state (*i.e.*, in his dormant condition), he acquires by his *satyasankalpa* character this cobweb of a world.<sup>532</sup> Therefore there is no contradiction in creating the (real) world in his state of Supreme Brahman consisting of undivided (*advitīya*) and (divided) *sadvitīya* characters.<sup>533</sup> Why? Because of the proof demonstrated in the joint state of *sandhyā* (where the union of light and darkness, in the morning or evening) is exhibited, and also in the two conditions of *prabōdha* and *supti* (wakefulness and sound sleep), when the dreaming state is experienced; as in these joint conditions, in the creations of the world also the joint condition (co-existing with Brahman and separated from Brahman) is experienced.<sup>534</sup>

For example, in the dreaming state, according to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Atha rathān rathayōgān pruthak srujatē* and ending with *Atha vēśantān pushkarīṇyaḥ samprata srujatē saḥikartēti*; and in other texts like *Yēshu suptēshu jāgarti kāmam kāmam purushō nirmimāṇaḥ*; *Tadēva śukram tadbrahma tadēvāmruta muchyatē* | *tasminllōkāḥ sritāḥ sarvē tadunānyēti kaschana*,<sup>535</sup> etc.;

<sup>531</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>532</sup> He acquires the three characteristics of the Supreme Brahman, during *srishti*, *sthiti* and *laya*.

<sup>533</sup> In the state of *advitīya*, *i.e.*, unity, the world is in Brahman; in the divided state, *i.e.*, it is in the *sadvitīya* state.

<sup>534</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 4. 13.

<sup>535</sup> *Kath. Upa.*, VI. 1.

the *jīva*, though he had never seen anything before, in his state of wakefulness, yet during his dreaming state, experiences by the aid of his good luck, the existence of several creations (*sṛiṣṭi*) made by Paramēśvara during that state. Therefore, during his dreaming state, even though he is sleeping, he has two kinds of experience—dreaming and sleeping—which are not contradicted. Similarly, the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda* is not contradicted even in the realized state (*muktasyāpi*), because there still remains in him (the *mukta*), the smell of *prārabdha* (*prārabdhavāsanā*) which exists in *prakṛiti* (*prakṛitirasti*). By this, it is clearly concluded that when he is in Śivalōka, enjoying all the undiminished happiness, being absolutely freed from every vestige of smell of his former life, he will be in fact one with Śiva experiencing all that of Śiva himself (*kēvala Śivaikya kaivalyānubhava*). Now, a doubt arises, in the second part of the *mukti* state of Śiva Parabrahman, whether a *jada* or lifeless thing (*i.e.*, *Pradhāna*) can also acquire the characteristic of *Sachchidānanda* by being one with him, though *Pradhāna* is a *prārabdhavāsanā*, which attaches itself to a *mukta*. The answer is that in the doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, there can be no such doubt. Because just as *chētana* and *achētana* and light and darkness, though absolutely opposite to each other in their character, co-exist, similarly *Pradhāna* co-exists with Śiva without any contradiction, because in the *sadvitīya* character of Śiva, it (*Pradhāna*) co-exists naturally. Similarly even in the case of a *mukta*, this is an acquired characteristic (in his realized condition).

In the state of dependence (*sāpēkṣatva*) (of a *mukta*), the *satyakāmatva*, which is established in the *Sruti* text, *Satyakāma satyasankalpa*, etc., would be contradicted. When according to the *Sruti* text, *Apāṇipādō javanō grihītā*,<sup>536</sup> etc., a *mukta* has attained independence (*prāpta svātantrya*) and has no more need for penance or meditation (*sādhanaṅtara nirapēkṣatayā*), he having acquired the

<sup>536</sup> *Sveta. Upa.*, III. 19.

characteristic of *sarvakartrutva*, if he is to co-exist with *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛiti*) as if in a dependent condition, then he is still seen dependent and thus a mutual contradiction arises. The explanation for this is that no such mutual contradiction need be apprehended; for the co-existence of *advitīya* and *sadvitīya* states (of Brahman with *Pradhāna*) is generally quite possible without such contradiction. Just as light and darkness co-exist, Śiva and *Pradhāna* do co-exist. In the *Sruti* text *Tasmātvā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, etc., in which the expression *tasmāt* stands for *Pradhānāt*, the expression *ētasmāt* for *Paramātma*; from these (*ākāśa*, etc.) the existing (*bhūta*) and the created (*bhautika*) came into being; and the indeclinable *vā* denotes the state of co-existence together. For *Sruti* texts like *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram | Tasyāvayava bhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat ||*<sup>537</sup> *Parāsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvīkē gnānabala kriyācha*,<sup>538</sup> etc., explain that *Māyā* being dependent on Śiva in the creation of the world, naturally co-exists with him and therefore in the *Sūtra* it is stated *tasyabhāvē sandhyavat upapattēḥ*. Here the expression *tasyabhāvē* means *Sivādhīna pradhāna vikāsa sadbhāvē* (the manifesting power of *Pradhāna*, i.e., subordinate to the will of Śiva though co-existing with him) and the expression *sandhyavat* means *tanutraya madhyāvagata lingaśarīram svapnāvasthācha vyavahriyatē*, i.e., establishes the co-existing condition of the germ of the carnal body and the dreaming conditions of—the scent of—previous existence. Just as the practice of meditation, as laid down in the whole of the *Vēdānta*, is the means (*hētu*) for an ignorant (*mūḍha*) *mumukshu* to reach the stage of a *mukta*, *mukta daśāsu mumukshu*, so does the seed of doubt in the *pūrvapakṣa* lead to the *siddhānta*. In the same way, the germ of the carnal body (*lingaśarīra*) is the means for the development of the visible material (perishable) bodily form (*sthūla śarīra*) for its functions. So, *Śivagnāna* is the means for removing

<sup>537</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>538</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 8.

ignorance and realizing *mōksha*. Therefore, by way of 'illustration' Śiva Parabrahman is shown to co-exist with *Jagat srisṣṭi*.<sup>539</sup>

Moreover, when the *jīva* during the period of profound meditation (*samādhi kālē*) is almost on the verge of attaining the state of *mukti*, he will be experiencing that state of Brahman knowledge and that state of bliss (*ānanda*), being absolutely free from the touch of any desire connected with the outside forces (*bāhyēndriya*), which is usually experienced by Śivayōgins. This is explained in *Sruti* texts like *Ātmakrūdā ātmaratir ātmānandasya svarāt bhavati*;<sup>540</sup> *Sō'snūtē sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaschitā*, etc. By this is meant that the *jīva* assumes the means for attaining Kailāsa by assuming *sārūpya*. From this assumed state, he will realize that (condition of the absolute *mukta*). In the *Sruti* text *Ākāśaśarīram Brahma satyātma prāṇārāmam mana ānandam*,<sup>541</sup> etc., it is said that Mahākailāsa which is the abode of Sadāśiva, is realized as the result of *parama ānanda* after all desires pertaining to outside forces have been absolutely given up. The expression *mana ānandam* in the text (quoted above) means *manasi ānandō yasya saḥ manānandah*, perfect joy in his mind. *Praṇēshu āsaman-tāt ramata iti prāṇārāmaḥ*—this determines his (the *mukta*'s) state. It is also stated in *Sruti* texts like *Sānti samruddham amrutam*,<sup>542</sup> etc., which mean the *mukta*'s form is that of being eternally virtuous (*taḥ śarīrasya satya-tvam*), eternally peaceful (*śānti karatvam*) and eternally

<sup>539</sup> Śrīpati in quoting the *Sruti* text *Māyāntu prakṛitīm*, etc. (*Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10) suggests that *māyā* and *prakṛiti* are synonymous with each other and *Mahēśvara* is termed *Māyin*. Out of the *araya*, the world is manifested. With this compare the view of Ānandatīrtha, who quotes the *Sruti* text thus:—*Māyāntu prakṛitīm vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram* । *Mahāmāyētyavidyēti niyatir mōhinītica* । *Prakṛitir vāsanētyēvā tavēchchā' nanta kathyatē* ॥ Ānandatīrtha suggests that *Māyā* is only the will of God existing not differently along with Brahman but in him (*vide* Ānandatīrtha, *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*).

<sup>540</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>541</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 6.

<sup>542</sup> *Ibid.*

lasting (*amrutatvam*). Even here the state of the meditator should also be considered, as of *Śivānanda* form. An alternative form, denoting the same idea, is enunciated in the next *Sūtra*—*Bhāvē jāgradvat* (IV. 4. 14). Just as the gross body (*sthūla śarīra*) in its state of repose assumes the subtle body (*sūkshma śarīra*) and experiences the results of its virtuous and sinful actions and subsequently attains the wakeful state of (*jāgradavastha*), in the same way at the time when *Prakṛiti*, the inert *śakti* in *Śiva*, is to come into play (i.e., manifests itself), *Śiva Parabrahman* exhibits himself in the two forms of *sūkshma* and *sthūla* and thereby shows the five-fold means of his creation (*jagat sṛiṣṭi*, *sthiti*, *laya*, *tirōdhāna* and *anugraha*) and his methods of concealing and favouring (*tirōdhāna* and *anugraha*). By this, even though a *mukta* is free from all worldly bondage, yet by reason of his possessing the *Lingaśarīra*, he cannot help undergoing all the experiences in the different worlds—this and the next—so that, after experiencing all, he will realize *Śiva Parabrahman*. And, therefore, this *Sūtra* points out that a *mukta* should experience all (he desires). It is also described that even *Mahādēva*, the Lord of Gods, did several acts, such as the destruction of *Vyāghrāsura*, *Gajāsura* and *Tripurāsura*, and the drinking of poison, and protecting his faithful follower *Mārkaṇḍēya* (in order to show his *bhaktas* that all should be done by one if it has been ordained he should do them). For it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Bhidyatē hridayagranthiḥ chchidyantē sarva saṁsayāḥ* | *Kṣhīyantē chāsya karmāṇi tasmīn drīṣṭhē parāvarē* || <sup>543</sup> and *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hṛdi sthitāḥ* | *Atha martyō amṛitō bhavatyatra Brahma samaśnutē*; etc., that one should get himself freed from all doubts, which will help him to shake off the ties of bondage when all his further *karma* will be at an end and *Brahman* realized by him. These and other similar texts declare that the truth of *Śiva*'s true nature will only be then revealed to such of those who can strenuously attempt to understand it by their absolute absence of worldly desires and real knowledge.

Verily, according to *Sruti* texts like *Muktaḥ Śivasamō bhavēt* | *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanū vipaschitā*,<sup>544</sup> etc., a *mukta* in the beginning having obtained a status equal to that of Śiva as the result of his meditation and worship, will proceed from one heavenly place to another with a heavenly body and finally becomes absorbed in Śiva.

But if it is doubted how he can proceed from one heavenly place to another in different heavenly forms and at the same time continue to be on a level with Śiva (*Śiva-sāmyatvam*), the *Sūtrakāra* clears the doubt in the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 15), *Pradīpavadūvōśastathā hi darśayati*. Just as a light kept in a particular place throws its rays so as to light up the space surrounding it, similarly there is nothing strange in the *ātma*, being only in a particular part of the body, throwing its light throughout the body. Even so, though the *chaitanya* (*jīva*) stays only within the precincts of the heart, its consciousness extends all over the body. In the same manner, here also, the same understanding is to prevail. A *mukta* (who at first) possesses self-knowledge in a contracted (narrow) form is not capable of being present everywhere simultaneously. Because a *mukta* has not, in the state of his narrow knowledge, still grasped that particular knowledge whereby he can be simultaneously present, whenever he likes, according to his determination, the *Sūtra* uses the words *tathāhi darśayati*. (Similarly he, *Bādarāyaṇa*, proves.) For the *Sruti* text says *Vūlāgra śatabhāgasya śatadhū kalpitasyacha* | *Bhāgō jīvaḥ savignēyaḥ sachānantyāya kalpatē* ||<sup>545</sup> etc. Similarly, the *jīva* gradually acquires a controlling power over *karma* and the power of existence in a *sūkshma* form, just as *Paramēśvara*, which enables him, as he desires, to create any number of bodies simultaneously so as to assume such forms and travel wherever he wants. For, as it is said in *Sruti* texts like

<sup>544</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. A *mukta* practically becomes one on a level with Śiva ; he enjoys all his desires along with the wise Brahman.

<sup>545</sup> Know that if the end of a hair follicle is divided into a hundred parts, one of the hundred parts represents the size of the *jīva*, which is capable of dividing itself *ad infinitum*.



*Sa ēkadhā bhavati dvidhā bhavati tridhā bhavati sahasradhā bhavati*,<sup>546</sup> etc., that as the result of meditation and worship of Paramēśvara, he (*jīva*), out of His grace, obtains the power of assuming several forms simultaneously. It is to be understood as ascertained truth that the *Śāstra* which treats of the atomic character of the *jīva* is one which deals with the *jīva* in bondage (*baddha jīva*). Verily, if it is asked whether a *mukta* has, like a family man, his worldly body and sensory organs—i.e., worldly existence—and if so what the difference between the two is, the answer is, he has not. A *mukta*, by virtue of his having realized the *Purushārtha*—one of the four principal objects of human life<sup>547</sup>—has no worldly desires to look to, though he is connected with the world. On the other hand, a *mukta* is bent upon meditating upon Brahman only in all his glory. And in that place—in the world of the Brahman (*Brahma prapancha*)—the *Sruti* text *Nānyat paśyati nānyat śruṇōti nānyat vijānāti sabhūmā*,<sup>548</sup> etc., says that a *mukta* experiences nothing but Brahman. Moreover, it is said in *Sruti* texts like *Ētat tatō bhavati*; *Ākāśa śarīram Brahma*; *Satyātma prāṇārāmam manānandam śāntisamruddham amrutam*<sup>549</sup> etc., and also in the texts *Āpnōti svārajyam āpnōti manasampattiḥ*, etc., that a *mukta* will obtain the happiness of his natural place, i.e., that of the state of Śiva Parabrahman (*Śivasya Parabrahmanah padam*). Further, after realizing that state, he becomes an absolute *yōgi* who has fully realized his entire wishes in Parabrahman. If it is asked what further remains to be realized by a *mukta*, the answer is, the *Sruti* text says:—*Vākepatischakshushpatih śrōtrapatir vighnānapatischa bhavati*; <sup>550</sup> i.e., the state of lordship of speech and observation; also the lordship of hearing and knowledge, by which he can have command over his speech and

<sup>546</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 26. 2.

<sup>547</sup> *Dharma, artha, kāma* and *mōksha* are the four *Purushārthas*.

<sup>548</sup> He sees nothing else but Brahman, he hears nothing else but Brahman and he knows nothing but Brahman. *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 1.

<sup>549</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, I. 6.

<sup>550</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 6. 2.

knowledge. In this way, a *mukta* will have realized the high state of Śivapada in Mahākailāsa and continue there for an endless period of time, in the purity of his affections, in the assembly of *muktas* (*viśvajālam bhavāti*). What follows next? The *Sruti* text goes *Ākāśa sarīram Brahmaiva*, etc. The *mukta* acquires the power of *Parāprākṛiti* (the natural form of Brahman) and *Paramasattā* (the Supreme Brahman existence, i.e., reality) and forms himself into the all-pervasive *Parama-ākāśa* wherein *Parabrahma śarīra* is manifested. And this state is called *Prakāśakānanda samarasa Paramaśakti*. This state of the *mukta* is the actual realized condition of Paraśiva. Here there are several of them who are separate from each other from time immemorial. So the *Sruti* texts declare *Kōhyēvānyāt kaḥ prānyāt* | *Yadēsha-ākāśa ānandō na syāt* | *Rasōvai saḥ* | *Rasam hyēvāyam labdhvā* "nandībhavati" | *Ēsha hyēvānandayati* | <sup>551</sup> etc., from which it follows that the *muktas* will experience every kind of *ānanda* region (*Brahma prapancha*). Later on, agreeably to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sa ēkō mānushaḥ*, etc., and ending with *Sa ēkō Brahman ānanda*, etc., the *mukta* enjoys *ānanda* (from that of a mere man) without any interruption (*upādhi*) to that of (the *ānanda* of) Brahman. Then as the *Sruti* text *Ānandāvīrbhāvastāratanyēna* declares, the *mukta* enjoys his *svarūpānanda* and without any interruption will enjoy, among the *muktas*, *ānanda* to the fullest extent and will be in the state of *paripūrṇa*. Then, as the *Sruti* text *Sa ēkō Brahman ānandaḥ* <sup>552</sup> declares, a *śrōtriya* who is devoid of desires finally realizes *Brahma buddhi* as a result of his virtuous acts, such as sacrifices, etc., and becomes fit for realizing Brahman (*paravidyāvān*). In such a condition even though he is in *jīva*, (i.e., bodily) form, he becomes a *mukta* and equal with Brahman (*Brahmanascha tulya ēva*) and enjoys all *ānanda*. The *mukta* had been experiencing in this world through his meditation and practice of *yōga* even before he realized the *ānanda* state, even before he left (this)

<sup>551</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

<sup>552</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 8.

world. Therefrom, after he reaches *Brahmalōka*, he continues to experience *ānanda* in his *mukta* form, beginning from that of the human state up to that equal to Brahman and ending with Brahman himself. And thus there can be no difference between the *ānanda* which a *mukta* experiences in his human form and that which he experiences after he assumes the *mukta* form. According to *Sruti* texts like *Atō ayamēva paramānandaḥ parāprakritiḥ; Parā chēt ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt*, etc., *Brahmatva* and *jagatkāraṇatva* is established for the *mukta*. He will then be installed, according to the *Sruti* text *Saishā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā paramē vyōman pratishṭhitā*,<sup>553</sup> etc., in the ethereal state of Brahman. And thereby a *mukta* here assumes that great ethereal form (*paramākāśarūpa śarīram*) of the Brahman in the region of Brahman and enters into the highest bliss (*paramānanda*) like Brahman himself, absolutely devoid of all connection with bondage or misery (*Brahmaṇa iva duḥkhānushangābhāvō darśitaḥ*). Verily, after thus realizing the *Paraśivabrahma sārūpya*, *Brahmagnāna lōpam darśayati*, i.e., the *mukta* loses the sense of difference between himself and Brahman (i.e., he feels he is one with Brahman. For he feels no knowledge of difference between himself and Brahman). The *Sruti* text goes *Prāgnēna ātmanā samparishvaktō na bāhyam kinchana vēda nāntaram*,<sup>554</sup> etc. (Being enveloped in that supreme knowledge of *ātma*, he does not see anything else beyond himself.)

How can a *mukta*, then, be said to have acquired the *sarvagnatva*, the omniscient (or all-knowing) power? The reply is furnished by the *Sūtrakāra* in the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 16) *Svāpyayasampattyōr anyatarāpēksham āvishkritam hi*. This statement does not refer to a *mukta*; but refers to one who feels exultant in his own self by his own meditation in his *sushupti* condition. In the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sampattischa maraṇam vāṅgmanasi sampadyatē* and ending with *Tējah parasyām dēvatāyām*, etc., it is declared that in the two states of existence, viz.,

<sup>553</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 6.

<sup>554</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, VI. 3. 21.

the *sushupti* and the *maraṇa*, the reaching of *prāṇa* (i.e., Brahman) is imperceptibly the same.<sup>555</sup> Therefore, in the *Sūtra*, the statement *anyatarāpekṣham* denotes that the stages of *sushupti* and *maraṇa* are almost quite the same for a *mukta* when he has reached the *sarvagna* state. According to *Sruti* texts like *Nāham khalvayamēvam sampratyātmanam jānātyayamahamasmṛti*; <sup>556</sup> *Nō ēvēmāni bhūtāni vināśamēvāpītō bhavati*; *Nāhamatra bhōgyam paśyāmi*,<sup>557</sup> etc., the *mukta* knows himself during the time of *sushupti* and recognizes himself as a *mukta* without any perception of difference. The *Sruti* text *Sa vā ēsha divyēna chakshushā manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramatē ya ētē Brahmālōkam*,<sup>558</sup> etc., says that the *mukta* will attain the *sarvagna* state. And similarly the *Sruti* text *Sarvam ha-paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnōti sarvagna*, etc., states clearly that when he attains *sarvagnatva* the *mukta* perceives that there is no difference between *sushupti* and *maraṇa*. And the saying declared in the *Sruti* text *Ētēbhyō bhūtēbhyah samutthāya tānyēvānuvinaśyati*, etc., will have been experienced, so that the *mukta* does not experience anything beyond himself. Therefore, according to the *Sruti* text *Tasmāt prāgnēnātmanā*, etc., he will have obtained that state of self-knowing wherein he does not, as stated in the *Sūtra*, require the help of others.<sup>559</sup>

Verily, according to the *Sruti* text *Sarvēshu lōkēshu kāmachārō bhavati* | *Imān lōkān kāmān kāmārūpyanusancharan*,<sup>560</sup> etc., the *mukta* can, through his meditation of Paraśiva Brahman without any break, can freely travel all over the worlds (*lōkas*) as he wishes. If it is doubted how he could travel over various worlds simultaneously, keeping a plural number of bodies, our

<sup>555</sup> In the *Chch. Upa.*, it is stated that in the *sushupti* state the *jīva* is enveloped by *prāṇa*, i.e., Brahman.

<sup>556</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII. 11. 2.

<sup>557</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 9. 1.

<sup>558</sup> *Mukta. Upa.*

<sup>559</sup> The *Sruti* says: *Swāpyaya sampattyōr anyatarāpekṣham āviś-*

<sup>560</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5, [kritam hi,

answer is, "There is no need for such doubting." For from *Sruti* texts like *Sa nō bandhur janitā sa vidhātā dhāmāni veda bhuvanāni viśvā*,<sup>561</sup> *Yatra dēvā amrutamānaśuḥ tritīye dhāmanyabhyairayanta*; *Paridyāvā prithivī yanti sadyaḥ*; *Parilōkōn paridiśaḥ parisuvaḥ Rutasya tantum vitatam vivrutya tadapaśyat tadabhavat* | *prajāsviti*, etc., it is clearly proved that the *mukta* being absolutely liberated from the bondage of *avidyā*, enters the region of the all-pervading Brahman. The meaning of the *Sruti* text, *Ēsha hi dēva iti*, is that the all-renowned Mahādēva, the Creator of the universe, is our father (*asmākam bandhur janitā*); he is the cause of all our happiness and joys (*sa vidhātā sakalaśrēyasām kartā*); he possesses majestic lustre of an extraordinary kind (*dhāmāni tējōrūpāni aprākrutāni*); he is the Creator of all the universe (*bhuvanāni viśvānyapi janitā*); he is the maker of the eternal abode of happiness and meditation (*tatra bandhuvādi yōgasya dhāma viśvasya cha prayōjanam uchyatē*). And making it the abode for the eternal company of *bandhus* (spiritual brothers) and staying in such (happy) regions is the chief utility of *gnāna*. *Yatra yasmin iha dēvā amrutam kaivalya lakṣmīm na śāsa aprāpya-nubhavantāḥ dēvāḥ tadbhāvāt vėdanasīlāḥ tritīyē dyusangnakē tatpadē māyātītē dhāmāni nijatējaḥ, pradhānāni svābhimatāni abhyairayanta svīkritavantāḥ*: he becomes subject to the grace of Mahādēva, the possessor of the *svarūpa* of Parabrahman, who is the sole eternal well-wisher just as a father and spiritual brother (*bandhu*), who finally cuts off all bondage whereby immortality is attained (*amrutabhāvam gatāḥ*). The *mukta* in the third stage passes to the region of *Paramavyōma* (the distant sky), where his own permanent station is actively realized by him as the result of his meditation and worship. And therefore (he) is then said to have *parama prāpti*, i.e., to have attained the realization of the Supreme. The *Sruti* text *Paridyāvā prithivī yanti*,<sup>562</sup> etc., says that a *mukta*

<sup>561</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, X. 82. 3.<sup>562</sup> *Ibid.*

will, by the strength of his realized position, put forth his glorious lustre all throughout the aerial regions, which finally reach the *Hiraṇyagarbha lōkas*, which position he will then realize. Then he will cover up by his lustre far beyond *Svargalōka*. In this way, all the *muktas* will be in this condition. Verily, it is said *Tēna sarvagnataḥ satya-karmaṇaḥ vistṛṇam bhōgam tantum vivṛitya bhūtvā puṇya-pāpavinirmuktāḥ santaḥ sarvapṛaṇishu tadēva Mahādēvākhyā vastapaśyan sarvātmakatayā tadabhavat tatsvabhāvāchchābhavat tatṛēti sambandhaḥ*. Having realized that state of *sarvagnatva*, having obtained a large part of the *mukta* world and being released from the touch of all *puṇya* and *pāpa*, he immediately sees nothing except Mahādēva. This will be the natural final result of the *mukta*, who sees no other form except *Mahādēva in himself* (*Mahādēvākhyā vastapaśyan sarvātmakatayā tadabhavat*). He will thus be existing ever afterwards in that state. Therefore, those who are called *jīvas* at first finally develop into the *mukta* state by virtue of the *saddharma* of Mahādēva and will be afterwards called after Mahādēva (*Mahādēva śabda vāchyāḥ*). They will then be called by the designation of *Dēvavrata*, those who will spread over to and live in the regions of the distant sky. In the text *Yē dēvā divishadaḥ*, etc., is fully described the state of these *Dēvavratas*. In the *Purāṇas* also it is said: *Tē hi sākshāt divishadatvantariksha-sadastadā | Prithivīshada ityantē dēva dēvavratāstund iti*. In this text, *prithivī* implies the whole form of Brahmānda and the word *prākṛita* (in this text)<sup>563</sup> implies the firmament (*antariksha*); *dvitīyam* implies the abode of *Māyā* (*Māyāpadam*); *tritīyam*, property of *ākāśa* (*ākāśa paryāyam*) synonymous with that form of pure *śakti* of Śivapada. And thus the *muktas* are those who have realized the *vibhūtvā rūpa* (i.e., the Supreme form).

Moreover, the *Sruti* text *Prāgnēnātmanā samparishvaktau na bāhyam kinchana vēda nāntaram*,<sup>564</sup> etc., states that

<sup>563</sup> Not quoted but indicated in the citation.

<sup>564</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 21.

*muktas* will not have any other knowledge about the world in any kind or form except that of Śiva. What is said in this text refers only to those who are tied to the bondages of the world, such as sleep, dream, etc. In other words, a *mukta* will have no more even the touch of a thought of any thing other than Śiva Parabrahman.

Thus ending his commentary on the *Sandhyādhikaraṇa*, Śrīpati proceeds to the consideration of the next topic, *viz.*, whether *muktas* attain to the power of creation of the world, etc. Verily, if it is said, remarks Śrīpati, that those *muktas* who by virtue of their meditation on and worship of Paraśiva Brahman are capable of realizing *satyasankalpatva*, *vyāpakatva*, *sarvagnatva* and other characteristics, the doubt arises whether they will also be in a position to bring into existence (by means of creation) man, *jagat*, etc., *i.e.*, whether they will also possess the powers of creation, protection and dissolution of the world. Śrīpati answers the question thus raised by saying that the next *Adhikaraṇa* sets the distinguishing marks of *muktas*<sup>565</sup> and *Paramēśvara*. The first *Sūtra* in this *Adhikaraṇa* called the *Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam*, is IV. 4. 17, *Jagadvyāpāravarjam prakaraṇādasannihitatvāchcha*.

It having been clearly shown above that those who meditate on and worship the *niravayava* form of Śiva Parabrahman will realize Śiva's characteristics of *pūrnatva* and *vyāpakatva*—like the all-pervading sky—and realize *Sivatva* themselves; and it having been also shown above that those who meditate upon and worship the *sāvayava* form of Śiva will realize *vyāpakatva*—like the light which sheds its brilliance on the space all round and illuminates it—*svatantratva*, *sarvalōkasanchāratva*, *sarvakāmāvāptitva*, etc., in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the distinctive marks of *mukta-jīvas* and *Paramaśiva* are further explained.<sup>566</sup> In this *Sūtra*, where *jagadvyāpāravarjam* is treated of, the state of those

<sup>565</sup> Those who have become *muktas* through meditation on Paraśiva Brahman.

<sup>566</sup> What follows is the *Pūrvapaksha* argument,

who meditate on and worship Paraśiva Brahman, absolutely free from the influence (*vyāpāra*) of all thought about *dēva*, *gandharva*, *manushya* and every other kind of thing connected with the worldly creation, except their own individual realization of Paraśiva and his powers, is treated of. These only will realize the very form of Śiva (*Śivasyaiva*). Such can be no other than Śiva only. How? *Prakaraṇāt* (says the *Sūtra*). *Sruti* texts like *Tasmād vā ētasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ | ākāśādvāyuh | vāyōragniḥ | agnēr āpah | adbhyaḥ prithivī | prithivyā ōshadhayaḥ | ōshadhībhyo'mnam | annāt puruṣaḥ | yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē | yēna jātāni jīvanti | yat prayantyaḥhisamviśanti | tadviḥjñāsasva | tad Brahmēti* <sup>567</sup> *dhyāyī-tēśānam pradhīyāitavyam* <sup>568</sup> *| sarvam idam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē*, <sup>569</sup> etc., prove that such meditators on such a form of Brahman will acquire the power of creating the *chētanāchētana* world—i.e., the characteristic of the living and the non-living—and also the power of creating *dēvatas* as well. And the *Srutis*, *Smritis* and *Purāṇas* bear witness to the fact that such meditators will acquire powers to create *dēvas* and every other being except themselves (*svaśarīrātirikta*). Moreover, as regards the expression *asannihitatvāchcha*, we have to observe that *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharṣiḥ ; Yō Brāhmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yō vai vēdāmscha prahīṇōti tasmai ; Tamhi dēvaṁ ātmabuddhi prakāśam mumukṣhuḥ vai śaraṇam aham prapadyē*, <sup>570</sup> etc., state that the *mukta* by virtue of his having acquired the power of creating *dēvas*, *gandharvas*, etc., like Paraśiva Brahman in the form of Hiraṇyagarbha, gets into contact with Paraśiva (*sannihitatvāchcha*) and enters into his *antaranga* (*antarangatvāt*) (i.e., becomes closely connected with him or enters into his interior). He thereby becomes immediately separated from those other *muktas* who have not acquired the powers of creation, etc. These *mukta*

<sup>567</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>568</sup> *Atharvasiras*.

<sup>569</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>570</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 18.



*jīvas*<sup>571</sup> are kept distant (*asannihitatvāt*) from those who have acquired the power of creation and have entered the *anta-ranga* of Paraśiva. That these (*i.e.*, those who have not yet acquired the power of creation) have not got the power of creating the *jagat*, *jīvas* (beings), etc., is the essence of this *Sūtra*. The doubt arises then whether *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*,<sup>572</sup> etc., give the power of creating *jagat* to those who attain *mukti* through meditation and realize *Sivatva* and to Śiva or only to Śiva Himself. *Sruti* texts like *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rukmavarṇam kartāramāśam puruṣam Brahma yōnim | Tadā vidvān puṇya-pāpē vidhūya nīranjanaḥ paramam sāmyamupaiti*||<sup>573</sup> declare that Śiva grants to *muktas* Supreme Equality (*paramam sāmyam*). Also, *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā*,<sup>574</sup> etc., explain that *muktas* obtain *satyasankalpatva* and other powers just as Paramēśvara Himself possesses. Again, *Sruti* texts like *Sa yadi pitrulōkakāmō bhavati*,<sup>575</sup> etc., declare that by virtue of mere determination (*sankalpa*), a *mukta* will be able to create *pitrulōkas*, etc. And further *Sruti* texts like *Imān lōkān kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,<sup>576</sup> etc., state that the *mukta* is capable of every kind of creation (*sarvatva vyāpāradyōtanāt*). And therefore the *mukta* is almost the same as Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvara sāmyē sankalpa-yōgāchcha*). And therefore a *mukta*, like Paramēśvara, will have assumed the power of creation. Thus argues the Pūrvapakshin. The answer to this doubt is: *Jagad-vyāpāravarjam*, *i.e.*, according to this *Sūtra*, he is excluded from *jagadvyāpara*, *i.e.*, creation of the world, etc. The meaning of *jagadvyāpara* is *nikhila chētanāchētana svarūpa sthiti pravruttibhēda niyamanam*, *i.e.*, the powers of creation, controlling, etc., of the whole animate and

<sup>571</sup> Of a lower kind—those who have not got the power of creation.

<sup>572</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>573</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

<sup>574</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7.

<sup>575</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII. 2.

inanimate world and their different states of existence. *Tad varjam*, i.e., that is excluded. What is excluded? *Nirasta nikhila tirōdhānasya nirvyāja Brahmānubhavarūpam muktasya aiśvaryam*. In the bliss that the *mukta* has earned, he is excluded from obtaining all the further hidden powers of the genuine (*nirvyāja*) Brahman and the state of his further enjoyments. How? *Prakaranāt nikhila jaganniyamanam hi Paraśiva Brahma prakṛityāmāmnāyatē*. The original power of creation, powers of control, etc., are solely ordained and reserved by Paraśiva Brahman as declared by the *Srutis*. *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;<sup>577</sup> *Dyāvāprithivī janayan dēva ēkaḥ*;<sup>578</sup> *Sōmaḥ pavatē janitā matnām*, etc., declare that *muktas* cannot commonly earn the characteristic (*nasamgachchatē*) power of creation, etc., of the world possessed by Brahman. This is an extraordinary power (for the *Mukta*jīva) to possess. (It is a power that cannot be claimed by him—for it is reserved to Brahman).<sup>579</sup> Similarly *Sruti* texts like *Sadēvasaumyēdam agra āsīt*;<sup>580</sup> *Ēkam ēvādviṭyāyam*; *Tadaikshata bahu-syām prajāyēyēti*; *Tattējō'srujata*; *Yadā tamastam na divā na rātriḥ na san na chāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*; *Tadaksharam tatsavitur varēnyam pragnācha tasmāt praśrutā purāṇi*;<sup>581</sup> *Brahma vā idam ēkam ēva agra āsīt* | *Tadēkam sannavyabhūvāt*; *Tachchrēyōrūpam atyasrujata kshatram yānyētāni dēva nakshatrāṇi*; *Indrō varuṇaḥ sōmo rudraḥ parjanyaō yamō mrutyur īśānaḥ*; *Ātmāvā idam ēkam ēva agra āsīt*; *Nānyat kinchana mishat*; *Sa īkshata lōkān asrujata*; *Sa imān lōkān asrujata*; *Ēka ēva rudrō na dviṭyāya tasthe*; beginning with *Yaḥ prithivyām tishṭhan prithivyā antarē* and ending with *Ya ātmani tishṭhan*, etc., declare that Paraśiva Brahman is quite peculiar in his characteristics which are indescribable in respect of his powers of creation, etc., of the universe

<sup>577</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>578</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, X. 82. 3.

<sup>579</sup> This seems to be the point involved in the use of the word *asādhāraṇalakṣhaṇa*.

<sup>580</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>581</sup> *Śvēta Itā* IV 18

and such characteristics cannot be attributed to a *mukta*, who cannot partake of any part of such *vyāpāra* (creation of the world, etc.). Moreover, while *Sruti* texts like *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē bhūtasya jātāḥ patir ēka āsīt; Sūryāchandramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayat; Ēka ēva Nārāyaṇa āsīt; Nārāyaṇāt Brahmā jāyatē; Nārāyaṇāt Rudrō jāyatē; Ēkō ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsīn na Brahmā nēsānaḥ*,<sup>582</sup> etc., declare openly that Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and others are evidently empowered with the powers of creation, etc., of the world, how can it be said, that to Śiva Parabrahman alone is reserved *jagad janmādikāraṇa*, etc. Therefore why should not *jagatkāraṇatvam* be attributed (without contradiction), in a similar way, to *muktas* as well? The answer is propounded in the next *Sūtra* IV. 4. 18, *Pratyakshōpadēśānnēti chēnnūdhikārika maṇḍalasthōktēḥ*.

The expression *Pratyakshōpadēśāt* in the *Sūtra* explains the meaning of *Sruti* texts like *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*, etc., which explain in a self-evident manner that Hiraṇyagarbha, Upēndra, etc., have the power of the creation of the world. If it is asked that Śiva Parabrahman is not the only one who is capable of creating the world, *Sruti* texts *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyāitavyam, Sarvam idam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē*,<sup>583</sup> etc., state that just like Śiva, Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa, etc., though they have the power of creation, yet they cannot claim equality with Śiva Parabrahman. Why? Because (the *Sūtra* states that) *adhikārika maṇḍalasthōktēḥ*, i.e., the charge of superintending creation was given to Hiraṇyagarbha, Indra, etc., out of the grace of Paramaśiva, so that they may, within their respective domains, Vaikuṇṭha, etc., create the world, according to his specification (*upadēśa*). Also, *Sruti* texts like *Tēna dēvā ajayanta sādhyā rushayascha yē*, etc., declare that Śiva Parabrahman alone

<sup>582</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

can bring into existence the *dēvas* and every other kind of creation, while secondary (*avāntara*) creations could only be done by Hiraṇyagarbha, etc., he himself being in them and guiding them.

Moreover, if it is asked that, according to *Sruti* texts like *Sa svarāt bhavati; Tasya sarvēṣhu lōkēṣhu kāmachārō bhavati; Imān lōkān kāmānnū kāmarūpya nusancharan*,<sup>584</sup> etc., a *mukta* can derive all powers relating to the world (*jagadvyāpāra*) just like Paramēśvara, the reply is "It is not so". These *Sruti* texts mean that the *mukta* having undergone several changes has at last realized the *vibhūti* state of Paraśiva Brahman, so that he can freely take any kind of divine body (*divya śarīra*) and enjoy like Brahma, Indra and Upēndra, as he pleases. Apart from that, he will have no control over the world (*Tasmāt na jagadvyāpārah*). If it is doubted whether even though a *mukta* becomes free from the bondage of the world, he should still, even in his realized state (of *mukta*), experience only happiness, continuing at the same time in the circumscribed position (*baddhassēva*) of a subordinate being (*antavadēva*)<sup>585</sup> and whether all that he has attained is only a *limited (alpa) happiness (bhōga)*, the following *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 19) removes this doubt:—*Vikārāvartī cha tathāhi sthītimāha*. The meaning of this *Sūtra* is *vikāre, janmādikē na vartata iti=vikārāvartī; nīrdhūta nikhila vikāram, nikhila hēya pratyānīka kalyāṇaikatūnam niratīṣayānandam Paraśiva Brahma savibhūtikam sakala kalyāṇa-guṇam anubhavati muktaḥ*. After *mukti*, the *mukta* is absolutely free from further *changes (vikāra)*; he will have abandoned by then all that he should have left behind; and he is fit to enjoy all happiness and pleasure, without any abatement in it, along with Paraśiva Brahman, in the fullness of his realized condition (*savibhūtikam*). A *mukta* enjoys every blessing and eminence. A *mukta* by reason

<sup>584</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

<sup>585</sup> *Antavat + ēva.*

of his having entered into (*antargata*)<sup>586</sup> Paraśiva Brahman will cease to undergo further change and therefore he is called the enjoyer of "bhukta bhōga" (i.e., *bhuktabhōgyatva*). That is, existing in Parabrahman, without further change, and enjoying limitless happiness is the state of a *mukta* while he exists in Parabrahman.<sup>587</sup> *Sruti* texts like *Yadā hyēvaiśha ētasminmadriśyē anātmē aniruktē anilayanē abhayam pratishthām vindatē ; Atha sō'bhayam gatō bhavati ; Rasō vai sah ; Rasam hyēvāyam labdhvā'nandībhavati*,<sup>588</sup> etc., declare that the *mukta* enjoys the state of full blessed happiness in that *mukta's* world in which he exists. Other *Sruti* texts like *Tasmin lōkāḥ śritāḥ sarvē tadū nātyēti kaschana*, say that the *mukta* lives in that blessed world along with all others, without any diminishing of happiness and therefore he will be near Parabrahman, in him enjoying his realized condition like others enjoying full happiness. *Sruti* texts like *Sarvēśhu lōkēśhu kāmachārō bhavati*, etc., declare to the same effect that the *mukta* can exist as he pleases throughout the *mukta* world. Moreover, as regards those *sūris* (sages) who are *nitya muktas* and who inhabit the Kailāsa of Paramaśiva, who always move about as they desire, as stated in the *Sruti* text *Kāmānñī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,<sup>589</sup> etc., who could transform themselves into any kind of form and who are quite free from all worldly ties, *Sruti* texts declare that they are absolutely possessed of *ichchāśakti*, *gnānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti* by which they can immortalise themselves in absolute happiness and self-effulgence and enjoy *Śivasāmarasya* (equality with Śiva), and can exhibit the full *Sarva Śivātmakabhāva*.<sup>590</sup> Again, *Sruti* texts like *Ahamannamahamannamahamannam ; Aham*

<sup>586</sup> *Antargata* or *Antargama* : in ; into ; between ; in the middle ; inside ; within ; interior.

<sup>587</sup> This is a condition (*sthitimāha*.)

<sup>588</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

<sup>589</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 10. 5.

<sup>590</sup> The stress is on *bhāva*, i.e., the *mukta* gets that peculiar *sta* or *condition* of possessing the endearing form of Śiva ; he exhibits the condition of Śivahood.

*annādō'hamannādō'hamannādaḥ*;<sup>591</sup> etc., declare similarly to the same effect. And so the experience of a *mukta* is thus clearly shown. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Trishu dhāmasu yadbhōjyam bhōktā bhōgascha yadbhavēt*<sup>592</sup> *Tēbhjō vilakshanaḥ sākshō chinmātrō'ham Sadāśivaḥ* || *Mayyēva sakalam jātam mayi sarvam pratishṭhitam* | *Mayi sarvam layam yāti tad Brahmādvayam asmyaham* || *Anōraṇyūn ahamēva tadvanmahānaham viśvamidam vichitram* | *Purātano'ham purusho'hamāśō hiraṇmayōham Śivarūpamasmi* || etc., declare that a *jīvanmukta* obtains the *Śivatva* with the designated characteristics (*upalakṣhaṇa*) of *Śivatva*, possessing the all-pervasive character of the sky and knowledge of Śiva like Vāmadēva and the like.<sup>593</sup> Those *jīvanmuktas* have the form of Śiva, enjoy the form of Śiva, and enjoy all the powers of *Ichchāśakti*, *Gnānaśakti* and *Kriyāśakti* except that of creating the world, etc. The term *Aham* (Self) is used in the *Sruti* text (*Ahamannam*,<sup>594</sup> etc.), to convey the idea of superiority and emulation to which state the *mukta* is raised in order to show himself in comparison with *dēvas*, *men* and others, who are indistinguishable in creed and who possess such characteristics. Here the word "*Aham*" should be understood to mean that the state of a *mukta* is *Śiva* himself and with all his full qualities (*Sakala chidachit prapanchūvagūhitvēna paripūrṇatvāchcha*). In this wise the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 20) *Darśayataschaivam pratyakshānumānē*, should be interpreted. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it was said that the *mukta* who is a *pratyagātmā* (reflected form of Brahman) but subject to *niyamana* and to the control of Paramapurusha Paramaśiva, cannot have the right to *jagadvyāpāra* (creation, etc., of the world) and control of the *jagat*. By the expression *vyāpāra* is meant *nikhila jaganniyamanarūpaḥ*, i.e., the chief controlling power of all the worlds and their creation.

<sup>591</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

<sup>592</sup> *Mānd. Upa.*, I. 5.

<sup>593</sup> Vāmadēva is the name of a sage, said to have been an incarnation of Śiva.

<sup>594</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

*Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts such as *Bhīṣhāsmādvātaḥ pavatē*, *Bhīṣhōdēti sūryaḥ*; *Bhīṣhāsmādagṇischa indrascha mrutyur-dhāvati panchamaḥ*,<sup>595</sup> *Ētasya vā aksharasya praśāsane gārgī*; *Suryāchandramasau vidhratau tishṭhataḥ*,<sup>596</sup> etc.; texts like *Ēsha sarvēśvara ēsha bhūtādhipatiḥ ēsha bhūtapāla ēsha sēturvidhāraṇaḥ ēshām lōkānām asambhēdāya*,<sup>597</sup> etc.; *Apa ēva sasarjādau tāsu vīryamaṇṣrujat*; the following text from *Manu Smṛiti*: *Sivēnōtpāditam Sivēna parivakshyatē punaḥ Sivē Mahādēvē līyatē sacharācharam*; statements in the *Satātapa* and many other texts declare that Śiva alone is the cause of creation, etc. *Sruti* texts such as *Nirāṇjanaḥ paramam sāmyamupaiti*; *Muktaḥ Śivasamō bhavati*,<sup>598</sup> etc., declare that *muktas* attain only a state equal to that of Śiva and attain to sameness (*samō*, i.e., identity or equality) with him *without* acquiring his other powers, such as *jagatkāraṇatva*, etc., and therefore to such *muktas* as appear as Śiva (*Śivavattēshām*) it is but right that they cannot have the power of *jagadvyāpāra* as it is excluded from their purview.<sup>599</sup> *Sruti* texts like *Ēkō vishṇur mahad-bhūtam prithagbhūtānyanēkaśaḥ*, etc., and *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni tripādasya amrutam divi*,<sup>600</sup> etc., declare that the expression *viśvābhūtāni* denotes the infinite, innumerable and unending Brahmāṇḍas which are existing and *Nārāyaṇa*, *Indra*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc., stand for the animated creation among them and *Bhūpati* stands for Paramaśiva; and the *Sruti* text *Tripādasya amrutam divi*<sup>601</sup> stands for the *Satchidānanda Sivapada* which characterizes the remaining three-fourths of the world. And, therefore, Paramaśiva surpasses all the three (Brahma, Viṣṇu and Kālārudra) in greatness.

And, therefore, though according to the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, *Sivam advaitam chaturtham*

<sup>595</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 8.

<sup>596</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 8. 9.

<sup>597</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 4. 22.

<sup>598</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

<sup>599</sup> This defines limit of *Sāmarasya* set down by Śrīpati.

<sup>600</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.

<sup>601</sup> *Ibid.*

*manyantē sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ*; and the text of the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, *Yō vēdādau svarāḥ prōktō vēdāntē cha pratisikhitaḥ* | *Tasya prakriti līnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*, etc., which mean that the *jīvanmukta* attains that form equal to or same as Mahēśvara (*paratvam mahēśvara sāmyatvam*) which denotes *akārōkūramakārātmaka Brahma Viṣṇu Kālarudra* and that though he attains to *paramasāmyatva*, yet the statement *jagadvyāpāravarjam* is not contradicted. Verily, though the *muktas* are excluded from the powers of Mahēśvara (such as *jagad janma*, etc.), yet both the *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts, such as *Niranjanaḥ paramam sāmyam upaiti*;<sup>602</sup> *Muktaśśivasamō bhavēt*, etc., declare without contradiction that a *mukta* is entitled to obtain *paramasāmyatva*. This contradiction between the *Sūtra* and the *Srutis* is unavoidable (*durnivārah*, i.e., difficult to ward off). To meet the doubt (*āśankya*) arising from this apparent contradiction, the *Sūtrakāra* propounds the next *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 21) *Bhōgamātra sāmyalingāchcha*. In this *Sūtra*, the expression *Bhōgamātra* establishes that the *mukta* is entitled to enjoy all that is granted by the *Srutis*, viz., the state of Brahman within the limits prescribed for those who meditate on the Mūrta Paraśiva form of Parabrahman and nothing more. The expression *lingāchcha* denotes that with the exception of the power of *jagadvyāpāra*, reserved to Paramēśvara alone, he can enjoy every other form of happiness (i.e., every power except *jagadvyāpāra*). But if it is said that *muktas* generally have *jagadvyāpāra* without contradicting *Sruti* texts like *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaschitā*,<sup>603</sup> etc., and that a *mukta* is equal to Paramapurusha Śiva in all his enjoyments, then the reply is that the expression *Lingāt*<sup>604</sup> in the *Sūtra* restricts his power for enjoyment with Paramaśiva. Hence the expression *jagadvyāpāravarjam*: excepting *jagadjanmādikāraṇatva*, etc. Even though the *mukta* meditated upon the formless form of Śiva Parabrahman,

<sup>602</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

<sup>603</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.

<sup>604</sup> *Linga* means distinguishing mark or characteristic.



yet that particular power of *jagatkāraṇatva* can never be obtained by the *mukta*jīvas; even though they be *dēvas*, *manushyas*, etc., they can never aspire to get it, even if they obtained many other kinds of forms among *muktas*. *Sruti* texts like *Ēsha hyēvānandayati*,<sup>605</sup> etc., declare that there is a graded (*tāratamya*) difference between the worshipper and the worshipped, in what is attained and what is aimed at (for attainment). Such a thing also is not in contradiction (to the *Sruti* texts), for we read in the *Skānda*, *Yadyapi bhēdāpagamē sām̐batavāham na mām̐makēnastvam*; *Sāmudrō hi tarangaḥ kvachana samudrō na tarangaḥ*, etc., and *Yadā sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ*; *Atha marthyō'mrutō bhavati yatra Brahma samasnutē*;<sup>606</sup> *Na tatra prāṇānnōtkrāmantē tatraiva samavalīyantē*; etc. These texts declare that those who meditate upon the formless form of Śiva Parabrahman attain that knowledge which makes them realize all their desires for obtaining *Śivatattva* soon after the *lingaśarīra*<sup>607</sup> is destroyed. *Sruti* texts such as *Gnātvā śivam śāntim atyanta-mēti*, *Na sa punarāvartatē na sa punarāvartatē*,<sup>608</sup> etc., declare that the *mukta* enters into that state of *Śivatattva*, after which he has no *punarāvritti* (no turning back). As the meditation and worship of *vyāpaka* Brahman in a particular form is unreal just as the rope which is mistaken for a serpent, similarly *mukti* is not realizable through meditation and worship of such an unreal form of Brahman. So, the answer to the question whether *mukti* is realizable through meditation and worship of such a form of Brahman who is *nirguṇa* and *nirviśeṣa*, thereby postulating *punarāvritti*, is that as declared in *Sruti* texts like *So'snutē sarvān kāmān saha (Brahmaṇā)*,<sup>609</sup> etc., a *baddha jīva* also will attain through meditation such a state of Brahman as the

<sup>605</sup> *Taitt. Br.*, III. 2. 12.

<sup>606</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, VI. 14.

<sup>607</sup> The subtle frame or body, the indestructible original of the gross or visible body. Cf. *Panchakōśa*.

<sup>608</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>609</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 8.

result of his full realization. And if it is doubted whether such a thing is possible, the next *Adhikaraṇa* (*Anāvṛittiśabdādadhikaraṇam*) ensures that position as the result of the firm truth definitely declared throughout all the *Vēdas* and *Siddhāntas*.

This *Adhikaraṇa* consists of one *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22), *Anāvṛittiśabdāt anāvṛittiśabdāt*. In the previous *Sūtra*, it was declared that a *mukta* will, by virtue of meditation, power and *bhakti* realize *sālōkya*, *sarvakāmāvāpti* and *sāmya* with *satyasankalpa sarvachētanāchētana prapanchūdhika bhakta-parādhīna paramakāruṇika Umāpati*, who is *Parabrahman* but does not attain to *jagatkāraṇatva*, which is an extraordinary (*ananyasādhāraṇa*) *dharma*. That is, *Umāpati* *Parabrahman* has got this power *solely* in him. In this *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22), in accordance with *Sruti* texts like *Brahmavidāpnōti param Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati*;<sup>610</sup> *Tarati śōkam ātmavit ; Gnātvā Śivam śāntim atyantamēti*;<sup>611</sup> and *Tattvamasi*, etc., it is declared that those who meditate upon and worship the form of *niravayava* *Brahman* will realize *Brahmātmakatva*. So, according to the *Lōharasādi nyāya*,<sup>612</sup> a *mukta* by virtue of his meditation on that (formless) form of *Paramēśvara* alone will naturally realize *Śivatattva*.<sup>613</sup> He has no *punarāvṛitti* just like a *pāśabaddha jīva*.

But in the text *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam | Dhyātvā munir-gachchati bhūtayōnim samastasākshim tamasaḥ parastāt* ||<sup>614</sup> it is declared that those who worship the *mūrti* form of *Paraśiva* will realize that extraordinary state of existence,

<sup>610</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>611</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>612</sup> By the use of the juice of a plant, a base metal is turned into gold.

<sup>613</sup> *Tattva*: The true state; the real nature of the human soul or the material world as being identical with the Supreme Spirit pervading the universe. It should be noted that he attains *Śivatva* and not *Paraśivatva*, which is an *ananyasādhāraṇa dharma* referred to by *Sripati*.

<sup>614</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

i.e., attaining *Śivatva*, after absolutely shaking off all their worldly qualities. Also, *Sruti* texts like *Vēdānta vīgnāna sunischitārthāḥ sanyāsayōgāt yatayaḥ śuddhasattvāḥ* | *Tē Brahmālōkētu parāntakālē parāmrutāt parimuchyanti sarvē*, etc.,<sup>615</sup> *Sa khalvēvam vartayan yāvadāyusham Brahmālōkam abhisampadyatē* ; *Na cha punarāvartatē na cha punarāvartatē*, etc., declare that those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrtā* form of Mahēśvara, after realizing all that they desire and after enjoying it in *Brahmālōka* along with Paraśiva Brahman, will finally cease to turn back (*na cha punarāvartatē*) ; and thereafter, it is in evidence in the *Srutis* that they will attain, in accordance with the *Bhramarakīṭa nyāya*, because of their fullness of knowledge (*vīgnāna parīpūrṇa bhāvēna*), *Śivasāyujya siddhi*.

This *Sūtra* teaches in its essence that those *baddha-jīvas* who meditate on and worship the *mūrtā* form of Paraśiva Brahman will attain the never-returning state (*punarāvrittir na sambhavaṭīti sūtrasūchita sūksh-mārthah*). *Sruti* texts like *Umāsahāyam Paramēśvaram prabhum*,<sup>616</sup> etc., declare also that those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrtā Brahman* will also attain *Śivatattva*, and thus, agreeably to the *Sruti* text, *Tarati śōkam ātmavit, amūrtā brahmōpāsakas* will be absolutely free from the touch of the sorrows flowing from family life. And if it is asked whether both *mūrtōpāsakas* and *amūrtōpāsakas* will alike realize *apunarāvritti*, then the answer is that, as stated in *Sruti* texts like *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaschitēti*,<sup>617</sup> etc., *mūrtā-brahmōpāsakas* will attain *sarvakāmāvāpti*, i.e., all their desired states in *mukti*, we state that *Sruti* texts like *Yadā sarvē pramuchhyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ* | *Atha martyō'mritō bhavati yatra Brahma samaśnutē*,<sup>618</sup> *Atmānam chēdvi jānīyāt ayasmaṁti pūrushaḥ* ; *Kimichchan kasya kāmāya śārīram anusancharēt*, etc., declare that all those

<sup>615</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

<sup>616</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>617</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.

<sup>618</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, VI. 14.

who have realized the real knowledge of Brahman will obtain all their desires (*sarva kāma*) whether they be *mūrtabrahmōpāsakas* or others and to them there will be no *punarāvritti*.

Moreover, texts like *Kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusancharan*,<sup>619</sup> etc., declare that *muktas* who meditate upon *mūrta Brahman* will attain the power of assuming any kind of form they like and enjoy every kind of happiness (*bhōga*) they like. And this is self-granted by the *Sruti* text *Kartrutvam arthāt siddhyati*. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē karmachitō lōkaḥ kshīyatē; Jyōtiṣtōmēna svargakāmō yajēta; Kshīṇē puṇyē martya-lōkam viśanti*;<sup>620</sup> etc., declare that just as those who get their existence in the world as soon as they finish the enjoyment in *svarga*, similarly those *bhaktas* who realize *Kailāsa*, may also chance to come to the world, if they so desire. Texts like *Parīkshya lōkān karmachitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēdam āyāti; Nāstyakritaḥ kṛitēna*; etc., declare that those who have completed their *karma* and are entitled to *mōksha*, do not any more enter the world as they have finished with it. If it is doubted whether a *mukta*, by virtue of his meditation on *mūrta Brahman*, cannot on any account realize *eternal mukti*, we declare that *Sruti* texts like *Tē Brahmalōkē tu parāntakālē; Nārāyaṇaḥ param Brahma tattvam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,<sup>621</sup> etc., state that the term *Brahma* (*Brahma śabda*) refers, according to customary usage, to *Chaturmukha* only and therefore one should realize only those regions (*i.e.*, the regions of *Chaturmukha*, *i.e.*, *Brahma*). And for those who worship the form of *Nārāyaṇa* as *Parabrahman*, they will also obtain those regions where *Nārāyaṇa* is *Parabrahman*, according to customary usage. And therefore the term “*Brahma*” is common to *Chaturmukha* and *Nārāyaṇa*. And these will gradually, after several generations, realize the

<sup>619</sup> *Taitt. Uṇa.*, III. 10. 5.

<sup>620</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, IV. 14. 3.

<sup>621</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 10.

forms of *Chaturmukha* and *Nārāyaṇa* without experiencing a turning back (*punarāvritti*). With regard to the rest, cannot eternal *mukti* be obtained by those who meditate upon and worship the *sāvayava* form of Brahman? The answer is *anāvrittiśabdāt anāvrittiśabdāt*. According to *Sruti* texts like *Dvē vāva Brahmanō rūpē mūrtanchā-mūrtam ēva cha*;<sup>622</sup> *Tadādi madhyānta vihīnamēkam vibhum chidānandam arūpam adbhutam*; *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakantham praśāntam*;<sup>623</sup> etc., *Śiva Parabrahman* has two forms, *niravayava* and *sāvayava*. Texts like *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyāścha vō namō namaḥ*, etc., found in the *Satarudrīya*, declare that devout followers (*bhaktānām*) can realize both the forms. Both those who meditate upon and worship the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms of Brahman will attain to *anāvritti*, because it is so declared in the *Vēda*. Also *Sruti* texts like *Dhyātvā munirgachchati bhūtayōnim*,<sup>624</sup> etc., definitely predicate *anāvritti* particularly to those who meditate only upon the *mūrtā* form, while texts such as *Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣam upaiti divyam*;<sup>625</sup> *Ēśa samprasādō'smāt śarīrāt samutthāya param jyōti rupa-sampadya svēna rūpēna abhinishpadyatē*,<sup>626</sup> predicate *apunarāvritti*, i.e., no coming back again (i.e., into the world).

As regards those who are *āmūrtōpāsakas* (those who meditate upon the formless form of Brahman), they will enjoy well all their desires (*sarvān kāmān*) in the company of Brahman (*saha Brahmanā*). In the *Sruti* text (*Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā*), the peculiar characteristics of the *baddhajīva* (the *jīva* in bondage) are seen and how it realizes Brahman in enjoying all its desires. *Sruti* texts like

<sup>622</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 3. 1.

<sup>623</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>624</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>625</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>626</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.

*Āptakāmaḥ pūrṇakāmō nishkāmō jīrṇakāmō bhavati*, etc., clearly prove that *muktātmans* realize just like Brahman himself (*i.e.*, in the same measure as Brahman) all the characteristics of Brahman and acquire the independence of Brahman for attaining all their desires. If bondage is admitted to exist by the learned (*vidushām*), then, according to texts like *Sō'kāmayaṭa bahusyām prajāyēyēti*, etc., it is absurd that even Brahman should have certain desires—which ends in *atīvyāpti*. *Sruti* texts like *Yadū sarvē pramuchyantē kāmā yasya hridi sthitāḥ*,<sup>627</sup> etc., predicate that those who meditate upon and worship Paraśiva Brahman without any desire (*nishkāma śruti*) will, at the end of their lives, realize Paraśiva (*Paraśiva prāpti*) having destroyed in course of time all kinds of bodily form. If this were not the case, then, those sages such as Vāmadēva, Śuka, Agastya, Dadhīchi, and others, who are *jīvanmuktas*, and others like Indra, Upēndra and Hiraṇyagarbha would not realize what they wanted. *Sruti* texts like *Kāmānū kāmārūpyanusancharan*,<sup>628</sup> etc., have admitted that *muktas* will realize *Śivasālōkya* (*i.e.*, realize eternal undiminishing happiness with Śiva). Also, while *Sruti* texts like *Sraddhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi*; *Ātmānam arañim kṛtvā prañavanḥa uttarāraṇim*; *Dhyāna nirmathanū-bhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitāḥ*<sup>629</sup>; *Ksharam pradhānam amritāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanū viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*,<sup>630</sup> *Tasyābhidyānāt yōjanāt tattvabhāvāt bhūyaschāntē viśva-māyā nivṛtīḥ*; *Amritasya dēvadhūraṇō bhūyāsam*; *Sarīrammē vicharshaṇam*; *Triyambakam yajāmahē sugandhim puṣṭi vardhanam*; *Urvārukamiva bandhanāt mrutyōr mukshīyamāmṛutāt*,<sup>631</sup> *Ātmāvā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsītavyaḥ* ||<sup>632</sup> etc., definitely enunciate that

<sup>627</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 7.

<sup>628</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10. 5.

<sup>629</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>630</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 10.

<sup>631</sup> *Atharvasīras*.

<sup>632</sup> *Bṛihaa. Upa.*, II. 4. 5.

*bhakti* and *dhyāna* of Paraśiva Brahman through *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa*, *pūjā*, *namaskāra*, *śravaṇa*, etc., will enable the *mukta* to attain the *bodily form* of Paraśiva Brahman (*sākshāt Paraśivaprapatti*). The procedure adopted in the method of meditation and worship through sacrificial offerings, such as *jyōtiṣṭōma*, etc., will make a *mukta* get back into creation again.<sup>633</sup>

*Sruti* texts like *Yāvadāyusham Brahmālōkam abhisampadyatē na cha punarāvartatē*,<sup>634</sup> etc., declare that the expression *Brahmalōka* should be interpreted as applying to the world of *Chaturmukha*, as stated in the *Srutis*, *Purāṇas*, etc. Therefore, such of those as meditate upon the form of *Chaturmukha* Brahma will realize only his world. *Sruti* texts like *Tvam dēvānām Brāhmaṇānām adhipatiḥ*; *Vishṇuḥ kshatriyāṇām adhipatiḥ*,<sup>635</sup> etc., and *Smṛiti* texts like *Brāhmaṇānām Śivō dēvaḥ kshatriyāṇām tu Mādhavaḥ*, etc., declare that Vishṇu is the deity of the Kshatriyas. And as Nārāyaṇa does not combine in himself the *kārya* and *kāraṇatva*, and lacks the overlordship over the Trinity (*mūrtitrayātītatva*, etc.), *Parabrahmatva* cannot fitly go with Nārāyaṇa. *Mahōpanishad* texts such as *Nārāyaṇaḥ Parambrahma*, etc., settle that Śiva who is the overlord of Nārāyaṇa is Parabrahman. Later on, in the texts *Brahmādhipatir Brahmaṇōdhipatir Brahmā Śivō mē astu Sadāśivōm*; *Ritam satyam param brahma purusham krishṇapingalam*; *Ūrdhvarētam virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,<sup>636</sup> etc., the words *Śiva* and *Brahma* are clearly used synonymously, just as *ghaṭa*, *kumbha* and *kalaśa* are. In the *Māṇḍūkya* text *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam chaturtham manyantē*; *Sa ātmā sa vignēyaḥ*; and in the

<sup>633</sup> *Sruti* texts predicate *Śivasākshātkāra* to those who offer *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa*, etc., through *bhakti* and *dhyāna*, there being no *punarāvṛitti* for them; but to those who offer sacrifices, there is *punarāvṛitti* for them and so they will get back to creation.

<sup>634</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

<sup>635</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>636</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 11.

*Kaivalya* text beginning with *Umāśahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakaṇṭham praśāntam*<sup>637</sup> and ending with *Sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ sa Hariḥ sēndraḥ sō'ksharaḥ paramaḥ svarāt*,<sup>638</sup> Śiva alone is spoken of as the overlord above the Trinity (*mūrtitrayātītatva*). And also the *Atharvaśiras* texts *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhīyāitavyam*; *Sarvamīdam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē*; and *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sīvamanyat parityajya*, declare that every deity other than Śiva is prohibited for purposes of meditation. The expression *śivamkara* plainly indicates, agreeably to the *Bhramarakīṭa nyāya*, *śivam karōtīti śivamkara* which means that the meditation makes the *bhakta* get Śiva's own form (*svasvarūpa pradāyakatvam*). The word *Bhagavān* is generally seen used in the case of Indra, Upēndra, Dinēndra, Chandra, Yatīndra, etc., in worldly language<sup>639</sup> (i.e., in common parlance). The word *Bhagavān* is also used in connection with Śiva in the *Svētāśvētara Sruti*, *Brahmakāṇḍa*, etc., for example in texts like *Sarvānana śirōgrīvaḥ sarvabhūta gūhāśayaḥ* | *Sarvavyāpī cha Bhagavān tasmāt sarvagataḥ Śivaḥ* || etc. And also in the text of the *Atharvaśiras*: *Yō vai Rudraḥ sa Bhagavān yaścha Brahma* | *Yō vai Rudraḥ sa Bhagavān yaścha Viṣṇuḥ*; etc. The expression *Bhagavān* is frequently used for "Śiva" as an attribute. Also, in the *Satarudrīya*, in the text *namastē astu Bhagavan Viśvēśvarāya Mahādēvāya*, etc. Similarly such expressions like "*Bhagavān*" have been applied to deities other than Śiva in common worldly parlance. But we should hold that there is a difference between the word as used in the *Sruti* texts and as used in common worldly parlance. The former must be admitted as indicating a more appropriate and stronger (*balīyastvāt*) usage. And therefore the word "*Bhagavān*" is chiefly applicable to no other deity but Śiva.

#### Sripati's Final Summing up.

Thus at the commencement of the *jīgnāsa*, in discussing the first *Sūtra* (*Athātō Brahmajīgnāsa*), it was

<sup>637</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>638</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

<sup>639</sup> The text has *laukika prayōga*.



concluded that a *mumukshu* should, after discussion, know Brahman. In this connection, the argument relating to the *nirviśēshatva* of Brahman was completely repudiated (*nirastah*) and Brahman was proved to be *saviśēsha*. In the second *Sūtra* (*Janmādyasya yataḥ*) it was, agreeably to the maxim *Lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇādhiṇā hi vastu siddhiḥ*,<sup>640</sup> clearly proved that in order to realize Brahman, the characteristics (of Brahman) should be clearly understood. And the characteristics of Brahman (*viśēshatva*) are fully borne out in the second *Sūtra*. In order to further establish the characteristics of Brahman, *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;<sup>641</sup> *Tasmādvā yētasmat ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*; *Yasya niśśvasitāni vēdāḥ*; *Rigvēdō yajurvēdassāmavēdō hyatharvaṇaḥ* and *Tantvaupanishadam puruṣam pruchchāmi*,<sup>642</sup> etc., have been adduced. These texts substantiate the truth of the third *Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, *Sūstrayōnītvāt*, which establishes that Brahman is the chief cause and effect of creation of *prapañcha* and by this means the *nirviśēsha vāda* and *jagad asatyatva vāda* have been repudiated. It has also been proved that there is nothing like any *asat padārtha* (unreal object), just as in the same way that there is no pair of horns to a rabbit (*śaśaśringādēḥ*). And such a thing cannot possibly come to pass (*i.e.*, into existence). And it has been clearly proved that all things are real (*sat padārthasyaiva utpattiḥ nirdishṭā*) and that nothing created could be unreal on the authority of the *Sūtras* enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa, *Asaditichēnna pratiśhēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7) and *Paṭavaścha* (II. 1. 19). So that even when the whole creation is reduced to *pralaya* or destruction yet, according to the *Bījāṅkura nyāya*, the germ of the thing exists in an infinitesimally minute form. Just as when an extended cloth is compressed, it exists in a very small form, the world also exists in a shrunken state in a *sūkṣhma* form and gets extended in the form of creation. Therefore the *prapañcha*, which is real, cannot be said to be

<sup>640</sup> A thing is recognized fully by its characteristics.

<sup>641</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>642</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1.

*asat*. And the *jīvas* who are in the *chētana* form are also eternal in their own forms (*svarūpatō nityatvam*), just as Paramātmā is eternal (*Paramātmavat upadishṭam*). On the strength of the *Sruti* text *Nityō nityānām chētanaśchētanānām*<sup>643</sup> and also on the strength of the *Smṛiti* texts like *Pravāhavat prapanchasya satyatvam upadiśyatē* | *Svarūpatōhi satyatvam chētanānām viddhīyatē* | *Aticirōdhūna satyatvam svatassiddham Śivasya hi* || etc., the learned delight in thinking about the *nirviśēsha chinmātra Brahma-vāda*.<sup>644</sup> If it is denied that the glorious body of Brahman is as unreal as the delusion in mistaking *raju* for *sarpa* (*raju sarpavat*), then how could the truth of the *Sruti* text *Bhīshāsmādvātaḥ pavatē, bhīshōdēti sūryaḥ, bhīshāsmā-dagnischēndrascha, mrityur dhūvati pañchamaḥ*,<sup>645</sup> etc., be clearly explained by the learned and how could the Sun as well as Vāyu (wind) be infused with fear against the extravagant discharge of their (respective) functions? In the *Sruti* text *Indrō māyābhiḥ pururūpa īśānaḥ*,<sup>646</sup> etc., Paramaśiva, who is distinguished by Paramaiśvarya, is proved to manifest himself through his *māyāśakti* in various *bodily* forms characterized by several (countless) *lakṣaṇas*, as is seen from the *Sruti* text *Sthirēbhiranguiḥ pururūpa ugraḥ*, etc., which figures he was pleased to partake of, assuming most brilliant and uncommonly auspicious appearances of pure knowledge and significance, which are all eternal and which will have to be given up (*dattāñjali prasangaḥ*) as if by the (proverbial) pouring of water (when donating away something). Moreover, texts like *Yadā tamasstam na divā na rātrir na san na chāsat Śiva ēva kēvalaḥ*,<sup>647</sup> etc., proclaim an unusual form assumed by Śiva at the time of *Mahāpralaya*. In the

<sup>643</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

<sup>644</sup> *Nirviśēsha* and *chinmātra* are contradictory; if you have one of these, you cannot have the other. *Chinmātra* means *pure intelligence* and *nirviśēsha* means *attributelessness*.

<sup>645</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 8.

<sup>646</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, II. 7. 17.

<sup>647</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

*Sruti* text *Rudra yattē dakṣiṇam mukham tēna mām pāhi nityam*,<sup>648</sup> etc., Paramēśvara is described as having had no birth. Again, texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharṣiḥ*;<sup>649</sup> *Parāsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāviki gnāna-bala-kriyā cha*; *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu Mahēśvaram*; *Tasyāvayavabhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat*,<sup>650</sup> etc., declare for Śiva *viśvādhikatvam*, *sarvaśaktitvam* and *sarvakāraṇatvūdikam*. Moreover, texts like *Ēka ēva Rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ na tasya kāryam kāraṇam cha vidyatē na tatsamaśchābhyadhikaścha driśyatē*, etc., declare *advitīyam* (for Śiva). Texts such as *Puruṣhō vai Rudraṣṣan mahō namō namaḥ*; *Viśvam bhūtam bhuvanam chitram bahudhā jātam jāyamānam cha yat*; *Sarvōḥyēśha Rudraḥ tasmai Rudrāya namō astu*; *Viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,<sup>651</sup> etc., declare that Śiva is *viśvātmaka* (all-pervasive in the universe). And *Sruti* texts like *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē sēnānyē disām chā patayē namaḥ*; *Hiraṇyāya namaḥ*; *Hiraṇyalingāya namaḥ*; *namō hiraṇya bāhavē hiraṇyarūpāya hiraṇyapatayē ambikāpatayē umāpatayē hiraṇyavarṇāya paśupatayē namō namaḥ*,<sup>652</sup> etc., declare for Śiva *jyōtirmayatva* (the all-supreme Light).<sup>653</sup> If it is asked how does the term “*hiraṇya*” come to mean “*jyōtis*”, then the reply is that in the *Sāstras* the term “*hiraṇya*” is well known to mean “as consisting of a fiery element” (*vahnnyātma-katvam*). And the term “*jyōtis*”, in the light of the above meaning, means Śiva who prevails in the Sun, who is bright-bodied, who is as well in Fire, which has a golden colour and in the form of a flowing lustre (*dravatvaprasaktyā nityatvaprasaṅgō durnivāraḥ*). And generally speaking, the term cannot be understood as bearing any other meaning. In the *Atharvaśiras* text, God’s own expression (*Bhagavad vachanam*) is, *Pushkaramaḥam pavitramamaḥm agryancha*

<sup>648</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>649</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 19.

<sup>650</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>651</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

<sup>652</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 18.

<sup>653</sup> *Jyōtis*, light of Brahman; light regarded as the Supreme Spirit.

*madhyancha bahiṣcha purastāt; Jyōtirahamēkaḥ sarvē cha māmēva; mām yō vēda sa sarvān vēdān vēdēti*, etc.: "I am Pushkara; I am Pavitra; I am the Foremost; I am the Middle; I am the Outside; I am everything leading ahead; and he that knows me that I am the all-glowing Light, he will have known everything." Thus it is said in the *Saiva Purāṇa*: *Dinakritkōṭisankāśam sthūnam-adyamumāpatēḥ | Sarvakāma samāyuktam viśuddham nityam avyayam | Samprāpya tatpadam divyam atah klēśa vivarjitāḥ | Sarvagnāssarvadā suddhāḥ paripūrṇā bhavanti cha | Viśuddhākūryakaraṇāḥ paramaiśvaryaśamyutāḥ | Sa-dēhāścha vidēhāścha bhavantyātmēchchayā punaḥ | Yē sam-prāptāḥ param sthūnam guṇanayōgaratā narāḥ | Na tēśhām punarāvrittīḥ ghōrē samsāramanḍalē* | etc. These and other texts declare that he who is in the place of Paramaśiva in *Mahākailāsa* (*Paramaśivasthūnasya mahākailāsasya*), possessing a light resembling (*sankāśa*) millions of suns (*dinakrit kōṭi*), will doubtless enjoy all *jyōtirmayatva* (Supreme Light). In the *Sruti* text *Sō'dhvanah paramāpnōti tadviśṇōḥparamam padam*,<sup>654</sup> if the words *tadviśṇōḥ paramam padam* are construed as being the *Paramapada*, then it should be said, "It is not so". Because, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Purāt parataram Brahma tatparāt paratō Hariḥ | Yat parāt paratō 'dhāsastanmē manah śivasankalpamastu*, etc. Also, in the *Bōdhāyana Sūtra* and in the *Sivasankalpōpanishad*, it is declared that the state of *Mahēśvarapada* is much higher than that of *Vishṇupada*. In the above *Sruti* text, it is stated that the state of *Nārāyaṇa* is not so high as *Sivasthāna* and therefore *Sivasthāna* is the highest of all states. And it is higher than *Vishṇupada* and therefore the *Mukta Siva* will enjoy *Brahmalōkam*. *Tasmāt Brahma-lōkam abhisam-padyatē; na cha punarāvartatē* is the meaning of the word *anāvritti* used in the *Sūtra* (IV. 4. 22).

And the term *Brahmalōka* should be taken to express *Sivapada*. For *Sruti* texts like *Virūpēbhyō viśvarūpēbhyascha vō namō namaḥ*, etc., declare that those who meditate upon

<sup>654</sup> *Rig-Veda*, X. 90. 3.

the formless form of Śiva and realize the *niravayava* state will enjoy *Śivapada* in the *niravayava* form; and those who meditate upon the *sāvayava* form, will enjoy in the *viśvarūpa* form. *Sruti* texts like *Nīlagrīvāśśitikanṭhāśśarvā adhā kṣhamācharāḥ*, etc., declare that *bhaktas* in realizing *Śivapada* will have the characteristic of *nīlakanṭhatva* of *Īśvara* and such other similarities (*tādriśāni*) as owned by Śiva. And the suggestion of some that the word *anāvritti*, which is repeated twice in the *Sūtra*, indicates the ending of a chapter, is not approved of by us. It should be taken to indicate that the other qualities of Śiva will also be realized by the *mukta* in enjoying *Śivapada*.<sup>655</sup>

In the previously enunciated *Sūtras* such as *Ubhaya-vyapadēśāt ahikundalavat*; *Ubhayathā cha dōśhāt*; *Na sihānato'pi parasyōbhayam lingam sarvatra hi*; *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt*; *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādi-bhyaḥ*; etc., Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa suggests that *dvaitā-dvaita* is the system which he approves of as containing the essence of the whole of the *Vēdānta* (*sarva vēdānta san-kōcha dvaitādvaitamatam*). He holds that opinion from the start without anywhere contradicting himself and confirms it in the *Sūtra* propounded by him *Dvādaśāhavadubhaya vidham Bādarāyaṇō'taḥ* (IV. 4. 12). Therefore, for those who desire to follow in the path of the *Vēda*, the system of

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<sup>655</sup> Rāmānuja commenting on this *Sūtra*, writing of the repetition of the words in it, remarks:—"The repetition of the words of the *Sūtra* indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine." Ānandatīrtha commenting on a similar repetition of words occurring in I. 4. 29 (the last *Sūtra* of the last *Adhikaraṇa* in that *Adhyāya*) *Ētēna sarvē vyākhyātā vyākhyātāḥ*, writes:—"In the *Varāha Samhita* this is said, 'In a work propounding general doctrines (leading to final conclusions), at the end of each chapter, the wise sages repeat the words twice over, so that what has been said from the beginning of the chapter may receive emphasis.'" Sankara has the following comment on the repetition in IV. 4. 22:—"The repetition of the words 'Non-return according to Scripture,' indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine." The remark of Srīpati may, accordingly, be held to apply to Ānandatīrtha.

*Dvaitādvaita*, which approves of both *dvaita* and *advaita*, should prove acceptable. This postulates that the *jīva* and Brahman during the *samsāradāśa* are naturally quite different from each other (*svābhāvīkabhinnavam*); if in the *mōkshadāśa*, the *jīva* is *abhinna* like Brahman himself (*tadvadabhinnatvam*); and Brahman is possessed of both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms. Therefore those *bhaktas* who meditate upon these forms will realize both these states of Brahman. Personal testimony is accordingly borne in this *Sūtra* (*Anāvṛittiśabdāt anāvṛitti śabdāt*) that both the *mūrtā* and *amūrtā* forms should be meditated upon in order to realize the state of Śiva Para-brahman. And therefore it is the confirmed truth that the system (*mata*) of the *Sūtrakāra* consists in the *dvaitādvaita mata*.

#### The Dvaita View.

Jayatīrtha in commenting on *Brahma-Sūtras* IV. 4. 17 (*Jagadyyāpāravarjam*) states that if the *viduṣa* (*mukta*) became the essence of Brahman (*tādātmya*), i.e., obtained unity with Brahman, then it would mean that he has acquired *sarvalōkādhipatyam*. In that case, the *Sūtrakāra* should have said that this wise man (i.e., *mukta*) would become Paramātmā himself. This much would have been sufficient. Instead, the *Sruti* text *Na tu so'munaiva iti*, etc., declares that he is by himself unable to get at, i.e., the *jīva* has the power to become by himself one with Brahman (*Brahma tādātmya*). If he had the power of realizing *Brahma tādātmya* (becoming identical with Brahman), he would have acquired it unaided (*tādātmya prāptim taddharmasya svatassiddhatvāt*). So the *Sruti* text could have also said (in the shortest manner) *Ayam asau bhavati*, he (the wise man) will become He Himself, i.e., one with Brahman Himself. Instead of these few words, the *Sruti* text uses many words, thus stranding the *Sruti* text in the *dōsha* of *akuśalatva*, (i.e., in the folly of inauspiciousness). For no wise man will put forth much exertion for obtaining a particular result which could be attained by him by the smallest effort. Moreover, is Paramēśvara to be understood as

*saguṇa* or *nirguṇa*? If he is the first, then the wise man (*viduṣha*, i.e., *mukta*) cannot have *tādātmya*, because nothing (like *guṇa*) was granted (*ex hypothesi*); nor can it be the second, for if Brahman is *nirguṇa*, attributes such as *Āditya*, *Aiśvarya*, etc., would be inapplicable to him and prove contradictory. And such a one cannot acquire *sarvalōkādhīpatya*. That is, *nirguṇa* is incompatible with *sarvaprakāśakatva*, *sarvaiśvarya*, etc. Then the argument would end in *apavyākhyāna* (misinterpretation) of the truth. Therefore, the *Sūtra Jagadvyāpāravarjam* was enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa in order that it might be clearly understood that a *mukta* even though God's own (*svakīyāvara mukta*), yet he is only next to him (i.e., less than him)<sup>656</sup> and therefore he is excluded from *jagadvyāpāra*. *Jagadvyāpāra* is a matter which is apart from the province of a *mukta* (*muktētara jagadvishayam*). Therefore this *Sūtra* uncontradictingly indicates that nothing that relates to *jagadvyāpāra* has anything to do with a *mukta*. If it were not so, it would not have been ordained in *Sruti* texts that Paramātma is the person who nominates those who are lesser than himself as fit for *mukti*. That is the very reason why Paramātma is styled "*Ananyādhipatiḥ*" i.e., one without a superior [cf. *Brahma-Sūtra*, *Ata ēva cha ananyādhipatiḥ* (IV. 4. 9)] and therefore what all a *mukta* can realize is only *ātmyatva* [i.e., that which relates to *Brahmapada* (*ayam ātmā Brahma*)] and not at all *Pāramēśvarapada*. This means, the *mukta* attains everything by the grace of Paramēśvara, short of his own—i.e., *Pāramēśvarapada*. Because the *Sruti* uses the expression *tat prasādāt*—out of his grace everything next to Paramēśvara.<sup>657</sup>

### Sripati's Philosophical Standpoint.

It will thus be seen that Sripati makes the Dvaitādvaita theory the central point in his interpretation of

<sup>656</sup> *Svakīyā* but *avara*, i.e., his own but less than and dependent on him. *Avara* means an younger in years, follower, or an inferior, less, etc. Cf. *Māsēnāvaraḥ*, *pūrvajēnāvaraḥ*.

<sup>657</sup> Jayatīrtha, *Nyāya Sudhā*, IV. 4. 17.

Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Round it he builds up a system of philosophy, to which we may now turn our attention. We may conveniently study it under the following heads :—

- (a) The material world,
- (b) Brahman and the material world,
- (c) The purpose of material creation,
- (d) The nature of the *jīva*,
- (e) The origin of the *jīva*, and
- (f) The attainment of *mukti*.

#### His Conception of the Material World.

Srīpati's conception of the material world is elaborated by him in II. 1. 26 to 33. The world existed in the minutest form of matter (*paramāṇvādīnām jagatkāraṇatvam upapannam*) and this was developed into Brahmāṇḍa through the infinite power and uncontrolled independence of Śiva Parabrahman. He quotes the *Sruti* texts *Atastasya sarvaśaktitvāt sarvasvatantratvāt* (*And therefore he is of infinite power and uncontrolled independence*) and *Sa sarvam asrujata*<sup>658</sup> (*He created all*) in support to show that there can be no limiting of the Parabrahman's power. He quotes further the texts *Nachāsti vētlā mama chit sadāham* (*There is no one who can know my will*); *Vedairanēkaiḥ ahamēva vēdyō* (*Throughout all the Vēdas I alone am extolled*); *Vēdāntakrit vēdavidō vachāham* (*I am the author of the Vēdas and can be understood through Vēdic expressions*). These show, he adds, that Paraśiva Brahman, without having a bodily form, consisting of the bodily organs, can exhibit his infinite powers. This is thus the wonderful power of Brahman in being the cause for the creation of the *jagat*. But how could the Brahman, destitute of bodily form, become the creator of a *jagat* which has a bodily form? This doubt is answered by him in II. 1. 28, *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāscha hi*. [*And in the Ātman only are such wonderful (powers).*] The power of *Ātman* (Paraśiva Brahman) is thus indescribably wonderful. Though bodiless, Paraśiva Brahman, in the form of *Ātman*, has always confined in

<sup>658</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa., I. 4. 4.*



him the infinite, variegated power of creating, through his *Māyā*, countless things which are possessed of bodily form (*Parichchinna śakti viśiṣṭē niravayavē jīvātmani svamanaś-śaktyā vichitra nūnāvidha Brahmāṇḍa kalpana mupapanam*).<sup>659</sup> Such a Sentient Being is visible in such inanimate bodily forms as hair, nails and other lifeless objects; also in the forms of water and fire which are dissimilar to each other. This same thing is seen actually in an ocean in the form of heat and water co-existing without any opposition to each other, just as darkness and light are seen in the same manner.

Also, in the same way in the interior of the body of living beings, the digestive fire (*jaṭharāgni*) is observed (without burning the beings themselves). Therefore to Paraśiva Brahman, who is beyond all the worlds (*lōkāṭīta*) and who is possessed of all wonderful powers, there is nothing impossible. (That is, he can reconcile even irreconcilable opposites.) It is for this reason, that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in answering the following query of his disciples, *viz.*, How did Lord Brahman, who is *nirguṇa* and *apramēya* and faultlessly *śuddha*,<sup>660</sup> acquire the power of creation (*kartrtva*, etc.)? said: Lord Brahman's powers are so great and so many, beyond one's comprehension or knowledge. And for the same reason the capacity for such variegated creation, etc., is quite natural and possible to him, just as fire is naturally associated with (the resultant) heat. The *Srutis* also support his (Bādarāyaṇa's) statement:

*Q. Kimsvidvanam kam usa vriksha āsīd yatō dyāvā  
prithivī nishṭatakshuḥ |  
Manīshinō manasā prichchatētu tadyadadhyatisṭhad  
bhuvanāni dhārayan ||*

<sup>659</sup> Śrīpati's use of the word "creating" (*kalpanam*) here should be noted, for that is the key, as it would seem, for reconciling the *bhēda* and *abhēda* theories in his own theory of *bhēdābhēda*. The word "creation" here is meant to convey both the idea of "creation" and the capacity of making visible that which was invisible before.

<sup>660</sup> Devoid of qualities, immeasurable and faultlessly pure.

A. *Brahmavānam Brahma sa vriksha āsīd yatō dyāvā  
prithivī nishtatakshuh<sup>1</sup>  
Manūṣhinō manasā vibravīmi vō Brahmādhyatishṭhad  
bhuvanāni dhārayan || iti.*<sup>661</sup>

Q. What was that water and which was that tree that then existed whereon the Heaven and worlds depended? Thus inquired the great beings to know how so many worlds held together.

A. Brahma as water and Brahma with the tree existed whereon the Heaven and the worlds depended. Thus know, O holy Beings! in this manner Brahma existed sustaining all these different worlds.

Even according to the *Srutis* and *Smritis*, the bodiless form of Paraśiva Brahman possesses this power of creation. This is to be seen in them (*Srutis* and *Smritis*) and this is to be expected from them as natural. If it is then questioned whether Paraśiva Brahman is influenced by *Māyāśakti* just as ordinary *jīvas*, Bādarāyaṇa answers the query in the next *Sūtra* (II. 1. 29), *Svapakshadōshāchcha* (And because of the defects of his view also).

Agreeably to the maxim, that the needle is attracted to the magnet, if *Nirguṇa* Brahman is attracted by *sat* in order to render *Prakriti* the agent for creation, then the Advaita position is made faulty inasmuch as *niravayava* *Prakriti* is made to appear as possessing the power of creation. Or, in other words, even though the inanimate *Pradhāna-Prakriti*<sup>662</sup> is incapable of creating the world, the very fact of the nearness of *Nirguṇa* Brahman makes it appear to possess that power of creation just as the loadstone attracts the needle. This obviously breaks down the theory of *nirviśeṣatva*. According to the maxim *Tachchaktēḥ tadadbhīnatvāt*, (To that power it is subservient, i.e., To its own power it is subject to), the conclusion that Brahman is *Sa-guṇa*, becomes unavoidable. It is also agreed to by

<sup>661</sup> *Taitt. Brā. Uṇa.*, II. 8. 9.

<sup>662</sup> *Prakriti* considered as the first evolver, originator or source of the material world; according to the Sāṅkhya system, *Pradhāna* is the primary germ out of which all material appearances are evolved.

the Sāṅkhya School that *niravayava Pradhāna* in the form of Ākāśa, etc. (*mahadādi*) has wonderful powers of transformation in developing the form of the world (*viśvākāra pariṇāmatvam*). Similarly, the Kaṇādas agree that *niravayava niraṃśa nishpradēśa* Pradhāna-Prakṛiti, coming in contact with the inanimate minutest atom (*paramāṇu*) attains the power of developing into the form of the world (*jagadākāra*).<sup>663</sup> Even though the inanimate Pradhāna is devoid of having any free action independently, yet, that it is, by the help of Brahman, by its very proximity, capable of developing wonderful transformations, is self-evident. Therefore, such a contradiction of one's own position (*svapakṣha dōṣaḥ*) in the case of Advaita, is inevitable (*durvāraḥ*). As the etymological derivation of the word *Māyā*, in the compound *yā mā sā māyā*, would have it, the existence of *Māyā* is seen to be (as real) as the horns of a rabbit (*yā mā sa māyēti vyutpattyā māyāyāḥ śaśaśringatvāt*). In the same way, the nature of the inanimate and the animate, *Māyā* and Brahman, *satyatva* and *asatyatva*, become like the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the cloth (*paṭa*), destitute of their characteristic marks. If such a combination does not exist, the development of the world or its cause would not be possible. Else Brahman, who is never changeable (*nirvikārasya*), could not have associated with *Māyā*. If it is doubted whether Brahman is enveloped in *Māyā*, just as the rope (*rajju*) throws the illusion of the serpent (*sarpa*), the next *Sūtra*, *Sarvōpēlā cha taddarśanāt*, meets the doubt. [And (the Supreme Deity is) endowed with all powers, because that is borne testimony to.]

<sup>663</sup> The name of the founder of the Vaiśeṣhika system of philosophy is preserved in his nickname *Kaṇāda*—sometimes styled derisively *Kaṇabhuj* or *Kaṇabhakṣhaṇa*, *Kaṇabhakṣhaka*, etc., i.e., atom-eater. *Kaṇaḥ* means a grain, an atom or particle. Kaṇāda propounded the Vaiśeṣhika system of philosophy, which may be shortly described as the "doctrine of atoms". The Vaiśeṣhika is so called from the category of "particularity" (*viśēṣa*) on which considerable stress is laid in its theory of atoms.

Paraśiva Brahman is possessed of every power (*sarvaśakti*) including the world-creating powers, etc., (*jagad-janmādi*) and thus is seen as *parāśakti*, for it is so experienced (*taddarśanāchcha*) and proved by *Srutis*. And this is plainly observed in Paraśiva Brahman and often expressly declared by *Sruti* texts such as *Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē*,<sup>664</sup> *Svābhāvikī gnāna bala kriyā cha*;<sup>665</sup> *Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram*; *Indrō māyābhikṣ pururūpa īryatē*,<sup>666</sup> etc., which declare that the bodiless (*niravayavasya*) Paramēśvara naturally possesses all kinds of powers (*sarvaśakti*). Therefore he possesses also the complete *triguṇātmaka hētubhūta pradhāna śakti* (the operative part of the three-fold creative power). This *śakti* is called *bhinna śakti* and the *chit-śakti* in him is called the *abhinna śakti*. Thus, Īśvara possesses these two kinds of *śakti* in their entirety. Possessing these two varieties of *śakti*, which are opposite to each other, Śiva Parabrahman on all three occasions (*srishṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya*) remains in the same unaltered identical state (*kālatrayēpi ēkarūpatayā sthitaḥ*). Then, if Paraśiva Brahman is possessed of *nirviśēśatva*, then there is no need for creation (*jagat-kāraṇatva na sambhavati*) as it is clearly contradictory to *Sruti*, *Smṛiti* and *Purāṇa* which state expressly that Śiva Parabrahman is naturally possessed of the power of creation (*svābhāvika śaktimattva sarvakāraṇatvādi*). And it is not just to ignore these facts and argue the *adhyasta mithyāvāda* (i.e., that whatever we perceive is an illusion and is untrue). If, then, Brahman is conceived of as possessed of *sarva-śakti*, we have to accept that he is the creator of the world (*jagat-kāraṇatvāṅgīkārē*); concurrently we have also to accept that he undergoes change into earth and the like (*mrudādivat*). Thus a great contradiction results. In order to harmonise this (apparent contradiction), the next *Sūtra* is propounded : *Vikāraṇatvānnēti chēttaduktam*.

<sup>664</sup> *Svēta. Uṇa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>665</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>666</sup> *Rig-Veda*, IV. 3. 1.

[Not on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained (before).]

The texts *Achakshuśśrōtram tadapāṇipādam*, etc., define the term *vikaraṇatvāt*. This means that it is the state of being destitute of body, sensory organs, etc., which are the means for accomplishing the desired object. The term *nēti chēt* indicates that Brahman cannot become the cause of the creation of the world, etc. (*jagat-kāraṇatvam*). If that be so, the reply is to be found in the texts *Sabda mūlatvāt* and *Vichitrāścha hi*. (*Sabda*—i.e., *Vēda*—is the fundamental cause and *śakti* is remarkably variegated in character.) Brahman, who is testified to by the *Vēdas* alone, is, even though destitute of body and sensory organs, capable of accomplishing every kind of act. Thus the *Sruti* declares:—*Apāṇipādō javanō grīhītā paśyatyachakshuḥ sa śruṇōtya-karṇaḥ*. (Though destitute of hands and legs, Brahman can catch hold of and walk; and can see without a pair of eyes; and can also hear without ears.) This *Sruti* text thus testifies to the powers of the Brahman. There are other texts like *Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē*,<sup>667</sup> *Pādō'sya viśvā-bhūtāni tripādasya amrutam divi*,<sup>668</sup> etc., which explain the variegated powers of Śiva Parabrahman and which also declare that a minute part of his *śakti* can dominate the whole world with all its wonderful characteristics. It is seen in the *Śiva Purāṇa*:—*Viśvōttarōttara vichitra manōrathasya yasyaikaśaktiśakalē sakalāḥ samāptaḥ* | *Adhyāyam adhvapatim adhvavidō vadanti tasmai namaḥ sakalalōka vilakṣaṇāya*. (I bow down to Him whom those learned in the *Vēda*, those who possess the knowledge of the Brahman, and those who have realized Him declare that He is capable, by the minutest fraction of His will, of creating, protecting and destroying a succession of worlds; and who is possessed of characteristics which are beyond the reach of comparison in all the three worlds.)

<sup>667</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>668</sup> *Rig-Veda*, II. 7. 18.

Therefore, it should be understood that Sarvēśvara, who is possessed of *sarvaśakti*, should be made to be the refuge of all who might seek *mōksha* (*mumukshus*). Therefore Brahman, who is *nirviśēsha* and *nirvikāra*, has to undergo *vikāratva* if the creation of the world is to be brought about; and therefore, if in the circumstances, the doubt arises whether Brahman becomes *māyāśabalita* (spotted with *Māyā*), then such a view stands contradicted by the next *Sūtra*: *Na prayōjanavattvāt* (*None, there being no motive*). The *Sruti* bears witness thus: *Parū'sya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāvikī gnānabalakriyā cha iti*. [His *Śakti* is of an indescribably variegated character. And *gnāna*, *bala* and *kriyā* (knowledge power and action) are absolutely natural to Him.] Brahman thus can never be of a *nirviśēsha* character (*i.e.*, a character which is without or destitute of distinction). The *Sruti* texts *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*; *Yēna jātāni jīvanti*; *Yat prayantya bhisamviśanti*,<sup>669</sup> etc., bear testimony to the fact that creation (*jagat-janmādi*) is all the aim of Brahman. This is the significance of the word *prayōjanavattvāt* in the *Sūtra*.

Moreover, the *Smṛiti* texts *Pradhāna kshētragnapatir guṇēśō samsāra mōksha sthiti bandha hētuh*, etc., declare that Brahman has an aim and end in creation, protection and destruction. Again, *Sruti* texts like *Amritasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam*; *Sarīram mē vicharshanam*; *Sarvalīngam sthāpayati pāṇimantram pavitram*, etc., declare that in order to save the community of *bhaktas*, Brahman assumes the *sthūla* and *sūkshma* causative bodily forms in the symbols of *iṣṭa*, *prāṇa*, and *bhāva* and releases them through *mōksha*; this therefore is the manner in which Brahman has made himself useful to them (*prayōjanavattvāt*). Here *prayōjanavattvāt* means *prakarshēna yōjanam prayōjanam*, *i.e.*, the extended application of *srishṭi*, *sthiti* and *laya* in all possible ways is called *prayōjanam*. Since he possesses this sort of power (*prayōjanam*), he is called

<sup>669</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

*prayōjanavān*. The quality of having this power (*prayōjanavatō bhāvaḥ*) is *prayōjanavattvam*. For that reason he is called *prayōjanavattvāt*. By the extended use of his power, by reason of the spirit of utter love he bears, there is *yōjanam*, *prayōjanam*, *samyōjanam* (of his power) (i.e., by the mere combination of love to *Prakṛiti* he can produce the world). The meaning is that Brahman reproduces<sup>670</sup> himself in the self-chosen symbolical gross and other bodily forms. As the maxim *prayōjanam anuddiśya na mandō'pi pravartatē* goes (even an ignorant man does not undertake anything without profit), if those desirous of *mōksha* had no benefit to be derived from Parabrahman, they would not have meditated on him. *Bhaktas*, who are well acquainted with the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas*, who meditate on him for the realization of their long-cherished wish in this and the next world, will acquire them in their unqualified entirety (*phala prayōjanam nirviśēshē nōpāpadyatē*). Therefore the argument that Parabrahman in association with *Māyā* (*Māyāśabalita Brahma*) is the cause of creation, is as manifestly objectless and aimless as the mistaking of the rope for the snake (and basing an argument on such mistaken identity). Just as the likeness of an object seen in water and other like fluids is untrue, the creation that is as the result of the reflection of *Māyā* is also an incongruity. *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam niravadyam niranjanam*;<sup>671</sup> *Na tasya kāryam karanam cha vidyatē*;<sup>672</sup> *Ētasmāj jāyatē prāṇo manas sarvēndriyāṇi cha*;<sup>673</sup> *Satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah sō'nvēśṭavyah sa vijignāsitavyah*;<sup>674</sup> and other *Sṛuti* texts declare that Parabrahman possesses the attributes of *nishkriyatvam* (redemption) and *kriyāśrayatvam* (being connected

<sup>670</sup> *Sambhava* : gives himself birth to ; gives himself existence to ; etc.

<sup>671</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 19.

<sup>672</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>673</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 3.

<sup>674</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7. 1.

with the execution of deeds). The doubt thus arises whether *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, by reason of being connected with *jagad-janmādi*, etc., is the *Saviśēsha śabala* Brahman. If *Nirviśēsha* Brahman consisting of Pure Intelligence (Supreme Spirit) is never capable of being the cause of *jagad-janmādi*, on account of his being *nirvikāra*, *nishkriya* and *niśśaktika*, then the assumption that *māyākālpita śabalēśvara* is the cause of the *jagat* (*jagat-kāraṇatvam*) is a false one (*ārōpa*). This being so, the established conclusion (*siddhānta*) is as propounded in the text *na prayōjanavattvāt*. We have the *Sruti* text *Parā'sya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyatē*. This text shows that *Nirviśēsha* springs up in connection with Brahman. How? *Prayōjanavattvāt*,—because of his being capable of being useful to everybody, without any benefit to himself. *Saviśēsha* Brahman alone is abundantly beneficial in granting *dēvas* and *mānushas* mentioned in the *Vēdāntas* all their desires in their entirety by the mere fact of his being *prayōjanavattvāt*. This doctrine is disregarded<sup>675</sup> by *Māyāvādins* and *Adhyātmavādins* (those who believe Brahman as the Supreme Spirit manifested as the individual life). Verily can *Nirviśēshavastuvādins*<sup>676</sup> postulate the existence in reality of a *vastu* existing without distinction—and yet having a difference (*Tathā hi nirviśēshavādibhiḥ nirviśēshē vastuni idam pramāṇam iti katham vaktum śakyatē*). (Because) every *vastu* is combined with its distinction. It is his own avowed doctrine that that *vastu* is real which is, from every known source of proof, within one's own personal experience. Even so is *ātmā* such a *vastu* (*sō'pyātmā*). But such a *vastu* has been contradicted, though actually seen and experienced to be *saviśēsha*, by mere (barren) argument.<sup>677</sup> When it is said "This (*vastu*) I saw" it is within the experience of every one that the object seen bears

<sup>675</sup> The word used is *anādaraṇīyam*, which would suggest that those who should naturally defend are found to be the opposers of the doctrine in question.

<sup>676</sup> *Māyāvādins* who argue the *Nirviśēsha* Brahman.

<sup>677</sup> *Sākshika saviśēshānubhava vādēna nirastah*.



certain peculiar distinctive attributes (*kēnachidviśēsha-viśiṣṭa viśayaṭvāt*). (Such being the position), how can we say, by the exercise of untrue ingenuity, that it (the *vastu*) is destitute of distinction (*nirviśēsha*)? In order to disassociate *Nirviśēsha* Brahman, we have to draw him out as the excess of actual Reality (*sattātirēka*) and as one unlike in character to things (*vastu*) which undergo constant changes as the result of their natural qualities. All these means of extracting *Nirviśēsha* Brahman from the Reality with which he is connected, the Reality itself, and the characteristics natural to it are in themselves the attributes of Brahman. Therefore by whomsoever would it be possible to deny the qualities of an object in order to establish it as being quite distinct from them? The answer is that it is never possible to postulate a *nirviśēsha vastu* as having been proved to exist.

When once knowledge is in disguise, ignorance is dispelled by self-illumination which is acquired through practice. That those who are in a state of a mental delusion, due to ignorance for the time being, get the same dispelled in course of time is in every one's experience. The reason for this could be explained at length. This is, indeed, in every one's daily experience. Such experience does not relate to the *vastu* alone; it is possible to demonstrate this by arguments. In order to establish the existence of a *vastu* as absolutely true, beyond every argument brought forward against it, it is necessary to employ every argument in order to dispel doubts so that it might not be mistaken from those similar to it. Therefore, we have to bring in descriptive attributes (*viśēshairviśiṣṭasyaiva*) of the particular *vastu* along with proofs and establish its existence. Generally knowledge of a *vastu* is acquired by the use of the descriptive expression appropriate to knowing it. For what is *padatva*? It is the formation of a *pada* with its *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* (the root of the word with its prefix or suffix) connected with it. If *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* are to be considered as being without distinction, the meaning of the *pada* formed by such *prakṛiti* and *pratyaya* cannot be

disregarded. Prefixes and suffixes are only intended to denote distinctions in the application of the *padas*. The difference as between *padas* necessarily connotes a difference in what they denote. A series of different *padas* combined together in the form of a sentence cannot possibly describe a *nirviśeṣha vastu*. And therefore if you try to establish a *nirviśeṣha vastu*, you are left without a *śabda* to prove it (*Na nirviśeṣha vastuni śabdah pramāṇam*). A  *vastu* which is before our very eyes, which is separated by differentiation and which is either conditioned (*nirvikalpaka*) or is accompanied with doubt (*savikalpaka*) cannot be proved to be without attribute (*nirviśeṣha*). *Savikalpaka* means belonging to a class possessed of a particular distinction; this distinction differentiates it from many other objects of its class taken together with all their different distinctions. Now, as to the *nirvikalpaka* class. It is the opposite of those objects which in our experience<sup>678</sup> come under the head of those which are possessed of distinctions. Knowledge (of one of the four kinds) testifies to this fact. Then what is *nirvikalpaka*? How can such a thing which is improved be grasped by knowledge? Therefore an object which is so void of all distinctions can at no time be one capable of understanding. As such a thing devoid of attributes cannot be determined with exactness, it must be declared to be impossible of being spoken of thus with definiteness. As it is not possible to describe such an object with exactness, it becomes utterly unintelligible and untrustworthy. Therefore the conclusion previously arrived at should be held to be the reasonable one.

If it is doubted and asked wherefore does Mahādēva, who is ever of the *paramānanda* and *niravayava* nature, bring into existence the creation of the world, etc., without any benefit to Himself, the next *Sūtra*, *Lōkavattu līlūkai-valyam* (II. 1. 33), explains it. In commenting on this

<sup>678</sup> *In our experience*: The word used is *svasvānubhūta*. *Anubhūti* means knowledge derived from four sources, viz., direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge.

*Sūtra*, Śrīpati says that Śiva Parabrahman is seen at times in perfect isolation by way of pastime. Being thus in perfect isolation on an occasion is His peculiar native habit. His thus abiding in Himself is so determined for Him. This is parallel with what is experienced in this world. Just as we see in this world a great monarch, who is the lord of all the seven islands subject to his sceptre, with all his wealth, his prowess, his courage, his heroism, and powerfulness and capacity to bear the burden of sovereignty, determines once upon a time, by way of sport, to begin some work; and sometimes sits quiet in silent contentment.

Moreover, all beings are naturally animated by their vital breaths; in a like manner Paramaśiva who is glowing in his bliss, brings into existence creation, etc., out of his native sportive nature in consonance with his determination. Therefore it is seen that creation, etc., is a mere sport for Śiva, who has attained all his desires and is characterised by his native joy. After the destruction of creation and upto the time that creation is again undertaken, He is in His unblameable, habitual situation of sitting quiet in silent contentment. If it is doubted whether Paramaśiva, who is *nirguṇa* and *nirlipta* (without qualities and unsullied), being the cause of creation, etc., is responsible for health and sickness, wealth and poverty, righteousness and unrighteousness, among created beings, such as *dēvas*, animals and men and the rest, having created them into superior (*uttama*), middle (*madhyama*) and inferior (*adhama*) classes, the answer is that it is inevitable that there should result among them, souls in bondage, jealousy, cruelty and other sinful qualities.

Passing on to the *Sūtra* (II. 1. 34), *Vaishamya nairghriṇyēna sāpēkshatvāt tathā hi darśayati*, Śrīpati asks, Are inequality and cruelty qualities attributable to Brahman? It is seen that they are the qualities of *jīvas* who get them bestowed on them by Brahman just as they desired them. In this world, *jīvas* are seen enjoying happiness or

undergoing misery which cannot reflect upon Parabrahman as attributable to him, because He has no share in the inequalities and cruelties seen in it. Why is this so? Because these are due to the desires of the *jīvas* themselves. Their desires are in consonance with the good and evil deeds wrought by themselves. This is seen (*from the Śrutis*). This truth is brought to light in the *Śrutis*. This is the gist of the *Sūtra*. Nevertheless, Paramapurusha Śiva, out of His natural power of *chitsakti*, even though He is bodiless in form, may be capable of being the cause of creating, etc., many different kinds of wonderful things (in this world) and thereby give room for the charge of partiality against Himself by the inequalities, etc., seen among the superior, middle and inferior classes of beings into which men, animals and the rest of the beings in bondage are found divided. This shows that these beings are bound to undergo the essential qualities appertaining to their doings by enjoyment in *Svarga* and suffering in *Naraka*, and by happiness and affliction (in this world). And if it is asked whether by His grace, they could escape the suffering from the cruelty, etc., inseparable from their own actions, the answer is, it is impossible.

The expression *sāpēkshatvāt* will rule the *Sūtra*, thereby meaning that "inequality" and "cruelty" (discernible) in creation, etc., will have to prevail because they are the peculiar results of the *jīva's* own *karma*. At the time the world was to be created, in the case of the *dēvas* and the rest, the creation had to become unequal because of the different desires expressed by the *jīvas* in accordance with their different *karmas*. The *Śrutis* also point to the fact that the *dēvas* and the rest (in all their gradations—higher, middle and inferior) desire that which is in accordance with their respective *karmas*: *Sādhukārī sādhubhavadati* (the righteous person will be created righteous); *Pāpakārī pāpō bhavadati* (the sinful person will be created sinful); *Puṇyaḥ puṇyēna karmanā bhavadati* (the virtuous person by virtue of his virtuous deed will be born virtuous); *Pāpaḥ pāpēna karmanā*

*bhavati* (the sinful person by virtue of his sinful deeds will be born sinful), etc. Agreeably to these (texts) is the text of Vyāsa:—*Nimittamātram ēvāsau sriyānām svarga karmaṇī* । *Pradhāna kāraṇabhūtā yatō vai sriyā-śaktayaḥ* । *Nimitta mātram muktvaiva nānyat kinchit apēkshatē* । *Nīyyatē tapatām śreṣṭha svaśaktyā vastu vastutām* ॥ This (Parabrahman) is only instrumental in bringing into existence *svarga*, while the *karmins* (beings) are really the chief causes (of their own beings); for that very reason they are capable of (helping) creation. Those beings, oh great among those who have done penance!, like *muktas* who ask for nothing more than what they desire, start in proportion to their strength, (for) *vastu vastutām* (*nīyyatē*), i.e., a thing is controlled by its own properties. In this way Parabrahman as *kṣētragna*, who knows the different classes of persons from the *dēvas* and others who for different reasons are to come into the wonderful creation, allows them to go into it agreeably to their past *karma*. Therefore there is no contradiction.

In secondary creation, the desire for doing acts involving *punya* and *pāpa* on the part of one falls to the share of Śiva; in primary creation, it is otherwise, as there are no *jīvas* who are involved in acts involving *punya* and *pāpa*. In the agency of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, inequality, cruelty and such other defects are unavoidable. Consequently, *jagat* being unreal (*mithyābhūta*), we have the result that Brahman's variegated creation itself is unreal. To meet this doubt, the next *Sūtra* is propounded: *Na karmavibhāgāditi chēnnānāditvāpyupapadyatē chūpyupalabhyatē cha* (II. 1. 35). (If it be said 'Not so on account of non-differentiation of deeds,' we say, 'Not so, on account of beginninglessness.' This is reasonable, and it is also observed.)

Before creation there was no *karma* for *jīvas*. Why? Because they were all undivided from the rest. When the world consisting of *chētanas* and *achētanas* was dissolved at its destruction, *karma* was also destroyed. Such a line of argumentation will not hold. Because the *Sūtra* says

“*anāditvāt*” meaning “without beginning or end”. Agreeably to the *pravāhataranga nyāya*—the maxim of the current and the waves which are endless—creation and dissolution are endless and occur in constant rotation without break. And hence the existence of the world is also endless. And it follows that the result of *karma* done by the *jīva* previous to the dissolution will remain in a dormant state at the time of dissolution. And again re-appears at the time of re-creation as the previously accrued *karma* of the *jīva*, merit or demerit according as it might have been desired by it with the re-creation of the *jagat*. Moreover, at the time of next dissolution, it remains over and is dormant in a *sūkṣma* form according to the will of *Paramēśvara*. And therefore the reality of the world is inevitable. This (*prapanchasatyatvam*) accordingly must be accepted without question, for it is unavoidable (*anivāryam*). This is the inner meaning of the *Sūtra* as suggested by the words *upapadyatē* and *upalabhyatē* used in it.

Before creation, the *jīvas* were in the minutest undivided form in a dormant condition in Brahman. How? In what form? Visible only in an undivided form. Countless hundreds of *Sruti* texts like the following bear testimony to the fact that in the beginning nothing like *karma* nor the fruits thereof existed:—*Brahma vā idamagra āsīt*; <sup>679</sup> *Ātmā vā idamagra āsīt*; <sup>680</sup> *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*; <sup>681</sup> *Yadū tamastam na divā na rātrir na sanna chāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*, <sup>682</sup> etc. How then can *karma* and its fruits of the *jīvas* become their respective desires at the time of creation unless it be due to (a sense of) injustice (on the part of) Brahman? The answer is, it is not so. For the *Sūtra* text declares *Anāditvāt* (from without beginning). Agreeably to the *pravāha taranga nyāya*, the *jīvas* and their *karmanas* and the fruits thereof are flowing in a current without beginning or end in creation; therefore, whenever

<sup>679</sup> *Aitarēya Upa.*, I. 1.

<sup>680</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>681</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>682</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

opportunity permits, these *jīvas* come into existence during creation, according to the results of their previous *karmas*, just as during summer time seeds sown are seen *in situ* in the earth in tiny little forms of different kinds. In the same way, we have to accept that among *jīvas*, *karma* and its fruits are seen in an identical manner. If we do not accept such a conclusion, a great contradiction will result in the *Āgama* and its proofs. Hence the text of the *Sūtra* uses the word *upalabhyatēcha* (results in). Therefore souls with their *karma* and the fruits thereof have inevitably no beginning or end. Accordingly, *Sruti* texts like the following, *Srīṣṭēḥ pravāharūpēṇa satyatvamupadiśyatē*;<sup>683</sup> *Gnā gnau dvāvajāvīśānīśau*,<sup>684</sup> etc., declare that souls have no beginning or end and their *karmas* and their fruits have to be held as established from the context (of the *Sūtras*) to be even so.

Assuming, then, that *jīvas* have in them the results of their beginningless *karma*. Though this be so, yet Paraśiva has to provide them with their several encasements (bodies) and this forms his principal duty (during creation). To impart to the *achētana* bodily form that active principle which renders it useful by reason of its *karma*, is the great capacity of Īśvara. How is it that some *jīvas* which have abided (in the Para-brahman) in a dormant condition in the most happy manner at the time of creation have come into this world in a bodily receptacle meant for affliction (*klēśāyatana śarīra*)? This shows that He is ill-disposed towards some of the *jīvas*. *Jīvas* being unable (of their own accord) to enter their bodies, were quite free from all affliction; except for His (Brahman's) will they would not have come into existence at creation. This is no doubt so; but why then does not Brahman give those *jīvas*, who are simultaneously eligible for release and who are fit for eternal happiness, the same without bringing them

<sup>683</sup> This is quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Mahābhārata Tātparyanirṇaya* thus:—*Jagat pravāhassatyōyam naiva mithyā kathanchana* ||

<sup>684</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

into creation which involves the bondage of *karma*? Because Śiva, even though He is All-Grace and capable of granting salvation simultaneously to all *jīvas* who deserve it, yet, just as the overlord of a kingdom, who feeling glad over the faithful manner in which his subordinate has discharged the duties of his office, in strict accordance with the laws of the realm, releases him from his obligations, so does the Lord Śiva dissolve the fetters that tie the *jīvas* to their *karma*, when they come to fruition. Just as a father, in this world, seeing his son behave in an unruly manner, does not receive him into his grace, without first duly punishing him, even so is it with Paramēśvara. Without administering (the fruits) of meritorious and evil deeds done by *jīvas*, Īśvara does not grant His grace (*svaprāptim na dāsyati*). Even the rays of the sun only open up the petals of the unblossomed lotus (and not others); even so Īśvara releases only such *jīvas* from the ties of bondage who meditate upon and worship him with *śama*, *dama* and *bhakti* combined. Moreover, it would follow from *Sruti* texts such as *Ēsha ēva sādhu karma kārāyati tam ūrdhvalōkam ninīshayati*; *Ēsha ēvāsādhu karma kārāyati tam adhōlōkam ninīshayati*,<sup>685</sup> etc., that it is Paramēśvara alone that determines the fate of the *jīvas* and *jīvas* themselves individually hold no responsibility. But if it is said that the sins of *vaishamya* and *nairghrīṇya* appertain not to the *jīvas* concerned but to Paramēśvara, the reply is: "It is not correct to say so." Even though *jīvas* are not all-capable and all-knowing like Paramēśvara, yet the *jīvas* because of their capacity, it so happens, possess a little of the responsibility and freewill (*kinchit kartrutvamcha svēchchayā sambhavati*) (appertaining to them); the result of the actions done out of their responsibility and freewill cannot be denied to the *jīvas*. Just as men and other beings in this world take to their avocations as the sun puts forth his rays of light at day-break, even so *jīvas* in keeping with the results of their respective *karmanas* and by reason of

<sup>685</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 22.



Paramēśvara's existence in them, accomplish their respective *karmas*. Therefore as the *Sruti* text *Dhyātū munitga-chchati bhūtayōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt*, etc., declares, Paramēśvara like the Sun will be witnessing all that the *jīvas* do. And therefore no taint of sin, etc., attaches to Him. Therefore, also *jīva*, *jagat* and *karma* are proved to be not only eternal but also are demonstrated to be always subordinate to Paramēśvara. Numerous *Sruti* texts like the following, *Sūryā chandramasau dhātā yathāpūrvam-akalpayat*;<sup>686</sup> *Na jāyatē na mriyatē vā vipaśchit*;<sup>687</sup> *Taddhēdam tarhyavyākṛitamāsīt*; *Tannāmarūpābhyām kriyatē*; *Gnāgnau dvāvajavīśānīśau*;<sup>688</sup> *Pradhāna kshētragnapatirguṇēśo samsāra mōksha sthiti bandhahētuḥ*,<sup>689</sup> etc.; texts like *Satyagnānātma kō'nantō vibhūrātma mahēśvaraḥ*; *Tasyaivāmśō jīvalōkaḥ prāṇinām hridayē sthitah*; *Viśphulingā yathā vahnau jāyantē kāshṭhayōgataḥ*; *Anādi karma sambandhāt tadvadāmśā mahēśituh*; *Anādivāsanāyuktaḥ kshētragna iti kīrtitaḥ*; *Sivabhaktischa sarvēśhām sarvadā sarvatō mukhī*; *Tasyāntu vidyamānāyām yastu martyaḥ pramuchchayatē*; *Samsāra bandhanāt tasmāt anyah kō vāsti mūḍhadhīḥ*; *Anādarēṇa śāthyēna parihāsēna māyayā*; *Sivabhakti ratiryasya sō'ntyajō'pi vimuchhyatē*; etc., appearing in the *Sivagītā*; *Prakṛitim puruṣhamchaiva vidyāvādī ūbhāvapi*, a text which appears in the *Kṛishna-gītā*; and *Nishkalam nishkriyam śāntam*,<sup>690</sup> etc., *Sruti* texts while they lay down *nishkriyatva* and other attributes of Brahman, also fix the standing responsibility which attaches to him in the sphere of creation. *Satyakāmaḥ*, *satyasankalpaḥ* and other *Sruti* texts have to be assumed in the light of the variegated Brahman who is reflected by *Māyā* (*māyāpratiphalita śabalabrahmaparatvam-ēvāṅgīkartavyam*). If we do not do so, great mutual contradictions in the whole of the *Vēdānta* will result and prove impossible of eradication. In order to remove this doubt, the next *Sūtra* is propounded: *Sarvadharmōpapatīēścha* (II. 1. 36). [And all the *dharma*s are proved (to be present in Brahman).] In accordance with the *Sūtra*,

<sup>686</sup> *Mahōpa.*, I. 38.<sup>688</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.<sup>687</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 20.<sup>689</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 16.<sup>690</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 19.

*Lōkavattu līlakaivalyam*, it is now demonstrated that the sport of Brahman ends at times in such results (as aforesaid); and at other times, ends in his perfect isolation. *Sruti* texts like *Yassarvagnaḥ sarvavit*<sup>691</sup> | *Vāmadēvāya namō jyēsthāya namaḥ śrēsthāya namō rudrāya namaḥ kālāya namaḥ kalavikarāṇāya namō balavikarāṇāya namō balāya namō balapramathanāya namaḥ sarvabhūtaḍamanāya namō maṇḍumanāya namaḥ* |<sup>692</sup> *Natasya kāryam karaṇam cha vidyatē*,<sup>693</sup> etc., declare that the *dharma* of Paramēśvara lies in the fact of his *sarvagatva* in respect to *līlākālaparatva* and *nishkriyatva*, which are respectively exhibited through creation and its results and in his perfect isolation. And therefore all his *saguṇatva* and *nirguṇatva dharma* have their birth in Parabrahma Śiva himself. And *Sruti* texts like *Ēka ēva rudrō na dvitīyāya tasthē* | *Ēkamēvādvitīyam Brahma*, etc., prove that Brahman is the sole author; through the agency of his supreme power, he appears in combination in the form of a reflected image of his variegated self fashioned after himself. All-pervasive yet bodiless, and not possessed of a reflected form, yet by reason of the mere agency reflected through the opening and the shutting of his eyes, all *dharma* (such as creation, etc.) proceed from him. These appear manifestly contradictory to what is declared both in the *Srutis* and *Smritis*, and are argued to be by Gautama, Dadhīchi, Vyāsa and Śiva and Kēśava, who are agreeable to imprecations, and others as false doctrines (*mōhaśāstrāṇi*) wherein *jīva* and *Īśvara* appear as inventions (i.e., as separate entities) and the world as false. This view should be discarded and unheeded by Śivabhaktas who seek *mōksha*. This is the established truth.

“Some cat-like disputants,<sup>694</sup> seeking support from the *Advaita* doctrine, state that they stand on an equality with

<sup>691</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9.

<sup>692</sup> *Namaka Chamaka.*

<sup>693</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>694</sup> *Kēchidadvaitamāsrītya bidālapratimā narāḥ*. The latter words appear to be used in a deprecatory sense and probably indicate “spiteful” disputants.

Rudra”; “Those Brāhmanas who were cursed by Dadhīchi and Gautama, having come into existence in the Kali age have become objects of censure”; “Dadhīchi, Vyāsa and Dūrvāsa and others having received curses have held the world as false (*jaganmithyātvaṃ āśritya*), and expounded such a doctrine will attain the region of hell”; “having preached to the world about the world (*jagat*) and *Īśvara* in a false manner and being devoid of devotion, will necessarily enter the kingdom of Yama”; “One who declares ‘I am Brahman’ (*aham Brahma*) will by such an assertion enter the most fearful eternal Hell”—these and other declarations are seen clearly in the *Skānda*, *Laingya* and *Kūrma Purāṇas*, where the discussion of *jagat* being false is contradicted and discarded. And hence those who desire *mōksha* should without any doubt whatever hold that Śiva Parabrahman is the sole cause of creation, etc., as the net result of Vēdāntic discussion and follow it as their main support.

#### Brahman and the Material World.

The relation of the material world to Brahman may now be considered. In commenting on *Sūtra* II. 3. 11, *Prithivyadhikārarūpa śabdāntarēbhyaḥ* [*Earth (from water); earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour and other texts*], Śrīpati sets out clearly the relation of Brahman to the material world. He starts by saying that when water manifested itself through the light, it reflected several beings. *Sruti* texts like *Tā annam asrujanta*, etc., declare that in order to sustain those beings, food was created. The doubt then arises, “Is it mere boiled food that was created or is it the world (that produced the materials of food)?” Certain sets of *Sruti* texts here and there declare *Prithivyā ōshadhayaḥ*; *Ōshadhībhyō’nam*,<sup>695</sup> etc., meaning that *prithivī* was created in which herbs and plants yielding corn were created. And these *Sruti* texts, even though appearing contradictory, yet confirm that all kinds of plants and herbs were created which yield food for sustenance to

<sup>695</sup> *Taitt. Uṇa.*, II. 1.

created beings. And the word *prithvī* therefore has become synonymous with *annam* or food and not with seedlings. How? The expression *adhikārarūpa śabdāntarēbhyaḥ* implies this meaning. The *Sruti* text *Tattējō asrujata*,<sup>696</sup> etc., declares that those primary elements which possess the authority to give birth to that which is sown become *annam*, etc., and in their edible, ripened condition become named *annam* and in that state remind one of *prithvī*. And even water also bears its commonness with *prithvī*. The *Sruti* text *Tadyadapām śura āsīt tat samahanyata sū prithivyabhavat*, etc., declares that other terms also express the product of *prithvī* and shows that *prithvī* is the chief source from which food originates. Here and there during the time of creation, water assumed the solidified form and presented the shape of an arrow. And that form of the arrow in course of time (the solidified form) produced *Ātma*. And that form in course of time turned into the hardened form of *prithvī*. This is the meaning of the *Sruti* text.<sup>697</sup> Similarly *anna*, which is cooked grain, cannot be said to have directly issued from water. It is the result of coming into contact with *prithvī*, by which it became grain and finally assumed the form of cooked food. And this is the established and uncontradicted truth.

So all the *Sruti* texts referred to above demonstrate without contradiction that the primary elements are the chief agencies involved in creation. The *Kaṇva* and *Mādhyandina* texts like *Yah prithivyām tishṭhan yah prithvī śarīram*, etc., also clearly explain that Śiva Parabrahman appears in the bodily form enclosed in *prithvī* consisting of all the primary elements. Though he cannot have a bodily form of his own, if he manifests himself in a bodily form which is liable to dissolution, he will reduce himself to equality with *jīvas*. If it be so—if he is not one different from the *jīvas*—there will result, from every point of view, an inconsistency in his being the chief cause.

<sup>696</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VI. 2.

<sup>697</sup> *Ibid.*

If it is said that a contradiction results by denying to Brahman the chief causality for *prithvī* and all things anterior and posterior to it, then the reply is, it is not so. For the *Sruti* text, “*Yō Rudrō agnau*” etc., proclaims his all-pervasiveness. And further other texts like *Yah prithivyām tiṣṭhan*,<sup>698</sup> etc., are equal to the *Sruti* texts, *Annam Brahma*, etc. His bodily form is only to show his all-pervasiveness and not for creating the very bodily form like the *jīva*. Alternatively if it is argued whether *prithvī* and other primary elements behave even in *pralaya* in the way indicated in the *paṭasamkōcha nyāya*, keeping Brahman within themselves, the *aṣṭamūrtitva* of Brahman remaining undisputed, then, the following texts in the *Saiva Purāṇa*: *Mahēśvarān mahāśaktyā śchēśānā-khyō khagūtmakāḥ*; *Sambhūtaḥ purushastasmāt pavanā-khyō mahābalaḥ*; *Tasmādaghōras sambhūtaḥ jvalanassarva-bhakshakāḥ*; *Jalātmakō vāmadēvastasmāt jātaḥ kripānidhiḥ*; *Tasmāt bhūmyātmakāḥ sadyō jātamurtiś śubhapradakḥ*; *Tasmāt oṣhadhayaḥ sarvē tatō'nnam jāyatē kramāt*; *Tasmāt pūjā bahirbhūtāś chētanāchētanātmakāḥ*; *Sarvāntaryāmirūpēṇa sarvakartā sadāśivah*; *Prathamam sūkshmarūpēṇa sadyōjātādi panchakam*; *janayāmāsa dēvēśaḥ tathā sthūla-prapanchakam*; etc., clearly prove that no one except (Parabrahman) is the chief cause. The *Sruti* text *Ākāśādvāyuh*,<sup>699</sup> etc., clearly deny to *prithvī* and other primary elements, which are mere lifeless objects, a hereditary character for causation. If it be doubted whether phenomenal agencies may possess such a character, the next *Adhikaraṇa* bears testimony to the fact that they do not possess such a character.

*Tadabhidhyānādēva tu tallingāt saḥ* (II. 3. 12). (*But he, from the inferential symbol supplied by their reflection.*) Now it is seen that Parabrahman joins the primary elements (*mahābhūta*), and becomes the associate with the associated and yet behaves as one separate from them. Then the question arises whether the primary

<sup>698</sup> *Mādhyandina Upa.*

<sup>699</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

elements act on their divine initiative in bringing into existence the creative character of the beings or is it that they act under the controlling power of Paramēśvara presiding in them. If, in accordance with the text *Ākāśādāvāyuh*,<sup>700</sup> etc., it is inferred that the controlling power imparted to them in their respective ranges of action is used by the primary elements in their capacity to create, then a mutual contradiction in the *Sruti* arises. The reply is that Parabrahman within the range of the capacity of each primary element brings into play at a look, as it were, his controlling power and enables the element appear as if it did the work itself and on its own initiative. Hence the word in the *Sūtra Tallingāt*—that distinguishing mark. The Supreme Being (Parabrahman) bearing the distinguishing symbol of controlling power over everything, as declared in the *Sruti* text, *Yah prithivyām tiṣṭhan*,<sup>701</sup> etc., proves that he is the sole controlling Being. The term *prithvī* and its *abhimāni dēvatā* should be understood. The terms *ākāśa*, etc., are understood to signify only what they are held to indicate by their traditional usage and are expected to do as their apportioned duty under divine control. It does not mean that these primary elements are infinitely independent in the range of their actions and so we do not hear of the *Sruti* text *Ākāśādāvāyuh*,<sup>702</sup> etc., giving them the all-independent power (of action). Nor should the *Sruti* text, *Tā āpa aikṣhanta*<sup>703</sup> *iti*, should be taken to mean that the primary elements alone form the chief cause in their respective names, for they signify nothing more than their own limited range of action. As the constant look of Parabrahman keeps the controlling power over these primary elements, there is no proof for individual independence of these primary elements themselves. Thus it is clearly proved that the

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<sup>700</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>701</sup> *Mādhyandina Upa.*

<sup>702</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>703</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VI. 2.

five great primary elements merge their agencies in the chief controlling power of Parabrahman in all their actions.

#### The Purpose of Material Creation.

On this head, *Sūtras* II. 3. 7 to 10 are of interest. Śrīpati remarks that when, in *Srutis*, we find mutual contradictions, we feel a doubt whether Brahman is the cause of *jagat* or not. To remove that doubt, the third *pāda* of *Adhyāya* II is devoted. Paramātmā has no desire in creation but creation and the *jīvas* are there. In allowing them their range of action in creation and giving them their desired realization lies the purpose of creation of Brahman. The *Sruti* texts say that the firmament is Brahman (*Kham Brahma*) and the all-extensive sky is his body (*Ākāśa Ātmā*). The formless form of Brahman, out of his will power, enters into the five primary elements (*pañcamaḥbhūtas*) and exhibits himself in their respective actions and finally terminates in the creation of *chētanās* of different forms. He then occupies the form of *ghaṭa* and in it places the *jīva* in the bodily form and stands in them in order to supervise their actions and also helps them to do their actions. The *jīvas* who appear like *jaḍa*, by his sole help in them, act freely as if they did their acts, in fact, on their own initiative. The *Sruti* texts express clearly that *jīvas* do their own actions and Parabrahman only witnesses their actions in them and helps them to achieve their desires. *Sruti* texts like *Tattējō asrujata*, etc., bear testimony to this. *Sruti* texts like *Ātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ*<sup>704</sup> declare that Brahman entered the bodily forms of the *jīvas* in the form of *ātman* and in the form of *tējas*, etc. And these, *ātman*, *tējas* and *āpaḥ* present in the *jīvas*, exhibit the Supreme Parabrahman in them by whose help the *jīvas* work freely. It is thus seen that throughout creation, Parabrahman plays the supreme part, both in the *chētanās* and *achētanās* (*jīva* and *jaḍa*) and behaves in them in their respective manner (*kāraṇabhūtē Brahmani yathāmukhyatvam*). If Parabrahman is said to possess no particular bodily form, then he cannot

<sup>704</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

bring into existence such forms. It should be said that he has the minutest form (*paramāṇvādīnāmapi nityatvam syāt*) which is eternal and which helps the *jīvas* in bringing them into creation and helping them to do their actions within their respective ranges. This peculiar power of Brahman cannot be contradicted.

According to the *Sūtra*, *Pratignāvirōdhāt*,<sup>705</sup> wherever there is cause for Brahman, there also is his action ; else it would mean a contradiction. Therefore, in the creation of *jagat*, the purpose of his action lies merely in bringing into play those *chētanas* in the form of *jīvas* and allowing them their ranges of action, being himself in them in all their actions. This is his peculiar power. There is no contradiction here with the *Srutis*. • And the *Taittirīya Sruti* text and the text *Tad brahma tējō'srujata* of the *Chchāndōgya* prove that there is no contradiction and that the cause and the power of action in Brahman are brought into play at creation in a manner quite in harmony with the *Srutis*.<sup>706</sup>

All the transformations that Brahman manifests in his creation are simply natural (II. 3. 6). The primary elements are his chief agencies, through whom these transformations are made to manifest in the *jīvas* when they come into being in creation. And this is the essence of the *Srutis*. Nothing is newly invented. Whatever is effected by one through an agency, will have to be reckoned as his own act.

#### The Nature of the Jīva.

We now pass on to the consideration of the next two topics, the nature of the *Jīva* and the origin of the *Jīva*.

<sup>705</sup> Srikara reads the *Sūtra* II. 3. 5 *Pratignāhānir avyatirēkāt śabdēbhyah* thus: *Pratignāhānirvyatirēkāt śabdēbhyah*, omitting the negative letter *a* in the *Sūtra*. Sankara and Ānandatīrtha read it with the negative *a* but with the words *śabdēbhyah*, which form a separate *Sūtra* in Rāmānuja.

<sup>706</sup> *Jīvas* exist ; creation cannot be denied to them ; *jīvas* prefer to go as they like into creation ; Brahman only agrees and brings them into creation, giving them bodily forms and power of free action but remains in them throughout in their individual division. There is no contradiction whatever in the *Srutis* in regard to this.



The nature of the *jīva* is discussed in the *Amśādhi-karaṇa* (II. 3. 40—II. 3. 50) more especially in II. 3. 40: *Amśō nānāvyaṣadēśādanyathā chāpi dāsakitavāditvam adhīyata ēkē*.

In the previous *Sūtras*, the atomic character (*aputva*) of the *jīva*, its capacity for understanding, its power for realizing Brahman, its power for independent action and the like having been demonstrated, now in this *Sūtra* are discussed at length the Oneness of the *jīva* (*jīvaikatva*), the *Brahmatva* of the *jīva* (*jīva brahmatva*), the *jīvas* falling off (from Brahman) (*jīvālīkatva*), the reflected character of the *jīva* (*jīvapratibimbādikam*) and other topics and how far they are impossible or inconsistent with the *Vēdas* (*Anupapannam<sup>707</sup> avaidikatvāt*). Hundreds of *Sruti* texts like the following, *Yathā sudīptāt pāvakādvīṣphulingās sahasraśaḥ prabhavantē sarūpāḥ*; *Tathā kṣharādvīvidhās saumyabhāvāḥ prajūyantē tatra chaivūpiyanti*;<sup>707</sup> *Māyāntu prakṛitim vīndyānmāyīnamtu mahēśvaram*; *Tasyāvayava bhūtaistu vyūptam sarvamidam jagat*,<sup>708</sup> etc., declare the *jīva* as the *amśa* of Brahman. It is therefore not right to discuss the question like *jīvaikatva*, etc. For the expression which occurs in the *Sūtra*, *Nānāvyaṣadēśāt*, clearly points out the meaning of *bhēda* in *Sruti* texts like *Dvāsuparṇū*,<sup>709</sup> etc., which declare that the *jīva* and Brahman are different. And the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Anyathā-chāpi*, denotes that *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,<sup>710</sup> etc., declare *abhēda*. Therefore it has to be accepted that there exists between the *jīva* and Brahman *bhēda* and *abhēda*. It is, however, proved by *Sruti* texts that *jīvas* are *amśas* (parts) of Brahman. Even though this is so, the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Dāsakitavāditvam adhīyata ēkē*, points out that the *Ātharvaṇikaśūkhins*<sup>711</sup> declare the *jīvas* as a servant class

<sup>707</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>708</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>709</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>710</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

<sup>711</sup> Those who follow the *Ātharvaṇasikhā Upanishad*.

(*Brahmaṇaḥ dāsakitavatvam*) of the Brahman, and therefore from the relation “of being a servant” and “of offering service” (*dāśya dāsakativēna*), they declare that between the *jīva* and Brahman there is *bhēda*. *Sruti* texts like *Brahma-dāśā Brahmadāśā Brahmaivēmē kitavāḥ*,<sup>712</sup> etc., incontestably prove that *jīvas* even in their *mukti* stage, having attained *Brahma sārūpya*, offer, by reason of their being servants, (holy) services and submit in their subordination to Brahman. The word *Ēkē* in the *Sūtra* particularizes *Ēkē sākḥinaḥ*, i.e., those belonging to the Atharvaṇaśākha. That doctrine is proved to hold good and is held to be in conformity with the Vēdic doctrine. It is therefore to be accepted as proved that those *jīvas* who being released from the bondage of the world and of family ties and who become quite pure and are fit for *mukti*, they, in their *mukti* stage also, still hold to their status of subordination and by reason of fear (by fear of such subordination) (*bhayahētutvēna*) offer their services (to Brahman) in the relationship of Paramēśvara *śēsha* and *śēshi* (Paramēśvara as the remainder and the *jīva* as the part taken away from the whole) (*Paramēśvara sēsha sēshitvādikam upapannam*). If it is urged, as against this, that *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyāli* etc., in which the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman (*jīva Brahmaṇōssvarūpaikyatva*) is declared, we suggest we always argue as those who act in conformity with the (teachings of the) *Sruti* texts. But as the saying goes *Na yuktīm bahumanmahē*, intelligence in argument is not the only thing that deserves respect. As at length proved in the *Jignāsādhikaraṇam*, intelligence should always be used in conformity with the teachings of the *Srutis* combined with experience. Even in the *Advaita* and the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* doctrines, on account of the want of harmony created by them as between *Sruti* texts as interpreted by them, they cling for a support to the shadow of the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine. If, as they say, they depend (for the truth of their teaching) on the harmony as between all the *Sruti* texts (*sarva Sruti samanvaya*) then

<sup>712</sup> *Atharvaśiras*.

they should be held to indirectly accept *bhēdābhēda*. As regards the highly argumentative followers of the Madhva school of teaching, who utterly hold to *bhēdāvāda*, they cannot be said to have harmonised all the *Srutis*—in so much as they practically reject all the *Advaita Srutis*,—just as Bauddhas who discard all the *Srutis*, both *bhēda* and *abhēda*. That such a doctrine should not be accepted is what is indicated as the gist of the *Sūtra*.

Now, who is this *jīva*? Is he absolutely different from Brahman (*Parasmādatyantabhinnaḥ*)? Or is he Parabrahman alone in this false form (*Paramēva Brahmābhrāntam*)?

Further, if we postulate that the *jīva* is only Brahman in disguise (*upādhi*) or only a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman, in either case it would be a contradiction of the *Srutis*. According to the *Sūtras*, *Tadananyatvam ārambhanaśabdā-dibhyaḥ* (II. 1. 14) and *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt* (II. 1. 22), etc., this conclusion is established: in truth, He is the same. Some *Srutis* declare plurality; others identity (with Brahman). If we examine these two sets of contradictory *Srutis*, then we will naturally arrive with the better conclusion that the *jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman. So long as it is not clearly established that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman, till then it is to be understood that *jīva* is not different from Brahman. At any rate nothing beyond Brahman is established. Then, what is the result? Is it to be inferred that the *jīva* is absolutely different from Brahman. How? *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,<sup>713</sup> etc., clearly point to difference (that Brahman and the *jīva* are different). It cannot be held out according to the *Sruti* text *Gnā gnau*,<sup>714</sup> etc., that the *jīva* and Brahman are one. The *Sruti* text *Agninā sinchati*, etc., declares metaphorically that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman. This cannot be proved. The word *aṁśa* means part and parcel of a certain thing. If *jīva* is then said to be an *aṁśa* of Brahman and forms a part of Brahman,

<sup>713</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>714</sup> *Ibid.*

then it is to be understood that whatever faults exist in *jīva* also exist in Brahman. At any rate, the view that Brahman is a *khaṇḍa* or part of *jīva* is not supported by reason. As Brahman cannot deservedly be characterized as a part of *jīva*, we arrive again at the same contradiction as before. Therefore, for one who is out and out different from Brahman (*atyanta bhīmatvam*), to call him an *amśa* is really difficult of proof. If we postulate that the *jīva* is Brahman alone in a false form, on the support of the *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,<sup>715</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>716</sup> etc., which explain the *jīva* as *Brahmātmabhāva* (as a form of Brahman in the form of *jīva*), then according to those who hold to the *nānātva* principle,<sup>717</sup> the result is that we arrive at a position which falsifies what is borne testimony to by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*, which endeavour to prove the *Advaita* standpoint. According to *Advaita*, the *pratyakṣhādi* (*anumāna*, *āgama*, etc.) argument tries to prove the *avidya* which lies in Brahman. Therefore it holds that Brahman is inseparably connected with *upādhi* which ends in the manifestation of the *jīva*. And, therefore, it holds that *Brahmātmabhāva* is to be seen in the state of the *jīva*. But it is certain that it cannot as a fact be concluded that the *jīva* is a disguised form of Brahman or his false form. Because it is through Brahman that bondage, release, etc., is to be finally secured (by the *jīva*). So we again arrive at the conclusion that the *jīva* is an *amśa* of Brahman, for, according to the expression in the *Sūtra*, *Nānā-vyapadēśādanyathā chaikatvēna*, the *jīva* holds the double state of *jīva* and *Brahman* in its respective *amśas*. The *nānātva* of the *jīva* is exhibited in the power of creation, and controlling (*niyantrtva*), and commanding

<sup>715</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

<sup>716</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

<sup>717</sup> *Nānātva vādins* as opposed to *ēkatva vādins*; pluralists as opposed to monists. *Nānātva vādins*: Those who maintain the Sāṅkhya doctrine that each individual has a soul distinct from the Universal Spirit.

(*niyāmyatva*) and all-knowing (*sarvagñatva*) and also not knowing (*agnatva*), both *svādhīnatva* and *parādhīnatva* (independence and subordination), *śuddhatva* and *aśuddhatva* (purity and non-purity), *kalyāṇaguṇākaraṭva* and its *viparītatva* (good qualities and bad qualities), etc., are also seen in these dual states. In the *Sūtra*, the expression *Anyathācha* is used. It is seen that the *jīva* behaves to exist identically with Brahman according to the *Sruti* texts *Tattvamasi*,<sup>718</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>719</sup> etc. In the *Sūtra*, moreover, the expression *Dāśakitavāditvamadhīyata ēkē* explains the *Ātharvaṇika Sruti* text *Brahmadāśā Brahmadāśā Brahmaivēmē kitavāḥ*, etc., which means that Brahman holds the forms of *dāśa* and *kitava* (servant form and the form of the rogue). Then all the *jīvas* generally hold this different form from that of Brahman. Thus, if we have to conclude by accepting the double state of the existence of the *jīva* and *Brahman* forms, then we must conclude that this *jīva* is only an *aṁśa* of Brahman. This is clearly accepting the opinions held by those who postulate that the *jīva* is different from Brahman. And it cannot well be otherwise. Then if Brahman is accepted to possess the powers of creation (*srujyatva*), control (*niyāmyatva*), remaindership (*tatsēśhatva*), support (*tadādhāratva*), maintenance (*tatpālyatva*), destruction (*tatsamhāratva*), meditating upon him (*tadupāsakatva*) and to obtain through his grace the enjoyment of *dharmārtha kāma mōksha* and release therefrom, then, *jīva* and Brahman are absolutely different from each other. And therefore it is clearly proved through *pratyākshānumānāgama* that the *jīva* is other than Brahman and therefore so long as the powers of *jagat srishṭi*, etc., cannot be proved for him, so far it cannot be proved that the *jīva* is only a disguised form of Brahman. Nor can he be affirmed to be *akhaṇḍa*, i.e., an indivisible part of Brahman in a different state (*akhaṇḍaika rasa chinmātra svarūpēṇa*).

<sup>718</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 8.

<sup>719</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

If, against this, it is held that the *jīva* enters this world of bondage in the *pañchabhūta sṛiṣṭi* stage; after thus entering into existence under a certain nomenclature and undergoing in this world all the results of bondage by experiencing in a mixed form, sometimes happiness and sometimes misery and then meditating upon that form of Brahman who brought him into creation and striving for *mōksha* according to the principles of the *Sāstra* as explained to him by his *guru*; and all the while that he should be in the *jīva* form, himself Brahman in disguise,—all this would clearly show in truth the ravings of a mad man in the height of his madness (*tathāsati unmatta pralāpitatvāpātāt*). And therefore it can never be maintained, however much you might try, with the support of the *Srutis*, that the *jīva* is only Brahman in disguise (*upādhyavachchinnam Brahmā jīva ityapi nasādhyah*), because the powers of creation, and command clearly go against such a view (*pūrva nirdiṣṭa niyāmyatva niyantrativādi vyapadēsa bādhdēva*). It cannot be held to be a proved fact that Devadatta, being only some identical person, not only possessed the powers of creation, control, etc., of the world but also underwent all the miseries of a family man through his ignorance. Nor is it possible by any *Sāstraic* device to combine in one and the same person the attributes of the *jīva* and an *aṁśa* of Brahman (*jīvōyam Brahmanōmśah*) unless we grant that the import of all the *Sruti* texts which proclaim the *dvaita* and *advaita* doctrines are in agreement on the fundamental points. And this is the conclusion. *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts such as *Śivah satyam jagat satyam jīvah satyam svabhāvataḥ*; *Tēshām abhēdassatyōvā krimibhramara-yōriva*, etc., declare that the existence of *Śiva* is true; that the existence of the world is true and that the existence of the *jīva* is true generally. Whether it is a fact that they are one and the same (*tēshām abhēdassatyōvā*), can only be understood in the manner in which we understand the relation of the *krimi* to the *bhramara* (*krimi bhramara-*

*jōriva*). Those who think thus with the *Smṛiti* text that Śiva is to the *jagat* and *jīva* as the *krimi* is to the *bhramara* and Brahman—think in a handsome manner. *Śruti* texts like *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>720</sup> etc., also declare of the *jīva* in terms of the Brahman (*jīvasyaiva Brahmatvōpadēśāt*). If that be so, then do *Bhēda Śruti* texts like *Brahmadāsā Brahmadāsā*, etc., which declare in the manner exemplified in the invented difference which mistakes the rope for the snake, lead us to a doubt as to how these two different sets of *Śruti* texts can be reconciled. The answer to this doubt is propounded in the next *Sūtra*, *Mantravarṇāt* (II. 3. 41).

*Śruti* texts like the following explain the gist of the *Mantravarṇa*, which declares that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Śiva (*Sivāṁśō jīvaḥ*):—*Māyāntu prakṛitim vindyāt māyīnantu mahēśvaram* | *Tasyāvayavabhūtōttham vyāptam sarva-midam jagat*<sup>721</sup>; *Pādō'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyāmrītam divi*,<sup>722</sup> etc. These texts clearly show that *Māyā* possesses the character of *prakṛiti* and *Mahēśvara* is never separated from it and therefore the whole world is stated to be something that has been born out of a membrane of his body. Therefore *jīva* also is a part of *Māyā*, which is a small part of Paramapurusha Śiva.

Moreover, the term *aṁśa* is synonymous with the word *pāda*. Paramaśiva represents the *viśvabhūta* and *jīvas*, who are innumerable and thus spoken of in the plural number, represent only a part or an *aṁśa*. Both in the *Mantras* and in the *Sūtras*, the word *aṁśa* is used only in the singular, in order to show that as a class, *jīvas* form only a part of Paramaśiva, who represents *viśvabhūta*. In the *Śruti* text *Ātmā śrutēḥ*, the word *Śruti* is used in the singular number only, thereby conveying the idea of *jīvas* belonging to a "class". *Śruti* texts like *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām ēkō bahūnām yō*

<sup>720</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

<sup>721</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>722</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.

*vidadhāti kāmān*,<sup>723</sup> etc., all go to prove that Īśvara is seen in *jīvas* in his entirety and eternality though the *jīvas* are many. This sufficiently establishes the fact that in His *gnāna svarūpa*, He is one in all the *jīvas* (though they are) quite separate from each other and Himself absolutely separate from them. This is the chief reason for the separate existence of each in different forms. This is what those well versed in the knowledge of the real nature of *ātman* (*ātma yāthātmya*) hold as a settled fact.<sup>724</sup>

<sup>723</sup> *Katha Upa.*, II. 18.

<sup>724</sup> Cf. Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*, I. 1. 1 (Nirṇaya Sāgara edition, page 18), dealing with *mukti*, after postulating that *mukti* is possible only through the grace of Hari, says that mere *gnāna* without a settled knowledge of Hari cannot help one to attain *mōksha*; that *mōksha* is the result of Hari's grace; and that Hari's grace is subject to *ātma yāthātmya gnāna*. He then observes:—*Ātma-yāthātmya gnānātānātmani sarīrādāvātmatvārōpē sati hi tadanukūla pratikūlayōḥ rāgadvēśhau bhavataḥ tābhayā prayuktaḥ puṇyapāpa lakṣaṇām pravruttimāchinutē tataścha sura nara tiryagādi nanā-yōnīshu navina sarīrēndriyādi samyōga lakṣaṇam janmāsya bhavati*. [If there is no knowledge of the exact *ātma yāthātmya svarūpa*, then it results in *rāga* and *dvēśha*, and these two latter lead to commission of sin and subsequently end in birth and rebirth among the human and inferior (*tiryagyōni*) species.] Then Tikāchārya writes:—*Tasmāchcha duḥkḥānubhava ityanādirayam kāryakāranya-pravāhaḥ samsāra ityuchyatē | Ātma tattva gnānāchcha agnāna viparyayaḥ nīvartētē | Tattvagnānasya samānāśraya viśhayāgnāna mithyāgnāna nīvartana svābhāvīyāt | Śūktikā tattva gnānasya tadagnāna rajatārōpa nīvartakatva darśanāt | Mithyāgnānanīvrittāu cha rāga dvēśhānūdayaḥ kāraṇābhāvāt | Tayōrabhavē cha na pravrutteḥ utpattiḥ tata ēva prāk upachitāyāśchōpabhōgēna prakṣayaḥ | Pravruttyabhāvēcha janmāntarābhāvō hētvabhāvādēva vartamāna sarīrādēścha ārambhakakṣayē sati nīvrttiḥ | Janmābhāvē cha na nirbijasya duḥkḥasyōtpāda ityēvam ātyantikī duḥkḥanīvrttir muktiḥ*. (And this ends in involving himself in the rotatory series of births and rebirths which is signified by the flow of *samsāra*. And therefore in order to free himself from such a flow of the bondage of life, *ātma tattvagnāna* is the only means—to remove him out of this illusion of ignorance. And this *ātmata-ttvagnāna* has the natural power of removing him out of the hold of *agnāna* and *mithyāgnāna*. Then, he will have been delivered from the ignorance which made him to imagine *rajata* in *śukti*. Thus ignorance being lost, he will



The *Sūtra*, *Asantatēschāvyatikarah* (II. 3. 46), clearly states that the plurality of *ātman* (*ātma bahutva*) is brought to manifestation only subsequently. And therefore it is not a pleasure to discuss further the *dvaita* phase of the argument as *Ātmaikatva* is also supported.

Here *Srīpati* passes on to the *Advaita* point of view. In this view, further proofs (for this position) are pointed out in the next *Sūtra*, *Api cha smaryatē* (II. 3. 42). (Moreover it is so stated in *Smṛiti*.) There is in the *Sivagītā* the text, *Satyagnānātmako'nantō vibhūrātmā mahēśvarah | Tasyaivāmśō jīvalōkō hrudayē prāṇinam sthitah | Visphulingā yathā vahnau jāyantē kāshṭhayaḡgatah | Anādī-vāsanāyuktāh kshētragnā iti tē smritāh | iti*. And also in the *Krishṇa-Gītā*, there is the text: *Mamaivāmśō jīvalōkō jīvabhūtassanātanaḥ | Īśvarassarvabhūtānām hruddeśē'rjuna tisthāti | Bhṛāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḡhāni māyayā | Tamēva śaranam yāhi sarvabhāvēna bhārata || iti*. Both of these texts declare that *jīvas* in their plurality also possess *Īśvaratva*. Similarly in the *Taittirīya Sruti* text, *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē | Yēna jātāni jīvanti || iti* and others of the same import, there is clear proof of the plural existence (*jīva bahutvam*) of the *jīva*. And hence the pretended *jīvaikatva* and *jīva-Brahmatva* disputation

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have no more cause for rotatory births, which, when it ceases, there will be no more seed left for sorrow to rise. And this state of being absolutely rid of any shadow of sorrow is called *mukti*, *Ātyantikī duḡkhanivṛttir muktiḥ*. The *Sruti* text, *Yasya prasādāt paramārti rūpat asmāt samsārān muchyate nāparēṇa*, declares that by nothing else but by *Paramātmā*'s grace can the *jīva* be removed out of the bondage of *samsāra* and made to attain *mukti*, which is true *gnāna*.

Cf. *Gnāni priyatamō'tō mē tam vidvānēva chāmṛitah | Vṛuṇutēyam tēnalabhyah* (*Smṛiti* text). *Yamaivēsha vṛuṇutē tēna labhyah tasyaisha ātmā vṛuṇutē tanūm svām* (*Sruti* text). Quoted by *Jayatīrtha* in *Nyāya Sudhā* (p. 17). (A *gnāni* should necessarily endear himself to me. Then only he is considered by me as one deserving of my grace and will thereby obtain it.) The *Sruti* declares: He whom he aspires for, through Him only could he attain *mukti*. And He will grant His grace in His personal Self in token of *mukti*.

is also possible. Verily, it is seen in the *Purusha Sūkta* text *Pādō'sya viśvābhūtāni*, etc., that Vishṇu is the sole regulator of *srishṭi*, etc. And also in the *Krishṇa-Gītā* there is the text *Mamaivāmsō jīvalōkaḥ*, etc., which denotes that Krishṇa himself in his *amśa* represents the *jīva*. And further from the invocation of Vishṇu as *Hariḥ Om*, etc., which is prescribed as the starting point in the *Vēdas* and *Vēdāntas* generally and from the *Kapila Smṛiti*, it is seen from the text, *Vēdavyākyaṇi sarvāṇi Harinamāni vai smṛitāḥ*,<sup>725</sup> that all the words used in the *Vēda* throughout are capable of being interpreted only in terms of Hari. If from this it is doubted whether the *jīvas* are the *amśas* of Vishṇu only, our answer is "It is not so". Because this is a clear contradiction to several *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts previously quoted. The same thing is dealt with at great length in the *Purusha Sūkta* I. i. as well as in the *Krishṇa-Gītā*. It is a contradiction of all *Sruti* texts if Nārāyaṇa, who is one of the embodiments of the three deities, who make up the Trinity (*mūrtitraya antarbhūtasya*), alone forms the *amśa* of all *jīvas* and to appropriate for himself the use of that term (*Vishṇu amśa*). In the *Sruti* text *Ēkō viṣṇur mahadbhūtam pruthak bhūtānyanēkaśaḥ* † it is said that Vishṇu is one great being who pervades severally in several forms all the different beings of creation. Also in the *Sruti* text *Viṣṇvādyuttama dēhēshu pravishṭō daivatā bhavēt*, *Manushyādyadhama dēhēshu pravishṭō mānavōbhavēt* etc., it is declared that having entered into the highest class of beings like Vishṇu and others, they become beings of high order; and having entered into the lowest class such as human beings, etc., they become beings of lower order such as human beings, etc. Thus Vishṇu is stated to have assumed the *jīva* form. Vishṇu is not explicitly proved throughout the *Srutis* that he is beyond the pale of the three forms of the Trinity, just as Śiva is. Śiva is present in all beings (*sarvātmaka*), and is the underlying

<sup>725</sup> Cf. the following citation of this *Sruti* text taken from Ānandatīrtha's *Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 6 :—*Nāmāni sarvāṇi yamāvisanti tam vai Viṣṇum paramam udāharanti*.

spirit in all words (*sarvaśabda vāchya*). That Viṣṇu should, in a substituted sense, be represented, in the place of Śiva, as the highest deity, with the emblems of *śankha* and *chakra* and the marks of *ūrdhvaṇḍra* and as keeping the whole world under his delusive sway, is an impropriety. It is generally stated that Śiva is the *aṁśa* of the *jīva*. The phrase *Harīḥ Om* with which Vēdic texts begin, in token of offering praise to Viṣṇu and thereby suggesting that throughout all the *Vēdas* Viṣṇu is the supreme underlying deity, is an unfounded statement which is not pleasant to discuss (*avichārīta ramanīyam*). In hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*; *Śivōmāmēva pīlaraḥ*; *Īśānassarvavidyānām*; etc., and also in hundreds of *Smṛiti* texts as well like *Vēdā śivāḥ śivō vēdaḥ*; *Vēdādhyāyī sadāśivāḥ*; *Nārudraḥ kramapāṭhaka iti*, etc., it is clearly proved that Śiva only is *sarvātmaka* (one pervading all); *sarvaśrutijanaka* (one who is the origin of all the *Sruti* texts); and *sarvavēdaniyāmaka* (one who controls all the Vēdic *dharma*). And thus all these powers cannot be claimed by any one else. Therefore in the expression *Harīḥ Om*, the word *Hari*, which is associated with the invocatory suffix *Om*, only implies Śiva in its utterance. For it is stated in the *Sruti* text, *Yō vēdādaṁ svarāḥ prōktō vēdāntēcha pratisṭhitaḥ*,<sup>726</sup> etc. (He who is invoked by the utterance of *ōmkāra* in the beginning of the *Vēdas* and also who establishes himself till the end of it). It is clearly shown that according to the *Srauta vidhi* (Vēdic practice), the expression *Om* only, unqualifiedly, is what should be uttered in the beginning as well as at the end of the *Vēda*.<sup>727</sup>

The *Māṇḍūkya Sruti* text beginning with *Om ityēta-dakṣharamidam sarvaṁ iti* and ending with *Prapanchōpaśamaśśivōdvaita ēvamōmkāraḥ samviśatyātmanātmānam ya ēvaṁ vēda iti*, declares that *Om* is the chief symbolic utterance expressive of the whole of the *Vēda* and denotes

<sup>726</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 24.

<sup>727</sup> That is, without the name *Harīḥ* being prefixed. See Note at the end of this Volume on p. 438 of the text on this topic.

Śiva as the Supreme deity of the *praṇava*. The word "Śiva" also expresses the primary meaning which the "praṇava" claims to express. And beyond "praṇava" there is no one. This is the chief idea underlying the *praṇava*. Also the *Taittirīya* text *Brahmādhipatir Brahmanōdhipatir Brahmā Śivōmē astu Sadāśivōm iti* and the *Sāma Sruti* text *Akārō Brahmā ukārō Vishnuḥ makārō kālakālōhyardha mātṛaḥ Paramaśivastasmādōmkāram lingamāhuriti*, declare clearly the gist of the *praṇava*. And the *Sruti* text *Parāt paratarō Brahmā tatparāt paratō Hariḥ | Yatparāt paratōdhīśastanmē manaśśivasankalpam astviti* || bears witness to the fact that the *praṇava* *Omkāra* can, without objection, be used as a prefix to the term *Hariḥ* but not as a suffix. Because the term "Śiva" should be expressed as being above that of "Vishṇu" as embodied in the *praṇava*. The *Sruti* text *Ardhōvā patnī ēshātmanō grihēshu iti* clearly shows and the *Smṛiti* text *Śivāya Vishṇurūpāya Śivarūpāya Vishṇavē* | and the *Kūrmēśvara Gītā* text *Mamaishā paramā mūrtir Nārāyaṇa samāhvayā* declare that in the body of Vishṇu the body of Śiva also is incontrovertibly contained. It is also stated in the *Sāma Śākha* in the text *Śivasya śaktirvinīyōgakālē chaturvidhābhūchchiva satprasādāt | Bhōgē bhavānī samarēcha durgā krōdhēcha kālī purushēcha Vishṇuḥ | iti* || that Vishṇu is represented as belonging to the *amśa* of Pārvatī (*Vishṇōḥ Pārvatyamśōpadēśāt*). In the *Śivāshṭōttaraśatanāmavalī* there occurs the text *Śankaraśśūlapānīścha khaṭvāngī Vishṇuvallabhaḥ | iti*, etc. Also in the *Skānda*, we have the text *Vandē sūrya śaśānka vahninayanam vandē mukundapriyam iti*, etc. The ascriptions in these texts of *Vishṇuvallabhātva* and *priyatva* bear witness to the *ardhāṅgatva* to Vishṇu. In the same way, as moon and moonlight are related to each other, Śiva who is the embodiment of the *praṇava* and Vishṇu are so related (as *Chandrikā* cannot be separated from *Chandra*, Śiva cannot be separated from Vishṇu).<sup>728</sup> In the *Vaiyāsika Skānda*, there is the text *Śivakēśava sambhūtam kalayē Kālabhairavam iti*, etc. It is generally stated in the

<sup>728</sup> We seem to have a glimpse of the Hariharēśvara doctrine here.

*Purāṇas* that Śiva is incontrovertibly spoken of in terms of *Vishṇuvallabhatva*. If it is questioned that while the term *Gowrīpati* is accepted as the principal expression for Śiva, then at both the beginning and the end of the *Vēdas* and *Vēdānta* there ought to have been used the expression (implying *Gowrīpatitva*). According to the saying current in the world *Yōshā jāramiva priyam*, so in the *Vēda*, in order to exhibit the natural tendency for a man to incline more towards his paramour in order to indicate his intenser love for her, clandestinely than naturally, so in the *Vēdas* also, the expression *Hariḥ Om* is considered to be proper, because that term is, even though inextricably woven with the name of Vishṇu, a source of pleasure.<sup>729</sup> Thus *jīvas*, being the *amśa* of Brahman in an infinitesimally small portion, whatever deficiency attaches to them should naturally apply to Brahman also in common. In order to remove this doubt the next *Sūtra* is propounded. *Prakāśādivattu naivam paraḥ* (II. 3. 43). (*But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.*)

In this *Sūtra*, the indeclinable *tu* (*śabīda*) indicates the exclusion of the discrepancy suggested at the end of the comments on the last *Sūtra* (*Prakāśādivat+tu+na+ēvam+paraḥ*). Like the brightness of a light, *jīva* is the *amśa* of Paramātma. Just as a fire, while it is burning with bright light, reflects brightness all about it, and thereby exhibits its *amśas* and just as cows and horses of different colours—white, black, etc.—possess certain common features between them as discriminating characteristics; and just as human beings and divine beings possess a carnal body, similarly *amśa* means a feature common to both.<sup>730</sup> In certain things, there are a larger number of characteristics which could be compared with any one of them in common with others. Similarly discriminating people explain by comparing certain features common to the two things for purposes of

<sup>729</sup> See Text note on page 438 on this topic.

<sup>730</sup> *Ekavastvīkāḍṣatvamhi amśatvam* : i.e., Where in one particular point, there is Oneness, there is *amśatva*. Being common in one part is *amśatva*.

comparison. Thus the *amśa* and *amśi* become matters for comparison with their common features in them as their natural characteristics. In this manner, the *jīva* and the *Parabrahman* are thus compared with their common natural features as *amśa* and *amśi* in drawing up a comparison between the two. Thus, in the *Sūtra*, it is said *naivam parah*, thereby meaning that the *jīva* only could be compared with Parabrahman and that Parabrahman could not be compared with anything else. What the *jīva* is as a being, the Parabrahman is not (as a being). In the same manner, the brightness also is of a different nature in these beings. And therefore the *ānanda* of *jīva* is something quite different from the incomparable *ānanda* of Śiva Parabrahman. In this way, the *jīva* and the Parabrahman stand, for comparison's sake, having these qualifying characteristics. And thus these natural differences in character stand as the fundamental basis for *bhēda* between *Īśa* and *jīva*. And these qualities naturally support the argument for *bhēda*. As for proving *abhēda*, there are not attributive expressions of a fitting kind that can help to establish it. And such expressions which can establish *abhēda* are not available in particular (*abhēda nirdēśāstu pruthak siddhyanarha viśeṣhaṇānām viśeṣhyaparyantatvam āsṛitya mukhyatvenōpāpadyantē*). In the texts *Tattvamasi*;<sup>731</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>732</sup> etc., and in the expression *Ayamātmēti*, the words *Tat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā* all clearly show that they are the controlling agency in the *jīva* and thus it is impossible to postulate *ēkatva* as between *jīva* and *Brahman*. This has been already made known above. The *Smritis* also lay stress on the fact that the unhappy state of the *jīva* is not to be seen in Śiva Parabrahman. This is more clearly set forth in the next *Sūtra*, *Smaranti cha* (II. 3. 44). (*And Smriti texts declare this.*) The *Smritis* strongly support the above view.

The indeclinable *cha* denotes the *Smritis* taken as a whole—*chaśabdassamuchchayē*. Take such *Smriti* texts

<sup>731</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

<sup>732</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 19.

as the following : *Tatra yaḥ paramātmāsau sa satyō nirguṇassmṛitaḥ* । *Nalīpyatē phalaiśchāpi padmapatrami-vāmbhasā* । *Karmātmātvaparōyōsau mōkṣabandhaiḥ sayujyatē* । *Vigraham dēvadēvasya jagadētachcharācharam* । *Ētadartham na jānanti paśavaḥ pāpagauravāt iti* ॥ etc. This Paramātmā is eternal and true and devoid of *guṇas*. He is never desirous of realizing any *phala* for himself, just as a lotus leaf on the surface of water. All *jīvas* endeavour by their actions to realize Parabrahman and thereby get themselves freed from bondage and obtain *Mōkṣha*. In trying to obtain *Mōkṣha*, the *jīvas* undergo a great struggle in this mundane world. Many a sinful creature does not know this real truth in what he is aiming at. Thus the *Smritis* clearly declare that the clear glow of light of Parabrahman attracts the *jīvas*; to obtain it they put forth all their efforts in their *aṁśa* form. And this relative feature of *jīva* and Brahman is sufficiently explained in the *Smritis* by Parāśara and other Rishis. The *Smṛiti* text *Ēkadēśasthitasyāgnēr jyōtsnā vistariṇī yathā* । *Parasya Brahmanaśśaktistathēdam akhilam jagat* । etc., declares that though fire burns in one particular place, it throws its light over a large area around it, similarly the glow of brightness of the *śakti* of Parabrahman is radiated throughout the world. Thus Īśvara partakes absolutely nothing of the miseries found in the *jīvas*. So proclaim the *Smritis*. The indeclinable *cha* lays stress on the absolute absence of *duḥkha* in Parabrahman. This is clearly declared in the *Sṛuti* text *Tayōranyaḥ pippalam svādvattyanāśnan anyō abhichākaśīti*,<sup>733</sup> which declares that one of the two, *viz.*, the *anyō jīvākhya* bird enjoys its fruit of previous actions in its former births, while the Paramātmā bird (*anaśnan anyō*) enjoys its eternal undiminished joy. In this way, the *Sṛutis* and *Smritis* clearly explain the widely differing features which contrast the *jīva* from the Brahman. Thus it is seen throughout the *Vēdānta* that in certain respects the *jīva* and Parabrahman stand

<sup>733</sup> *Svēta. Upa., IV. 6.*

as objects for comparison—such as *amśa*, *gnāna*, *saṁāna*, etc.,—and these widely contrast with what is mentioned in other *Smritis*, their inequalities and improbabilities which cast the doubt as to how the *Sūtra* should be harmonised. In order to clear this doubt, the following *Sūtra* (II. 3. 45) is propounded: *Anugnā parihārau dēhasambandhājyōtirādivat*. (*Accepting and rejecting goes with the nature of the body with which it is connected, as we accept or reject fire, etc.*) Even though as a fact, all *jīvas* possess an *amśa* of Brahman and have knowledge about him, yet they being located differently among sects differing as those of Brahma, Kshatriya, Vaiśya and Sūdra, with whom cleanliness and dirt (*Śucyāśuchirdēhasambandha*) are a matter of like and dislike and are tied up with their respective habits and practices. Just as fire which though it is the same everywhere it is found, is yet always preferred from the household of a Brahman well versed in sacred learning (*Srōtriyāgārāt agnirūhriyatē, smaśānādēstu parihriyatē* " ) being discarded at the same time the fire, from the cremation ground and just as a person prefers to beg his food from the house of a learned Brahman and discards it even when offered at the house of a fighting enemy, even so it is in the matter of *jīvas* who possess bodily forms. Thus the acts done by Dēvadatta and those done by Yagnadatta widely differ in their characteristics and in their results.<sup>734</sup> If it is asked why this is so, it is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Asantatēschāvyatikarāḥ* (II. 3. 46). (*Being different in descent, they are not reciprocal.*) Though it is true that the *amśa* of Brahman is the same in all *jīvas*, yet it shows a difference in every individual body by reason of the difference that exists mutually between different bodies. The experience of these different bodies cannot

<sup>734</sup> This is an elaboration by Śrīpati of Śrīkantha's short comment on this *Sūtra*. Both do not explain the term *ādi* in the *Sūtra*. Nor does Rāmānuja bring out the force of this word. (See *Śrī-Bhāṣya*, III. 3. 48). Śrīpati herein seeks to establish the dualistic position between *jīva* and *jīva* throughout creation.



be blended together. Judging from the (*Advaita*) theory which propounds the doctrine that *bhṛānti* makes us differentiate the *jīva* from the Brahman, from the *jīva* point of view, the differences that exist between *jīvas* seem as though they were inherent in the *jīvas* severally. In the experience of the *jīvas* severally, there is found to be difference; this seems a defect in them. And these defects cannot, as among the *jīvas* themselves, be harmonised. In order to establish that such a natural defect in the *jīvas* cannot be harmoniously blended, the word *avyatikaraḥ* has been fittingly used in the *Sūtra*. It cannot be said that the acts of Dēvadatta can make Yagnadatta responsible (for them), as both Yagnadatta and Dēvadatta are bodily absolutely different from generations and therefore the character of the one cannot be blended with that of the other. Those *jīvas* who are naturally wise and fit for realizing *mōksha*, until they have reached that stage they change their bodily form, behave differently from the other *jīvas* who are affected by *upādhi*; and these two cannot be harmoniously blended either. Just as a *jīva* in bondage (*baddha jīva*), which undergoes both happiness and misery as decreed to it by its fate, cannot be blended with one that is not so subject to bondage,<sup>735</sup> by possessing a profound knowledge regarding Śiva Parabrahman, a *jīva* will be free from all family and other illusory bondages. To this effect, it is clearly said in the *Sivāgama*:—*Baddha śuddhādi bhēdēna jīvātrayam idam smritam । Gurudīkshā vihīnaścha Sivabhakti vivarjitāḥ । Svakartrushvābhīmānītu baddhassa paśuruchyatē । Gurudīkshām parām labdhvā kaimkaryātraya samyutaḥ । Sāntyādi sadguṇōpētō mumukshū rāga varjitāḥ । Sivādīhna sudhī bhaktaś śuddha jīva iti smritāḥ । Sivayōga Sivagnāna vibhavānanda samyutaḥ । Prachandātapa madhyastha śuddha karpūra dīpavat । Sivākārē parākāśē kōṭisūrya prakāśakē ।*

<sup>735</sup> Does Sripati believe in the theory of Ānandatīrtha : *Trividhā jīva sanghāstu dēva mānusha dānavāḥ* ? According to Ānandatīrtha, these cannot be blended together. See *Tātparya Nirṇaya*, 1st *Adhyāya* (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition). See Note 740 on page 536.

*Vitāna chittavrittistu mukta jīva iti smṛitaḥ* ! *Sa jīvan mukta ityuktō rāgadvēsha vivarjitaḥ* ॥ The *jīvas* are said to be of three kinds: *baddha*, *śuddha* and *others*. He who is void of faith in his *guru* and bereft of faith in Śiva Parabrahman belongs to one class. And he who esteems himself as his own lord and is self-conceited is considered to be one in bondage like a *paśu*. He who is always conscientiously serving his *guru*, who unites in himself the triple qualities of servitude, who possesses the qualities of humility and other good qualities fit for being a *mumukshu*, who is bereft of personal ties and who always realizes that he is dependent on Śiva, is said to be a *śuddha jīva*. He who is associated with Śiva, who is full of knowledge of Śiva, who enjoys in himself the company of Śiva in his undiminished joy and who is always standing in the burning sun fearlessly like a piece of burning camphor, and realizes Śiva Parabrahman in the open space in his resplendent brilliance of a thousand suns, keeping his mind dissolved, is called a *mukta jīva*. He is said to be a *jīvanmukta* who is absolutely free from either friendship or enmity (*rāga* and *dvēsha*) of any kind.

Moreover, if the doubt be raised whether such differences (as above) among *jīvas* and their enjoyment, etc., hold good in the case of the *Bhrānta-Brahma-jīva-vādins*, who postulate that such differences are due only to *avidyā* caused by *upādhi* and that there could not naturally be such differences, it is cleared in the next *Sūtra* : *Ābhāsa ēva cha* (II. 3. 47). (*It is only fallacious appearance.*) Brahman, who is absolutely *akhaṇḍaikarasaprakāśa* (all fluid-like lustre) in his *svarūpa* but who on account of *upādhi* (disguise), which is a material which supports the cause of *bhēda* between *jīva* and himself, is only *hēturābhāsa* (an unsupportable cause or argument).<sup>736</sup>

<sup>736</sup> Brahman is absolutely *akhaṇḍaikarasaprakāśa* in his *svarūpa*. But *upādhi*, the material which makes the reflection or deceitful appearance possible, on account of which he is made to appear as different from the *jīva*, is a false material and cannot support the *ābhāsa* for asserting that difference.

For it is said in the *Smritis*: *Prakāśaika svarūpasya prakāśaka tirōdhānam prakāśana ēva iti prāgēva upapāditam*. [Brahman is all *prakāśa* (resplendent lustre) only in *sva-rūpa* and *upādhi* is a material which obstructs the appearance. This was originally discussed and brought to light.] The *Sūtra* can also be read as *Ābhāsa ēva*; the indeclinable *cha* denotes only *hēturābhāsa*, i.e., the falsity of the material which causes the false appearance by its obstruction. But *Sruti* texts such as *Pruthagātmānam prēritāramcha matvā | Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau*<sup>737</sup> | *Tayōranyah pippalam svādvatti | iti*,<sup>738</sup> etc., quite contradict the above argument and *avidya* becomes *kalpita upādhi*, i.e., an invented disguise, which brings into existence an idea of difference (*bhēda*) affecting the *sva-rūpaikya* (the union of appearance) contradicting the *bhēda*. The state of opposite experiences, as happiness and misery, which is constant between the two,—i.e., Brahman and *jīva*—is made to appear as only one. Moreover, if as is clearly proved in the *Sruti*, it is conceded that *bimba* and *pratibimba*, forming the Brahman and *jīva*, always live together each possessing a separate conscience of its own,—as declared in the *Sruti* text, *Guhām pratishthē paramē parārdhē*<sup>739</sup>—and *Sūtra* texts like *Guhām prati-shthāwātmanau hi taddarśanāt* (I. 2. 11) etc., do contradict the position that *bimba* and *pratibimba* are one in their nature. This is a subject that it is pleasant not to discuss further. If this contention, however, regarding Brahman and the *jīva*, relating to the highest truth, as being enveloped by *upādhi*, raises the doubt whether such a difference is merely illusory and cannot be said to be real, as it is not clearly seen and declared to be so by the *Sāstras*, the next *Sūtra* meets it: *Adrishtānīyamāt* (II. 2. 48). (*And on account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.*) As the real nature of *upādhi* and its series of changes are not clearly understood when coming into contact with *Brahma-svarūpa*, therefore no definite conclusion has been arrived at

<sup>737</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>738</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

<sup>739</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, III. 1.

nor declared and thus stands an unsettled fact. On account of this unknown *upādhi* coming into contact with *Brahmasvarūpa*, the position becomes one of an extirpator or an eradicator (of *Brahmasvarūpa* itself). Moreover, according to the *Advaita* system, the *jīvas* being alike in their *vibhūta* (lordliness), in spite of all of them being *pratibimbās*, it is also not determined in the *Sāstras* that these *pratibimbās* who appear different from each other are one in their original form. There is also no declaration about the nature of *puṇya* and *pāpa* with which these different *pratibimbās* are connected. The *Sāstras* do not clearly lay bare which class of *pratibimbās* are naturally of the poorer class and which of the richer class. And therefore we have to concede necessarily that *jīvas*, even in their minute form, are innumerable (*bahutvam*) and are by their very nature different from each other (*pratiśarīra svābhāvika bhinnatvam cha angīkartyam*).<sup>740</sup> If it is doubted whether in such a case the *jīvas* as *pratibimbās* are of different kinds—saying “Verily I may obtain this fruit”; “I can get rid of this fruit”; “I will do this”; “I will not do this” and so on—thus exhibiting the *jīvas* as being in a confused state and making it impossible to determine their nature or the classes to which they really belong, etc., the next *Sūtra* clears the doubt.

Commenting on *Abhisandhyādishvapi chaivam* (II. 3. 49) (*And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on*), Śrīpati remarks that it is also equally undetermined as to which class of *jīvas* could be stated to be possessed of *rāga* (love) and which of *dvēsha* (enmity). And therefore, under such indeterminable circumstances, it cannot be exactly stated in clear terms the distinction between the two classes of *jīvas*. Verily, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Ēsha ēva sādhu karma kārayati*,<sup>741</sup> etc., that the *jīva* is absolutely devoid of independence and whatever is achieved by it as *puṇya* or *pāpa* becomes attributable in its birth to *Īśvara*. If

<sup>740</sup> Śrīpati accepts that the *jīvas* are different from each other. Cf. Ānandatīrtha's *Jīvēśayōrbhidāchaivā jīva bhēda parasparam.—Tatva Vivēka*. (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition.)

<sup>741</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 4. 22.

it is said that *karma* is subordinate to Īśvara's promptings, that Īśvara is its prompter, and that *karma* itself (which prompts action) is eternal (*anādi*) and that the result of actions done by both classes of *jīvas* goes to none other than Īśvara, then the answer is "It is not so". Because the *jīvas* unlike Īśvara, though devoid of all knowledge and all power, yet they are not as lifeless as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* and are not *jaḍapadārthas* (motionless matter). But still as a servant behaves towards his king in his subordination, and acts agreeably to the king's commands, though his power of action within the pale of a servant cannot be denied to him; in the same manner, within the pale of their subordinate position, even though their liberty of action be very small, *jīvas* do enjoy the effects of their actions resulting in *puṇya* and *pāpa*. The *Sruti* texts *Jyōtiṣtōmēna svargakāmō yajēta*; *Karmachitō lōkaḥ kṣhīyatē, puṇyachitō lōkaḥ kṣhīyatē*; *Parīkshya lōkān karmachitān Brāhmaṇō nirvēda-māyāt*; <sup>742</sup> *Satyam vada dharmam chara*, <sup>743</sup> etc., and hundreds of others similar to them declare clearly that the *jīva* is one having some small right to action (*kinchit kartrutva*), some small knowledge (*kinchid gnanatva*), and possessing a body fettered in eternal subordination (*kinchit kartrutva, kinchid gnanatva baddhānāditva sarīrah*). *Sruti* texts like *Īkṣhaṇādi pravēśāntam srishṭirīśēna kalpitā* | *Jāgradādi prapanchasya srishṭir jīvēna kalpitā* | *iti*, etc., clearly state that beginning from the time the *jīva* desired to view the world, etc., until the *jīva* enters the final stage (*īkṣhaṇādi pravēśāntam*), his creation rested in the responsibility of Īśa. Thereafter his (the *jīva*'s) wakefulness (*jāgrati*), etc., (*i.e.*, after he came into the world) was of his own responsibility. This shows clearly that *jīvas* have their part of *kartrutva*, though it is minute in its character. The Sun whose action results in the day dawning and the night following and also the actions of *paśu*, *pakshi* and *mṛiga* and the smaller creatures such as insects, etc., have within their own sphere their independence of action,

<sup>742</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 2. 12.

<sup>743</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, I. 15.

which are not denied to them. In the same way, Īsvara has prescribed to the different classes of *jīvas* their limited nature of independence of action and there is, according to the *Srūtis* and *Smritis*, no contradiction in this statement. If this were not so, the aforesaid *Srūtis* and *Smritis* would become seriously opposed to each other. Therefore, the *Srūtis* which grant the double *kartrutva*—the unlimited and the limited (*ubhaya kartrutva*)—are not contradictory to each other. It is therefore seen that *jīvas*, on account of their *Brahmāmśa*, are in a divided form from Brahman (*Brahmāmśatvōna parichchinnatvāt*), even though *amśa* and *amśi* are not different.<sup>744</sup> Therefore if the doubt is raised whether *sukha* and *duḥkha* are not clearly determined, then the next *Sūtra* explains it:—*Praveśabhēdādītichēnnāntarbhāvūt* (II. 3. 50). [*Should it be said (that this is possible) owing to the difference of place; we deny this, on account of (all upādhis) being within (all places).*] (The word *jīva* is understood here.)

If it is said that whatever it may be, Brahman is one and it is not possible for him to go into a divided condition by reason of his coming into contact with *upādhi* of various kinds in various different places, the answer is that Brahman himself does not come into contact with different kinds of *upādhi*. On the other hand, he closely accompanies the *jīva* in order to give the latter the experience of the different states. Therefore it is that the *jīva* is said to be subordinate. By Brahman following the *jīva* to make it undergo the different changes, Brahman remains in the *jīva* controlling it, himself absolutely unaffected by *upādhi*. This state of altered existence is always, in every state of existence, permanent to the Brahman and the *jīva* for all time. But since Brahman wanders in every place, together with the *jīva*, the experience gained by such connection also proceeds solely from the *jīva* and has nothing to do with the Brahman. Therefore, the statement that the *jīva* is the result of the *upādhi* of Brahman and that it is

<sup>744</sup> *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* are both provided for here by Śrīpati.

subordinate to *upādhi* is not a matter relevant to the present subject to discuss.

*Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*;<sup>745</sup> *Gnā gnau dvau ajāvīśānīśau iti*,<sup>746</sup> etc., clearly contradict the position that Brahman is affected by *upādhi*. [They in fact declare that Brahman is absolutely free from *upādhi*.] In the *Sūtra*, *Utpattirasambhavāt*, the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has clearly said before that the *jīvas* are not brought into existence afresh. [Both Brahman and the *jīva* are *nitya*, eternal.] In the present *Adhikaraṇa* in the *Sūtra*, *Amsō nānā vyapa-dēśāt*, etc., it is clearly stated that some of the *jīvas*, who are eligible for realizing *Brahmapada*, do so at the *pralaya* by entering into Brahman (*Brahmānupravishṭānām*) in a naturally divided condition (*svabhāvabhinnānām*) and occupy their respective reserved places (*pada*). At the time of the next creation when they come into existence, *jīvas* who are naturally divided (*svabhāvabhinna*) appear again in their *amśa* form only, even though they belong to Brahman's creation and they cannot, on any account, be called as belonging to *Brahmāmśa* in their origin (i.e., they are born in their own *amśas* and not Brahman's, though the *śrīṣṭi* is Brahman's). In this world, by reason of the knowledge derived from the memory of several different previous births, men generally come into existence, just as a son is born out of the womb of a member of the female sex, and then are called, according to the *Sruti* text, *Ātmā vai putra nāmāsi iti* saying that "Thou art born to me as my son out of my *ātmā*", thereby proving that the son is of the *amśa* (*svāmśatvam*) of the father. Therefore, in our opinion, those several kinds of *jīva* who entered Brahman in the previous *pralaya* went in their own *amśa* form. And this has been accepted as a proof of *amśa* and *amśi* always going in conformity. The *Sūtras* and *Sruti* texts do not contradict each other when they declare that some *jīvas* are eligible for coming into creation while others are not. The *Sruti* text, *Tayōr anyah pippalam svāddvatti*

<sup>745</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>746</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

*anaśnan anyō abhichākaśīti*<sup>747</sup> *iti*, etc., clearly proves that of the two (*jīvākhya pakshi* and *paramākhya pakshi*), the former (the *jīvākhya pakshi*) always seeks to enjoy the results of the actions of its previous births, whereas the latter (the *paramākhya pakshi*) which is always unaffected in its joys, exults in its transcendent splendour. This proves that there is no contradiction when it is said that the *jīva* always enjoys the results of its previous births. The theory, therefore, that for the mere reason that the *jīva* comes into Brahman's creation, he is of Brahman's *aśa* and because he is subject to sorrow and joy, such sorrow and joy belong to Paraśiva Brahman, stands rejected. *Sruti* texts like *Sō'ntarūdantaram prāviśat*<sup>748</sup> | *Antaḥ pravishṭaḥ śāstā janūnām* | *Īśānassarvavidyānām Īśvarassarvabhūtānām*, etc., in their spirit clearly declare that Īśvara is all the while in the heart of the *jīvas* controlling them and directing them towards the results of their previous actions, which theory has been agreed to and accepted. And therefore it is established that whatever the *jīva* does, according to the results of its previous acts, be it sorrow or joy, the enjoyment of it cannot go to Īśvara.

#### Origin of Soul.

The principal *Sūtras* dealing with the *Ātman* are the following:—

- (1) I. 4. 26. *Ātmakritēḥ pariṇāmāt.*  
(Rāmānuja and Śrīkanṭha treat this as two *Sūtras*: I. 4. 26, *Ātmakritēḥ* and I. 4. 27, *Pariṇāmāt*. But Śrīpati follows Sankara and Ānandatīrtha in reading the two *Sūtras* together as one.)
- (2) II. 1. 28. *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāścha hi.*
- (3) II. 2. 33. *Ēvanchātmākārchchanyam.*
- (4) II. 3. 16. *Nātmāśrutērnītyatvōchcha tābhyah.*

<sup>747</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>748</sup> *Atharvaśiras*. This text would seem to suggest that the *jīva* was already in a subordinate position (*antarāi*) and was enabled to enter into (*prāviśat*) a subordinate existence (*antaram*).



- (5) II. 3. 19. *Svātmanā chōttarayōḥ.*  
 (6) II. 3. 28. *Yāvadātmabhāvityvāchcha na dōshastad-  
darśanāt.*  
 (7) III. 3. 15. *Ātmaśabdāchcha.*  
 (8) III. 3. 16. *Ātmagrihītiritaravaduttarāt.*  
 (9) III. 3. 51. *Ēkātmanaśśarīrē bhāvāt.*  
 (10) IV. 1. 3. *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha.*  
 (11) IV. 4. 3. *Ātmā prakaraṇāt.*

The *ātman* is accordingly dealt with in each *Adhyāya*. In the first *Adhyāya*, in *Sūtra* I. 4. 26, the term *ātman* is applied to the *jīva* when it has reduced itself to the infinitesimal part—*anutva*—agreeably to the *dadhikshūra nyāya*. That is, the *ātman* (*jīva*) has by giving up its own form (*svarūpa*) only obtained its another form (*rūpāntara eva*) and thus has transformed itself.

Śrīpati, commenting on this *Sūtra*, says :—By becoming the instrumental and material cause, Brahman made, as connected with himself, the *rūpa* of *ātman* (*nimittōpādānatvē Brahmanah ātmanassambandhinī kritirātmakritiḥ*). In general, Brahman exhibited himself in his own form (*Ātmakritiḥ*) as the chief instrumental cause. According to the text *Tadātmānam svayamakurutē* (Then the Supreme Brahman makes himself of himself a *kārya*; i.e., he makes himself *kāraṇa* and *kārya*), Paramēśvara to whom is applied the appellation of *Ātman*, then transforms himself both as chief cause and as action itself, in order to bring about attainment of creation. If it is doubted how Śiva Parabrahman became himself *kriti* and *karma* (*katham kriti karmatvam*), the reply is summed up (in the word) *Pariṇāmāt* (in the *Sūtrā*), i.e., transformation. In the great, supreme, all-pervading Lord Paraśiva, who is all glory, far from any defilement, and who is above all, these two kinds of forms—*kriti karmatvam*—are not contradictory. These two forms of Parabrahman, viz., the *kriti* form and the *karma* form, culminated in evolving in the two states *chētana* and *achētana* or the *prapancha* form in the final transformation. Verily, according to the *dadhikshūra nyāya* (milk converted

into curds) so Parabrahman, out of his original form, converted himself into two kinds of forms leaving the original. *Pariṇāma* means exchanging the original form by conversion into these two states of existence, viz., *chēṭana* and *achēṭana*. If it is doubted whether it is possible for the eternal unpolluted one (i.e., Brahman) to assume a transformed inferior state, destroying his original state in all its glory, the reply is, "Even though Paramēśvara exhibits himself as the instrumental and material causes respectively, yet, there is no actual destruction of or harm to his original glory. Paramēśvara always has at his call the *Māyā Śakti*, with which he can transform himself into the *jagat-rūpa* (i.e., worldly form). That *Māyā Śakti* of Paramēśvara (*Tat Paramēśvarasya*) is the *nimittakāraṇa* (i.e., the instrumental cause) for the process of transformation. For, it is said in the *Sruti* text, *Mayāntu prakṛitīm vindyāt*, etc.,<sup>749</sup> by which *Māyā Śakti*, which is not different from himself, is the chief *śakti* of Paramēśvara whereby he stands as controller and also as the (controlled) (*Svabhinnamāyayā niyāmyatvam Paramēśvarasya niyāmakatvam cha śravaṇāt*). These (controller and controlled) can be predicated in this world of no other. This is proved. There are other reasons as well.

In the next *Sūtra*, *Yōniścha hi gīyātē*, the other reasons are developed. Śrīpati says, commenting on it, that in this word *Yōni* is used as the synonym for *Prakṛiti*. Because in the *Upanishad* it is stated, *Prithivī yōnirōśhadhi vanaspatīnām iti*, etc. (*Prithivī* is the womb for generating several kinds of plants, trees, etc.). *Yōni* is also a special organ of *śṛiṣṭi*. Indra is also called *Yōni* because he is one of the sources of creation. Therefore *ātman* assumes the form of *Prakṛiti* in order to generate *śṛiṣṭi* of various kinds through the instrumental cause acting upon the material cause. This view is supported by the *Sruti* text, *Yāthōrṇanābhissṛijātē grihyātē cha iti*,<sup>750</sup> etc., which declares that the material

<sup>749</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>750</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 7.

cause also is evidenced by Śiva. And there is thus no contradiction.<sup>751</sup>

In the second *Adhyāya*, in *Sūtra* II. 1. 28, *Ātmani chaivam vichitrūścha hi*, the question is answered, as we have seen above, how Brahman, destitute of bodily form and qualities, becomes the creator of *jagat* which has a bodily form and has many qualities. In answering the question in the affirmative, the further question is raised whether Brahman is influenced by *Māyā Śakti* just as ordinary *jīvas* are.

In the third *Adhyāya*, we have *Sūtras* III. 3. 15 and III. 3. 16, *Ātmaśabdāchcha* and *Ātmagrihītiritaravaduttarāt*. Commenting on the former, Śrīpati says that in this *Sūtra* the term *Ātma* denotes Parabrahman. Texts in the *Taittirīya Sruti* such as, *Tasmādvā ēlasmādātmana ākūśassambhūtaḥ iti*,<sup>752</sup> etc., declare that *Ātman*, that supreme form of Parabrahman, is the chief cause of creation. And through him *ākūśa*, etc. (Vāyu, Agni, etc.) were originated. It is also said in the *Mūṇḍūkya Sruti* in texts such as *Prapañchōpaśamam śāntam śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā sa vighnēyaḥ iti*, etc., which state that the term *ātma* is here used in order to denote that He is Śiva Parabrahman who is the cause of *prapañcha*. It is also declared in the *Atharvaśikhū* text beginning with *Dhyāyītēśānam pradhyāyitavyam sarvamidam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē samprasūyantē iti*, etc., and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya*, etc., that all those who wish to obtain *mōksha* in its final (*charama*) form should meditate upon Paraśiva Brahman only to the prohibition of other forms. Therefore, it is that it is decisively proved that Śiva Parabrahman, who is eternal and who is all-happy, who is all-auspicious and all-bliss,

<sup>751</sup> In this connection, Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 6 :—*Yadbhūtaḥ pūṇaḥ paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ* ; and follows it up with the following citation from the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* :—*Vyavadhānēna sūtiṣṭu pūṇaḥ vidvadbhīruchyātē* ; *Sūtiravyavadhānēna prakṛititvam iti sthitiḥ* » *Ubhayātmakasūtitvāt Vāsudevaḥ paraḥ pūṇaḥ* »

<sup>752</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

is the dual cause of this world under the nomenclature of *Ātman*. *Smṛiti* texts like *Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham kṛṣṇaṅgingalam* । *Ūrdhvarētam virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*,<sup>753</sup> etc., declare that the *Kṛṣṇaṅgingala* and *Virūpākṣhu* form of Parabrahman must always be meditated upon. Thus say the *Smṛitis* : *Śivam bhajanti yē narāḥ Śivam vrajanti tē narāḥ* । *Śivētaram bhajanti tē Śivētaram vrajanti tē* ॥ Those persons who meditate upon and worship Śiva finally go to realize Śiva, while those who meditate upon other forms of Parabrahman than that of Śiva, go to and realize only such other forms. So, therefore, those who are fond of and anxious to reach Śiva should meditate only upon the Śiva Parabrahma form in order to realize the fruit of *Ānandamaya* Śiva and should not think others. The *Sṛuti* text, *Anyō'ntara ātmānandamayaḥ*, etc., declares clearly that Śivamantra should be the chief term employed in meditating upon Śiva in order to derive *Ānandamayasiddhi* and this is clearly explained in them (the *Sṛuti* texts). Moreover, in other contexts also wherein, the text *Anyō'ntara ātmānandamayaḥ* appears, the word *ātma* denotes Parabrahman and in that context explains that Śiva forms the head of Parabrahman and that the other sides of Parabrahman, such as the two flanks and the back, are represented by other forms of deities. And therefore in order to derive complete happiness and enjoy it, head is the chief part of the body and this part being the form of Śiva Parabrahman above all others, must be meditated upon. The *Sṛuti* text, *Indriyēbhyaḥ parāhyarthū arthēbhyaścha param manah* । *Manasastu parā buddhiḥ buddhērātmā mahān parah* । *Mahataḥ param avyaktaṁ avyaktāt puruṣaḥ parah* । *Puruṣānu param kinchit sā kūṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ* ॥ *iti*, etc., declares that subtler are the elements than the senses ; subtler is the mind than the elements ; subtler is the intellect than the mind ; subtler is the great *Ātman* than the intellect ; mightier than the great *Ātman* is the *Avyakta* ; mightier still than even the *Avyakta* is the

<sup>753</sup> *Mahōpa.*, V. 8.

*Purusha*; there is little beyond the *Purusha*. He is the final limit, and the final refuge (for the *jīva*).<sup>754</sup> The *Sruti* texts, *Anyōntara ātmā prāṇamayah* | *Anyōntara ātmā manōmayah* | and also *Anyōntara ātmā vighnānamayah*<sup>755</sup>, point out that the term *Ātma* is used for the subordinate *anātma*, because this is the highest reward that he could reach in realizing *Ātman* on whom he meditates. And therefore the word *Ātma* is used in these two senses (for *Ātman* and *Anātman*).<sup>756</sup> But how can we determine the *vighnānamaya anātma* to realize the *ānandamaya ātma* by meditation as declared in the *Sruti* text *Anyōntara ātmānandamayah*? The next *Sūtra* clears the doubt: *Ātmagrihītiritaravaduttarāt* (III. 3. 16). The term *Ātma* in the *Sruti* text, *Anyōntara ātmānandamaya iti*, points out only the Paramātma and should be understood only as such. The expression *itaravāt* in the *Sūtra* means clearly "as compared with the word *Ātma* used elsewhere"—(i.e., the secondary sense signifying *anātma*, i.e., *jīva*). The *Sruti* text, *Ātmā vā idamēka ēvāgra āśīt* | *Sa īkshata lōkān srijā iti*,<sup>757</sup> etc., in which the word *ātma* is used, refers only to Paramātman and should be understood in that sense. Then, why is this term used in this way? The expression *uttarāt* in the *Sūtra* explains the meaning of the *Sruti* as an answer. *Sō'kāmayata bahusyām prajāyēya*.<sup>758</sup> It was his desire to create many such *prajas* (*ātman*s). And this is the answer of Parabrahman when questioned.

In *Ēka ātmanaśśarīrē bhāvāt* (III. 3. 51), *Srīpati* says: *Ātmanah*—In the body of the *jīva*, Parabrahma Śiva

<sup>754</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, III. 10. *Avyaktam*: The undeveloped. Paul Deussen translates it as *natura naturans* and *Vyaktam* as *natura naturata* or the already developed. See the *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 240. *Purusha*: Spirit; the Knowing Subject. *Ibid.*

<sup>755</sup> *Anyōntarātmā* = *Anyah* + *antarah* + *Ātmā*, where *anyah* denotes Parabrahman. Cf. *Uttamah Purushastvanyah* (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, XV. 17); *antarah* + *ātmā* denotes the subordinate *anātmā* (i.e., the *jīva*).

<sup>756</sup> *Ānandatīrtha* quotes from (i) *Vāmanasmṛiti*: *Anātmanyātma sabdastu sōpachārah prayujyatē*; and (ii) from the *Tal. Br. Upa.*: *Dvēvāva brahmaṇōrūpē Ātmāchaiva Anātmācha*.

<sup>757</sup> *Aitarīya Upa.*, I. 1. 1.

<sup>758</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

prevails as its chief (or dominating) innate property. The texts, *Grihapraśishthē paramē parārdhē* | *Īśānasarvavidyānām īśvarassarvabhūtānām* | *Pradhāna kshētragna-patirguṇēśaḥ samsāra mōksha sthītibandha hētuh* | *Brahma-vidāpnōti param* | *Tattvamasi* | *iti*, etc., clearly denote that Brahman as *Ātman* exists in the body absolutely over and above the *jīva* (*jīvātirikatatvēna*) as supreme and unsurpassed. And it is therefore not correct that the *jīva* should meditate upon himself for realization. This is the gist of what is intended to be conveyed by this *Sūtra*. In all this Brahmanavidya, during meditation, the *upāsaka* (i.e., the meditator) should clearly understand the *svarūpa* of Parabrahman in order to differentiate the *upāsaka* from the *upāsya*. In the *Sūtra*, *Trayāṇāmēva chaivam-upanyāsaḥ praśnaścha iti* and\* the *Taittirīya Sruti* text, *Bhṛigur vai vāruṇiḥ* | *Varuṇam pitaramupāsasāra* | *Adhīhi bhagavō Brahmēti* | *Tasmā ētat prōvācha* | *Annam prāṇam chakshuh śrōtram manō vācham iti* | *Tam hōvācha* | and the text beginning with *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*<sup>759</sup> and ending with *Saishā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā paramē vyōman pratishkītā*,<sup>760</sup> it is said in answer to the question raised whether in order to meditate on *ānandamaya* Brahman should the *upāsaka* (the meditator) think upon the Paramātmā or the *jīva*:—In the *Srutis* it is said *Ayamātmā Brahma*<sup>761</sup> (This *ātma* is Brahman) thereby meaning that the *jīva* alone is Brahman. The *Sruti* texts *Yō'nyām dēvatām upāstē anyō'sāvanyō'hamasmi* | *Na sa vēda yathā paśuh* | *Mri-tyōssamrutyumāpnōti iti*,<sup>762</sup> etc., clearly state that there is no other beyond the meditator himself to realize as the Supreme. The *Sruti* texts, *Ahamasmi Brahmāhamasmi iti*,<sup>763</sup> etc., also support the same view. Therefore if it is argued that it is the conclusion of all Vēdantic texts that the meditator should meditate on himself for realization, then the reply is

<sup>759</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>760</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 1. 6.

<sup>761</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.

<sup>762</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 19.

<sup>763</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 4. 10.

that the explanation is propounded in this *Sūtra*: *Ēka ātmanāśśarīrē bhāvāt*. The expression “*Ēkaḥ*” means “*Paramātmān*; *Pradhāna kshētragnapatir mahēśvaraḥ*”; the expression “*Ātma*” means “*sthāvara jaṅgamātmaka jīva*” i.e., the being in the movable and immovable world; the word *Bhinnaḥ* is to be read here after the word “*Ātmanah*”. This word is suggested as completing the sense of the *Sūtra*, which *Srīpati* reads as to mean that “In the *jīva*’s body, *Paramātmān* dwells as the Chief Lord; on account of *jīva*, He is different from him (*jīva*)”. As read by him, the *Sūtra* would run: *Ēka ātmanō bhinnah śarīrē bhāvāt*.

*Srīpati* then proceeds. The *Sruti* texts *Ritam pibantau sukritasya lōkē guhām pravishiṭau paramē parardhē* | *Chchāyātāpau Brahmavidō vadanti panchāgnayō yē cha triṇāchikētāḥ*<sup>764</sup> | *Dvāsuparṇā śayujā sakhāyau* | *Ksharam pradhānam amritāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*, etc., declare that the two internal beings, *jīva* and *Īśvara*, are always living in the *Puṇḍarika* (heart) of the body as two different beings. All *Vēdānta* agrees in declaring that the two are ever constant and this is amply proved in the dialogue between *Bhrigu* and *Vārūṇi*, in the manner of question and reply. *Bhrigu* has clearly explained the *Brahma dharma*, viz., that the *vignānamaya jīva* is absolutely different from the *Anandamaya Brahma*, as existing in the body of the *jīva*. This peculiar characteristic of the two is inevitable. In conclusion, the *Sruti* text beginning with *Sa yaśchāyam purushē* | *Yaśchāsavādityē* | *Sa ēkaḥ* | *Sa ya ēvam vit* | and ending with *Ahamannamahamannamadantamadmi* | *Aham viśvam bhuvanam abhyabhuvām* | *Suvarṇa jyōtiḥ* | *Ya ēvam vēda* | and also the *Sruti* texts *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ* | *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* | *Ūrdhvarētam Virūpāksham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*<sup>765</sup> | *Hiraṇmayōham Śivarūpamasmi* | *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē* | *iti*, and numerous other texts declare that *Paraśiva* in his form of *Hiraṇmaya* and the All-pervading prevails everywhere. This cannot be claimed by another (*nētara paratvam*). *Sruti* texts

<sup>764</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>765</sup> *Ibid.*

like *Yō vignānē tishthan yasya vignānam śarīram* | *Ya ātmani tishthan yasyātmā śarīram*<sup>766</sup> | *Hiraṇmayē parēkōṣē virajam Brahma nishphalam* | *Tat śubhram jyōtishām jyōtistattadātmavidō viduḥ* | *Ātmāvā'rē drashtavyaḥ śrōtavyō mantavyō nididhyāsitaṇyaḥ* | *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati* | *iti*, etc., declare that according to one's own and other *sākhās* of *Vēdānta* and every other branch of learning, Śiva Parabrahman is the one to be meditated upon and that the *jīva* is the meditator. And that by his meditation upon Brahman, the *jīva* can obtain and realize Brahman is also clearly explained. The meditation on Brahman as *Annam Brahma* by the *vignānātmaka jīva* during the period of meditation refers only to Paramēśvara Brahman who pervades him. And in order to reach him, the various stages of his meditation show the several steps that he advances in his progress of meditation in order to reach him. The conception of the *jīva* as Brahman himself absolutely is flatly contradicted by several *Sruti* texts :—*Anūśayā sōchati muhyamānaḥ* | *Tarati śōkamātmavit*<sup>767</sup> | *Īśam gnātūā amritatvamēti* | *Tamēvam viditūā atimrityumēti* | *Nānyaḥ panthā vidyatē ayanāya*;<sup>768</sup> *Śradhā bhakti dhyāna yōgādavēhi* | *Ātmānam arañim kritūā prañavam chōttarāraṇim* | *Dhyāna nir-mathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ* | etc., and many others. This forms the subject of discussion of the *Bhṛiguvalī* dialogue from the beginning to the end. *Sruti* texts like *Aham Brahmāsmi*, *Tattvamasi*, *iti*,<sup>769</sup> etc., though they lead to the inference that the meditator and the meditated are one in the result (*phala*), yet they have not sufficiently proved and declared that the *jīva*, who enters into *anādi malasamsāra* (an infinite series of sins) and binds himself for entering into several generations in his bodily form, now going into it and now coming out of it, and who thus keeps struggling on in this fire of

<sup>766</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.

<sup>767</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 3.

<sup>768</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 8.

<sup>769</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.



*tāpatraya* and feels burning pain (*dandahyamāna*), could ever come out of it and ever could possibly attain *Brahmatva*—this is kept as a great doubt. That this is never possible is conclusive (*Tāpatrayānala dandahyamāna svabhāvasya naśvatō Brahmatvam sambhavaṭīti siddham*).

*Ēvanchātmākārtsnyam* (II. 2. 33). (*And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.*) Thus, it follows that the *ātman* (as *jīva*) became a totality with the Supreme. In other words, the *jīva* is, as compared with the body, in small size and occupies but a small portion of it. There, in that small space, it lives in a very diminutive form; in the same way it lives in small insects occupying but a small space in them, and making the totality of its form with the Supreme Ātman. Moreover, if it is conceded that the *jīva* occupies the body in as small form, then, there is room to think that it goes even to *Paralōka* in that small form. And therefore we have to accept that the *jīva* assumes the *sūkshma* form and lives in the body.

If we have to oppose such a view, the next *Sūtra*—*Sarīrāṇām chānavasthīlaparimāṇatvāt* (II. 2. 34) (*And on account of recognition*)—explains that it cannot be so contradicted.

We have seen insects such as flies, etc., in minute forms, born as the result of their previous *karma*; such insects are born again in their future lives as elephants as the result of their previous *karma*.<sup>770</sup> But the suggestion, because the *jīva* is small and minute, it can ascend to the other world in that form (*i.e.*, with its body), because its body is small and that the elephant cannot because of its heavy body, is fallacious and cannot be accepted. Such a reasoning ends in contradicting the *siddhānta* (the theory) that no *jīva* goes to the other world with its body but leaving the body behind.

*Nātmāśrutēr nityatvāchcha tābhyah* (II. 3. 16).

The word *Ātma* cannot obtain the meaning of *śarīra*. Why? Because it is not so supported by the *Srutis*. We do not

<sup>770</sup> A fly in one generation may become an elephant in another birth. See *Mahābhārata*, *Ānuśāsanika Parva*, *Kiṣṇopākhyāna*.

hear from the *Sruti* texts describing creation that the *jīvas* were created anew. (They already existed.) *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., bear testimony to the eternal existence of the *jīvas*. This is the gist of the meaning of this *Sūtra* (*Na+ātma+aśrutōḥ +nityatvāt+cha+tābhyah*). That this entire world was originated through the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc.<sup>771</sup> and that Brahman became manifest through Parabrahman is stated in the *Sruti* texts. Then, if it is asked whether the *jīva* also came into existence along with Brahman and the entire world, the question arises which is the right answer. The answer should be in the affirmative (*astīti*). How? The ready reply is provided by the *Sruti* text *Ēkavignānēna sarvavignānam*<sup>772</sup>—by understanding one we have to understand the rest in the same way, in order that we may be consistent with our previous *pratigna* (*Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., texts). We have agreed that originally there was only one *srishṭi* (creation) during which just as *ākāśa* and the rest became manifested, *jīvas* also became manifest and this is supported by the *Sruti* texts as already set forth in our arguments (texts like *Yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī-tōyēna jīvān visasarja bhūmyām*).<sup>773</sup> From whom the world came into existence, through him (the Parabrahman) *i.e.*, the same source, came also the *jīvas*. *Prajāpatih prajā asrujata; Sanmūlāssomyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ*

<sup>771</sup> *Ākāśādvāyuh vāyōragnih agnērāpaḥ*, etc., *Rig-Vēda*, *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1. 1.

<sup>772</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 4.

<sup>773</sup> This is a text from the *Mahānārāyaṇōpanishad*, I. 16. It is quoted by Ānandatīrtha, I. 1. 1. The full text is as follows:—

*Yam antassamudrē kavayō vadanti yadaḥśharē paramē prajāḥ |*  
*Yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī tōyēna jīvān visasarja bhūmyām ||*

Ānandatīrtha quotes it for establishing his thesis that the world is eternal and only became manifest through Parabrahman at the time of creation along with the *jīvas*, thereby suggesting that *jīvas* were no new entities brought into being at the time of creation but only previously existing ones brought into manifestation at creation by him.

*satpratishtāh*; <sup>774</sup> *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*; <sup>775</sup> *iti* and other texts clearly prove that the creation of the world was *along with all the jīvas* in a *sachētana* form. These texts clearly demonstrate that the coming into being of the *jīvas* was along with the world and that it is to be understood to be as such. No separate statement (of this) is necessary, for Brahman is also said to be eternal. This view is amply proved by *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi* <sup>776</sup> etc., inasmuch as the *jīvas* to whom *Brahmatva* is attributed, are also eternal. *Sruti* texts like *Aitadātmyamidam sarvam*; <sup>777</sup> *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*; <sup>778</sup> etc., also prove that Brahman became manifested through *Ākāśa* etc., though eternal. And therefore the view that even the *jīvas* did come through the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc., has to be accepted. • If this is the conclusion we have to come to, then according to the *Sūtra Nātmāśrutēr nityatvāchcha tābhyah iti*, etc., the word *ātma* cannot be construed to mean the *śarīra*, because it is not so established by the *Sruti* texts. The *Gītā Smriti* says: *Na jāyatē mriyatē vā vipaśchit* <sup>779</sup> (Neither is he born nor does he die). And *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*, etc., conclusively oppose the holding of a contradictory view. The eternity of the *Ātman* (*Ātmanō nityatvam*) (i.e., *jīva* and the Parabrahman) is amply proved by the *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts themselves. *Sruti* texts such as *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām ēkō bahūnām yō vidadhāti kāmān*; <sup>780</sup> *Ajō nityaśśāśvatōyam purāṇō na hanyatē hanyamānē śarīrē*; <sup>781</sup> *iti*, etc., declare the same view, viz., that *jīvas* are eternal among the eternal things (*nityō'nityānām*); are sentient

<sup>774</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 6. 4.

<sup>775</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>776</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

<sup>777</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 8. 7.

<sup>778</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 4.

<sup>779</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II; *Kaṭha Upa.*, II. 18.

<sup>780</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

<sup>781</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II.

beings among sentient beings (*chētanaśchētanānām*); and one among several eternal things (*ekō bahūnām*), who realize their desires; this *jīva* is called *aja* (because he is not born); *nitya* (eternal); and *śāśvata* (ever existing as a being); he is always old (*purāṇaḥ*); he is neither killed nor does he die although he loses his bodily form. And therefore *ātma* cannot mean the *śarīra*. Then how is it possible to know everything by knowing well one thing (as stated in the *Sruti* text *Ēka vijnānēna sarva vijnānam*)?<sup>782</sup> The reply may be thus formulated. The *jīvas* also possess the right to act and are in the fields of *kāraṇa* and *kārya* independent of others.

This being so, then, we have to admit that the world and *jīvas* came into existence by the influence of *Ākāśa*, etc. But it is said that it is not *sū* (*nētyuchyatē*). Because of *dravya* (substance)<sup>783</sup> being the same, all others are the transformed travail (*avasthāntarāpattiḥ*) of that one. And the same remark applies to the *jīva* also. But in the *jīva*, there is something more, *viz.*, while *Ākāśa*, etc., are *achē-tana*, *jīva* is not so, because it is a *chētana* (sentient being). This is the peculiarity (*viśēsha*). Another peculiarity is that the *jīva* has in it invested *gnāna* (knowledge) to a small extent while *Ākāśa*, etc., do not possess it. But *Ākāśa*, etc., have for their part a peculiar transforming characteristic, thereby showing a constant tendency to change from one appearance to another (*svarūpānyathābhūva*). This last peculiarity of liability to constant change is not found in the *jīva*, which is prohibited (*pratishiddhyatē*) to it. So, in conclusion, it follows that having proved the eternity of the *jīva* and explained the difference between Parabrahman and the *jīva*, and the *jīva* being always dependent on the Parabrahman for obtaining all that it is to enjoy through his favour and under his control, the *jīva* can in no circumstances aspire to be on a level with

<sup>782</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 1. 6.

<sup>783</sup> *Dravyam*: a thing, substance, matter; the ingredient or material of anything. An elementary substance, the substratum of properties, one of the seven categories of the *Vaiśēshikas*.

the Parabrahman in the many characteristics which mark him—*nityatva* (eternality), *niravadyatva* (faultlessness), *sarvagñatva* (all-knowing), *satyasankalpatva* (truthful determination), *kāryakāraṇādhipatva* (lordship of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*), and *viśvapatitva* (lordship of the universe). And therefore Parabrahman is the ordainer of all the states in the *chidachit* world in the entire creation and is responsible for its control. And therefore in the light of all the qualities proved in Parabrahman, the *jīva* can never acquire any such *dharma* unto himself. Even though in his *sūkshma daśū*, Parabrahman lies in him (*jīva*) also in a *sūkshma daśū*; *dvaita* (dualism) is eternal (*dvaitasya nityatvam*). In the *mōksha daśū* (realized state), by virtue of the *Bhramarakṛtanyāya*, the *jīva*, being freed from all kinds of bondage, attains *Sivatva* (*Sivatva prāptih*). *Sruti* texts like *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati iti*,<sup>784</sup> etc., clearly declare this truth. Therefore we have to admit that in the state of bondage (*baddha daśāyām*), *jīva* and Brahman are entirely different from each other (*baddha daśāyām jīva Brahmanōr bhēdatvam*) and in the realized state (*mukta daśāyām*) they are one (*muktadaśāyām abhēdatvam*). This is the manner in which *Sruti samanvayam* is brought about. When one's power in himself expands, *Sivatva* is naturally reached in its fully developed state (*Sivasvābhāvika svaśakti vikāsatayā*). Just as *Sruti* texts like *Yathōrṇa nābhissrujatē grihyatēcha iti*, etc., demonstrate that both the act of creation of the universe and the act of withdrawing of it is in one and the same *ūrṇanābhi* (Paramount Lord), the *dvaitādvaita* doctrine follows in the same way. If we are to discuss the principles involved, then it comes to *bhēdatva*, i.e., Parabrahman being the cause (*srishti*) and the material world the *upādāna kāraṇa*. Judging from the material world and its creation (*upādānatva*), *abhēdatva* is established. Both *kāryāvastha* and *kāraṇāvastha* have come to prevail upon *jagat* and *Īśvara* and this establishes the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēdatvam*. Judging from *kāryāvastha*, Parabrahman's own *śakti* is throughout

<sup>784</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

seen to be in continuity without any break (*svaśaktiparī-  
nāmatvēna abhēdatva*) and hence *abhēdatva* is established ;  
but judging from *niyāmakatva* (the controlling power be-  
hind the creation), *bhinnatva* is proved (*svanīyāmakatvēna  
svabhinnatvam*). Even judging from the standpoint of  
*kāraṇāvastha*, every part of the creation is withdrawn into  
himself—which proves *abhēdatva* (*svāntarīnatvēna abhēda-  
tvam*). Just as in the hot season (*grīshma kālē*), the earth  
is seen quite free from green grass, etc., being parched up  
these existing but in very minute (*sūkshma*) form, everything  
having been absorbed in Parabrahman, *svabhinnatvam* is  
established by the whole of the *Vēdānta* (that is, it follows  
that the material world is separated from the Parabrahman).  
Thus *abhinnatva* is, in Sṛipati's opinion, the minutest form  
of *bhinnatva*. This passes generally as *abhinnatva*. *Sṛuti*  
texts like *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*,<sup>785</sup> etc. (*He was the  
only one that existed at first in the form of Sat*) declare that  
at the time of *Pralaya* in this world, Parabrahman existed in  
the form of *chidachidātmaka Parabrahman* (i.e., keeping  
everything in himself, He alone existed). Then when crea-  
tion came into being, Parabrahman began to manifest every-  
thing as quite different from himself and brought into  
existence the world and the rest. *Sṛuti* texts like *Asadvā  
idamagra āsīt; Tatō vai sadajāyata iti*,<sup>786</sup> etc., declare that  
the term *asat* in the *Sṛuti* texts denotes the *chidachidātmaka*  
form of Parabrahman and that he existed in a very minute  
(*sūkshma*) form and thereafter everything became minutest in  
a visible form. Thus the things which were in the manifest  
form at first, became, through the cause of Parabrahman,  
all visible in their gross (*sthūla*) form. In other words, these  
transformations from their minutest forms to big, bulky  
forms were due to that Supreme Parabrahman, who caused  
these changes from one state to another, i.e., from cause to  
effect through his *śabda* and other influences, which did not  
exist before (that is, what was in *sūkshma bhinnatva*, i.e.,  
*aikatva*, became in Parabrahman's hands *sthūla bhinnatva*).

<sup>785</sup> *Chh. Upa.* VI. 2.

<sup>786</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 7.

Parabrahman in whom *chidamśa* was latent, minutest during *srishṭi* its actual, real state, by way of *vikāra* (transformation), in order to prove the fruit of its own action (*karma phala bhōktravāya*) i.e., the real nature of *chidamśa* (latent in Parabrahman). (What was latent in him looked like *aikya* but not really *aikya*; so in *srishṭi* it comes out in its real form.) This double manner of manifesting himself which is latent in Parabrahman and which is brought into play during *srishṭi* shows his controlling nature. This manifests his two-fold nature, in which *chidachit* are, in *Pralaya*, latent in him. In creation, these are separated and are shown, by reason of *kārya* and *kāraṇa* as separate, each with its different characteristics. These are different in creation (*srishṭi*) owing to their inherent characteristics and are so manifest. These two kinds of manifestations look, in their manner of operation, quite different from each other, so as to seem that they are the result of magic (*Prakāradvayē prakāriṇiṇiṇi samānah*).<sup>787</sup> Therefore an undesirable conclusion is reached (*āpattiḥ*). The *Sruti* text beginning with "*Yēnāśrutam śrutam*"<sup>788</sup> and ending with *Ēkavignānēna sarva vignānam*, etc. (what has not been heard has now been heard; by understanding one thing thoroughly well, everything will be understood) is illustrated in the example contained in the *Sruti* text *Yathā saumyēkēna mṛitpindēna*,<sup>789</sup> etc. (Oh sweet disciple! look at this rounded ball of earth, etc.) This example seems knowledge in a nutshell, which, when expanded, explains clearly the whole relationship which is made up of coming together and parting (i.e., creation and dissolution). In the same way, you have to understand, by way of application, how the *jīva* is brought into manifestation and how it undergoes dissolution (*jīvasyōtpatti maraṇavādinyah*). Several *Sruti* texts like *Prajāpatiḥ prajā asrujata*, etc., declare clearly how

<sup>787</sup> *Sūkshmadvaita* is *advaita* reduced to the minutest form. This, briefly put, seems to be *Srīpati*'s view.

<sup>788</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

<sup>789</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 1. 4.

the *achidamśa svarūpa jīva* comes into existence and goes into dissolution. This forms the subject of discussion between the two sets of argumentators known as *jīva-nityatva-vādinayah* and *jīva-pratishēdha-vādinayah*, those who argue that *jīva* is eternal and those who contradict that view. *Smṛiti* texts like *Na jāyatē mriyatē*, etc., and *Sṛuti* texts such as *Nityō'nityānām chētanaśchētanānām*,<sup>790</sup> *iti*, etc. declare the two states of the *jīva* in their *svārūpa* in the *sankōcha* and *vikāsa* form in the illustrating example (of *mṛitpīṇḍa*) shown to the disciple. Also, texts like *Savā ēsha mahānaja ātmā ajarō amarō amritō Brahmā*,<sup>791</sup> *Nityō'nityānām*,<sup>792</sup> etc., prove distinctly the *Parabrahma vishaya* (i.e., characteristics of Parabrahman). Thus, at all times, it is clearly explained what there is contained in Paraśiva-brahman in his latent form•of *chidachid vastuḥ*; while he himself is *Pūrṇah* and while before creation he shows himself, as one all contained in himself, undifferentiated in name, form and division (*prākṣrishtērēkatvā-vadhāraṇam nāmarūpa vibhāgābhāvādūpapadyatē*). This is how it operates. *Sṛuti* texts like *Tārhya vyākṛitamāsīt tannāmarūpābhyām vyākriyatē, iti*,<sup>793</sup> declare how during *srishti* those latent things in *avyakta* Parabrahman became manifest, and how they have been described in the *Sāstras* by their individual names and forms in their several states of existence at their origin and at their dissolution. There are interpreters who argue that Brahman himself appears in several *jīva* forms owing to the *upādhi* of *avidya* (*avidyōpādhi*) in him (*Yētvavidyōpādhikam jīvatvam vadanti*); there are those who argue that at all times the *jīva* lies in Brahman absolutely separate from him, but only comes into *srishti* in order to work out his own destiny (*pāramārthikō-pādhikritam*); and there are those who argue that Brahman, who by himself forms the *bhōktru* (the enjoyer), *bhōgya* (the object of enjoyment) and the controller (*niyantru*). All these

<sup>790</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

<sup>791</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 25.

<sup>792</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

<sup>793</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 3.



three sets of disputants maintain *avidyāśakti*, *rūpādīśakti* and *bhōktru-bhōgya-nīyantru śakti*, and agree to the conclusion that at the time of *Pralaya*, Parabrahman alone exists as Self. And all these say that Parabrahman alone exults in bliss without another name, form or division as explained in *Sūtras* like *Vaishamya nairghrīṇyēna sāpēkshatvāt* (II. 1. 34), *Nakarmavibhāgāditi chēnnānāditvāt hyupapadyatēchāpyupalabhyatēcha* (II. 1. 35), *iti* etc. These texts declare clearly that the flow of *jīvas* in their different states of existence (*jīvabhēdasya*) in their different series of *karma* (*tat karma pravāhasya*) is of eternal nature (*anāditvāt*) and is seen in the form of a stream continually flowing. They also say that in both the states—*pāramārthika* and *anādyupādhi*—Parabrahman himself undergoes bondage. As *upādhi* is nothing apart from Parabrahman nor anything new from him, Parabrahman alone undergoes all these transformations (*Upādhi Brahma vyatirikta vastvantarābhāvāt aparasya Brahmaiva vichitrākārēna pariṇamatē*). He alone enjoys all results, both good and bad. But in that capacity as controller (*nīyantru*), he does not enjoy any portion of the results ; yet the unseparateness from Parabrahman as both *enjoyer* and *enjoyed*, he manifests himself as All-alone. As for our part, we hold that Parabrahman, out of his supreme power of expanding and contracting in the forms *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, is always absolutely free from any speck of fault and far from any smell of it. His *satyasankalpatva* (truthful resolution) is exhibited variously and without end and is always seen in the midst of the ocean of his good qualities. He holds in himself *chit* and *achit* things ; but He has no other kinds of forms which are wanting in His goodness. And therefore the demonstrated conclusion is everything is reasonable and virtuous in Him.

*Svātmanā chōttarayōḥ* (II. 3. 19) (*Sva*+*ātmanā*+*cha*+*uttarayōḥ*). Is *sva* (Parabrahman) or *ātma* the greater ? The answer is in the conclusion reached. In order to reject any *vibhutva* for the *jīva*, this *Sūtra* is propounded. The particle *cha* in this *Sūtra* is intended to restrict the meaning of *ātma*. However, death follows from the

separation of the *jīva* from the *śarīra*. This is called *utkrānti*. Even if the *jīva* as the associate of *sva* stayed in the *śarīra*, he finds no secure home in it. (This *Sūtra* says that the *jīva* cannot reckon on the *śarīra* as its permanent home ; because *jīva* has no *vibhutva* over the *śarīra*.) Therefore *anūtva* (atomicity or minuteness) becomes established (as the chief characteristic) of the *jīva*. [The *Sūtra* means : The meaning of the word *ātma* (*jīva*) used with the term *sva* (Parabrahman) is restricted by the conclusion arrived at later on.] The word *sva* must be understood from its own meaning according to the term used in the *Sūtra*. Because the term *sva* used in *Sūtra* 21 restricts the meaning to *jīva* who occupies in a minute form the *śarīra* merely for enjoyment of the results of his previous *karma* (II. 3. 20). The term *aṇu* cannot apply to *jīva*, but to Parabrahman, the chief *adhikāri*, who is other than the *jīva* and controls the *jīva* in the *śarīra* (*Na+anuk+atah+śrutēh+iti+chēt+na+itarādhikārāt*) (II. 3. 20). In the next *Sūtra*, *Svaśabdōnmānābhyāmcha* (II. 3. 21), it is stated that the *jīva* also is called *aṇu* when in the *śarīra*. Thus the *Sruti* text says, *Yēśhō aṇurātmā chētasā vēditavyō yasmin prāṇaḥ panchadhā samvivēśa*,<sup>794</sup> *iti*, etc. (This *aṇu* who is also called *ātma* and who is determined by the method of his actions also entered the *śarīra* in the form of the five elements). This *aṇu* form of the *jīva* was placed in the *śarīra* along with the controlling *adhikāri* (*sva*),<sup>795</sup> in order to give the *jīva* opportunities of enjoying the fruit of his actions. The text says, *bhāgō jīvassavignēyaḥ* (The lesser one who actually enjoys should be understood to be the *jīva*). The *jīva* is usually known to be of such a minute form as to be known in the world's parlance as the size of a hair at the end of the tail of a horse (*vālāgra mātṛō vyavahārōpi*). Therefore he (*jīva*) is also called *aṇu* as well as the Supreme *Ātma*, with whom he stays in association in the *śarīra*. Thus under the control of the Supreme *Ātma*, this *aṇu*

<sup>794</sup> *Mund. Uṇa.*, III. 1. 9.

<sup>795</sup> *Sva*. Literally, one's own, belonging to oneself. Brahman, the Supreme Soul, claiming the *jīvas* as his own.

*jīva* pervades the whole of the *śarīra* and undergoes experiences such as misery, etc.<sup>796</sup>

In the *Sūtra*, *Svaśabdōnmānābhyāmcha* (II. 3. 21) (And on account of the very word—*Sva*—and of the measure of pervasion), the significance of the term *sva* is explained at some length. The term *sva* is employed to show that Parabrahman is also in the *anu* form. The *Sruti* text, *Eshō anurātma chētasā vēditavyō yasmin prāṇaḥ panchadhā samvivēśa*<sup>797</sup> declares that this *jīva* in the form of *anu* is to be understood by his actions; he entered the *śarīra* as *prāṇa* composed of the five elements. The expression *unmānam* in the *Sūtra* means *Udhrutya-mānābhyām*, i.e., the measure of elevation as between the two; (*Sva*) resembles *anu* in his form; what results from the resemblance and the measure of elevation (afforded) to the *jīva* (by *Sva*) makes it get such elevation applied to itself (the *jīva*).<sup>798</sup> The *Sruti* text declares *Vālāgra śatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya cha* | *Bhāgō jīvas savignēya iti*. (The *jīva* is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of hair follicle of a horse's tail divided a hundred times.)<sup>799</sup> And in *vyavahāra*, the *jīva* occupies such a small minute form in the *śarīra*; yet he throws his refulgence throughout the whole body during life. And therefore it is the *ātma* in the *anu* form that exists in the *śarīra* and it is he who calls himself the *jīva*. In this *anu* form, whatever experiences he, (the *jīva*), gathers of sorrow, pain, etc., is for himself only and not for the *Sva*. If it is asked whether it is possible for two sets of beings—*jīva* and *sva*—one undergoing pain, sorrow and

<sup>796</sup> The term *unmāna* used in the *Sūtra* is meant to measure out the difference between the *jīva* and the Parabrahman in *anu* forms in which the *jīva* experiences pain and sorrow while Parabrahman is all-exultant bliss, controlling the *jīva*. *Unmāna* means weighing or measuring up; it is really a measure of size or quantity.

<sup>797</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 9.

<sup>798</sup> The *sva* is in the *śarīra* in *anu* form and gives his *prabhāva* to the *jīva* and makes him appear as if he was everything. The *bimba-pratibimba* theory is implicit in this comment.

<sup>799</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, V. I.

the like and the other free and exultant in joy, to co-exist, the following *Sūtra* explains it: *Avirōdhaśchandanavat* (II. 3. 22) (*There is no contradiction as in the case of sandal unguent*).

There is no contradiction; because it is like the sandal plant in the midst of a number of other kinds of trees. Just as the sandal paste smeared over the body in a particular spot spreads its scent throughout the body and produces coolness, etc., similarly the *jīva* and *kshētragna* staying in one place in the body throws its radiance all over the body and experiences sorrow and joy in every part of the *śarīra* generally. Hence, there is no contradiction here. If it is asked in which part of the *śarīra* the *jīva* lies in its *amśa* form (*Kasmīnamśēva sthānam*), the next *Sūtra* determines its special place (in the *śarīra*). *Avasthiti vaiśeṣhyāditi chēnābhyupagamāddhrudhi* (II. 3. 23) (*If it be said that this is not so on account of specialization of abode, we say no, because of the acknowledgment of a place of the Sva, i.e., in the heart*).

*Sruti* texts like *Hridayadēśē hyātmanah sthitiḥ*; *Hridihyayam ātmā tatraikaśatam nūḍinām iti*,<sup>800</sup> etc.; *Katama ātmā iti*,<sup>801</sup> etc.; *Yō yam vignānamaya prāṇēshu hridyantarjyōtiḥ*; <sup>802</sup> etc., declare that the *ātma* cannot live in any other place than what is allotted to it especially as its own, *viz.*, the interior of the heart. The example of sandalwood is given only to proclaim the special region allotted to it in the *śarīra*, by which it proclaims itself through its radiant rays—just as the scent does the existence in the midst of other trees of the sandalwood. The example of the sandal is not to show merely its position among the trees; but to indicate how it proclaims

<sup>800</sup> *Praśna Upa.*, III. 6.

<sup>801</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, VI. 3. 7.

<sup>802</sup> These may be thus translated:—*Ātma* is in the *Hridayapradēśa*—the area of the heart; in the area of the heart, along with a hundred nerves, this *ātma* dwells; the *ātma* is none at all when compared with the Supreme *Sva*; he who is proclaimed as *vignānamaya* dwells in the living body in the interior of the heart in a glowing form.

its existence in the place where it is by its scent. Even though its existence is confined to one particular spot, its rays carry its fame through the *śarīra* and makes itself all-pervasive (all which is due to the influence of *Sva* in the body by the side of the *jīva*). The following *Sūtra* gives a further description of the *jīva*'s existence in the *śarīra*: *Guṇādvā lōkavat* (II. 3. 24)<sup>803</sup> (*Or on account of its all-round lustre*).

The expression *vā* in the *Sūtra* excludes all other doctrines than what is declared herein. *Ātma* by its own property (*guṇa*) and knowledge (*gnāna*) stays in its allotted spot with its rays radiating throughout the *śarīra*. And therefore *ālōkavat*. Just as a jewel seen in the rays of the sun puts out the rays of the jewel exhibiting its property, similarly the *jīva*, remaining in the region of the heart, receiving the rays of the Supreme *Sva* (Parabrahman), radiates in his own property as his characteristic, just as a mirror, wherever he moves. In the same way, the wisdom of the *jīva*, through the supreme influence, pervades throughout the *śarīra*. Therefore it is, in conclusion, determined that in that special region, which gives him the opportunity of catching the rays of light by virtue of being under the influence of *Sva* (*svāśrayāt*), the *jīva* is so much capable of as to throw out rays in his own capacity. Verily, if it is doubted whether so long as the *jīva* is dependent for his *gnāna* and *prabha* because of the influence of one who is different from himself (*svarūpa vyatirikta*), then he should be considered as different in his properties also from the Supreme. The next *Sūtra* removes this doubt: *Vyatirēkō gandhavattathācha darśayati* (II. 3. 25)

<sup>803</sup> Śrīpati reads this *Sūtra* thus: *Guṇādvā ālōkavat. Ālōkavat*: *Ā* as a prefix to verbs and nouns expresses the senses of near, near to, towards, from all sides or all around. *Ālōka*, as read by Śrīpati, would thus suggest light, or lustre, spreading all around, which is peculiarly appropriate when used with reference to the *jīva* who, under the influence of the *Sva*, is held to pervade the whole *śarīra*.

(There is a distinction as in the case of smell ; and thus Scripture also declares).

Just as we experience from different smells their different qualities and determine the differences between them, in the same way the *jīva* recognizes himself by his *gnāna* that he is pervading throughout the *śarīra* and every part of it from the particle of a hair to the end of the nail and can say that he can feel and experience all over the *śarīra*. The *Sruti* text *Ālōmabhyah ānakhāgrēbhyah Jānātyēvāyam puruṣaḥ iti*, etc., (This man can feel all over and experience his existence) declares that even though he dwells in an atomic (*anu*) form within the region of the heart, yet by virtue of power, he proclaims that he lives in every part of the *śarīra*. *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,<sup>804</sup> *Aham Brahmāsmi*,<sup>805</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>806</sup> *iti*, etc., proclaim as if the *jīva* and Brahman live in the *śarīra* as if they were one (*jīva Brahmanōrēkatvōpadēśāt*).<sup>807</sup> If it is asked whether they are actually one in their lordliness (*vibhūtvā*), the next *Sūtra* answers the question : *Pruthag-upadēśāt* (II. 3. 26) (*Their distinctness is taught*).

*Sruti* texts like *Īśānassarva vidyānām ; Īśvarassarva bhūtānām* ;<sup>808</sup> *Yō dēvānām prathamam purastāt ; Viśvādhiḱō rudrō maharṣiḥ* ;<sup>809</sup> *Pradhāna kṣhētragnapatirguṇēśaḥ sam-sāra mōksha sthiti bandha hētuḥ* ;<sup>810</sup> *Dvā suparṇau*,<sup>811</sup> *iti*, etc., clearly declare that *jīva* and Parabrahman in their respective capacities of the controlled and the controller, and in their peculiar characteristics of *jīvatva* and *Īśatva*, and in their subordinate and independent existences and in the state of experiencing bondage and in the shape of being free from

<sup>804</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 8. 7.

<sup>805</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>806</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 5. 19.

<sup>807</sup> Some of these texts are quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* when commenting on this identical *Sūtra*, which is according to his text II. 3. 27.

<sup>808</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XIX.

<sup>809</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 19.

<sup>810</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 16.

<sup>811</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

such bondage—in all these the two (*jīva* and Parabrahman) are entirely distinct from each other. While they are thus distinct from each other, *viḥvutva* is only due to the independent Parabrahman, who is the controller. This is the conclusion proclaimed by the *Srutis*. There are, however, seen *Sruti* texts like *Yō vignānē tishṭhan*,<sup>812</sup> *Vignānam yagmam tanuta, iti*, etc. If it is doubted whether the *jīva* cannot be called *vignānātmā*, the next *Sūtra* explains the doubt: *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadēśaḥ prāṇavat* (II. 3. 27) (*A particle of the essence of Parabrahman's qualities being reflected in the jīva, he is termed as if he were a prāṇa*).

In this *Sūtra*, the *śabda* 'tu' screens the blame of dependency attaching to the *jīva*, because of the good quality reflected by the ray of his (Parabrahman's) grace; because also *vignāna* is all his (Parabrahman's) grace bestowed on the *jīva* through his goodness. And therefore the *jīva* is extolled as *vignānātmā*, thereby suggesting that the *ātma* derives that name (*vignānātmā*) purely through his being associated with Parabrahman. According to *Smṛiti* texts like *Yathā prāṇasyānanda sārabhūtō guṇa iti*, the word *prāṇa* as applied to the *jīva* is simply intended to pass him falsely as *ānanda*, because of the grace of Parabrahman. Accordingly *Sruti* texts like *Yadēsha ākāśa ānandō na syāt*; *Ānandō Brahmēti vyajānāt*<sup>813</sup> *iti*; *Prāṇasya hyānanda sārabhūtō guṇaḥ*; *Sa ēkō Brahmanā ānandaḥ*; *Ānandam Brahmanō vidvān nabibhēti kutaśchana*<sup>814</sup> *iti*, declare that just as Parabrahman is all *satya*, all *gnāna*, all *ānanda*, so, this *jīva*, who becomes a *gnāni* by his (Parabrahman's) grace, also passes as such but falsely by the application of the terms *prāṇa* and *gnāni* to him as stated in *Sruti* texts like *Saha Brahmanā vipaśchitā*,<sup>815</sup> *Yassavagnaḥ iti*, etc. In conclusion, the *jīva*,

<sup>812</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, V. 7.

<sup>813</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 6.

<sup>814</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 4.

<sup>815</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1,

who becomes a *prāgna* and a *gnāni* through his *samskāra*, calls himself through his qualities *vignāni*.

The following *Sūtra* assigns further reasons why he is so called: *Yāvadātmabhāvitvāchchra na dōshastaddarśanāt* (II. 3. 28) (*And since the quality of vignāna exists wherever the Self is, there is no contradiction here; thus the Scripture declares*). The *Sruti* text *Yōyam vignānamayaḥ prāṇēshu hridayantarjyōtiḥ purushassamānassannubhau lōkāvanusancharati, iti*, declares that the *jīva* when he attains the stage of *vignānamaya*, gets the opportunity to catch sight of that luminous Supreme Brahman (*prāṇēshu hridayantarjyōtiḥ*) who, living within the *śarīra* as an associate with the *jīva*, enlightens as to both the internal and the external world. In saying this there is no contradiction, because it is only when the *jīva* becomes possessed of *ātmabhāvitva* (the form of Parabrahman in his mind), that he will be in a position to realize the Supreme Brahman (*taddarśanāt*), i.e., only by actual sight. Hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya | Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādivimuktaḥ parātparam purushamupaiti divyam*<sup>816</sup> *Gatāḥ kalāḥ panchadaśāḥ pratishṭhā dēvāścha sarvē pratidēvatāsu | Karmāni vignānamayaścha ātmā parē'vyayē sarva ēkūbhavanti*<sup>817</sup> *Ēsha samprasādōsmāt śarīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtirupasampadya svēna rūpēṇābhinishpadyatē*<sup>818</sup> *iti* etc., declare that the *jīva*, naturally meditating through the *nivritti mārga*, will subsequently enter the region of Śiva (*Śivatattva*); being rid of his carnal body will enter the kingdom of Śiva through *Śiva-yōga*, *Śiva-dhyāna* and *Śiva-gnāna* and become a *jīvanmukta* (a *jīva* free from bondage) and enter *Śiva-dhyāna samādhi* in the midst of burning brightness radiating like the lighted camphor, even in his *anu* form and present himself before the Supreme Brahman. And therefore there is no contradiction in the declaration of the *Sruti* texts. This clearly shows that the

<sup>816</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 8.

<sup>817</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 2. 7.

<sup>818</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 12. 14.



*jīva* through his continuous ardent labour of holy meditation and austerity, has finally, like the one in sleep (*supta puruṣha*) who awoke at once into the illumination of the bright day, through enlightenment obtained by knowledge. In the comparison of the *jīva* in his *anu* form along with Parabrahman in his *vibhūṭva*, of course, there is a contradiction as between the *jīva* and Brahman, just as there is as between the river and the ocean. The former in running through his meditation concentrates on the Brahman in the form of a vast ocean; this contradiction between the two cannot be prevented (*durnivāra*). Moreover, if it is said that *Īśvara* cannot live in the heart as a separate entity giving light to the *jīva*, and that the *anu* form of the *jīva* cannot be accepted, being merely an illusion through *upādhi*, then the argument becomes inconsistent (*asāṅgata*). *Sruti* texts like *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*<sup>819</sup> *iti*, etc., clearly declare that *jīvas* were brought into being through *bhūta sṛiṣṭi* and remained so until they reached Parabrahman again all throughout in the *anu* form. And therefore the *anutva* of the *jīva* as its natural form is clearly proved as a fact. It has also been proved as an undoubted fact that the *jīvas* were in the state of *sushupti*, etc., without *gnāna*. And that *gnāna* is not their natural adjunct in their *svārūpa* or their *dharma* in their original state is proved by the *Sūtra*: *Pumstvādivattvasya satōbhivayakti yōgāt* (II. 3. 29) (*Since, as in the case of virile power, etc., there may be manifestation of that which exists*).

The term *tu* in this *Sūtra* is intended to clear the doubt expressed above, *i.e.*, whether the *jīva* is associated with *gnāna* in its original form (*svārūpa*); or in its natural state. Even in the *sushupti* state, the *jīva* is not completely free from *agnāna*, because it is only after he becomes awake that he is able to refer back to what took place in *sushupti* as something that occurred while he was asleep. Therefore, *gnāna* is only what he could acquire as a *dharma* subsequently (to his holy practices). *Gnāna* is a *dharma* to be acquired and not one attaching to the *jīva* naturally (*svārūpa dharma*),

<sup>819</sup> *Sveta. Upa.*, I. 9.

just as manliness and other extraordinary powers become manifest only when the child grows into manhood, because they are extraordinary qualities (*asādhāraṇa dharma*), which though they exist in children, yet they are not manifest in them until they become men, when only such qualities become manifest in them and never earlier, nor at all times. The body (*śarīra*) is made up of the *sapta dhātu* (i.e., chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen), which keep continually developing themselves and are attached to the *svarūpa* in unbroken sequence (*svarūpānubandhi*). "Body" (*śarīra*) means the thing which is made up of the *sapta dhātu*, the three-fold impurities (*trimala*), the two births (*dvīyōni*) and the four-fold feeders (*chaturvidha āhāramaya*).<sup>820</sup> (*Tatsapta dhatu trimalam dvīyōni chaturvidhāhāramayau śarīram.*) This identical meaning was conveyed previously when discussing the *sushupti* state. The experience and the varied knowledge he had acquired, in that *sushupti* state, the *jīva* was able to recall in the wakened (*jāgrata*) state. These qualities, therefore, are the natural *dharma* of the *jīva*, which he can avail himself of always. This point has been already discussed. Therefore, even before he develops the state of *prāgnatva*, the *svarūpa* of the *jīva* was in him. Therefore, this *ātma svarūpa* is not always small in measure (*anuparimāṇa*). And this the *jīva*, even after death, carries with him in a symbolic form, and nothing is new in him even in the *mukta* state. And therefore he cannot be said to have not possessed it at any time. Moreover, according to the *Sruti* text *Etēbhyōbbhūtēbhyassamuthkhāya tānyēvānu vinaśyati iti*, whatever of a destructible kind is possessed by the *jīva*, during the time he is tied to family life, such as birth, death, etc., is not seen by him at the time he becomes a *mukta*. The same is explained in the *Sruti* text *Yathā nadyādi*<sup>821</sup> etc., which declares that a particle of water goes and joins a mass of water. Water attains to water at the time of *mukti* (*jalē jalavanmuktadaśāyām*).

<sup>820</sup> *Annamaya, prāṇamaya, manōmaya, vignānamaya.*

<sup>821</sup> *Mund. Uṇa., III. 2. 8.*

Similarly, the *jīva* as soon as it becomes morally pure (*śuddha jīvasya*) finds its home (*tat prāptitva darśanāt*) in itself at the time of its realization. *Smṛiti* texts such as *Na paśyō nruthyūm paśyati narōgam nōtaduḥkhatām* | *Sarvam raha paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnōti sarvaśaḥ* | *Nōpajanam smarannidam śarīram manasētān kāmān paśyan ramatē* | *iti*, etc. (the *jīva* does not see death, i.e., he has no death; nor suffer illness, nor unhappiness; but he sees everything secretly and finally when he comes out, he sees everything clearly all round; and finally he always recollects and keeps in memory what all he saw and experienced and enjoys all he wants for ever) state that the *anu* form of the *jīva* and the *jīva* in his well-developed and all-knowing state (*svārūpa*) are not different from each other and they are never a contradiction to each other. (That is, there is no contradiction between the *anu* and *prāgna* states of the *jīva*.) If it is hereafter doubted how the *jīva* acquires knowledge of *Brahman*, casting off all his ignorance, etc., the next *Sūtra* clears the doubt: *Nityōpalabdhyānupalabdhiprasaṅgō'nyatara niyamō vānyathā* (II. 3. 30) (*Otherwise there would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else restrictive limitation to either*).

If it is admitted that the *jīva* is capable of obtaining all-pervading influence, then the question arises whether it refers to his all-knowing character or being present in all places at the same time (i.e., omnipresence). If the first alternative be assumed, then the *jīva* should be conceded to have possessed such knowledge at all times, which is not true. Also the *jīva* in his *anu* state should be conceded to have possessed all the characteristics of Parabrahman. But according to the above conclusion it is not so. Therefore, the *jīva* should at all times attain to knowledge in due course. It means this:—In this world, in order that the *jīva* may realize *Brahmatva*, he has to obtain *gnāna* by meditation and then only he becomes a cause for realizing Parabrahman. If not, realization is not possible. If the *jīva* does not continually work through meditation in order to realize Brahman, then, *mōksha* is not realizable. *Jīva* fails

to realize his intended purpose. For our part, it has been sufficiently proved and declared that within our *śarīra*, in the central region of the heart, the *ātma* remains and prompts the *jīva* to realize (Brahman) by his own exertions. We have already declared, after offering sufficient proofs, that in all cases wherever there is the cause easily workable, in all such circumstances, the *jīva* constantly meditates upon through penance and realizes the *ātma* who remains in him. Else, it is not possible, on account of the various kinds of sins to which he is attached. Therefore, what has been previously proved, holds true. According to the *Sruti* texts *Ayamātmā Brahmā iti*,<sup>822</sup> etc., *Brahmatva* is possible of realization only if the *kshētragna* is well understood and that he alone is the chief *kartru* within. Else, it is otherwise. This can be realized only when all the illusory bondage to which he (*jīva*) is attached has been absolutely broken. In order to throw overboard (eschew) the *Advaita* argument developed in the *Jīva-Brahmavāda*, the *Ātmā Adhikaraṇa* i.e., (*Kartrādhikaraṇam*) is begun.

*Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha* (IV. 1. 3)  
(But as the *Ātma*; thus he realizes and apprehends).

In this *Sūtra* the term *ātma* means *jīva*. This *jīva* being a *mumukshu*, constantly meditates upon, by prayer, etc., in order to realize Paraśiva Brahman and thus realizes him. *Mumukshu* means a *bhakta* (i.e., a devotee) of Para-brahman. After knowing the *Vēdānta*, etc., well through the *Dakṣara*, *Sāṇḍilya* and other *vidyas* (i.e., means of meditation) he finally apprehends<sup>823</sup> the Paramātmān, and thus realizes him and gets near him.<sup>824</sup> This is the gist of the *Sūtra* as suggested by itself. The term *tu* in the *Sūtra* denotes certainty. *Sruti* texts like *Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rukmavarṇam kartāramīśam puruṣam Brahma-yōnim* | *Tadā vidvān puṇyapāpē vidhūya niranjanam paramam sāmyamupaiti*<sup>825</sup> | *Yathā nadyassyamamānāssamudrē*

<sup>822</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.

<sup>823</sup> *Grāhayanti*=*jānanti*.

<sup>824</sup> *Upagachchanti*=*prāpnuvanti*.

<sup>825</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 3.

*astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya* । *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktah parātparām puruṣhamupaiti divyam* ॥<sup>826</sup> *iti*, declare that those who thus meditate on Brahman as laid down in the *Muṇḍakōpanishad*, apprehend Brahman and finally realize him. In the *Kaivalya Sruti* text beginning with *Hritpuṇḍarīkam virajam viśuddham* and ending with *Umā-sahāyām paramēśvaram prabhūm trilōchanam nīlakantham praśāntam* । *Dhyātūvā munir gachchati bhūtayōnim samasta sākshim tamasaḥ parastāt, iti*, it is said that *Daharōpāsakas* who meditate upon Śiva Parabrahman in order to attain *Śivatattva*, finally realize him in this way (*i.e.*, as laid down in the *Kaivalyōpanishad*). *Upāsana* is of three kinds:—(1) *Ahamgrahōpāsanaṇi* ; (2) *pratīkōpāsanaṇi* ; and (3) *angāvabaddhōpāsanaṇi*. Of these, the first is carried out according to the method prescribed in the *Dahara*, *Sāṇḍilya*, *Vaiśvānara* and *Upakōśala vidyas*. Of these, some hold to the *Sruti* text *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta* (There is Brahman in the utterance). This denotes that the *chētana* who is the *jīvātma* meditates upon Paramātman in order to realize him. Some others (*i.e.*, some other *vidyas* named above) hold to the doctrine enunciated in *Sūtra* texts like *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt* and *Sruti* texts like *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshih, iti*,<sup>827</sup> etc. Agreeably to these *Sāstras*, the *jīva* is enjoined to meditate upon the Brahman *svābhinnatayā* (*i.e.*, I am not different from Him). This is called *Ahamgrahōpāsanam*. *Sruti* texts like *Kam Brahma*, *Kham Brahma*,<sup>828</sup> *iti*, etc., declare that just as we see idols made of copper, earth and stone in the forms of Śiva, Kēśava, etc., so, the *Sruti* texts like *Nāma Brahmētyupāsīta*,<sup>829</sup> *iti*, etc., urge that *upāsana* should be in the name of Parabrahman as if he were present in these material objects (*jadapadārthas*). This kind of meditation of Parabrahman, keeping in view the form of an idol, is called *Pratīkōpāsanam*. The third kind

<sup>826</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 8.

<sup>827</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>828</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15.

<sup>829</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 18. 1.

of *Brahmōpāsana* is explained in the chanting of the *Udgītha* (*Sāmaṇveda*) where the sacrificial functions are executed by meditating on Parabrahman, through the performance of ceremonial functions by the meditator as *upāsana*. If it is asked whether the *jīva*, who is the *upāsaka*, is meditating in his *chētana* form thinking that he is himself the *Ātma* and meditates upon Śiva or whether he thinks that he is separate from Śiva and meditates upon Śiva as different from him, the reply is that *Sruti* texts like *Ayamātmā Brahma*,<sup>830</sup> *Aham Brahmāsmi*,<sup>831</sup> *Pragnānam Brahma*,<sup>832</sup> *iti*, etc., declare clearly that the *jīva* should settle in the belief that he himself is Brahman and as such meditate upon Brahman through the knowledge of *Dahara* and other *vidyas* thinking that he is himself Śiva (*kēyala Śiva*) as enjoined in the *Srutis* that he should do so. And, therefore, it is inevitable that he (the *jīva*) is meditating on himself as *svātma*, being Brahman himself, the object meditated upon (*Svasya svātmadvēna Brāhmōpāsanamanivāryam*). Though *Sruti* texts such as *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta*, *Nāma Brāhmētyupāsīta*, *Manō Brahmētyupāsīta*, *Prāṇō Brahmētyupāsīta*, *iti*,<sup>833</sup> etc., declare generally that meditation upon Brahman should be made by uttering the above *Sruti* texts, even though the utterance in the form and speech is inanimate (*achētana*), yet the *Srutis* support the *Brahmōpāsana* of *Ātma* in this manner. But if it is asked whether it is right for *mumukshus* to meditate in this manner without discriminating between the *chētana* and *achētana* character of their methods of meditation according to the *Dahara* and other *vidyas* and whether *Sadāśivōpāsana* should not thus be done, then the answer is that a reference to the *Sruti* text beginning with *Daharam vipāpam paramēśmabhūtam* and ending with *Tasmin yadanta-stadupāsītavyam*,<sup>834</sup> supports the meditation upon Paramātmā with *Dahara vidya*. And if it is asked what is that

<sup>830</sup> *Bṛihad Upa.*, II. 5. 19.

<sup>831</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>832</sup> *Aitarēya Upa.*, V. 3.

<sup>833</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, III. 18. 1.

<sup>834</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

knowledge, the answer is furnished to us in the *Sruti* text *Yō vēdādaṁ svarāḥ prōktō vēdūntē cha pratishṭhitāḥ* । *Tasya prakṛitiḥ tīnasya yāḥ parāḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ*,<sup>835</sup> which supports *Śivatattvōpāsana* in this way and enjoins that all *mumukshus* should follow this method without waiting to discriminate between *chētana* and *achētana*, often discussed (herein) in several places. It is also stated in *Kaivalya Sruti* texts like those beginning with *Hṛit-puṇḍarikam virajam viśuddham* and ending in *Umāsahāyām paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśantam*, etc., which describe that the *tīlāmangala vighraha Śiva Parabrahman*, who is the embodiment of *chit-prakṛiti*, should be meditated upon in the interior of their hearts by the *mumukshus*. *Sruti* texts like *Ākāśa śarīram Brāhma*, *Satyātma prāṇārāmam mana ānandam*, *Sānti samruddhamamrutam*,<sup>836</sup> *iti* and *Prāchīna yōgyōpāsava*, *iti*, etc., all prove that meditation should be done in the same way as above. And therefore it is concluded as a matter of certainty that meditation should be undertaken by *mumukshus* on Paraśiva Brahman without exerting to discriminate between *chētana* and *achētana* character. *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brāhma*, *Sarvō vai Rudraḥ*,<sup>837</sup> *Ritam satyam param Brāhma puruṣam kṛishṇa pingalam*, *Ūrdhvarētam virūpākṣham viśvarūpāya vai namō namaḥ*, *iti*,<sup>838</sup> etc., declare that Śiva Parabrahman is *Sarvātmaka* (omnipresent). *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmanō antarō'yam ātmānavēda yasya ātmā śarīram ya ātmānamantarō yamayati sa ta ātmā antaryāmyamruta* *iti*,<sup>839</sup> etc., and *Yō Rudrō agnau yō apsu ya oṣadhīṣhu yō Rudrō viśvā bhuvanāvivēśa tasmai Rudrāya namō astu* *iti*, etc., declare omnipresence for *sarvāntaryāmi chētanāchētana Parabrahman* without contradiction.

Moreover, *Sūtra* texts like *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt*, *Bhēdavyapadēśāchchānyah*, and *Sruti* texts such as *Yēśhāmīśō paśupatiḥ paśūnām viśvādhikō Rudrō*

<sup>835</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 24.

<sup>836</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>837</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 10.

<sup>838</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>839</sup> *Bṛihad Upa.*, V. 7.

*maharshiḥ*,<sup>840</sup> *Īśānassarva vidyānām īśvarassarva bhūtānām*,<sup>841</sup> *Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraḥ ksharātmanā viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*,<sup>842</sup> *Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tatvabhāvādbhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivruttiḥ*<sup>843</sup> *iti*, etc., declare that Parabrahman is visible to the naked eye of the *mumukshu*. They also declare that Śiva famous as Parabrahman (*Śivākhyā Parabrahma*) is greater than the *jīva* (*Śivākhyam Parabrahma jīvādadhikamēva*). Notwithstanding this, if we examine *Sruti* texts like *Tattvamasi*,<sup>844</sup> etc., which postulate the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine and discriminate between the meditator and the meditated object as *upāsaka* and *upāsya*, we find that they declare in the final (*charamāvasthā*) state *abhēda*. According to the *Mahāvākya Sruti* texts like *Aham Brahmāsmi*,<sup>845</sup> etc., it is declared in incontrovertible fashion that meditation on Śiva should be done by uttering *Śivōham*. Further, *Sruti* texts like *Atmānamaraṇim kṛtvā praṇavanchōttarāraṇim, Dhyāna nirmathanābhīyāsāt pāśam dahati paṇḍitaḥ iti*,<sup>846</sup> etc., declare that *mōksha* is realized by constant meditation on the *vilakṣaṇa Śivatattva* form, freed from all touches of worldly feelings and attaining unsurpassed *Paramānanda* (*Niratiśaya paramānanda chidachitprapāṇa vilakṣaṇa śivatattva prāptirēva mōkshaḥ*).

In the extant teachings of the *Vēdānta* doctrine, it is declared that release from the animality of the *jīva* from bondage can never be obtained without this form of meditation. Without this (*i.e.*, meditation), it is impossible to realize *Śivatattva yōga*. Therefore meditation without any kind of break should be constantly employed during *Śivōpāsana*. As declared in *Sruti* texts like the one

<sup>840</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

<sup>841</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>842</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, I. 10.

<sup>843</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>844</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

<sup>845</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>846</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*



beginning with *Dhyāyītēsānam pradhyaṃyitavyam*,<sup>847</sup> and ending with *Sambhurākāśa madhyē Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivam-karaḥ sarvamanayat parityajya* <sup>1</sup> <sup>848</sup> *iti*, etc., a *mumukshu* is forbidden to meditate upon any other form but that of Śiva. Either in the animate form of *śarīra* or in the inanimate form of *prapancha*, the chief source of earning *mōksha* and realizing *Sivatattva* (the state or condition of Śiva) is the constant meditation on Śiva and none else. *Sūtras* like *Tadananyatvam ārambhana śabdādibhyaḥ*, *iti*, etc., declare that the form of the world (*prapancha*) belongs to Śiva as a sort of *Sivalattva* (state or condition of Śiva) and as such the world is said to be the body of Śiva (*Sivātmakatvam nirdiṣṭam*). Here some hold, agreeably to the *Sruti* text *Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Śivamadvaītam chaturtham manyantē, Sa ātmā sa vighnēyaḥ*,<sup>849</sup> *iti*, etc., and hundreds of other texts, that the term *ātma* is used to denote Parabrahma - Śiva. And therefore the term *Ātma* denotes Śiva only and he is the only one who should be meditated upon by *mumukshus* through the *Dahara*, *Sāṇḍilya*, etc., *Brahma vidyas* and worshipped. This is how those famous Rishis like Upa-manyu, Dadhīchi, Gautama, etc., meditated upon and worshipped Śiva Paramātmā in the forms of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *kīrtana*, *smaraṇa*, etc., and how they understood Śiva Parabrahman. The word *grāhayanti* was taken by them to mean *jānāti*, *sākshātkurvanti*. That is how they understood and how they got perception of Śiva. And the term *upagachchanti* was admitted by them to mean *prāpnuvanti*, i.e., finally reached Śiva. Thus they say.

The indeclinable *cha* indicates *samuchchayārtha*, while the term *tu* denotes the prohibition of other kinds of meditation than that of Śiva. And even this is rightly said by them. Thus ends the *Ātmādhikaraṇam*.

*Ātmā prakaraṇāt* (IV. 4. 3) (*The Ātma on account of the subject matter*). This *Sūtra* concludes the first

<sup>847</sup> *Atharvaśiras*.

<sup>848</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 18.

<sup>849</sup> *Atharvaśiras*.

*Adhikaraṇa*—*Sampadyāvīrabhūtādhikaraṇa*<sup>850</sup>—of the fourth *pāda* of the fourth *Adhyāya*.

The effect of *dahara*, etc., *upāsana* is to attain a *śarīra* which is actually that of the form of Sadāśiva (*Śarīra sākshāt Sadāśivarūpō bhavati*). How? *Sabdāt*, i.e., by the utterance, *Aham Brahmāsmi* (IV. 1. 1). He realizes thus his real *svarūpa*; as water joins with water and fire unites with fire, in the same way, the *jīva* joins with *Sivasvarūpa* (*Sivasvarūpēṇa svarūpaikya kathanāt*, IV. 1. 2). Thus the *jīva* attains to *Sivalōka* through the *Prabhākaramaṇḍala* and joins the *Sivatattva* region. If it is doubted whether the *jīva* entering the *Sivalōka* (*Sivalōka prāptirēva*) was one with the body of Paraśiva Brahman himself, the next *Sūtra* answers the doubt—*Ātmā prakaraṇāt*. In this *Sūtra*, the term *ātma* means Paramātmā and is used in the sense of *jyōti* (light regarded as the Supreme Spirit). It does not mean the region of the Sun (*āditya maṇḍala*). Why? Because it is a topic by itself (*prakaraṇāt*). *Sruti* texts like *Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijarō vimrutyurviśōkō vijighatsō pipāsassatyakāmassatyasankalpah*,<sup>851</sup> *iti*, etc., declare that *ātmā* treats of the topic of *Prajāpati Brahman* and this is purely one which speaks of Paramātmā, as explained in the *Sūtra*, *Uttarāśchēdāvīrabhūta svarūpastu iti*. If the *jīva* which has neither beginning nor end (*anūdi*) is not at this stage freed from all worldly bondage, then how else could it attain such a condition? *Sruti* texts like *Gnū gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau*,<sup>852</sup> etc., declare that the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are eternally little-knowing and all-knowing respectively, characteristics which are opposite in character and always co-existing. But as the effect of concentrated meditation (*Brahmavidyā mahimnā*), the *jīva* becomes quite free from the *mala-traya* bondage and in that liberated condition becomes a pure *jīva* and joins that *Paranjyōti* form in his next state, just as a river joins the ocean and is transferred

<sup>850</sup> The *Adhikaraṇa* which deals with that which is brought about, accomplished, effectuated or manifested.

<sup>851</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1.

<sup>852</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.

into the ocean, as declared in hundreds of *Sruti* texts like *Yathā nadyassyaṇḍamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmārūpē vihāya, Tathā vidvān nāmārūpādvimuktaḥ parātparam puruṣhamupaiti divyam*,<sup>853</sup> *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati, Tattvamasī*,<sup>854</sup> *Aham Brahmāsmi*,<sup>855</sup> *Brahmavidāp-nōti param, Gnātvā Śivam śāntamatyantamēti*,<sup>856</sup> *iti*, etc., which enunciate the truth that the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are clearly explained to be of a *bhēda* and *abhēda* character. Thus ends the *Sampadyāvīrbhūtādhikaraṇam*.

#### The Attainment of Mukti.

What is 'mukti'? How is it attained? Is there any continuance of 'bhēda' after attaining mukti? These are questions which are again and again referred to by Śrīpati. Commenting on IV. 3. 9, *Sāmīpyāttu tadvyapaśēṣaḥ* (*Parabrahma sāmīpya is mukti*), he gives an outline of his views. After remarking that the *śabda* 'tu' here clears the doubt, he states that *Sruti* texts like *Yō dēvānām prabhavaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*,<sup>857</sup> *Hiraṇyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam sanōbudhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* came into origin through Parabrahma Śiva by the agency of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and that in meditating on him alone lies his union with him. Then again the *Sruti* texts, *Tamīśānam varadam dēvamāḍyam*<sup>858</sup> *nichāyyainām śāntimatyantamēti, Yō dēvānām prathamaśchōdbhavaścha viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ, Hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam sanō budhyā śubhayā samyunaktu*, etc., declare that the *jīva* through constant meditation gets within sight of *Hiraṇyagarbha*<sup>859</sup> through whom he is brought to the presence of Parabrahman and within sight of him. He,

<sup>853</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>854</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 1. 3.

<sup>855</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, 1. 4. 10.

<sup>856</sup> *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>857</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

<sup>858</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>859</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha. *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ, khaṇḍīkṭaḥ iṣaḥ Sankara ēvacha srishtyādinā vartayati* » *Skānda*. In the beginning, Parabrahman assumes the *vyakta* (*sat*) form in *Hiraṇyagarbha* and begins the work of creation, etc.

the *mumukshu* (i.e., the released soul), then has no other to meditate upon except Parabrahman and enjoy the bliss of his sight (*svasamīpa Hiranyagarbhēkshitrutvam śubha smṛiti hētutvamcha vyavasthāpanāchcha*). *Sruti* texts like *Yō veda nihitam guhāyām paramē vyōman, Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipāśchita*,<sup>860</sup> etc., declare that the *upāsaka* of Parabrahman by nearness to Parabrahman and enjoying the bliss of his sight will have been entirely granted every wish (*sarva kāma*) of his. This is the established fact. *Sruti* texts like *Tatpurushō mānavassa ēnān Brahmagamayati*,<sup>861</sup> etc. (That being—hitherto a mere man—hastens towards the determinate knowledge that he is gone away to Brahman) declare that the *mumukshu* is one who has speedily gone near to Śiva (*Śiva ēva avagamyati*). *Sruti* texts like *Śiva ēkōdhyēyaḥ śivankaraḥ sarvamanayat parityajya*,<sup>862</sup> etc., state that *mumukshus* should not meditate upon any one other than Śiva Parabrahman. In order to remove this objection—for meditation on *Hiranyagarbha* is mentioned above in another text—the next *Sūtra* mentions the alternative proof: *Kāryātyayē tadadhyakshēna sahātaḥ paramabhidhānāt*. There are the *Sruti* texts which we have heard: *Gatāḥ kalāḥ panchadaśā pratishṭhā dēvāścha sarvē pratidēvatāsu*; *Karmāṇi vignānamayaścha ātmā parē vyayē sarva ēkībhavanti*.<sup>863</sup> These declare that all *dēvas* in whom are invested the fifteenth part of Paramātman's power return to him at the time of *mōksha*. Thus all *karmas* performed having resulted in abiding knowledge, all *ātmās* become associated with the Imperishable Supreme. In the *Sūtra*, the word *kāryātyayē* means when the *mumukshus* reach their final stage of bodily existence, when they are to cast off their carnal sheaths, when the work to be done through their sensory organs has absolutely ended. The word *ataḥ* signifies "therefore". Then the word *paramabhidhānāt*

<sup>860</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>861</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.

<sup>862</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>863</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2, 7.

means that they are therefore termed to be installed along with others already in association with Parabrahman (*tad-adhishṭhāna Brahmādi dēvatābhissaha*<sup>864</sup> *paramabhidhānāt*). This is what is meant when it is said that by the expression *paramātmanēkībhavatva*, i.e., becoming associated with the Paramātman. Why *mumukshus* should meditate only on *Hiranyagarbha* is a topic which is pleasant not to discuss. Therefore the *Sruti* texts: *Ēsha dēvathā Brahmapatha ētēna pratipādyamānā imam mānavamāvartantē*,<sup>865</sup> *Tayōrdhvamāyannamrutatvamēti*,<sup>866</sup> etc., declare that this is the chief way for the *dēvas* to reach the path to Brahman (*Brahmapatha*) by reaching which this *mānava* (being) has not to go back for further rotation (of births and deaths) and getting into this path, he rises up higher and higher until he reaches the deathless stage (*amrutatva*). The *Srutis* here do not mention *Hiranyagarbhapatha* but since the *mumukshu* has no further rotation, he is declared to have reached the stage known as *Chitkailāsa*.

As from *Smṛiti* texts like *Ābrahma bhuvanāllōkāḥ punarāvrittinō'rjuna*,<sup>867</sup> etc., we hear that the *Brahma* and other worlds are non-eternal, the world even before it came to be created and after its dissolution, existed only in the womb of *Śiva* as propounded in the texts *Yadā tamastan na divā na rātrir nasan nachāsachchiva ēva kēvalaḥ*,<sup>868</sup> *Tadakasharam tatsaviturvarēṇyam pragnācha tasmāt praśrutā purāṇi*, etc. *Sruti* texts like *Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham krishṇa pingalam*,<sup>869</sup> etc., clearly state that *Brahmadharma* is declared to be existing at all the three times—past, present and future—without interruption and that *ritatva* and *satyatva* are the characteristic *dharma*s of

<sup>864</sup> Note that the words used directly suggest that *Brahma* and other gods are there already and *mumukshus* are only installed in their group on their obtaining their release—when their sensory organs cease to work and carnal bodies are cast off.

<sup>865</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII. 6. 6.

<sup>867</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VIII. 16.

<sup>868</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, VI. 10.

<sup>869</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 20.

no one else but Parabrahman whom the *mumukshus* should meditate upon and none else.

*Smritiśāha* (IV. 3. 11) (*On account of the smṛiti*). The *Smṛiti* texts, *Śivāmsābhūtaṣṭvānām Śivōpāsanaṃmucyate*; *Śivasyaṇugrahādēva krimi kīṭakavat sadū*; *Śivātmakatvam samprāpya na punarjanma labhyatē*, etc., clearly declare that to those who meditate on Śiva alone, there is no more return as they will have attained *Śivātmakatva*.<sup>870</sup> To *mumukshus*, no other *upāsana* is prescribed.

In this connection an alternative practice also is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Param Jaiminir mukhyatvāt* (IV. 3. 12) (*The highest Jaimini opines; on account of primariness of meaning*). The *Sruti* texts, *Ritam satyam param Brahma puruṣam kṛiṣṇa pīṅgalam*;<sup>871</sup> *Brahmādhīpatir Brahmanōdhīpatir Brahmā Śivō mē astu Sadā-śivōm*,<sup>872</sup> etc., declare that the Śiva form of Parabrahman is the highest form for meditation—the symbolic form of *pranava*. Jaimini thinks that all those who meditate on this Śiva form of Parabrahman are taken to *Śivalōka* led by *ātivāhikas* (angels of Kailāsa). Why? Because that is the chief place intended for them, according to the *Sruti* text *Brahmavidāpnōti param*,<sup>873</sup> etc. For the word “*Brahman*” always denotes in its most important sense “*Parabrahman*” only (*Brahma śabdasya paraminnēvāt Brahmani mukhyatvāt*).<sup>874</sup> At other times, the word *Brahma* denotes *Chaturmukha*, *Hiranyagarbha*, etc., according to the sense in which the terms are used in the beginning and the end with reference to *śaḍvidha linga tātparya* without contradiction (*Chaturmukha Hiranyagarbha pakṣhē upakramōpasamhārādi śaḍvidha linga tātparyē virōdhāchcha*). Therefore in *Sruti* texts like *Tatpurushō mānavassaēnān*<sup>875</sup>

<sup>870</sup> Assuming Śiva's own form.

<sup>871</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 20.

<sup>872</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 21.

<sup>873</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 6.

<sup>874</sup> This should be compared with Ānandatīrtha's words: “*Brahma śabdasya Viṣṇvāvēva*” (The word *Brahma* in its highest sense implies only *Viṣṇu*). He quotes the *Sruti* text: *Tadēva Brahma paramam kavīnām*. *Mahōpa.*, I; See *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1.

<sup>875</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 15. 6.

*Brahma gamayati*, etc., the word *Brahma* should be interpreted in terms of *Śiva (Śivaparatvam)*. This is the conclusion.

Further argument as to this is adduced in the next *Sūtra*: *Darśanāchcha* (IV. 3. 13) (*And because Scripture declares it*). *Yēsha samprasādō'smāchcharīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtirupasampadya svēna rūpēṇābhinishpadyatē*;<sup>876</sup> *Yathā nadyassyandamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmārūpē vihāya* | *Tathā vidvān nāmarūpāt vimuktaḥ Parātparam puruṣhamupaiti divyam*;<sup>877</sup> these and other *Sruti* texts declare that *jīva* and *Brahman* are as the attainable and the attained (*prāpyaprāpakatvēna*)<sup>878</sup> without contradiction in a manner which exhibits *bhēda* as well as *abhēda*. To attribute to the *jīva* for ever the state of *Brahman* (*Brahmatvam sadā*) or to postulate eternal difference (*sadā bhinnatvam*) between the *jīva* and the *Brahman* cannot ever be accepted (*Jīvasyaiva Brahmatvam sadā jīva bhinnatvamcha nāngīkartavyam*).

The further argument for this is adduced in the next *Sūtra*: *Na cha kāryē pratyabhisandhiḥ* (IV. 3. 14) [*And the objective is not towards union (with Hiranyagarbha)*]. *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ*;<sup>879</sup> *Hiranyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam*;<sup>880</sup> these and other *Sruti* texts declare that there is no promise that the *jīva* would attain the *Hiranyagarbha* form. Hence the word *pratyabhisandhiḥ*—there is no declaratory statement that the *jīva* will attain the *Hiranyagarbha* form. There is no declaration, that through the agency of the dissolution of the *jīva* form, he will attain to *Hiranyagarbha* form in *mōksha*. *Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti*; *Nānyaḥpanthā vidyatē ayanāya*;<sup>881</sup> *Gnātvā Śivam śāntam atyantamēti*;<sup>882</sup> these and other *Sruti* texts declare that it is

<sup>876</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 3. 4.

<sup>877</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>878</sup> *Prāpaka*=Procuring, conveying, leading to attainment.  
*Prāpya*=To be reached; attainable.

<sup>879</sup> *Mahōpa.*, X. 19.

<sup>880</sup> *Ibid.*, XI. 19.

<sup>881</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 12.

<sup>882</sup> *Atharvasīras*,

only after fully knowing Śiva through his *gnāna* that the *jīva* can attain *Śivatādātmya* and *sāyujya* (intimate union with Brahman) and *mukti*. Those who meditate upon *Chaturmukha* Brahma will, according to *Srutis*, *Smritis* and *Purāṇas*, attain a form of *mukti* wherefrom no further return is declared (to be possible). *Sruti* texts like *Aśva iva rōmāṇi vidhūya pāpam chandra iva rāhōrmukhāt pramuchya dhūtvā sarīramakrutam krutātmā Brahma lōkam abhisambhavāmi*,<sup>883</sup> point out that wherever *Brahma lōka* is referred to in the *Srutis*, it is to be understood as applicable to *Śivalōka*. In this manner, agreeably to the maxim, *bahavōpyēka yatnīta*, though many may be the trials put forward, yet the objective aimed at is the same; while conforming to the theories (of philosophy) advanced by different Āchāryas, our own system of philosophy has been made to shine.<sup>884</sup>

*Apratīkālambanānnayaṭīti Bādarāyaṇa ubhayathā cha dōshāttatkratuścha* (IV. 3. 15) (*Those not depending on symbols he leads thus, says Bādarāyaṇa; there being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that*). *Apratīkālambanam* means those who act contrary to *pratīkālambana*. (Those who do not seek the support of Brahman through meditating on images (*pratīkas*) are called *Apratīkālambanas*.) Such of them—i.e., *Apratīkālambanas*—are led by the group of *Ātivāhikas*—i.e., divine carriers of *muktas*—to the presence of Brahman through the *Archirādi mārگا*. Thus opines Bādarāyaṇa. This *Sūtra* declares thus: Meditation (*upāsana*) carries every one to *mukti*; but this does not apply uniformly in the same way generally to all (*muktas*). *Sruti* texts like *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma; Tajjalānīti śānta upāsīta*;<sup>885</sup> *Aitadātmyamidam sarvam tatsatyam sa ātmā tattvamasi śvētakēṭi*;<sup>886</sup> *Tattvamēva*

<sup>883</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 11. 1.

<sup>884</sup> Śrīpati says that he has interpreted the systems of other Āchāryas—*bhēda* and *abhēda*—in conformity with their views but has at the same time made them illustrate the truth of his own system of philosophy.

<sup>885</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14.

<sup>886</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 1. 8.



*tvamēva tat*; *Tvam Brahmāsi*; *Aham Brahmāsmi*;<sup>887</sup> etc., declare that this universe consisting of *chētana* and *achētana* beings is the result of *Brahmakārya* and is pervaded by Brahma (*Brahmātmakatva*) and this can be realized through meditation whereby the meditator realizes *Brahmatattva* (*dhyānēna Brahmataṭṭva prāptyaṅgamāt*). The *Sūtra* has the expression *ubhayathācha dōsha tatkratuścha*. If this expression is explained in accordance with *Dvaita Sruti* texts like *Dvā suparṇau*,<sup>888</sup> etc., and made to declare in *upāsana* that the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are different, then many *Advaita* texts like *Tattvamasi*,<sup>889</sup> etc., are tainted with the sin of compromise. If, on the other hand, the *Advaita Sruti* texts are treated as more important, then many hundreds of *Dvaita Sruti* texts would be tainted with the sin of compromise. And therefore it is that we have to accept the theory of *bhēda* and *abhēda* between *jīva* and *Brahman* on the analogy of the *bhramara* and the *kēta* and numerous other examples of a similar kind. *Yēsha samprasādo'smāchcharīrāt samutthāya paramjyōtīrupasampadya svēnarūpēṇābhiniṣṭhādyatē*;<sup>890</sup> *Yathā nadyassyaṇḍamānāssamudrē astam gachchanti nāmarūpē vihāya*,<sup>891</sup> etc. *Sruti* texts declare that one should not stick to a one-sided view and a view which has been repudiated. The *Sūtra* uses the expression *tat kratuścha*. This is the realization he has toiled for and obtained at last. As the *Sruti* texts *Tam yathā yathōpāsata*,<sup>892</sup> etc., declare that the fruit of one's action will be in accordance with his meditation and trials. Therefore whatever one does in this world, he will reap the fruit of the same in the next, quite in accordance with his action. To the meditators, the meditated (object) will be at hand. Throughout

<sup>887</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>888</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>889</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 8.

<sup>890</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII. 12. 14.

<sup>891</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>892</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, IV. 10.

the *Vēdānta* in its entirety, it is declared that *bhēdābhēda* should be accepted as inevitable (*durvārya*).

Verily it is seen in *Sruti* texts like *Nārāyaṇa param Brahma tattvam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,<sup>893</sup> etc., that meditation is undertaken in connection with Viṣṇu and many other gods. But in the *Dahara*, *Śāṇḍilya*, *Upakōśala*, *Vaiśvānara* and other *vidyas*, it is clearly explained that that particular form of God which entirely releases beings from the bondage of *Māyā* should be meditated upon. And if it is asked which is that particular form, it is explained in the next *Sūtra*: *Viśeṣhancha darśayati* (IV. 3. 16) (*And Scripture declares the difference*). Here the indeclinable particle *cha* indicates certainty in the meaning (*niśchayārthaḥ*). In the midst of *jīvas* possessing the *paśu* form of Brahma, Viṣṇu, etc., Śiva Parabrahman is Paśupati. The term *viśeṣhancha* signifies that this is generally borne testimony to in the *Rig* and other *Vēdas* and in the *Vēdānta*. *Darśayati* means *shines forth*; i.e., that this fact is brought to light. Thus it is testified to in the following texts of the *Rigvēda*:—*Antarichchanti tam janē; Rudram parō manīshayā gribhṇanti jihvayāsanam; Ayam mē hastō bhagavān ayam mē bhagavattaraḥ; Ayam mē viśvabhēshajō ayam śivābhi-maršanaḥ*, etc., and in the following texts of the *Yajurvēda*: *Yātē Rudraḥ Śivātānūḥ aghorā pāpakāśinī; Tayānastanuvā śantamayā giriśantāblichākaśīhi; Triyam-bakam yajāmahē*, etc., and it is also seen thus testified to elsewhere.

Moreover, in the *Taittirīya* in the text, *Daharam vipāpam*, while prescribing for the *mumukshus* the meditation upon Parabrahman within their hearts (*daharaṇḍarīka*), it is said in the text, *Yō vēdādaṁ svarāḥ prōktō vēdāntēcha pratishṭhitāḥ; Tasya prakriti-līnasya yaḥ parassa mahēśvaraḥ*,<sup>894</sup> etc., in which the meditation on Mahēśvara is prescribed. And also texts like *Na karmaṇā na prajayā dhanēna*,<sup>895</sup> etc., declare that

<sup>893</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 4.

<sup>894</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 24.

<sup>895</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*, 2.

all those who have freed themselves from worldly bondages and family ties and have accordingly become *viraktas*, should in the midst of other *dēvas* ardently aspire for meditation on Śiva.

The *Sruti* text beginning with the words *Sahasra śīrsham dēvam*,<sup>896</sup> etc., eulogizes God Nārāyaṇa at length and the hymn beginning with *Padmakōṣa pratikāśam* and ending with *Tasyāśśikkhāyām madhyē Paramātmā vyavasthitah*,<sup>897</sup> etc., declares that Nārāyaṇa in his three forms should be meditated upon in one's own heart. Then, further on, *Sruti* texts like *Ādityōvā ēsha ētanmaṇḍalam tapati*,<sup>898</sup> etc., declare that Śiva pervades everything including the *Ādityamaṇḍala* and the *Sruti* text beginning with *Nidhanapatayē namaḥ*<sup>899</sup> and ending with *Pāṇimantram pavitram*, declares that Śiva Parabrahman pervades every part of the universe in his two symbolic forms of *Mūrta* and *Amūrta*, which cause the creation of the *jagat* in its manifested condition. The *Sruti* then prescribes that according to the five texts beginning with *Sadyōjātādi*, etc., and ending with *Namō hiraṇyabāhavē* eulogizing Śiva in all his glowing forms, including Umā Śakti, that these (*Mūrta* and *Amūrta*) forms should be meditated upon by all those who seek for *mukti*. And the *Sruti* text, *Ritam satyam param Brahma*,<sup>900</sup> etc., declares that the forms of Krishṇapingala Virūpāksha and Viśvarūpa are to be meditated upon. In the *Kaivalya*, the text beginning with *Hritpuṇḍarīkam virajam viśuddham*, etc., and ending with *Tadādi madhyānta viḥṇamēkam vibhum chidānandamarūpamadbhutam*; *Umāsahāyam paramēśvaram prabhum trilōchanam nīlakanṭham praśāntam*, and other similar texts declare clearly that only the Parabrahman form of Śiva, who is the presiding supreme deity at heart, should be meditated upon in his *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* forms. The *Smṛiti*

<sup>896</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 1.

<sup>897</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>898</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 19.

<sup>899</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XIV. 1.

<sup>900</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 21.

texts, *Sarvabhūtaśthamātmānam sarvabhūtānīchātmani* । *Sampāśyan Brahma paramam yūti nānyēna hētunū*<sup>901</sup> etc., clearly declare that *Śivōpāsana* only is capable of granting *mukti*. In *Śivasankalpōpanishad* and *Bōdhāyana Sūtra*, the texts *Parātparatarō Brahmā tatparāt paratō Hariḥ* । *Yatparātparatō Īśastanmē manāśśivasankalpamastu*, etc., clearly prove that *Mahēśvara* is the greatest of all deities (*Mahēśvarasya sarvādhikatva nirdēśāt*).

As regards the *Sruti* text *Tadvishṇōḥ paramampadam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*,<sup>902</sup> etc., the *Śivapada* which is termed *Kailāsa* is beyond *Vishṇupada* and this the holy sages with their eyes of knowledge (*gnāna drishti*) reach. For it is said in the *Skānda*: *Tadvishṇōḥ paramam divyam padam kailāsa samgnikam* । *Śivakūruṇya lēśēna sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*, etc. And also in the *Māṇḍūkya*, it is said:—*Prapanchōpaśamam śāntam Śivamadvaitam chaturtham manyantē sa ātmā sa vignēya*, etc. Also in the *Śvētāśvatara*, it is seen:—*Ēka ēva Rudrō nadvitūyāya tathē* । *Yō dēvānām prathamāśchōdbhavaścha*, *Viśvādhikō Rudrō maharshiḥ* । *Hiranyagarbham janayāmāsa pūrvam*, etc.; *Māyāntu prakritim vindyāt māyinantu mahēśvaram* । *Tasyāvayava bhūtōttham vyāptam sarvamidam jagat*<sup>903</sup> । *Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam Haraḥ ksharātmanū viśatē dēva ēkaḥ*<sup>904</sup> । *Tasyābhidhyānāt yōjanāt tattva bhāvādbhūyaśchāntē viśvamāyā nivruttiḥ* । *Tamīśvarānām paramam mahēśvaram tam dēvatānām paramamcha daivatam* । *Patim patīnām paramam purastāt vidāma dēvam bhuvanēśa mūdyam*<sup>905</sup> । *Na tasyakāryam karanamcha vidyatē na tatsamaśchābhyadhikancha driśyatē* । *Parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva śrūyatē svābhāviki gnāna bala kriyācha*<sup>906</sup> । *Na tasya kaśchit patirasti lōkē nachēśītānaiva cha tasya lingam* । *iti*, etc. Also it is said in the *Atharvaśiras*:—*Dēvā ha vai svargam lōka-*

<sup>901</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VI. 29.

<sup>902</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, IV. 2. 9.

<sup>903</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV. 10.

<sup>904</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 10.

<sup>905</sup> *Kaivalya Upa.*

<sup>906</sup> *Śvēta Upa.*, VI. 8.

*magaman* | *Tē dēvā Rudramapruchchan* | *Kō bhavāniti* | *Sō'bravūt* | *Ahamēkaḥ prathamamāsam vartāmicha bhavi-shyāmicha* | *Nānyaḥ kaśchinmattō vyatiriktaḥ* | *iti*.

In the *Atharvaṇa śikhā* also the same view is propounded in the text beginning with *Dhyāyitēśānam pradhya-yitavyam* | *Sarvamidam Brahma Viṣṇu Rudrēndrāstē sam-prasūyantē* and ending with *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya*, etc. These and hundreds of other texts thus clearly declare that Śiva alone is to be meditated upon for obtaining *mōksha*. Though *Sruti* texts like *Vācham Brahmētyupāsīta* | *Prāṇam Brahmētyupāsīta* | *Manō Brahmētyupāsīta*<sup>907</sup> | *Nārāyaṇa parō dhyātā dhyānam Nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ*,<sup>908</sup> etc., declare that through word, thought and deed, Nārāyaṇa should be meditated upon with purity of mind and body, yet, those learned in the *Vēda* declare as the established truth that in order to obtain the form of Śiva Parabrahman in the end, through the *sushumnā nāḍi*, these are the stages through which they (the meditators) have to pass. It is to obtain this glorified knowledge, by which the form of Śiva Parabrahman may be realized, that *Ātivāhikas*—those holy servants of Śiva—lead the meditator so that he may obtain the final Kailāsa, passing beyond all Indra and Upēndra *lōkas*, there to enjoy eternal bliss.

The attainment of *Svasvarūpa* and *Śivatva* (*Śivatva prāpti*) being defined as *mukti* (IV. 4. 22), it does appear that Śrīpati directly answers the question whether there is *bhēda* after attaining *mukti*. Whether *Śivōpāsana* prevails in *mukti* is not thus explicitly stated though he quotes the *Atharvaśiraḥ* text *Śiva ēkō dhyēyaḥ śivamkaraḥ sarvamanyaḥ parityajya*, etc., and remarks that none other than Śiva should be meditated upon (*upāsana*). It would seem that when *svasvarūpa* is obtained, the *upāsana* would still continue even in *mukti*. *Mukhyatva* (i.e., *Parabrahmatva*) would remain in Śiva while *muktitva* would have come to the *upāsaka*. The term *Bhagavat*, he adds, is not applicable to anybody else except *mukhya*, i.e., Paraśiva

<sup>907</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 5.

<sup>908</sup> *Mahōpa.*, XI. 24.

(*Bhagavat śabdō nētarasya mukhyaḥ* | *Tadvadupadishṭam laukika prayōgāt śrautavidhēr balīyastvāt* ||). Quoting in support the *Śatarudrīya* text *Namastē astu Bhagavan Viśvēśvarāya Mahādēvāya* | *iti*, he would seem to hold that the *mukta* says: *Salutation to Bhagavān Mahādēva, the Lord of the Universe*. According to the view of Sṛipati, the *Sṛuti* holds strongly that the term *Bhagavat* applies only to *Mukhya* and to none else. Paraśiva Brahman would thus appear to be supreme even in *mukti* and the *mukta*, though in Śiva's own form, can only bow down to him and offer worship to him, even in *mukti*. The fact that Sṛipati seeks *Sṛuti* support for this view (*Srautavidhēr balīyastvāt*) would seem to indicate that he strongly holds to this view.<sup>909</sup>

### Sripati's Position Defined.

This brief review plainly shows that Sṛipati holds a middle position between *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* and hence his suggestion that we should not push the argument for either *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* to its logical limits. He remarks that some matters are best left out uninquied into—*avichārīta ramaṇīyam*. Similarly as between those who claim supremacy for Viṣṇu and those who desire to establish the supremacy of Śiva, he, despite the fact that he is a strong upholder of the supremacy of Śiva, identifying him as he does with Parabrahman, states that topics of this kind are best left untouched—*avichārīta ramaṇīyam*. A few examples ought to suffice to illustrate this middle point of view adopted by Sṛipati:—

(1) II. 3. 42. *Apīcha smaryatē*.

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Sṛipati states that *jīvas* are of *Śivāṁśa* (*Jīvānām śivāṁśatvamēva abhidhīyatē*). He protests against the view of others that the words "Hariḥ

<sup>909</sup> This is strictly in conformity with the view of Ānandatīrtha who quotes *Kāmānni kāmārūpyanusancharan ēshatsāmagāyānnāstē*, a text quoted by Sṛipati in his commentary on IV. 4. 22. The term *Bhagavat* means "glorious", "illustrious", etc., an epithet applied to gods, demi-gods and respectable deities. Here it has to be taken to mean Paraśiva Brahman.

Om !” indicate the splendour of Viṣṇu and that the *Vēdas* establish the supremacy of Viṣṇu. He holds that these are matters which are best left uninquied into (*avichārīta ramaṇīyam*).

(2) II. 3. 41. *Mantravarṇāt*.

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Śrīpati states that the argument about *ātmaikya* and the suggestion that *ātma* indicates *Brahman* and not *jīva*, are matters best left uninquied into. If inquied into, they are bound to end in affirming *bhēda*. Knowledge will show that though they are all one, to our eyes they (*Brahman* and *jīva*) look as different from each other. *Srutis* also declare superabundantly that *Brahma* and *jīva* are *different*. That the *jīvas* are *many* and *eternal* is vouched for by numerous texts. *Ātmaikyātva*, which is the view propounded by the Advaitins, is accordingly *avichārīta ramaṇīyam*. He quotes *Sruti* texts like *Nityō nityānām chētanaśchētanānām, ēkō bahūnām, yō vidadhāti kāmān, iti*,<sup>910</sup> etc., in support of his view. Śrīpati suggests that the *Advaita* argument would fail here if pushed to the full length.

(3) II. 3. 40. *Amsō nānāvyapadēśādanyathāchāpi dāśa-  
kitavāditvamadhīyata ēkē*.

In commenting on this *Sūtra*, Śrīpati strongly urges that *bhēdābhēda* is the only acceptable theory—*tadēva ramaṇīyam*. Elaborating, he says that we should understand that the *jīva* is an *amsa* of the *Brahman*. Proofs that manifestly demonstrate *bhēda* being too strong for rejection, to urge anything contrary to it, cannot avail. That Parabrahman is the author of creation, that he alone is the controller, that he alone invests all with *gnāna*, that all the rest are separated from him, that he alone wears, as it were, the rest and protects every one and destroys all, and obtaining *upāsana* from all, gives them what is owing to them as the fruits of their action, and grants *mōksha* to those who desire it, and the rest of the *purushārthas* (*dharma, artha* and *kāma*) as the Supreme Lord—if all this is granted, *jīva* and *Brahman* cannot but be different from each other (*Jīva*

<sup>910</sup> *Kaṭha Uṇa.*, V. 13.

*Brahmaṇṣor bhēdaḥ*). The rest, being not visible to the eye, we cannot argue or explain it in any other way—i.e., by way of the *Advaita* argument. While therefore *jagatsrishi*, etc., are being proved from authorities by Bhēdavādins, to undertake the rôle of arguing for *mithyā* is not possible. Also, for undertaking to prove that *ātma svarūpa Brahman* is *akhaṇḍaika rasa chinmātra svarūpa*, there are no authorities available. Further, Parabrahman brings into existence many kinds of creations out of his mind, and establishing them with the aid of *ākāśa* and the *pañcabhūtas*, entering them as if he were a *jīva*, and becoming famous with many different names and forms, granting to *jīvas* the experience of bliss and sorrow as they deserve and himself staying in them, untouched, and being the authority for granting to *jīvas* all that they may deserve, separating them from the bonds of family life and granting them *mōksha*—when all this is said of Parabrahman in the *Sāstras*, if we are to reject them all as illusion, as required by the *Advaitavādins*, then that would be the cry of a mad man (*unmatta pralāpitatvūpātāt*). So it is impossible to argue out successfully that the *jīva* is only Brahman under the control of *upādhi*.

(4) II. 3. 50. *Pravēśa bhēdāditi chēnnāntarbhāvāt*.

In the course of his comment on this *Sūtra*, Sṛipati says that the argument that Brahman is only *jīva* under the control of *upādhi* (*Brahmaṇṣo upādhivāsēna jīva iti vādaḥ avichārita ramanīyaḥ*), is one best left out without argumentation. Several *Sruti* texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*<sup>911</sup> *Gnā gnau dvāu ajāvīśānīśau* | *iti*<sup>912</sup> etc., are decidedly opposed to such a view. Also, in *Sūtras* like *Utpattirasambhavāt iti*, etc., Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa has at length conclusively proved that *jīvas* are eternal and are not created afresh. And therefore, in spite of repeated and harassing opposition, the two sets of *Sruti* texts—*bhēda* and *abhēda*—cannot be brought into harmony. Therefore in consideration of the arguments that the *jīva* is immortal and is always to enjoy the fruits of his actions (*bhōktatva*) and that he should work out his life

<sup>911</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>912</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, I. 9.



for attaining *gnāna* and that *Īśvara* should be his inner being and his controller (*antaryāmi* and *niyāmaka*) and no enjoyer of any part of the fruit of his actions, it is decided that the *jīva* is not *Īśvara* (*Jīvakṛita karmasiddhēśhānīṣṭha phala bhōktrutvam nēśvarasyēti nirṇyatē*).

(5) II. 4. 18. *Vaiśēshyāttu tadvādaśastadvādaḥ*.

Commenting on this *Sūtra*, *Srīpati* says that it is not possible to accept the *Advaita* theory that postulates the identity of the *jīva* with *Īśvara*. The statement of the *Advaitins* that during creation *Īśvara* entered the *viśva-srishti* in the form of *jīva* is also not reasonable. Because this theory is obviously contradicted by numerous *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* texts. Invented statements like the one that an elephant is a horse and that the *jīva* is *Īśvara* are impossible of proof. It happens that *bimba* and *pratibimba* are found in the identical place; but they are different from each other. *Sruti* texts like *Yatō vā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*,<sup>913</sup> etc., prove clearly that the *jīva śarīra* in its *chētana* and *achētana* form, during creation and destruction, is within the control of and subordinate to Parabrahman and that it has no independent power whatever. In the *Sruti* text, *Pradhāna kshētragnapatir guṇēśaḥ samsāra mōkshasthiti bandha-hētuḥ*,<sup>914</sup> it is declared that *Paramēśvara* is the overlord (*kartru*) above all the *jīvas*, having in his control grace and punishment (*tirōdhānānugraha*).

And thus it is concluded that *Paraśiva* Brahman grants to all those *bhaktas* in their final release all happiness and *Sivatva*, according to the *Bhramara kīrtanyāya* in the *nirābhāra* form (*Nirābhāratayā*) having freed the *jīvas* from all worldly bondage, the result of previous births. This is the gist of the whole of the *Vēdānta* as understood from the *Dvaitādvaita siddhānta* point of view.

(6) II. 1. 14. *Tadananyatvamārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*.

Cause and effect are closely connected; effect indicates cause. In this lies *ananyatva*, i.e., without another; not relating to another; having no other resource left. There

<sup>913</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, III, 1.

<sup>914</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, IV, 16.

can be no effect without a cause for it being found. To know that there is nothing beyond cause and effect, is to know *ananyatva*. The Kaṇāda doctrine that there is something beyond cause and effect is not maintainable. *Rajju* and *sarpa* are not connected with each other as cause and effect. *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are not likewise *ananya*. Similarly *jīva* and *Brahman*, from the effect of *upādhi*, are described as different from each other. But as there is nothing beyond Brahman which can be described as real, it would be attributing *upādhi* to Paraśiva. But cause and effect (*kārya* and *kāraṇa*) cannot be described as being one and the same. If we are to presume *Avidyā* in Brahman, then darkness and light will have been spoken of as being existent in the same place which is contradictory. Then we will be compelled to attribute *agnatva* to Brahman himself. This is opposed to the *Sāstras*. If we accept that *chaitanya* is without a second (*advitīya*), this also will be opposed to the *Sāstras*. Following the *Sruti* text, *Yathōrṇanābhiḥ sriḥ sriḥ grihyatēcha*,<sup>915</sup> just as the spider which is the cause, weaves the delicate web which is the effect and thus shows the effect, Paramēśvara, as the cause (*kāraṇarūpa*), creates the *chidachidātmaka srisṭi* and in *Pralaya* he again drags the whole of it into himself. In this way, Paramēśvara, by his creation, care and dissolution of *chidachidātmaka prapancha*, demonstrates the doctrine of *kārya kāraṇa ananyatva*.

### Later Critics of Bhedabheda.

It has been remarked above that the system of Sripati has been styled by him as *Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśēṣādvaita*.<sup>916</sup> The criticism of *Bhēdābhēda*, as propounded

<sup>915</sup> The *Yathōrṇanābhis sriḥ sriḥ grihyatēcha* is usually a text cited in support of the *Bhēda* view. *Munda. Upa.*, I. 1. 7.

<sup>916</sup> The terms *Viśēṣa* and *Viśiṣṭa* may be fully distinguished here. *Viśiṣṭa* in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* means *advaita* with a distinction; or a kind of *advaita* that is distinguished (in a particular manner); a particular, special or distinctive kind of *advaita*. An *advaita* characterized by a distinction. It may also mean a superior kind of *advaita* as *viśiṣṭa* means *superior* or *best of all* or *excellent*. As applied to

by Vāchaspati Mīśra in his *Bhāmati*, has been briefly referred to above.<sup>917</sup> As Vāchaspati Mīśra lived about the 9th century A.D., he may be said to represent the *Advaita* view of his time on this doctrine. Other *Advaita* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* criticism of it will be considered below. As the doctrine has also been examined by the *Dvaitins* as well and as Śrīpati criticizes certain aspects of both *dvaita* and *advaita*, it seems necessary to set out briefly here the *dvaita* viewpoint taken in regard to this particular doctrine and then advert to other criticism.

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Rāmānuja's doctrine, it might be taken to signify the particular or peculiar distinction that Rāmānuja makes as distinguished from Sankara, that Brahman and Prakṛiti are *identical* and *real entities*. As *viśiṣṭa* in Sanskrit is a name of Viṣṇu, it might, in addition, be taken to stress Rāmānuja's particular regard to this deity, whom he holds in his *Bhāṣya* as the one God, as the highest Self or Brahman, as the Creator, as the promulgator of the Pāncarātra and as pervading the whole world (I. 1. 13 ; I. 1. 21 ; I. 4. 4 ; II. 1. 15 ; II. 1. 23 ; II. 1. 24 ; II. 2. 35 ; II. 2. 3).

*Viśeṣha* in *Viśeṣhādvaita* means species, kind or variety ; an *advaita* of a special kind or variety ; in other words, a sort or species of *advaita* which is different from Sankara's or Rāmānuja's. As *viśeṣha* also means *individuality* or *particularity*, the term *viśeṣhādvaita* may be translated as an *advaita* doctrine which has an individuality of its own. Not only does Śrīpati assert the reality of *Brahman* and *Prakṛiti* but also that the Brahman is possessed of *viśeṣha*, i.e., attributes. Śrīpati calls his system *Bhēdābhēdātma viśeṣhādvaita*. In this sense, the word *viśeṣha* may be taken to distinctly limit or qualify the sense of the word (*advaita*) following it. In other words, we would have to describe it as an *advaita* with a qualification, while Rāmānuja's *Viśiṣṭādvaita* would be rightly called an *advaita* characterized by a distinction. Śrīpati's name for his system *Bhēdābhēdātma viśeṣhādvaita* would thus mean a variety of *advaita* which embodies in itself the *bhēda* and *abhēda* views. *Viśeṣha* as used here appears to signify nothing more than "peculiar", "special", "distinctive", "discriminating" or "variety". *Viśeṣha* is used to indicate "variety," when it is used at the end of a compound, i.e., *Bhūta viśeṣhaḥ*,—*Uttararāmacharita*, 4 ; *Parimala viśeṣhān*,—*Panchatantra*, 1 ; *Kadalī viśeṣhāḥ*,—*Kumārasambhava*, I. 36. Śrīkantha describes his system as *Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita*.

<sup>917</sup> See *supra*. Also the *Bhāmati Chatussūtri* by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, page 175 ; Introduction, p. XIX.

The *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine has been dealt with at some length by Ānandatīrtha in his *Tatvōdyōta*.<sup>918</sup> The relevant passage may be quoted here:—*Sarva vilakṣaṇyaṅgīkūrāt durghaṭamapi Brahmaṇānāt angīkriyata ēva jagatō bhinnam abhinnam uta bhinnābhinnam iti vikalpaḥ tatvāpi yujyātē । Bhinnam chēt bhēdādi viśiṣṭāt śuddham bhinnam abhinnam vētyādi anavasta । Abhinnam chēt mithyūrūpēṇa jagatā brahmāpi mithyaiva syāt । Bhinnābhinnam chēt dōshadvayamapi ubhaya vilakṣaṇam chēt anirvachanīyatvam Brahmanā ēva patitam । Yad ēvamapi na anirvachanīyatvam Brahmanah tarhi jagatōpi nasyāt । Viśvam satyam ityādi śrūtērvachanam atrāpi yuktam । Nasattan nāsaduchchatē ॥* While you accept that Brahman is one having contradictory characteristics, though such a conclusion is impossible to arrive at, the existence of Brahman is accepted through evidence. If this be so, these doubts arise:—Is Brahman separate (*bhinna*) from the world (*jagat*), or is he one with it (*abhinna*), or is he both separate and non-separate (*bhinnābhinna*)? If *jagat* is held to be different (*bhinna*) from Brahman, then he must be held to be absolutely different and no occasion for a doubt can arise as to whether he is divided, undivided and both divided and undivided. If *jagat* is held to be undivided from Brahman, then if *jagat* is said to be *mithyā* (unreal), then Brahman also becomes unreal. If it is said that the *jagat* is both divided and undivided from Brahman, then there arises a double discrepancy (*dōsha dvayam*). And both the discrepancies then become so inexplicable that Brahman himself cannot be explained. If Brahman becomes so difficult of explanation, then *jagat* itself is reduced to nothingness (*nasyāt*).<sup>919</sup> But the *Sruti* texts declare *Viśvam satyam*, etc.<sup>920</sup> (i.e., The

<sup>918</sup> See T. R. Krishnachar's (Kumbakonam) Edition, p. 241, lines 1—2.

<sup>919</sup> That is, *jagat* is not merely *mithyā*, but something worse, it is not at all existent.

<sup>920</sup> The full text of *Rig-Vēda*, II. 24. 12, runs as follows:—*Viśvam satyam maghavānaya uvōridāpāschana praminanti vratam vām । Praghānvasya mahatō mahāni satyā'satyasya karaṇāni vōcham ॥*

*jagat* exists) and *Nasattan nāsaduchchatē*, etc. (The world is true and eternal).

In the *Karmanirṇaya*<sup>921</sup> Ānandatīrtha touches on this question once again. Discussing the *nirviśeṣa* theory, he asks whether the *vailakṣhanya* of Brahman exists in being *Bhēda*, *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*—in difference, in non-difference or in both difference and non-difference. As regards *Bhēda*, it has never been accepted by you (the *Advaitin*); but *vyāvahārika* is accepted in the light of *anirvāhatva* (i.e., inexplicability). Therefore there is really no such thing as *vyāvahārika*; for if all *vyavahāra* is dispensed with, there is no proof (of anything existing thereafter). In *vyavahāra*, the unreal (*mithyā*) and the real (*tathya*), when put to common test, will prove indistinguishable like vapour (from the air) and vapour from the tears (*dhūmabāshpayōrdhūmatavavat*). Therefore *Abhēda* cannot be accepted. Consequently there remains only *Bhēdābhēda*. This too cannot be accepted. In *Abhēda*, Brahman is inexplicable (*anirvāchya*)—*Brahmanōstatśabdāyōḥ paryāyatva*. You want to make Brahman and *tatśabda* synonymous with each other. This synonymity cannot be accepted because you have discarded *viśeṣhaṇa* and argue *nirviśeṣhatva*. While you don't accept *viśeṣhatva*, you still discuss Brahman, assuming *tatśabda* as synonymous with him, which is an attribute. This contradicts your own statement and thus cannot be accepted. You also say that a Brahmagṇāni should not use any other term as synonymous with Brahman, if he wishes to attain *Brahmatva* but still you employ the term *tat*, which is an attributive term and not Brahman. Thus your argument ends in contradiction. And therefore you have not proved your doctrine—*mithyā viśeṣhya chāsiddhirukta*. Therefore, the argument for *Bhēdābhēda* which relies on the mutual dependence or support (*anyōnyāśraya*), on unsettledness (*anavasta*) and on a fraudulent device (*chakrakam vā*) becomes contradictory

<sup>921</sup> A work on the *Rigvēda Brāhmaṇa*, 1 to 5 khaṇḍas—more properly called *Karma nirṇaya mūlabhūta Rigvēda bhāvaḥ*. (See Krishnachar's Edition, p. 247.)

and has to be rejected even on your own footing. Nor can Brahman be explained to be anything else which can appeal to knowledge. Therefore, the suggestion of *bhēdābhēda* becomes contradictory. So, that form of *bhēdābhēda* consisting of *vilakṣaṇa* (contradictory) characteristics becomes destroyed (*i.e.*, refuted).

In his *Vishṇutattva-Nirṇaya*<sup>922</sup> also, Ānandatīrtha discusses the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda*. He says :—*Abhinnaścha mabhēdaścha yathā bhēdaviavarjitam vyavahāryam pruthaktvam syāt yēvamēva guṇōharēḥ* । *Abhēda bhinnayōrbhēdō yadivā bhēdabhinnayōḥ* । *Anavasthiti rēvasya naviśēṣhaṇatūmatih mūlasambandhamagnātvā tasmādēkam anantata vyavahāryam viśēṣhēṇa dustaraḥ balatōharēḥ* । *Viśēṣhōpi svarūpam sa svanirvāhakatasyacha* । *iti Brahmataṛkā* । The *Brahma Tarka* says :—The expression *Abhēda* denotes undividedness (*abhinnatvam*), as if it were impossible of being divided (*i.e.*, incapable of being divided). And the expression *vyavahāra* denotes absolute difference. So the characteristics of Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman) are absolutely different from those of others. If *Abhēda* should mean difference among the divided things (*bhinnayōrbhēdaḥ*), or if *Abhēda* is understood to mean difference existing between two different things, then, in either case, there arises unsettlement. And there can be no correct understanding arrived at (in either case). Without understanding correctly the relationship of the original (*i.e.*, Brahman), if we begin to argue, then the argument ends in false reasoning in understanding about Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman). Because all attributes use the natural forms of Brahman. And all attributes are possessed of Hari (*i.e.*, Brahman). The *Sruti* texts *Ēkamēvādviṭīyām tannēhanānāsti kinchana* ;<sup>923</sup> *Mṛityōssamrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēvapaśyati* ;<sup>924</sup> *Yathōdakam durgē vriṣṭam parvatēshu vidhūvati* । *ēvam dharmān*

<sup>922</sup> T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, page 274.

<sup>923</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 2. 1.

<sup>924</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 19. (In the text *iha* has been interpreted by Ānandatīrtha thus : *iḥēti Paramēśvara rupēshu avayavēshu dharmēshucha kinchana nānā nāstīyantaḥ* ॥)

*pruthakpaśyan tñēvānuvidhāvati*,<sup>925</sup> etc., declare that there is only one Being and no others and that great Being is capable of becoming the God of Death, just as a big fall of showers on the tops of the mountain makes the water roll in torrents and fully reach the sea, all characteristics denote that great Being to whom alone those attributes apply. Therefore that great Being is the possessor of all the infinite *guṇas* (qualities) and to him alone they apply in the main. And those who thus understand Viṣṇu in the fulness of his character will free themselves from the bondage of *samsāra* and enjoy everlasting *ānanda* in his presence (*tatsamāpē samōdate*). To *muktas*, Viṣṇu is an object of shelter (*āśrayabhūta*); and under him all those *muktas* serve and *Īśvara* is the Overlord of all. This is the declaration of *Parama Sruti*. The *Sruti* texts, *Amrutasyaisha sētuḥ*, *Sō'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaschita*,<sup>926</sup> etc., clearly state that the Lord Viṣṇu is the great bridge for the *muktas* to pass over free from bondage to the everlasting enjoyment of *ānanda* and he that thus passes over the bridge enjoys eternal happiness as the result of realizing of what all he desired to enjoy by the side of Brahman (*Sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā*). The *Pādma Purāṇa* states that all the *Srutis* exult in glorifying the innumerable and infinite qualities of the great Overlord (Viṣṇu) and therefore Nārāyaṇa is the only faultless and all-bliss. This is the final conclusion.

In his commentary on the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad* also, Ānandatīrtha refers to the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine.<sup>927</sup> In order to declare that there is no *bhēdābhēda*, the word *iha* is used in *Sruti* texts *Ēkamēvādvitīyam tannēha nānāsti kinchana*,<sup>928</sup> *Mṛityōssamrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēva paśyati*<sup>929</sup>. In the forms as well as characteristics of *Paramēśvara*, there is no distinction or difference; nor is there anything that can be considered higher or equal to him. This means that there is nothing equal to or higher than

<sup>925</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, IV. 14.

<sup>926</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>927</sup> T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, *Bṛihad. Upa.*, pp. 492-493.

<sup>928</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 2. 1.

<sup>929</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 19,

Īśvara, or one who can be said to excel him in any respect. And therefore Parabrahman is the highest of all (beings). And the *bhēdābhēda* view is thus refuted because the term *bhēdābhēda* itself is of contradictory import (*viruddhōbhaya samyōga iva śabdaḥ*). (It is just like a clubbing together of two contradictory thoughts in a single expression.) And the *Sruti* does not imply such a contradiction, because the illustration given in it explains that there is no *bhēdābhēda*. The illustration in the *Sruti* text is:—*Yathōdakam durgē vrishtam parvatēshu vidhāvati* <sup>1</sup> *Ēvam dharmān pruthak paśyan tān evānuvidhāvati* ॥ etc. As the rain which falls on the top of a mountain naturally flows down as a stream to find its own destination, similarly all different characteristics found in various things go to Him, the great Overlord. This clearly shows that He is quite different from other things. Hence there cannot be any *bhēdābhēda*, for he is quite out and out different from all others. *Bhēdēna darśanādvāpi bhēdābhēdēna darśanāt* <sup>2</sup> *Vishṇōr guṇānām rūpānām tadangānām mukhādīnām* <sup>3</sup> *Tathā darśana kālāttu kshīpramēva tamō vrajēt*, etc., as declared in the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*. The *Srutis* and the *Sāstras* generally denote distinctly *bhēda* only and not *bhēdābhēda*. The characteristics of Vishṇu as well as his various features, although equal in Himself, yet are absolutely different from those other beings in the world. The *Sruti* texts *Jyushṭam yadā paśyatyanyamūsam asya mahimānamiti vītaśōkaḥ* <sup>4</sup> *Dvāsuparnau sayujau sakhāyau* <sup>5</sup> *Yō vēda nihitam guhāyām paramē vyōman* <sup>6</sup> *Sō'snute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaśchita iti* <sup>7</sup> <sup>930</sup> *Ētamānandamayam ātmānam upasankramya ya imān lōkān kāmānmī kāmārūpyanusancharan* <sup>931</sup> and the text beginning with *Athātānandāsyā nīmāmsā bhavati* and ending with *Manushyādi brahmāntīnām muktānām ānandē śataguṇa viśēshaśchōchyatē satē* <sup>8</sup> *Muktānāmcha ayam viśēshaḥ* <sup>9</sup> *Śrōtriyaasyacha akāmahatasyēti viśēshanāt* <sup>10</sup> *Nahi Brahmādīnām anadhigataḥ śrutyarthaḥ kēshamchidasti* <sup>11</sup> *Na cha Brahmanā ēva kēchana kāmahatāḥ kēchana akāmahatāḥ ityatra pramāṇamasti* <sup>12</sup> *Tasmāt śrōtriya iti*

<sup>930</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>931</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 8.



*prāpta śruti phalatvān muktyuchchyatē* | *Akāmahatatvancha mukhyam muktasyaiva* || clearly declare that a *mukta*, by virtue of his realization, has finally attained what he desired—*mukti* or *Brahmapada*. The *Sruti* texts nowhere accord sanction that a realized person (*mukta*) will have anything more to aspire for. The expression *Athātānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati*<sup>932</sup> declares that beginning from the state of “man” to the state of “Brahman” all enjoy *ānanda* from one to hundred parts according to their merits as *muktas*. This itself is the chief characteristic of *muktas*. The attributes *śrōtriyasyacha* and *akāmahatasyacha* also do not in any way allow the *muktas* a position any whit higher than (*adhigataḥ*) the *Brahman* stage. Therefore the expression *śrōtriya* (one who obtained the result declared in the *Srutis*) clearly means that the *mukta* has realized what he ought to obtain as the result,—i.e., the highest state, the state of a *mukta Brahman*. He has no desire beyond *mukti*. Hence *akāmahataḥ*. Therefore *śrōtriyas* are declared to be those who have obtained fully their desires.<sup>933</sup> These are therefore declared in the *Bhārata* as *āptakāmaḥ*, i.e., those who have realized their desires, i.e., those who have nothing else to desire, *mukti* being the final stage and there being nothing beyond it. When *Bhēda* has once been proved all round, we cannot revert to a discussion of *Abhēda* or of *Bhēdābhēda*, as both of these are proved to be non-existent. For it has been proved that there is no such thing as *bhēdābhēda* in Vishṇu considered as Parabrahman.

If *Bhēdābhēda* cannot be maintained, then either *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* will have to go. Śrīpati's position is that either extreme is impossible in view of the two different types of texts we have to deal with in the *Srutis*. As against *Advaita*, he thinks that neither an attributeless Brahman nor an illusory world can be successfully maintained. As against *Dvaita*, Śrīpati's contention is that stressing only

<sup>932</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, III. 13. 7.

<sup>933</sup> Cf. Ānandatīrtha in *Bṛihad. Uṇa.*, III. 4. 14 :—*Prāpta Sruti phalatvāntu śrōtriyāḥ prāptā mōkshinaḥ* || (See Krishnachar's Edn., p. 493).

one set of *Sruti* texts defining the *Dvaita* viewpoint as against the weight of the other set expounding the *Advaita* position, would be tantamount to rejecting the authority of the latter. Śrīpati's cardinal point is that *Bhēdāvādins* fail to recognize the *Abhēda Sūtras*. They differ, in his opinion, from Bauddhas only to a small extent: while Bauddhas reject all *Srutis*; *Bhēdāvādins* reject only a part of them. The difference is thus one of quantity and no more.<sup>934</sup> But *Bhēdins* may urge—as they have—that there may be what seem like contradictions between *Sruti* texts. It will not do to say that there are such contradictions. It is your duty not to treat them as contradictory, for have you exhausted all the *Srutis* to say conclusively that they *are* contradictions? It is difficult to prove such a contradiction. It only shows that you are not able to harmonise all the *Sruti* texts "into a consistent whole. A *Sruti* text says:—*Guṇā śrutāḥ saviruddhāścha dēvē santayaśśrutā api naivātra śankā* । *Chintyā chintyāścha tathaiva doṣhāḥ śrutāścha nagnaivihi tathā pratītāḥ* (*Saṅgapaṇa Sruti*). The qualities described in the *Srutis* are, though appearing apparently contradictory, really not so; because God is faultless, and nothing could be doubted of Him which is of contradictory import. In view of the fact that His nature could not be fully understood, the alleged contradictions cannot either be proved or harmonised by us within our limited range (of knowledge). And thus they go for mere observations without any proof. God is faultless; nor are the *Srutis* contradictory in this regard. So runs the *Saṅgapaṇa Sruti*, quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his commentary on the *Sūtra*, *Sarvadharmōpapattēścha* (II. 1. 38).<sup>935</sup>

<sup>934</sup> A similar criticism is offered by Ānandatīrtha in regard to the lack of difference between those who hold the Bauddha and the Śūnyavāda doctrines. (See Ānandatīrtha's *Anuvyākhyāna*, II. 1. 29–33.)

<sup>935</sup> Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. 1. 38. The Jaina doctrine is rejected by the Sūtrakāra, according to Ānandatīrtha, because on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes

Another point urged by Sṛīpati against *Dvaita-vādin*s is their extreme insistence on the difference between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* (*ghaṭapaṭayōr atyanta bhēda-vādinah*). As to this point it may be pointed out that some *Bhēdavādin*s have anticipated this point and answered it at some length. Among these, Jayatīrtha stands easily first. Commenting on the *Sūtra*, *Asaditi chēna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 8), Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā* sets out the truth underlying the criticism that *Bhēdavādin*s attach undue importance to the *ghaṭapaṭa vāda*. In its ultimate analysis, this criticism reduces itself to a denial of *kartrutva* to Brahman. What is behind and beyond *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*? There is the *kartru*, whose existence cannot be denied. If his existence is denied, then not only the *bhēda* between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* is denied, but also the existence of the creator of this distinction, i.e., the *kartru*. If *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are not in existence, there is no *kartrutva* behind them.

If there is no *kartrutva*, then there is no topic to start with. Then, there will be, in consequence, no discussion. If we have to accept the existence of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, then we have to accept the existence of *kartrutva*. Without *kartrutva*, *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* could not have come into existence. In the *Sūtra*, the term *pratishēdha mātra* declares *kartrutva* to Īśvara, because his *kartrutva* is beyond denial. The lordship of Īśvara is of an all-pervasive nature and it is his special characteristic and there it is beyond the control of another. Much less is it capable of interruption (or prohibition). The indeclinable term *mātra* (in this *Sūtra*) indicates his pervasive character in its entirety. The words *pratishēdha mātra* accordingly imply that injunctions cannot predominate over him (*pratishēdha mātra śabdō vidhēraprādhānyam lakṣhayati*). Therefore *kārya* and *kāraṇa* would have become inoperative without a *kartru*, for example *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*.

being represented as being in one and the same thing. (See *Ibid.*, II. 2. 32-34.) The same reasoning would apply to the co-existence of *Bhēdābhēda*. (See also Ānandatīrtha's *Aṇuvyākhyāna*, II. 2. 29-34.)

*Ghaṭa* and *paṭa* depend purely for their coming into existence in their particular forms upon a *kartru*. Obviously *ghaṭa* could not have had any existence as such before it was made, though the material out of which it was made was in existence. If there is no *kartru*, in spite of the materials available in the forms of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, nothing could be brought into definite form. The *kartru* being undeniable (*anishēdhatayā para pratīkshēpēṇa pratīyatē*) he avails himself of the *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and brings into manifestation (*srishtī*) as the potter having under his control the material earth and the wheel brings into existence several forms of *ghaṭa*. Thus it is proved that the *kartru* uncontradictingly possesses in himself by his inherent powers both the powers of (*Dēvasyēsha svabhāvōyam*) *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. Just as if we deny the existence of the potter, we cannot predicate the making of the pot, in the same way, if we deny the *kartru*, we are reduced to denying the utility of the truth of the illustrative example, *viz.*, the existence of the *ghaṭa*, for we should in such circumstances have not realized its existence, but only ended in arriving at its non-existence. If we attempt to predicate that there is such a thing as a non-existent *ghaṭa*, the very idea itself cannot be supported in any form, because its very existence is a nullity (*abhāvāt*). If we want to prove nullity (*abhāva*) through an illustration, the question of *bhāva* and its character must first be illustrated and understood. What is *bhāva* and what is *abhāva* and what are their respective characteristics? It is possible to describe *bhāva svarūpa* from example, but it is not possible to do so in the case of *abhāva svarūpa*. Where we deny *bhāva svarūpa*, there we have to infer the existence of *abhāva svarūpa*. That is why the word *mātra* is used in this *Sūtra*. It comes to this: By merely denying the *bhāva rūpa* which can be attained, we will be imagining a non-existent state. This is not what is intended by the *Sūtra*. It does not attempt to describe anything beyond *bhāva dharma*. It is because it seeks to establish the *bhāva svarūpa* that the illustrative example

of *ghaṭa* has been sought (by *Dvaitavādins*). Therefore it is that the *bhāva* and *abhāva* of *ghaṭa svarūpa* cannot be dispensed with by their mere denial so long as *kartrutva* remains in the *kulāla*, whose *dharma* is clearly to be understood. The non-mention of *kulāla* cannot remove him from existence. How then can his existence be established? It is said that the term *mātra* in this *Sūtra* indicates the absolute independence of the potter in regard to his discretion as to the forms the pots should take (*mātru śabdōhi sākalyē vartatē*). Nobody can hinder his independence (in this regard). The thought of denial of *kartrutva* was only adduced by the upholders of the opposite doctrine (*parēṇaiyōktatvāt*). The phrase *pratishēdha mātra* interferes with the independence of the *kartru* against this injunction. Thus, if it is stated that he partook of only food, it is understood that he left other things alone and partook of food only. Therefore, the mind of the partaker of food is signified—his *kartrutva* is signified in regard to the kind of food he has chosen to take, *i.e.*, that he has taken only food and not anything else. This peculiar turn of mind indicates only a mind which predicates one that is thinking of a *bhāva svarūpa* and not *abhāva svarūpa*. Therefore, the use of the phrase *pratishēdha mātra* indicates that the mind is fixed on *bhāva svarūpa* and not on *abhāva svarūpa*. The topic to be proved is of two kinds: *svatantram* and *paratantram* (independent and dependent). *Paratantra* is further divided into *bhāva* and *abhāva*. *Bhāva* is in turn sub-divided into *chētana* and *achētana*. While *abhāva* does not come under the headings of *chētana* and *achētana*, what is the utility of considering *abhāva* as belonging to one of these two categories? However, we cannot even assume, for example, that there is in existence some one, a very intelligent man, but who never had actually his existence. What then is the use of saying, in such a case, that such a person (an intelligent person) never actually existed and that such a person has never been found? A discussion which leaves away the actual connected argument and premises a point of no consequence whatever,

is impertinence (*atiprasaṅgāt*). Of course, the *Sruti* text *Tan manō kuruṭē* does not concede this impertinence. Otherwise, the correct conclusion cannot be arrived at. If the term *pratishēdha mātra* had a meaning contradictory to the *Srutis*, then, the *Srutis* cannot be harmonised. The term *asat* in the *Sūtra* only shows *Brahman* and denotes solely *bhēda*, difference. And this meaning the opponent has to contradict because *Brahman* becomes a term of plurality. There cannot be many *Brahmans* independent of each other. Therefore *Brahman* is defined here by the term *asat*. Truly, the phrase *pratishēdha mātra* used in the *Sūtra* is intended only to indicate the insistence to be laid on the right use of one's intellect for interpreting in a feasible manner the *Srutis* in an harmonious way, avoiding thereby all contradictions. Many commentators, while accepting the unusual<sup>7</sup> matter contained in this *Sūtra*, and conceding the *dharma* of *bhāva*, have doubted the existence of *abhāva* but left it however in a state of doubt. We cannot fit in *bhāva* with *abhāva dharma* and *abhāva* with *bhāva dharma*. Because there is demonstrably no proof available to fit in the characteristics of *bhāva* and *abhāva* with the characteristics of their *abhāva* and *bhāva dharmas*; because they are decidedly of an opposite nature. Between two white cloths, a comparison may be easily effected, but not between two unconnected things like *mēru* and *mandira* (i.e., a mountain and a house). Moreover, there is no connection whatever between *bhāva* and *abhāva* and it is never possible to effect a comparison between the two because of their contradictory character. A reasonable comparison between two things is possible only when both possess the identical qualities and not otherwise. Take, for instance, a buffalo and a horse. They cannot be compared, because of the inimical and opposite characters they are naturally endowed with. Such is the nature of *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Their very natures make them the opposite of each other and exclude the one from the other. A *ghaṭa* can never assume by itself that form (i.e., the form of a *ghaṭa*). The *dharma* of one particular

thing cannot be made by itself, so that *dharma* and *dharmi* cannot be one and the same, unless the *dharmi* is acted upon by the *dharma*. It, therefore, comes to this : *dharma* is the property of a particular thing, which can be clearly seen in the *dharmi* as its property. That which is made known by its peculiar qualities, *i.e.*, its distinguishing property, that is called its *dharmi* (the possessor of a *dharma* is *dharmi*). *Dharmi* is the possessor of the *dharma*, *i.e.*, the characteristic property. It is not possible to describe these two—*dharma* and *dharmi*—in any other mode. *Bhāva* and *abhāva*, therefore, cannot be established by any other means beyond their actual essential properties. Otherwise, the discussion regarding *ghata* and *paṭa* will be evidently out of the way if the characteristics not existing in one are assumed to be as if they were existent. This leads to a result undesirable. How can it be said that *bhāva* and *abhāva* do not possess the *dharmi* *bhāva* ? Why not *abhāva* be considered to be absence of *dharma* of the *bhāva* ? Two dissimilar objects which are possessed of different properties compared with two white cloths possessing the same comparable characters are instances for comparison between *bhāva* and *abhāva*. As an illustration, two white cloths may be compared in regard to their respective characteristics for obtaining a knowledge of them. Similarly, as an illustration of *abhāva*, may be mentioned *mēru* and *mandira*, the characteristics of which are dissimilar. The characteristics found in *mēru* are not found in *mandira*. In this way, *abhāvarūpa* is illustrated. In the same manner, the characteristics of *ghata* being absent in *paṭa*, any comparison between the two (objects) cannot hold good, for in the *ghata* is involved the earth for its original property, while that is not found in the *paṭa*. In this way, all objects of a contradictory character—which are different from each other—are stated to be possessed of opposing properties. Hence the idea of *bhāvābhāva* being considered as *abhāvābhāva* and associated with such *dharma* is repudiated. As to things which last eternally and those which are liable to eventual destruction, even though they do possess certain

contradictory properties, their qualities have still to be considered in describing them. The same cannot be said of two similar things like *śukla paṭa*—two white pieces of cloth. Because the two white cloths are similar to each other in their qualities. The same should hold good in the case of all objects of comparison. The opponent has always agreed that two dissimilar things do not agree in their properties. And it is not possible to discover any points of similarity in two things of dissimilar nature. If, in this manner, we proceed to compare two dissimilar objects, which from their very nature are patently different from each other and begin to describe the qualities of each for purposes of comparison, we will only end our argument in incoherent talk.

If we still insist on so comparing existing things with things non-existing (i.e., *bhāvābhāva*) with their respective opposing properties (*abhāvābhāva*), then it results in the inconsistency that the properties and the things possessed of the properties (*dharmādharmi*) cannot be differentiated. Then, there can be no restriction of thought in understanding things existing with their properties and things non-existing and their properties (*bhāvatvēna abhāvasya cha abhāvasya bhāvatvēna*) so that things existing may be described as non-existing—as argued in the *Nyāya Mīmāṃsa* under the heads of *Prāgabhāva*, *Pradhvamsābhāva* and *Atyantābhāva*. And then finally a comparison will prevail in knowing which things existed and which non-existed. Such must not be the way employed for knowing the correct properties of things to arrive at a correct conclusion. The whole world will not consider such conclusions as deserving of any value. Therefore, the terms *bhāva* and *rūpa* are terms indicating properties of particular things. And hence we have to understand things existent and things non-existent as we come into contact with such of them according to the context in which they are referred to. This is the proper way of interpreting. Should a reader be taught to lay down a rule for himself as to how to understand the usage (of *bhāva* and *abhāva*) in the context in which they are referred to? The latter part of the question suggests the answer for the



former. (He must discover the proof and draw the inferences.) However, certain things—either existent or non-existent—such as *ghaṭa*, etc., really never existed before. In order to illustrate how a thing which never existed before could be brought into existence, *i.e.*, to give an instance of *prāgabhāva*—reference may be made to the utility of things such as the earth, which when made into a rounded ball-like thing, can be converted into a *ghaṭa* of any form that one likes. This shows how a thing (*padārtha*) could be used and what its properties are. Out of the material earth, a form has been brought into existence which did not exist before. The inference is that a form not existent before (*prāgabhāva*) has come into existence. According to the *abhēda* theory, the *dharmā-dharmi bhāva* is not considered as an attribute of quality (*viśeṣa śaktiṃ samgachchata iti*). This may be right for that theory. But as regards the second (*abhāva*) it is, as in the case of the first, unyielding and the properties of *abhāva* are likewise neglected. Whoever accepts the fact that *ghaṭa* can be made from a rounded ball of earth, admits also the existence of *bhāva*; whoever admits that a thing existent is liable to destruction, he should be held to admit both *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamsābhāva*. Whence *ghaṭa* is brought into its form, it cannot be compared with a non-existing thing like *paṭa*. Nor can it be interpreted in terms of the non-existing thing *paṭa*. Accordingly the states of *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamsābhāva* may be described as subjects for comparison to convince one of how a non-existent thing came into existence and also how it can undergo destruction. This is the only way to arrive at the right conclusion by interpreting the terms used in a particular context. In order to indicate that many things could in this way be compared in order to arrive at the correct conclusion, the plural indeclinable *hi* is used by the Āchārya (Ānandatīrtha) in the text (*Prathamēhi*, II. 20. 14, in his *Anuvyākhyāna*). The topic and the matter relating to the topic are related in the same way as the supporter and the supported. In order to illustrate this view, the Āchārya uses the locative case. In all such

illustrations, one has to bear in mind the chief topic and how the matters relating to it should be viewed and compared, so that the primary and secondary thoughts may not be mixed up (*gauna mukhyatva vivakshābhāvasya sthīratvāt iti*). Thus it has been clearly proved how *bhāva* and *abhāva* are so intermixed in discussion by argumentators, thus proving the contradictory conclusion they arrive at, which bears testimony in itself to be against the teaching of *Sruti* texts. Now, the *Sūtrakāra*, having proved that there is no contradiction between *Sruti* texts, explains how the term *Asat* should be understood in the correct manner, so that such explanation might be in harmony with all *Sruti* texts and at the same time disallow all other methods of argumentation that might be in contradiction with it, and proceeds to lay down the next *Sūtra*: *Api taṁ tadvat prasangādasamanja-sam* (II. 1. 9). If we discussed the term *asat* in this manner, contradictory to the *Sruti* texts, then our discussion will end in disagreement with them (*asamanjasam*). And thus this expression *asamanjasam* would lead us to assume that the *Viśva* (universe) has come into existence without a maker (*kartru*). How is this? If we are to accept the theory that *Jagatkartrutva* should be assigned to *abhāva*, then we would have to say that there exists nothing else than *abhāva*. Then *Īśvara* and all others would have had to come into existence out of *abhāva*. But it is not so. For if *Īśvara* is ignored and denied to be the maker of the *jagat*, then we will have none else to hold responsible for creation, etc. And therefore obviously this is not the meaning of the *Sruti* text and therefore it should not be said that in *Pralaya* nothing existed including *Īśvara* and all other minute forms of embryonic matter capable of bringing about creation again. It is therefore to prove clearly, by way of illustration, that there were at *Pralaya* all forms of matter in their undestroyable condition that *ghaṭa* was chosen to exemplify how non-existent things can be brought into creation by the maker—the *kartru*—by means of different kinds of matter existing in embryo. The *Sūtrakāra* thus formulated the last *Sūtra*, only to declare that everything—i.e., all matter—

was existent in its embryonic form at *Pralaya* (*asat*) and not that nothing was existent at *Pralaya*. To accept the latter proposition would be wrong. Because, the illustration of the *ghaṭa* has been brought in only to drive home this point. The all-pervasive character of Paramātmān is amply proved by evidences, which are not liable to destruction. These evidences are clear proofs to illustrate the minute embryonic existence of everything during *Pralaya* under the all-pervasive control of Paramēśvara. Where are these proofs available and what *Srutis* establish this position? The Bhāṣhyakāra (in his *Anuvyākhyāna*) establishes it in connection with the expression *Sarva nāśēshvapi iti*, etc., occurring in II. 1. 15.<sup>936</sup> There the word *Sarva* not only includes those existing at present but also all those that have been existing for all time. In order to remove the apparent inconsistency involved in this statement, he points out that from the given premises the conclusion follows that the Paramātmān's all-pervasiveness is at the root (of the position) (*Purushasya vyāpti mūlam anumānamuchchyaṭē*). The illustration itself amply proves the statement without contradiction. Therefore it follows clearly as an inference that in *Pralaya*, Paramēśvara and everything else (favouring *srishṭi*) did actually exist (*sat bhāva*) in an embryonic form. If it is suggested by the opponent that the *jagat* originated from *abhāva kartrutva*, even that is destroyed by his own argument. Because if the *Pralaya* was such as to leave no vestige of a Purusha, if *abhāva Viśva kartrutva* is to occur, even the very occasion for such a *kalpana* (assumption) disappears. Because such an assumption evidently has to fall back for its support on the *kartrutva* of the Purusha, which was *ex hypothesi*, destroyed at the *Pralaya*. Verily in this world, if the *kulāla* did not exist before the *ghaṭa* came into existence, no one could have had the idea of its maker (*Nahi lōkē*

<sup>936</sup> See *Anuvyākhyāna*, II. 1. 15, where the full text of the passage occurs: *Sarvanāśēshvapi sadā śishṭatvāt yasya kasyānuh | Nāśōyam vimatōpi syānnāśatvāt kartru śēshavān || Dharmā'dharmāstrayatvēna svikāryōpi nirālayē || Anāditvāt iti ||*

*prāgulpattēḥ kulūlābhāvayōḥ satōrabhāvō ghaṭasya kartā drishtaḥ*). They would have necessarily asked who is this *kulāla*? Naturally one who had not seen the maker, would at once reply, "He is the maker of a pot" and thus free himself of the confusion. Again, when in the struggle that ensued between Sunda and Upasunda,<sup>937</sup> when countless numbers fell down, there still remained one who was the chief cause of their struggle. Thus, there has been never an instance where everything went to destruction along with the *kartru* as it is opposed to the principle of *kartrutva* for a *kartru* cannot destroy himself (*Nātū nāśa kartuḥ Puruṣasya aviśiṣṭatā*). Nor while destroying what existed till then, can one prevent from coming into existence what is going to come into existence in the future. Since he cannot foresee what is going to come into existence in the future, much less is it within his power to prevent it from coming into existence. It really comes to this: leaving the *kartru-tva* quite free for what is to come into existence in the future in due course, he must say that only what has been existent—in the present—has been destroyed. If not, the premises assumed will be overruled and contradicted. It cannot be granted for a moment that destruction is possible for all three periods of time—past, present and future—for no one has any control over what is going to befall at the next moment. Nor can it be proved. But if it is to be assumed that the destruction of what is going to happen is also possible, then it has to be described as an anomaly<sup>938</sup> (*tatra vyabhichārasyāt*).

<sup>937</sup> See the *Mahābhārata* for the story of Sunda and Upasunda. These were two brothers, the sons of Nikumbha. They secured a boon from the Creator that they would not die until they should kill themselves. On the strength of this boon, they grew very oppressive and Indra had at last to send down a lovely nymph named Tilōttama, and while quarrelling for her, they killed each other—leaving Tilōttama alone.

<sup>938</sup> *Vyabhichārah* is going away from; deviation; or leaving the right course. Hence an irregularity, anomaly or exception to a rule. In Logic, a fallacious *hētu*, the presence of the *hētu* without the *sādhya*.

*Pralāya*<sup>939</sup> is the complete destruction of everything that has, during the course of ages, been brought into existence. Thus, *Pralāya* is the destruction of *existing* things. There is, however, no reason to co-relate *Īśvara abhāvatva* with *Pralāya*. Therefore, there is no reason to predicate that *Pralāya* indicates such a destruction as to include the destruction of *Īśvara*, etc. It is thus clear that to assume that nothing existed at the time of *Pralāya* and that everything had been destroyed is a clear contradiction. Both the *Sūtrakāra* and the *Bhāshyakāra* accordingly left this point for inference on the part of their disciples without dwelling at length on it. However, this was hinted at by the *Sūtrakāra* in the first words of the *Sūtra* beginning with *Api tau*, etc. The *Bhāshyakāra* asks : What is the profit to be derived from a proof which establishes such a *Pralāya* (as evidences the destruction of everything including the *kartru*)? Therefore *laya* evidently means the destruction of everything else existing except *jīva* and *Īśvara* which are indestructible. And this is the ordinary inference to be drawn. Now, we have to prove whether in *Pralāya*, the *jīva* and *Īśvara* did actually exist. To meet this point, the following inferential proofs are available :—At destruction, the *dharma* (matter) and *dharmi* (properties of matter) were never interfered with. In order to drive home this fact, the term *api* in the *Sūtra* is used. The dual term *tau* indicates that *jīvātma* and *Īśvara* did exist. During *Pralāya*, *dharma* and *dharmi* (matter and its properties) did continue. *Dharma* also includes the opposite *adharma*.

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<sup>939</sup> *Pralāya* : *Pra* + *laya* : a condition in which the exhausted state is allowed to lie in an inactive condition, only to be rejuvenated and allowed to gain power and start and grow again afresh, as if quite new. In other words, *Pralāya* is a dormant condition of inactive existence. In the compound word *Pralāya*, *laya* means *lurking* or *hiding*. How modern science is approaching this ancient doctrine of *Pralāya* is thus expressed by a scientific writer in closing a series of papers in "The New World Picture" :—"The idea of the eternal dissolution of matter into waves and the materialization of waves back into matter, has now some experimental foundation."

*Dharma* and *adharma*, which are always associated with the *jīvātma*, can never undergo destruction. Therefore, even in *Pralāya*, though the form of *nara*<sup>940</sup> (human form) underwent change, *dharma* or *adharma* still remained with the *bhāva*. But if it is objected that this is only an arbitrary proof intended to gain ground for alleging that *Īśvara* and his *kartrutva* existed even during *Pralāya*, the reply is that the word *āśraya* used in the *Sruti* text (*Pralāya kālāvartī dharmah sūśrayah*) clearly proves that *Pralāya* also sought the asylum of *Īśvara*. It sought refuge in *Īśvara* saying, "Now, I have done my portion of the *dharma* as per your will" (*Dharmatvāt idānīmtana dharmavat*). Even *dharma* is represented as having subjected itself to the *kartrutva* of *Īśvara* in its work of destruction. Evidently the seeking of this kind of refuge which results in subjecting *Pralāya dharma* itself to the *kartrutva* of *Īśvara* makes it nothing more than perform the function of a *jīva*. The fact is that in *Īśvara* alone the *kāraṇa chētanatva* exists. It is not possible to eradicate this *kartrutva* from *Īśvara*, who is the sole repository of all causes. It is not within the physical power of any one force beyond *Īśvara* to remove from *Īśvara* his *kartrutva* and *kāraṇatva* and place it in another (*Nachātīndriyayōḥ dharmādharmayōḥ adhishṭhātritvam īśvarādanyasya upapadyatē*). Therefore it should be imperatively agreed to that in *Pralāya* the controlling power over *dharmā-dharmi* and the *jīvātma* does exist along with *Paramapurusha*.

Verily, if it is to be agreed that *bhāva* only existed in *Pralāya*, then it is not necessary for us to admit that *dharmā-dharmi* existed separately seeking asylum in *Īśvara*. This point must be made clear—whether *bhāva* is separate from *dharmā-dharmi* or included in it. Do you mean to say that the characteristics of *dharmā-dharmi* exist in the cause or in the effect or in both during *Pralāya*? Or, if it is granted that *Sat* signifies *akāraṇatva*,

<sup>940</sup> *Nara* means *dōṣa sahita jīvātma*, i.e., the *jīva* taken with his taint,

then the reply is that we have to accept for granted that nothing existed. The contradiction thus arises that those things that existed from eternity did exist in *Pralaya*. In certain places, it is also said that everything existed during creation. However, nothing came into existence during creation which never existed before or during *Pralaya*. If it were otherwise, *kārya* which existed from beginningless eternity would have gone without a *kāraṇa*. Because from *Asat*, there can be no cause for action. (That is, from non-existence, there can be no existence.) All causes leading to creation will have to be considered as having ceased to exist. Let it be so. If it is agreed that from a certain cause not foreseen, *srisṭi* came into existence in the beginning, then *Pralaya* also should be agreed to have come into existence from some unforeseen cause. 'It, therefore, naturally follows that there was in existence something unforeseen from beginningless time. This, therefore, has to be assumed. Such a thing did exist in *Pralaya*. Even the present existing thing came out of that unforeseen cause which was existing from beginningless time, wherefrom our present premises came into discussion. As we agree to this, the other also will have to be agreed to in the same way. It cannot be asked whether there existed no cause in the beginning of time. In the same way, *Pralaya* shows plainly that there was enough cause for it, *Pralaya* being the proof for it. How? In *Pralaya* itself, sufficient illustration of what previously existed from beginningless time, the cause of which could not be ascertained, is fully proved. Else, there would not have been sufficient cause for *Pralaya*. *Pralaya* did not destroy beginningless time. If not, how could effect come into play without any cause? Therefore, we have rightly to infer that cause and effect did exist in the interval of time between the beginning of creation and its end (*i.e.*, *Pralaya*); just because there existed things unforeseen in *Pralaya*, therefore we have to infer that cause for it did exist in *Pralaya*,

To understand even *ādikāla*, we have to infer the unforeseen causes which existed before in beginningless time and thereby seek to establish the causes which brought about *mahadādi kāraṇa*.<sup>941</sup> This must be clearly said. In *ādikāla*, nothing could be foreseen. Later on, out of the unforeseen causes that existed previously, things came into existence, and helped to give rise to *ādyam*. That which previously did not exist later came into existence. This is the general saying. This removes the doubt. If so, we ask that which did not exist previously, how did it come into existence later? However that may be, it is not questioned how that which was not in existence even before the time of *Pralaya* came into existence later. We explain usually that which was not in existence previously came into existence later. This explanation is objectionable because how could it be possible that what never existed before should have subsequently come into existence? That could not possibly be. If there was nothing that could as efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) give rise to the existence of everything, though not seen by us, creation would not have been possible in the beginning of time. We never said for a moment that what we never saw did never exist. Then, how is it possible to say that whatever came into existence in the beginning of time (*Ādikāla*) such as *mahadādi*, came out of nothing as its cause? If creation came into existence in the beginning, we cannot say, however, it came out of nothing as such an assumption would be a clear contradiction, because all unforeseen things cannot come within our observation, even if we desired. Then, why should we not assume that *mahadādi* came into existence during creation out of some unforeseen causes which are not known to us? As the unforeseen causes cannot be closely examined by us, even

<sup>941</sup> *Mahat* is the second of the twenty-five elements or *tattvas* recognized by the Sāṅkhyas. In Sāṅkhya philosophy, *Mahat* stands for the great principle, the intellect (distinguished from *Manas*), the second of the twenty-five elements above referred to,



if we desired, as it is beyond our reach, we have simply to grant the existence of the unforeseen causes, in order to bring into existence the *mahadādi srisṭi*. Then, let it be granted that from unforeseen causes only things came into existence. We cannot, however, deny that there was nothing unseen before, for it is not possible to prove such a statement. In order to gain a correct understanding we have to lean upon a particular conclusion, which is indisputable in order to establish what we seek to prove. If you cannot grant that there existed what was beyond your perception, then there would be no cause whatever for anything to come into existence. In that case, where is any *Pralaya* at all and where, the proof for it? *Pralaya* also, in such a case, would be rendered *apramāṇika* and would be impossible of belief. Because you did not see it with your own eyes. Even so, Īśvara and others, whether they existed or not in *Pralaya*, cannot be perceived by you and even a statement about *Pralaya* would not stand as proved. And so the opponent will have his statement disproved. This is what we have to understand. Necessarily in *Pralaya*, we have to assume that certain things should have existed which were capable of bringing into existence creation in the beginning of time. It is thus : The creation of the Universe is a series of creations in one continuous flow (*Viśvasantānōyam dṛiṣya santāna śūnyaiḥ santānābhirārabdhaiḥ santānatvāt āraṇīya santānavat*) which cannot be understood by those who are devoid of a continuous flow of perception, and it cannot be realized by them how this series of creations came into existence ever since the beginning of time ; just as the trees in the forest (*āraṇīya santānavat*)<sup>942</sup> form a continuous flow (one succeeding the other), so is the universe which forms a continuous flow of creations, one following the other. Therefore, even the present creation of *Brahmāṇḍa* came out from the

<sup>942</sup> It may also be explained in another manner, *Araṇi* being interpreted as "relating to *Araṇi*". *Araṇi* is a piece of wood of the Śami tree used for kindling the sacred fire by attrition ; the fire-producing wooden stick (*Araṇiḥ agniyōniḥ*).

embryonic state that existed in *Pralaya*, out of which it came into existence in its present form. Even though it existed for ever, it is said to have existed from the beginning. In other words, that which is like a small light has become a big glowing torch. In the same way, all these series of generations cannot be rooted out, because they still remain in their embryonic state just as a small light keeps constantly burning. It is never possible to eradicate these little *paramāṇu* wholesale at any time, because they are capable of coming to life again. If it is assumed that they were so *eradicated*, then, we have to assume again that they resumed their existence by the air beginning to blow. Even the series of terrestrial globes (*bhūgōla*) cannot be thought of as having been rooted out at any time, because of their endless series in existence like particles of glowing fire. This phenomenon (*kriya*) is at all times under the control of the Supreme *Kartru*. If so, then, it must be agreed to that all *dharma* and *adharma* and all causes are brought to effect by the Supreme *Kartru*, just as the happiness or sorrow that attend on the body of Dēvadatta are born of Dēvadatta's own peculiar characteristics and his own personal endeavours. What all peculiar things Dēvadatta does, owe their origin to his peculiar personal characteristics, born of the smell of his previous birth (*Sragūdivadityādi anumānēna vichitra kāryānyathānupapatyā*). According to the *Sruti* text *Jyōtiṣṭōmēna svargakāmō yajēta*,<sup>943</sup> *Yō Brāhmaṇāyazā gurēt tam satāmēva yatayēt, iti*,<sup>944</sup> it has to be understood that Dēvadatta, by reason of his own peculiar qualities, offers the *Jyōtiṣṭōma* and other sacrifices and attains *svarga*, etc. This is the right way to understand. Now, if you think that it is not so—that it is not by his labour that Dēvadatta attains *svarga* and that he is ignorant of the future, then, you will have to answer whether it was possible for Dēvadatta to earn his happiness or sorrow by his own special qualities or as the fruit of the series of actions inherited by him (*Dēvadatta śarīrādēh Dēvadatta viśēsha guṇa*

<sup>943</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, VIII. 12.

<sup>944</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 24. 1.

*janyatvam kim sākshāt sādhyamuta paramparayāvā*). It is not, however, the first; because you have not agreed to accept that *dharma* and *adharma* which existed previously were the ones which impelled Dēvadatta. And it is also not true that the bodily happiness or otherwise of Dēvadatta was not the result of Dēvadatta's own labour, just as it was seen in Yagnadatta's instance. It evidently proves itself that the results came only out of the labour in previous births as the result of the worship offered to deities then. It cannot be said that Īśvara is responsible for any part of the fruits of the actions born of the peculiar characteristics of Dēvadatta. From what is now happening before us we are helped to think of what might have been their cause. Even the beginning of creation is evidently the result of causes unforeseen and antecedent to it and yet we are led to think that what did not exist has suddenly come into existence. If that is the idea we maintain, there will be neither an end to the means to be adopted for sacrificial functions such as *Jyōtishṭōma*, etc., performed in order to win *svarga* nor an attainment of the objects to be achieved by their performance. Having adopted an uncertain procedure probably an unintended end will be reached; for generally if the deity that is to be invoked in a particular sacrifice is unknown, the result is that *svarga* and the rest (of the salvation) sought for will remain unattained. Therefore to attain a correct result, he (the sacrificer) should find out all advantageous means by which the attainment of *svarga*, etc., might be enabled to be accomplished. If so, then, even to obtain a knowledge of *Pralaya*, we have to seek such correct sources of information as will help us to secure its correct meaning without any of the existing facts being contradicted. It is thus: we cannot say that time was not existing even before *Pralaya* and that the expression "in the beginning" does not suggest that time was not in existence previously. It is not right to premise that before Brahman came into existence there was absolutely nothing like *Brahmanatva* and even if we did so assume, we will have drawn an

inference which is liable to doubt. Therefore, it is not enough to take into account only the time at which *Pralaya* occurs, because we will not then have taken into consideration all the factors then prevailing (i.e., at the time of *Pralaya*). If we do not so take into consideration all the then existing factors at *Pralaya*, then we cannot be expected to arrive at a correct conclusion.

In this way, if you say that it would be an error if we assumed that there was before *Pralaya* a Brahman who had neither a beginning nor an end, the reply is it is not so. Because, in all Vēdāntic argument, we have to draw an inference. Thus, (to understand the position), in the example *Parvatō agnimān ityūdan*, to determine the question whether there is fire (*agni*) on the mountain or not, we lean on smoke (*dhūma*) and are thus led to draw the inference that there is fire on the mountain. This is the only correct manner of determining the truth; else our inference would be thrown away. If it is said that there are other ways of determining the existence of fire on the mountain, then, if that be so, how can contradiction find place in the argument? If the correct method of reasoning correlating the different limbs of the argument is employed, having regard to the particularity of time, the very face of the contradiction will cease to exist. Putting aside the point whether an entity like Brahman (*Brahmaṇya vyaktē*) came into existence anew (*ādyatva*), whether it did exist without beginning (*anādyatva*), to prove merely, for the time being, the existence of Hiranyagarbha and then to say that Hiranyagarbha disappeared in *Pralaya* cannot help the opponent to succeed. By first assuming the existence of Brahman, do you also assume that *viśva* existed with all Brahmanāṇḍa or that it only came into existence as the result of a new creation? Not the first; because it does not answer your purpose. Evidently, it is the second; because you have agreed that at *Pralaya*, everything including Brahmanāṇḍa went into destruction.

If Brahmāṇḍa did not exist at first, there can be no *Pralāya* which could come off at the end. If you say that things came into existence in the same way that flies come into existence in the fruit of *audumbara* and fire from the internal part of the *audumbara*,<sup>945</sup> then there would be no cause that would give rise to further results and it would be just like the sprouting of a cotton plant from a pot in which no cotton seed had been planted. Then Time, Fire, Rudra, etc.—none of these—should have existed. As for the second alternative, there would be no cause for *Pralāya* at all. And the happening of *Pralāya* itself would be impossible of proof. Then, we will have nothing whatever to assume, and no kind of existence whatever, such as fire, wind, and the series of things, gradually ending with darkness and neither tree, mountain nor other object left to us, and no *Pralāya* whatever—thus landing us in a vacuum of nothingness (*avayavaśūnya samayāsiddhēḥ*). If you assume any one of these—of this series of fire, wind and the series gradually ending with darkness—you will have assumed either all of them to be existing or none at all.

Fifthly, if the terrestrial globe is assumed to be in existence always in a successive series (*santāna śabdēnnōchantē*), will we be making an unwarranted stretch in our assumption? In the first place, there is a way for establishing the truth. But then the minute embryonic particles forming the *ingredients*, as it were, for the scattering of the seeds and bringing into existence the next creation, will have to be assumed to have existed without destruction. Secondly, if not, there is nothing else left to lean upon. Seeing these contradictory fallacies, we have to ignore all arguments. Therefore, in order to save this position, the granting of such an assumption would prove ineffectual, inasmuch as the cause which made such an assumption possible would be subject to destruction and nothing could possibly come into existence anew. Thirdly, it would end in a false conclusion (*apasiddhānta*).

<sup>945</sup> *Arani*, churning wood used in the production of sacrificial fire. See footnote on page 613.

Gradually, there would be an eradication of all argument. Fourthly, it is just like assuming the existence of the threads of a cloth when the whole cloth has been destroyed, which is an evident wrong deviation (from the truth). If the minute particles (*paramāṇu*) from which the existence of the world was assumed to have come into existence and developed by multiplication, even such an assumption would be rendered false and go without proof.

To assume only one of them would be a wrong deviation (*vyabhichārah*). A cause for a beginning means assuming the existence of a cause for a series of all things existing—fire, wind and the rest of the series ending with *Pralāya*. If we assume that one particle came into existence and then multiplied itself into two, and then into three and thus in a series of multiples, creation came into existence, there will be an occasion for a serious objection. Therefore we have to discard even the second inference as well. *Brahmāṇḍa* did exist originally and did not come into existence anew (at *Pralāya*). If we agreed to assume its existence, the source from which it was brought into existence would be subject to destruction in *Pralāya*. We should construct our arguments in such a way as to establish *Pralāya* from proofs obtained from the *Āgamas*. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, the chief thing required is to put together proofs (from the *Sāstras*) which do not contradict each other. If we did so, one would not be enabled to say that some of the proofs adduced are unimportant or uncommon. If important links are thus sought to be omitted on the plea that they are unimportant or uncommon, then, there will occur a renunciation of the support sought from the *Āgamas*. This being so, how can it be said that you seek your support from the *Āgamas* only? Thus, it is clear that every link of proof afforded by the *Āgamas* should be accepted and closely followed. In this manner, it having been established with the aid of proofs drawn from the *Āgamas* that *jīva* and *Īśvara*

did exist in *Pralaya*, it follows as equally established that the properties of all things in their embryonic form did exist in *Pralaya* (*dharmādi satvamapi sādhitam*). Else, there will be a clear contradiction if we concluded that in *Pralaya* there was only *abhāva* in the form of *asat*. Having thus far maintained one side of the argument, and a cause being established, the fact that Prakriti and the rest existed is also established (*Ēvamādi kāryam pakṣhīkṛitya sōpādānatva sādhanē prakṛityādi siddhirapi drashtavyēti*). In the very first *Sūtra*, in order to remove this contradiction of *abhāva kartrutva* and to repudiate it, the *anumāna* has been clearly placed (for correct inference being drawn according to the *Āgamas*). The *Sutra* (propounded by Bādarāyaṇa) *Drishṭāntābhāvāt*<sup>946</sup> clearly lays down the principle that the creation of the universe was not the result of *abhāva kartrutva*, for *Īśvara*, the *Kartā*, did exist in *Pralaya*. *Pralaya* is the result of the will of the *Kartā*. Out of his free will, *Pralaya* took shape, just as we assume that a piece of cloth or some such thing (*paṭādan*) had a maker. In all places wherever ellipses are to be filled in, the filling in should be done in such a way as to remove contradiction. If we assume that *abhāva* existed in *Pralaya* and then proceed by admitting *mahadādi* came into existence, this very assumption would be a clear contradiction of the actual existence of matter in embryonic form, which will have to be doubted. In order to completely expel such a doubt, the expression *sarvatra* is used . . . . By the word *kartā* we have to understand that he is a *Buddhimān*, i.e., the knower of all things. If you assume otherwise, one who begins to argue, leaning on *abhāva kartrutva*, will surely fall into contradiction and fail to arrive at a sound conclusion (*Abhāvakartrutvavādinām pratisiddha sādhanatāprasangāt*). There will be no use arguing with such a person. Where is the objection (to the above statement)? There is no

<sup>946</sup> The reference is to I. 1. 1. The discussion referred to in it is one relating to Brahman and not *abhāva*. The *Sūtras* propound a *jīgnāsa* about *Brahman* and not about *abhāva*. The word Brahman includes *Brahmasvarūpa* (*Kartā*), *Āgamas*, *Vēdas*, etc.

ground whatever to infer *kartrutva* in *abhāva*. The *Sūtra Drishṭāntābhāvāt*<sup>947</sup> clearly meets the opponent's doubt. And this again is amply proved in the *Sūtra, Svapakṣha dōṣhāchcha*.<sup>948</sup> In fact, this *Sūtra* becomes the commentary for the previous *Sūtra*. This lays down the procedural order to be followed. We should never be at variance with the truth of the statement in the *Sāstras* which says *kāryatvāt ghaṭavat*, i.e., *chētana kartrutva* exists always as is seen in *ghaṭa*. The destruction of *chētana* should be understood in the same way as a *ghaṭa* should be when it is destroyed. We should not doubt the fact that without *chētana kartrutva*, it is possible to create as is seen in the bringing into existence of a *paṭa* (*paṭōt-pattivat*). If we agreed to the proposition that the *ghaṭa* is destroyed, it should not be assumed that we have agreed to the (other) proposition that the maker of the *ghaṭa* is (also) destroyed. There is no reason whatever to think of the destruction of *chētana kartrutva* in our argument. It is our duty now to discuss and prove whether the *chētana kartrutva* existed quite intact or not in *Pralaya*. It is generally seen that even though all the plants die out in the dry season, soon after a time we notice sprouts coming up, thereby proving that there were the seeds that had not been perceived. From this phenomenon, we cannot assume and premise that at the destruction of the threads of the cloth the cloth could come into existence again (of their own accord). When the world comes to perish at the occurrence of *Pralaya*, it cannot be assumed that the Great Maker as well as his *kartrutva* have also perished. He had still his *kartrutva* existing in himself. We cannot say for a moment that the Maker and his *kartrutva* originated afresh. Such an assumption would be wrong. In order to refute such

<sup>947</sup> II. 1. 9. The text of the *Sūtra* is :—*Natu drishṭāntābhāvāt* (Not so ; as there are parallel instances).

<sup>948</sup> II. 1. 10. This *Sūtra* may be thus rendered : " And on account of the objections to his view ". It immediately follows *Natu drishṭāntābhāvāt*, and is referred to below as explanatory of the latter.



an idea, and to establish that even in *Pralaya* the Maker and his *kartrutva* did exist and there was no annihilation of the Maker and his *kartrutva*, the expression *asat* (*a+sat*)<sup>949</sup> in the *Sūtras*, *Asaditichēnna pratishēdha mātṛatvāt* (II. 1. 7) and nine other *Sūtras* in the *Asadadhikāraṇam* has been used. It is very easily inferred that such a state of annihilation could not have been possible. It is for this reason that the next *Sūtra* *Drishṭāntābhāvāt* was enunciated by the *Sūtrakāra*, to drive home the fact that *kartrutva* did exist in *Pralaya*. Nor could it be a fact. If annihilation had been agreed to by the *Sūtrakāra*, it would not have been possible for him to prove the *kartrutva* of *Īśvara* (*Īśvarasya jagatkartrutvam*) from the annihilated stage and it would also go against his own utterance (*ukta viruddham*). The *Sūtra* *Sāstrayōnivoāt* (I. 1. 3) also strongly refutes the existence of such an annihilated state and argues strongly against such an idea. Inferential premises must be supported by correct proofs so as to lead to the existence of the Maker and his *kartrutva*. The existence of the Maker at all times was never for a moment doubted by the *Sūtrakāra* nor has he doubted the existence of his *kartrutva* at all times. What is the purpose of our going in quest of the proofs provided by the *Āgamas* by inferential premises? It is only to establish the existence of *Īśvara*—and his *kartrutva* at all times—that we seek for aid in the *Āgamas*. If it were not so, there would be no necessity to begin such a discussion, if the proofs in the *Vēda* would not establish the existence of *Īśvara* and his *kartrutva* at all times. Such a *jīgnāsa* would be fruitless and it were well it had not been begun (at all). Then, what should we do? The only answer is that *Āgamas* alone should help to clear our doubt and on the clear proofs afforded by them we have to lean and agree to. If we, after discussion, understand correctly the meaning of the *Sruti* text *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē iti*,<sup>950</sup> etc., and agree to its conclusion, then there would be no further cause for us to doubt

<sup>949</sup> The word *Asat* denotes the great *Avyakta* aś Brahman.

<sup>950</sup> *Taitt. Uṣa.*, III, 1,

the existence of Īśvara and his *kartrutva* at all times and there would be no cause for any contradiction to arise. Thus, from correct inferential premises, we have proved beyond all doubt that the creation of *viśva* never came out of *abhāva kartrutva*. Having assumed the doubtful argument that the *viśva* was created from *abhāva kartrutva*, we have arrived at the correct proof that the creation of *viśva* is only possible with Īśvara *kartrutva* and his existence at all times (*Īśvara kartrukatvam samarthitam*). From the same conclusion is met the opponent's argument and the objection against it in the next *Sūtra*, *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānādapi anyathānumēyamiti chēdēvamapyanirmōksha prasangaḥ* (II. 1. 12).

Because discussion of one kind has not proved profitable, if another indefinite kind of inference is had recourse to, away from the provision of the *Āgamas*, the argument will be driven away from the one position that would lead to salvation (*anirmōksha prasangaḥ*). This is the explanation for the objection. The *Sūtra* states that when a start (in discussion) is made on the basis of a certain inference, in keeping with the *Āgamas*, if one happens to arrive at a difficulty (in the *pūrvapaksha*), he should not at once jump into several other kinds of inferences, exceeding the provisions of the *Āgama*, for fear the *pūrvapaksha* discussion will not lead us into a correct *siddhānta*, and thus fail in helping to attain at our object. Generally, the *pūrvapaksha* starts on account of certain doubts that could not be cleared from the proofs (*pramāṇa*) put forward by us; we have to arrive at the *siddhānta* by closely examining such proofs which could be harmonised and which could help us to arrive at a correct conclusion. Inferences themselves cannot be final proofs. Why? Because, if one inference fails, we should not think we can at once start off with another inference. What is an inference and what are its limits? We should not premise things that are unnecessary, untrue or ungranted by the *Āgamas*, for we cannot get acceptable proofs from the *Āgamas* for them nor can we agree to them. Nowhere is it found justified that when an argument that has been

started, on certain premises, is found to be inconvenient, that we should issue forth with another mode of argument, contrary to the original one (*na tarkōnumānāt bhidyata, iti*). You should not say that the new method of argument is more profitable and that it is possible to gain proof for it. Why? Because logic did not establish the original argument (*tarkāpratishtānāt*). And so, we have had to seek some (other) kind of solution. Nobody has prevented us from seeking out the solution at hand. It is said that through discussion and inferences, you have to prove and arrive at the conclusion, removing the doubt. Therefore this mode of endeavouring to subsist in different receptacles of argument (*vyadhi-karaṇa*) by changing from inference to inference, one contrary to the other, is not seen in the *Āgama*. Just because the first method of argument proved a failure, that we should start off a contrary one is not permissible. It is to remind one of this provision that the *Sūtrakāra* sets down this *Sūtra*. Discussion (*tarka*), according to the *Āgama*, should never change from one mode of argument to another. Or, if one inference does not help to put forth a correct argument to establish the truth, the most suitable thing to do is to find out proofs which will best harmonise with the *Āgama*. (That is, the inference should not question the *Āgama*, which has for its sheet-anchor the pervasion of the Brahman; an argument that controverts *Paramēśvara vyūpti* ends as *apratishṭhita tarka*).<sup>951</sup> How could an argument become untrustworthy (*apramāṇa*)? By its inability to arrive at a correct conclusion and by its being obliged to draw inferences to the contrary. This is how it should be understood—the *apratishṭhita* character of the argument. It is to clear up this doubt that the *Sūtrakāra* has laid down this *Sūtra*, so that no one may fall into this blunder and invariably to find out such proofs which would satisfy the *Āgamic* standpoint. Therefore, the searching of proofs for an argument means the comprehension of the *Āgama* (standpoint). Therefore, the latter part of the *Sūtra*

<sup>951</sup> Unstable logic or reasoning ; hence unprofitable, useless,

(*anyathānumēyāmitichēṭ*, etc.) lays down clearly that such a constant change of arguments from one to another leads to fruitless discussion and ends in the putting off of the attainment of *mōksha*. *Āgama* is fixed as the only means of obtaining correct *pramāṇa*. In order to lay full stress on accepting Āgamic proofs as the sole truth, the commentator (Ānandatīrtha) uses the expression *akṣhajāgama mūlāsya* in the later half of the verse (in his *Anuvyākhyāna*),<sup>952</sup> thereby meaning that just as the axle of a wheel is to the wheel itself as a pivot, so the *Āgama* is the chief pivot on which all arguments by the aid of *tarka*, should be made to turn by the drawing of inferences. If *Āgama* is thus accepted, there will be encountered no contradiction and the truth will be established. The chief point in view is that all inferences to be drawn should be authoritative and agreeable to the *Āgama*.<sup>953</sup> What the Sūtrakāra means is this:—Whatever was drawn as inference with the given data, must be proved by the Āgamic proofs, so as to harmonise the argument with *pakṣha linga vyāptimatva*. In this lies the skill of the argumentator as to how he searches into the *Sāstras* to establish the irrefutable truth of the inference. If not, his *tarka*, being away from the Āgamic proofs, can never establish the truth (of the inference). Therefore, it is only through the Āgamic *pramāṇa* that we can establish the truth of the inference.

What is the purpose of our making an inference? It is only to seek the truth by the help of Āgamic proofs. First, in order to find it out, we start by making an inference from the given data. With the help of it, how can we arrive at a correct result, if we do not closely follow the *Āgama* and select proofs that will help to harmonise with the inference? No fawn (*harīṇaśāvā*) ever tries to go against its will into the gaping mouths of a wolf, if it wants to get

<sup>952</sup> See *Anuvyākhyāna* (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, page 177): *Āgamānugrahābhāvē natarkasyāt pratishṭhitaḥ | Akṣhajāgama mūlākhyāsyādvēśasya pratishṭhitaḥ ||*

<sup>953</sup> All discussion is subject to the cardinal doctrine *Pakṣha linga vyāpti*.

away from it. The very fact that it cannot thus save itself is evidence enough for the opposite view. Secondly, even if we assume the contrary as a fact and proceed to argue, saying that the first inference was a wrong one, then what follows? In such a case, both the inferences will be rendered wholly groundless. Thus arise a series of contradictions between one set of proofs and another and the doubts relating to the proofs themselves become obstructed, the one to the other, and go uncleared. It is not infrequently so. Therefore the first aim of the argumentator should be to determine the meaning of the *Āgama*, in order to obtain a path with its aid. The second point one has to keep in view is whether a statement is in accordance with Āgamic proof or if not, how could such a proof be available in the *Āgama* and how is it to be made available. This should be the aim of the argumentator. At all times, he will necessarily find the proof fully supported by the *Āgama*, because *Āgama* stands for the *Sāstra* just as the axle-wheel stands to the wheel itself. The established truth will be such a one that it could withstand any kind of refutation and the opponent will be successfully beaten down. There cannot be two opposing proofs for arriving at one established truth, for that would result in inconsistency. If every kind of inference can help us to arrive at a final conclusion, whether with or without the aid of the *Āgama*, then every one will think that all the inferences thus drawn are unfounded. In order to save us from this position, the *Sūtrakāra* has definitely laid down in the *Sūtra* that this is the only way to draw an inference. Else the arguments by which such contradictory conclusions are reached will result in the failure to realize *mōksha* (*Ēvam anirmōksha prasangah*). And this is clearly pointed out in the *Sūtra*. Therefore, we should understand that all inferences drawn should be authoritative and subject to proof from the *Āgama*. The inference drawn should be such a one that no opponent could oppose it from the Āgamic standpoint and it should be free from flaws, judged from the position taken by the *Āgama*.

If one step of the proof fails to harmonise with the *Āgama*, then the whole of the proof will, from the point of view of *Āgama*, fail to be authoritative. Also, it will be subject to *Āgamic* refutation. If one correct method is not properly followed throughout, then the inference drawn will not only have failed to establish the truth but also it will have repulsed itself. Some commentators have coupled this *Sūtra* with *Sūtras* like *Navilakṣaṇatvāt* (II. 1. 4), etc., and have thus tried to establish that the world is a material cause for Brahman for purposes of creation. If this is conceded, *Prakṛityadhikaraṇa* becomes supererogatory. For which reason, they split the *Sūtra* into two parts and treat the first part *Tarkāpratishṭhānāt* as describing the conclusion (*siddhāntatayā varṇayanti*). The commentator (Ānandatīrtha) opposes this view. Because the questions arise (1) whether the argument has failed and further argument is impossible of being adduced; or (2) whether the argument cannot find sufficient *Āgamic* proof to support it; or (3) whether it indicates the inadequacy of search into the *Āgama* for the requisite proof. The answer to the first question is hidden in the question itself. This is in fact so (*i.e.*, implicit in it). Because one who attaches himself to Sāṅkhya philosophy does not admit that he has failed in his argument, even though he fails to secure *Āgamic* support and does not mind it. In his own opinion, he does not desire to retrace his steps to obtain a connection for fear his opinion may prove redundant. In his opinion, he thinks that the *Sūtra* *Śiṣṭrayānītvāt* (I. 1. 3) is explained clearly by the subsequent *Sūtras*, *Ikṣhitērnāśabalam* (I. 1. 5), etc. and *Anumāṇikamapyēkēśhāmiti* (I. 4. 1), etc. The second standpoint is also objected to on the ground that *Āgama* being like an axle-pole (*akṣhaja*) for all its proofs, in order to get at it, we have to search how far the *kartrtva* of Parabrahman is proved and select such proofs in support of the inference drawn. There must not be the slightest room for the opponent to refute. This the *Sūtrakāra* points out and indicates how to draw the inference and how to select *Āgamic* proofs free from flaws. When the *Sūtrakāra*

has himself thus shown the method of selecting the Āgamic proofs according to the *Brahma Mīmāṃsa Sāstra*, how can one say that the Sūtrakāra has not himself established the truth by the method of discussion (*tarka*) employed by him and how can it be open to objection? Of course one set of commentators do blame another set of commentators. Notwithstanding their objections, an argument correctly put forward, and directly in search of the truth according to the *Āgama*, cannot be said to have gone off unestablished from the right path. Such an argument cannot be easily discarded. Accordingly, the *Sūtra* briefly means: no *tarka* can be easily discarded which supports an inference established by Āgamic proofs intended to postulate the all-pervasive *kartrtva* of Parabrahman (*Vyāptyādimatvāna prāmāṇyāprāmāṇya karaṇa*).

Proceeding, he comments on the next *Sūtra*, *Ētēna śishtā parigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ* (II. 1. 12). In order to prove conclusively that the truth underlying *Sruti* texts should be admitted in their entirety, *Sruti* texts do not as between themselves contradict each other. They cannot each of them be refuted with the aid of others. But all of them should be interpreted harmoniously as a whole for arriving at the truth. *Tarka* should be so used that a harmonious interpretation is arrived at and that in a manner not inimical to the *Āgama*. This is the gist of the *Sūtra*, *Ētēna śishtāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ* (II. 1. 12). From the above (*Sūtra*), the remaining (*Sruti* texts) which had proved unacceptable to certain wise commentators, have also been commented upon (here). In this *Sūtra* (II. 1. 12), the Sūtrakāra says that he has taken into consideration what has been left out by wise commentators and has commented without reserve on the true import of all *Sruti* texts, including those which have proved unacceptable to them. Some commentators comment like this: By the expression *Ētēna* in the *Sūtra* they refer back to the *Sūtras*, *Navilakṣhanatvāt* (II. 1. 4), etc., which are not to the point. Thus, they accept to a certain extent the meaning of the Upanishadic

texts, so far as it helps to put forth their argument and leave away the rest, for fear of meeting with contradiction. They also have been considered as useful to the argument and commented upon in this *Sūtra*, as it is adduced to be important by such writers as Manu, Vyāsa and other commentators. These latter eminent men have taken the *Sruti* texts as a whole in supporting the *anvādi kārana vāda* by the Vaiśeṣhikas. That has here been contradicted. Let us first consider their doubts and their reasoning. The seeking of a solution for this is by means of application by analogy (*atidēśa*).<sup>954</sup> There are, it is said, two sets of argumentators—the Sāṅkhyas who hold to the doctrine *Nirīśvaratva* and the Vaiśeṣhikas who hold to the *Sēśvaratva*. It is fitting that both these contrarieties should be considered. Some hold a view opposed to the granting of *jagatkāranatva* to Brahman. But the Sāṅkhyas refuse to concede the very existence of a Brahman. The one question that has led to differences of opinion among Vedāntins as between themselves is the granting of *jagatkāranatva* to Brahman. Even the views of those opposing the granting of *jagatkāranatva* to Brahman have been taken into consideration. Vaiśeṣhikas, though they grant the existence of Brahman and concede that the *jagat* is the *nimitta kārana*, do not agree to the *jagat* being *upādāna kārana*. There is thus a little difference of opinion here. Hence the use of the word *śiṣṭa*—a part of the *Sruti* remaining unaccepted by the Vaiśeṣhikas. Satkāryavādins, who accept the *Srutis* in their totality, need not be considered here, as they do not fall under the category of *śiṣṭa parigrahas*. If they are also to be included in this connection, the argument will become too elaborate and become rambling (*viparivartasyāt*). In such a case, we would have to consider the performance of sacrifices and the pain

<sup>954</sup> *Atidēśa* is of five kinds : *Sāstrātidēśa*, *Kāryātidēśa*, *Nimittātidēśa*, *Vyapadēśātidēśa* and *Rūpātidēśa*. *Atidēśa* is usually expressed by words showing likeness or resemblances, such as *iva*, *vat*, *sadrūṣa*, etc.



inflicted on animals thereat. This is held over only to save a lengthy argument in which the *Vēda* could be shown to support the position that no pain is inflicted on the animals offered as sacrifices. Multiplying arguments on this scale is not our purpose. Principles and rules are numerous. How can this *Sūtra* be limited in its application? The *Sūtra* aims only at disowning the attitude of the two sets of argumentators to a certain extent, by agreeing to the principle half way, as convenient to them, and disagreeing from the remainder. With a view to reject the wrong comment and impress on the mind the correct interpretation, this *Sūtra* has been enunciated. Chief among those who have departed from the correct interpretation, in our opinion, are those who have assigned *kartrutva* to *abhāva* and to *jagat* the *kartrutva* of *jīva* and the rest. The latter point is also in the remaining part of their argument. By using the expression *api vyākhyāta*, it is indicated that all such arguments as these, which have been left out of account by them, though they are part of the *Vēda*, have been considered by the *Sūtrakāra*. Though rejected by them, they are still part of the *Vēda* and so have had to be considered, as they cannot disappear from the *Vēda* because they have been rejected by one set of commentators. The *Vēda* admits *jīva*, *pradhāna*, *satkāla* and *svabhāva* and the arguments which support them, and these we have acknowledged according to this *Sūtra*. The expression *śiṣṭa* in the *Sūtra* also includes the argument about *Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda*.

This, some argumentators have not acknowledged. In leaving aside this part of the argument, they still hold on to the *abhāva kartruvāda*. This, again, is explained by means of application by analogy (*atidēśa*) and proved. The word *śiṣṭa* has, therefore, been used in the *Sūtra*. In order to set out clearly the doubts of those commentators which made them disagree to that portion of the *tattva*, the expression *śiṣṭa* has been used in the *Sūtra*, thus helping to prove by referring to the contrary views held by them. It is not to help their disagreement but to

clearly explain the real meaning of the Vēdic expression and to establish the *bhāva kartruvāda*. Some of the commentators referred to support the argument *jīva pradhāna vāda* and try to establish *asat kartrukatva*. It is not right. It has been clearly proved in the foregoing *Sūtra* and rejected. It is unnecessary to refer to it here to avoid repetition. The *Sruti* texts *Tan manō kurutē*, etc., are strong proofs that *manas* (mind) is only one of the seats in bringing about an action into existence and therefore *manas* cannot be called as *asat* or *abhāva*. We must understand it in the manner we have explained in the previous *Sūtra*, *Asaditichēna pratishēdha mātravāt*. From the expression *pratishēdhamātra* used in the *Sūtra*, it is to be clearly understood that *asat* cannot be the agent nor can *kartrutva* be ascribed to it.<sup>955-56</sup> In order to instruct clearly that *asat* which ends in *śūnyāt* cannot possess any agency, the expressions *pratishēdhamātra*, etc., were used in the *Sūtra*. Also, the *Sruti* texts *Akasmādidam āvirāsīt iti*, etc.<sup>957</sup> [This (universe) came into being accidentally] declare that without mind (*manōvinā*), *asat* would be merely *śūnya* and nothing could have come into existence. So that it comes to mean this: in the foregoing argument, it was proved that *abhāva* could not have been the cause for the universe coming into existence; now, it is proved that *śūnya* is not capable of bringing anything into existence. *Abhāva* is thus synonymous with *śūnya*. What was said before is that nothing could come into existence without *kartrutva*—and now it is affirmed that a *kartru* is of the utmost necessity. *Asat* has no *kartrutva* assigned to it (i.e., to create the world, etc.). The statement that *asat* has no *kartrutva* assigned to it is not one made by the commentator. This has been said above. Yet there is no *punarukti dōsha* here. Because it is made by the commentator with the object of anticipating the objection of the opponent and

<sup>955,56</sup> The word *Asat* should be understood as *avyakta* as in the words of the *Sruti* text: *Asabda asparsa arūpa avyaya agandha* (*Kaṭha Uṇ.*, III. 15).

<sup>957</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, I. 1. 1.

answering it in advance and for laying bare the proofs that could be adduced from the *Āgamas*. It is only to prove these aspects of the matter, viz., *asat (abhāva) kartruvāda*; *bhāvasya kartrutvam* and *kartrutvam vinā na kāryasya utpattiḥ*, that the discussion of the matter has been brought up and the doubts cleared.

Therefore never think of *abhāva* as possessing *kartrutva*—*abhāva kartrutva*; nor of creation of the universe by *jīva*. Of course, *Sruti* texts like, *Jīvāt bhavanti bhūtāni*,<sup>958</sup> *Pradhānādidam utpannam*,<sup>959</sup> *Akasmādidam āvirāsīt iti*, etc.,<sup>960</sup> support only *bhāva kartrutva* and not *abhāva kartrutva*, just as for example, *ghaṭa dadhi*, *kaṇṭaka taikshnya*, etc. These examples are illustrative of the truth of the *Sruti* texts. *Jīvas* and others cannot counteract the innate qualities of things—the piercing quality of the thorn, etc., or the agency required for placing the curds in a *ghaṭa*. If we say that *jīvas* and others can counteract the innate qualities of things, our words will prove untrue. The above-quoted examples are intended to illustrate the characteristics of *asatva* and *achētanatva*. Do you then say that *asat kāraṇatva* cannot be attributed to *asat* or is it that you attribute to *asat* *akartrutva* also? It is not the first; because the examples above quoted contradict it (such a position). Nor is it the second; because we do not attribute *kartrutva* to *abhāva*. The expression *kartrutva* should everywhere be understood as carrying with it the sense of (*i.e.*, as implying) *kāraṇatva* also. From this it should not, however, be understood that *Īśvara*, by reason of his possessing *kāraṇatva*, would create *jīvas* afresh at creation, because they have existed at all times. By a fresh creation of *viśva*, there is no contradiction of the previous conclusion (*i.e.*, that *Pralaya* does not mean complete annihilation of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, but it is only development into *srisṭi* of what existed in the embryonic form at *Pralaya*). The *jīvas* themselves do not know what all have been existing which

<sup>958</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, IX. 96. 5.

<sup>959</sup> *Bhāgavata*, VI. 9. 11.

<sup>960</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, I. 1. 1.

causes them to come into existence as helps at creation. This aspect of the matter has already been agreed to (by us). The *jīvas* cannot avail themselves of opportunities of knowing all those materials that cause the bringing about of their creation, as they are unable to know them. The *kartru* himself knows the causes of *srishṭi* as evidenced by the *Āgamas*. The *Srutis* refute uncontradictingly the *pradhāna-kāraṇa-vāda* and subsequently establish *Sēśvara Sāṅkhya* doctrine. And therefore there is no contradiction meant here. Whatever it may be, the right of prohibition is not in *Pradhāna* and the rest of them, because they are *achētana*. If we still hold and argue that they have such a power, then it results in uncertainty (*anēkāntika vāda*).<sup>961</sup> And further it ends in *yukti virōdha*, i.e., becomes opposed in reasoning to the *pūrva-paksha*; and this has been pointed out briefly in the words *pratishēdhamātāratvāt* and *drishṭāntābhāvāt*. Further, from the *Sūtras*, *Svapaksha dōshāchcha* and *drishṭāntābhāvāt*, the argument becomes unsupported by authority (*apramāṇikaṭva*), and therefore your doubts are cleared from your own words. It makes no difference to us—your raising this point. It is the same as before, i.e., as if you had not put it forward (*Aviśēṣhitassamūnah*). And this is how we have proved by analogy (*atidēśa*). (*Kāraṇatva* to Brahman has not been assigned groundlessly.) Further, verily if you ask again how it could be contradictory if we argued that the *jīva* possesses the *kartrutva* and how it could be *yukti virōdha*, our reply is that the very fact that there was causation for every thing, leaves no room for anything to be made afresh by the *jīva*, for it is said *akrutam iti*, nothing is made newly that did not exist previously. And

<sup>961</sup> Uncertainty; being not to the point. *Anēkāntika* is the name given to one of the five main divisions of *hētvābhāsa* (fallacies) otherwise called *savyābhichāra*. It is of three kinds:—(i) *Sādhāraṇa*, where the *hētu* is found both in the *sapaksha* and *vipaksha*, the argument, therefore, being too general; (ii) *Asādhāraṇa*, where the *hētu* is in the *paksha* alone, the argument being not general enough; (iii) *Anupāsamhāri*, which embraces every known thing in the *paksha*, the argument being non-conclusive.

therefore the *pañchami* (*vibhakti*) is used to denote that nothing was created afresh (*achētanādakrutamcha drishṭvā*). The *ēva śabda* denotes that there could be no doubt whatever (*asandigdha*) as to the existence of the *jīva* at the time of *Pralaya*. If any doubt had been entertained, the *pañchami* would not have been used. The *jīvas* also were never made (*akrutatva*) but they existed. They existed with the *mahat* (the great principle), etc. Hence it is that *pañchami* has been used. The *mahat* includes all *jīvas*; therefore it is that *mahat*'s function is the causing of creation. *Mahadādi* also have to be actually taken to be like *jīvas*. But *mahadādi* are not *achētana*. It would be wrong to suppose that *pradhāna* is capable of action—because it is only an *achētana vastu*. In the same way it is wrong to suppose that *asat* is capable of action—though it is a  *vastu*, it is only like a pot, an *achētana vastu*. However, it has already been agreed to that *srisṭi* comes into being only for the sake of *jīvas* and *pradhāna* also is brought into creation as *upādāna kāraṇa* in order to help the *jīvas*. In order to denote that these *jīvas* are devoid of independence, and are always subject to Parabrahman, this *Sūtra* has been enunciated. Therefore, the argument is not unwarranted. Verily if it is said that *jīvas* also were made by *Īśvara* just as any other  *vastu*, we have to say "It is not so," for it is not right to apply such an argument in the case of *Īśvara*. Because *Sruti* texts like *Sa idam sarvamasrujata iti*,<sup>902</sup> etc., clearly declare that *Īśvara* being above all did create *mahat*, etc., under his supreme control. But to interpret *Sruti* texts like these in any other manner without understanding them correctly, would land us in an unwarranted stretch of the argument, would affect the inferential premise as to *kartrutva* and *kāraṇatva* of Brahman, and would render us unauthoritative. Thus, this matter has, in the light of your objections, been discussed without varying the meaning of the *Sruti* texts and displaying any bias, and brought to a conclusion. *Sruti* texts like *Jīvāt bhavanti bhūtāni iti*,<sup>903</sup> etc.,

<sup>902</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 26.

<sup>903</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, IX. 96. 5.

clearly denote the superiority of Parabrahman in his *bhāva-pradhāna* in respect of all *kartrtva*, he being the Supreme. And the term "*jīva*" wherever used in *Sruti* texts like those referred to above, should be understood to mean Parabrahman; any other interpretation will end in contradicting other *Sruti* texts like *Nāmāṇi sarvāṇi yamāśanti iti*,<sup>964</sup> etc. Verily if it is assumed that ordinary *jīvas* are capable of creating, then, such a view would go against the example quoted in *Sruti* texts that earth by itself cannot become *ghaṭa* (without a *kartru*) and thus such a view becomes contradicted. *Sruti* texts like *Nānyaṭō'sti kartā iti*,<sup>965</sup> etc., clearly prove that the Supreme Brahman is the only *kartru* and independent and above all. This has been sufficiently proved by the examples set out above and this is the only way to arrive at a reasonable and satisfactory conclusion. By this argument we have rejected every kind of trick (*upādhi*) that has been directed against it. Generally *jīvas* are devoid of *svatantra*, just as the earth is incapable of becoming a *ghaṭa* by itself; and therefore the *svatantra* of Parabrahman is rendered manifest and placed beyond all attack. Thus everything has been rendered clear.

Commenting later, on the *Sūtra*, *Amsōnūnāvya-padēśā-danyathāchāpi dāsakitavūditvam-adhīyatyēkē* (II. 3. 40), Jayatīrtha directly meets by anticipation the criticism (adverted to by Śrīpati) that the Bhēdins are *atyantayōr ghaṭapaṭavādinaḥ*. In doing so, he begins by stating that some (commentators) amplify this *Sūtra* by suggesting that *jīva* is an *amśa* of Paramātman. This *amśa* is indeed beginningless. Paramātman is also beginningless. These are (individually) not capable of being divided. The *Sruti* terms them *achchēdyatvāt*.<sup>966</sup> Both cannot be localized in a particular spot. Just like *ghaṭa*, the *jīva* is subject to *anityatva*, i.e., to changes in form. What then is the significance of the terms *Abhinnavatva* and *Bhinnavatva*? In this

<sup>964</sup> *Bhāllavēya Sruti*, as quoted by Ānandatīrtha.

<sup>965</sup> *Agnivēśma Sruti*, as quoted by Ānandatīrtha.

<sup>966</sup> So also in the *Smritis*. Cf. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 24, *Achchēdyōyam adāhyōyam aklēdyō aśōshya ēva cha*, etc.

connection, it has to be remarked *Bhēda* is only conditional<sup>967</sup> (*aupādhika*) while *Abhēda* is natural (*svābhāvika*). This *upādhi* (this conditional existence), which, some say, is *avidyā*, is without beginning (*anādya*) and is indescribable (*anirvāchya*), while others opine that it is real and due to internal attachment (*Satyamēvāntahkaraṇādikam iti*). Why is this difference in opinion? Because there are *Sruti* texts like *Dvā suparṇau iti*,<sup>968</sup> *Nityō nityānām iti*,<sup>969</sup> etc., signifying *Bhēda*; and there are other *Sruti* texts like *Tattva-masi iti*,<sup>970</sup> *Aham Brahmāsmi iti*,<sup>971</sup> etc., which signify *Abhēda*. It cannot be said in regard to one single *jīva* by itself (*Ēkasya jīvasya Brahmanah iti*) that it bears, in regard to Brahman, the relationship of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*. Such a statement should be applicable to all (*jīvas*). For which reason, certain commentators postulated that *jīvas* that attain to *Brahmatva*, some can be *Brahmadāsa* and some others *Brahmakīṭava*. This does not seem to be right. If it were so, what is the kind of *Abhēda* that they postulate in regard to *Brahmadāsas*? Is it of a primary or of a secondary nature, implying, by way of illustration, only a *similarity* etc., *between the two*—*jīva* and *Brahman* (*sādrūṣyādilakṣaṇah*)? If it is alleged to be the first (*i.e.*, *primary*), it has to be discarded; because the expression *api* in the *Sūtra* postulates that much of relationship between the *jīva* and the Brahman and no more. That is, in its essence *abhēda* is meant only to stress *bhēda* (*Tatpakṣhō mukhyābhēda pakṣhah*). *Jīva*, on account of *upādhi*, is, even in *mōksha*, different from Brahman (*Jīvasya aupādhika ēva paramātmano bhēdah*). Those who argue *abhēda* as *svābhāvika* in *mukti* argue out in effect only *bhēda* and not *abhēda* (*Abhēdastu svābhāvika iti vadaṭā muktau bhēdābhāvō*

<sup>967</sup> That is, pertaining to attributes or properties; an effect produced.

<sup>968</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 1. 1.

<sup>969</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, V. 13.

<sup>970</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 9.

<sup>971</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

*vāchya*). To suggest that in *mukti* the *jīva* is possessed of *avidyā* but free from *antaḥkaraṇa*, is contrary to the previously quoted *Sruti* texts, because these plainly enunciate that even in *mukti*, *jīva* and Brahman are different. Accordingly as it is against the *pramāṇas*, it is fit to abandon this standpoint (that the *bhēda* postulated is of the primary kind). If it is alleged to be the second (or secondary kind), it also deserves to be rejected, because the *jīva* being *achētana*, *Abhēda* indicates only the *mukta*'s distinctive feature of similarity with Brahman (*sādrūṣyam iti upalakṣhaṇam*)<sup>972</sup> as compared with those who have not attained that state. It is clear from this that the superiority of Brahman stands out of itself unaffected (*Tat pradhāna-katvādyapīti drashtavyam*). If *Abhēda* is agreed to, how is it possible, then, to accept the opposite of it (*viz.*, *Bhēda*)? Accordingly it is meet to repudiate it. If it is said that *Abhēda* prevails only in cases of certain people who attain to *mukti* from *samsāra*, even this is opposed utterly to reason. Moreover, the acceptance of the theory that *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* prevail as between *jīva* and Brahman, would also be opposed to *Sruti* texts. Because *Bhēdābhēda* means *Bhēdēnasahitō bhēda*, i.e., *Abhēda* that exists along with *Bhēda* (*Bhēdēnasahitō Bhēdō Bhēdābhēdaḥ*.) Nowhere could such a relationship (*Bhēdābhēda*) be said to exist. Without such a joint existence (of *Bhēdābhēda*), it is improper to enumerate the second (*Abhēda*) with the first (i.e., *Bhēda*) (*na upasankhyātavya*). While there is no such real collective existence (of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*), there can be no such thing in existence as *Bhēdābhēda* (*samudāyamrutē nakēchit bhēdābhēdō nāsti*). Therefore, there being no existence without its natural

<sup>972</sup> *Upalakṣhaṇam* : A mark, characteristic or distinctive feature. Implying something that has not been actually expressed ; implication of something in addition or any similar object where only one is mentioned. The idea seems to be that *Abhēda* indicates only a partial or one-sided similarity and in that respect is only a distinctive mark of a *jīva* in *mukti*. Hence the word *sādrūṣya* is used to indicate "likeness," "resemblance," or "similarity".



characteristics, there can be no such thing as *Abhēda* (*svaguṇādīn vinā abhēdō nāsti*). Accordingly, the characteristics of *jīva* and Brahman are natural to each of the two and cannot be harmonised (*Ētēna jīva Brahmanō bhēdābhēdan dvāvāpi svābhāvikan*). *Bhēda* is not a thing that has been fettered by the *upādhi* termed *avidyā* and the like (*natu bhēdō vidyādyupādhi nibandhanah*). And therefore even in *mōksha*, *Bhēda* prevails, and we reject *Abhēda* in *mukti*, as propounded by the *Yādava Prakāśa*, because it is clearly contrary to *Bhēda vachanas* (found in the *Srutis*) (*Atō muktāvāpi Bhēdasadbhāvāt nāsmākam muktabhēda vachana virōdha iti vadan yādava prakāśōpi nirastah*).<sup>973</sup> The expressions *kvachit* and *kēnachit*<sup>974</sup> occur here and there (in arguments of this nature) but they are opposed to a large number of *Sruti* texts (*viśeṣha Sruti virōdhāt*). While there is nothing like *Bhēdābhēda* existing between *jīva* and Brahman, how then could the *Bhēdābhēda Sruti* texts been brought out by way of illustration to explain the *Sūtra*? The answer is that Bādarāyaṇa has explained the *Sruti* texts (referred to) from his own point of view in this *Sūtra*. *Sruti* texts declare only *Bhēda* and describe the distinctive features of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* that are generally found in *jīva* and Brahman (*Upalakṣhaṇamētat Bhēda śrutayaścha ityāpi drashtavyam*). Because each of these belongs to his own (respective) *amśa*. This is how the *Sūtra* has

<sup>973</sup> *Yādava Prakāśa* :—The work of Yādava Prakāśa is referred to by Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāṣya*. He is taken as typical of those who propound the view that “the general cause, i.e., Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities.” See *Srī Bhāṣya*, commentary on II. 1. 15 (*Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*). This theory is severely criticised by Rāmānuja as opposed to all Scripture, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and Reasoning (*Ibid.*). Tradition says that Yādava Prakāśa was the teacher of Rāmānuja.

<sup>974</sup> *Kvachit* :—Met with occasionally ; rare ; unusual.

*Kēnachit* :—By some persons, in the indefinite sense indicating the unimportance of the person or persons referred to.

to be understood. The statement that the *jīva* is a part (*i.e.*, an *aṁśa*) of Paramātmān, is a solemn declaration (*pratignājāta arthah*). The words *nānāvyaṣāḍāt* in the *Sūtra* show that the *jīvas* are relatively different from each other just like son, brother, etc. The words *anyathāchāpi* denote that though they (son, brother, etc.) are different from each other, yet their relationships exist in this manner (as sons, brothers, etc.). In the same way *Sruti* texts also indicate *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* between *jīva* and Brahman. These *Sruti* texts also broadly declare that the *jīva* is only an *aṁśa* of Brahman and nothing more. If perchance *jīva* is utterly different (*bhinna*) from Brahman, just as what *ghaṭa* is to *paṭa*, *i.e.*, extremely different, then all the *Abhēda Sruti* texts would have been obstructed. Similarly, if perchance *jīva* is utterly *abhinna* from Brahman, then, all the *Bhēda Sruti* texts would be invalidated. We should not, because there are *Sruti* texts supporting both *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*, endeavour to club them, the two sets of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* (*Sruti* texts), into one harmonious whole (*Yadi jīvō Brahmanō ghaṭa iva paṭādatyantabhinnaṣyāttadā bhēda śrutayaḥ uparuddhyēran* | *Yadivā Brahmābhinnaḥ syāttarhi bhēda śrutayo bādhayēran* | *Nacha bhēdābhēdā-śrayaṇēna śrutidvaya sāmanjasyam vāchyam*). It is nowhere exemplified that if this is not done, the *Sruti* texts would be contradicted (*Na kēnachidityudāhruta śruti virōdhāt*). From the mere fact that there are *Bhēda* and *Abhēda Sruti* texts, we cannot combine what are opposite *Sruti* texts and say as a demonstrated conclusion that *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman (*Atō bhēdābhēda śrutyanadhūnupapattyā jīvō Brahmanōṁśa angīkārya ityēva sūtrārtha iti*). It is neither right that we should use the expression *Bhēdābhēda* as one expression by itself nor as conveying this meaning (*i.e.*, as conveying a consistent meaning of the *Sruti* texts). For it is said, *Yatō bhēdēnatasyāyamabhēdēnacha gīyate* | *Ataśchāṁśatva mud-dishtam bhēdābhēdau na mukhyata iti* <sup>975</sup> Those *Sruti* texts

<sup>975</sup> The authority is not quoted.

which declare for *Bhēda* cannot be held to declare for *Abhēda*. As those *Srutis* have declared *amśatva* to be their primary object, the idea of *Bhēdābhēda* is not the important matter (i.e., *amśatva* and not *Bhēdābhēda* is the important point). When we admit that we have correctly understood the *Paramātmā amśatva*, then we should not agree also to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory. Because the characteristics of *amśatva* cannot be properly determined. To this, the reply is that we have already admitted that there is no difference as between the *Matsya* and other *avatāras* as all the *amśas* are admitted to be one without difference (*Matsyūdishu paramēśvara amśēshu abhēdasya angīkritatvāt*). But as regards the *jīvas*, the expression *Paramēśvara amśa* is used simply in order to show that there is *such a similarity* as between them (as there is between the different *avatāras* of Vishṇu). This similarity as between the *jīvas* shows their constant subordination to Parabrahman in their existence. By this, it is declared that the characteristics of virility (*pumstva*) etc., possessed by Parabrahman in his *amśatva*, are denied to the *jīva*.

Thus what seems to be suggested in regard to the *jīva* in the very name of the *Adhikaraṇa* is rejected. It is not possible to interpret the *amśatva* (of the *jīva*) even by any hidden mode (*prakāṛāntarēṇa*). The expression *cha* in the *Sūtra* (*Amśō nānāvyaṣadēśat*) warrants the restriction of the meaning of the term *amśa* in this way that the *jīva* is subordinate to Brahman (*Tadadhīnasattādimatvam chētyarthah*). Really, the term *amśa* has been used in the *Sūtra* to denote that there is absolutely no difference between the *avatāras*, *Matsya* and the rest. Nevertheless, the term *amśa* when used in connection with *jīva* is merely intended to denote a proportionate similarity in its characteristics when compared with the entire *amśatva* as seen in the different *avatāras* of Parabrahman. And therefore the term *amśa*, when applied to the *jīva*, has only a secondary significance (*Tathāpi mukhyāmśa sādruśyam tatsattaiva sattāvatva lakṣaṇam ēva jīvasya amśatvam gaṇṇōyam amśaśabda iti*). The term *amśa*

is possessed of several meanings, among which the most primary one is seen in the *Matsya* and other *avatāras* (of Viṣṇu), in which each *avatāra* consists of the *svarūpāṃśa* in its entirety. But when the term *amśa* is used in respect of the *jīva*, it is not so. For, the *amśatva* of the *jīva* is possessed of varying characteristics. Hence it bears a secondary significance, as declared by the *Āgamas* (*āgama vākyaṃ paṭhati*). The *Āgamas* declare clearly that the *jīva* bears only a small amount of similarity (*kinchit sādruśya mātram*) to Brahman. The expression “*amśatviti*” used by the Āchārya (Ānandatīrtha) should be construed as covering both these two aspects of its significance, viz., the first *lakṣhaṇa* indicating the capacity to create, etc., the *svarūpa* indicating *pūrṇānandikam* (entire bliss) and the *sthiti* indicating the measure of his all-pervading omnipresence (*sarvagatatvādiparimāṇaḥ*). These are the chief characteristics of the first aspect of *amśatva*. These are to be understood as indicating the never-changing *svarūpāṃśa* of Brahman. As regards the *jīvāṃśa*, it is otherwise. This also, the *Sūtra* illustrates from the examples of *dāsakī-tavāditvam*. This explains further the import of the subsequent *Sūtra*, *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ*. The *jīvas* in their *amśatva* can never bear the same likeness (*sāmya*) to Paramēśvara in the same manner as the *avatāras*, etc., do in their different manifestations. Because *Matsya* and other *avatāras* bear the likeness of *svarūpāṃśa* while the *jīvas* bear a divided likeness (*vibhinnāṃśā eva*). In order to break down the misconception of similarity as between the two, the subsequent *Sūtra*, *Prakāśādivattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 47) was propounded by the Sūtrakāra to illustrate his position. These illustrations sufficiently show that it would not be meet to take the word in one and the same significance.<sup>976</sup> In order to remove the doubt whether it should be understood as applicable both to *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* in their respective applications (*ubhayatra bhēdābhēda sabbhāvādityāśankā*

<sup>976</sup> I.e., The word has a double significance and must be understood in one way when applied to Brahman and in another when applied to *jīva*.

*nirāsāyabhāshyam*), this interpretation has been offered. In fact, the existence of self-conceit in *jīvas* is pointed to in the term *amśa* in its significance. In order to bring out the force of pride (egotism) existing in *jīvas*, the term *amśa* is further explained in the subsequent *Sūtras* by clear illustrations and this makes the position very explicit. Commenting on the *Sūtra*, *Prakāsādivattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 46), the Ācharya (Ānandatīrtha) says that the sun is within his own disc, his own measurer and his own sharer. The rays of light that proudly proceed from the sun and the sun in the *Sūryamaṇḍala* are both the same (*amśa* and *amśi* are both the same). In this way (*i.e.*, this idea of oneness) we have to carry everywhere. The word *atha* (used by Ānandatīrtha) is used in a collective sense. Because the sun overspreading the seven oceans with his lordly rays (his *amśa*) and himself (*amśi*) are one. The *prithvi* which extends to an area measuring *pañchāśatkōṭi* is, as *amśa*, the same as the mountain Mēru, its *amśi* (*Amśibhūtā dharādēvi mēruvādērabhimānini dēvatāpi amśa-rūpa ēka ēva*). Mēru and the Himavat are termed males in the *Purāṇas* because they are famed for their hardness. Some *Sruti* texts declare that the earth is very hard; this is only to represent that, in certain places, the earth is also hard. Here, the characteristic of the earth (*svarūpāmśa*) is explained in its variety only. In the same way, Bhagavān Viṣṇu (Parabrahman), who is *amśi*, is one and the same in his many different *avatāras* and absolutely without difference in his *amśa*. This is how we have to understand. Parabrahman is immutable (*avyaya*), and always full of good qualities (*sadāpūrṇagunaḥ*), both in *amśa* and in *amśi*. This is the idea that is propounded in the succeeding *Sūtras* for demonstrating the *abhēda* point of view as between the *svarūpāmśa* of Parabrahman and *avatārāmśas*. The different *amśas* (*vibhinnaṁśa*) of the *jīva* are next expounded by way of illustration. Next to Parabrahman are the *dēvatas* who have fallen away (*sadā apabhrashta nāmaka dēva-tāmśa*), who are also of the *amśarūpa*, such as Sūrya, Varuṇa, Prithvi, etc., who are quite different from each

other and are in their inverted order from Parabrahman. In this *Sūtra*, Bādarāyaṇa has established that the *jīvas* in their *aṁśas* are thus severally different from each other in the inverted order when compared with Paramēśvara's *svarūpāṁśas* which are absolutely one and the same.

With great skill, in the next *Sūtra*, *Anugñāparihārau dēhasambandhājyōtirādivat*, this difference between Paramēśvara—as *aṁśa* and *aṁśi*—is demonstrated. In this *Sūtra* and in those succeeding it, the commentator further illustrates how the *jīva* is of *vibhinnāṁśa* on account of the egotistic feeling (*abhimāna*) in him. And on this *abhimāna* of the *jīva*, the commentator proceeds to say that the *jīva* is always embodied in a body, which even divine beings, though they may possess the capacity to be invisible (to us), cannot avoid. Hence the *cha śabda*—which occurs in the *Asantatēschāvyatikaraḥ* (II. 3. 49)—is intended to denote the collective sense. Sūrya and the rest are subordinate in *srishṭi* and *sthiti* to Parabrahman (*prasādāyatta*), that is both for coming into *srishṭi* (*pratibandha*) and for absolution (*nivrittivāt*). By the word *anugrāhya*, we have to understand that they possess bodies which have been polluted by the taint of *abhimānadōsha* (attachment). Suffice it to say that *jīvas* as *aṁśas* are different from Paramēśvara (*Paramēśvarādbhēdam*); that the *bhēda* is of varying kinds and that it is never one like the *svarūpāṁśa* of Parabrahman as manifested in his many *avatūras*. The very word *anugrāhya* denotes “subject to grace”. This in itself plainly denotes that *jīvāṁśa* is different from *svarūpāṁśa*. *Sruti* texts like *Nēshyatē, naivatē, jāyantē iti*, etc., strongly support this view of subordination (of *jīvāṁśa*). The *Sūtra*, *Asantatēschāvyatikaraḥ* (II. 3. 49) strongly supports this view in that the *jīvāṁśas* are held to be absolutely different from *Paramēśvarāṁśa* (*tat jīvāṁśānām paramēśvarādbhēdamēva sādhayatpratīyatē*) and not identical with *Matsya* and other *avatārāṁśas* (*Na tu matsyādīnām abhēdam*). *Matsya* and other *avatārāṁśas* are in the possession of the attributes of perfect *ānanda* and other good qualities. The *Sūtra*,

*Anugñāparihārau*, etc., (II. 3. 47) indicates, on the other hand, that the *jīvāmśa* is subordinate to *Parabrahmāmśa*. It must never be understood that *jīvāmśa* is equivalent to the *svarūpāmśa* of the *Matsya* and other *avatāras*. Thus, it has been established by proofs that *jīvāmśa* is absolutely different from *Īśvarāmśa*. And thus it is established by many proofs that the *jīva* is different from *Īśvara* (*ēvam amśasyāpi jīvasya Īśvarādbhēdaḥ pramāṇaiḥ samarthitah*). Yet, if any one still tries to prove that *jīvāmśa śabda* is intended to be identical with *Parabrahmāmśa* and tries to find out proofs for it, he will fall into confusion of the kind noted above. And in his attempt to establish a contradiction, he will arrive at a result which is expounded in the next *Sūtra*, *Ābhāsa ēva cha* (II. 3. 50). According to this *Sūtra*, the *jīvas* bear a semblance to the *Parabrahmāmśa*. This is the import of the *Sruti* text, *Tathaitasmin Purushottamē ētat jīvajātam ātatam ētadēvāsya tadamśatvam iti*, etc. (That is, though born as an *amśa* of *Paramātma*, *Paramātma* is complete, in his *amśatva*, whereas he—the *jīva*—is different from *Paramātma* and calls himself an *amśa*.) This text by itself does not establish the *Parabrahma amśatva* of the *jīva*. Because there is this text contrary to it (in the *mantra* of the *Rig-Vēda*): *Pādō'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyā amritam divi iti*.<sup>977</sup> (In a small fourth part of *Parabrahman* is the whole universe; the remaining three parts are unseen in the world of immortality).<sup>978</sup> The *dyu śabda* (*ākāśa*) covers up the entire worlds *Anantāsana*, *Svētadvīpa* and *Vaikunṭha* which are implied by the term *pāda*. This word *pāda* also means *amśa*. Merely because the *jīva* is referred to as *amśa*, it is not permissible to claim identity with *amśatva* or *pādatva* of *Parabrahman*. And therefore we cannot invent a place for the *jīva* which is identical with *Parabrahman*. Next, the term *natviti* is used by the *Āchārya*. How can the *jīva* as *amśa* claim identity with *Parabrahman*, while *Parabrahman*'s every *amśa* is entire in itself as described in the *Sruti* text, *Pumpādavat purushasya amritapādatrayam*?

<sup>977</sup> *Rig. Taitt. Aranyaka*, III. 12.<sup>978</sup> *Ibid.*

If it is asked (*kutah*) how can every *amśa* of Parabrahman be entire in itself, the answer is *Nārāyaṇam prādurbhāva-rūpam (jīvāmsēbhyah param vilakṣaṇam)*—the *avatāra rūpas* of Nārāyaṇa, etc., are manifested forms among Parabrahman's infinite and unimaginable forms. The *amśa* of *jīva* when compared with Parabrahman is quite separate and quite the reverse in its character. Hence different. The *Sruti* says *Jagādā*, etc.—that Parabrahman in his *svarūpa* has *ādhidaivādi svarūpa* (*ādhidaiva*, *ādhyātma* and *ādhibhautika*) which is determined in every part of it (*pāda*) and *srishti* begins in the *amśa* itself. In order to explain the *ādhidaivādi svarūpa* etc., this section was begun so as to enable one to understand this state of difference existing between the *amśa* of Parabrahman and the *amśa* of the *jīva*; and to give a firm impression of it, the Āchārya summarises and states it in the further sloka, *Akṣhaya iti*—Parabrahman in his *svarūpa* is *akṣhaya*, i.e., he has no *śarīra* which he is to assume and to lose, while the *jīva* in his *amśa* necessarily assumes one and casts it off. Therefore it is that in *Pralaya* also He undergoes no change (because he has no *śarīra*). This is at length described in the *Sūtras*, *Asambhavastu śatōnupaṭtēḥ* and *Na'tmā srutēr nityatvūchchatābhyah*.<sup>979</sup> The Āchārya says *Lakshmyāvāsa iti*. Parabrahman always exists with Lakshmi and Lakshmi is ever at His will. Even in *Pralaya*, Parabrahman, while in His entire *svarūpa*, keeps Lakshmi also in Her entire *svarūpāmśa*. This is at length explained in the *Viyadadhikaraṇa* (II. 3. 1)—that Lakshmi with the will of Parabrahman starts the creation by bringing into manifestation Brahma and others with their *abhimāna*<sup>980</sup> ending ultimately in their respective bodily forms only during *srishti* (*utpatti*) and none during *mukti*. In thus treating of the order of creation and destruction, *srishti* and *pralaya*, it is intended to show the relative importance of *jīvas* in their respective *amśas* (*tāra-tamya*). This is treated of at length in the *Adhikaraṇa*,

<sup>979</sup> II. 3. 9 and II. 3. 17.

<sup>980</sup> *Pride* (in a good sense); i.e., *śarīra* in which it ultimately ends.



*Viparyayēṇa tu kramōta sampadyatē*, etc.<sup>981</sup> The gist of *Viyadadhikaraṇa* is further elaborated in the *Sūtras* following it, wherein it is said that Prakriti appears as Lakshmi. Then Sankarshaṇa assumes the form of Prāṇa. Then, again, Prakriti assumes the form of Saraswati and Bhārati. These two latter are also the original forms of Prakriti. Thus with the united *kartrutva* of Prakriti and Puruṣa, Brahma is made to manifest himself in *mahattattvarūpa*. Then he develops into *ahamkāratattva*; then, again, appears as Indra, Skanda and other *tattvābhimānis* (i.e., primary agencies of creation). In order to reject the misconception that they are superior to the *amśa* of Parabrahman, these symbolic names indicate their grades in subordination to Parabrahman. This is explained in the *Sūtras*, *Tathāprāṇāḥ* etc.<sup>982</sup> Thus *srisṭi* and *pralaya* are the order in which Parabrahman manifests his *kartrutva*. And the *Sūtras*, *Tējōtastathāhyāḥa* and *Tadabhidhyānādēvatu tallingūtsaḥ* (II. 3. 15 and 16), indicate that the spirit (*tējas*) of each belongs to himself. The *Panchami* (*vibhakti*) used clearly shows the meaning of the *Sūtra*, *Parāt tu tat śrutēḥ*. (Both in *srisṭi* and *pralaya* all *jīvas* are, in the order of gradation, subordinate to Parabrahman.)<sup>983</sup> The liberation from *janma* and *laya* is what is called *mōksha*. Liberated from both these—*janma* and *laya*—to be eternal (*nitya*), is *mukti*. In *mukti* also, though there is no *janma* again, the fact of affectionately praising the Parabrahman, is in itself being subordinate to Parabrahman. This is established at length in the *Sūtra*, *Tadadhīnatvāt arthavat*.<sup>984</sup> Thus, this subject of gradation of Brahman and other *jīvas* in their *amśas* has been discussed and determined throughout this *pāda* (i.e., II. 3.) It will thus be seen that the criticism of the *Dvaita* view that undue stress is laid on *Bhēda* by the upholders of that theory has been met, in anticipation, as it were, by Jayatīrtha. It will also be conceded that the position of Śrīpati in regard to *Abhēda* in the *mōksha* stage is widely different from that of the *Advaita*

<sup>981</sup> II. 3. 14.<sup>982</sup> II. 4. 1.<sup>983</sup> II. 3. 38.<sup>984</sup> I. 4. 3.

school of thought. That is the very reason why he designates his system as *Viśeṣhādvaita* and not merely *Advaita*. His conception of *Advaita* may perhaps be described as *Advaita* with a difference and embodying the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* views combined in a harmonious manner.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*<sup>985</sup> (I. 1. 1.) lays down the principles of *Brahma Tarka* which should guide discussions relating to the Brahman and the value to be attached to opposing *Sruti* texts. His argument is that *Sruti* texts are, broadly speaking, of two kinds : *Sāvakāśa*, those which leave room for discussion ; and *Niravakāśa*, those which leave no room for discussion. He thus enunciates these two principles :—

(1) *Atō namu adhikabala virōdhē na hīnabala pramāṇam bhavati*. Where there is a stronger opposing argument, there the weaker proof cannot prevail.

(2) *Sāvakāśa niravakāśayōḥ niravakāśam balavat*. Between the *sāvakāśa* and the *niravakāśa* arguments, only the *niravakāśa* argument will prevail.

(3) *Sāvakāśācha advaita śrutih*. The *Advaita Sruti* texts quoted in support of *Brahmaikya* belong to the *sāvakāśa* order as they leave much room for discussion and contradiction.

(4) *Bhēda śrutistu niravakāśaḥ*. The *Bhēda Sruti* texts, i.e., those that declare the *Bhēda* doctrine, belong to the *niravakāśa* group.

(5) *Atō niravakāśatayā balavatya bhēdaśrutya sāvakāśatayā durbalāyāḥ advaitaśrutēḥ bādho yukta iti*. Therefore it is but right that those *Niravakāśa Sruti* texts which hold, without giving room for discussion, the *Bhēda* doctrine prevail over those *Sāvakāśa Advaita Sruti* texts, which are weak in their argument and leave scope for discussion. They are weak and rightly sublated.

These principles, as will be seen, differ from those formulated by the *Advaita* school of thought. Rāmānuja in setting out the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* argument, which

<sup>985</sup> T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 66.

is said to embody the Advaitic view,<sup>986</sup> thus summarizes them: There being a conflict between the two sets of passages (those which describe Brahman as possessed of qualities and those which describe Brahman as devoid of qualities), we (*i.e.*, the upholders of the Advaitic view)—according to the *Mīmāṃsā* principle referred to above<sup>987</sup>—decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities.”<sup>988</sup>

Commenting in his *Anuvyākhyāna*<sup>989</sup> on II. 3. 29 *Tadguṇa sārātāt tadvyapadēśaḥ prāṇavat*, Ānandatīrtha definitely rejects *Bhēdābhēda*. He says:—

*Sādrūṣyāchcha pradhānatvāt svātantryādapi chābhīdām ।  
 Āhurīśēna jīvasya na svarūpābhīdām kvachit ॥  
 Sthānaikyamaikamatyancha muktasya tu viśishyatē ।  
 Sādrūṣyancha viśēshēna jādānām dvayamēva tu ॥  
 Bhavēt sādrūṣyamatyālpam tritīyam paramātmanā ।  
 Īsarūpakriyānām cha guṇānāmapi sarvaśaḥ ॥  
 Tathaiivāvayavānām tat svarūpaikyam tu mukhyataḥ ॥  
 Yathōdakam durgē vrishṭam parvatēshu vidhāvati ।  
 Ēvam dharmān pruthak paśyan tānēvānuvidhāvati ॥  
 Iti śrutēr nōbhayancha bhēdābhēdākhyamishyatē ॥  
 Ēkamēvādviṭīyam tannēha nānāsti kinchana ।  
 Mrityōssa mrityumāpnōti ya iha nānēvapaśyati ॥  
 Iti śrutāvivētyasmāt bhēdābhēda nirākritih ।  
 Ivōbhayē cha sādrūṣyam iti vākśabdānirṇayē ॥*

In the text *Brahma vidbrahmaiva bhavati*, *sādrūṣya* and *svātantrya* are promised by Īśvara to the *jīva*. Never

<sup>986</sup> It has been suggested that this *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* view enunciated by Rāmānuja represents the Advaitic view developed by Vimuktātman in his work *Ishṭa-Siddhi*, which has been set down to the middle of the 11th century A.D.—See M. Hiriyanna, *Ishṭa-Siddhi*, Intro. xi—xiii.

<sup>987</sup> *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* of Jaimini, VI. 5. 54, where *Kachchavimōchana* in the *Jyōtishṭhōma* sacrifice is explained.

<sup>988</sup> *Srī Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1. See Thibaut's *Vēdānta-Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Commentary*, pp. 25–27.

<sup>989</sup> T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 193.

was Īśvara's undifferentenced *svarūpa* granted to the *jīva*. *Sthānaiḥ* is all that has been provided for the *mukta*. This *sādrūṣya* (between *Īśa* and *jīva*) differs as much as the *sādrūṣya* of the *muktas* does from that of the *jaḍas* (such as pearls, rubies, etc.). The *sādrūṣya* of the *jīva* is of the third order and utterly small. In quality it differs from Īśvara in its *lordship* (*Īśatva*), form (*rūpa*) and in action (*kriyā*). In every other quality the *jīva* is in the third order.<sup>990</sup> Similarly in bodily form, it differs. In fact, nothing beyond *svarūpaikya*<sup>990a</sup> is promised to the *mukta*. Just as the showers pouring on the summit of a mountain flow towards the sloping ground, thereby finally reaching the ocean, similarly all *dharma*s find their own avenues and flow till they reach their final end. Thus the *Sruti* does not accord sanction to the double system known as *Bhēdābhēda* position. And the *Sruti* text *Ēkamēva*, etc., declares that Parabrahman is only one and in Him there are no divisions and he who contemplates on Him in the idea that he differs from himself (in his forms) will meet with the death of deaths. Thus, by the help of the *Sruti* texts themselves, the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* is rejected. The indeclinable adverb *iva* in the *Sruti* text denotes mere *sādrūṣya* (likeness) between the two as declared in the *Sabdanirṇaya*.

The same idea is suggested but not developed by Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* in the commentary on the same *Sūtra* (II. 3. 29). Only because the *jīva* possesses for his essence qualities similar to those of Brahman, he is spoken of, says Ānandatīrtha, as in the case of the all-wise Brahman. As the essence of the *jīva* consists of only wisdom, bliss and other Brahman-like qualities, the statement is made that the *jīva* is one like Brahman; as in the *Sruti* text *Sarvaṃ khalvidam Brahma tajjalāniti śānta upāsīta*,<sup>991</sup> etc., Brahman is spoken of as

<sup>990</sup> *Trividhā jīvasaṅghāstu Dēva Mānuṣa Dānavāḥ* |  
*Tatra dēva mukti yōgyā mānuṣhēshu uttamāstathā* ||

*Tattvasaṅkhyāna*, T. R. Krishnachar's Edn., p. 237.

<sup>990a</sup> *Sva + rūpa + aikya*. *Aikya* means only similarity, i.e., what the *jīva* deserves. *Ēkē mukhyānya kēvalāḥ*. (*Nighaṇṭu*).

<sup>991</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

identical with all the world, on account of Brahman possessing all the qualities which are predicated of the whole world. But he quotes the following from the *Bhavishyat-purāṇa* to indicate the limit of the likeness between the *jīva* and Brahman: "The souls are separate; the perfect Lord is separate; still owing to the similarity of intelligent nature, they are spoken of as Brahman in different Scriptural disquisitions."<sup>992</sup>

In commenting on II. 2. 33 (*Naikasminnasambhavāt*), though he does not refer to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, Ānandatīrtha states that the *Sūtrakāra* rejects the Jaina theory because of the impossibility of the existence of contradictory attributes being in one and the same thing at the same time. He suggests that the *Saptabhangi nyāya*, according to which seven different moods are said to be in the same thing at the same time, is not maintainable as they are contradictory of each other, and so cannot be admitted to be in the same thing. These seven moods are: "Somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable." "It might be being; it might be non-being; it might be being as well as non-being; it might be different from what is being as well as non-being, etc." These contradictory attributes cannot be admitted to be existent in one and the same thing from their very nature, *i.e.*, such an admission would be, he says, against all reason and proof, while the authorities to prove it are wholly absent. Rāmānuja urges, while commenting on this very *Sūtra*, as will be shown below, that what applies by way of objection to the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, applies to this Jaina doctrine of *Saptabhangi nyāya* also. Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha treat both the theories as a species of paralogism which cannot be maintained as contradictory attributes cannot be held to co-exist in the same thing at the same time.

<sup>992</sup> Ānandatīrtha, *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. 3. 29.

Ānandatīrtha, in interpreting *Sūtras* I. 4. 24 to 29 (from *Prakritiścha pralīnā drishṭāntūnuparōdhāt* to *Ētēna sarvē vyākhyātāh vyākhyātāh*), states that Brahman is also called *Prakriti*, agreeably to the argument and illustrative instances. He quotes the text "This verily is the Person whom all the names declare; just as all the rivers going to the sea, flow towards and enter it, so do all names enter and declare the Perfect Being." *Prakriti* is Brahman only because of his divine will being called *Prakriti*. Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Sruti* text "Let him know the Lord's Will to be *Prakriti* and the Supreme Lord to be the master of the Will."<sup>993</sup> According to this text, *Prakriti* is only the Will of the Lord. The *Sruti* text is quoted: "He is Will; He is the guiding thought; He is wisdom; He is bliss." This is so, because he is both *Prakriti* and *Purusha*. In support, is quoted the text of the Paingins' *Sruti* which directly describes the Brahman as both *Prakriti* and *Purusha*: "He is woman; He is man; He is *Prakriti*; He is the *Purusha*; He is Brahman; He is the support; He is the light; Who is the Lord Hari, the cause of all; Himself without a beginning or end, but the end of all; the highest of the high; the original present in all." *Prakriti* is Brahman only for the reason He moulds forms out of *Prakriti* (i.e., *Prakriti* the material cause), in which He also exhibits Himself in various ways and makes everything. That Brahman is *Prakriti* is seen from the etymology of the word *Prakriti*: "he works eminently". Brahman enters into *Prakriti*, the material cause, shapes it differently and in the different shapes He dwells as a ruling principle for which purpose He assumes numerous forms. The *Bhāllavēya Sruti* is quoted to this effect: "Now indeed the Lord enters with *Prakriti*, makes himself many; hence He is *Prakriti*, hence He is *Prakriti*, they say." Next the *Nārādīya Purāṇa* is cited: "The Supreme Lord Gōvinda, though He undergoes no change,

only having entered into *Prakṛiti* the changeable, is spoken of as *Prakṛiti*." The suggestive remark is added: "No other interpretation is to be put upon it, for that would be against the authority of Scripture." In conformity with this view, that Brahman while He enters *Prakṛiti* and makes Himself, Himself undergoes no change, is further strengthened in the *Anuvyākhyāna*, in the comments on the corresponding *Sūtras* (I. 4. 24 to 29). This exposition is taken up by Jayatīrtha and expanded at length into an argument which shows how these *Sūtras* are an exposition of Bādarāyaṇa's views against the *Bhēdābhēda* theory.

Ānandatīrtha in his *Anuvyākhyāna*,<sup>994</sup> commenting on I. 4. 24 (*Prakṛitiścha pratignā drishṭāntānuparōdhāt*) says:—*Na cha prakṛiti śabdēna Brahmōpādānamuchchyatē | Avikāraśadā śuddhō nitya ātmā sadā Hariḥ | Sa-daika rūpa vignāna bala ānanda rūpakah | Nirvikārō'ksharah śuddhō nirātankō'jarō'marah | Aviśvō viśvakartā'jō yah parah sō'bhidhīyatē || Nirvikāramanāupamyam sadai-karasa makshayam | Brahmēti Paramātmēti yamvidur vaidikā janāḥ || Iti Śruti purāṇōktyā na vikāri janārdanaḥ | Parādhūna viśēshāptirānivartyōnyathā bhavaḥ || Kshīrādivad vikārassyāt naiva sa syāt harēḥ kvachit || Apādānatva-mēvāsya yadyupādānatēshyatē ||*

The use of the *Prakṛiti* does not mean that Brahman is liable to undergo *vikāra*. The *Sruti* declares *Avikārah sadā śuddhaḥ*, i.e., that Brahman is *Avikāra* and ever *śuddha*, *nitya* (eternal) and is called *Ātma* and ever removes one's sin. Brahman always has *ēka rūpa* and is always all-knowing, all-potent and all bliss. Such a one, who never undergoes any change (*nirvikāra*), is called *aksharah*, *śuddhaḥ*, *nirātankaḥ*, *ajarah*, *amarah*, *aviśvaḥ*, *viśvakartā* and *ajah*. He alone is declared as *parah* i.e., Mahēśvara. Such a one who undergoes no *vikāra* cannot bear comparison as there is none other to compare with him. Therefore he is termed Brahman and Paramātmā by great sages who are well versed in the *Vēda*.

<sup>994</sup> T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 172.

Similarly do the *Srutis* and *Purāṇas* declare Janārdana to be *nirvikārin*. But here and there, it is seen as if Brahman is subjected to others' control (*parādhiṇa*). This is either a seeming misconception or a misjudgment. Curd is a state of *vikāra* from milk, but the change of curd into milk is unheard of. Parabrahman never undergoes such a state of *vikāra*, which disables him from going to his original state. Mere mention that he is the *kūṛaṇa* (*apālāna*) and also the *kartru* (*upādāna*) does not make him lose the state of *nirvikāratva*.

This has been accepted by all—that Parabrahman is like a father (*pitru*) and is also creator of the *viśva*. But it is also agreed that he was not born out of the *viśva*. Just as the spider throws out the thread of its web, without itself showing any *vikāra* in the act, Parabrahman, out of his entire *kūṛaṇatva* and agency, creates *viśva* as a result of action (*kāryarūpatayā*). Furthermore, he is the great cause, being the *viśva kartru*, he creates out of his mere will as declared by the *Sruti* text *Ichchāmātrāt Prabhōḥ srisṭiḥ avikārasya sarvadā* । *Svabhāvō yamanantasya rajōyēnābhavaḥ jagat*. So declares the *Bhāllavēya Sruti* which says that out of His (Parabrahman's) mere Will, *viśva srisṭi* came into existence. Commenting on this passage, Jayatīrtha says :—

*Nēti । Yasya kshīrasya vikāro yaddadhi tasmāt kshīrā danyathā tasya dadhmaḥ kēnāpi kvāpi na dṛśyata ityarthah । Evamanyathā darśanasya siddhāvīkāra vikāri bhūtvādvya-vrittiḥ ॥ Tataḥ kim ityata āha ॥*

*Sarvagnāt iti ॥ Hi śabdo yasmādityarthē tasmānnatayō vikāri vikāra bhāva iti śēśah ॥ Ayamatra prayōgaḥ । Jagat brahma vikāro na bhavati । Tatō anyatvē nōpalabhyamānatvāt । Yō yatō anyatvēnōpalabhyatē sa na tadvikārō yathāghataḥ paṭasya । Yaścha yadvikārō nāsau tatō 'nyatvēnōpalabhyatē । Yathā dadhikshīrāditi । Yadvā jagad brahmaṇi nānyōnya vikāra vikāriṇi । Anyōnyamanyatvēnōpalabhyamānatvāt । Ghaṭapaṭavaditi prayōgaḥ । Nachāyamasiddhō hētuḥ । Yassarvagna iti brahmaṇah sarvagnatva śravanāt । Gnāna kāryasya sarvathāpyanuupalambhēna jagatō*



gnānābhāvānumānāt । *Viruddha dharmādhikarāṇa yōśchān-*  
*yōnya manyatvōpalambha niyamāt iti bhāvēnōktam ।*  
*Sarvagnūditi । Nanu vikāra vikāriṇōr bhēdābhēdābhyupaga-*  
*māt kathamayam hēturitichēna । Bhēdēnaiva upalambhasya*  
*hētutvāt । Tarhi drishtāntassādhana vikalah । Sarvatra*  
*mayā Bhēdābhēdābhyām sankarāśyābhyupagamāt । Tat*  
*kim tvadabhyupagama mātrena ghaṭa paṭayōrabhēda utō-*  
*palambhāt । Nādyah । Madabhyupagamēna śuddha bhēdasyaiva*  
*grāhyatvāt । Nadvītyah । Asiddhēh । Abhēdānupalambhōvā*  
*hētutvēna vivakshitah । Nanvayam asiddhō hētuh । Jagad-*  
*brahmanū abhinnaṁ satvādbrahmavadityanumānēnā bhēdō-*  
*palambhāditi chēna । Kharvam svarṇēnābhinnaṁ satvāt*  
*svarṇavadityābhāsa samāna yōga kshēmatvādityāha । Abhēda*  
*iti । Yadi jagadbrahmanōh sādhyēta tarhīti śēśhah । Kharva-*  
*mayah kharparamvū । Nanvidam ishṭamēva । Kharvasvarṇa-*  
*yōrabhēdasya mayāngīkṛitvatvāt itichēna । Abhēda śabdēna*  
*bhēdābhāvasya vivakshitatvāt । Atra pramāṇa virōdha iti*  
*chēt । Jagat brahmanō' atyantam bhidyatē । tatsvarūpānugati-*  
*śūnyatvāditi tvadanumānasyāpi pramāṇa virōdha iti samam*  
*samādhānam । Atyanta bhēdō mama na kvāpītyaprasiddha*  
*visēshaṇatēti chēna । Mōkshābhāva prasangāt । Tathāhi ।*  
*Gnānēna nivritta karmanācha mōkshōbhyupēyatē । Tachcha*  
*gnānam agnānamapi bhavati । Nivrittam karma pravritta-*  
*mapi bhavatīti katham mōkshasāadhanam syāt । Gnānatvādinā*  
*tadbhāvē agnānādērapī tadbhāvasyāt । Gnānādikam gnānā-*  
*di svarūpēṇa atyantā bhinnam agnānādi svarūpēṇa tu*  
*bhinnābhinnamatō na kārya sankara iti chēt । Tathāpi*  
*agnānādyabhēdēna svakāryasya kartavyatvāt । Ēvam*  
*mōkshōpi samsārā bhinna ityamōkshasyāt । Mōkshātma (tā)-*  
*nā sabbhāvēna mōkshatvē samsārōpi tathā syāt । Yadi*  
*chāyamabhēdō'nupalabhyamānō arthakriyāsu nōpayujyatē ।*  
*Tadā vyasanitayaivābhyupagantavyah syāditi । Brahma*  
*svarūpānugati śūnyatvāt na tat pariṇāmōyam prapancha*  
*ityuktaṁ । Tatra kim sarvasvarūpānugati śūnyatā abhiprē-*  
*tā । Utākinchit anugama śūnyatā ॥ Nādyah । Sarvānugamā*  
*bhāvēpi ghaṭādinām mridādi vikāratva darśanāt । Na*  
*dvitīyah । Satvānugamēna vikāra vikāri bhavōpapatte-*  
*rityata āha । Abhēda iti । Abhēdō vikāri vikāra bhāvah ।*

*Nanu na suvarṇasatvam kharvēnugatam । Tat kathama-  
yam prasangaḥ । Tat kim brahma satvamēva viyadādīnām ।  
Adhyētichēnna । Pramāṇā bhāvāt । Prāṇāvai satyam,  
tēshāmēsha satyam ityādi Sruteḥ prāṇa satyatvasya  
brahmādhīnatārthatvōpapattēḥ । Brahmaṇa ēva sāmānya  
sattā viyadādāvanugatēti chēt tarhi katham na suvarṇasattā  
kharvē nugatā । Atha manyasē kārāṇamēva kāryātmanā  
bhavatīti pariṇāmaavādinām matam । Tatascha kārāṇam  
yatsvabhāvā vyabhichāritadanugamaḥ kāryē'vāśyābhypa-  
gantavyaḥ । Anyathā kārāṇamēva kāryātmanā bhavatīti  
riktam vachassyāt । Avyabhichārīta svabhāvānugamē  
kārāṇasyaivānanugama prāptēḥ । Nacha saṁmūtra sva-  
bhāvam suvarṇam । Eṇa kharvam tadvikārasyāt । Kintu  
tadavyabhichāri suvarṇatvōdyanugamē satīti । Eṇam tarhi  
jagadapi katham brahma pariṇāmassyāt । Nahi saṁmūtra  
svabhāvam brahma । Kintu vigṇānamūnanānam brahmē-  
tyādi śrutyā vigṇānādīnāmapi tadavyabhichāri svabhāvavā-  
vagamāt । Nacha vigṇānādyanugamaḥ prapanchē'stīti  
samam । Nanu kshīravyabhichāri svabhāva mādhyakṣānugati  
vidhuram dadhi, tadvikāro drishṭamiti chēnna । Satkārya-  
vāda bhanga prasangāt । Kshīrakāryam dadhīti niśchayē-  
na mādhyakṣam kshīrasvabhāva iti kalpyatē । Mādhyakṣasya  
kshīra svabhāvatā niśchayē vā । Kshīravinaśē tatkāraṇasya  
dadhyupādānatvam kalpayata iti na dōshaḥ ।*

*Apichāgamairanumānāischa brahmaṇō nirvikāratvē  
siddhēḥ satyaprachyuta (svarūpa) svabhāvāsvaiva brahmaṇō  
jagadupādānatvam yōmanyatē tam pratyētau prasanga vipa-  
ryayāvuktāvīti kō virōdhaḥ । Eṭēna pradhānasya jagadupādā-  
natvē pyayam samāno dōsha iti nirastam ।*

*Atha matam । Dvirūpam brahmāpyupagamyatē ।  
Anantānanda chidātmakam sadātmakamchēti । Tatvādīyēna  
rūpēna nimittam । Dvītyēnōpādānam । Atō na kaśchiduktō  
dōshaḥ । Tathāhi । Yattāvaduktam nirvikāratvam tachchichakti  
vishayatvā chchrutvādēradūshaṇam । Nimittakāraṇēna chi-  
chchaktikēna prakriti pradhānādyabhīdhanam sachchaktikam  
brahma pariṇāmatītyangīkarē na yukti virōdhōpi । Sadā-  
tmakasya jagadupādānatvōchchaitanyā dyananugamōpi na dō-  
shaḥ । Sadanugamasya vidyamānatvāt । Anyatva darśanamcha*

navirudhyatē | Yatō yasmādanyatva mupalabhyatē sarva-  
gnāt | Tannimittamēva nōpādānam | Yachchōpādānam  
sadrūpam na tasmād bhēdē nōpalabhyata ityāśankyāhā |  
Bhāgēnēti | Yadi brahmaṇaḥ sadbhāgēna pariṇāmaḥ chidbhā-  
gēna nirvikāratvamangīkriyatē | Tadā vaktavyam | Tayōrbhā-  
gayōrabhēdō bhēdābhēdau vā | Na tāvadabhēdaḥ | Dvayōra-  
pi pariṇāmitvādi prāptyābhāgadvaya kalpanā vaiyyarthyāt |  
Nāpi bhēdābhēdau abhēdēna sankara prasangāt | Bhēdā-  
bhēda kāryam nirupaddhitichēt | Kim tarhya prayōjakēnābhē-  
dēna | Tasmād bhāgayōratyanta bhēdēvāngīkaraṇīyaḥ |  
Tataḥ kimityata āha | Yō bhāga iti | Parasparamatyanta bhi-  
nnē dvē vastuni | Tatraikam nirvikāram jagannimittamēva |  
Aparantu pariṇāmi jagadupādāna mēvētyaṅgīkārēṇēśva-  
rasya kēvala nimittatva vādinā masamākam kaśchidvivādaḥ |  
Nirvikārasya jagannimittasyāsmābhīrīśvaratvēna pariṇā-  
minō jagadupādānasya pradhānatvēna svīkritatvāt | Vivādā-  
bhāvūchcha prakritīśchētyādi sūtrāṇām anārambhā yēvēti |  
Atra yō bhāga iti parābhyupagamēnōktam | Svamatēna tu  
yadvastviti gnātavyam | Nahi bhāginam vinā bhāgassambha-  
vati | Nāpi vikāryavikāriṇōḥ kaśchit bhāgī vidyatē | Nan-  
vasti vivāda vishayaḥ | Nimittōpādāna bhēdāvādinā nimitta-  
syaiva brahmatvamabhyupagamyatē | Mayātu sadānantānanda  
chitām samudāyasyēti tadarthamadhikaraṇārambhā iti chēt |  
Kimidam brahmatvam | (Kim) Brahma nāmavatvam uta  
jagatkāraṇatvādi lakṣaṇārthavatvam | Ādyam dūshayati |  
Bhinnānām iti | Tadbhavēdityabhyupagumamāha | Tataśchā-  
yamarthaḥ | Yaddyarthēna vivādō' sti tadā nārambhāṇīyamēvā-  
dhikaraṇam | Śabdāmātrē parēṇa vivādā kāraṇāt | Kārṇēpya-  
śabda śāstratvāditi | Dvītiyēpi vivēktavyam | Kim parasparam  
bhinnā ssatchidānandādyāḥ pratyēkam brahmaṇi | Uta tē na  
brahmaṇi | Kintu tatsamudāya ēvēti | Nādyāḥ ēkamēvādvī-  
tīyam ityādi śrutivirōdhāt | Dvītiyēpi tatsamudāyōnāma kim  
tadupādānakam dravyāntaram saṅkhyā vā samyōgō vā |  
Sarvatrāpi dōshamāha | Brahmēti | Tadēti manasi sthitānām  
pakṣhāṇām vikalpītānām vāṅgīkārē | Kvachit pakṣhē hi  
śabdēnānupapattīḥ prasiddhatāmāha | Atra hi brahmōpādāna-  
sya vā tadguṇinō vā jagadupādānatvam prāptamiti viśvasya  
brahmōpādānakatā nasyāt | Nahyupādānaguṇigatāḥ śaktayaḥ

*kāryadravyē guṇēvā sambhavanti । Tadupādānatvādērasambhavāt । Athavā brahmaṇaḥ kāryatvāt guṇatvācheha na viśvōpādānatvam sambhavatīti vyākhyēyam । Atrā brahmōpādānātētyupalakṣaṇam । Brahma nimittakatā cha na yuktētyapi drashtavyam ॥*

Jayatīrtha's position may be briefly set down. The milk is seen to undergo a change resulting in curd ; but the curd does not admit of undergoing the process of reversion to its former condition of milk. Such is not the change that Brahman is expected to undergo in the creation of the world (*Srishti*). Out of his mere will, *Srishti* becomes manifest, himself undergoing no change whatever. The changes seen in *Srishti* are only changes in *Pradhāna* by the power of his (Brahman's) will. The term *hi* clearly indicates that Brahman undergoes no change whatever during this transformation of *Pradhāna* in *Srishti*. Accordingly *jagat* cannot become a transformed condition of Brahman. Brahman is quite independent from what is manifested out of his will. For the very reason that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* being made out of earth and cotton materials are subject to the agency of the potter and the weaver, similarly *jagat* is the manifested result of the will of Parabrahman without absolutely any change in himself. For, no such change is ever observed in Parabrahman; what all is otherwise seen in the manifested *jagat* itself is as the curd transformed from milk. Nor can it be said that *jagat* is capable of showing any *vikāra* in Brahman during the series of changes it undergoes. In order to illustrate this truth the examples of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* have been brought in. These two illustrations were not brought in for any other ineffectual purpose. Brahman is declared *Sarvagna* and in all his manifestations the greatest output of knowledge is exhibited by him and his master workmanship leaves nothing to be questioned. In every particle of work in *Srishti*, no contradiction could ever be pointed out either in character or in the result, for the very reason that he is *Sarvagna*. Nor can it be doubted that during the transformation of *Pradhāna* carried out at his will no

contradictory aspect of *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* can be pointed to throughout his manifestation. In every particle of transformation, he proves himself quite out of touch with the *Pradhāna* and its varied changes. Else, the illustrations would prove against his *Sarvagnatva*. If it is asked that in certain places *Bhēda* is indicated and in certain others *Abhēda* is perceived, and the question raised why should not *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* be conjointly considered, the answer is that the illustrations above quoted, *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, do not allow of such a fused consideration. These illustrations show fully that the agents—the potter and the weaver—are absolutely different from the things made by them. In no way can they be proved to be a part of the changes that *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* have undergone. Similarly, *jagat* in its manifested form is absolutely free from Brahman at whose will it became manifest. And it cannot be said that Brahman himself underwent any change at all by reason of his manifestation. A gold bangle is in a form assumed by gold different from gold itself; though gold is made to appear in the form of a bangle, yet, the gold is there, the change of form is also there and the agency through whom the change was made is also clearly seen. In this illustration, the gold and the bangle are one and the same, while the agent that brought the gold into this different form is absolutely different and underwent no change whatever. The illustration amply proves that in the very same way *jagat* and *Brahman* are absolutely different from each other as gold and the maker of change in its form. It also proves beyond all doubt that gold in its *svarūpa* underwent no change whatever in transforming itself into a bangle. If it is asked “where lies this *atyanta bhēda*, and that it is not quite clear on account of its mere attributive character,” then the reply is there is no *Mōksha*, because of the very same reason, *Mōksha* being subject to His Grace. It is therefore said that *Mōksha* is the result of *nivritti karma* (action done without desire). And this can be attained both from *gnāna* and ignorance, for sometimes *nivritti karma* assumes the form of *pravritti*

*karma*. In such a case, how can *Mōksha* be expected? If *gnāna* and *agnāna* cannot be distinguished, the result also cannot be distinguished. Thus what one thinks that he is doing out of his wisdom, he may be actually doing as the result of his ignorance. Unless one distinguishes that *gnāna* is absolutely different (*atyanta bhinna*) from *agnāna*, he will have no room to commingle *gnāna* and *agnāna* in the form of *Bhinnatva* and *Abhinnatva*. Therefore every one, in order to obtain *Mōksha*, should work out of mere wisdom. Therefore it is held that *Mōksha* is absolutely different from and free from the bondage of *Samsāra*. Unless one holds such a decisive opinion, he cannot free himself from the bondage of *Samsāra*. Nor will his actions be productive of any good result to make him realize *Mōksha*. Thus his actions will all be reduced to a sorrowful end. It must not be thought that *Brahmasvarūpa* is realized from the mere assertion of the non-existence of *jagat*. Because if it is held that there existed nothing and everything but Brahman was *śūnya*, then there is nothing to assume whereby *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* could have been put forth as examples out of *Pradhāna*, which was subject to *vikāra*. It was proved that Brahman himself would not undergo *vikāra*, because he is always *avikāra*. Then, what is *Abhēda*? It is *vikārivikāra bhāva*. Evidently it should signify something which undergoes change because it is liable to change—a natural state subject to change. It cannot be said that gold is such a thing. Then, what is the proof? Can it be said that Brahman, in his *sat*, is identical with *Ākāśa* and the rest of them? If it is so affirmed, it should be said that it is not so; for there is no proof that it is so. For the *Sruti* texts, *Prāṇā vai satyam tēshāmēsha satyam iti*, etc., prove that *Prāṇā* is real; and that this *Prāṇā* is subordinate to Brahman and that Brahman alone is generally ruling over all and not merely as gold in relation to gold bangle. Those who maintain the *Parināma vāda* hold that cause ends in the result, *Kāraṇamēva kāryātmanā bhavati iti*. Thereafter, the cause which is the root always exhibits itself

necessarily through the result. *Kāraṇa* is thus reduced to mere void (*riktam vachassyāt*).

In instances where the truth is unopposed, the causes leading to the truth alike are unopposed and open to no contradiction. For example, gold is not only naturally of a pure quality but also all articles made of it, of different sorts, are also of the same pure quality. And there is no reason to dispute its quality. When that is so, how can *jagat* be said to be a thing transformed out of Brahman (through *vikāra*)? Similarly Brahman cannot be said to be of the same *svabhāva* as gold illustrated above. But as the *Sruti* declares *Vignānam ānandam Brahma iti*, etc., Brahman is all-knowledge and bliss in form and cannot to any extent separate himself on account of his *sat* nature from knowledge and bliss. Else the *satsvabhāva* of Brahman would be put into opposition to the *Srutis*. It is certain that curd is an altered state from that of milk; for this is the only state into which milk can naturally and ultimately turn into. Of course sweetness is naturally one of the qualities of milk and at one time this quality is liable to destruction, at which stage it results in exhibiting itself as curd. And we cannot say that this kind of conversion is a fault. Moreover, all *āgamas* and *anumānas* assure and assert that Brahman is absolutely *nirvikāra*. If one says that creation (*srishṭi*) by Brahman is but his natural tendency, there is nothing to contradict such a statement; no one can dispute it. And in so far as *Pradhāna* is considered a mere subordinate cause, subject to Brahman's will in the matter of *srishṭi*, it is equally open to no contradiction. Accordingly the opponent's objection is discarded. The fact is Brahman has two forms; one is *anantānanda chidātmaka* form and the other *sadātmaka* form. Out of the first, all causes are stored (*apādāna*); from the second (form), all causes play upon the *upādāna kāraṇa* in bringing into manifestation *Pradhāna*. And there is absolutely no contradiction in this statement. What was said previously, *viz.*, Brahman undergoes no *vikāra*, is again reaffirmed that it is so, because of

his faultless *chitsakti* and this does not contradict the *Srutis*. The question arises whether from the *satsakti* form of Brahman comes the *nimittakāraṇa* (*apādāna kāraṇa*), thereby ending in the name of *Prakriti-Pradhāna* (*upādāna kāraṇa*). If this view is accepted, would there be any contradiction with the *Srutis*, in employing such an argument? There would be no contradiction. For Brahman being *sadātma*, the manifestation of *jagat* is his mere nature and hence there is no contradiction. His *sadātmaka* form is above all charge of *vikāra*. His manifestation of *Pradhāna* does not in any way affect him during the transformation of *Pradhāna* into *jagat*. And therefore it has been declared that Parabrahman, who is *Sarvagna*, is beyond all *vikāra*. By his mere will, the cause comes into play. If it is doubted whether *sadrūpa* consists of his *upādāna* and whether it is completely different from the *jagat*, the reply is *Bhāgēnēti*, i.e., it is by mere difference. If Brahman through his *sat* ultimately puts the *chit* into manifestation through his *nirvikāratva*, then, he is called *avyakta*. If it is asked whether the two parts, the manifested and the unmanifested, are *Bhēda* or *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*, the reply is it is not *Abhēda*, because both the parts have the will of Parabrahman in their *pariṇāma* and therefore it cannot be said to consist of *Bhēdābhēda* for *Abhēda* in this combination simply expresses no commingling. Thus *Bhēdābhēda* becomes confused and contradicted. Then, in such a state, *Abhēda* becomes a mere rhetorical expression. Therefore the two parts being absolutely different from each other, we have to accept only *Bhēda* as true. Then, what is the result? When the two parts are utterly different from each other, of which one, the Brahman, is *nirvikāra*, *jagat* becomes only a *nimitta kāraṇa*. And subject to his will, *jagat* undergoes various *vikāras* at the mere will of Parabrahman. And this proves that we have no dispute whatever. So, it is declared that Parabrahman being absolutely *nirvikāra*, *jagat* is subject only to his natural will in all his lordship (over it) and undergoes changes under



the name of *Pradhāna*. In order to remove this dispute, the *Sūtra*, *Prakritēścha pratignādrishtāntānuparōdhāt* was laid down by the *Sūtrakāra*. Else there would have been no necessity for this *Sūtra*. It has been stated above that the two parts (forms of Brahman) are absolutely different from each other. In your view, it is not granted that Brahman has two different forms. Without a thing to be divided, there can be no division. Unless there is a thing ready to be divided, there can be no division. Nor can there be *vikāra* unless there is a thing ready to undergo *vikāra*. Let this be the matter for discussion. The *Bhēdavādin* says that the *nimitta kāraṇa* of Parabrahman is purely a source of cause and nothing more in Brahman. We therefore say that the *sadānanda* form of Brahman always rules over the *chitsamudāya*. In order to prove this, the *adhikaraṇa* is begun. If so, then, what is this Brahmatva in Parabrahman? Is this Brahmatva in Brahman merely a name or is it something in him for manifesting the *jagat* in its varied form? The first view is contradicted because of its divided character. This means that where we do not agree and where we always differ, there we should not begin the *adhikaraṇa*. For the agreement merely ends in argument. Only when one is ready to stand to the literal meaning of the expressions an argument should be advanced. If it is asked whether in Parabrahman *sat*, *chit*, *ānanda*, etc., are different from each other or one in combination, the reply is "It is not the first". For, the *Sruti* text *Ēkamēvādviṭīyam* is contradicted. As regards the other view, the combination consists of both the *nirvikāra* and *vikāra* forms under the name of *upādāna kāraṇa* and other combinations. There is fault attaching to all these views. For Brahman, when it is once determined in mind and accepted, there can be no cause for disagreement. The expression *hi* proves without a doubt the declared meaning of the *upādāna kāraṇa* of Parabrahman, which is his natural characteristic in bringing *Pradhāna* into *Srishti* in its varied aspects. Else Brahman's lordship over *upādāna kāraṇa* would not have existed. Brahman's lordship

is amply shown in *Srisṣṭi* in various transformations by his mere will in which lies his *Brahmatva*. Else, it (*Brahmatva*) would not have existed in him. It cannot be said that Para-brahman's *upādāna kāraṇa* and the various manifestations of *Pradhāna* in bringing the universe into existence, cannot be said to be interdependent on each other. Hence in Brahman's chief *nimitta kāraṇatva* lies his *Brahmatva*. Hence also he is the overlord of all manifested *vikāra* forms of *jagat* under his will and control. This is no mere subtle argument but proved from an examination of all *Srutis* and *āgamas*.

#### Ramanuja's Criticism of Bhedabheda.

We have referred above to Jayatīrtha's criticism of Yādavaprakāśa's view. Not much different is the criticism of Rāmānuja from the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* standpoint. Commenting on *Sūtra* II. 1. 15, *Tadananyatva mārāmbhāṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*, he offers a strikingly strong criticism of Yādavaprakāśa's conception of *Sat*. "Others again (*Yādavaprakāśa*)," he says, "hold that the general cause, *i.e.*, Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a *pralaya* this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts, *viz.*, enjoying subjects, object of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects

of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is' constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one substance only, *viz.*, 'that which is', that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman." Demurring to the reasoning adopted, Rāmānuja says—"But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and Reasoning. For Scripture, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* alike teach that there is one supreme cause, *viz.*, Brahman—a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful, instantaneously realizing all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth';<sup>995</sup> 'Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattrā, *viz.*, those Kshattras among the Dēvas—Indra, Varuṇa, Sōma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛityu, Īśāna';<sup>996</sup> 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds';<sup>997</sup> 'There was in truth Nārāyaṇa only, not Brahma, not Īśāna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Sōma, nor Sūrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' etc.<sup>998</sup>—these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nārāyaṇa. For as the terms 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Nārāyaṇa', it follows that they all mean Nārāyaṇa. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the

<sup>995</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 3.<sup>997</sup> *Ait. Ar.*, II. 4. 1. 1, 2.<sup>996</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 11.<sup>998</sup> *Mahōpa.*, I. 1.

following text also, 'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities—he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord'.<sup>999</sup> Similarly the *Manu Smṛiti*, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma)—desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind—first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them'.<sup>1000</sup> *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇas* also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nārāyaṇa, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create and sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions.' 'From Viṣṇu the world originated and in him it abides.'

Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such 'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all 'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's connection with all his auspicious qualities—knowledge, bliss, and so on—is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts—*viz.*, 'His high power (*Śakti*) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action';<sup>1001</sup> 'He who is all-knowing, all-cognising'<sup>1002</sup>, and others—to the end of proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connection with the *potentialities* (*Śakti*) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the *Svētāśvatara* text the word 'essential' independently qualifies 'knowledge, strength and action' no less than '*Śakti*'; and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication (*lakṣhanā*). Nor again can it be said that in words such as *sarvagna* (all-knowing), the formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other words such as *pūkaka* (cook); for grammar does not teach that all these (*kṛit*) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches<sup>1003</sup> that a few *kṛit*-affixes only have this

<sup>999</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 7. 9.

<sup>1000</sup> *Mahōpa.*, I. 6—8.

<sup>1001</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 8.

<sup>1002</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9.

<sup>1003</sup> *Cf. Pāṇini*, III. 2. 54.

limited meaning; and in the case of *pākaka* and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other explanation open to us. If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a part of the *Sat*, as the whole, would be superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the Lord, *cp.* *e.g.* 'Him the highest great lord of lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior'.<sup>1004</sup> If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in, and being parts of, him. But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature. Should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable) consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their connection with substances, it would be difficult to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as 'being', there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything,

<sup>1004</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, VI. 7. 8.

and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil (*i.e.*, every one would have conscious experience of everything). This point we have explained before. For all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.

Nor is Rāmānuja satisfied with the view of Bhāskara. "Those again who (like Bhāskara)," he remarks, "hold the effect also to be real—the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential—enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of *karman* while Brahman is free from all evil, etc., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman—as being indivisible—must be undivided while entering into connection with the *upādhis*, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (*śakti*), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change: this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non-different."<sup>1005</sup>

In another place, in establishing the Great Siddhānta, Rāmānuja more directly attacks the *Bhēdābhēda* view and shows how it is, in his opinion, untenable. Commenting on I. 1. 1, he enlarges at some length on the point that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference. He says:—"The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called *Bhēdābhēda* view). Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realize here the non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? 'The such and such' denotes a peculiar

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<sup>1005</sup> See Rāmānuja's *Srī Bhāṣya*, II. 1. 15. George Thibaut's translation in the *S.B.E.*, Vol. XLVIII, *The Vedānta Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Commentary*, Part III, page 459.

make characterised, *e.g.*, by a dewlap, the 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such and such'. In general, wherever we cognize the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Some things—*e.g.*, staffs and bracelets—appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (*i.e.*, of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets), other entities—*e.g.*, the generic character of cows—have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely—admitted by every one—which is expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.' This same point is clearly expounded by the Sūtrakāra in II. 2. 33 (*Ēvañchātāmākārtsnyam*); also in II. 2. 34 (*Na cha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*).<sup>1006</sup>

Then, again, in commenting on I. 1. 1, Rāmānuja propounds how *Bhēdābhēda* involves, like *Bhēda* and *Abhēda*, the reflection of all those texts which teach that Brahman

<sup>1006</sup> *Ibid.*, 42-43.

is the universal Self. "It appears," he says, "that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda* (co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal Self. With regard to the first mentioned doctrine, we ask, 'if there is only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer?' The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance'. But we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of Brahman (*The True, Knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,—Taitt. Upa. II. 1*), and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman. But those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference! This, we reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness. The *Bhēdābhēda* view implies that owing to Brahman's connection with limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) all the imperfections resulting therefrom—and which avowedly belong to the individual soul—would manifest themselves in Brahman itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and composing within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be discarded. If, on the other hand, the theory be held in that form that *bhēdābhēda* belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not only owing to an *upādhi*), the view that Brahman by its essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with Brahman free from all imperfections. For those finally who maintain absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has no meaning whatsoever—for things absolutely different can in no way



be one—and this implies the abandonment of all Vēdānta texts together.” Rāmānuja then points out at length how his own view—that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes Brahman’s body—is in accord with all *Sruti* texts. “Those, on the other hand,” he says, “who take their stand on the doctrine proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of the Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahman. For as genus (*jāti*) and quality (*guṇa*), so substances (*dravya*) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*), in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else. . . . The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the Self ; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word ‘body’ is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as ‘whiteness’, ‘generic character of a cow’, ‘species’, ‘quality’ are used in a distinctive sense (although ‘whiteness’ is not found apart from a white thing of which it is the *prakāśa* and so on). Words such as ‘god’, ‘man’, etc., therefore, do extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connection with aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls, extend in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.” Rāmānuja adds that he has made this point clear in his earlier work, the *Vēdārtha Saṅgraha* and quotes the *Sūtra*, *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanticha* (IV. 1. 3) in support of his position remarking that it declares that “the identity of the world and Brahman consists in the relation of body and Self.”<sup>1007</sup>

Commenting on I. 1. 4 (*Tattu samanvayāt*), Rāmānuja sets out at length the view that scriptural texts have,

<sup>1007</sup> *Ibid.*, 134–138.

for their subject, Brahman which constitutes the highest aim of man. Such, he states, is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads. As against this view, he puts forward several different views, each of which he rejects. Among these is the *Bhēdābhēda* view which he elaborates in considerable detail and then rejects. It is interesting to note that he eventually rejects it on the ground that the idea of *Bhēdābhēda* is contradictory and cannot be maintained. This position is reached after a long argumentation which is worth some consideration, having regard to the force with which it is put forth and the closeness of the reasoning adopted.

“Nor can we approve,” he says, “of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non-difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light and darkness. Let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called *bhēdābhēda* view has to say. The whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time : they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on ; for these cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual ; on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects—‘this jar is clay’, ‘this cow is short-horned’. The fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction, because as fire consumes grass, so non-difference absorbs difference ; for the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, etc., at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should

belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different. But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived! On the contrary, we reply, things have two-fold aspects, just because it is *thus* that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in an object—*e.g.*, a jar or a cow—placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'This jar is clay'; 'this cow is short-horned'. Nor can it be maintained that he makes a distinction between the cause and genus and as objects of the idea of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance (difference); for, as a matter of fact, there is no perfection of these two elements, in separation. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general element in the thing, and the non-persistent, individual element.' Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect *plus* cause, and the individual *plus* generic character, also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and character. Each thing thus being cognized as endowed with a two-fold aspect, the theory of cause and effect and generic character and individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.

"But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is taken to express the relation of difference *plus* non-difference, we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I am a divine being' that the self and the body also stand in the *bhēdābhēda* relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a

man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house ! This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the *bhēdābhēda* relation. The correct principle is that all reality is determined by state of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination, however, of the identity of the self and the body *is* sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the Self. It is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the *bhēdābhēda* relation.

"For the same reasons the individual soul (*jīva*) is not absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the *bhēdābhēda* relation in so far as it is a part (*amśa*) of Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential (*svābhāvika*); its difference is due to limiting adjuncts (*auṣādhika*). This we know, in the first place, from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference—such as 'Thou art that'<sup>1008</sup>; 'There is no other seer but he'<sup>1009</sup>; 'This Self is Brahman'<sup>1010</sup>; and the passage from the *Brahmasūktā* in the *Samhitōpanishad* of the Atharvaṇas which, after having said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings'<sup>1011</sup>; 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not knowing; one strong, the other weak'<sup>1012</sup>; 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another'<sup>1013</sup>; 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the

<sup>1008</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI.

<sup>1009</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 23.

<sup>1010</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 5. 19.

<sup>1011</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, II. 5. 13.

<sup>1012</sup> *Śvāta. Upa.*, I. 9.

<sup>1013</sup> *Ibid.*, V. 12.

bondage, the existence and the release of the *Samsāra*<sup>1014</sup>; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs'<sup>1015</sup>; 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on'<sup>1016</sup>; 'He who dwelling in the Self'<sup>1017</sup>; 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within'<sup>1018</sup>; 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning'<sup>1019</sup>; 'Having known him he passes beyond death'<sup>1020</sup>. On the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be assumed to stand in the *bhēdābhēda* relation. And texts such as 'He knows Brahman'<sup>1021</sup>, which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into Brahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become all for him, whereby should he see another'<sup>1022</sup>, which forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is essential (while difference is merely *aupādhika*).

"But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is expressed in two of the *Sūtras*, viz., IV. 4. 17; and IV. 4. 21 (*Jagadvyūpāra varjam prakaraṇādasannihitatvāchcha* and *Bhōgamātrasāmya lingāchcha*). This is not so, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he'<sup>1023</sup> and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The *Taittirīya* text quoted by you means that the man reaches Brahman with all desires, i.e., Brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the *Sūtra* IV. 4. 17 meant that the released

<sup>1014</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 16.

<sup>1015</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, VI. 9.

<sup>1016</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 6.

<sup>1017</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, III. 7. 22.

<sup>1018</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 3. 21.

<sup>1019</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 3. 35.

<sup>1020</sup> *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8.

<sup>1021</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9.

<sup>1022</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 13.

<sup>1023</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 7. 23.

soul is separate from Brahman, it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the *Sūtra* would be in conflict with other *Sūtras* such as IV. 4. 1 (*Sampadyāvīrbhāvassvēna śabdāt*). For these reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts, *i.e.*, the internal organ, the sense organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible mutual dependence—Brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connection with them are due to action (*karma*), and the stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works, and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as this connection with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can be found with our theory. The non-difference of the souls from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is due to the *upādhis*. These *upādhis*, on the other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman; for there are no other *upādhis* (to account for their distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again have to assume further *upādhis*, and so on *in infinitum*. We therefore hold that the *upādhis* are produced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman.

"To this *bhēdābhēda* view the Pūrvapakshin now objects on the following grounds:—The whole aggregate of Vēdānta texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while, on the other

hand, the *karma*-section of the Vēda, and likewise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real. The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are provided by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (*bhēda*); of the two the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (*abhēda*); who in his senses then would maintain that these two—suchness and non-suchness—can be found together? You have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and that, owing to this two-fold aspect of things, non-difference and difference are not irreconcilable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of things and the non-difference in the other? or that difference and non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects? On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and the individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory. On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kinds and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing

which is their substrate, we ask in return—How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduced into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes (*viz.*, difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a *in regressus in infinitum*. Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ‘this is such and such’ it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion, the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs; the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.

“For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the *bhēdābhēda* relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience. But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections springing therefrom, such as birth, death, etc., would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as ‘He who is all-knowing’<sup>1024</sup> ‘That Self free from all evil’.<sup>1025</sup> Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view, on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the *upādhis* cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily connect themselves

<sup>1024</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 9.

<sup>1025</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VIII. 1. 5.



with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it. Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an *upādhi* constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, *viz.*, the internal organ is itself of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place that is determined by the *upādhi*, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the *upādhi*. In reply to this we ask—Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some particular part of Brahman to which, without thereby being divided of, is connected with an atomic *upādhi*; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an *upādhi*; or some other intelligent being connected with an *upādhi*, or finally the *upādhi* itself? The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two. On the second alternative it would follow that as a part of Brahman would be connected with the *upādhi*, all the imperfections due to the *upādhis* would adhere to that part. And further, if the *upādhi* would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the *upādhi* moves the part with which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the *upādhi* possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman—as not being capable of division—would be attracted and move with the *upādhi*. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and moved, well then the *upādhi* only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the *upādhis* were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should

it be said that they are not thus cognized as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the *upādhi* of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman). On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the *upādhi* enters into the condition of the individual soul, and there remains no non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only. On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the *upādhis* of Brahman. And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the *Chīrvāka* (who makes no distinction between soul and matter).<sup>1026</sup>

Rāmānuja reverts to this topic of *Bhēdābhēda* once again when he comments on II. 2. 31 (*Naikasminnasambhavāt*). As is well known, he considers under this *Sūtra* the Jaina theory of the *Saptabhaṅgi nyāya*, with whose help, he says, the Jainas prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya* and *pariyāya*) (particular states of substances)—to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are *pariyāyas*. As the particular states of substances are of the nature of Being as well as Non-Being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. “With regard to this,” he says, “the *Sūtra* (II. 2. 31) remarks that no such proof is possible, ‘Not so, on account of the impossibility in one’; *i.e.*, because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called *pariyāya*—are different things (*padārtha*), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that

<sup>1026</sup> George Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Rāmānuja*, 189-196.

a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, *i.e.*, non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal." This matter, Rāmānuja adds, he has already explained at length under I. 1. 1 (*Athātō Brahmajñgnāsā*) when refuting the *Bhēdābhēda* theory.<sup>1027</sup>

#### Sankara's Criticism of Bhedabheda.

We now turn to the criticism offered from the Advaita standpoint. We have, ere this, referred to the *Bhāmati's* comment on *Sūtras* I. 4. 20 (*Pratignāsidhērlinga-māśmarathyaḥ*) and I. 4. 21 (*Utkramishyata ēvambhāvādityauḍulōmiḥ*) and pointed out how the theories of *Bhēdābhēdavāda* and *Satyabhēdavāda* have been traced to them by its author. Sankara in commenting on these two *Sūtras* and on I. 4. 22 (*Avasthitēriti kāśakritsnaḥ*) which follows them, rejects definitely the first two views propounded in them and attaches himself to the third. "Of these three opinions," he says, "we conclude that the one held by Kāśakritsna accords with Scripture, because he agrees with what all the Vēdānta texts (so, for instance, the passage 'That art thou') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kāśakritsna, immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot

<sup>1027</sup> *Ibid.*, 516-518.

abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based on the limiting adjuncts of the soul. The reference here is to the *Bhēdābhēda* view, which is thus rejected by him. It is for this reason that Sankara interprets I. 4. 20 in the manner he does. "Āśmarathya," he says, "although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'—which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul (*i.e.*, not on the relation of absolute identity)." His disposal of the *Satyabhūda* view of Auḍulomi is equally clear. "The opinion of Auḍulomi," he says, "again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition (*i.e.*, upon the state of emancipation and its absence)." Commenting on the words "Because the soul when it will depart is such" (*Utkramishyata ēvambhūvāt*, etc.), he adds that "the statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the Great Being rises, etc.)<sup>1028</sup> is possible, because the soul when—after having purified itself by knowledge and so on—it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self." He winds up by observing that "the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selves, and to maintain

<sup>1028</sup> The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text which declares that the Great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements: "Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge."

that the individual soul is different from the highest Self and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave'<sup>1029</sup> refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul). And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, *viz.*, 'Having sent forth he entered into it,'<sup>1030</sup> according to which the Creator only entered into the created beings. Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vēdānta texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude and groundlessly assume release to be something effected and therefore non-eternal (while release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman). And (if they attempt to show that *mōksha*, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic."

In commenting on II. 1. 13 (*Bhōktrāpattēravibhāgaśchēt syāllōkavat*), Sankara answers the objection whether non-duality which has been made out by a connected interpretation of Vēdic texts can be held to be proved false by *pratyaksha*, etc., *i.e.*, by sensuous perception, empirical inference and the like which reveal a distinction between the perceiver and the things perceived. He poses the question in this telling fashion:

"Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its own grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as *mantras* and *arthavādas* have occasionally

<sup>1029</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

<sup>1030</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 6.

to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposites. Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and *vice versa*. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment."

To this objection he replies, "It may exist as an ordinary experience." He then says:—"To the preceding objection we reply, "It may exist as an ordinary experience. Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, and etc. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea water, it does not allow that they pass over into each other: and, again, although they do

not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the modified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it' <sup>1031</sup>), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause as analogous instances of the sea and its waves demonstrates."

Between the perceiver and the things perceived, there is thus really no distinction as in the case of the ocean in connection with which we perceive both duality and non-duality. In the form of waves, it is dual and as a body of water, it is non-dual. Only, he suggests, these opposites, duality and non-duality, cannot co-exist in that thing which does not altogether admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one. Therefore, he argues, when it is possible to distinguish two aspects—non-dual as Brahman, and dual as differentiated into the perceiver and the objects of perception—the Vedic doctrine cannot be disputed because it is opposed to our perception of duality. Here, it will be seen, while duality of *aspects* is conceded, the *co-existence* of opposites in a thing which does not admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one, is opposed.

Again, in commenting on the next following *Sūtras* II. 1. 14 to II. 1. 20, *Tadananyatvamōrambhāṇa śabdā-dibhyaḥ* to *Yathāchaprāṇādih*, Sankara first considers the question: Is this non-duality in duality absolutely real or only

<sup>1031</sup> *Taitt. Uṇa.*, II. 6.

apparently so? The *prima facie* view is that it is absolutely real; for it never proves false in the case of Brahman any more than in the case of the ocean. The *Siddhānta* is established that there is neither duality nor the commingling of duality with non-duality. The refutation contained in II. 1. 13, *Bhōktrāpattēravibhāgaschētsyālokaṇat*, was, says Sankara, set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction, he remarks, does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (*i.e.*, identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, *i.e.*, has no existence apart from the cause. How so? "On account of the scriptural word 'origin' and others." The word 'origin' is used in connection with a simile in a passage undertaking to show how, through the knowledge of one thing, everything is known, as in the *Chchāndōgya* text<sup>1032</sup>: "As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (*i.e.*, the effect, the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely" etc. The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names—individual effects distinguished by names—they are untrue; in so far as they are clay, they are true. This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase "having its origin in speech" to the case illustrated by the instance quoted, we understand that the entire body of effects has no

<sup>1032</sup> *Chch. Uṇa.*, VI. 1. 4.



existence apart from Brahman. Later on, again, the text, after having declared that fire, water and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, "Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true."<sup>1033</sup> Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, says Sankara, in accordance with the words "and others" of the *Sūtra*. Such texts are "In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; Thou art that;"<sup>1034</sup> "This everything, all that is Self;"<sup>1035</sup> "Brahman alone is all this;"<sup>1036</sup> "The Self is all this;"<sup>1037</sup> "There is in it no diversity."<sup>1038</sup> On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known, as the text quoted above declares. We therefore must adopt, adds Sankara, the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and water pots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature, *i.e.*, apart from the surface of the desert—so, this manifold world, with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on, has no existence apart from Brahman.

But, says Sankara, it might be objected that Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are, therefore, both true. Thus, a tree considered by itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as

<sup>1033</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 4. 1.

<sup>1034</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

<sup>1035</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 6.

<sup>1036</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 11.

<sup>1037</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 25. 2.

<sup>1038</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 25.

having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connection with the element of unity (in Brahman) while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the *Vēda*, which depend on the *Karmakāṇḍa*, may be established in connection with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay, etc., agree very well. This theory, Sankara remarks, is untenable because in the instance—quoted in the Upanishad—the phrase “as clay they are true” asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase “having its origin in speech” declares the unreality of all effects. But, it may be said, he adds, that Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications. This objection, Sankara remarks, is without force, because a number of scriptural passages by denying all modifications of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (*kūṭastha*). Such passages are, “This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman”<sup>1039</sup>; “That Self is to be described by No, no”;<sup>1040</sup> “It is neither coarse nor fine”.<sup>1041</sup> For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, “Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?” Sankara answers that the qualification “absolutely” (*kūṭastha*) predicates this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all

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<sup>1039</sup> *Bṛihad. Uṇa.*, IV. 4. 25.

<sup>1040</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 9. 26.

<sup>1041</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 8. 8.

attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.<sup>1042</sup>

It has been remarked that Sankara is much more emphatic in his rejection of the *Bhēdābhēda* in his commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, which, indeed, has been claimed in certain quarters as one continuous protest against it. In commenting on *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, V. 1. 1. (*Om pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam*, etc.), Sankara criticises the *Bhēdābhēda* view. First, he remarks that Brahman is infinite, all-pervading, like the ether, without a break, and unconditioned. So also, he says, is *this* conditioned Brahman manifesting through name and form and coming within the scope of relativity (of the universe), infinite or all-pervading indeed in its real form as the Supreme Self, not in its differentiated form circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. This differentiated Brahman, the effect, proceeds from the infinite, or Brahman as cause. Although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up its nature, infinitude, the state of the Supreme Self—it emanates as but the infinite. Taking the infinitude of the infinite, or Brahman as effect, that is, attaining perfect unity with its own nature by removing through knowledge its apparent otherness that is created by ignorance, through contact with limiting adjuncts, the elements, it remains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman alone, without interior or exterior, the homogeneous Pure Intelligence. Next, Sankara reiterates that what has been said before, *viz.*, “This (Self) was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself. Therefore it became all” (I. 4. 10) is the explanation of this *mantra*. He suggests that ‘Brahman’ in that sentence is the same as ‘That is infinite’; and ‘This is infinite’ means ‘This (universe) was indeed Brahman in the beginning’ and he quotes another *Sruti* text in support, “Whatever is here is there and whatever is there is here.”<sup>1043</sup> He adds that Brahman, which is the theme of all the Upanishads, is

<sup>1042</sup> See George Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Sankarāchārya*, Part I, Sūtras II. 14-24, pp. 320-347.

<sup>1043</sup> *Katha. Upa.*, IV. 10.

described in this *mantra* to introduce what follows; for certain aids, to be mentioned immediately thereafter, *viz.*, *Om*, self-restraint, charity and compassion, have to be enjoined as steps to the knowledge of Brahman—aids, that, occurring in this supplementary portion, form part of all meditations. It is at this point, he takes up the other point of view represented by the *Bhēdābhēda* and criticises it. First, he enunciates the position thus :

“ Some<sup>1044</sup> explain the *mantra* thus : From the infinite cause the infinite effect is manifested. The manifested effect is also infinite or real at the present moment, even in its *dvaita* form. Again, at the moment of dissolution, taking the infinitude of the infinite effect into itself, the infinite, causal form alone remains. Thus in all the three stages of origin, continuance and dissolution, the cause and the effect are infinite. It is just one infinity spoken of as divided into cause and effect. Thus the same Brahman is both *dvaita* and *advaita* (*Dvaitādvaitātmacakamēkam Brahma*). For instance, an ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles, etc. As the water is real, so also are its effects, the waves, foam, bubbles, etc.—which appear and disappear, but are a part and parcel of the ocean itself—real in the true sense of the word. Similarly the entire *dvaita* universe, corresponding to the waves, etc., on the water, is absolutely real, while the Parabrahman stands for the ocean water. If the universe is thus real, the *karmakāṇḍa* portion of the *Vēdas* is also valid. If, however, the *dvaita* world is but apparently so—if it be a creation of *Avidya*, false like a mirage and is in reality the one without a second, then *karmakāṇḍa* portion, having nothing to work upon, becomes invalid. This would only mean a conflict, for one portion of the *Vēdas*, *viz.*, the *Upanishads*, would be valid, since they deal with the Reality, the one without a second, but the *karmakāṇḍa* would be invalid, since it deals with *dvaita*, which is unreal. To avoid this conflict,

<sup>1044</sup> The reference here is said to be to the view taken by the *Bhartriprapancha*.

the *Sruti* speaks of the reality of both cause and effect, like that of the ocean, in the *mantra*, 'That is infinite,' etc.

"All this is wrong, for neither an exception nor an option—which are applicable to specified objects—is possible with Brahman. It is not a well-considered view. Why? Because an exception can be made with regard to some part of an action, where the general rule would otherwise apply. For example, in the dictum, 'Killing no animal except in sacrifices',<sup>1045</sup> the killing of animals prohibited by the general rule, is allowed in a special case, *viz.*, a sacrifice such as the *Jyōtishtōma*. But that will not apply to Brahman, the Reality. You cannot establish Brahman, the one without a second, by the general rule, and then make an exception in one part of it; for it cannot have any part, simply because it is the one without a second. Similarly, an option also is inadmissible. For example, in the injunctions, 'One should use the vessel *Shōḍaśi* in the *Atirātra* sacrifice', and 'One should not use the vessel *Shōḍaśi* in the *Atirātra* sacrifice,' an option is possible, as using or not using the vessel depends on a person's choice. But with regard to Brahman, the Reality, there cannot be any option about its being either *dvaita* or *advaita*, for the Self is not a matter depending on a person's choice. Besides there is a contradiction involved in the same thing being both one and many. Therefore this is not, as we said, a well-considered view.

"Moreover, it contradicts the *Sruti* as well as reason. For instance, *Sruti* passages that describe Brahman as Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a lump of salt, without a break, devoid of such differences as prior or posterior, interior or exterior, including the external and internal, birthless, 'Not this, not this,' neither gross nor minute, not short, undecaying, fearless and immortal—passages that are definite in their import and leave no room for doubt or mistake—would all be thrown overboard as mere trash. Similarly, it would clash with reason, for a thing that has parts, is made up of many things and has

<sup>1045</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VIII. 15. 1.

activity, cannot be eternal ; whereas the eternity of the Self is inferred from remembrance, etc.—which will be contradicted if the Self be transitory. Your own assumption too will be useless, for if the Self be transitory, the *karmakāṇḍa* portion of the *Vēdas* will clearly be useless, since it will mean that a man will be getting the reward for something he has not done, and be deprived of the reward for what he has actually done.”

Meeting here the possible objection that there are the illustrations of the ocean, etc., to show the *dvaitūdvaita* of Brahman, and that, therefore, one cannot say that the same thing cannot be both one and many, Sankara replies : Not so, for they refer to something quite different. We have said that *dvaita* and *advaita* are contradictory only when applied to the Self, which is eternal and without parts, but not to effects, which have parts. Therefore your view is untenable as it contradicts the *Sruti*, the *Smṛiti* and reason. Rather than accept this, it is better to abandon the *Upanishads*. Besides, your view is not in accordance with the Scriptures, for such a Brahman is not fit for meditation. A Brahman that is teeming with differences, comprising thousands of evils in the shape of births, deaths, etc., has parts like an ocean, a forest and so forth, and is heterogeneous, has never been presented by the *Srutis* either as an object of meditation or as a truth to be realized. Rather they teach its being Pure Intelligence ; also, ‘It should be realized in one form only’ (IV. 4. 20). There is also the censure on seeing it as multiple : ‘He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in it’ (IV. 4. 19 ; *Ka.* IV. 10). What is deprecated by the *Srutis* is not to be practised ; and that which is not practised (as being forbidden) cannot be the import of the Scriptures. Since the multiple aspect of Brahman, in which it is regarded as heterogeneous and manifold, is condemned, it is not to be sought after with a view to realization ; hence it cannot be the import of the Scriptures. But the homogeneity of Brahman is what is to

be sought after, and is therefore good, and for that reason it ought to be the import of the Scriptures.

“You said that one part of the *Vēdas* would be invalid in the sphere of *Karmakāṇḍa* because of the absence of the *dvaita* world, while another part would be valid in the realm of *advaita*. This is wrong, for the Scriptures seek to instruct merely according to existing circumstances. They do not teach a man, as soon as he is born, either the *dvaita* or the *advaita* of existence, and then instruct him about rites or the knowledge of Brahman. Nor is *dvaita* required to be taught; it is understood by everyone as soon as he is born; and nobody thinks from the very outset that *dvaita* is false, in which case the Scriptures would first have to teach the reality of the *dvaita* world and then establish their own validity. (The unreality of the universe is no bar to the validity of the Scriptures), for even the disciples of those who deny the *Vēdas* (and do not believe in the objective universe)<sup>1046</sup> would not hesitate to accept the authority of their Scriptures when they are directed (to do something helpful in accordance with them) by their teachers. Therefore the Scriptures, taking the *dvaita* world as it is—created by *Avidya* and natural to everybody—first advise the performance of rites calculated to achieve the desired ends, to those who are possessed of that natural ignorance and defects such as attachment and aversion, afterwards, when they see the well-known evils of actions, their factors and their results, and wish to attain their real state of aloofness, which is the opposite of *dvaita*, the Scriptures teach them, as a means to it, the knowledge of Brahman, consisting in the realization of the *advaita* of the Self. So when they have attained that result—their real state of aloofness, their interest in the validity of the Scriptures ceases. And in the absence of that, the Scriptures too just cease to be Scriptures to them. Hence the Scriptures having similarly fulfilled their mission with regard to every person, there is not the least chance of a conflict

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<sup>1046</sup> The reference here is said to be to certain Schools of Buddhism.

with them ; for such *dvaita* differences as Scripture, disciple and discipline terminate with the knowledge of *advaita*. If any of these survived the others, there might be a conflict with regard to it. But since Scripture, disciple and discipline are interdependent, not one of them survives the rest ; and when all *dvaita* is over, and only *advaita*, the one without a second, the Good, alone stands, with whom is conflict apprehended ? Hence also there is no non-contradiction either.

“ Even taking your position for granted, we have to say that it is useless, for even if Brahman be both one and many, there will be the same conflict with the Scriptures. That is to say, supposing we admit that the same Brahman has both forms of *dvaitādvaita* like the ocean, etc., and that there is no other thing, even then we cannot escape the charge of a conflict with the Scriptures that you have levelled against us. <sup>e</sup> How ? For one and the Parabrahman has both forms of *dvaita* and *advaita* and plurality ; being beyond grief, delusion, etc., it would not seek instruction ; nor would the teacher be different from Brahman, for you have admitted the same Brahman to be both one and many. If you say, since the *dvaita* world is manifold, one can teach another, and it will not be instruction imparted to or by Brahman, we reply that you contradict your own statement that Brahman in its two-fold aspect of *dvaita* and *advaita* is one and the same, and that there is nothing else. Since that world of *dvaita* in which one teaches another is one thing, and *advaita* is of course another thing, your example of the ocean is inappropriate. Nor can we presume that Brahman, if it is one consciousness, as the ocean is one mass of water, will either receive instruction from, or instruct, anyone else. If Dēvadatta is both *dvaita* and *advaita* consisting of the hands, etc., it is absurd to think that between his tongue and ear—both parts of him—the tongue will instruct and the ear only receives the instruction, while Dēvadatta himself will neither instruct nor receive any instruction, for he has only one consciousness, as the ocean is made up of the same volume



of water. Therefore such an assumption will clash with the *Sruti* and reason, and frustrate your own object. Hence our interpretation of the *mantra*, 'That is infinite,' etc., is the correct one."<sup>1047</sup>

Sripati's View of Bhedabheda.

We may now turn to Sripati to see how he interprets the self-same *Sūtras* which Rāmānuja and others have interpreted as suggesting the rejection by the *Sūtrakāra* of both the *Saptabhangi* and *Bhēdābhēda* doctrines. Sripati includes under *Ēkasmīnnasambhavādhikaraṇam* the following five *Sūtras*: *Naikasmīnnasambhavāt*; *Ēvanchātmākartsnyam*; *Sarīrāṇām chānavasthita parimāṇatvāt*; *Nachaparyāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*; *Antyavasthitēśchōbhayanityatvādaviśēṣaḥ*. Sankara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Srikāṇṭha, Ānandatīrtha, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Vignānabhikshu do not mention the *Sūtra*, *Sarīrāṇām chānavasthita parimāṇatvāt*. For what purpose did Sripati include this particular *Sūtra* in this *Adhikaraṇa*?<sup>1048</sup> In *Naikasmīnnasambhavāt*, Sripati rejects the simultaneous existence and non-existence as enunciated in the *Saptabhanginyāya*. Since he says the changes are evidenced in a really existing thing (*vastu*) which is subject to *vikāra* or change of form at different times, the different forms are seen to be admitted but not their simultaneous existence and non-existence. The *Sūtra* disproves, according

<sup>1047</sup> See *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, V. 1. Swāmi Mādhavānanda's Edition, pp. 801-813.

<sup>1048</sup> It may be useful to state that the introduction of a new *Sūtra* like this by Sripati which does not appear in the texts of other Bhāṣhyakāras is not peculiar to him. The *Sūtra* entitled *Pratignā virōdhāt* (I. 1. 9) is peculiar to Rāmānuja and Sripati while *Ata ēva cha sa Brahma* (I. 2. 16) appears only in Rāmānuja and not in Sankara, Ānandatīrtha and Sripati. Again, the *Sūtra* entitled *Dṛiṣyatēcha* (II. 1. 7) is peculiar to Ānandatīrtha, being omitted by Sankara, Rāmānuja and Sripati. The same remark applies to the *Sūtras* entitled *Pratignānuparōdhāchcha* (II. 4. 3). Similarly *Yuktēścha* (II. 3. 19), *Yathētamanēvam cha* (III. 1. 9) appear only in Ānandatīrtha. The *Sūtra* entitled *Pravrutteścha* (II. 2. 2) appears only in Ānandatīrtha and Sankara and not in Rāmānuja and Sripati.

to Sripati, the Jaina doctrine only but not the real existence of matter and its different forms of existence at different times. Matter (*dravya*) has two inevitable states of existence: its original and its altered conditions; for it is always subject to change. We have, therefore, to accept the existence of two states of matter, genesis (*utpatti*); destruction (*vināśa*); its altered condition (*pariṇāma* *viśeṣa*) and its eternality (*nityatva*). In the altered condition, matter is seen with its opposing characteristics. This is called *bhinnatva*. Its original condition (*viparītam cha*) is what is called *abhinnatva*. If it is asked how are these opposite states to be intimately united (*samavaiti*), the reply is that if at different times we admit and agree to the existence of *bhēda* and *abhēda* (*kālabhēdēna bhēdābhēdāṅgīkārē*), then only such intimate union may occur, but not just as a horse (*aśva*) and buffalo (*mahiṣa*) being intimately united in one and the same animal at the same time, which is impossible. It is also observed in this world generally that things are classed differently. If it is asked, again, how Śivātmaka Parabrahman, who is one and all-pervading, is observed in the *chētana* and *achētana* worlds, which are of different characters, and still he pervades through these two in his all-knowing (*Sarvagnatva*) character, the reply is that with Parabrahman's omnipotence, he is capable of exhibiting that he is all-one; he is *kshētra* and *kshētragna* also. *Kshētra* and *kshētragna* are naturally of the same undivided character (*abhinnatvōpi*). Naturally meditation on Śiva Parabrahman is the character (*svabhāva*) of *jīva* in trying to liberate himself from bondage and realize the eternal blissful all-glorious Parabrahman. Ultimately the *Kūṭa* assumes the form of *Bhramara* through meditation (*dhyāna*) and *dhāraṇa*, such realization being the gist of all *Vēdānta*. But the doctrine of the Jaina School which attains the simultaneous appearance of matter in the changed condition and the unchanged condition involves really a serious contradiction and cannot be accepted. One thing, however, is a fact and that is that matter

allows of its existence in different states at different times. But the Kshapaṇakas argue otherwise. Hence this *Sūtra* rejects their argument.

Propounding the next *Sūtra*, *Ēvanchātmākārtsnyam*, Śrīpati says: "*In this way follows the non-universality of the Ātma.*" Commenting on the *Sūtra*, he says that the non-universality of the *Ātma* is to be agreed. This amounts to saying that the *Jīva* is to exist in a particular locality (*pradēśa*). Then, it has to exhibit itself in bodies of *Sthūla* and *Sūkshma* forms just like ants, etc. (*pipīlikādi*). *Jīva*, then, has both tiny little forms of existence and heavy body forms like elephants, etc. For it is stated that when the *jīva* realizes *Mōksha*, the *sūkshma* form prevails and he attains to *Paralōka*. The next *Sūtra* establishes these states of existence. *Sarīrāṇām chānavasthitaparimāṇatvāt*. It is stated in the Śāstras that flies (*maśaka*) on account of their good deeds in one birth, are born as big elephants (*gaja*) in their next birth. It cannot then be said that the tiny little form of a fly could not be born with the huge body of an elephant. And conversely, a huge-bodied elephant as the result of its sinful deeds is said to assume the form of a fly in its next birth. And this cannot either be denied. So that, if these two conditions are accepted, the *jīva* is subject to these altered states of existence in these two forms. If this is objected to, the next *Sūtra* affirms their different states of existence: *Na cha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyaḥ*. This *Sūtra* clearly proves these two states of existence, the contracted and expanded (*sankōcha* and *vikāsa*) forms and their existence cannot be objected to as contradictory, for we generally see the separate existence of the *jīva* in the forms of elephant, horse, son, daughter and fly (*gaja*, *turaga*, *putra*, *putrikā* and *maśaka*). That the *jīva* enters into these forms can neither be denied nor contradicted. And it is also seen that *jīvas* exist with bodily forms (*sāvayava*) not in the forms of *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, both of which are subject to destruction in their assumed forms. If this opinion is contradicted, the next *Sūtra* proves

such a state as existent ultimately as a constant factor : *Antyāvasthitaśchōbhaya nityatvādaviśeṣaḥ*. Of course, the *jīva* will, in its final existence, realize the *Mōksha* state by *parināma* and then assume a separate form of existence. These two forms of existence are inevitable until both attain their finality. None who are wise will refuse acceptance to this view and if any one denies it, he rejects the truth of the *Srutis*.

Thus it will be seen that Sṛīpati tries to exculpate his position of *bhēdābhēda* from that of the Jaina system to which Rāmānuja so plainly wants to graft it. His direct answer is that time is a factor which is lost sight of by the Jaina theorists while he allows scope for it. That matter is liable to change and that matter has two inevitable states of existences, he does not deny ; but that matter can exist and non-exist simultaneously in the same form he stoutly denies. The *Sūtrā* he additionally cites—*Sarīrāṇām chānavasthitaparimāṇatvat*—gives him the foundation for his theory that the two states of existence of a *vastu*—that *vastu* is subject to *vikāra* and that *vastu* has its unaltered original form—cannot be denied. From this position, he lays down the two forms of Brahman—*mūrta* and *amūrta*. The Śāstra lays down both (*ubhayatvāt*) *bhēda* and *abhēda* and if you reject the one you reject the other and thus deny the *Vēda*. As the *Sūtrakāra* lays down both *bhēda* and *abhēda*, *bhēda* and *abhēda* have to be accepted. The *Sūtrakāra* says, *ubhayanityatvāt*, both are eternal, i.e., *chētanāchētanātmaka mūrtāmūrta* forms are both eternal.

In arguing for *Bhēdābhēda*, Sṛīpati seeks invariably the help of *nyāyas*, like *naḍīsamudravat*, *chchāyūtapavat*, *tamaḥ prakāśavat*, *bhramarakūṭavat*, etc. These comparisons involve things which indicate neither inseparables nor separables. They are always fused and dual in their character. Of course, they are absolutely different in their individual existence. In order to prove that these two always co-exist, he relies on the *Sūtra* IV. 4. 4, *A vibhāgēna drishyatvāt*. In commenting on this *Sūtra*,

he quotes the first of these *nyāyas*, viz., *nadīsamudravat* and says that the *mukta-jīva* stands in relation to Paraśiva-brahman as the *nadī* does to the *samudra* in the divided and undivided form (*bhinnābhinnatvēna naiva tiṣṭhati*). Even if they were different like *tila* and *tanḍula*, they cannot always be different and be apart from each other, i.e., in the *bhinna* state—the river has to inevitably join the sea, i.e., stand in a commingled condition and apparently look as one. In order to support this fact—that they stand in this condition—he quotes the *Sruti* texts *Yadāpaśyaḥ paśyatē rugmavarṇam kartāramāśam puruṣam Brahma-yōnim! Tadā vidvān puṇyapāpē vidhūya niraṇjanam paramam sāmīyamupaiti* || and *So'snutē sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaśchitā | iti*. These texts declare, he says, that a *mukta-jīva*, though similar in form, stands in association with Brahman. And this state, Śrīpati considers, for the *mukta-jīva* as appearing undivided from Brahman (*Brahmābhinnatvēna dṛiṣṭatvāt*). The *jīva* has undergone the change from the state of bondage and enjoys the *mukta* state. In this state, we cannot accept that the Brahman and *jīva* as different from each other (*Baddhāvasthāvanmuktāvasthāyām jīvabrahmaṇōrbhēdō nāngīkaraṇīyah*). (Because the *Sruti* texts quoted above contradict such a statement.) This state of attaining the likeness of Śiva (*paraśivasāmīyatva*) is the highest form that the *jīva* could realize through the *dhāra*, etc., *upāsanas* which aim at the attaining of this exulting, effulgent and permanent joyful state, i.e., state in which enjoyment of the form of Paraśiva Brahman (*Lingāmubhavadāśāviśēṣamīti*) is made possible. If it is asked how are the differing opinions of the *pūrvāchāryas* to be harmonised with this view, we have to state that they have taken an one-sided view of the *Sruti* text. Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa has answered these different opinions in his answers to Jaimini, Auḍulōmi, etc., (IV. 4. 5 and 6). In IV. 4. 12, *Dvādaśāhavat ubhayavidham*, Bādarāyaṇa reiterates this view. Similarly, in IV. 4. 13 *Sandhyāvadupapattīḥ*, Śrīpati urges that, according to the *nyāya* *Ubhayavidhabalāt ubhayasiddhiḥ*, the two forms of

Parabrahman (*mūrta* and *amūrta*) sum up the gist of the whole of the Vēdānta. And therefore it is only by postulating *bhēdābhēda* that you can harmonise all *Sruti* texts (*Sarvaśrutisamanvayāya*). And in this opinion he says Bādarāyaṇa agrees.

Differences between Sankara, Ramanuja, Srikantha,  
Anandatirtha and Sripati.

Enough has been said to show that though Srīpati calls his system *Bhēdābhēda*, his conception of *abhēda* is exceedingly thin. He almost entirely dissents from Sankara's views and rejects the fundamental factors of the *Advaita* system. Like Rāmānuja, he upholds *Dvaita*. His *abhēda* or *advaita* would seem to mean merely *nitya-sānūpya*, *sārūpya* and *bhōgamūtra*, which makes equality (*amatva*) infinitely small as between Īśvara and *jīva*. Both are *nitya*; but there the sense of equality ceases. While Īśa is *Pūrṇa*, the *jīva* is *Apūrṇa*; while Īśa is *Prabhu* or *Śakta* (He is called *Mukhya* by Srīpati) the *jīva* is *Aśakta*; and finally while Īśa is *Sarvasvatantra*, the *jīva* is *Sarvādhīmatantra*. The characteristics mentioned indicate clearly *sārūpyabhukti*, to which is limited *Śivasāmarasya*. Equality (or identity) is only in form and does not, according to him, transcend that limit. Elsewhere also, Srīpati speaks of the *sārūpya* form of Brahman and not of the *sāyujya* (*svasvarūpatayā param brahma*) and describes *mukti* in these words: *niratiśaya-svarūpānanda sākshi svaprakāśa śivarūpa parūhambhāvū-pattiḥ muktiḥ*. Though he upholds *Dvaita*, Srīpati does so only upto a point. Madhva's system has been described as the *Pancha bhēda mata*, which includes *five* kinds of difference: (1) Every *jīva* differs from every other *jīva*; (2) Every *jīva* differs from Brahman; (3) Every *jaḍa* differs from every other *jaḍa*; (4) Every *jaḍa* differs from Brahman; (5) Every *jaḍa* differs from every *jīva* (cf. *Jīvēśayōrbhidā chaiva jīvabhēdaḥ parasparam | Jaḍēśayōrjaḍānām cha jaḍajīvabhīdā tathā || Panchabhēdā imē nityāḥ sarvāvasthāsu chōchyatē*). Srīpati holds that the *jīva* differs from Brahman in the *samsāra* stage of existence

(*jīva*brahmaṇōḥ samsāradaśāyām svābhāvika bhinnatvam ; mōkshadaśāyām tadavadabhinnatvam ; *Brahmaṇō mūrtāmūrtatvam*, etc., IV. 4. 22). The difference between Śrīpati, Sankara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkanṭha and Ānandatīrtha will have been clear from what has been thus far said. Śrīpati rejects Sankara's *jaganmithyātva* and the Māya theory. He does not agree with Rāmānuja's theory that the *jagat*, which consists of *chētana* and *achētana* beings, is the body of Īśvara. He does not agree with Ānandatīrtha in regard to absolute *bhinnatva*, both before and after *mōksha*, though he accepts other parts of Ānandatīrtha's system, such as that Īśvara, *Jīva* and *Prakṛiti* are *anādi* (without beginning). With Śrīkanṭha, he upholds the position that Śiva is the supreme deity but he does not follow Śrīkanṭha in the *viśiṣṭādvaita* turn he gives to his system. On the other hand, he assigns the *kartrutva* of the *chētana* and *achētana* beings to Brahman. In other words, he holds the *chētana* and *achētana prapancha* as different from and dependent upon Brahman. (II. 3. 1. *Na viyad āsrutēḥ*, where he says *Svapakṣha vikṣēpādidoṣhagandhābhāva kṣhāpanāya Brahma kāryatvēnābhimata chētanāchētana prapancha kārya prakārō viśhōdyatē*). He does not agree with Sankara and Rāmānuja when they suggest that certain Śāstras should be treated as *Pūrvapakṣha* and certain others as *Siddhānta* (e.g., see II. 3. 1 which both Sankara and Rāmānuja treat as a *Pūrvapakṣha Sūtra* while Śrīpati treats it definitely as a *Siddhānta Sūtra*), very much like Ānandatīrtha, as a comparison of the comments of both Ānandatīrtha and Śrīpati on this *Sūtra* will show. Similarly, as regards the *Sūtra* II. 3. 20 (*Nāṇuvatachchrutēriti chēnnētarādhihikārāt*) which Sankara holds as a *Pūrvapakṣha Sūtra*, Rāmānuja treats as a *Siddhānta Sūtra*. Śrīpati, however, makes it part of his argument for establishing the truth of the *Adhikaraṇa*, *Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam*, which according to him is intended to reject the *Advaita* doctrine that the *jīva* and *Brahman* are one. But Śrīpati would seem to treat each *Adhikaraṇa* by itself and that in such a manner that it is made to strengthen the position he desires to set forth in it. The

middle position he occupies will thus be seen to be one for which he has had to work with great circumspection and care.

The stress he lays upon the supremacy of Śiva and his identification of Śiva with Parabrahman is in keeping with his position as an exponent of the Vīraśaiva position. Partly religious learnings and partly the position of importance occupied by Vīraśaivas during his period account for this standpoint. As before remarked, following Basava, in the 12th century A.D., Vīraśaivism attained its summit of regal support and popular favour about the beginning of the 15th century A.D. The reign of Dēva Rāja II (1423—1446) of the Vijayanagar dynasty was marked by the production of some of the most well-known works on Vīraśaivism. Among the writers of the period were Mahālinga Dēva, the author of *Ēkōttara Shaṭsthaḷa* and the *Shaṭsthaḷa Vivēka*; Lakkaṇṇa Daṇḍēśa who wrote the *Śiva-tattva-chintāmaṇi*; Kumāra Bankanātha, the author of *Shaṭsthaḷōpadēśa*; Chāmarasa, who wrote the *Prabhulinga-līle*; and Kallumaṭha Prabhudēva, the author of *Linga-līlā Vilāsa*. An age that was responsible for works of this kind could not have gone dry in the philosophical field. Srīpati, who wrote about this period, reinterpreted the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* in a manner that while it retained as much of the *Bhēda* doctrine as might be deemed essential for the elucidation of Vīraśaivism on the philosophical side, endeavoured to keep to the *Abhēda* doctrine in so far as it was required to make it square with the *Saḡuṇa* Brahman which is postulated by the theory. *Bhēdābhēda*, as presented by Srīpati, endeavours to combine realism with idealism and presents a position which is, in the main, in keeping with the fundamental articles of faith of Vīraśaivism. Hence it is that Srīpati calls this theory *Bhēdābhēdātmaḡa Viśēśhādvaita*, that is, it is a theory which embodies the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* doctrines with belief in a *qualified* Brahman and *Advaita* in the *Mōksha daśā*. How is this *mōksha* to be attained? This has been elaborated above, but it might



be useful to sum up Śrīpati's position in a few words. By adherence to the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* and the practice of *Ṣaṭsthala*, *Śivatva* is attained on the analogy of the *Bhramarakūṭanyāya*. By *upāsana*, *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa* and *gnāna*, the earthly sheath is cast off and *Śivatva* is attained. *Ṣaṭsthala* is the connecting link between the *jīva* and the Brahman. The *jīva* attains Brahmatva by *gnāna*. *Gnāna* is obtained by *drashtavya* (closely examining the truth); *śrōtavya* (learning the *Smritis* by the guru's *upadēśa*); *mantavya* (meditation); and *nidhidhyāsita* (concentration). If concentration is thus acquired, the result is the *jīva* attains to *Śivatva*. Without knowledge of *Ṣaṭsthala*, such attainment is impossible. For *gnāna*, initiation into it is essential. *Ṣaṭsthala* accordingly marks the six stages which signify the acquisition of the *gnāna* which leads on to *sāmarasya*, or equality with Brahman. These six stages are termed *bhakti*, *māhēśa*, *prasāda*, *prāṇalinga*, *śaraṇa* and *aikya*. What *aikya* means and what *sāmarasya* means, Śrīpati has set down in no unintelligible terms, as will be seen from what has been said above. *Lingāṅga-sāmarasya* would, according to him, mean that the individual *jīva* (*anga*) has attained the form of the subtle frame or body, the indestructible original of the gross or visible body (the *linga*). That is the form described by Śrīpati in the words *Svasvarūpatayā param brahma*. And we should note that, in keeping with the spirit of Vīraśaivism, it is laid down by Śrīpati that even after *mōksha*, i.e., even after *sāmarasya* is attained, the *upāsana* would still continue for the *jīva*, i.e., even in the *mukti* stage. *Mukhyatva*, according to him, would remain in Parabrahma Śiva and thus he would remain supreme even in *Mukti* and the *Mukta*, though in Śiva's form, would be offering worship to him.

The organic view of *Bhēdābhēda* which Śrīpati represents and which for him has come to mean the basis of knowledge, ethics and even, in a sense, Reality, is due mainly to his close reading of the Upanishadic texts and of the necessity he seems to have felt of harmonising them

in a manner at once simple and intelligible. To him it is a philosophy for it has helped a rational interpretation of Reality as a whole. To him the world is actually before and within us—just as it seems to be. To him, it is the negation of philosophy to try to regard it as if somehow it was put there by our minds or were built up through an instrument uncritically called knowledge. That there is an objective world in which we ourselves have our places as objects is a basic fact of experience. Such experience is ours at a certain standpoint and level which might have been different. But for us it is our necessary point of departure: it is our “that”. To seek for the genesis of knowledge in which it appears is to misconceive the problem. For such a genesis must be itself a fact within a knowledge which is its own entire knowledge. We come thus to a view of the objective world and ourselves in it as a reality of which we are distinctly conscious in an experience which includes and is inseparable from feelings and sensations as falling within it. The world is something more than the particular minds which compose it. The minds are objects of experience in and along with it. They are thus finite (*Viśēshātma*) but because they are fashions in which knowledge presents itself through them, they are always more than they take themselves to be. Their foundation is broader than they are, and that is why the penetrative power of thought knows no limit that it does not itself create, and is incapable of superseding. But it is conditioned by its state in nature, its point of departure. Sripati suggests that knowledge should be interpreted as a whole. Difficulties will then disappear, if not they will appear insuperable. What objective idealism should effectively aim at is: No barrier must be set to knowledge or its interpretation. Daily experience may present it at levels which we can recognize and with a demarcation of subject from object. But these are on the face of the partial aspects and distinctions within a fuller and more complete entirety which is our objective in a sustained effort to know. It is in the ideal of that entirety of

knowledge that we find what enables us to look beyond partial aspects that are merely fragmentary, and having reached the conception of the entirety inductively as implied from the beginning, later on to interpret by means of it deductively from above. Thus, according to him, philosophy is an attempt at a rational interpretation of Reality as a whole.

It may be urged that Śrīpati is unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion. But the answer should be that if the perfectly real can alone be perfectly known, and if to know Brahman, the perfectly real Being, is eternal life, the goal of philosophy is the same as the goal of religion—perfect knowledge of the Perfect. Nor can a man's philosophy be completely separated from his religion. Śrīpati shows us the way to bridge the dilemma of idealism and realism, a dilemma which still confronted the philosophical controversies of his time. In declaring all realism to be ideality, idealism does not, according to him, imply that objectivity is a subjective illusion, or that the framework and content of the universe is such stuff as dreams are made of; on the contrary, it affirms, in his view, that the real is the ideal because only the ideal is concrete, and every attempt to set up the object as reality in complete independence of the subject of experience and of the conditions of experience in vain. Success could only be, as has been well put, the hypostatization of an abstraction. Abstractions are not unreal in the absolute sense, but it is in their claim to independent reality that the antinomies of ordinary thought arise. Śrīpati thus makes the great historical development of philosophical speculation known as the *Bhēdābhēda*, which, as we have seen, has its roots deep-drawn in the *Sūtras* themselves. In him we recognize the wonderful philosophical abilities of the mediæval Indian theologian combined to the abilities of a philosopher who tries to harmonise Realism with Idealism. He endeavours to exhibit truth and reality, as he sees them, in the light of the criterion which is the positive non-contradictory whole. His philosophy must have taken its form and colour from

what he must have most deeply made his own in life; or rather what he most deeply made his own in life was selectively determined by the same leanings and impulses which his philosophy has expressed in no uncertain fashion. The position which *Bhēda* in his conception holds is of interest in determining the range that *Abhēda* holds in it. *Abhēda*, as we have seen, is criticized at great length by him, its various constituent parts being attacked by him in no uncertain voice. But the basic principle of *Abhēda*—the oneness, the unity of the whole universe, the maker and the made—is never lost sight of by him. Like Plato, he not only confirms the dualism of “this” world and “the other”, but also passionately strives to demonstrate the unity of things, the unity of the universe. He demonstrates that “the other world” is not in its nature remote but is here and now for you, if you could but see it and live it. With higher experiences, he suggests an end of dualism in principle though fragments of dualistic formulæ might float in the ocean of his thought undissolved for the moment. The law of value—that which is filled with the more real and is more really filled—and the vital stability of experience led to this result. His philosophy was thus, like Plato’s again, philosophy as it takes up in its embrace both the ideal and the real, at once the sensible and the super-sensible world.

#### Western Thought and Bhedabheda.

This brings us to Western philosophers, whose views may be considered briefly in order to see if they have propounded or held doctrines analogous to *Bhēdābhēda*. Mediæval philosophy was based on that of Aristotle, who propagated the doctrines of Plato. Indeed, Aristotle has been reckoned the oracle of the scholastic philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages. The very incarnation of the philosophic spirit, Aristotle, by the vast field of speculation he covered by his many writings, has influenced besides the progress of modern thought and clear science

which establish the value of his works. Scholastic philosophy made, with the aid of Aristotle, an attempt at reconciliation between dogma and thought, between faith and reason, an attempt to form really a scientific system on that basis founded on the pre-supposition that the creed of the Christian Church was absolutely true and capable of rationalization. This held the ground in Europe during the period beginning with the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D. and closing with the invention of printing, the discovery of America and the revival of learning in Europe in the fifteenth century. It is in the period succeeding the Middle Ages that we get the first attempts at bold speculations relating to Man, Nature and God. The direct cause of this was the Revival of Learning that marked the Renaissance (15th and 16th centuries A.D.). The capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks drove learned Greeks into Italy. Their arrival quickened the growth of study of Classical, especially Greek, literature. This, in its turn, aided, by the invention of printing, the gradual extinction of the dry, barren scholasticism so far in vogue in Europe. The new learning, based on the study of ancient models in the literature and art of Greece and Rome, awakened in the cultured classes the free and broad humanity which inspired them. The Renaissance thus marks an epoch—the transition from the rigid formality of mediaeval to the enlightened freedom of modern times. First among the products of the Renaissance was the Italian Giordano Bruno, the bold and fervid original thinker, who was burned as a heretic in 1600 A.D., after seven years spent in prison, at the hands of the Inquisition. Bruno, though currently described by European writers as a pantheist, was really a qualified monist. He regarded God as the living omnipresent soul of the universe, and Nature as the living garment of God—as the Earth-Spirit does in Goethe's *Faust*—a definition of Nature which finds favour in the pages of *Sartor Resartus* and sounds as a mere echo of Rāmānuja's conception of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. In illustration

of Rāmānuja's view, one single passage taken from his commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtra* II. 1. 15, *Tad-ananyatvam ārambhāṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* will prove instructive. After quoting numerous *Śruti* texts and remarking that these intimate that non-difference only is real, he says:—"It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with *ārambhāṇa*, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, *i.e.*, the highest Brahman. Brahman only having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (*prakāras*) is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state, when—just owing to that subtle state—they are incapable of being (conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form. Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then is in its "effected" state. The effect, *i.e.*, the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, *i.e.*, the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts we have shown above."<sup>1049</sup>

Bruno, who was open to Neo-Platonic influences, admits only one first principle, cause, or substance in the universe. Much like Rāmānuja—and other Visishtādvaitic philosophers of India—he is never tired of dwelling on the unity of all things, which he regards as a multiform unity embracing the whole and present in every part. He

<sup>1049</sup> Thibaut, *Vēdānta-Sūtras with the Commentary of Rāmānuja*, 458-459. See also Rāmānuja's commentary on I. 4. 27, *Parīṇāmāt*, Thibaut, 402-407.

rejects the notion of formless matter, and maintains that matter and form are inseparable. Finite things differ from one another, not in other being, but only in their mode of being so that in them the one substance is not diverse but only diversely fashioned and figured; all things are in the universe, and the universe in all things. The study of Nature seems to disclose two substances of mind and body, but further contemplation reduces them to one; and the ultimate object of all philosophy and science is declared (with an ironical reservation as to supernatural knowledge) to be the perception of unity. In one dialogue the speaker who represents Bruno's own opinions asserts that the "first principle" is infinite in all its attributes, and that one of those attributes is extension (*uno amplissima dimensionale infinite*). Again, it is animated, in as much as it includes all life as part of one and the same being; all particular lives are effects of the divine life present in all things, *Natura est deus deus in rebus*. The terms *attribute* and *mode* appear in Bruno in a manner which suggest Spinoza's adoption of them, though the precision with which he uses them is his own. Similarly, in parts of Bruno's writings, much prominence is given to the identification of the highest kind of speculative knowledge with the love of God, or the one perfect object; and the power and surpassing excellence of this ideal and intellectual love are dealt with, as Pollock remarks, with exuberant poetic fancy. Notwithstanding the wide difference between Bruno's manner and Spinoza's, the thought and even the expressions are often strikingly like those of the *Essay on God and Man*.<sup>1050</sup>

Contemporaneous with Bruno was Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), the celebrated German mystic, who also suffered for his views at the hands of the men of the letter. His philosophy anticipated in no small measure the secret of Hegel, who, indeed, acknowledges him as one of the

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<sup>1050</sup> See Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, Chap. III, 98-99.

fathers of German philosophy. His writings bear witness to a scheme of mystical philosophy which sets forth the trinity in unity of the Hegelian system, that is, viewing the divine as it is itself, as it comes out in Nature, and as it returns to itself in the human soul. These are the first instances—Bruno and Boehme—we have in modern western philosophy of anything like a systematised conception of Reality consisting in one-ness—the One Substance of Spinoza. Spinoza (1632—1677), indeed, is said to have come largely under the influence of Bruno. This is evident as much from the system of thought we associate with the name of Spinoza as from his writings. Almost every one—for instance, Pollock, Avenarius and Sigwart—stresses the influence of Bruno, while Hale White gives a selection of parallel passages from Bruno in his translation of Spinoza's *Ethics* which is decisive in the matter. Spinoza was also largely influenced by Descartes (1596-1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1619), who were both his contemporaries, and by the writings of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who had just died when he was born. To the last of these, the father of the inductive method of scientific inquiry, he did not owe more than his method and the scientific attitude. Spinoza had evidently studied the *Novum Organum* as some Baconian phrases occur in his writings, but as Pollock says, the influence Bacon exercised on him "at all events, was a transitory one". To Descartes he owed more, though his allegiance was brief, for he invites attention to his differences with him, not only on minor issues but also on fundamental points. All the same, Spinoza owed to Descartes his knowledge of contemporary metaphysical thought, and what is more, his knowledge of physical science. As Pollock observes, Spinoza derived his notions of physical science and his doctrine of conservation of matter to Descartes. His *Principles of Cartesianism Geometrically Demonstrated* shows that he well knew the system he discarded. Descartes' philosophy starts with Doubt, and by one single step it arrives at Certainty. "If I doubt, it is plain, I exist" and from this certainty,



that is, the existence of the thinking subject, he deduces his whole system. If all comes from the formula *cogito, ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I exist," *i.e.*, the thinking ego exists; in which thinking, philosophy ere long sums the universe up, regarding it as a void, without thought. The extent of the influence exerted by Cartesianism on Spinoza has been increasingly doubted in recent years. It is now suggested that he owed more to his Jewish parentage than to Cartesianism. At any rate his starting point and inspiration is now sought for in the religious speculations of his Jewish predecessors. Histories of philosophy describe his theory as the logical development of Descartes, doctrines of the One Infinite and the two finite substances. Mr. Pringle-Pattison, however, remarks, Spinoza himself was never a Cartesian. He brought his pantheism and determinism with him to the study of Descartes from the mystical theologians of his race.<sup>1051</sup> Earlier than Pattison, Pollock has remarked that the pantheist, or as he calls it the mystical element in Spinoza, is to be traced to the mediæval Jewish philosophers, with whose works Spinoza is known to have been familiar.

Spinoza postulated a system—popularly called to-day Spinozism—which regards God as the one self-subsistent substance and both matter and thought attributes of Him. The foundation of Spinoza's philosophy is the doctrine of one infinite substance, of which all finite existences are modes or limitations (modes of thought or modes of extension). God is thus the immanent cause of the universe; but of creation or will there can be no question in Spinoza's system. God is throughout as equivalent to Nature. The philosophical standpoint comprehends the necessity of all that is—a necessity that is none other than the necessity of the divine nature itself. To view things thus is to view them, according to Spinoza's favourite phrase, *sub-specie æternitatis*. His doctrine has been summed up thus:

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<sup>1051</sup> See Pringle-Pattison's article on *Spinoza* in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XXV (Eleventh edition).

Whatever is, is; and that is extension and thought. These two are all that is; and besides these there is nought. But these two are one; they are attributes of the single substance (that which, for its existence, stands in need of nothing else), very God, in whom, then, all individual things and all individual ideas (modes of extension those, of thought these) are comprehended and take place. Spinoza, it will be seen, includes under the term extension all individual objects, and under thought all individual ideas, and these two he includes in God, as he in whom they live and move and have their being—a great and fruitful conception, being the speculative ground of the being of all that lives and is. This oneness of Spinoza ran the risk of being called “atheistic” in his own life-time—that was the reason why he refrained from publishing his *Ethics* during his life-time, it being published a year after his death—and in later times came to be generally spoken of as “pantheism” or “mysticism”. The greatness of Spinoza, in Western eyes, consists in not merely placing the pantheistic or mystic element besides the scientific element, but fusing it into one with it. The scientific element is that of the unity and uniformity of the world. Nature, as conceived by him, includes thought no less than things, and the order of nature knows no interruption. Again, there is not a world of thought opposed to or interfering with a world of things; we have everywhere the same reality under different aspects. Nature is one as well as uniform. The combination of these two elements—the physical and speculative—is what makes, in the opinion of Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza’s philosophy great.<sup>1052</sup> The pantheist or mystical element is traced by Sir Frederick to the mediæval Jewish philosophers, with whose works, it is known, Spinoza was familiar. “This,” adds Sir Frederick, “is to some extent a matter of direct evidence.” A claim has also been put in, and with likelihood practically amounting

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<sup>1052</sup> Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, 80-81.

to certainty, for Giordano Bruno. Now Bruno himself was subject in certain ways to Oriental influences, while the Jewish and Arabic Schools of the Middle Ages were again strongly imbued with Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Platonism in turn has a semi-Oriental character. It seems impossible even if it were worth while, to disentangle all the details. But it remains sufficiently clear, whatever theory we may adopt, that the East has a considerable share in this portion of Spinoza's materials. Next, as to the scientific element, Sir Frederick says that it "may be assigned without hesitation to Descartes, though Spinoza carried out the scientific view of the world farther and more vigorously than Descartes himself." As regards its union with the mystical element, it is material to remark, adds Sir Frederick, that "a nascent scientific impulse runs through the naturalism of the Renaissance philosophy as represented by Bruno and others; and thus, the line of contact was in a manner already traced." The monistic element is given, in Sir Frederick's opinion, "by reaction from the dualism of Cartesian philosophy" and determined chiefly, in his opinion, by considerations of a scientific order. The pantheist idea may also have its part—that, one would think, is permitted by way of concession. "But we can strike," remarks Sir Frederick, "no exact account between the two, for Spinoza had completed the fusion of the mystical and scientific principles before he settled his monism in its final form." Though Spinoza might have had ideas and suggestions of a general kind from Descartes, and a good deal of more definite material from Hobbes, Sir Frederick holds that the conception of natural law is "the most independent work of Spinoza's genius".

It will be readily seen that Sir Frederick Pollock in analysing the birth and growth of Spinoza's philosophical ideas sets down what he calls the "pantheist or mystic element" to Jewish philosophers. Writing further on this topic, he traces the Jewish influence to Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 A.D.); Chasdai Creskas (14th century); Gersonides (1288-1340); and the Kabbalah. Of these, Maimonides

was the great Jewish Rabbi, who, born at Cordova, came to be regarded by the Jews as their Plato and called "The Lamp of Israel" and "The Eagle of the Doctors". He was a man of immense learning and taught his co-religionists to interpret their religion in the light of reason. He wrote a *Commentary on the Mishna and the Second Law* but his chief work is the *Moreh Nebuchim*, or *Guide to the Perplexed*. Gersonides, who was born at Bagnal in Provence, was thoroughly Aristotelian in his outlook, though he professed to be a mere interpreter of the Scriptures. The influence of these writers on Spinoza is admitted to be "comparatively slight" in the purely philosophical part of his work. As a matter of fact, Spinoza's object was indeed opposite to that of Maimonides. He was not impressed with Maimonides' artificial system of interpretation and suggests that it is idle to seek philosophy in the Scriptures. In the *Ethics*, in particular, Sir Frederick admits, there are only traces of influence of these Jewish writers "apart from the doctrine of the mind's eternity" (in the Fifth Part), which Sir Frederick believes "comes from the Averroists through Gersonides." The Averroists were, it might be added, the followers of Averroes (1126-1198), the celebrated Arabian physician and philosopher, a Moor by birth and a native of Cordova, who devoted himself to the study and exposition of Aristotle, earning for himself the title of the "Commentator", though he appears to have coupled with the philosophy of Aristotle the oriental doctrine of emanations. It must also be remarked that certain of the views of Maimonides were not peculiar to him. They were the common possession of the scholastic writers and perhaps might be further traced much farther back to Neo-Platonism. Next as to Chasdai Creskas, his chief work *Adonai*, or the *Light of the Lord*, contains many thoughts and views which come "near to characteristic points of Spinoza's philosophy". He evidently exercised a great deal of influence on Spinoza, in regard to the making up of "extension", his idea of the perfection of God consisting not in knowledge as the Aristotelians hold, but in love, and

his conception of determinism. But Spinoza took his suggestions in detail and worked them into a systematic connection of his own which, as Pollock puts it, "would probably have found little favour in Chasdai's eyes". The influence on Spinoza of the mystical literature represented by the Kabbalah has also been widely discussed. The metaphysical foundations of the later Kabbalah appear to have been derived by some road not fully known from Neo-Platonism and they bear evident traces of imitation from Greek. The doctrine of emanations and intermediate powers between God and the world was adopted as a counterblast to Maimonides and the rationalists. In Spinoza's time, this system had attained its highest development. Spinoza himself refers to its "follies". The doctrines of emanation and the transmigration of souls are both fundamental to it and these are incompatible with Spinoza's system. But he shows marked respect to the earlier Kabbalistic system. "Only an accomplished Orientalist can be entitled" says Pollock, "to a positive opinion on the sources and antiquity of these speculations." But at the same time, he admits that "all mysticism is Eastern in its ultimate origin, and the choice would seem to be substantially between holding that the Jewish mysticism was indirectly delivered from the East through Neo-Platonism and the Alexandrian Schools, or that it came, as we know that modern Jewish theology came, earlier and more directly from the old Persian religion, in which case Jewish and Alexandrian mysticism would be related to one another, not in a direct line of descent, but as parallel and partly intermixed streams from the same fountain-head." Personally, Pollock would adhere to the latter view. He also notes the fact that Giordano Bruno, whose relationship to Spinoza is known, was not free from Neo-Platonic influence. Bruno is known to have used the writings of the Jewish Neo-Platonist Avicbron (Ibn-Gebirol) who lived about 1200 A.D. This was another road by which, says Pollock, "Neo-Platonic ideas may have found their way to Spinoza." In his speculative writings, Avicbron is known to have

followed Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist (207-270), who, as we know, taught a system of philosophy which based itself on the intuitions of the soul elevated into a state of mystical union with God, who in his single unity sums up all and whence all emanates, all being regarded as an emanation from Him. Pollock draws attention to the close resemblance there is between Bruno and Spinoza in regard to the prominence given by both to the identification of the highest kind of speculative knowledge with the love of God, or the one perfect knowledge and the exuberant manner in which they dwell on the power and surpassing excellence of this ideal and intellectual love. Despite the fact that even their expressions are similar, Pollock thinks, that as this topic is "so much the common property of all mystic and mystically inclined writers" it is hardly possible to hold that these resemblances "add very much to the evidence of a specific connection between the two thinkers." It would, he says, be no great matter for surprise if an equally good parallel could be produced from the Persian Sufis, whom Spinoza had certainly not studied. The strong resemblances that exist between Spinoza's doctrines and the mystical schools of mediæval Christianity are also referred to by him. But he dismisses all these as sources of Spinoza's philosophy for "there is neither evidence nor probability to warrant any belief in a historical connection". But cultural and religious contacts have a tendency to influence metaphysical and religious thought and that is what seems ignored by Pollock. As to Sufism, for instance, there is reasonable ground for belief that, at least in its later stages, it borrowed from Hindu philosophy. Its chief doctrines are, according to Klein,<sup>1053</sup> that the souls of men differ in degree, but not in kind from the Divine Spirit, of which they are emanations and to which they ultimately return; that the spirit of God is in all He has made and it in Him; that He alone is perfect love and beauty and that hence love to Him is the only real thing and all besides is mere illusion; that the present

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<sup>1053</sup> T. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islam* (1906).

life is one of separation from the Beloved ; that the beauties of nature, music and art revive in man the divine idea and recall his affections from wandering from God to other objects. The highest state of bliss is oneness with God, absorption in the Eternal—oneness in the sense as being inseparable from God and absorption in the sense as being always together, in all conditions, as associates which is "Dualism appearing as Monism". The Sufis are also required—as among Hindus—to implicitly obey their teachers. The doctrine that the soul is a direct emanation from the Deity seems incompatible with the fundamental article of the Muslim faith which exalts God as a being passing all comprehension, but such is the influence of cultural contact that it overcomes even such obstacles and produces changes too remarkable for words.

Thus the common saying that the system of Spinoza owes as much to the Jewish Rabbis as to Descartes is only partially true. It is nearer the truth to say that while it owes something to the Rabbis, it owes much to Giordano Bruno who himself owed a great deal to Oriental influences, while the Jewish Rabbis and Arabic Schools of the mediæval times were again strongly imbued with Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism in its turn had been largely coloured by Hindu thought and doctrine. The Christian mystics, too, to whom Pollock refers, were, it is admitted, profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism and Dionysian thought. It is to-day conceded that Dionysius, the Areopagite,<sup>1054</sup> was a

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<sup>1054</sup> Dionysius, St., the Areopagite (Judge of the Areopagus) according to *Acts* XVII: 34, was a convert of St. Paul's, became bishop of Athens and died a martyr in 95 A.D. He has been long regarded as the father of mysticism. He is said to have been the author of writings imbued with a pantheistic idea of God and the universe. While some have expressed doubts as to the authenticity of this tradition, modern opinion seems to favour it. Dean Inge holds that the mediæval mystics were "steeped" in Dionysius. His works (6th century A.D.) were translated into Latin by John Scotus Erigena (9th century) who worked up his theories "into a consistent philosophical system". See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (7th Edn.), 101-122. Harnack places him in the second half of the 4th century

Neo-Platonist. "No one doubts at present," writes Max Müller in his *Theosophy or Psychological Religion*, "that the writer was a Neo-Platonist Christian, and that he lived towards the end of the fifth century, probably at Edessa in Syria." The fact that he was a Neo-Platonist and that he had been at one time in Alexandria, which was the centre for Indian thought in his days, shows that his source of inspiration should have been India. Admittedly Neo-Platonism has Indian elements in it—elements too which, it is significant, have no basis in Greek, Jewish or Christian thought. It is not Christianity that has influenced Neo-Platonism but it is Neo-Platonism that has shaped Christian thought. "The influence of Christianity" says Harnack, "whether Gnostic or Catholic, on Neo-Platonism was at no time considerable.... If we search Plotinus for evidence of any actual influence of Jewish and Christian phraseology, we search in vain; and the existence of any such influence is all the more unlikely because it is only the later Neo-Platonism that offers striking and deep-rooted parallels to Philo and the Gnostics."<sup>1055</sup> On the other hand, there is to be seen a close similarity—some have termed it "identity"—between Indian beliefs and doctrines and Neo-Platonism. Ammonius Sakkas of Alexandria (175-200 A.D.), the founder of Neo-Platonism, gave a religious and mystical turn to Greek philosophy. It was he that combined to the ideas and doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras, the Hindu ideas and doctrines. His teaching was such that it could not be traced to any known philosophy current in the Alexandria of his day. Tradition says he lived in contact with travellers who reached Alexandria from almost all countries in the East or the West,

A.D. Dean Inge remarks that Dionysius is quoted not much beyond 500 A.D.

<sup>1055</sup> Adolph Harnack (born 1851), the German theologian and Professor, has written on the history of dogma in the Christian Church, on Gnosticism, early Christian literature and the Apostle's Creed. On the last of these, he has written in a manner which has not commended itself to the orthodox. As to Indian ideas being current in Alexandria, see H. G. Rawlinson, *Intercourse between India and the Western World*.



including Palestine, Syria, Chaldæa, Persia and India, besides Greece and Rome. His teaching was held to be so novel that he came to be called "God-taught". Among his students were Longinus, Origen, Herennius and Plotinus. Of these, Plotinus was the most distinguished. Plotinus had his practical spiritual training under Ammonius and for long, kept his teachings a secret. He, indeed, did not make them known until some of his co-students had published them. It has been suggested that the novel character of Ammonius' teaching is also confirmed by this fact. In view of the general similarity that exists between the Hindu and the Neo-Platonic views, it seems fair to infer that the teaching of Ammonius was derived from Hindu sources. A consideration of the views of Plotinus, his greatest pupil, seems to confirm us in this view. It was Plotinus who actually developed and systematised Ammonius' doctrines and theories. Born at Lycopolis in Egypt, he studied under some teachers in Alexandria and finally became a pupil of Ammonius. Eleven years he studied under this great master and then desired to know first hand the philosophy of the Persians and the Hindus. He accordingly joined the army of Marcus Antonius Gordianus, grandson of the Emperor of the same name, who was surnamed Africanus and was Emperor from 238-244 A.D., in the hope of reaching Persia and India. But as misfortune would have it, though Gordianus drove back the Persians beyond the Euphrates and relieved Antioch, he was assassinated by his own soldiers while preparing to cross the Euphrates. Though he was thus effectually prevented from accomplishing his ambition, Plotinus must, from his very objective, be held to have been a spirit which claimed kindred with that of Persia and India. This view is confirmed by the nature and character of philosophy he developed and systematised. By him all existence is referred not to two principles, but only one. "God or the primal Essence is the simple unity that lies above all multiplicity. As such, God is without thought, because thinking requires plurality; and without will, because willing pre-supposes duality. God

is the absolutely transcendent One, exalted above every thing, above consciousness and unconsciousness, above rest and motion, above life and being. Hence God is entirely unattainable in our knowledge. Thinking must here abandon itself and become Not-thinking, if it is to apprehend God in blessed vision and unite itself with Him. But at the same time God is the original source and ground of all things; finite things arise out of Him by emanation of what is absolutely simple unfolding itself into an ever-advancing series of finite things, that are always the more imperfect the farther they are removed from God. In all things, therefore, there is only one divine power and essence, but in different degrees of perfection, so that every higher existence embraces the lower with itself. Finite things long for a return to their origin, and this is especially true of the human soul, which, banished into this earthly life as a punishment for former sin, strives to soar aloft to its higher home. . . . The higher goal is immediate intuition of the primal divine Being. This is the true philosophy, the perfection of the spirit and likewise the highest happiness. By such intuition the soul becomes completely one with the primal Being and sinks in ecstasy into deity."<sup>1056</sup>

Dean Inge, who has written at length on Plotinus, remarks that he laid "the coping stone on the edifice of Greek philosophy by a scheme of idealism which must always remain one of the greatest achievements of the human mind". He welds into one compact whole several of the most characteristic doctrines of mysticism which in Plato are only thrown out tentatively. Among the doctrines developed by him are his theory of the Absolute, whom he calls the One, or the Good, and his theory of the Ideas which differs from Plato's. Plato represents the mind of the World-Artist as immanent in the idea of the Good, while Plotinus makes the Ideas immanent in the universal mind. In

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<sup>1056</sup> See B. Punjer, *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion* (1887).

other words, the real world (which he calls the "intelligible world," the sphere of the Ideas) is in the mind of God. Further, in his doctrine of vision, he attaches an importance to revelation which was new to Greek philosophy. Above all, to his psychology, which is really the centre of his system, the Christian church and Christian mysticism became most indebted. With the soul is the meeting-point of the intelligible and the phenomenal. It is diffused everywhere. Animals and vegetables participate in it and the earth has a soul which sees and hears. The soul is immaterial and immortal, for it belongs to the world of real existence, and nothing that *is* can cease to be. The body is in the soul, rather than the soul in the body. The soul creates the body by imposing form on matter, which in itself is no-thing, pure indetermination, and next door to absolute non-existence. (If matter were *nothing*, it could not desire to be something; it is only no-thing.) Space and time are only forms of our thought. The concepts formed by the soul by classifying the things of sense are said to be "Ideas unrolled and separate," that is, they are conceived as separate in space and time, instead of existing all together in eternity. The nature of the soul is triple; it is presented under three forms, which are at the time the three stages of perfection which it can reach. There is first and lowest the animal and sensual soul, which is closely bound up with the body; then there is the logical, reasoning soul, the distinctively *human* part; and lastly, there is the superhuman stage or part in which man "thinks himself according to the higher intelligence, with which he has become identified, knowing himself no longer as a man, but as one who has become altogether changed, and has transferred himself into the higher region". The soul is thus "made one with Intelligence without losing herself; so that they two are both one and two". The soul is not altogether incarnate in the body; part of it remains above, in the intelligible world, whither it desires to return in its entirety. The world is an image of the Divine Mind, which is itself a reflection of the One. It is therefore not bad or evil. "What more

beautiful image of the Divine could there be", he asks, "than this world, except the world yonder?" And so it is a great mistake to shut our eyes to the world around, "and all beautiful things". The love of beauty will lead us up a long way—up to the point when the love of the Good is ready to receive us. Only we must not let ourselves be entangled by sensuous beauty. Those who do not quickly rise beyond this first stage, to contemplate "ideal form, the universal mould," share the fate of Hylas; they are engulfed in a swamp, from which they can never emerge. The universal resembles a vast chain, of which every being is a link. It may also be compared to rays of light shed abroad from one centre. Everything followed from this centre, and everything desires to flow back towards it. God draws all men and all things towards Himself as a magnet draws iron, with a constant unvarying attraction. The whole universe is one vast organism, and if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it. This is why a "faint movement of sympathy" stirs within us at the sight of any living creature. All existence is drawn upwards towards God by a kind of centripetal attraction, which is unconscious in the lower, half conscious in the higher organisms. Plotinus' Trinity are the One or the Good, who is above existence, God as the Absolute; the Intelligence, who occupies the sphere of real existence, organic unity comprehending multiplicity—the One—Many, as he calls it, or, as we might call it, God as thought, God existing in and for Himself; and the Soul, the One and Many, occupying the sphere of appearance or imperfect reality—God as action. Soulless matter, which only exists as a logical abstraction, is arrived at by looking at things "in disconnexion, dull and spiritless". It is the sphere of the "merely many", and is zero, as "the One who is not" is Infinity. The Intelligible World is timeless and spaceless, and contains the archetypes of the Sensible World. The Sensible World is our view of the Intelligible World. When we say that it does not exist, we mean that we shall not always see it in this form. The "Ideas" are the

ultimate form in which things are regarded by Intelligence, or by God. Evil is disintegration. In its essence it is not merely unreal but unreality as such. It can only *appear* in conjunction with some low degree of goodness—as Plotinus finely puts it, “Vice at its worst is still human, being mixed with something opposite to itself”. The “lower virtues”, as he calls the duties of the average citizen, are not only purgative, but teach us the principles of measure and rule, which are Divine characteristics. As the Sensible World is a shadow of the Intelligible, so is action a shadow of contemplation, suited to weak-minded persons. From this proceeds the doctrine—styled “heartless” by Dean Inge—that public calamities are to the wise man only stage tragedies—or even stage comedies. Finally as to the conditions under which the vision is granted. “The soul,” says Plotinus, describing the ecstatic vision, “when possessed by intense love of Him divests herself of all form which she has, even of that which is derived from Intelligence; for it is impossible, when in conscious possession of any other attribute, either to behold or to be harmonised with Him. Thus the soul must be neither good nor bad nor aught else, that she may receive Him only, Him alone, she alone. While she is in this state, the One suddenly appears, ‘with nothing between’, and they are no more two but one; and the soul is no more conscious of the body or of the mind, but knows that she has what she desired, that she is where no deception can come, and that she would not exchange her bliss for all the heaven of heavens.”<sup>1057</sup> Dean Inge thinks that the vision of the One is no part of Plotinus’ philosophy, but “a mischievous accretion”. “What,” he asks, “is the source of this strange aspiration to rise above Reason and Intelligence, which is for Plotinus the highest category of Being and to come out on the other side of Being?” Plotinus says himself elsewhere that “he who would rise above Reason, falls outside it”; and yet he regards as the highest reward of the philosopher-saint to

<sup>1057</sup> See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, Seventh Edition (1933), 91-96. Also, his study of *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 2 vols. (1929).

converse with the hypostatised Abstraction who transcends all distinctions. Accordingly Dean Inge holds that the vision cannot be a part of Plotinus' philosophy. For he adds, though the "super-essential Absolute" may be a logical necessity, we cannot make it, even in the most transcendental manner, an object of sense, without depriving it of its Absoluteness. What is really apprehended is not the Absolute, but a kind of "form of formlessness," an idea not of the Infinite but of the Indefinite. It is then impossible to distinguish 'the One', who is said to be above all distinctions, from undifferentiated matter, the formless No-thing, which Plotinus puts at the lowest end of the scale.<sup>1058</sup> How then did the theory of the "vision" of the One become part of the Neo-Platonic system? Dean Inge thinks that its accretion was due to two different causes. First, he says, "there was the direct influence of Oriental philosophy of the Indian type, which tries to reach the universal by wiping out all the boundary-lines of the particular, and to gain infinity by reducing self and the world to zero"; and secondly, there was the influence as well of the blank trance which was a real psychical experience, quite different from the "visions", of which we have abundant evidence. But to dismiss the "vision" thus from the philosophy of Plotinus cannot be justified, because in keeping with the Hindu system with which Plotinus allied himself, both immanence and transcendence have to be conceded to the God predicated by Plotinus. Not only that; there are other parts of Plotinus' theory which show the influence that the Hindu system exerted on his own. Plotinus' conception of the One is the same as Brahman; the Absolute is as inexpressible to him as to the authors of the *Upanishads*; his Divine Mind seems to be analogous to the *Īśvara* in the *Vēdānta* system; his World-Soul represents the *Hiranyagarbha* of the *Vēdānta*; and his Nature takes the place of *Prakṛiti*. Then, again, his view of man as spirit, soul and body corresponds to *kāraṇa*, *sūkṣma* and *sthūla upādhi*; his three spheres

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<sup>1058</sup> Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 98.

of existence or states of being, or hypostases of being correspond to the *avasthā-traya*, the three states of *jāgrata*, *svapna* and *sushupti*; and his ecstasy is indistinguishable from *samādhi*. Finally, he is a believer in the theories of reincarnation and *karma*, his law of Necessity being akin to the latter. Of course, parallels of this kind can be set up easily between two different systems of thought, but still when the general probability of Plotinus' relation to Hindu thought, as systematised in the *Upanishads*, is once conceded, all points of coincidence have a certain cumulative effect, though each may in itself be capable of a different explanation. It will be seen that Dean Inge, in common with other writers, fully acknowledges that Neo-Platonism owes its doctrine of ecstasy directly to the influence of Oriental philosophy of the Indian type, though he doubts if it was really part of Plotinus' teachings. According to tradition Plotinus practised ecstasy—*samādhi*—and if his disciple Porphyry is to be believed, ended his life in the manner of the Indian *yōgis*, *i.e.*, by deliberately entering into *samādhi* and giving up the body. His last words were: "Now I seek to lead back the Self within me to the All-Self."<sup>1059</sup> Evidently as Max-Müller says, "Plotinus and his school seem to have paid great attention to foreign, particularly to Eastern, religions and superstitions and endeavoured to discover in all of them remnants of divine wisdom." Porphyry of Tyre (233-305 A.D.), the disciple and biographer of Plotinus, developed Neo-Platonism on its religious side. The replies which have come down to us against his

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<sup>1059</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. XIX, page 373, article on Neo-Platonism. Porphyry records the fact that on four occasions during the six years of their intercourse, Plotinus attained to this ecstatic union with God. See also Dean Inge's *Plotinus*, Vol. I, pages 114-121. Dean Inge records that when Puteoli, his friend and physician, came to see him for the last time, he uttered these last words: "I was waiting for you, before that which is divine in me departs to unite itself with the Divine in the Universe." See also Swāmi Ashōkānanda, *The Influence of Indian Thought on the Thought of the West*, Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora (1931).

animadversions against his Christian contemporaries suggest the wide influence exercised by the doctrines of Plotinus on the Christian church of the day. His disciple and successor, Iamblichus of Coele-Syria (333 A.D.), developed the mystical side and taught a system of theurgy (*divya-drishhti*), which would seem to indicate the part the "vision" had been playing in the Neo-Platonic system. Next, Proclus (412-485 A.D.), born in Constantinople, built up a whole system of dogmas and philosophy, which depict Neo-Platonism as a fully blown system of thought. Neo-Platonists like Synesius of Cyrene (*circa* 430 A.D.), who was a disciple of the Neo-Platonist Hypatia of Alexandria, and Boethius (470-524 A.D.), one of the last of the Neo-Platonists, when they became Christians carried their Neo-Platonism into their new religion.

The question whether the influence of Persian and Indian thought can be traced in Neo-Platonism, or whether that system was purely Greek—including in that word the Hellenized Jew—is discussed by Dean Inge and it is worth while to note his view as well here. Though he remarks that it is a quite hopeless task to try to disentangle the various strands of thought which make up the web of Alexandrianism, "there is," he says, "no doubt that the philosophers of Asia were held in reverence at this period." Origen, in justifying an esoteric mystery-religion for the educated, and a mythical religion for the vulgar, appeals to the example of the "Persians and Indians". And Philostratus, in his life of Apollonius of Tyana, says, or makes his hero say, that while all wish to live in the presence of God, "the Indians alone succeed in doing so. And certainly there are parts of Plotinus, and still more of his successors, which strongly suggest Asiatic influences. (Proclus used to say that a philosopher ought to show no exclusiveness in his worship, but to be the hierophant of the whole world. This eclecticism was not confined to cultus.) When we turn from Alexandria to Syria, we find Orientalism more rampant. Speculation among the Syrian monks of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries was perhaps more unfettered and more



audacious than in any other branch of Christendom at any period." To illustrate this remark, Dean Inge refers to the book of Hierotheus, which the canonised Dionysius praises in glowing terms as an inspired oracle. Dionysius, indeed, professes that his own object in writing was merely to popularize the teaching of his master. Hierotheus was the holy man converted by St. Paul and the teacher of the original Dionysius the Areopagite. The book attributed to him is believed to have been written really by one Stephen bar Sudaili, a Syrian mystic, who is assigned to the 5th century A.D. According to Hierotheus, everything is an emanation from the Chaos of bare indetermination which he calls God, and everything will return thither.<sup>1060</sup> There are three periods of existence. First, the present world, which is evil, and is characterised by motion; secondly, the progressive union with Christ, who is all in all—this is the period of rest; and thirdly, the period of fusion of all things in the Absolute. He says that the three Persons of the Trinity will then be swallowed up, even the evil spirits being thus ending their existence. Further, these three world-periods are also phases in the development of individual souls. In the first, the mind aspires towards its first principles; in the second, it becomes Christ, the Universal Mind; and in the third, its personality is wholly merged. Much space is given to the adventures of the Mind including the ladder of perfection. The writer of the book—whether it was Hierotheus or the Syrian Stephen bar Sudaili—professes to have attained to ecstatic union more than once and describes the process of preparation for it in words characteristically *yōgic*. "To me," he says, "it seems right to speak without words, and understand without knowledge, that which is above words and knowledge; this I apprehend to be nothing but the mysterious silence and mystical quiet which destroys consciousness and dissolves forms. Seek, therefore, silently and mystically,

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<sup>1060</sup> Cf. with what has been said in the preceding pages in the Commentary on the *Sūtra*, *Asaditichēna pratishēdhamātravāt*, II. 1.7.

the perfect and primitive union with the Arch-Good."<sup>1061</sup> It is interesting to note the various transmutations the Mind undergoes in its "ascent". At one stage, it is crucified "with the soul on the right and the body on the left"; it is turned for three days; it descends into Hades; then it ascends again, till it reaches Paradise, and is united to the tree of life: then it descends below all essences, and sees a formless luminous essence, and marvels that it is *the same essence* that it has seen on high. Now it comprehends the truth, that God is consubstantial with the Universe, and that there are no real distinctions anywhere. So it ceases to wander. "All these doctrines," concludes the seer, "which are unknown even to angels, have I disclosed to thee, my son" (—Dionysius, probably). "Know, then, that all nature will be confused with the Father—that nothing will perish or be destroyed, but all will return, be sanctified, united and confused. Thus, God will be all in all." Dean Inge's remark on this description of the process of apotheosis is significant. "There can be no difficulty," he writes, "in classifying this Syrian philosophy of religion. It is the ancient religion of the Brahmins, masquerading in clothes borrowed from Jewish allegorists, half-Christian Gnostics, Manicheans, Platonising Christians and pagan Neo-Platonists."<sup>1062</sup> Dionysius, who uses his master's theory, is even more distinctively Hindu in his thought, so much so that he may be said to carry the Hindu ideas into Christianity as it prevailed in the 5th century A.D. He was a theologian, and not a mere mystic. As Dean Inge puts it, his main object was "to present Christianity in the guise of a Platonic mysteriesophy" and he uses the technical terms of the mysteries wherever he can. His philosophy is that of his day—"the later Neo-Platonism, with its

<sup>1061</sup> Cf. with the Commentary on the *Sūtras*, *Om āvrittir asakridupadēśāt*; *Lingāchcha*; and *Ātmēti tūpagachchanti grāhayanti cha*, IV. 1. 1-3.

<sup>1062</sup> W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 104. The summary of Hierotheus' doctrine is taken by him from Frothingham's account of Hierotheus, *Ibid.*, 102, f. n. 1.

strong Oriental affinities". His theories are those of Proclus rather than Plotinus. He is so Oriental in his view that Dean Inge is tempted to class him as a Syrian monk who "probably perpetrated a fraud—a pious fraud in his opinion—by suppressing his own individuality and fathering his books on St. Paul's Athenian Convert". Though pretended to have been written in the first century A.D., it is full of the later Neo-Platonic theories of probably the second half of the fourth century A.D. As Dean Inge remarks, readers of the sixth century A.D. did not see anything strange in the success that the "imposture" attained and the mediæval church was even ready "to believe that this strange semi-pantheistic Mysticism dropped from the lips of St. Paul." The fact of the matter is that Christianity early absorbed Hindu ideas and its so-called mysticism is entirely Hindu in its origins. Proclus propounds a trinitarian view of the universe and regards the All, abstractly viewed as contained in the Divine, ever emerging from it and returning into it. This doctrine, as we know, is implied in the *Gospel of St. John*<sup>1063</sup> (I. 1), and appears in a

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<sup>1063</sup> The *Gospel of St. John* is presumed to have been written by St. John at Ephesus about 78 A.D. Recent criticism assigns it to somewhere between 160 and 170 A.D. Though its authenticity has also been greatly debated, there is no question that its portrayal of Jesus as the light of life shows its author as a person who should have imbibed a great deal of the Neo-Platonic philosophy current in the second century A.D. The *Gospel of St. John*, says Arnot Naumann in his *Jesus*, "cannot be placed earlier than the second century, and arising as it did as a protest against Judaizing parties and as a defence of ideas of religion conceived in an unhistorical way, all the details in the story, as regards localities, time and personal characteristics, have been adapted to the requirements of that Christian philosophy in which the Gospel is steeped, or have been misplaced through its influence. To the author of this Gospel, Jesus is the 'Word of God,' that is to say, the second person of the Godhead, who existed before Abraham, and in fact took part in the creation of the world (I. 1. 3; VIII. 5. 8; XVII. 5). Holding this view, he is naturally obliged to represent the appearance of Jesus as the thinly-veiled manifestation of a Divine Being. ....The author's conception of the religion of Jesus, pervaded

highly developed form in Hegel. But it is a later idea and is traceable to outside influences exerted on Christianity when it was still under development. Dionysius beginning with the Trinity, identifies God the Father with the Neo-Platonic Monad and describes Him as "Super-essential Indetermination," "Super-rational Unity", "the Unity which unifies every unity", "Super-essential Essence", "Irrational Mind", "Unspoken Word", "the absolute No-thing which is above all existence". But he is a good Platonist. "The Good and the Beautiful," he adds, "are the cause of all things that are; and all things love and aspire to the Good and the Beautiful, which are, indeed, the sole objects of their desire." Then he tries to reconcile the two ideas—the Platonic with the Hindu. "Since then," he says, "the Absolute Good and Beautiful is honoured by eliminating all qualities from it, the non-existent also must participate in the Good and Beautiful." Dean Inge characterises this attempt at reconciliation as the "pathetic absurdity" to which we are driven "if we try to graft Indian nihilism upon the Platonic ideas." Dionysius found the co-existence of the two sets of ideas and what he attempted was a reconciliation and no more. And the fact that Dionysius attempted such a reconciliation should be set down to his credit rather than be made a matter for adverse criticism; as "God is the Being of all that is," Being being identical with God or Goodness, evil as such does not exist. It only exists by its participation in good. Evil must arise from "disorderly and inharmonious motion". "All evil is done with the object of gaining some good; no one does evil as evil." Evil in itself is that which is "no-how, no-where and no-thing. God sees evil as good." All this is in accordance with Hindu theory. According to this theory, there is nothing intrinsically evil in nature. Evil has neither objective existence nor ultimate reality, apart from

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throughout by the spirit we have indicated, is certainly sublime enough, but it is far removed from the simple, sober, naive facts of history as we find in the Gospels according to Mark, Matthew and Luke."

Brahman whose real nature consists of good only. The true principle is that sin is its own punishment and virtue its own reward. That is the essence of the law of Karma. It is not surprising, therefore, that Dean Inge should see from this point of view, certain of the chapters in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* show "a certain sympathy with Oriental speculative Mysticism," "Oriental" here standing for "Hindu". Nor is it surprising that he should see in other parts of the theory of Dionysius the influence of "the old religion of India". Dionysius propounds the theory that all things flow from God, and all will ultimately return to Him. The first emanation is the Thing in itself, corresponding to the Johannine Logos. He gives it the names of "Life in Itself" and "Wisdom in Itself". "The Divine Wisdom," he says, "in knowing itself will know all things". "It will know the material immaterially and the divided inseparably; and the many as one, knowing all things by the standard of absolute unity." In creation, the "One is said to become multiform". The world is a necessary process of God's being. He created it "as the sun shines", "without premeditation or purpose". But he does not assert that all separate existence will ultimately be merged in the One. The highest Unity gives to all the power of striving, on the one hand, to share in the One; on the other, to persist in their own individuality. And more than once he speaks of God as a Unity comprehending, not abolishing, differences. "God is before all things"; "Being is in Him, and He is not in Being." The transcendence of God is thus safeguarded, while immanence is not denied. The outflowing process is appropriated by the mind by the *positive* method—the downward path through finite existences: its conclusion is, "God is All". The return journey is by the *negative* road, that of ascent to God by abstraction and analysis: its conclusion is, "All is not God". The mystic, according to Dionysius, "must leave behind all things both in the sensible and in the intelligible worlds, till he enters into the darkness of nescience that is truly mystical." This "Divine darkness,"

he says in another place, "is the light unapproachable" mentioned by St. Paul. It is dark through excess of light. "This doctrine," remarks Dean Inge, "really renders nugatory what he (Dionysius) has said about the persistence of distinctions after the restitution of all things"; for as "all things agree in the dark," so, "for us, in proportion as we attain to true knowledge, all distinctions are lost in the absolute".

According to Dionysius, the soul is bipartite. The higher portion sees the "Divine images" directly, the lower by means of symbols. Symbols, he suggests, should not be despised for they are, in his view, "true impressions of the Divine characters," and necessary steps, which enable devotees to "mount to the one undivided truth by analogy". Dionysius holds that this is the way we should use the Scriptures whose symbolic truth and beauty can be perceived only by those who free themselves from the "peurille myths" in which they are sometimes embedded. Dean Inge is somewhat startled by the language used in this connection by Dionysius, a saint of the Church. But there is no need for any surprise for Dionysius was something more than a mere saint; for he was also one who had attained to enlightenment. Dean Inge notes that the theory propounded by Dionysius that we can approach God only by analysis or abstraction was not an "invention" on his part, but found also in Plotinus (third century A.D.) and Proclus (fifth century A.D.). Proclus, indeed, we find using phrases like "sinking into the Divine Ground", "for-saking the manifold for the One", etc. This would make the doctrine as old as the beginning of the third century A.D. Since Basilides also is seen to hold it, it may be even referred back to the early part of the second century A.D., as Basilides is known to have died about 139 A.D. Basilides, indeed, presents it in an extreme form. "We must not," he says, "even call God ineffable, since this is to make an assertion about Him. He is above every name that is named."<sup>1064</sup>

<sup>1064</sup> Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 111, quoting Harnack, III, 242, 243.

Christian tradition absorbed the doctrine. Dean Inge points out how Cyril's catechism repeats the common-place of Christian instruction that "in Divine matters there is great wisdom in confessing our ignorance". At the bottom, Dean Inge remarks, "the doctrine that God can be described only by negatives is neither Christian nor Greek, but belongs to the old religion of India."<sup>1065</sup> Though he misapprehends the implications of the doctrine, there is no doubt that he is right in seeking for the root of the doctrine in "the old religion of India". What texts he has in view he does not specifically mention. Since he quotes not long after the *Vēdāntasāra*,<sup>1066</sup> it is, perhaps, permissible to go back to well-known Upanishadic texts on which generalizations of this kind should be held to be based, for example, the famous one in the *Kāthakōpanishad*, VI. 12, *Naiva vāchā na manasā*, etc.;<sup>1067</sup> *Taittirīyōpanishad*, II. 4 and 9, *Yatō vāchō nivartantē*, etc. The *Vēdāntasāra* itself opens with a description of the Brahman which is largely *negative* in character. Brahman, for instance, is termed *Akhaṇḍa*, partless, a negative description. Again, he is called *Sachchidānanda*, which has to be interpreted negatively, being placed between two negative epithets. *Sat* does not predicate *being* of *ātman* but only denies "becoming" of it. In the same way, *chit* and *ānanda* do not predicate intelligence and *bliss* but only deny objectivity and strife that arises from the consciousness of mere diversity.<sup>1068</sup> Dean Inge elaborates at some length the negative argument and its

<sup>1065</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>1066</sup> He quotes Hunt's summary of the philosophy of the *Vēdāntasāra* as given in the latter's *Pantheism and Christianity*, 19. The *Vēdāntasāra* referred to here is the work of the same name by Sadānanda, the disciple of Narasimhasarasvati, who lived about the beginning of the 16th century. His chief sources are the *Māṇḍūkyaōpanishad* and the *Panchadaśī* attributed to Vidyāraṇya.

<sup>1067</sup> *Kātha. Upa.*, VI. 12, which may be thus rendered: Neither by words nor by mind can one perceive the divine source! no, not by the eye—for none apart from the believers true, can grasp the Real.

<sup>1068</sup> Cf. Sankarachārya's commentary on *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 1.

consequences. "Since God is the Infinite, and the Infinite is the antithesis of the Finite," he remarks, "every attribute which can be affirmed of a finite being may be safely denied of God." Hence, God can only be *described* by negatives; He can only be *discovered* by stripping off all the qualities and attributes which veil Him; He can only be *reached* by diverting ourselves of all the distinctions of personality, and sinking and rising into an "uncreated nothingness"; and He can only be *imitated* by aiming at an abstract spirituality, the passionless "apathy" of an universal which is nothing in particular. Thus we see that the whole of those developments of Mysticism which despise symbols, and hope to see God by shutting the eye of sense, hang together. They all follow from the false notion of God as the abstract unity transcending, or rather excluding, all distinctions. Of course, it is not intended *to exclude* distinctions, but to rise above them; but the process of abstraction, or subtraction, as it really is, can never lead us to "the One". The only possible unification, he says, with such an Infinite is that of the Nirvāṇa. Dean Inge, it would seem, misses the whole point of view involved in the conception of the Nirguṇa Brahman. Even though described as Nirguṇa, it is not pure nothing, for it is fundamentally one, with our own self, which it is impossible to negate. God is not abstract Unity transcending distinctions but the ultimate Reality. According to the doctrine of Advaita, of which Dean Inge is really thinking in this connection, the only Reality is the Supreme Brahman. It postulates an organic Unity of the whole which is ever maintained by the power of the Brahman. Both the inanimate objects of nature and the individual *ātman* are comprehended in the Brahman. They have their essential being in the Brahman by an organic Unity which does not permit the world of any separate existence apart from the Brahman. Neither the inanimate objects nor the individual *ātman* can exist or fulfil their functions of their own accord apart from the Brahman, who controls the world from within by inexorable laws, maintaining a synthetic unity of the world as



a whole in its different states of creation, preservation and destruction. This primal doctrine of Unity is what is known as Advaita. It postulates the unity of the entire world in the Brahman. The Upanishadic texts, *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, etc. and *Sadēva saumyēdamagra āsīt*, etc.<sup>1069</sup> fully establish, in the opinion of Advaitins, this doctrine of organic unity of the world. It is needless to add that this doctrine of organic unity of the world should not be confounded with the doctrine of pantheism as it is commonly understood in the West. Pantheism in the latter sense takes cognizance of only the empiric world of reality. Thus, Weissenborn defines Pantheism as the system which identifies God and the *all of things*, or the *unity of things*.<sup>1070</sup> Pantheism, thus conceived, does not comprehend the whole metaphysical truth. It simply attempts to identify the Supreme Being and the Universe, including those in it. It does away with the distinctions between matter and spirit, cause and effect, and subject and object of the empiric world. The doctrine of Advaita correctly conceived, does not seek to identify spirit with matter in its manifest condition in the world. Spirit is immaterial and cannot be identified with matter which is not real. This being so, what the Advaita aims at is to attempt to identify the individual *ātman* with the Supreme Brahman and to set up a relation of non-separateness between the self and nature, the individual *ātman* and matter having their being in pure spirit, thus preserving the unity of the world. This relationship is postulated in the great Upanishadic texts: *Aham Brahmāsmi*;<sup>1071</sup> *Tattvamasī*;<sup>1072</sup> *Pragnānam Brahma*;<sup>1073</sup> *Ayamātmā Brahma*;<sup>1074</sup> etc. The second of

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<sup>1069</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 13. 1 and VI. 2. 1.

<sup>1070</sup> K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrines* (1880), III, 323.

<sup>1071</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>1072</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 8. 7.

<sup>1073</sup> *Ait. Upa.*, V. 3.

<sup>1074</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 5. 19.; cf. *Sadeva Saumya*, *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1 and *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

these texts may be taken to sum up Vedāntic thought at its highest. It is the text on which Uddālaka bases his teaching to Svētakētu in the *Chchūndōgya Upanishad*. Dean Inge suggests that the negative view popularised in the West by the "old religion of India" held the ground throughout the mediæval period. "It held sway," he says, "for a long time—so long that we cannot complain if many have said, 'This is the essence of Mysticism'." It is interesting to note what he thinks was the cause which made popular in Europe the *via negativa*, which, in metaphysics, religion and ethics he regards as "the great accident of Christian Mysticism". How it became the ruling passion as it were of Christian thinkers is described by him in terms which it is well to note. "The break-up of the ancient civilization, with the losses and miseries which it brought upon humanity and the chaos of brutal barbarism in which Europe weltered for some centuries," he says, "caused a widespread pessimism and world weariness which is foreign to the temper of Europe, and which gave way to energetic and full-blooded activity in the Renaissance and Reformation. Asiatic Mysticism is the natural refuge of men who have lost faith in civilization, but will not give up faith in God. 'Let us fly hence to our dear country!' We hear the words already in Plotinus—nay—even in Plato. The sun still shone in heaven, but on earth he was eclipsed. Mysticism cuts too deep to allow us to live comfortably on the surface of life; and so all 'the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world' pressed upon men and women till they were fain to throw it off, and seek peace in an invisible world of which they could not see even a shadow round about them." This explanation for the spread of what is termed "Asiatic Mysticism" may be true to the extent it goes, but it does not explain the whole position. "Asiatic Mysticism" is not the refuge of people who have "lost faith in civilization" but of people who have believed in it, but set due bounds to it in their scheme of life. Its spread into the West was primarily due to the fact that it was the natural line of

development that religion and with it philosophy sought in the centuries following the rise of Christianity. It was an Eastern religion and it followed its modes of thought—the thought in which it was born and had had its living. The Renaissance and Reformation did not altogether kill it. The broad humanism of the former prepared the way for the latter which may be fully described—at least in the domains of religion and philosophy—as a spent force. Though described as a revolt of light against darkness, it had, even during the time it had its highest effect, no uniform effects on the states of Europe. Its appeal varied from nation to nation and country to country. Austria, according to Carlyle, preferred “steady darkness to uncertain new light”; in Spain people stumbled “in steep places in the darkness of midnight”; Italy shrugged its shoulders and elected “going into Dilettantism and the Fine Arts”; and France “with accounts run up on compound interest”, had to answer the “unit of summons” with an all too indiscriminate “Protestantism” of its own. Whether this enshrines a true picture of its effects or not, there is nothing to show that it barred the march of mysticism in Western Europe. Martin Luther himself (1483-1546) published a remarkable book by an unknown writer, *German Theology*, which is held to have prepared the way for the Reformation. This work is mystical in tone and contends that “the more the Self, the I, the Me, the Mine, that is, self-seeking and selfishness, abate in a man, the more doth God Himself, increase in him.” Pollock finds much in common between this writer and Spinoza. Valentine Weigel (1533-1588) is another mystic of the Reformation period. He holds that God is conscious in man of His own being and that in pitying man He has pity on Himself. Followers of Weigel continued down to the 18th century. St. Juan of the Cross (1542-1591) is perhaps the greatest Catholic mystic of modern times. He tried to restore Mediæval Christianity as a protest against the fanatics of the Renaissance. “Obey God; cast thyself on Him; He resembles no created thing; put your faith in Him; contemplate on Him; and your

soul, by participation, becomes God." In this mystic state, "the soul gives God to God; for she gives to God all that she receives of God; and He gives Himself to her." Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), the great Nature mystic, has already been referred to. William Law, the English mystic (1686-1761), translated Boehme's work and thus became the exponent of his views in England. Michael Molinos, the founder of Quietism (1640-1696), expounded Spanish mysticism. On most of these Dean Inge himself has written at some length.<sup>1075</sup> What has been said thus far is sufficient to show that the Renaissance and the Reformation did not do away with mysticism which is deep-rooted in the Christian religion because of its root origins in contemplative Hindu thought. Nor does Dean Inge himself hold that the "negative road is a pure error". As he himself frankly admits, "there is a negative side in religion, both in thought and practice. We are first impelled to seek the Infinite by the limitations of the finite, which appear to the soul as bonds and prison walls. It is natural first to think of the Infinite as that in which these barriers are done away. And in practice we must die daily, if our inward man is to be daily renewed...." The individual has generally to pass through the quagmire of the "everlasting No", before he can set his feet on firm ground; and the Christian races, it seems, were obliged to go through the same experience. Moreover, there is a sense in which all moral effort aims at destroying the conditions of its own existence, and so ends logically in self-negation. Our highest aim, as regards ourselves, is to eradicate not only vice but temptation. We do not feel that we have the victory until we no longer wish to offend."<sup>1076</sup> But a thought crosses the mind of Dean Inge and he says that a being who is entirely free from temptation would be either

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<sup>1075</sup> See Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*; for German Theology at pages 363-365; for Luther, at page 196; for Weigel, at pages 274-76; for Boehme, at pages 277-86; for Molinos, at pages 231-34 and for Law, at pages 278-86.

<sup>1076</sup> *Ibid.*, 115-116.

more or less than a man—either a beast or a God, as Aristotle has it. There is, accordingly, “a half truth”, in his opinion, “in the theory that the goal of earthly striving is negation and absorption”. It at once becomes false, he adds, “if we forget that it is a goal which cannot be reached in time, and which is achieved, not by good and evil neutralising each other, but by death being swallowed up in victory. If morality ceases to be moral when it has achieved its goal, it must pass into something which includes—as well as transcends—a condition which is certainly not fulfilled by contemplative passivity.” This criticism would be true if the premises on which it is based were granted to be true. But as Dean Inge himself admits, it would be a misuse of the term *via negativa*, to interpret it in this extreme manner. The negative road marks but the line of argument which establishes the transcendence of God, as the “affirmative road” establishes His immanence. A theory or practice is not tested by its extremest abuse of it. The negative mode stresses the affirmative and the so-called “contemplative passivity”, at least so far as the *Upanishads* go, is intended to affirm the affirmative. The text goes “Let him meditate (*upāsīta*) on mind as Brahman” and concludes “He who knows this (*vēda*) shines, warms, etc.”<sup>1077</sup> Further on we have the text, by means of *upās*, “teach me the deity on which you meditate.”<sup>1078</sup> Similarly we have texts, which have the same meaning as the text “He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest”—*viz.*, “the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (*nididhyāsītavya*)”; “Then he sees him meditating (*dhyāyamāna*) on him as without parts”;<sup>1079</sup> and others use the verb *dhyai* to express the meaning of *vid*. *Dhyai* means to think of something not in the way of mere representation but in the way of *continued* representation. And *upās* has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. It has, therefore, to

<sup>1077</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 18.

<sup>1078</sup> *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 2.

<sup>1079</sup> *Munda. Upa.*, III. 1. 8.

be concluded that the verb *vid* is used interchangeably with *dhyai* and *upās*, the mental activity referred to in texts such as "He knows Brahman" and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.<sup>1080</sup> The "contemplative passivity" suggested by Dean Inge is a non-existent, indefinite idea and his suggestion that the negative way is liable to abuse—as it did in the case of the early Christian mystics—is only partially—if at all—true. As he frankly admits, even these Christian mystics should not be judged with "impatience or contempt". "The limitations incidental to their place in history," as he justly remarks, "do not prevent them from being glorious pioneers among the high passes of the spiritual life, who have scaled heights which those who talk glibly about the mistake of asceticism have seldom ever seen afar off."<sup>1081</sup> This, indeed, is a just appreciation of the teaching of the early Christian mystics. They are easily charged as being pantheists in the looser sense of the term. But as Mr. H. B. Workman says, however much they might play with phrases tending to convey loose ideas of pantheistic belief, there are few of them who do not seek to conserve personality. "For the mystics were conscious," as Mr. Workman remarks, "that the originality of Christianity<sup>1082</sup> consists in its revelation through the person of Christ of the depth and inexhaustibleness of human personality." Accordingly in the Christian mystics, dangerous as their language with reference to absorption may be at times, there is always an emphasis of purpose; in the later mystics, for instance, much is made of the will—and this in itself is fatal to pantheism of the looser variety. This is so, because the foundations of belief of the early Christian

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<sup>1080</sup> See the illuminating comment of Rāmānuja on IV. 1. 1, *Āvrittirasakridupadēśāt*.

<sup>1081</sup> Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 117.

<sup>1082</sup> As compared with Judaism, and not with Hinduism in which the looser pantheistic ideas do not find any prominent place. Indeed, they are put into the shade in almost every known text of the *Upanishads* which speak of the all-inclusive character of the Brahman,

mystics, who led the way in this matter, were based on Upanishadic teachings *via* the Neo-Platonists, as above indicated. Not much is required by way of proof to show that "absorption", according to Upanishadic ideas, does not mean loss of personality. Indeed, the stress laid on this particular idea by the different schools of philosophy in India, more particularly by the Dvaitins, Vishistādvaitins, the Bhēdābhēdins and others, is proof positive of the affirmation of personality even after the attainment of salvation. There is thus need to distinguish between types of pantheism and this, indeed, is what Dean Inge is compelled to do.

"True Pantheism", according to Dean Inge, "must mean the identification of God with the totality of existence, the doctrine that the Universe is the complete and only expression of the nature and life of God, who in this theory is only immanent and not transcendent. On this view, everything in the world belongs to the Being of God, who is manifested equally in everything; whatever is real is perfect; reality and perfection are the same thing." For a perfect example of this type of pessimism, we have to go, he says, to India, and quotes the text "The learned behold God alike in the revered Brahman, in the ox and in the elephant, in the dog and in him who eateth the flesh of the dogs." He styles this type of "pantheism" an "error" and describes it as leading to "all manner of absurdities and even immoralities", as inconsistent with any belief in *purpose*, either in the whole or in the parts; that, according to it, evil cannot exist for the sake of a higher good but must be itself good. "It is easy to see," he adds, "how this view of the world may pass into pessimism or nihilism; for if everything is equally real and equally Divine, it makes no difference, except to our tempers, whether we call it everything or nothing, good or bad." This is an extreme way of putting the case against pantheism and though Dean Inge rescues most of the mystics with whom he deals from this error, he thinks Eckhart comes perilously near it and Emerson seriously compromised in its direction. So far as Upanishadic teaching is concerned, it is enough to state

that it represents the stages marked by realism, theism, pantheism and idealism. It, indeed, presents, as Deussen has well remarked, "a very varied colouring of idealistic, pantheistic or theistic shades without becoming contradictory in the proper sense of the term. For the fundamental thought, that is held fast at least as a principle at all stages, even at the lowest which maintains the independent existence of matter, is the conviction of the sole reality of the *ātman* ; only that side by side with and in spite of this conviction more or less far-reaching concessions were made to the empirical consciousness of the reality of the Universe, that could never be entirely cast off ; and thus the Universe disowned by the fundamental idealistic view of the sole reality of the *ātman* was yet again partially rehabilitated. This was effected either by regarding it pantheistically as an apparition of the only real *ātman* or theistically as created by and out of the *ātman*, but yet contrasted with it as separate, or realistically as *prakṛiti* occupying from the very beginning an independent position by the side of the *puruṣha*, although in a certain sense dependent on the latter."<sup>1083</sup> Texts of the kind quoted by Dean Inge should not accordingly be taken as typical of the teachings of the *Upanishads*. Their position in the context where they appear is explainable as those which, for instance, declare that with the knowledge of the *ātman* all is known<sup>1084</sup> and which accordingly deny a universe of plurality.<sup>1085</sup> While this height of thought was reached, a prolonged stay on it was naturally impracticable. The universe was still something existing ; it lay there before the eyes of the *Upanishadic* teachers. It was necessary to find a way back to it. This was accomplished without abandoning the fundamental idealistic principle, by conceding reality of the manifold universe, but at the same time

<sup>1083</sup> Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (1906), 161.

<sup>1084</sup> *Bṛihad. Uṣa.*, II. 4. 5 ; *Chch. Uṣa.*, VI. 1. 2 ; and *Mund. Uṣa.*, I. 1. 3.

<sup>1085</sup> *Na iha nānā asti kinchana*, *Bṛihad. Uṣa.*, IV, 4, 19 ; *Kaṭha. Uṣa.*, IV. 10-11,



maintaining that this manifold universe is in reality Brahman, *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*.<sup>1086</sup> Idealism, therefore, entered into alliance with the realistic view natural to us, and became pantheism—not of the type described by Dean Inge but of the higher kind which the Upanishadic sages absorbed to make their teachings rise to the highest heights imaginable. “This,” as Deussen aptly reminds us, “was the case already in the definition of *satyasya satyam*, ‘the reality of reality’.”<sup>1087</sup> The universe is reality (*satyam*), but the real in it is Brahman alone. The same is true when in *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*, VI. 6, the rise of the manifold universe is traced in a realistic manner, accompanied by the repeated assurance that all these changes are “dependent on words, a mere name”. With this are connected the numerous passages which celebrate Brahman as the active principle through the entire universe:—“He is all-effecting, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, embracing all, silent, untroubled;”<sup>1088</sup> “the *ātman* is beneath and above, in the west and in the east, in the south and in the north; the *ātman* is this entire universe”;<sup>1089</sup> “the Sun rises from him, and sets again in him”;<sup>1090</sup> “all the regions of the sky are his organs;”<sup>1091</sup> the four quarters of the universe (east, west, south and north), the four divisions of the universe (earth, air, sky and ocean), and the four vital breaths (breath, eye, ear and *manas*), are his sixteen parts;<sup>1092</sup> fire is his head; his eyes Sun and Moon; his ears, the regions of

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<sup>1086</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

<sup>1087</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 1. 20. This doctrine may be traced back to the great *Nāradiya Sūkta* of the *Rig-Vēda* (Griffith, *Rig-Vēda*, X. 129). The *Purusha Sūkta* is also interpreted as conveying the idea that the Supreme Soul having animated the universe, became also present in man, either in a minute form or of indefinite dimensions. (See Wilson, *Rig-Vēda*, X. 7. 6).

<sup>1088</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 2.

<sup>1089</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 25. 2; cf. *Mund. Upa.*, II. 2. 11.

<sup>1090</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 5. 23; *Kaṭha. Upa.*, IV. 9; *Atharva-Vēda*, X. 8. 16.

<sup>1091</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 2. 4.

<sup>1092</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 4-9.

the sky; the revealed *Vēda* is his voice; the wind his breath; the universe his heart; from his feet is the earth; He is the inmost self in all things.”<sup>1093</sup> In what manner, however, is the relation of Brahman to this his evolution as the manifold universe to be conceived? Deussen would answer “as identity”, following in this the later *Vēdānta*, which appeals to the word used to express attachment.<sup>1094</sup> But this word is, as he justly remarks,<sup>1095</sup> a mere make-shift; there is still always a broad distinction, between the one Brahman and the multiplicity of his appearances. A concession is made to the empirical consciousness, tied down as it is to space, time and causality. Brahman is regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it. The inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him is represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman. We find ourselves at a point where we apprehend the creation theories of the *Upanishads*—unintelligible though they may seem from the standpoint of its idealism—form an unconscious accommodation to the forms of our intellectual capacity. A few of the more important texts which set out the essential identity of the created universe with the Creator may be noted here. In the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* we read: “Just as the spider by means of its thread goes forth from itself, as from the fire the tiny sparks fly out, so from this *Ātman* all the spirits of life spring forth, all worlds, all gods, all living beings. Its secret name (*Upanishad*) is: “The Truth of truth.” “The Reality of reality.” “The vital force is truth, and it is the truth of that.”<sup>1096</sup> These illustrations of the spider and the fire are repeated in another *Upanishad*.<sup>1097</sup> That

<sup>1093</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, II. 1. 4.

<sup>1094</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 3; see also Sankara's commentary on *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1. 14, *Tadananyatvamārambhāṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*. This *Sūtra* is II. 1. 15 according to Rāmānuja. The word *ārambhāṇa* is to be noted in this *Sūtra*.

<sup>1095</sup> *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 163-166.

<sup>1096</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, II. 1. 20.

<sup>1097</sup> *Mund. Upa.*, I. 1. 7; II. 1. 1.

the material substance of things also is derived solely from Brahman is taught in connection with the illustration of the spider, in the text of the *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad*,<sup>1098</sup> where Brahman is described as the god "who spider-like by threads which proceed from him as material (*pradhānam*), concealed his real nature". The last words, according to Deussen, mean that Brahman, by not bringing objects forth from himself, but changing himself into the objects, "has concealed his real nature" (*svabhāvato . . . svām āvriṇōt*). In this sense it is said as early as the *Rig-Vēda* that Visvakarman by his entrance into the lower world was "concealing his original state" (*prathamāchchād*).<sup>1099</sup> Similarly another Upanishadic text declares<sup>1100</sup> that the *Ātman* has "entered" into this universe "upto the finger-tips, as a knife is hidden in its sheath, or the all-sustaining fire in the fire-preserving (wood). Therefore is he not seen; for he is divided; as breathing he is named breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, and as thinking mind." According to another text, the *Ātman* is *amritam satyēna chchannam*, "the immortal, concealed by (empirical) reality;"<sup>1101</sup> and in a third, we read that "it is with him as with a lump of salt, which, thrown into the water, is lost in the water, so that it is not possible to take it out again; whence, however, we may always draw, it is salt throughout." This thought is developed in another text.<sup>1102</sup> To meet a possible objection the same idea occurs in another text<sup>1103</sup> in an altered form: "It is with him as with a lump of salt, which has no (distinguishable) inner or outer, but throughout consists entirely of taste," etc. Likewise, in this manner, efforts are made in other texts to show that Brahman by his transformation into the universe has forfeited nothing of the perfection of his own nature. This

<sup>1098</sup> *Śveta. Upa.*, VI. 10.

<sup>1099</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, X. 81. 1.

<sup>1100</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 7.

<sup>1101</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 6. 3.

<sup>1102</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 13.

<sup>1103</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 5. 13.

idea was not a new one to the Upanishadic seers. It is seen in the *Rig-Vēda*,<sup>1104</sup> in the famous *Purusha Sūkta*, where it is said that all beings are only a fourth of the Purusha while the three other fourths remain immortal in heaven. This teaching appears in the *Upanishads* again and again,<sup>1105</sup> in one of which it is elaborated in a manner which is strikingly impressive. This text referring to the Brahman as Gāyatri, describes one-fourth of his as consisting of the three worlds (Earth, Sky and Heaven), the second of the triple knowledge of the *Vēda*, the third of the three vital breaths, while the fourth, exalted above the dust of earth, shines as the Sun.<sup>1106</sup> The same idea is expressed still more clearly in another well-known text which says that Brahman, after having created the three worlds with that which lies above and beyond them, himself entered "that half beyond".<sup>1107</sup> Still another Vēdic text describes the infinite nature of Brahman,<sup>1108</sup> in keeping with which is the famous Upanishadic text *Om̐ Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam*, etc.<sup>1109</sup> which stresses the theme that though a man may journey from the perfect to the perfect, yet that which is perfect yet remains over and above all. It holds forth that Brahman is infinite, that this universe is infinite, and that the infinite proceeds from the infinite. Then, taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone. This same idea is amplified

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<sup>1104</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, X. 10. 3. The full text is : "Such is his greatness ; and Purusha is greater than this : all beings are one-fourth of him ; his other three-fourths, (being) immortal, (abide) in heaven." And X. 10. 4 is as follows :—"Three-fourths of Purusha ascended ; the other fourth that remained in this world proceeds repeatedly and diversified in various forms, went to all animate and inanimate creation." Deussen's citations have been checked and corrected.

<sup>1105</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 12. 6, which repeats the *Rig-Vēda* text ; *Maitr. Upa.*, VII. 11.

<sup>1106</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 14. 1.

<sup>1107</sup> *Satap. Br.*, XI. 2. 3.

<sup>1108</sup> *Atharva-Vēda*, X. 8. 29.

<sup>1109</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1. ; this reiterates what is enunciated in I. 4. 10 ; cf. also *Kaṭha. Upa.*, IV. 10.

in greater detail in the beautiful verses of another Upanishadic text, which have been thus rendered in inimitable manner by Deussen:—"The light, as one, penetrates into space, and yet adapts itself to every form; so the inmost self of all beings dwells enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside. The air, as one, penetrates into space, and yet adapts itself to every form; so the inmost self of all beings dwells enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside. The Sun, the eye of the whole universe, remains pure from the defects of eyes external to it; so the inmost self of all beings remains pure from the sufferings of the external worlds."<sup>1110</sup> Thus, it will be seen that though there are passages in the *Upanishads* which identify the *ātman* as the infinitely small within us with the infinitely great outside of us, and in this way the identity of the two, the *ātman* and the universe, is incessantly emphasized, as though it were a matter which stood greatly in need of emphasis, still, as Deussen has pointed out, the equation that "*ātman* = universe" has remained "very obscure". The one *ātman* and the manifold universe, often as they were brought together, always fell asunder again. A natural step was therefore taken, when more and more as time went on, instead of this unintelligible identity the familiar empirical category of causality made its appearance, by virtue of which the *ātman* was represented as the cause chronologically antecedent and the universe as its effect, its creation. Thus a connection with the ancient Vedic cosmogony became possible. Several *Upanishads*<sup>1111</sup> can be quoted to support this position. It is characteristic at this point that the *ātman*, after having evolved the universe from himself, enters himself into it as soul. Thus, we read, in the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*: "That deity resolved: 'Verily into these three deities (heat, water, food), I will enter with this living

<sup>1110</sup> *Kāṭha. Upa.*, V. 5. 11.

<sup>1111</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 19; VI. 2. *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6; *Ait. Upa.*, I, 1, etc.

self'.<sup>1112</sup> Again in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, we have the following: "After he had created the universe, he entered into it";<sup>1113</sup> and in the *Aitarēya Upanishad*, we read: "He reflected: 'How could this subsist without me?' ....accordingly he cleft here the crown of the head, and entered in through this gate"<sup>1114</sup> Even at this stage, the individual soul maintains its identity with the *ātman*. It is not like everything else, a created work of the *ātman*; but it is the *ātman* himself as he enters into the world he has created. But the stage is soon reached when the contrast between the Supreme and individual souls appears. This was early anticipated;<sup>1115</sup> but later on the individual soul became more and more definitely opposed to the Supreme Soul as "another".<sup>1116</sup> With the rise of theism, a theory of pre-destination was also evolved.<sup>1117</sup> The *Svētāśvatara Upanishad*, on which Śrīpati relies so much, is the best evidence of this theism. But it must be remembered, however, that here all the earlier stages of development, the idealistic, pantheistic and cosmogonic, continue to exist side by side, as already remarked, as indeed generally in the religious sphere the old is accustomed to assert its time-honoured right by the side of the new, the fruits of which are readily seen in the far-reaching inner contradictions, with which we are often confronted. Thus, not only the origin of Indian pantheism—strictly so called, according to which the universe is real, and yet the *ātman* remains the sole reality, for the *ātman* is the universe—is very different from the pantheism of Europe but also its identification with the philosophy of the *Upanishads* is apt to be wholly misleading. Even in the West, pantheism has been defined in a variety of views and it will not do to confuse these different views with one another. Weissenborn

<sup>1112</sup> *Chh. Upa.*, VI. 3. 2.

<sup>1113</sup> *Taitt. Upa.*, II. 6.

<sup>1114</sup> *Ait. Upa.*, I. 3. 11.

<sup>1115</sup> See *Bṛihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 22; *Kaush. Upa.*, III. 8.

<sup>1116</sup> See *Kaṭha. Upa.*, I. 3; *Svēta. Upa.*, IV. 6, 7, 5, 8, etc.

<sup>1117</sup> See *Kaṭha. Upa.*, II. 2. 3; *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 3.

defines it as the system which identifies God and the *all of things*, or *the unity of things*.<sup>1118</sup> At least six forms of Pantheism are known in the West. Mechanical or materialistic pantheism represents God as being the mechanical unity of existence; ontological pantheism, which postulates abstract unity, represents God as being the one substance in all—this school being associated prominently with the great name of Spinoza; dynamic pantheism, which represents God as being the only force in all; psychical pantheism, which represents God as being the soul of the world; ethical pantheism, which represents God as being the universal moral order, a school at whose head stands Fichte; and logical pantheism, which is enunciated by Hegel. These different views of Western pantheism show how dangerous it would be to seek to define Upanishadic pantheism, as we find it developed in the texts above quoted, in terms not strictly covered by them. If Christian mystics are loosely charged with being pantheists, the Upanishadic seers are worse so, for the charge is not only loose but also entirely unsubstantiated. The fact that pantheism in the *Upanishads* is connected with idealistic and realistic thought should never be forgotten in any discussion pertaining to its exact connotation. Dean Inge finds consolation in the dictum of Amiel that "Christianity, if it is to triumph over Pantheism, must absorb it". Upanishadic teaching has, indeed, triumphed over it by actually absorbing it. This is best illustrated in the *Bhēdābhēda* of Śrīpati which is a serious attempt at reconciling theism with pantheism. From what has been thus far said, it will be clear that both Neo-Platonism and early Christian mysticism were largely influenced by Hindu religion and philosophical thought, and they in their turn influenced Western philosophical thought, especially, through Bruno, the great philosophy propounded by Spinoza. This philosophy outlined a

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<sup>1118</sup> See K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrines*, III, 323.

world-idea, which in its essence is the idea underlying the system of *Bhēdābhēda* postulated by Śrīpati. In this view of Spinoza's philosophy, it is necessary to set out briefly its main features.

### Spinoza's System of Philosophy.

To metaphysical speculations on the nature of the Deity derived from his studies of Hebrew writers and others who had come under the influence of Hindu thought, Spinoza combined the scientific aspect of the world, revealed by Descartes. Though he perceived at first some conflict between the two views, as he pondered, he found their outlines fused; and he saw that really there was only one view to propound. The universe unfolded itself to him as the necessary result of the Perfect and Eternal God. Though he owed something to Bacon and Hobbes, yet he was indebted mainly to the Jewish Rabbis, the Neo-Platonists and Descartes. Briefly put, Spinoza conceived as a vast unity all existence, actual and possible. Indeed, between the actual and the possible he recognizes no distinction. For, if a thing does not exist, there must be some cause which prevents its existing, or, in other words, renders it impossible. This unity he terms, rather indifferently, Substance or God. Being the sum of existence, it is necessarily infinite, for there is nothing external to itself to make it finite; and it can be the Cause also of an infinite number of results. It must necessarily operate in absolute freedom, for there is nothing by which it can be controlled; yet, it must necessarily operate in accordance with eternal and immutable laws, fulfilling the perfection of its own nature. Substance displays itself through an infinite number of Attributes, but of these only two, Extension and Thought, are knowable by us. This being so, the rest may be left out of account in our inquiries. These Attributes are not different things, but different aspects of the same thing.<sup>1119</sup> Extension and Thought are thus

<sup>1119</sup> As Mr. R. H. M. Elwes remarks, Spinoza does not make it clear whether the difference is intrinsic or due to the percipient. See *Chief Works of Spinoza*, I. Introd. xvi.



not parallel and interacting, but identical, and both acting in one order and connection. Accordingly all questions of the dependence of mind on body or body on mind, are summarily done away with. Every manifestation of either is but a manifestation of the other, seen under a different aspect. Attributes display themselves through an infinite number of Modes; some eternal and universal in respect of each Attribute, such as motion and the sum of all physical facts; others having no eternal and necessary existence, but acting and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and definite laws. These latter have been compared in relation to their Attributes to waves in relation to the sea; or to the myriad hues which play over the iridescent surface of a bubble. Each is the necessary result of that which went before, and is the necessary precursor of that which will come after. All are modifications of the underlying film. The phenomenal world is made up of an infinite number of these Modes. It is manifest that the Modes of one Attribute cannot be acted upon by Modes of another Attribute, for each may be expressed in terms of the other; within the limits of each Attribute the variation in the Modes follows an absolutely necessary order. When the first is given, the rest follow as inevitably as from the nature of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Nature is uniform and no infringement of her laws is conceivable without a reduction to chaos. Hence it follows that a thing can only be called contingent in relation to our knowledge. To an infinite intelligence, such a term would be unmeaning. Hence also it follows that the world cannot have been created for any purpose other than that which it fulfils by being what it is. To say that it has been created for the good of man, or for any similar end, is to indulge in grotesque anthropomorphism. Among the *Modes* of Thought may be reckoned the human mind; among the Modes of Extension may be reckoned the human body; taken together they constitute the Mode man.

Man's mind, according to Spinoza, is the idea of

man's body, the consciousness of bodily states. Bodily states are the result, not only of the body itself but also of all things affecting the body. Hence, the human mind takes cognizance, not only of the human body but also of the external world, in so far as it affects the human body. Its capacity for varied perceptions is in proportion to the body's capacity for receiving impressions. The succession of ideas of bodily states cannot be arbitrarily controlled by the mind taken as a power apart, though the mind, as the aggregate of past states, may be a more or less important factor in the direction of its course. We can, in popular phrase, direct our thoughts at will, but the will, which we speak of as spontaneous, is really determined by laws as fixed and necessary, as those which regulate the properties of a triangle or a circle. The illusion of freedom, in the sense of uncaused volition, results from the fact, that men are conscious of their actions, but unconscious of the causes whereby those actions have been determined. The chain of causes becomes, so to speak, incandescent at a particular point, and men assume that only at that point does it start its existence. They ignore the links which still remain in obscurity.

If mind be simply the mirror of bodily states, how can we account for memory? When the mind has been affected by two things in close conjunction, the recurrence of one reawakens into life the idea of the other. Mind is—to put it illustratively—like a traveller re-visiting his former home, for whom each feature of the landscape recalls associations of the past. From the interplay of associations are woven memory and imagination. Ideas may, however, be adequate or inadequate, in other words, either distinct or confused. Both kinds are subject to the law of causation. Falsity is merely a negative conception. All adequate ideas are necessarily true and bear in themselves the evidence of their own veracity. The mind accurately reflects existence, and if an idea be due to the mental association of two different factors, the joining, so to speak, may, with due care, be discerned. General notions and

abstract terms arise from the incapacity of the mind to retain in completeness more than a certain number of mental images; it, therefore, groups together points of resemblance, and considers the abstractions thus formed as units.

Knowledge is of three kinds: opinion, rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. The first alone is the cause of error; the second consists in adequate ideas of particular properties of things, and in general notions; and the third proceeds from an adequate idea of some Attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of particular things. Reason does not regard things as contingent, but as necessary, considering them under the form of eternity as part of the nature of God. The Will has no existence apart from particular acts of volition and, since acts of volition are ideas, the Will is identical with the understanding. Next as to the emotions. In so far as it has adequate ideas, *i.e.*, is purely rational, the mind may be said to be active; in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is passive and therefore subject to emotions. Nothing can be destroyed from within, for all change must come from without. In other words, everything endeavours to persist in its own being. This endeavour is simply the result of a thing being what it is. When it is spoken of in reference to the human mind only, it is equivalent to the Will; in reference to the whole man it may be called appetite. Appetite is thus identified with life; desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof. All objects of our desire owe their choice simply to the fact that we desire them: we do not desire a thing, because it is intrinsically good, but we deem a thing good, because we desire it. Everything which adds to the bodily or mental powers of activity is pleasure, everything which detracts from them is pain. From these three fundamentals—desire, pleasure and pain—the entire list of human emotions is deduced. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause; hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Pleasure or pain may be excited by anything,

incidentally, if not directly. Almost all the emotions arise from the passive condition of the mind, but there is also a pleasure arising from the mind's contemplation of its own power. This is the source of virtue, and is purely active. And in what does this virtue consist? The answer to this question leads on to the consideration of man, in so far as he is subject to the emotions. Spinoza here defines the terms "perfect" and "imperfect", "good" and "evil". A thing can only be called "perfect" in reference to the known intention of its author. That is "good" which we know with certainty to be useful to us; we style "evil" that which we know will hinder us in the attainment of good. By "useful" we mean that which will aid us to approach gradually the ideal we have set before ourselves. Man, being only a part of nature, must be subject to emotions, because he must encounter circumstances of which he is not the sole and sufficient cause. Emotion can only be conquered by another emotion stronger than itself; hence knowledge will only lift us above the sway of passions, in so far as it is itself "touched with emotion". Every man necessarily, and therefore rightly, seeks his own interest, which is thus identical with virtue; but his own interest does not lie in selfishness, for man is always in need of external help, and nothing is more useful to him than his fellow-men. Hence individual well-being is best promoted by harmonious social effort. The reasonable man will desire nothing for himself, which he does not desire for other men; therefore he will be just, faithful and honourable. Thus, rational emotion rather than pure reason is necessary for subduing the evil passions. What are the means whereby man may gain mastery over his passions? These depend on the definition of passion as a confused idea. As soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of a passion, it changes its character and ceases to be a passion. With due care, it is possible to form a distinct idea of every bodily state. Accordingly, a true knowledge of the passions is the best remedy against them. While we contemplate

the world as a necessary result of the perfect nature of God, a feeling of joy will arise in our hearts, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause. This is the intellectual love of God, which is the highest happiness man can know. It seeks for no special love from God in return, for such would imply a change in the nature of the Deity. It rises above all fear of change through envy or jealousy, and increases in proportion as it is seen to be participated in by our fellow-men. "The human mind," says Spinoza, "cannot be wholly destroyed with the body, but somewhat of it remains, which is eternal." The eternity thus predicated cannot mean indefinite persistence in time, for eternity is not commensurate with time. It must mean some special kind of existence; it is, in fact, defined as a mode of thinking. As we have seen, the mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas; in so far as it is composed of the former, it is part of the infinite mind of God, which broods, as it were, over the extended universe as its expression in terms of thought. As such, it is necessarily eternal, and, since knowledge implies self-consciousness, it knows that it is so. Inadequate ideas will pass away with the body, because they are the result of conditions, which are merely temporary, and inseparably connected with the body, but adequate ideas will not pass away, inasmuch as they are part of the mind of the Eternal. Knowledge of the third or intuitive kind, above mentioned, is the source of our highest perfection and blessedness; even as it forms part of infinite mind of God, so also does the joy with which it is accompanied—the intellectual love of God—form part of the infinite intellectual love, wherewith God regards Himself.

According to Spinoza, morality rests on a basis quite independent of the acceptance of the mind's Eternity. Virtue is its own reward, and needs no other. He holds passionately to this doctrine. For him who is truly wise, Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. "And though the way thereto be steep, yet it may be

found—all things excellent are as difficult, as they are rare."<sup>1120</sup>

Such in brief is the system of Spinoza, if it can be called one.<sup>1121</sup> It has been compared to Sankara's system of Advaita by more than one writer. Pollock himself was evidently inclined to this view, as we see him prefix to a chapter, as a motto, a couplet descriptive of Sankara's main teaching, for explaining Spinoza's fundamental doctrine of the unity of the world. The first line offers the admonition: "Know in thyself and the world one self-same soul"; and the second one demands: "Banish the dream that sunders part from the whole." Another writer suggests that the substance of Spinoza corresponds to the Upanishadic *sat* and *ātman*; he compares the *Kārya Brahman* to Spinoza's *natura naturans*; and the *Kāraṇa Brahman* to Spinoza's *natura naturata*. The last of these has, it is added, all the properties of Spinoza's Substance. He is infinite in all things finite and is eternal in all things fugitive. He is the ultimate and the highest reality. In this view, Sankara anticipated Spinoza's theory of knowledge by a thousand years. But the criticism is offered that neither one—neither Sankara nor Spinoza—explains the world; they, it is said, only explain it away, because they are acosmists, affirming the *Ātman* (or *Brahman*) or *Deus* (*i.e.*, God) and denying the

<sup>1120</sup> R. H. M. Elwes, *Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, I, Intro. ; also Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*, especially Chap. IX.

Pollock's version of the passage quoted is as follows:—

"And if the way I have shown to lead hither seems exceedingly hard, yet it may be discovered. That truly must be hard which is so seldom found. For if salvation were so easy and could be found with little trouble, how should it come to pass that nearly all mankind neglect it? But every excellent work is as difficult as it is rare." (These are the last words of Spinoza's *Ethics*.)

<sup>1121</sup> Sir Frederick Pollock has remarked that Spinozism as a living and constructive force is not a system but a habit of mind (*loc. cit.*, 381). He adds: "The genuine and durable triumphs of philosophy are not in systems but in ideas." (*Ibid.*)

world. To Sankara, it is said, Being or *Sat* is identical with perfection. By a similar thought, Spinoza, we are told, identifies Substance with God. Spinoza begins his system with the Substance, without any preceding inquiry as to its reality. From there he proceeds to the attributes, and thence to the *modi* in order to explain the world away. Sankara proceeds in the same way. Brahman, or being, requires no further proof for its existence, because from it springs forth all possibility of thinking and recognition. To Sankara, intuitive and immediate recognition is the highest form of knowledge. He too visualises the world, *Sub specie æternitatis*. The totality of things he sees as an indivisible oneness from which everything flows with mathematical necessity. All miracles and extraordinary events are as taboo to Sankara as they are to Spinoza, for to both everything happens only by absolute necessity. Both were engineers of fate who tried to encase it in immutable and unchangeable laws. It will thus be seen, we are told in conclusion, that the monism of both Sankara and Spinoza is correlated to pantheism in equal measure, because both represent the same type of consciousness.<sup>1122</sup> While a good part of the argumentation as to similarity in reasoning observable in Sankara and Spinoza may, perhaps, prove acceptable to some, the conclusion drawn from it would not. Does Spinoza postulate really monism? This view of Spinoza has not been approved even by certain Western scholars, notably by John Caird, who lays bare the contradiction that would result in accepting such an interpretation. Spinoza's conception of Substance as unity in the abstract would, in a word, be in conflict with his concrete idea of Attributes and Modes, as applied to finite beings. If Substance is absolute and indeterminate, it cannot display itself, as postulated, through an infinite number of Attributes nor could there be Extension and Thought, the only two Attributes knowable by us. Concisely conceived, Spinoza's theory must be understood

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<sup>1122</sup> Melamed, *Spinoza and Buddha*, 241, 251, 254.

to correlate the Substance with the idea of its displaying itself through an infinite number of Attributes and allow these Attributes again into displaying themselves through an infinite number of Modes ; some eternal and universal, in respect of each Attribute, such as motion and the sum of all physical facts ; others having no eternal and no necessary existence but acting and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and definite laws. These latter have been compared in relation to their Attributes to waves in relation to the sea ; or to the myriad hues which play over the iridescent surface of a bubble. The conception underlying a theory like this shows that Spinoza by postulating it was trying to connect the infinite with the finite, thus providing for the manifestation of the finite from the infinite. The Self-Evolution of the Infinite would thus seem to be the bed-rock on which Spinoza's theory is based. This idea is inherent in the theory of *Bhēdābhēda* and it would seem that, in its essence, Spinoza's system, in so far as it is a system, is of the *Bhēdābhēda* variety. " Extension " and " Thought " help towards the maintenance of the doctrine of *æternitas* and thus is got over the need for the absorption of the finite in the infinite. This, it will be seen, is the very position advanced by Sṛīpati in the enunciation of his own theory. There is unity, and yet there is diversity ; unity in the Substance and Variety, through Extension and Thought and the infinite number of Modes that Attributes can themselves display.

About the time that Spinoza propounded his philosophy, there were others who put forward views that were far different from his own. Among these were Descartes and Hobbes, to each of whom, as we have seen, Spinoza owed something ; Leibniz ; and Locke. Of these, Descartes, who introduced the mathematical method into philosophy, accepts the reality of the world of experience in so far as this is distinct. Next, he concedes supernaturalism and as such accepts that the world is the creation of God and is wholly dependent on Him for its continued existence. Finally, he holds that the created world consists



of two classes of things, bodies (or "extended things") and minds (or "thinking things"), between whom there can be no interaction, they being quite distinct. The soul can, and through the aid of God, direct but not produce the movements of the body. Hobbes (1588-1679), while opposed to supernaturalism, extended the scope of mechanistic explanation to the whole world of reality. His naturalism landed him in materialism. To him, matter and motion become the sole realities and account for everything. The pressure of matter on the sense organs produces sensations, and sensations produce knowledge. Sensations and thoughts are only kinds of motion, while mind—or soul—is also matter. The same tendency—the tendency to persist in their present condition, whether of motion or of rest—characterises all things. God may be the first Cause, but man cannot have any idea of Him. Spinoza, as we have seen, was influenced by Descartes, from whom he took over the mathematical method. But it was from Hobbes that he derived his naturalism, which he applied more systematically than even Hobbes. To him reason became supreme and with the aid of reason, he tried to discover the inter-connection that exists between things. With him, accordingly, naturalism and rationalism go together, though naturalism, in his hands, becomes something quite different from the naturalism of Hobbes. He finds place in Nature for both the material and the spiritual, for the divine and the human. To him, accordingly, Nature is God and God is Nature. To Spinoza, God is All and All is God. Every finite object or event is dependent on innumerable others, which ramify in all directions. Each of these is, in its turn, dependent on innumerable others. A world consisting of such contingent objects and events would be unintelligible. There should therefore be predicated some self-dependent reality—which Spinoza calls "Substance"—which sustains all dependent things and events. This self-dependent, self-existing "Substance", however, need not be sought in any external creator. The cosmic system—or Nature—may in its entirety take the place of God.

This conception of God avoids the problem of creation from nothing. God is thus deemed to be co-extensive with Nature. Nature or God is accordingly all-comprehensive, infinite and perfect. Nature is, besides, dynamic, exercising every existing form of energy. Each ultimate kind of energy is an Attribute of God. Of these ultimate Attributes, man only knows two. And these, according to Spinoza, are Extension and Thought, *i.e.*, physical energy and mind energy. As before stated, Spinoza holds that there may be infinity of other Attributes. All material bodies and physical events are "modes", *i.e.*, modifications or states, of the attribute Extension, and all minds and mental experiences are modes of the attribute Thought. The apparent interaction between body and mind arises from their being concomitant modes of the constitutive Attributes of the one ultimate reality. The various finite modes are not illusions, but real while they last; and even when they pass away, they do not utterly disappear. For, the One remains in which the many change and change again. To Spinoza, God is not a Person. He is more than a Person; he is super-Personal, for he is more than what we can understand by designating him a "person". And he is, for this reason, not the less worthy of love. Indeed, Spinoza's philosophy ends in "the intellectual love of God", which, as Professor Wolf well expresses it, "is the fruit of that highest intuition to which man attains when, after an adequate discipline of intelligence and character, he arrives at a synoptic vision of One and All."

John Locke (1632-1704), who was born in the same year as of Spinoza and lived for twenty-seven years after Spinoza's death, propounded a philosophy which was limited to the study of human nature and human knowledge. His *Essay on the Human Understanding* was intended to show that all our ideas are derived from experience, *i.e.*, through the senses and reflection on what they reveal. The mind has the power of reflecting upon the course of its ideas, and in reflection, higher ideas (such as power, cause, unity, relation) are formed. He thus explains universal

ideas on an empirical basis. According to him, there are thus no innate ideas. The understanding being dependent on sensations, it can reflect on these and combine them into more complex wholes, but it cannot add to them. Sensations, however, are only appearances of the primary qualities of things—extension, shape, solidity, number, motion, sensations of secondary qualities—colour, smell, sound, taste—are merely subjective effects produced in us by primary qualities, and are not copies of anything objective. Then as to substances (bodies and souls) our ideas are vague, and cannot be justified by sense-experience. It is accordingly impossible to say whether the soul is a spiritual substance or a material substance endowed with the capacity to think. Man, being strictly limited to his experience, does not know the real essence of anything. Every person can be sure only of his own existence, by intuition, and of the existence of God as the cause of his existence.<sup>1123</sup> Locke reaches his conclusions by the use of the inductive method. He thus makes observation his starting point and rejects all metaphysical ideas as to the origin of knowledge—innate ideas, pre-established harmony, divine inspiration.

Leibniz (1646-1716), who was a contemporary of Spinoza and corresponded with him, propounded a theory of reality which is wholly psychological in character. Its pivotal points are his doctrine of monads, the principle of pre-established harmony, and the law of continuity. He tries to reconcile mind and matter in what Dr. Aveling has described as “a panpsychism”, a universe in which all that exists is held to be spiritual. To Leibniz, mental substances are independent activities, essentially individual, yet together constituting a world. These active forces he

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<sup>1123</sup> Prof. Saintsbury makes the characteristic remark that “Locke is eminently—*i.e.*, before all his contemporaries—of such stuff as dreams are *not* made of.” He is wholly a prosaic, practical man and Englishman.

calls "monads":<sup>1124</sup> Like material atoms, they are simple, indivisible and indestructible; they are also, according to Leibniz, endowed, in varying degrees, with the power of mental representation. The human soul is such a monad, conscious of what it represents. Others represent the universe confusedly or even unconsciously, and so reflect every other monad in existence. The world consists of these immaterial monads in an ascending scale of perfection, their place being determined by the degree of clearness with which each actively represents the rest. They are thus of all degrees of development, some having but a very low kind of consciousness or sub-consciousness, others are in a higher dream-state, yet others are wide awake, and have clear thoughts, while God enjoys the most intense and most active consciousness. The monads are infinite in number and infinite in gradation, no two monads being exactly alike. Each monad is self-contained and is not affected by the others, except only by God who has created\* them by a kind of emanation, or "fulguration". The appearance of interaction between different monads is due to a "pre-established harmony". God has so made them that they all act in harmony. The correspondence of the succession of ideas in the mind with the movements of the monads of the body is explained in the light of the same theory. Soul and body agree like two clocks, originally set going by God and absolutely synchronised. As observed by Professor Wolf, the whole theory bears the "impress of supernaturalism". The motive which prompted this theory on Leibniz's part, according to him, was "the anxiety to justify the belief in the ultimate reality and permanence of individual souls".

It will be seen that Leibniz makes a difference between minds and ordinary souls. In ordinary souls, for instance the souls of brutes, there is some connection between conscious perceptions in accordance with the laws of memory

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<sup>1124</sup> *Monad*, from Greek *monos*, alone; an ultimate atom; a micro-organism of extremely simple character. In his *Monadology*, Para I, Leibniz defines it as "a simple substance which enters into compounds; simple, that is, without parts".

and imagination ; but minds, which have clear and distinct apperceptions, are further gifted with reason. Ordinary souls are the living mirrors of the universe of created things, whereas minds are also images of the Divinity himself, the Author of nature, and are capable of knowing the system of the universe. This makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, so that they are members of the City of Minds, the most perfect state under the most perfect of monarchs. Just as within the world of nature there is harmony between the two kingdoms of efficient and of final causes, so there is a harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace. In other words, there is accord between God as Architect of the machine of the universe and God as Monarch of the divine City of Minds.<sup>1125</sup> By reason of this harmony, there is no good action without reward, and no evil action without punishment. All things work together for the good of the righteous in a universe which is the image of the infinite perfections of God.<sup>1126</sup> According to Leibniz, then, substances are really unities and cannot be affected by anything outside themselves ; that if the constituent elements of things are real unities, they must be the only real unities, and that if they are to keep together as real unities, they can only be compounded by aggregation ; that we have in experience an instance of such a real unity in our self, which, though indivisible into parts, but yet is capable of great variety ; that the mind is unaffected in its experience by anything outside of itself, which shows that real unities are pregnant with their own nature ; that the essence of material substance is not extension, nor even motion, but force, a character in things which is pre-supposed by solidity and motion ; that real entities must, therefore, be conceived to be endowed with force in the same manner

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<sup>1125</sup> A generalization based on Leibniz's own words occurring in his *Monadology*, Paras 85 to 89.

<sup>1126</sup> See *Monadology*, Para 90. *Vide The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, ed. Mary Morris and C. R. Morris.

as the soul is endowed with activity ; that since there cannot be any interaction between real unities, there must be pre-established harmony in order to give unity to the universe, as without such harmony, there would be a chaotic plurality and everything would be purposeless, which seems absurd ; that reality is governed not by mechanical laws, but by the law of sufficient reason ; that the real world is not the only possible world, but the best of possible worlds ; that everything is ordered not by a mechanistic necessity but by the moral necessity to work for the highest good of minds ; and that this is achieved by making the kingdom of nature subservient to the kingdom of minds, God being at once the Architect of the one and the Monarch of the other.<sup>1127</sup> Leibniz thus postulates that minds are the mirrors of the Divinity himself ; they are capable of knowing the system of the universe ; they are capable of entering into a kind of society with God ; they are members of the City of Minds, the most perfect state under the most perfect of monarchs.<sup>1128</sup> There is thus evidence enough to indicate that Leibniz postulates not only individuality of the soul, but also its permanence ; not only its permanence but also its association with God ; not only its association with but also its origin in God. In these views, Leibniz approaches certain aspects of the *Bhēdābhēta* view. He holds that "there is never, strictly speaking, absolute generation nor perfect death, consisting in the separation of the soul. And what we call *generation* is a development and a growth, while what we call *death* is an envelopment and a diminution." In the next paragraph, Leibniz adds that "philosophers have been much embarrassed over the origin of forms, entelechies or souls. But to-day when exact researches on plants, insects and animals have revealed the fact that the organic bodies of nature are never produced from a chaos or from putrefaction, but always

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<sup>1127</sup> See C. R. Morris, *Introduction to the Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, xxiv-xxv.

<sup>1128</sup> *Monadology*, Paras 83-85.

from seeds, wherein there was certainly some *performance*, we conclude not only that the organic body was already present before conception, but also that there was a soul in this body; that, in a word, the animal itself was present, and that by means of conception it was merely prepared for a great transformation, so as to become an animal of another kind. We even see something of this kind apart from birth, as when worms become flies, and caterpillars become butterflies."<sup>1129</sup>

Leibniz did not agree with Spinoza in fundamental points and expresses his dissent from him in some of his works.<sup>1130</sup> Pollock strongly criticizes Leibniz's attitude towards Spinoza, and his "tone of systematic depreciation", as he calls it, in his works. He even says that Leibniz's attitude "encouraged injustice towards Spinoza" and contributed its share "in keeping Spinoza out of his rightful place".<sup>1131</sup> Whether this is so or not, there is no question that Leibniz, holding the views he did, could not but disagree from the views of Spinoza.

#### Influence of Spinoza: Bhedabheda in the West.

The views of later writers on philosophy are mainly based on the systems of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke or Leibniz. These provided, as Professor Wolf says, "the broad foundations for all, nearly all the philosophies" which have been propounded since then during the past two centuries. There is hardly any doubt that Leibniz helped Kant to effect the Copernican revolution he did in logic. Through Wolff, the chief follower of Leibniz, Kant sought to revivify philosophy. But the influence of Spinoza on German thought generally was far greater than that of Leibniz. F. H. Jacobi (1743-1819) spoke of Spinoza's philosophy as logically unanswerable though

<sup>1129</sup> *Monadology*, Para 74.

<sup>1130</sup> See *Theodicy*. Morris, *Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*, page 196; page 242, Para 173.

<sup>1131</sup> Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 355.

morally unacceptable.<sup>1132</sup> Lessing (1729-1781) said that there was no other philosophy but Spinoza's. Kant was not wholly unaffected by its rising influence but Goethe (1749-1832) assimilated and used it. J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), though he started as a disciple of Kant, broke away from him subsequently and developed a philosophy in which we see how he had studied Spinoza and how he had felt the power and the influence of Spinoza's world-idea. He took Spinoza's metaphysical interpretations of theology with but little alteration, though he diverged from Spinoza's theory of substance. He argued that even the Absolute is the product of the mind. The whole of experience—not its form only—is generated by the "absolute self" in which individual minds participate. The "absolute self" divides itself into a knowing self and a known object, because the moral growth of the self needs objects as obstacles to be surmounted by moral endeavour. For similar reasons, he holds that the absolute self must divide into many selves, otherwise there would be no opportunity for the exercise of moral duties. But the many selves are all expressions of one moral order, which is the absolute self or God. He thus tries to harmonize realism with idealism and in doing so reaches the *Bhēdābhēda* position. No wonder that his philosophy impressed Carlyle. "So robust an intellect, a soul so calm," said Carlyle of Fichte, "so lofty, massive, and immoveable, has not mingled in philosophic discussion since the time of Luther...the cold, colossal, adamantine spirit standing erect and clear, like Cato Major among degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa and to have discoursed of Beauty and Virtue in the groves of Academe."

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<sup>1132</sup> Jacobi contended for the dogma of immediate cognition as the special organ of the supersensuous. As Schwegler suggests, he failed to note that cognition has, as already described, a series of subjective intermediating movements and can pretend to immediacy only in entire oblivion of its own nature and origin.



Hegel (1770-1831), though he criticized Spinoza, was greatly influenced by him. He repeatedly said that to be a philosopher, you must first be a Spinozist and that if you have not Spinozism, you have no philosophy. It is to be feared that Hegel criticized Spinoza not for what he actually said or thought but for what was understood as Spinoza's view in his time.<sup>1133</sup> However this may be, the fact remains that his theory endeavours to harmonize the absolute with the many. The philosophy of Hegel resolves being into thought, and thought into the unity of the logical moments of simple apprehension, judgment and reason, all purely spiritual acts, whereby being in itself, or *seyn*, becomes other than itself, or *für sich seyn*, the universal being first by separating from itself particularised, and then by return into itself individualised, the whole being what Hegel characterizes as *Des Process des Geistes* or "the Process of the Spirit". This is what has been called "the secret of Hegel". It is an open secret, as has been well said, and one too that pervades the whole of his system. "Open where you will," writes Dr. Sterling, the first of his chief exponents in England, "you find him always engaged in saying pretty well the same thing"—always identity by otherness passing into selfness or making that for itself which is at first *in* itself. The unity that Hegel aims at is, again, *Bhēdābhēda*, wherein difference is particularised while unity is stressed. The two seem to be opposed to each other but are really allied to each other. Hegel's identity of the opposites is what we see in *Bhēdābhēda*. The similarity does not end there, for we see *Bhēdābhēda* more than lurking in Hegel's description of the nature of the absolute and its separation from itself.

F. W. S. Schelling (1775-1854), though originally a student of Hegel, later attached himself to Fichte, and then departed from him in restoring the Absolute to the position of an unknown thing-in-itself. He re-established once

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<sup>1133</sup> See Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 372, f.n. 2.

again the reality of the physical world. To him the beauty of the material world is sufficient ground for its reality. It is an expression of the Absolute as the mind is. The Absolute thus is neither mind nor matter, though it expresses itself in both. Thus Schelling's theory of unity is essentially based on the idea of the Absolute being allowed its place of pre-eminence. Though he has been criticized as having gone back to Spinozism, it is clear that he urges as much the reality of the Absolute as the reality of the material world. That is just where he agrees with the *Bhēdābhēda* theory, which refuses to yield either the Absolute or the material world.

J. T. Fechner (1801-1887), the great psychophysicist, who laid the foundations of the science of psychophysics in his *Elements of Psychophysics*, has elaborated a theory which has to be described as a phase of *Bhēdābhēda*. He regards the universe as a society of souls, and God as the supreme all-embracing Soul. To him, inwardly all souls are mental, though they appear outwardly to each other as material bodies. Just as smaller bodies are included in larger bodies, and all bodies are included in physical nature, so some souls are included in others, and the soul of God embraces all other souls.

Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), the German philosopher, author of *Microcosmus*, developed a system of teleological idealism—sometimes also called as idealistic pantheism—which is largely based on ethical considerations. According to it, ultimate reality is mental substance. Material phenomena are, in his view, appearances produced by souls or spiritual monads, but he held that these monads are not independent substances, but modes or states of God, who is the sole and infinite Substance. He repudiated both agnosticism and a mere mechanical view of the universe. In his view, mechanistic phenomena are appearances resulting from the uniform laws with which God comes out of these immanent activities which, he suggests, are, at the same time, directed to divine ends. He thus endeavoured to reconcile idealism with what might be called qualified

monadism of a kind which, while it is a departure from that of Leibniz, contains the elements of the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine.

T. H. Green (1838-1882) and F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) continued in the spiritual tradition set up by Hegel. Green led the protest against empiricism and evolutionism, which denied to man a sense of moral obligation. Man is not a being who is simply "the result of natural forces". To understand his real nature, it is necessary to understand, first, the nature of our consciousness, the reality of which is all that we are sure of in the first instance. Human consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. In man, even the simplest process of sense-perception is not a mere change, but the consciousness of a change. Human experience, thus, consists not only of mere events, physical or mental, but of recognitions of such events. What is apprehended, accordingly, is never a bare fact, but a recognized fact, a synthesis of relations in a consciousness which involves a self as well as the elements of the objects apprehended, which it holds together in the unity of the act of perception. Knowledge therefore always implies the work of the mind or self. The work of the mind, however, is not capricious or arbitrary. This is attested by the common distinction between truth and error, between reality and illusion and by the very existence of the sciences. But all this, in the view of Green, implies that the reality which we know is an intelligible reality, an ideal system, in short, a spiritual world. And such a world, in his opinion, can only be explained by reference to a spiritual "principle which renders all relations possible and is itself determined by none of them", an absolute and eternal self-consciousness which apprehends as a whole what man knows only in part. This "principle", this absolute, and eternal self-consciousness, is, to him, God. In some measure, man partakes of the self-consciousness of God. This participation is the source of morality and religion. For a self-conscious personality, according to him, cannot be supposed to pass away but

must partake of the nature of the eternal. A bridge between the Absolute and the finite is thus created—by the “principle which renders all relations possible and is itself determined by none of them”. The Absolute is the ideal and the finite partakes of its nature—the self-consciousness of the one being the self-consciousness of the other. Thus, the finite partakes of the “nature of the eternal”. Green thus affirms both unity and difference between the Absolute and the finite and harmonizes both by postulating a spiritual world, an “ideal system”, drawn from his Hegelian repertoire. F. H. Bradley, if anything, is even more specific. He feels that the Hegelian view that the “real” is the natural, adopted by Green, is far from satisfying. He finds this kind of idealism not only “as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism” but also the apparent glory of the perceived world as much “a deception and a cheat”, if it covers “some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories,” which Hegel’s idealism regards as ultimate reality. He makes “immediate experience” rather than “cognitive consciousness” his starting-point. He finds in immediate experience “an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one”. It is doubtless at first an undifferentiated unity, and non-relational but it contains implicitly numerous distinctions which discursive thought or judgment makes explicit. For immediate experience is felt to be inadequate, and thought is our endeavour to supplement it by introducing distinctions, abstractions, qualifications, relations, etc. But the categories and concepts with which thought operates, though useful as working ideas for the special tasks of science, are unsatisfactory for a philosophic understanding of ultimate reality. “The nature studied by the observer and by the poet and painter, is in all its sensible and emotional fulness a very real Nature. It is in most respects more real than the strict object of physical science.” For the concepts of science are abstract and not ultimately true. Space and time, relation and quality, primary and secondary qualities, motion and change, causation and

activity, self and things-in-themselves—all these notions, when closely examined, end in self-contradiction, and are therefore applicable only to mere “appearances”, not to ultimate reality. For ultimate reality must be self-consistent and harmonious. Yet even “appearances” cannot be mere illusions, though Bradley sometimes describes them as such. They must have a place in ultimate reality. How is ultimate Reality, the Absolute, to be conceived? The clue to such a conception, though a very inadequate conception, is sought by Bradley in immediate experience, at least in immediate experience at—as it has been put—a higher remove. The Absolute is a Spirit embracing and completing all finite experiences and “appearances”. And the experience of the Absolute or the Absolute experience, repeats at a higher remove, with infinitely greater wealth and perfection, the “immediate feeling”, the “knowing and being in one”, which characterizes the “immediate experience” of human beings. “Reality is one experience” and “experience” exhausts all reality. “There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence. Feeling, thought and volition—any groups under which we class psychical phenomena—are all the material of existence. And there is no other material actual or even possible.” Spirit is to Bradley “the unity of the manifold in which externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. “Outside of spirit,” according to him, “there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.” To Bradley, the Absolute was supra-personal, and it “has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number.” The Absolute is a Spirit which embraces and completes all finite experiences and “appearances”. And that Spirit is the unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has ceased. Finite experiences are there, but they are embraced in the Spirit—the Absolute; the unity of the manifold makes the Spirit, the externality of the manifold having ceased. This conception of

the Absolute is much like *Bhēdābhēda*, which postulates the unity of the manifold, the manifold having lost its externality.

B. Bosanquet (1848-1923), who makes thought the pathway to absolute reality, reaches the *Bhēdābhēda* position in a different manner. He refutes the idea that thought could lead, by its abstraction, to any inconsistencies. It is wrong, in his view, to identify thought with the formation of abstract universals, which naturally lead to an inadequate interpretation of reality. Thought is not merely abstract; it is, at its best, systematic. It helps to construe the systemic character of reality. Its characteristic "universal" for the understanding of reality is the "concrete universal", *i.e.*, the conception of a "whole" or "system", not the merely "abstract" universal which is only concerned with what is common or general in things instead of with their systematic inter-relations in a whole or system. Thus conceived, thought leads, not to contradiction or illusory appearance, but to the very heart of reality. It is, in fact, to Bosanquet, "the self-revelation of reality". Thought and reality are, to him, correlative. "Thought," he says, "is always an affirmation about reality." And reality "is the whole that thought is always endeavouring to affirm." In all experience, the influence of "the whole" or the concrete universal, is implicit. In logical thought, which follows the natural impulse to seek the truth and reality, we have "the whole" operating explicitly as the criterion. In it "the idea of system, the spirit of the concrete universal, in other words, of individuality, is the central essence." All higher experiences are characterised by the fact that in them comes to light the coherence of things, the "wholeness", or system, *i.e.*, integrity, of the universe, that is, the Absolute. In such experiences, accordingly, we feel "the heart-beat of the Absolute". And the Absolute is the final synthesis of mind and nature. Nature and mind are correlative. Nature is what is revealed to mind, and mind is what apprehends or interprets nature.

In the Absolute all finite experiences are transmuted and perfected into a complete whole. As such a whole in which everything is adjusted in relation to the rest, the Absolute may be described as self-directing. The Absolute is thus the one, according to Bosanquet, in which all finite experiences are changed and perfected into a whole. It is thus self-conditioned and self-regulating. The finite has no significance without it; in it, it finds its coherence or systemic integrity. But its individuality is not denied; but is affirmed and, indeed, without such individuality, the very conception of the idea of system, would be in danger. Only it would be without purpose, if it were not correlated to the whole, the Absolute. In his view, the finite can have no separate existence but must find its place in the Absolute, if human experience is any guide.

Professor Benedetto Croce (born 1866), the leading Italian Idealist philosopher, has propounded a philosophy of the spirit which is likewise a form of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory. He starts with the view that conscious experience is the only sort of reality that need be assumed. But he concedes that spiritual reality contains more than the experience of merely finite minds. He also posits a universal consciousness or spirit which is immanent in all finite minds and is more than the mere totality of finite minds. While Hegel and his school of thought conceived of the dialect of thought as essentially logical rather than temporal in character—though Hegel had to agree that it was also a process in time—Croce definitely regards the cosmic spirit as a process in time and identifies reality with history. In other words, he represents reality as incessantly changing, always active, ever creative. Much like Bergson and James, he rejects the idea of a static, immutable Absolute, or “block universe,” complete once for all. Cosmic activity proceeds in cycles, but is without a beginning and without an end. Within this total spiritual activity, certain phases, aspects or factors may, he holds, be distinguished, though not separated. He distinguishes theoretical from practical activity. Within each of these, he makes further distinctions,

Under theoretical, he differentiates intuitions from concepts, which are thoughts or ideas. Intuition, he holds, is the act of creating the materials of cognition and exemplifies it by the creation of the artist. In this case, the mind has no material from outside supplied to it; it simply creates or produces its intuitions. On the other hand, conceptual thinking operates on intuitions and traces relations between them, or traces what is universal in them. Concepts, indeed, are immanent in the intuitions, it being impossible to separate them. Concepts, however, have a certain special significance. They are common to all minds and are the means of communion between them. They are universal, and are expressive of the Universal Spirit that is immanent in all finite minds. As to the objects to which theoretical activity must always be directed, they also are the creations of that activity. In fact the process of thinking, the object of thought, and the discrimination between the activity and the object are all of them aspects of the same total experience. They seem separate, but are not. It is only by a process of abstraction that a world of seemingly independent objects is set up over against the world of thought. Next, as to practical activity, Croce holds that this is always volition, since there are no physical actions in a spiritual world. As volition depends on cognition, practical activity is dependent on theoretical activity. To Croce, this world is in the region of pure intuition, of experience accepted for its own sake. The question of the reality of experience does not arise in this region. We are satisfied with experience itself, simply as such. But anything can be intuited and taken as pure experience. The world then can be imagined as simply existing and as satisfying our desires simply by being so imagined. This does not preclude the conception of a world that exists and of the idea that its existence is an affair of perfect interconnection and coherence. Croce is largely governed by the Hegelian idea of the supremacy of the Spirit, though he differs from his master in suggesting that religion is only imperfect philosophy and not the



supreme form of the Spirit. However\* this may be, Croce agrees with *Bhēdābhēda* when he refuses to accept the "block universe" idea; when he speaks of a universal consciousness or spirit as immanent in all finite minds and is something more than a mere totality of finite minds; when he suggests the Cosmic Spirit as a process in time; and when he speaks of concepts as being universal and as expressive of the universal Spirit that is immanent in all finite minds.

J. Royce (1855-1916), the well-known American philosopher, approaches to some extent the views of Bradley. To him finite ideas are not mere images, but imply some mode of action, and therefore some purpose. Such purpose constitutes its internal meaning. They also possess an internal meaning; the external meaning having reference to objects beyond themselves. But objects cannot be really independent of the knowledge relating to them. To be related, the object and the idea should have something in common. The reality of these objects of reference thus consists in their fulfilment of the inner meanings of the corresponding ideas. The reality of an object is accordingly conceived as the realization in experience of the purpose involved in the internal meaning of an idea. Whether this purpose is or is not fulfilled can only be judged by the idea itself. Thus the idea itself is constructed as having a purpose and will of its own. Thought thus came to be conceived by Royce as a conscious life in which ideas embody their purposes in objects. From this point of view, "to be" means to express "the complete internal meaning of an absolute system of ideas". This is so, because reality in its fulness must fulfil all ideas. It follows from this that finite ideas must be assumed to be absorbed in one complete system of ideas and one all-comprehensive purpose which finds its satisfaction in the total realm of existence. Absolute experience, however, embraces much that is beyond finite experience. According to Royce's conception, human individuals are not merely engulfed in the Absolute, but are, in some way, conserved. Each individual

expresses in his own way something of the Absolute will, and so constitutes a unique part of the unique whole. Even time, in his view, is not entirely superseded, in the Absolute, by an eternity that is utterly different from it. He rather would suggest that "Eternity is the Absolute's simultaneous apprehension of all time, somewhat in the same way as a melody is the simultaneous apprehension of a certain sequence of notes." The significance of Royce's theory in the light of *Bhēdābhēda* will be evident when it is said that he tries to reconcile by it the theories of monism and pluralism in a manner which is strikingly illustrative of the hold of this doctrine in modern Western philosophy.

This is even more evident when we review the views of a few other Western philosophers of modern times, who have propounded what may be styled composite types of Realism in their endeavour to effect compromises between different kinds of philosophical opposites—monism and pluralism, idealism and materialism, empiricism and rationalism. Renouvier, who essayed a fusion of positivism and idealism on a basis of phenomenalism, is a good example of this tendency. In his later writings, he admitted the existence of more organic individualities than orderly aggregates of phenomena, namely, monads, spiritual individualities and personalities. "When freedom makes its appearance," he says, "in a given being, that being, bound by a thousand relations to other beings, acquires an incomparably more individual existence; what was only distinguished is now separated; what was a self becomes self-subsistent, an essence, or . . . a substance . . . ; an individual, and the most individual that is known—the human individual, the human person." Further, to form a comprehensive view of reality as a whole, more is needed than a knowledge of the categories and particular laws. We have to assume the law of contradiction, and have recourse to the principle of free Belief under the inspiration of our whole personality. Renouvier believed in a kind of harmony between man and the universe, in virtue of which the universe responds to the moral demands of man. In

view of his rather wide departure from absolute idealism, Professor Wolf is inclined to class him with critical idealism or even monadism, but he is not only idealistic but his very monadism and indeed his pluralism enables us to put him down under the *Bhēdābhēdavadins*. Next, G. Gentile (born 1875) for whom self-consciousness is ultimate reality, suggests that just as the self-consciousness of a finite mind or spirit is immanent in each of its experiences, so the universal consciousness or spirit is immanent in each finite self-consciousness. Finite minds are therefore only moments or aspects of the universal mind which at once is and creates the universe. Although the subjective and objective phases or moments of self-experience (finite or cosmic) are not really separate, yet they are distinguishable.

W. E. Hocking (born 1873) who elaborates a philosophy which admittedly contains elements drawn from idealism, naturalism and pragmatism, suggests that sense experience is a common link between many selves and that thereby we get to know directly not only other human selves but even God himself. Hocking regards the whole world as a self. "This word Self," he writes, "indicates chiefly that the mental life within the world has its unity, and that all the meanings of things cohere in a single will." The ultimate evidence for the self-hood of the whole world is to be found in immediate experience. "We, as a group of human selves," he adds, "know that we are not alone in the universe: that is our first and persistent intuition." But the self of the universe is infinite in its depth and mystery. And human life is a reaching out to the reality of things as a region in which the discovery of value need never end. The human self spans past and future, lives on values, and is free, determining out of a matrix of many possibilities which shall become fact. But the human self is not all these things from the beginning—its freedom and its immortality must be won. In these respects man is the creator of his own destiny. That is not a mere echo of *Bhēdābhēda*, but *Bhēdābhēda* itself in its fullest sense as

propounded in the last *Sūtras* of the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* by Śrīpati and his school of thought.

James Ward (1843-1925) propounded a theory which partakes of the character of *Bhēdābhēda*. Though agreeing with contemporary idealists to some extent, he fell back on theism to avoid, it would seem, speculation. He maintained that actual experience does not involve a dualism of matter and mind, but a duality of subject and object and that this duality-in-unity (*Bhēdābhēda*) is consistent with a spiritual monism in which the unity of nature is conceived to be the counterpart of the unity of experience. Beginning with the plurality of reals, he proceeded to find out where such an empirical method would lead him, assuming the existence of an indefinite variety of psychical beings of all grades, some higher than human minds, others much lower, but all tending to self-conservation and self-realization. This conception of all entities as psychical individuals, based on the principle of continuity, led him to endow them with spontaneity. Spontaneous activity leads into regular habits while their co-operation and organization leads to progress by a kind of creative synthesis, just as a melody comes into being when single notes follow in a certain sequence, or a certain level of culture is attained when society is organized on certain harmonious lines. As the final of progress, he suggests the "eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflicts, wherein the many have become one, one realm of ends." Ward thus construes the world as a plurality of psychical beings, primarily independent as regards their existence, and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, "an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity". Fearing that all this might mean "some ground beyond itself", he called in the aid of theism to supplement his spiritual pluralism. Without subscribing to the common ideas of creation, he held that God in some sense sustains the world by a continuous act of self-limitation. The pluralistic aspect of *Bhēdābhēda* implicitly postulates such a view and though Ward feared that he had been

more speculative in this part of his philosophy, and treated it as a matter of faith and his belief in God and in immortality on moral grounds, there is reason to believe that the conclusion he arrived at was the more sound because any other would not be in keeping with the premises with which he started his simple, yet daring, theory.

The ethical philosopher W. R. Sorley (born 1855) tries to harmonise natural laws which constitute the causal order of the existing world with values which constitute its moral order. Values apply to personal life, and their validity consists in expressing an ideal which people feel they ought to realize. Natural laws apply to phenomena in space and time, and their validity consists in their reality. A satisfactory theory of reality must harmonise these two orders. Sorley's solution postulates a universe consisting of a Supreme Mind, or God, to whom finite minds and their environment owe their reality. God is the creator, the essence and source of all values, but is willing that these values should be shared by the free minds who owe their being to Him. If Sorley had persuaded himself to follow out his theory, he would have naturally ended in *Bhēdā-bhēda*, for that seems implicit in it. He thus lacks not so much definiteness as a purposeful pursuing of his theory.

The moral philosopher A. E. Taylor (born 1869), who seeks to harmonise the exigencies of scientific thought with the moral and religious demands of life, suggests that the reality of religious experience is evidence of the reality of its object. Postulating a theistic position, he holds that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself, and has the characteristic of being intrinsically complete or perfect, and an adequate object of adoration or worship. This supreme reality is best conceived after the analogy of the human spirit at its very best. The reality of moral progress, in his view, presupposes the reality of time, of causal agency, of free-will, and of permanent personality. The moral life is a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal and is only possible to a being which is neither abiding nor

simply mutable, but both at once. It is a life of real adventure which begins with "nature" and ends in "supernature". The attainment of a fully unified personality depends on our finding our principal good in God, the concrete unity of all good in its source. The implication of morality is thus a double one. It points to the existence of God as the absolute and final plenitude of good, and to an eternal destiny for the moral person whose aim is the fruition of the good. Taylor's conception of supreme reality after the human spirit at its best has its counterpart in *Bhēdābhēda* which asks the devotee to concentrate on the Self as the Brahman (*Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1. 1-3). His description of moral life as a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal; his idea of God as the unity of all good in its source; and his suggestion that the attainment of a fully unified personality depends on our finding our principal good in God—find a place in the theistic turn that *Bhēdābhēda* receives at the hands of Śrīpati. Taylor's forecast of the nature of man's life "in Heaven", after his present life of "probation" is also worthy of remark. While the process of character-forming will be over, the activity issuing from character will, Taylor says, remain. In *Bhēdābhēda* of the type enunciated by Śrīpati, this "activity" is countenanced.

The Russian philosopher Lossky (born 1870) adumbrates a philosophical standpoint which, as Professor Wolf puts it, oscillates "between spiritual pluralism and absolute idealism", a something which seems allied to *Bhēdābhēda*. Lossky conceives the principle of life not as a force but as a substance exercising the creative activity that is the source of its laws and not their slave. He conceives the universe on this analogy. The world, to him, is an organic whole—an organic whole which is prior to its parts, so that the parts can only come into being and continue to exist within the whole. "The unity of the intelligible world is," further to him, "not a functional unity of abstract ideas but a community of beings that live an infinite life." Such an organic life cannot, however, be self-existent. It

has to be grounded, in his view, on some higher principle. He traces the unity of the cosmos, accordingly, to "a super-cosmic principle, the Absolute, as the source of a plurality of substances which form a unity more intimate than the abstract unity of the world, and nevertheless remain free in their activity." It is thus that Lossky finds a philosophical basis for theism in his "Organic Concrete Ideal-Realism" which, rather not very picturesque name, seems to signify nothing more than a phase of *Bhēdābhēda*, much akin to what Śrīpati has propounded.

The German E. Husserl (born 1859), one of the greater leaders of the Neo-Kantianism and the founder of the phenomenological movement, propounds a theory which starts with realism and ends with idealism, which is the characteristic of *Bhēdābhēda* considered as a philosophy. It is his idealism that animates his phenomenological method from the start. He suggests that the minds, objects and the activities by which it apprehends them are not ultimately different in kind, only in degree. The acts of the mind may themselves become its objects, and the mind is just as active when it is itself and its activities for its objects. (See *Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1-3.) What the mind gets to know of its objects is only their "whatness", not their "thatness", that is, their universal characters, their "essences", not their peculiarities as their particular existents. The phenomenological method is, therefore, aptly described by Professor Wolf, as a method of "intuiting essences". In the last resort, the "essences" which the mind comes to know are really the forms of its own *a priori* activity. Husserl assumes that all "being" is "being in consciousness". The objectivity of objects is held to be due to the fact that over and above the empirical ego there is the transcendental ego, in relation to which the empirical ego is only one object among many. And it is the transcendental ego that constructs all objects and their essences according to its own *a priori* forms. Finally, all the transcendental egos jointly constitute one supreme transcendental Being or Spirit, much like the

Absolute of Hegel. Husserl, it will be seen, starting with Kant ends in Hegel, which is enough to indicate his kinship with *Bhēdābhēda*.

The philosophy of H. Bergson (born 1859) bears more than a mere trace of the theory of *Bhēdābhēda*. Protesting against scientific mechanism, he tries to vindicate the spiritual character of the universe as a whole. He does not, however, deny altogether the reality of matter and of natural law. What Professor Wolf calls the "key concepts" of his system are those of change, activity, freedom, creative evolution, duration and intuition. His philosophy is commonly described, for this reason, as the "philosophy of change" or of "creative evolution". To him, ultimate reality is neither material nor mental, but something less determinative from which both mind and matter derive. It is "change", a flow of events, a surging *life*, moving incessantly to new forms. It is not static. The functions which Bergson attributes to matter are not wholly evil. It is the principle of individuation, it divides the sea of life into separate individualities who can each develop distinctive personalities. Moreover, the very obstacles that matter presents serve as an incentive to the intensification of activity, which is "life". In the last resort, "all the living hold together". In not denying reality to matter and to natural law, in investing the universe with a spiritual character, in postulating the principle of individuation and in making all life to hold together and God, the central radiation of life, Bergson shows an affinity to *Bhēdābhēda* which seems unmistakable. There can at least be no doubt that the *Bhēdābhēda* elements in the philosophy of Bergson ought to be noted, especially as he is held to be the most significant thinkers of to-day.<sup>1134</sup>

From Bergson to Professor W. James (1842-1910), the chief exponent of Pragmatism, seems natural. Like

<sup>1134</sup> "I find too....in the teaching of Bergson so many things that make up almost the very body of truth and fact upon which Pragmatism, and Humanism and Idealism, all repose (or ought to repose.)"—William Caldwell in *Pragmatism and Idealism*, 234.



Bergson, James develops a psychology which lays stress on the activity of consciousness or experience, which, under the influence of emotional and practical interests, selects for attention only certain things from a "theatre of simultaneous possibilities". His philosophy is a protest against excessive intellectualism and the monism or singularism or of absolute idealism and its conception of an eternally finished static world or "block universe". He has a keen feeling for what lives and moves, and to this feeling is traced by Professor Wolf the most distinctive factors in his philosophy—its pluralism, individuality, freedom and novelty.<sup>1135</sup> James bases his world-view on his psychology. His conception of reality is thus built on "experience". He accordingly came to accept the reality of a superhuman consciousness composed of all finite minds. He found justification for this view from evidence derived from psychical research, the phenomena of multiple personality, and more than all from the "varieties of religious experience" known. Though he approved of theism, he regarded God as finite, or of limited power and responsibility. This last conception was little understood in contemporary Europe and it led to many facetious remarks.<sup>1136</sup> But James does not seem to

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<sup>1135</sup> James seems to have resembled Bergson in his anti-intellectualism. Caldwell, writing of Bergson, says, "Bergson's anti-intellectualism rests ultimately upon his contention that the human intellect is related in the main to the needs of action, that the brain is an organ of action rather than an organ of thought, that our intelligence is at home only in the realm of the physical and the mathematical sciences, that contrivance and invention and the practical comprehension of the "material" are its proper activities and that for these latter purposes it splits up the world of the senses and the understanding into a discontinuous aggregate of physical units, which it then proceeds to reconstruct in a spatial and temporal order." According to Caldwell, the pragmatist elements in Bergson's philosophy are (1) his Anti-intellectualism, and (2) his Activism or Action, which latter culminates in his freedom-philosophy and his spiritualism." W. Caldwell, *loc. cit.*, 234-235.

<sup>1136</sup> One of these came from the French philosopher Bourdeau, who has suggested that the Pragmatist God is not really God, but merely an old domestic servant destined to do us personal services—

have meant more by this suggestion than that the world is undetermined so that it is quite possible, as Professor Wolf puts it, to realize in it whatever we reasonably think ought to be realized. James' world-view thus rejects a static conception of the world; accepts pluralism; grants individuality and freedom; and concedes a superhuman consciousness composed of all finite ends. All these are elements in *Bhēdābhēda*, while his *activism* seems closely allied to a type of *Saktism*.

Among modern realists, Professor S. Alexander (born 1859), whose system of philosophy is held to be in consonance with the spirit of modern science, suggests a point or two of alliance with *Bhēdābhēda*. According to him, though consciousness is the highest quality in human beings, there are still higher qualities in the universe. The highest quality is designated by him the "deity" or "divinity", which is the highest quality of God. The whole is, in his view, the body of God, mind being a lower quality. The nature of "deity" is always changing, as the universe is never complete and higher qualities may continue to emerge. Thus "deity" is always becoming, always yet to be. But God as the whole universe tending towards "deity" exists always. This accounts for the human longing for God, and for communion with Him. The finite many are related to infinite One in this manner: "the One is the system of the many in which they are conserved, not the vortex in which they are engulfed." Professor Alexander's suggestion that the quality of "deity" is what we aim at or rather should aim at; that the whole universe is the body of God; and that the infinite One "conserves" in itself the finite many postulates a world-idea which is strangely like certain elements of *Bhēdābhēda*.

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help us to carry our trunk and our cross in the midst of sweat and dirt. He is not gentleman even. "No wonder," he adds, "it was condemned at Rome." See his *Pragmatisme et Modernisme*, 82. See Caldwell, *loc. cit.*, 193, where he remarks that Pragmatists were forgetful of many of the deeper facts of life and of the economy of human civilization.

L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) propounded a system of philosophy, described as a form of evolutionary realism, which is worthy of note because of its attempt to reconcile a number of mutually opposing theories—monism and pluralism, idealism and materialism, and empiricism and rationalism. Following Bosanquet, he pleads for the organic function of reason. He suggests that the whole and the parts should be considered together. "The whole rests upon the parts and in turn maintains them, and it is this principle of mutual support through inter-connection which is the Reason." On the speculative side, reason is the continuous and comprehensive effort towards harmony in the judgments which interpret experience. On the practical side, reason is the same impulse applied to all our experience that we value. He holds that it is a mistake to assume that the whole somehow explains the parts, without seeking also the explanation of the whole in the nature of the parts which it holds together. It is this mistake, he says, which is mainly responsible for the idealist identification of knowledge with reality, for it violates the claim of knowledge to refer to objects beyond itself. He offers the antithetical remark: "Nothing exists because it is known, but is known because it exists." He explains that "there is in the nature of knowledge itself no ground for restricting the nature of the known or knowable. What they are must be learnt from the reports of our immediate judgments in so far as their deliverances are reduced to consistency." Knowledge, in his opinion, is the correlation both of immediate judgments and of objects, for he urges the interconnected system of judgments asserts a Reality of interconnected objects. This is so, not because objects adapt themselves to thought but because thought adapts itself to its objects. But he does not exaggerate the inter-connection of objects. Accordingly he distinguishes between *organic* and *harmonic* unity. Wherever there is some degree of both mutual dependence and independence among the parts, there is, in his opinion, organic unity. The greater the mutual dependence, the greater is the tendency towards

harmony. Reality has, he says, an organic unity, though it is only slowly moving towards harmony. Mind, which is teleological in its activity, helps towards inter-relation and harmony. Harmony helps to keep all things alive. Reality, in this view, stands for development. Hobhouse's conception of Reality is thus closely connected with development, and a development too which, as remarked by Professor Wolf, is "not the peace of death, but the harmony which keeps all things alive". The theory of *Bhēdābhēda* is touched by him in its very kernel here, for it stands for development, in which the mind plays the largest part in bringing about the harmony he speaks of. *Bhēdābhēda* is sometimes, on this account, known as *Parīṇāmavāda*, the theory which makes change or transformation its cornerstone.

A. N. Whitehead (born 1861) has propounded a "philosophy of organism" by which he tries to reconcile the claims of science with those of humanity. His theory is a protest against the mechanistic tendency of science, which concentrates on abstractions and mere logical entities. Actual experience is always an experience of concrete events. These events may be analysed into simpler elements. These events of experience are thus concrete systems or "organisms", in which the character of the whole influences the very characters of various subordinate parts, elements or events which constitute it. "Organism" in this sense is a characteristic of all reality and is not restricted to living organisms. It is a fundamental feature throughout the whole of nature. The universe consists of events and their inter-relations. Larger events are systems of lesser events, and eventually of "atomic" events. Reality is thus conceived as a flux, though an attempt is made to save something of permanence by positing forms, "eternal objects", or universals. "In the inescapable flux," it is said, "there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence there is an element that escapes into flux." Atomic events are "actual occasions", so that an event is a nexus of actual

occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. A thing or a person is a society of events, or a systematic stream of such events, having a certain causal continuity. As each actual occasion is connected with every other such occasion, the universe is one compact, organic system of actual occasions, an "interlocked community" of events. The interlockings of actual occasions are called "pretensions", and conceived causally. Each actual occasion is generated from its pretensions of preceding occasions, and is pretended by succeeding occasions. In this way, each actual occasion attains "objective immortality" in spite of the flux. The "togetherness" of the universe, and the principle of "concretion" is identified with God. Whitehead, however, adds that "God is not concrete, but he is the ground of concrete actuality." Not only that; "the world is the multiplicity of finites seeking a perfected unity." And finally, God is "the unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity". God is also "the lure for feeling, the second stage of desire", and each creature has its "pretension into God". "The theme of cosmology, which is the basis of all religions," says Whitehead, "is the story of the dynamic effort of the World passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majority of God's vision, accompanying its purpose of completion by absorption of the World's multiplicity of effort." But he adds, "neither God nor the World reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty." Thus Whitehead's world-idea not only postulates an organic world, but also a realistic world; but the realistic world is in a state of flux—nothing is but everything becomes, that the truth of being is becoming. It is not surprising that Professor Wolf should recall the fact that there is in Whitehead's theory not only the Heraclitian idea of everything throughout the universe being in constant flux but also something of Plato's ideas of "eternal objects" in it. His doctrine of "pretensions" conceived causally, which Professor Wolf compares to Bergson's conception of the

telescoping of the past in the present, resembles the cosmic process which is postulated by the *Bhēdābhēdins* in so far as they admit a realistic view of this world. But the elements in Whitehead's theory which are pre-eminently of the *Bhēdābhēda* order are where he speaks of the "togetherness" of the universe and of "the principle of concretion"; where he suggests that God is the "ground of concrete reality"; where he says that "the world is the multiplicity of finites seeking a perfected unity" and where he suggests that God is "the unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity". The other idea that neither God nor the World reaches static completion also finds its counterpart in *Bhēdābhēda* which differs in this respect fundamentally from *Abhēda*.

### Spinoza, Father of Modern Western Philosophy.

The manner in which *Bhēdābhēda* is reflected in Western philosophy since the time of Spinoza has been touched upon so far. Spinoza's influence was vast, not only on Germany but throughout the Western world. He has moulded modern culture, philosophy and religion as perhaps no single thinker in Europe has done. Pollock has set out in his work the extent and range of Spinoza's influence in Europe. He has been acclaimed the founder of modern philosophy, a verdict which has been confirmed by the general voice of German criticism.<sup>1137</sup> Pollock singles out, in England, Wordsworth and Shelley, the latter of whom tried even a translation of the *Tractatus*; then come, in his view, F. D. Maurice and G. H. Lewes; Matthew Arnold and Froude; and in France, Victor Cousin, Taine, Flaubert, Paul Janet and Renan.<sup>1138</sup> Mr. Melamed, in his recent study of Spinoza, has enlarged this list and points out how greatly Spinoza has influenced modern culture. Lenin, the maker of Soviet Russia, is said to treat him as the official philosopher of Red Russia. Bismarck, who built the old German Empire, was attached to his philosophy, if

<sup>1137</sup> Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 373-374.

<sup>1138</sup> *Ibid.*, 374; 375; 378.

his biographer Busch is to be believed. Then comes Frederick Nietzsche, the philosopher of Superman. Besides Goethe, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, who have been already mentioned, Herder and Schiller were overwhelmed by Spinoza's philosophy. Though a critic of Spinoza, Eduard von Hartmann, defends his monism and doctrine of the Substance. To the very end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Spinozism remained an important factor in Western philosophy. Herbert Spencer in England, Wundt and Lotze in Germany, Bergson and Renouvier in France were greatly influenced by many elements in Spinoza's philosophy.

### Spinoza and Modern Science.

In the religious sphere, the influence of Spinoza was as great as on the philosophical. The entire Protestant Church was against him. The German philosopher Wolff, though he disagreed from Spinoza, still defended him. Enlightenment, however, soon spread. Lessing's religious theory—differentiating the religion of Christ from the Christian religion—was suggested to him by Spinoza. Kant's hostile attitude towards the Old Testament, he owed to Spinoza. Judaism to him is an example of organized religion without any moral basis to support it. To him true religion starts with Christianity and Jesus the first great religious teacher. Schleiermacher discovered salvation and beatitude in Spinoza's intellectual love of God. Religion to him was not identical with knowledge. To him, its primary purpose was to visualize the universe in its every aspect and in all its manifoldness. This renders man humble and meek. Religion thus becomes the immediate consciousness of being, the recognition that all finality is part of the infinite and that all timeliness is part of eternity. To seek, to find, and to recognize eternity in everything that moves and lives, in all action and suffering, is religion. Hence it is only a state of mind bordering on passivity and mystical vision. Schleiermacher thus makes religion a pious vision from which meekness, love, gratitude, pity and repentance must

be deduced. These phenomena are not ethical but religious in character. Religion is not thus the support of morality or ethics, but only the companion of man. It cannot be expressed in terms of law, for it is not reason but emotion. Religion thus is identical with emotion. Thus though he began with Spinoza, Schleiermacher ends with himself. He attempted to formulate an emotional rather than an intellectual love of God. But emotion divorced from reason may degenerate into wild passion which inspired the Spanish Inquisition and the witchcraft superstition in Europe. In England, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, following Spinoza, endeavoured to rationalize religion. He rejected the dogmatic theories of revelation in the Christian Scriptures, though he was fully convinced of their ethical value. He was for the religion of Christ and not for the Christian Church. To Carlyle, too, religion is a matter of the heart and of the emotions, originating not in man's intellect, but in his intuition; with Spinoza and Goethe, he rejects the idea of a God who pushes and moves the world from without. He holds that God can only be found in the human heart. Though God is the central problem of religion, man's activities must also find a place in it. Both Francis Newman and Matthew Arnold came under Spinoza's influence. The personality of Spinoza so deeply impressed Arnold that he came to identify ethics with religion. He could not believe in the existence of a supermundane God or accept Biblical miracles. Newman adopted in part Spinoza's attitude towards the Bible. In France, Spinoza's influence was less because of the great personality of Descartes. Still, Victor Cousin, Ernest Renan, Taine and many others of the nineteenth century fell under his spell. More important than this, Spinoza broke through Roman Catholicism and made it yield in the matter of higher criticism. Even the greatest poets of England, France and Germany, including Goethe, Shelley and Hugo, came under Spinoza's sway. Mr. Melamed devotes many pages in his volume to describe the new cynicism that his influence gave birth to. Not only poets but



also men of science became the votaries of Spinoza. Among these may be mentioned Albert Einstein, Reichenback, Planck. These, however, were the successors of an earlier set which includes Friedrich Wilhelm Stock, the physiologist; Holbach and Delametrie, the vitalist Miller and the mechanist Hæckel. Among psychologists may be mentioned Fechner, Wundt and Freud. Though in physics, his influence has been on the wane—both his theory of causation and his theory of substance have been subjected to adverse criticism—there is no gainsaying that he still wields considerable sway over science to-day. “As long as Spinoza’s world-picture will continue to dazzle humanity,” as Mr. Melamed puts it, “so long will it continue to influence science.”<sup>1139</sup>

### Upanishadic Origin of Spinoza’s Root-Ideas.

Where did Spinoza get his main ideas from? We have seen the influence on him of Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon; of the Rabbinical writers; of Bruno; and of the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish school of thought and Bruno were influenced by Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism in its turn was semi-oriental in character. As Pollock has remarked, whatever theory we may adopt “the East has a considerable share in this portion of Spinoza’s materials.” But Pollock, however, avers that “it seems impossible, even if it were worthwhile, to disentangle all the details.” This is rather inexplicable, especially if we are able to “disentangle all the details”. Apart from earlier writers, to whom he owes much, this is what Mr. Melamed—in his *Spinoza* and *Buddha*—has attempted to essay and it seems necessary to refer to his arguments to indicate briefly the Upanishadic and Buddhistic elements in the philosophy of Spinoza. It is interesting to note Mr. Melamed describing Spinoza as “the greatest occidental representative of Eastern mysticism”. Though somewhat rhetorical in character, Mr.

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<sup>1139</sup> Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 115. See also *Notes and Bibliography*, included in his work for indicating Spinoza’s influence in Germany and England, 368-375.

Melamed's work shows considerable study and thought, both of Eastern and Western philosophy and religion. Though a lack of first-hand knowledge of Eastern writers in philosophy—mainly Indian—has proved an evident disadvantage to him, still, it must be acknowledged he has tried to probe matters deeply and endeavoured to get to the roots of the main issues involved. A question that he raises is this :—Is there any possible connection between Buddhism and the ideas underlying Spinoza's system? This question is discussed at length by Mr. Melamed in a long and interesting chapter in which he describes how Buddhism spread westward and swamped the Western world with its passive world-idea :

“It is one of the most astounding paradoxes in the history of man's spiritual development that not the active world-idea of the Greek or Hebrew, but the passive world-idea of the Hindu, became predominant in the Western world. But the paradox is easily explained when one considers that the representatives of the active world-idea had exhausted themselves through centuries of combat and strife with each other. When the sources of subjectivism and individualism in Judea and Greece had spent themselves, the spirit of passivity and pessimism of the Middle East settled upon the Grecian Polis and upon the Judean hamlets. The figure of the ancient Greek Eros transformed itself into the patent God-seeker, and the virile and courageous Prophet of Jerusalem was replaced by the meek and the will-less scribe.

“Hinduism in its Buddhistic form finally overwhelmed the Western world, not because its world-idea was inherently superior to that of the Greek or the Hebrew, but because, being passive and still from the very beginning, it had not spent itself as did the other two world-concepts. With death as its goal it could not die, for nothing is more immortal than the cemetery.

“After the death of Gautama, Buddhism stole into the Western world and rooted itself into the soil. It spread its wings over the dying cities of Aramaic lands and

even enveloped the great seeds of Hellenistic civilization. And just as the Eastern Aryan, because of his weakened physique, surrendered to nature, so now did the Western Aryan, in his hour of exhaustion, surrendered to the spirit of the East.

“Although from times immemorial there were certain contacts between the Eastern and the Western Aryans, the logic of history demanded that Palestine should become the meeting-ground of the East and the West. This was not due to any blind caprice of fate. Palestine is geographically situated midway between the settlements of the Eastern and the Western Aryans, and was thus the logical battle-ground for the two contradicting world-ideas to encounter and to decide man's spiritual destiny for a thousand years. Buddhism closed in on Palestine from Persia and Babylonia on the East and from Greece and Egypt on the West. The struggle between the Buddhist and the Hellenist in Palestine destroyed not merely the Greek but also the Jew.

“The triumph of Buddhism in Palestine led to the greatest religious upheaval in the world's history, resulting, first, in the destruction of Judea; second, in the rise of Christianity; and, third, in the destruction of ancient Rome. All historians and scholars, except St. Augustine, agree that the rise of Christianity spelled ruin to ancient Rome. Not the aggressive barbarians, but the ascetic saints who planted Eastern holiness in the Western world, were the true destroyers of Rome. It is equally true that not the Roman Cæsar but the Buddha Gautama destroyed Judea. Not the desolation of the land by the Roman legions, but the dilution of Judaic culture by Buddhism, destroyed the entire fabric of Jewish life in Palestine. The moment when the spirit of Buddhism infiltrated into Palestine and led to the formation of sects, which were opposed to the fabric ideas of the supremacy of man and the value of earthly life, the die was cast. The Essenes, the Mandeans, and the various Nazareans, who were permeated with the spirit of more or less diluted Buddhism, brought there by Buddhistic monks and Missionaries,

spread the gospel of salvation, redemption, beatitude through self-denial, resignation and deadening of the senses. There the ideal of the holy as against the ideal of the good or the beautiful destroyed the devitalized and decadent Hebraic culture and set the stage for the elimination of ancient Hebraism as a force in the world's history.

"In describing the processes of the origin of Western redemptive religiosity, it will become evident that the powerful tendencies emanating from the East, which had reached their culmination point in Buddhism, continued themselves in St. John, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. Their spirit uprooted and destroyed the civilization of classical antiquity and forced upon occidental humanity a new mentality. Paulinic Christianity is a new mentality rather than a new religion."

Tracing the history of the spread of Hindu philosophical ideas into the West, Mr. Melamed suggests that the speculative and scientific ideas associated with the name of Pythagoras were already current in India as early as 600 B.C. He draws attention to the analogies that exist between the Sāṅkhya and Pythagorean systems. Further, the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis is allied to the Hindu tenet of the transmigration of the soul. Even the so-called Pythagorean theorem of the irrational number had been developed long before him in the *Sulva Sūtras* in India. "The very character of the Pythagorean organization, the religious fraternity," he says, "was Hindu and not Greek in origin. Whether he acquired his Hindu wisdom in India or in Persia, there can be no doubt that he represents an Eastern tendency in Western thought."<sup>1140</sup> Not only Pythagoras but also Empedocles, Xenophanes and Parmenides represent, according to him, Hindu wisdom in the West. He alludes to the striking similarity in the views of the Xenophanes and the *Upanishads*. Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School of Grecian

<sup>1140</sup> Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 304-305, quoting Sir William Jones and Leopold von Schroeder. See the latter's Essay: *Pythagoras und die India* (1894).

philosophy, was born in Asia Minor and was evidently influenced by Indian thought. He was the first to enunciate in the West the doctrine "all is one" but without specifying whether this unity was intellectual or moral, though Aristotle says he called God the one. Parmenides and Zeno were leading adherents and advocates of this school of thought, all three belonging to Elia from which fact the School takes its name. Parmenides flourished about the 5th century B.C. He seeks to demonstrate the existence of an Absolute which is unthinkable because it is without limits, and which he identifies with thought, as the one in the many. Zeno, a contemporary of Parmenides, completed this school of philosophy. The Eleatic School had thus for its ground-principle the affirmation of the unity, negating the diversity, of being—in other words, the affirmation of pure being as alone real to the exclusion of everything finite and merely phenomenal. These doctrines of the Eleatics sound like echoes of the *Upanishads* and the systems of Vēdāntic thought built upon them.<sup>1141</sup> Empedocles (440 B.C.), who conceived the universe as made up of "four eternal, self-subsistent, mutually underivative, but divisible, primal material bodies, mingled and moulded by two moving forces, the uniting one of friendship and the disuniting one of strife," has also been held by Garbe to have derived his doctrine from Hindu sources. Likewise, Heraclitus' (480 B.C.) theory of the eternal change has been held to correspond to the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. His theory that everything throughout the universe is in constant flux and nothing permanent, but in transition from being to nothing and from nothing to being, from life to death and death to life, that nothing is, that everything becomes, that the truth of being is becoming, that no one, nothing is exempt from this law, the law symbolised by the fable of the Phoenix in the fire corresponds, according to many scholars, to a similar theory of the

<sup>1141</sup> Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 304-305, quoting Garbe's *Philosophy of India* (1897). See also Albert Schweigler's *History of Philosophy*, translated by H. Stirling.

Sāṅkhya philosophy. Heraclitus' theory of the many annihilations and reformations of the universe, in Colebrook's opinion, is analogous to a similar one found in the Sāṅkhya system. There are many elements in Plato's philosophy which are, says Melamed, of Hindu origin, he basing them through Pythagoras. Summing up, Mr. Melamed writes that "a thorough examination of the century-old controversy about Hindu-Greek relationships justifies the assumption that both branches of the Āryan race were in touch with each other. The analogies and parallels in the philosophical thought of both cultures are so striking that they cannot be explained by logical continuity alone." "Ancient India," he adds, "was never hermetically sealed to the outer world. From times immemorial, it was reached by traders from Western and Central Asia. A country with a rich culture like India, which was constantly visited by traders from many countries, was bound to colour the historical process of other countries which were in contact with the West. The cultural stream moved westward from India, and not eastward from Greece, for the eastern Āryan matured intellectually before his Western cousin. Alexander's attraction to the East was stimulated, not by a sudden vision of the Orient, but by older Greek tradition."

In the Post-Buddhistic era, the relationship even grew stronger, Indian kings sending ambassadors to the courts of foreign kings. This is well exemplified in the case of King Aśoka, whose Edicts testify to the fact that he not only kept up friendly relations with neighbouring kings in India but also sent missions to Antioches of Syria (B.C. 261-246), Ptolemy II of Egypt (B.C. 285-247), Magas of Cyrene in North Africa (died 258 B.C.), Antigonas of Macedonia (B.C. 277-239) and the King of Epiros. The desire for closer contact brought from Seleucus the well-known Megasthenes as ambassador to Aśoka's court and Ptolemy sent Dionysius to India. A continuous stream of intercourse was thus set up between India and the West by way of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Armenia. There was also the sea-route through Ceylon. Buddhism

thus profoundly affected the religious thought of countries like Syria, Egypt and even further westwards. This movement—of traders, emissaries, ambassadors and missionaries—carried not isolated Hindu ideas but, says Mr. Melamed, “the framework of a definite system of culture, namely, Buddhism”. Aśoka’s inscriptions show “a highly organized, legalized and missionarized” Buddhism spreading about the third century B.C. in and beyond the land of its birth. From one of these, we learn that the Buddhistic trinity—Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, identified with God-father, God-son or Logos, and the Holy Spirit—had already been carried by Buddhist priests to all parts of the Western World. In the second century B.C., many cultural centres in Asia Minor were permeated by Buddhism. Mr. Melamed suggests that evidence of this is afforded by a passage of Alexander Polyhistor, preserved by Cyril of Alexandria, in which Buddhists are referred to as *Samanos*, which is a corrupt form of *śramana*, a name which was given to Buddha, and then to all Buddhist priests.<sup>1142</sup> Rome and Alexandria became the goal of Hindu missionaries and propagandists. The statement of Aśoka in his Edicts that the kings of Syria and Macedonia were followers of the Buddhist law confirms such a suggestion. Literary works composed in the West on India have been lost, as for instance, that of Seneca. The fragments which have come down testify to the influence of Hindu thought in Europe. Clemens of Alexandria, one of the Greek Fathers of the Church (second and third centuries A.D.), who had Origen for

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<sup>1142</sup> Sanskrit *śramana*, meaning an ascetic, a devotee, a religious mendicant in general; more especially a Buddhist ascetic. A female devotee is termed *śramaṇī*. Evidently so called from their dress, which consisted of robes coloured in a pigment derived from the Bengal madder plant known as *śramaṇa*. It is the climbing perennial plant, *Rubia tinctorum*, the root of which furnishes valuable dyes and pigments. *Shamanism*, the religion professed by the Turanian races of Siberia, derives its name from *Shaman*, the name given to the Siberian priest-magician. It has been suggested that all Siberia had early come under the influence of Buddhism, its priests, called *śramans*, giving their name to the *Shamans* of later days.

his pupil, mentions Buddha by name. Brought up in Greek philosophy, he was converted to Christianity from finding in his appreciation of knowledge over faith confirmation of it in his philosophy, to which he still adhered. He was evidently a product of his age, which was thoroughly under the influence of Gnosticism. "Buddhism," says Mr. Melamed, "stormed into the Western world at a time when the creative genius of the ancient Greeks had already spent itself. Its commingling with a decadent Greek culture resulted in a new spiritual orientation, which found its expression in Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Gnosticism. A similar metamorphosis took place in Palestine, when it, in its turn, was overwhelmed by Buddhistic influences. Essenism, Mandaism, Ebionitism, Nazareanism were the Palestinian products of the encounter between Hebraism and Buddhism. These sects are the connecting link between Buddhism and Christianity."

The Essenes above referred to, though they grew upon the soil of Judea and had establishments in it, were not of it. Similarly though they accepted the Old Testament, they repudiated it in effect. The descriptions we have of them from Philo and Josephus stamp them "definitely as a Buddhistic sect". "To consider them to be a Jewish sect," says Mr. Melamed, "is to misunderstand completely the entire historical process." Their original name was *Ashi*, which in Chaldean means *Bathers* or *Baptists*. Their very name shows that religiously they had deviated from the traditions of their race, which, by the way, did not recognize baptism as a religious act. They differed from the Pharisees in that they led an ascetic life, practised the most ceremonial cleanness and developed a monastic spirit unknown to the Jewish faith. All the characteristics of Buddhistic life, says Mr. Melamed, such as celibacy, communism, puritanism, passivity, contempt for sensuous pleasures, the refusal to take an oath, and the like testify to their non-Jewish character. Like all Buddhistic religious groups, he adds, they were organized as an order, and as a closed fraternity. Like all Buddhistic



groups, again, they too turned away from life. Their conception of immortality of the soul, too, establishes their philosophical dependence on Buddhism. "The soul is neither mortal nor immortal." This view, says Mr. Melamed, represents a mystical type of consciousness that was utterly strange to the logical Greek or to the rationalistic Hebrew. Only the mystic can affirm and deny in the same breath. Only the mystic can accept monotheism and trinity at the same time. Arguing from the opposite direction, even Schürer, the great Biblical scholar and author of the *History of the Jewish People*, is forced to admit that "Essenism is first and mainly of Jewish formation, and in its non-Jewish features it had most affinity with the Pythagorean tendency of the Greeks". And the whole tendency of the Pythagoreans, in a practical aspect, was ascetic and aimed only at rigid castigation of the moral principle in order thereby to ensure the emancipation of the soul from its mortal prison-house and its transmigration into a nobler form. It is with the doctrine of the transmigration of souls that the Pythagorean philosophy is specially associated, and this doctrine finds a place of fundamental importance in the *Upanishads* and Buddhism.

Like the Essenes, there were other sects who practised asceticism in the spirit of Buddhism. Among these were the Mandeans, a group of whom who work to-day as skilled artisans has survived in the Persian province of Khuzistan and in Basra on the Euphrates. In their principal sacred work they have developed a metaphysical principle, which is, says Mr. Melamed, "reminiscent of the Ātman-Brahman theory of ancient India". Their cosmic principle, the All, is bounded only by itself and all things emanate from it. It is, adds Mr. Melamed, the golden egg of the Brahminic cosmogony, and corresponds to the Hindu Ātman. In the Mandaean metaphysics, there is already fully developed the principle of the trinity. It is not surprising, therefore, that Reitzenstien, a great authority on Comparative Religion, should remark that "the doctrines of the Mandeans bear no

resemblance to those of Judaism".<sup>1143</sup> Ado, the founder of the sect, is described as a wandering mendicant and in all probability a Buddhistic monk. This sect accepted St. John the Baptist and by doing so made it possible for Christianity to arise. But the stress laid by them on knowledge, from which they derive their name (*Manda* meaning *gnosis*, knowledge), allies them at the other end with the Gnostics, their religion being, apart from Babylonian, Jewish and Persian elements, a mixture of Buddhistic and Gnostic practices and beliefs. There is much to be said for the view of Reinach that "it is not impossible that John the Baptist may have belonged to a primitive sect of Mandaeans; if at this early period they already called themselves Nazarenes, we should have an explanation of the tradition which made Nazareth the birthplace of the Messiah, who was himself called a Nazarene."<sup>1144</sup> Mandeism was Buddhism in one sense and Gnosticism in another; Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism were, like Pythagoreanism, largely made up of Buddhistic elements and they, in their turn, influenced very considerably the spiritual life of Alexandria. Lassen maintains that Gnostic Cosmogony is purely Buddhistic in character. And as pointed out by Mr. Melamed, "there are many analogies and parallels between Gnosticism and Buddhism, chief among which are the identification of soul and light and the contrast of soul and matter." Similarly he suggests that the Logos idea, which has shaped Christianity so much, is largely Buddhistic in origin. Philo of Alexandria who developed this theory was, in Mr. Melamed's view, directly susceptible to Buddhistic influences. Alexandria, in those days, "seethed," he says, with Buddhistic missionaries, who not only spread the gospel of Buddha, but also propagated the philosophical teachings of their race. Philo's doctrine of the Logos was coloured by these currents, which originated in the *Rig-Vēda*, in the conception of *vach* (*vāk*) or voice or the word. His idea

<sup>1143</sup> *Das Iravische erlosung mysterium* (1921).

<sup>1144</sup> S. Reinach, *Orpheus* (1910).

of God has nothing in common with the Old Testament, since it is nothing else than the Upanishadic Brahman or Ātman idea in Hellenistic garb. His is, like the Brahman of the *Upanishads*, a static god. But to him, a Jew and one imbued with Greek culture, the idea of such a god controlling the living world was difficult of reconciliation. He, therefore, evolved the theory of the Logos, which served the purposes of "an intermediary between a static god and a dynamic world". It is the world's representative to God and God's representative to the world—in the former capacity to lay the world's prayers before God and in the latter to administer the world for God. Logos is, as Mr. Melamed puts it, the son of God and the first-born. Man himself is a divine being only to the extent that he participates in Logos. As God's son, Logos is the second God. He is uncreated in the earthly sense, but is an emanation of God. This doctrine of the Logos evolved by Philo Judæus is to-day held to be unconnected with the Logos idea of Heraclitus but directly traceable to the *Upanishads*.<sup>1145</sup> Many other Buddhistic ideas are to be found in Philo which shows how fully in the first century A.D., Alexandria was subject to Buddhistic influence. The idea of a static god, the conception of a mediator between God and the world, the vision of a God remote from reality and such other ideas were strange to the Hebrew mind. It is, therefore, as Mr. Melamed suggests, a misreading of history which has caused countless theologians and historians to regard Philo "as the connecting link between Hebraism and Christianity". As a matter of fact, "he is the most direct link between Hinduism and Christianity. His Logos-idea and his

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<sup>1145</sup> Mr. Melamed points out that Oswald Spengler and numerous other scholars have urged that the Alexandrian doctrine cannot be traced to the Heraclitan theory. He also suggests that Philo was not inspired by the Stoics in this connection. "While the Stoics' Logos meant," he remarks, "destiny or pneuma, an all-penetrating moral and rational force, but not a metaphysical principle, Philo's Logos is a cosmic, metaphysical entity resembling the attribute of thinking of Spinoza's Substance."

conception of salvation and its attainment by self-denial point to ancient India."

Thus Buddhism had permeated into Palestine and had affected Hebraic thought. The political ferment created by Roman rule, the economic pressure induced by foreign occupation, the Hellenising process from within, the religious tension induced by these causes, the influence of the ideas put forth by the different new sects which came into being as the result of the impact produced by Buddhistic doctrines, and the growing contempt for life imbibed by the people as a consequence of the alien domination of the country combined to create a situation in Palestine, about the time that Jesus was born, which could not but affect and colour his views and doctrines. The people too expected at the time a political Messiah—one consecrated by God who would emancipate his chosen people from bondage and exalt them in the eyes of all the other nations of the earth as His Elect Nation, and for the glory of His name. In this state of expectancy, when all eyes were turned heavenward, there appeared John the Baptist. He spoke of the world to come. He personified the tendencies of the time. He broke through the Jewish tradition. In religion he was a Mandaic. It was his call which aroused Jesus. Like John the Baptist, he too was enveloped in the apocalyptic spirit. He too pictured only the world to come, not the world that is. As Mr. Melamed well puts it, "he hoped that the Redeemer would soon come and cause the world to expiate for its sins. When he was completely absorbed by the certainty of the coming of the Redeemer, it flashed upon him that He, Himself, was the Redeemer. At first, he barely dared to admit it to himself; later he slowly revealed it to his friends, who spread his message over the entire countryside: 'The Redeemer is coming.' While those who were close to him believed in his mission, He Himself was still tortured by doubts, and the possibility that He was in error robbed Him of his peace of mind." That was but natural for, living in an apocalyptic world, he could not rid himself of visions of terror and despair, of hope and

salvation, which at times overtook him. He truly described himself when he said, "I am not of this world". Nothing on this earth and nothing that grew out of it attracted Him. His one message to humanity was the Kingdom of God, which had but little in common with the hereafter of the Rabbis. According to Jesus, Mr. Melamed writes, "not this world, not this life with its many turns of the wheel of fate, with its tragedies and comedies, but the Kingdom of God is the goal of man. Not ceremonials, rituals, or prayers, but faith in God, is man's purpose, care and aim. Since this world is not man's final goal, everything in it is valueless and meaningless. This new doctrine by its affirmation of God denies life, man, and the world. Since man cannot serve two masters, God and mammon, it is necessary that he dispose of his earthly goods to the poor in order that he may gather celestial rewards. To serve God it is necessary to free one's self from all ties of earthly life, to forego human relations, loves and friendships, rights and privileges, to suppress all natural urges, to endure injustice and disgrace, to offer no resistance to the enemy but to love and to bless him for the sake of Christ." It was with this doctrine of self-denial and negation of life and the world that Jesus broke with the traditions of His people. Like the Essenes He was entirely unconcerned with earthly life and its future. His aspirations were purely religious and it is questionable whether He even hoped to become a religious reformer. He and His Kingdom were not of this World. Not man's welfare but the saving of man's soul was His main concern. This attitude of Jesus was fundamentally opposed to ancient Hebraism, which affirmed life, the world and men. By discarding the world, Jesus renounced Judaism. In suggesting that He was the mediator between man and God, He put His people against Himself, for it is a primary article of faith with Judaism that God faces all humanity and does not require an intermediary. As Mr. Melamed puts it, "although Jesus was of Jewish blood, His mind was not hewn from pure Jewish rock, for His main doctrines originated not in the valley of the Jordan but along the banks of the Ganges."

Mr. Melamed argues that Jesus though a Jew by race was not a Jew in spirit; that he is not to be linked to the prophets of Israel but to be described as the Buddha of the West; and that there are similarities, analogies and parallels between the Buddhist and Christian gospels which indicate Buddhism as the source of the religion of Jesus.<sup>1146</sup> Answering the objection that these similarities and analogies are but mere "chance coincidences", Mr. Melamed says that "yet the fact remains that Buddhist canons were already known to the Western world before the coming of Jesus", in fact, long before the death of Clemens of Alexandria, who mentions Buddha by name in 220 B.C. "To-day hardly any Indologist of note denies," he adds, "an organic connection between the two redemptive religions (the religions of Buddha and Jesus). So close is the connection between them that even the details of the miracles recorded by Buddhism and Christianity are the same. Of Buddha, too, it was told that he fed five hundred men with one loaf of bread, that he cured lepers, and caused the blind to see." In the light of these facts, it would be preposterous to assume, he remarks, that the poets of the *New Testament* originated their own folklore. Long anterior to the birth of Jesus, Buddhistic doctrines had made heavy inroads in the Western world. Innumerable sects preaching some form of Buddhism, made their appearance in the century preceding the coming of Jesus. Mr. Melamed, accordingly, supports the view of Seydel that "it is not permissible to admit an independent origin of the

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<sup>1146</sup> He quotes Rudolph Seydel's *Das Evangelium von Jesus—in seinen verhältnissen zu Buddha—sage und Buddhalehre*, in which that great German historian of religion has demonstrated clearly that all the tales, miracles, similes and proverbs of the Christian gospels have their counterparts in the Buddhistic gospels. He also cites Edmund's *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels compared* (1907) in which it is shown how the tales about Jesus in the *New Testament* have their exact parallels in Buddha's life and career and how in many respects the two gospels are so similar even in their expression as to become almost indistinguishable. See Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 321, 325.

parables, legends, similes, and proverbs of Christianity and Buddhism. Inasmuch as Buddhism precedes Christianity by some five hundred years, one cannot escape the assumption that the newer religion was inspired by the older. The principal canon of Buddhism, called the Pali Canon, was fixed eighty years before Christ. No Christian scholar of note has asserted that the Synoptic Gospels influenced Buddhism, but numerous scholars long ago discovered Buddhistic elements in the Gospel of John and also recognized the Buddhistic background of Essenism, by which Jesus was greatly influenced. The conclusion is inescapable that Palestine, together with many other parts of Asia Minor, was inundated by Buddhistic propaganda for two centuries before Christ. The world in which Jesus lived was Buddhistic territory in the spiritual meaning of the term, and not Hebraic or Judaic. Hence Christianity, including the personality of its founder, is not an offshoot of religiosity but of Buddhistic theology. Only this phenomenon explains the gigantic struggles within the young Christian Church, and the various schismatic tendencies, sects, and controversies in the first five hundred years of its existence." Jesus thus was, like Buddha, not of this world and his religion was, like Buddhism, not concerned with the world. No wonder it was not legalistic like Judaism but redemptive like Buddhism. When Jesus died, he scarcely had a following in the land of his birth; yet within half a century, his religion spread westward and shook the very foundations of the Roman Empire! How did this happen? This was the work of Paul, the great Apostle, who, as Mr. Melamed says, "used the figure of Jesus to impose upon Western humanity an Eastern world-picture".

Saul belonged to Tarsus, an international city, the capital of south-western Asia Minor. It was the meeting-place of the East and the West and the scene, in those days, of Buddhistic propaganda. The Jewish community in it was a small one and was not famous for its learning. If Paul, accordingly, lacked education, he made up by his

metropolitan outlook. Belonging to a Provincial City and proud of his Roman Citizenship, he was attracted to Rome and to the West. Renouncing a worldly life and adopting the missionary rôle, for which Nature had fitted him admirably, he devoted himself to the task of transforming the apocalyptic religion that Jesus had taught on the Galilean coast into the world religion called Christianity. For, be it remembered, Paul's one goal and object was not even the Kingdom of God that Jesus had preached, but Jesus Christ as he conceived him. He made himself the Prophet of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer. It was thus he presented himself to Western humanity. It was entirely due to his activities that "Christianity, an Eastern religion, made such rapid headway in the Occident rather than in the Orient". This success of Paul was partly due "to the fact that he carried westward not the Eastern Jesus, but the Western Christ, the Logos which was known in some form to the entire Western world of that time. He christianized the Western world by westernizing Christianity. His main doctrine is the doctrine of salvation, which has as its goal redemption from this world. Man in this life is under the rule of the flesh, of sin, of the law, and of death. These are powers which represent frightfully mysterious forces, and which reign whimsically and despotically. Christ redeemed man from all these dark forces." But "Christ is not Jesus of Nazareth, the humble carpenter's son, but is a heavenly being who pre-existed in God. He became man only to redeem the world and His work of salvation began upon becoming man. The redemption of the world was accomplished through His death and rise from His grave, for He thus freed Himself from the serfdom of this world. By the fall of Adam this world became filled with unredeemable sin, and the human race would have been doomed if not for the death and rise of Christ." Such was the doctrine relating to the person of Christ propounded by Paul. "A highly subjective conception of the deed of Jesus was interpreted by St. Paul as an objective occurrence, which has nothing to do with personal



experiences and inner processes. He who accepts these doctrines obediently is *ipso facto* redeemed."<sup>1147</sup> The mass inculcation of this belief became the main vocation of Paul's life. It moved him, as Mr. Melamed remarks, "to accomplish immortal feats, and it gave him the strength and power of a conqueror." But it also brought to an end his connection with the Jewish faith. He saw that if the acceptance of the Jewish law was to be a condition precedent to joining the Church, the doctrine of Christ would be professed but by a few. He accordingly permitted the Gentiles to join the Church untrammelled by any

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<sup>1147</sup> Perhaps Christianity, according to the Pauline conception, has never been defined with greater brevity and precision than it is by Ruskin in his *Præterita*. "The total meaning of it," he says, "was and is, that the God who made earth and its creatures, took at a certain time upon the earth, the flesh and form of man; in that flesh sustained the pain and died the death of the creature he had made; rose again after death into glorious human life, and when the date of the human race is ended, will return in visible human form, and render to every man according to his work. *Christianity is the belief in, and love of, God thus manifested.* Anything less than this, the mere acceptance of the sayings of Christ, or assertion of any less than divine power in His Being, may be, for aught I know, enough for virtue, peace and safety; but they do not make people Christians, or enable them to understand the heart of the simplest believer in the old doctrine." The belief is fundamental that there is in Christ, as in no other, from first to last, a living incarnation, a flesh and blood embodiment, for salvation, of the ever-living spirit of the ever-living God and Father of man, and except by eating His flesh and drinking His blood, that is, except by participating in his divine-human life, or except in His Spirit, there is no assurance of life everlasting to any man. The religion of Jesus was simple. In order to adapt it to the Western world of his time—dominated by the Græco-Roman civilization prevalent then—Paul elaborated and to some extent transformed it. A community of disciples became a Church. The divine aspect of Christ was emphasized. Jesus became a Redeemer sent from heaven to deliver mankind from sin and death, and His death a vicarious sacrifice of atonement. The sacred acts of Christianity—such as Baptism and the Lord's Supper—began to receive a sacramental importance. Paul and John saw mysticism in the Gospel and developed along these lines.

conditions. He urged that the law and the ceremonial was an obstacle to the acquisition of holiness and virtue. The law did not lead, he put forth, to virtue and salvation, but bred sin. Man tends towards sin for the flesh is weak and the law cannot hinder him. Accordingly "to annihilate sin and death, God handed over the Messiah, His son, to the forces of death, only to bring Him to life again. He became the second Adam who wiped out original sin, overcame death, and restored eternal life. Thus, Jesus Christ means the end of the law, and he who believes in Him is already righteous and has a share in His life which is free from sin and temptation. The Jewish Messiah was supposed to redeem the nations from the yoke of oppression, but Jesus Christ redeemed them from sin." St. Paul thus put Christianity as the antithesis of Judaism. The latter rests on law; the former, on freedom and grace. The law, according to him, is void, while Christ is supreme. Thus was Judaism rendered ineffectual as a religion by St. Paul in the West. St. Paul was, remarks Mr. Melamed, "justified" in rejecting Judaism entirely. He urges that St. Paul's doctrine "consists of a diluted Buddhism". That is, that it represents a form—an attenuated form—of Buddhism current in the land where Paul was born and brought up. "Both Buddha and St. Paul," he says, "were confronted with the same problems—the worthlessness of life, its sinfulness, its futility, and its evil; both had a negative attitude to it; both had the same starting-point—original sin. Both sought to attain holiness and eternal happiness—by overcoming life, by rejecting it, by estranging one's self from it, and not by participating in its joys and pleasures. Both had the same eschatology. Buddha's central goal was Nirvāṇa and St. Paul's was Christ, which is more tangible because St. Paul was not an Easterner, but a Westerner, both by education and experience. The God of St. Paul is as unsubstantial and lifeless as was Buddha's Brahma. Like Buddha, St. Paul too, tries to escape both from life and from death. He was not satisfied with the thought that Jesus purified life,

but was very happy that he freed man from death. This paralysing fear of death is one of the outstanding features of redemptive religiosity. Death is terrifying and must be overcome." Then, again, "Buddha and St. Paul both used many terms to describe man's sinful disposition. Both identified flesh with sin and taught that the age of fulfilment is the age when the flesh will be overcome. St. Paul's term of spirit is as ambiguous as Buddha's term of soul. Their doctrines are not of and for this world." Both denied man. Finally, "Buddha described Nirvāṇa as the union of the soul with Brahma, and St. Paul described Christ as a being in whom God and man are joined. Buddha speaks of man's innumerable existences; St. Paul speaks of Christ as having pre-existed in God. To Buddha the first-born was 'Logos' (*Vākḥ*); to St. Paul it was Christ." The spiritual relationship—rather descent—of St. Paul thus becomes easily discernible.

St. Paul's Christology, says Mr. Melamed, is Philo's Logos. Though many modern theologians do not favour this view, there is much force in the contention of Mr. Melamed that St. Paul's theology is not traceable to any other Jewish source. If Philo Platonized, St. Paul Philonized. "St. Paul's theology," adds Mr. Melamed, "is anti-Hebraic and anti-Rabbinic in character. Not only his Christology but also his entire world-picture is strange to the Jewish mind. His Christ is not the Hebrew Messiah, his redemption is not the Hebraic Geulah, and his doctrine of the two Adams has no foundation in Judaism. These concepts are to be traced to the Book of Wisdom or to Philo." If Philo's Logos is only a Greek edition of the Hindu *Vākḥ*, St. Paul's Kingdom of God is only a Western copy of the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa. "It has no analogy," writes Mr. Melamed, "in the Rabbinic doctrine of Oolom Habo, for it is not spatial in character. It is only a state of mind—the union of man with Christ. All the main features of the Hinduistic world-picture such as universalism, determinism, pessimism, salvationism, and nihilism, as well as a deep-rooted contempt for everything

earthly, reverberates in the theology of St. Paul. He was the first typical Eastern mystic in the Western world."

St. Paul detached early Christianity from its Jewish origin and linked it to ancient Greek culture. The Gnostics, who immediately followed him, not only Hellenized Christianity but were also hostile to Old Testament beliefs. As Harnack has put it, they tried to capture Christianity for Hellenic culture and Hellenic culture for Christianity, giving up the Old Testament in order, with the aid of Hellenism, to assert the absoluteness of Christianity. The Hellenism they stood for was not the Hellenism of the Græcized Middle East but the culture of Ancient Greece, which was predominantly Hellenic, "tinged with Hinduistic motives". Both St. Paul and the Gnostics were true Hellenists. Both were concerned more with Eastern mysteries than with theological dogmas; both moved westward, though driven by Eastern forces; and their Hellenization of Christianity was more formal than substantial. As Mr. Melamed remarks, "it is difficult to understand how a theological master like Harnack, in enumerating the various Gnostic schools of thought and their motives, could overlook their Hinduistic background." Thus, the ascetic element in Gnosticism has to be set down as a Hindu contribution. The stress laid on impersonal Christ, in preference to the historical Jesus, has to be attributed to the influence of the idea of a historyless Brahman so well known to Hinduism. But after St. Paul, Christianity branched off in two opposite directions, the one beginning with Marcion and leading to Manichæism and the other beginning with Arius and leading to the Reformation. Marcion, who adopted St. Paul's interpretation and stuck fast to his Christ idea, made ascetic life the essence of Christianity.<sup>1148</sup> Not only that; he and his followers, called

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<sup>1148</sup> To Marcion, the Old Testament was the Bible of the Jewish God, the creator of evil, while the New Testament became the Bible of the God of the Redeemer. "Marcion was the real creator of the Christian scripture, which was entirely detached from the Hebrew spirit and background. It is a purely Oriental creation, teeming

Marcionites, who viewed life through the prism of Hinduism, not only rejected the Old Testament but also taught that its God was only a demiurge—a mere creator of the world of sense like Brahma of the Hindu Trinity—and that Christianity represents the separation of the Supreme God—Christ analogous to Brahman of the Vēdānta—from the God of the Old Testament, a highly individualistic being, who has nothing in common with the God of Christianity.<sup>1149</sup> Marcion may be taken as representative of Roman Gnosticism, as Saturnius of Antioch could be of the Syrian. But many sects grew up on the Syrian soil. From there, it spread to Alexandria, where it became associated with Basilides, Valentinus and Carpocrates, who all belonged to the second century A.D. An examination of the chief tenets of these representative leaders shows the exact relationship of Gnosticism to Hindu thought. Basilides recognized one Supreme Being or First Cause. From it sprang, he taught, Understanding (*Nous*), from Understanding—the Word (or *Logos*), from the Word—Providence,

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with Oriental (*i.e.*, Buddhistic) myths, which it stresses in preference to dogma. Both his metaphysics and his ethics betray his Hinduistic and Parseeistic (*i.e.*, Zoroastrian) leaning.”—S. M. Melamed in *Spinoza and Buddha*, 337. Mr. Melamed treats as a settled question that Buddhism influenced Christianity and devotes an Appendix to quotations taken from J. Edmund’s *Buddhistic and Christian Gospels, being Gospel Parallels from Pali Texts* (Philadelphia, 1908). See Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 376-381.

<sup>1149</sup> Of the Jews, it has been observed that “their religion was determined by a moral standard; through them more than through any other race has the moral principle, or the law of conscience, been evolved in humanity as the sovereign law of life and this at length resolved itself into a faith in one God, the sole ruler in heaven and on earth, the law of whose government is truth and righteousness; only they stopped short with the assertion of this divine unity, and in their hard monotheism stubbornly refused, as they do still, to accept the doctrine of the trinity in unity which, spiritually understood is, as it has been well defined, the central principle of the Christian faith, the principle that to have a *living* morality, one must have a faith in a Divine Father, a Divine Son and a Divine Spirit, all three equally Divine.”

from Providence—Power, from Power—Wisdom, from Wisdom—Righteousness, from Righteousness—Peace. From these, again, sprang the higher angels, principalities and powers; and from these the lower angels. The God of the Jews was only one of those angels of the lowest kind who created the world. Christ, the Son (*Nous*) of the Supreme Being was sent down to bring to man, who had become corrupt, heavenly knowledge. He joined himself to the man Jesus, and it was this man, not the Christ, who was crucified. As Basilides regarded matter as evil, he did not believe in the resurrection of the body. But he taught the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Saints and martyrs, he said, suffered because they had sinned in a previous state of existence. Every one, he held, had to atone for his sins in this way, by living again in a different body. The philosophy or rather theology of Valentinus is full of symbolism. He regarded pre-Christian religions as preparatory to Christianity and Christ as the full and final development in human form of a series of fifteen stages of emanation from the infinite divine—the original, invisible, ineffable and self-existent Existence—to the finite divine in Him “the fulness of Him that filleth all in all,” each stage in the process being achieved by the union of a male element with a female, that is, a conceptive and a susceptible. Like Basilides, he stresses more the Christ rather than the Jesus aspect and makes creation the work of Demiurgos, made out of psychic animate substance. Demiurgos creates mankind, material and psychic. Some of these catch a spark of the spiritual substance, and become superior or spiritual men. The spiritual men do not need to be saved; the material men cannot be saved. The psychic men can be saved, if they are helped. “The scheme of redemption,” as Duchesne puts it,<sup>1150</sup> “is intended for them. The Redeemer is formed of four elements. The first, without being actually material, has the semblance of matter; the semblance is sufficient, as matter does not

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<sup>1150</sup> L. Duchesne, *Early History of the Christian Church* (1909).

need salvation. The second element is psychic; the third pneumatic; the fourth divine: this is Jesus, the last æon. These three last elements then proceed respectively from the Demiurge, Haehamoth, and from the Pleroma. The æon Jesus did not, however, descend into the Redeemer until the moment of his baptism; at the moment of his being brought before Pilate, he returned to the Pleroma, taking with him the pneumatic or spiritual element, and leaving the psychic element, clothed with his material semblance, to suffer." Finally Haehamoth and the spiritual men will pass into the Pleroma. The Demiurgos and the best of the psychic men will follow. The points to note are that the theory of emanations is the pivotal factor in Valentinus' theory; the place assigned to the original, ineffable, self-existent Existence, is analogous to that assigned to Parabrahman in the Vēdānta; the work of creation assigned to the Demiurgos, is analogous to that assigned to Brahma in the Hindu Trinity; and the differentiation made between Christ and Jesus. Carpocrates also believed in one God, from whom, according to him, emanated a whole hierarchy of angels. The visible world is their work. The souls of men first moved around the Father-God; then they fell into the power of matter, from which they have to be released to go back to their original state. Jesus, the son of Joseph, naturally born like other men, and subject as they are to transmigration, was able by a remembrance of what he was in his first existence, and by power sent from above, to obtain dominion over the rulers of the world, and to re-ascend to the Father. It is in the powers of all men, by following his example, and by the method he used, to despise the creators of this world and to escape from them. They can achieve this equally, or even better, than he did. This scheme of deliverance is consistent with all conditions of life, and with every kind of act.<sup>1151</sup> Carpocrates not only believed in the transmigration of the soul but also in its final emancipation from all external

<sup>1151</sup> L. Duchesne, *loc. cit.*

bonds and obligations by means of concentrated meditation on the divine unity, and a life in conformity therewith. He was as much a Platonist as a Gnostic and his followers paid reverence not only to images of Jesus Christ, but also to those of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and other sages. Amid the diversity of these different Gnostic systems certain common and fundamental conceptions can be easily perceived. Among these are: (1) God, the Creator and Lawgiver of the Old Testament, is not the true God. Above him, at an infinite distance, is the Father-God, the Supreme First Cause of all being. (2) The God of the Old Testament knew not the True God, and in this ignorance the world shared, until the appearance of Jesus Christ, who proceeded from the True God. (3) Between the True God and creation is interposed a series of beings, divine in their origin, there occurring a catastrophe, at some point or other in this series, which destroys the harmony of the whole. The visible world—often including its Creator—originates in this primal disorder. (4) In humanity there are some elements capable of redemption, having come in one way or another from the celestial world above the Demiurge. Jesus Christ came into the world to deliver them from it. (5) As the incarnation could not really amount to a true union between divinity and matter, the accursed, the Christian Gospel story is explained as a moral and transitory union between a divine æon and the concrete personality of Jesus, or again, by a simple semblance of humanity. (6) Neither the passion nor the resurrection of Christ is therefore real; the future of the predestinate does not permit of the resurrection of the body. (7) The divine element which has strayed into humanity, that is, the predestinated soul, has no solidarity with the flesh which oppresses it. Either the flesh must be annihilated by asceticism (rigorism), or at least the responsibility of the soul, for the weaknesses of the flesh must be denied (libertinism).<sup>1152</sup> This analysis of Gnosticism shows its parentage in broad outline. This philosophy had perforce

<sup>1152</sup> L. Duchesne, *loc. cit.*



to be eclectic deriving as it did its root ideas from Hellenic and Hindu beliefs dominant in the place of its origin.<sup>1153</sup> Gnosticism possessed great vitality. Though persecuted in the Christian Church, it persisted by taking refuge underground. For a thousand years, writes Workman, we find it living a subterranean existence, ever and anon coming to the surface in some new form—usually stigmatised as “heresy” in the Christian Church—the roots of which lie deep in the older Gnosticism, or rather in the religions older even than Gnosticism to which Gnosticism was so largely indebted. In the third century, it appears in the formidable movement known as Manichæism, so called from Mani, the founder of the sect. Born at Ecbatana, about 215 A.D., Mani came of ancient Persian stock, but being brought into close contact with certain of the Gnostic sects—the Elkesaites and the Mandæans, the latter of whom regarded John the Baptist and not Jesus as

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<sup>1153</sup> H. B. Workman, in his *Christian Thought to the Reformation* (1911), describes Gnosticism as an eclectic philosophy of religion, chiefly Hellenic in character, though in union with many Oriental elements, cosmical speculations and mystic theosophy similar to what we find in Hinduism. This description errs in laying greater stress on the Hellenic rather than the predominantly Hindu elements which lie imbedded in Gnosticism. For instance, among the Gnostics, the formula, “I am thou, and thou art I,” which finds expression in Bādarāyaṇa’s text: *Ātmētītūpagachchanti grāhayanticha* (*Brahma-Sūtras*, IV. 1. 3.), itself being based on well-known Upanishadic texts, was common. It indicates that belief in the merging of the separate individuality in the Supreme Existence was a cardinal article of faith among the Gnostics. Lassen has remarked in his *Indian Antiquity* that “the Hindu elements in the Gnostic systems were derived from Buddhism and exercised a considerable influence upon the spiritual life in Alexandria.” And this remark is the more noteworthy because Lassen stoutly denies that ancient India ever affected Hellenic thought. The Gnostics anticipated what the Neo-Platonists succeeded in achieving. Their main idea seems to have been to reconcile speculative and revealed religion by systematising the symbols of transcendental and mystic thought. They failed to digest what they borrowed from Oriental thought, largely dominated by Hindu philosophical and cosmological ideas.

the true prophet—he was largely influenced by their tenets and doctrines. He regarded himself as the last and greatest of a series of prophets, including Adam, Noah, Abraham and the phantom Christ, and described himself as the “leader,” “ambassador” and “Paraclete”. His religion was one of physical redemption, and admits the worship of no personal redeemer. As may be imagined from its headquarters being in Babylon, its doctrines were in the main akin to the old Babylonian native religion, modified by Zoroastrian dualism which ascribes the created universe to two antagonistic principles, one essentially good, and the other essentially evil—with some admixture, especially in the West, of the Gnostic Christianity as developed by Basilides and Marcion. Partly owing to their minute and strict asceticism and their rigid morality, and partly also, as Harnack observes, to the great number of “the cultured who sought for a rational and yet, to some extent, Christian religion, and who had exalted free inquiry, especially as regards the Old Testament, into a battle-rag,” Manichæism attained to a great position in Christian circles, especially in North Africa, and even claimed, for a time, Augustine among its votaries.<sup>1154</sup>

Thus the practical effect of the preaching of St. Paul and the Gnostics was to displace the Old Testament and to concentrate attention on the Christ idea rather than on the personality of Jesus. St. Paul declared the Old Testament was fulfilled and replaced by a new religious development. Marcion entirely eliminated the Old Testament as obsolete and made the New Testament the book of the Redeemer. Marcion became “the real creator of the Christian Scripture, which was entirely detached from the Hebrew spirit and background.” “It is,” says Mr. Melamed “a purely oriental creation, teeming with oriental myth, which it stresses in preference to dogma. Both his metaphysics and his ethics betray his Hinduistic and Parseeistic (*i.e.*, Zoroastrian) leanings. Jehovah, whom he identifies with evil, can be overcome only through the

<sup>1154</sup> See Workman, *loc. cit.*

subjugation of the senses. This repression necessitates self-denial, asceticism and celibacy. His doctrine represents the ancient struggle between Oriental universalism and Occidental individualism." But Marcion did not completely free Christology from Hellenistic influences. St. Paul had, by Hellenizing Christianity, prevented its complete Orientalization. Mani still further orientalized Christianity and as we have seen threatened the very existence of Christianity by his dualism. St. Augustine, though he came under Mani's influence, later left him and asserted himself a devotee of the Church. His opposition to Pelagius (400-418 A.D.) shows him in the light of one who desired to make his own theology safe for the Church. A favourite principle with Pelagius was the declaration, "I ought, therefore, I can". He stood for a rational idea of God. In his view, Augustine's doctrine of total depravity and of the consequent bondage of the will, cut the nerve of all human effort. He insisted, accordingly, that man is able to do all that God commands. In keeping with this, he denied original sin, holding that since obligation implies ability, the power of choosing the good exists after the Fall precisely as before it. It is apparent that these positions rest upon a theory of freedom quite different from St. Augustine's. Augustine believed in freedom in the ordinary actions of life, but taught that in its highest form, as the power to keep God's law, freedom is a lost gift, which only grace can restore. By freedom Pelagius meant an equipoise of the will, which enables us at any time, whatever our previous history may have been, to choose between the evil and the good. The condemnation of Pelagius by the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D. meant the acceptance by the Church of St. Augustine's doctrine of pre-destination, which later became a matter for hot dispute in the Christian Church.<sup>1155</sup>

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<sup>1155</sup> See J. H. Blunt, *Dictionary of Sects* (1903); also the *Protestant Dictionary*. Semi-pelagianism, a modified form of Pelagianism, was a reaction against the Augustinian views of pre-destination and grace. This was also condemned in 529 A.D. See Blunt, *loc. cit.* and the *Protestant Dictionary*, and *Catholic Dictionary*.

Philosophically, his doctrine is eclectic and a combination of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Neo-Platonism. "In its final form," says Mr. Melamed, "his God-idea is reminiscent of Plotinus, Philo and many of the Gnostics. It is the timeless, attributeless, intangible oneness, removed from all reality and is a dead deity. It is as bereft of will or intellect as Buddha's Brahma, Philo's Theos and Spinoza's *Deus*." It was this neo-Platonic God-doctrine, the Western echo of the Brahman doctrine, which crowded Manichæism out of St. Augustine's head and brought him close to the Christ idea of St. Paul. He must be ranked a neo-Platonic monist rather than a monotheist. He identified God with being *per se*. God is unknowable because He has no attributes and He is unknowable because we can know nothing about Him. Our knowledge of Him is purely negative. We only know that He is not identical with any of the phenomena of nature or mind. Since He is everywhere He is also in man's mind and hence it has some perception of Him. It can have a premonition of Him, although it cannot visualize Him. Our initiative knowledge of Him cannot be expressed in words. He cannot be even called the unspeakable, for in doing so, we already speak of Him. St. Augustine, following Plotinus, uses only negative formulæ to indicate God's ineffability. Though he speaks of the triune God, and as such makes Him appear tangible, he speaks of Him as inexpressible, indefinable and unknowable. Like the One of Plotinus, his God also transcends time. Time is the measure of corporeal motion and where there is no corporeal motion there is no time. In God, however, there is no-motion and so there can be no experience of time. God can, therefore, only know the present. He is pure being and for Him whatsoever is only is. How a dynamic world could be created by a static God, is not explained by St. Augustine. Holding, as he does, conflicting views drawn from Old Testament, Platonic and Stoic sources, he holds that the world has not always existed; that it was created out of nothing in a

given moment; and that with its creation, motion and time began. The purpose of creation in the economy of a static God is, however, not indicated by him. While he denies intellectuality to God, he asserts that God created the world by an act of his own free will. While he does not explain God's relationship to this world—or its reality—he yet paints a detailed picture of creation. While he describes Him as bare being, he individualises Him suddenly and evolves the doctrine of the Trinity. As Mr. Melamed puts it, Augustine “attempted to synthesise the impossible—Biblical individualism and neo-Platonic universalism,” derived, as above shown, from Hindu sources. The latter theory he owed to Plotinus, in whose doctrine of the three hypostases of the divine, a Trinity theory is clearly to be seen. St. Augustine gave form to what was vague in Plotinus. Though the founder of the Western, he developed an Eastern trend of thought. His denial of the reality of the world made him arrive at the very doctrine of self-denial and asceticism, which Buddha had preached long before him. Similarly, the development of the Logos doctrine—derived from the Neo-Platonists—marks the abandonment of the idea of the Old Testament individual God in favour of the Hindu idea of Parabrahman and all it connotes—an idea with which Plotinus and his successors were fully acquainted. This is what Mr. Melamed, in his eloquent language, describes as “the triumph of Eastern mysticism over Western rationalism”. It must be added that Mr. Melamed invites pointed attention to the similarity in views between St. Augustine and Buddha. Thus St. Augustine's doctrine of self-denial and asceticism is reminiscent of Buddhism; he denied freewill like Buddha; he held that the conduct of man is the necessary fruit of either a good or a bad tree, against which Mr. Melamed quotes the doctrine of Buddha that man is the fruit of a tree; his static God is like that of Buddha; his doctrine of predestination is only an exaggerated form of Buddhistic determinism applied to religious life.<sup>1156</sup> The doctrine that God alone is reality made

<sup>1156</sup> Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 350.

little of man. Man had to surrender himself to God, losing his own personality. Not only St. Augustine but mediæval philosophers generally held fast to this idea in some form. The goal of man thus became—a return to God. The idea of self-surrender led not only to the exalting of ascetic life—the renouncing of worldliness and concentration on Godliness—but to the development of the doctrine of grace, without which mere surrender was powerless. Both these ideas of self-surrender and grace were Hindu and they had become inextricably bound with the patristic and scholastic philosophy of a Mediæval Europe. Though the influence of the East upon the West had slackened, if not ceased, by the third century A.D., it had succeeded, as Mr. Melamed remarks, “in putting a set of ideas into circulation which were to overwhelm the Western minds for more than a thousand years”. Among these ideas were the two which have been mentioned above. “Union with God or with Christ” is a reverberation of “the Buddhistic yearning for Nirvāṇa” which itself is an echo of the older Upanishadic doctrine of the union of the soul with Brahman. In its mystical fervour, the Western Church excelled the Eastern. The representatives of the Greek Church recognized in Christ the Trinitarian figure—but his place in the Godhead was still a matter for theological speculation or dispute. In the Roman Church, St. Augustine introduced the new doctrine of “living in Christ” as a personal matter. St. Paul had said, “Let the same mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus.” St. Augustine pushed this mystical doctrine to its logical conclusion. “God became man,” he says, “to be to us an example of humility, to show us God's love, and to help us to realize and to hold in our hearts that the self-abasement in which it pleased God to be born of a woman, to be scorned, rejected and put to death by man, is the best remedy for an inflated pride. He was crucified and now it depends upon thee to take his poverty upon thyself: far from thee He lived, but in poverty He comes nigh unto thee.” To Augustine and the Western Church, Christianity thus was no longer a definitely defined religion,

but transformed into a "mystical state of mind, expressing itself in the love for humiliation, scorn, suffering, and contempt for worldliness". Asceticism accordingly became a known institution and a means to an end, the way to salvation. St. Bernard, who is commonly represented in art as bearing the implements of Christ's passion and who is one of the grandest figures in the Church militant and founded a hundred and sixty monasteries, turned this negative mysticism into a positive one. He, indeed, awoke Europe to a second Crusade, dealt death-blows all round to no end of "heretics", and declined all honours to himself, content if he could only awake some divine passion in other men. He inculcated the doctrine that it is the duty of the Christian believer "to have a part in Christ by having a part in His sufferings". This theme of his became the primary motive of piety in the Christianity of the west of Europe for many centuries after him.<sup>1157</sup> One who follows the Redeemer in poverty, who is

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<sup>1157</sup> St. Bernard lived and laboured between 1091-1174 A.D. He was a Cistercian and founded a monastery in 1115 A.D. at Clairvaux, a village in France, situated on the Aube, where he lived and lies buried. He is for this reason often called St. Bernard of Clairvaux, to distinguish him from others of the same name. The Cistercian Order to which he belonged was founded by Abbot Robert in 1098 A.D. at Citeaux, near Dijou. This Order followed the rule of St. Benedict, who reformed the Order after it had lapsed. St. Benedict (480-543 A.D.) was the founder of western monachism. Born near Spoleto, in Central Italy, he left home at 14; passed three years as a hermit in a cavern near Subiaco to prepare himself for God's service; was appointed to an abbey, but left it; founded twelve monasteries of his own; composed the "Regula Monachorum", which formed the rule of his Order. The famous Order of monks called Benedictines was founded by him and followed his rule; its cradle was the celebrated monastery of Monte Casino, near Naples; as an institution it reckoned among its members a large body of eminent men who in their day rendered immense service to both literature and science, and were, in fact, the only learned class of the Middle Ages; they spent their time in diligently transcribing manuscripts and thus preserving for posterity the classic literature of Greece and Rome. St. Benedict's life shows the severely ascetic form that Christianity took, a form which is indicative of the

tireless in deeds, penitence and asceticism, and excels in self-denial, is assured of communion with the Redeemer. This desire for a union with Christ translated into human terms means the emptying of one's self of all human desires, of overcoming one's senses, and of attaining beatitude. "This beatitude is the Western term for the Eastern Nirvāṇa." The scholastics, who tried to reconcile dogma with thought and faith with reason, still further developed this subjective religiosity. They aspired not merely to a union with Christ, but to the absorption of the soul by the triune God. Only by becoming part of God, the Father Himself, can existence be made a true reality. The celebrated Duns Scotus (fourteenth century A.D.) who proclaimed the Will against Understanding (put forth by his contemporary Thomas Aquinas) as the principle from whose spontaneous exercise he derived all morality, taught that this union requires the complete surrender of the will. Only in this manner can the soul be merged with God. "This de-individualization

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influence exercised over Christianity by Buddhistic impulses and ideals, which were exclusively Upanishadic in character. As Professor Max Müller put it, Buddhism is nothing more than the Upanishads applied to social life. "The *Upanishads* are," he says, "to my mind the germs of Buddhism, while Buddhism is in many respects the doctrine of the *Upanishads* carried out to its last consequences, and, what is important, employed as the foundation of a new social system. In doctrine, the highest goal of the Vedānta, the knowledge of the true Self, is no more than the Buddhist *Samyaksambodhi*; in practice the Sannyāsin is the Bhikshu, the friar, only emancipated alike from the tedious discipline of the Brāhmanic student, the duties of the Brāhmanic householder, and the yoke of the useless penances imposed on the Brāhmanic dweller in the forest. The spiritual freedom of the Sannyāsin becomes in Buddhism the common property of the *Sangha*, the Fraternity, and that Fraternity is open alike to the young and the old, to the Brāhman and the Sūdra, to the rich and the poor, to the wise and the foolish. In fact there is no break between the India of the *Vēda* and the India of the *Tripitika*, but there is an historical continuity between the two, and the connecting link between extremes that seem widely separated must be sought in the *Upanishads*."—Preface to the *Sacred Books of the East*, (1879), pp. li-iii.



of man, forming as it does the high water-mark of mediæval Christian universalism, became," writes Mr. Melamed, "the driving force of Christian piety of the Middle Ages. Surrender, relinquish, became the cry word of mediæval mysticism; everything is meaningless, worthless, and unreal, and only Christ, or, as the ancient Hindu said, Brahma (*i.e.*, Brahman) is real...stupefied by the constant disaster called 'life', he...surrendered."

This passion for "surrender" receives a higher definition in the profoundly mystical Meister Eckhart. Born about the middle of the thirteenth century, he entered the Dominican Order and rapidly attained to a high position in the Church. But his daring speculations attracted attention and he was arraigned for "heresy" in 1325 A.D. but finally acquitted. A couple of years after his death in 1327, his writings were condemned as "heretical" by a Papal bull. He owed much to Thomas Aquinas, whom he usually introduces as "Master", though he differs from him in certain respects. Mr. Melamed refers to him as "a full-fledged pantheist" as one "whose doctrine resembles the metaphysics of Sankara". Both these descriptions seem to lack foundation. For one thing, Eckhart is only semi-pantheistic in his idealism and as regards his "metaphysics", he more nearly is of the view of Śrīpati and Rāmānuja than Sankara, as will be shown below. Distinguishing between "the Godhead" and "God" he describes Godhead as the abiding potentiality of Being, containing within Himself all distinctions as yet undeveloped. He, therefore, cannot be the object of knowledge, nor of worship, being "Darkness" and "Formlessness". The Triune God is evolved from the Godhead. The Son is the Word of the Father, His uttered thought; and the Holy Ghost is the "Flower of the Divine Tree", the mutual love which unites the Father and the Son. The universe is the expression of the whole thought of the Father; it is the language of the Word. He says that "Nature is the lower part of the Godhead" and that "Before creation, God was not God". This is not crude pantheism, for he

argues that without the Son the Father would not be God, but only undeveloped potentiality of being. He insists that the generation of the Son is a continual process. The three persons are not merely accidents and modes of the Divine Substance, but are inherent in the Godhead. And so there could never have been a time when the Son was not. The generation of the Son necessarily involves the creation of the ideal world; for the Son is Reason, and Reason is constituted by a cosmos of ideas. When creation and the world which had no beginning are spoken of, what is meant is, not the world of phenomena, but the world of ideas. The ideal world is the complete expression of the thought of God and is above space and time. Eckhart calls it "non-natured nature", as opposed to "*diu genā türte nāture*", the world of phenomena. The Neo-Platonists subordinated that which emanates to that from which a thing emanates from, *e.g.*, the rays to the sun, as they recede from the central focus; but Eckhart does not subordinate the Son to the Father nor the Holy Ghost to the Son. The Son is the pure brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His Person. "The eternal fountain of things is the Father; the image of things in Him is the Son, and love for this image is the Holy Ghost." All created things abide "formless" (as possibilities) in the ground of the Godhead, and all are realized in the Son. Since subordination is denied, Eckhart seems more pantheistic. His intelligible world is really God—it is the whole content of the Divine mind. But he does not seem to have landed himself into pantheism completely. This seems clear when we consider his conception of the relation of the phenomenal world to the world of ideas. He offers the Christian dogma of the Incarnation of the Logos as a kind of explanation of the passage of "prototypes" into "externality". When God "speaks" His ideas, the phenomenal world arises. This is an incarnation. But the process by which the soul emancipates itself from the phenomenal world, is also called a "be-getting of the Son". Thus the whole process is a circular

one—from God and back to God again. Time and space, he says, were created with the world. Material things are outside each other, spiritual things in each other. But these things, as Dean Inge remarks, do not make it clear how Eckhart accounts for the imperfections of the phenomenal world, which he does not explain, as the Neo-Platonists did, by a theory of emanation. The difficulty cannot be solved by a recourse to modern theories of evolution. The idea of the world history, as Dean Inge points out, as a gradual realization of the Divine personality, is not to be seen in Eckhart. Nor are there any indications in it of the doctrine that the human mind is a necessary organ of the self-development of God. The “necessity” which impels God to “beget His Son” is not a physical but a moral necessity. “The good”, he insists, “must needs impart itself.” His view of the world, accordingly, is much nearer to acosmism than to pantheism. He sees in phenomena, only the negation of being, and it is not clear how he can also regard them as the abode of the immanent God. Dean Inge suggests it is probable that, like the thinkers of his time, Eckhart did not feel himself obliged to give a permanent value to the transitory and that the world interested him only to the extent that it served as the temporary abode of immortal spirits. He also hints that the stress Eckhart laid on the Christ aspect rather than the Jesus was due to the same feeling. Eckhart attaches no importance to the personal life of Jesus not because he does not believe in the miraculous but because he thinks that the Divine process in the “everlasting Now” is a fact of much greater value than any occurrence in the external world can be. This may be so, but there is no denying that the emphasis laid on the Christ aspect was not only in agreement with the view-point of his contemporaries but was also in keeping with his own moods on certain occasions when it was pronouncedly under the influence of Asiatic doctrines. His doctrine of immanence is distinctly Hindu. According to him, the human soul is a microcosm, which in a way contains all things in itself. At the “apex of

the mind " there is a Divine " spark ", which is so closely akin to God that it is one with him, and not merely united to Him. This is what other scholastics and mystics called the *residue* and the Neo-Platonists the *scintilla*. Eckhart suggests this as the true *Wesen* of the soul, into which all its faculties may be transformed.<sup>1158</sup> Eckhart, however, is not clear in regard to his teaching about it. He calls it at first the " ground of the soul " and says it is created and describes it as being only the medium by which God transforms us to Himself. But his later view is that it is uncreated, the immanence of the Being and the Nature of God Himself. The latter view was adopted by his successors, with or without qualification. This spark, according to Eckhart, is the organ by which our personality holds communion with God and knows Him. It is with reference to it, as Dean Inge aptly reminds, that Eckhart uses the phrase which has so often been quoted to convict him (so unjustly and so groundlessly, one need hardly add) of blasphemous self-deification—"the eye with which I see God is the same as that with which He sees me". The "uncreated spark" is really the same as the grace of God, which raises us into a Godhead. But, says Eckhart, "this grace is God Himself acting like a human faculty in the soul, and transforming it so that man

<sup>1158</sup> Cf. the Sūtra *Aṁśanānāvyaṣāḍāt* and Śaṅkara's comment on it, II, 3. 43. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra propounds the theory that "the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire". Rāmānuja likewise states that this "Sūtra declares that the soul is part of Brahman" (II. 3. 42) and raising the objection later on in the Sūtra *Apichasmar-yate* (II. 3. 44) that if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also, he states that the next Sūtra *Prakāśādīvattu naivamparaḥ* (II. 3. 45) meets this objection. Commenting on this Sūtra, Rāmānuja remarks that "the individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body", etc. The idea that the world is created from and by Brahman as the web from the spider and as sparks from the fire, is seen in Upanishadic texts. *Bṛihad. Uṣa.*, II. 1. 20; *Śvêta. Uṣa.*, VI. 10; *Māndū. Uṣa.*, I. 1. 7; II. 1. 1.

himself becomes grace." The exposition of the doctrine shows that Eckhart laid much stress on it. "There is in the soul," he says,<sup>1159</sup> "something which is above the soul, Divine, simple, a pure nothing; rather nameless than named, rather unknown than known. Of this I am accustomed to speak in my discourses. Sometimes I have called it a power, sometimes an uncreated light, and sometimes a Divine spark. It is absolute and free from all names and all forms, just as God is free and absolute in Himself. It is higher than knowledge, higher than love, higher than grace. For in all these there is still *distinction*. In this power God doth blossom and flourish with all His Godhead, and the Spirit flourisheth in God. In this power the Father bringeth forth His only-begotten Son as essentially as in Himself; and in this light ariseth the Holy Ghost. This spark rejecteth all creatures and will have only God, simply as He is in himself. It rests satisfied neither with the Father, nor with the Son, nor with the Holy Ghost, nor with the three Persons, so far as each existeth in its particular attribute. It is satisfied only with the super-essential essence. It is determined to enter into the simple Ground, the Still Waste, the Unity—where no man dwelleth. Then in it is satisfied in the light; then it is one; it is one in itself, as this Ground is a simple stillness, and in itself immoveable; and yet by this immobility are all things moved." It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do His good pleasure; but our own nature and personality remain intact. It is plain that we could not see God unless our personality remained distinct from the personality of God. Complete fusion is as destructive of the personality of love and knowledge as complete separation. This is in fact the position of Śrīpati in his *Bhāṣya* in propounding the *Dvaitādvaita* system.

Eckhart, as will be seen, distinguishes "the Godhead" from "God". This finds its counterpart in well-known

<sup>1159</sup> Dean Inge quotes this passage as perhaps "the most instructive" in this connection.

Upanishadic texts like *Sadēva saumyē*,<sup>1160</sup> *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*,<sup>1161</sup> etc. The "Brahman" or "Ātman" could not be the object of worship, any more than "the Godhead" of Eckhart could be. Hence the evolution of a God who can be conceived of as the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer,<sup>1162</sup> or as the Ruler, Governor and Controller,<sup>1163</sup> much as Eckhart endeavours to evolve the Triune God from the Godhead. The Supreme Being thus conceived of in the *Upanishads* becomes the object of worship as he is endowed with divine qualities<sup>1164</sup> and the power of dispensing justice.<sup>1165</sup> How this led eventually to the worship of the Brahman in his *Saguna* form and the manner in which it was to be done is also seen in the *Upanishads*.<sup>1166</sup> To Eckhart, personality was "the eternal ground-form of all true being, and the notion of Person is the centre-point of his system". He says that "the word *I am* none can truly speak but God alone". The individual must try, as Dean Inge commenting on this sentence puts it, to become a person, as the Son of God is a Person. This is in keeping with Eckhart's view that we could not see God unless our personality remained distinct from that of God, and that complete fusion would be destructive of love and knowledge as complete separation. This stress on personality is worthy of note from the point of view of the *Upanishads*. Eckhart in this belief comes nearest to the view of Rāmānuja with whom fusion means the keeping distinct of personality, though in its elaborated form, Eckhart's doctrine is more nearly in agreement with Śrīpati's. The views

<sup>1160</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 2. 1.

<sup>1161</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

<sup>1162</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1; *Taitt. Upa.*, III. 1.

<sup>1163</sup> *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 22; III. 8. 9; III. 7. 3. 23.

<sup>1164</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14. 1.

<sup>1165</sup> *Kaṭha. Upa.*, III. 9.

<sup>1166</sup> *Chch. Upa.*, III. 14; IV. 10. 5; III. 19. 1; VII. 2. 2; *Kaṭha Upa.*, I. 1-7; *Chch. Upa.*, V. 3-10; *Brihad. Upa.*, VI. 2. 9-16; *Chch. Upa.*, IV. 10-15; VIII. 1-6; V. 11-18; III. 1-11; *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 5; *Pras. Upa.*, VI.

of both Rāmānuja and Śrīpati are covered by the *Brahma-Sūtras* and by the *Upanishads* which they sum up. There is hardly any need to set out at any length the evidence on this point here, and it ought therefore to suffice if it is said that the modes of meditation prescribed or referred to in the *Upanishads* refer to the maintenance of this distinctness of personality even while declaring spiritual unity<sup>1167</sup> between the devotee and the Divinity. Any other mode of meditation is discountenanced.<sup>1168</sup> Eckhart's insistence on *Will* being everything is likewise an echo of teachings of the *Upanishads*.

On the doctrine that "It is in the Father's nature to beget the son and it is the son's nature to be born", Eckhart bases the teaching that between God and creature there comes about a relationship with mutual surrender which is equally essential to both, and that God can do as little without man, as man can do without Him. When man's will becomes God's will, all is well; but when God's will becomes man's will, that is perfect. In the first instance, man only subjugates himself, and in the second, God is born in him and the aim of creation is attained. Man, who surrenders his will, becomes by grace what God is by nature, and He is as near to us as the water which we drink. The doctrine of grace finds a prominent place in both Vaishnavism and Saivism and is reflected in the text of the *Bhagavad-gītā*: *Sarvadharmān parityajya*,<sup>1169</sup> a text, on which the whole of the *prapatti* doctrine has been built from very early days in India. The doctrine, as taught in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, is the most tolerant and catholic; it is absolutely free from the sectarianism that has marked its growth in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

### Mr. Melamed and Spinoza.

In one respect Mr. Melamed has been less than just to Spinoza. There is a note of derision in the phrases

<sup>1167</sup> *Kaṭha Upa.*, I. 6.

<sup>1168</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10.

<sup>1169</sup> *Bhagavad-gītā*, XVIII. 66. Also XVIII. 64; XVIII. 65; XVIII. 56-57; IX. 29.

"Consumptive Jew," "Epileptic Jew," "Sickly Jew," "Lonely Jew", "Lonely Dutch Jew" "Lonely Jew of Amsterdam," that we find interspersed through his volume. At one or two points, he comes very near blaming the Jew for his birth (see pp. 22, 23, 30, 31 and *et passim*). Yet he was the Jew of whom Matthew Arnold wrote: "Spinoza led a life perhaps the most spotless to be found in the lives of philosophers; he lived simply, studious, even-tempered, kind, declining honours, declining riches, declining notoriety. Therefore, he has been in a certain sphere edifying, and has inspired in many powerful minds an interested admiration such as no other philosopher has inspired since Plato. In my father's house are many mansions, only, to reach any one of these mansions, there are needed the wings of a genuine sacred transport, of an immortal longing. These wings Spinoza had, and because he had them his own language about himself, about his aspirations, and course are true, his foot is in the *vera vita*, his eye on the beatific vision." Of him, Renan declared at the dedication of a statue to him at the Hague, in 1882: "Woe to him who in passing should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head! He would be punished, as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to conceive what is divine. This man, from his granite pedestal, will point out to all men the way of blessedness which he found; and ages hence, the cultivated traveller, passing by this spot, will say in his heart: 'The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here.'" Earlier than Renan, Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) had said that "the only life with which that of Spinoza can be compared is the life of Jesus Christ."

### Spinoza's Indebtedness to Hindu Metaphysicians.

We may now sum up and see how far Spinoza was indebted to Hindu metaphysicians for his views. Pythagoras and Plato owed much to the ancient Hindus. Hinduism in its Buddhistic form spread to the western world and being passive in form, it influenced effectively and lastingly western philosophical notions. A number of sects, more or



less Buddhistic in character, came into being in Palestine and influenced Christianity. These sects adopted the fundamental Upanishadic doctrines, which through them passed into Christianity. Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism were largely shaped by Buddhism and its source, the *Upanishads*. Among the theories introduced by it into Christianity is the Logos idea, which helped to shape Christianity. Not only is there a close similarity between the lives of Buddha and Jesus, but also the main doctrines of Jesus recall to mind those of Buddha. These are more than mere coincidences. Christianity owes its doctrine of redemption to Buddhism. St. Paul carried westward the Logos idea, which had been already made familiar in the western world. He preached not Jesus but Christ, the Redeemer. His God was like Brahman, redemptive in character. His doctrine was a form of diluted Buddhism.<sup>1170</sup> His Kingdom

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<sup>1170</sup> The following comparison has been instituted between Buddhism and Spinozism:—

(1) "What is wealth, honor or lust of senses?" asks Spinoza and answers that they are all optic illusions. Only in salvation is their genuine happiness. Buddha said the same 2,300 years ago.

(2) Buddha understood that the general law of causation does not explain or include all the phenomena of life. Like Spinoza, he, therefore, resorted to a theory of external and internal causation. We may fail to understand external causation, because our knowledge is limited and confined to the inter-relation of the phenomena. We are, however, absolutely certain that internal causation is in operation and that our will determines our acts. Will or *Karma* is the source and kindling point of all our actions and is the only reality. "Everything that exists, exists by reason of *Cupiditas*," says Spinoza.

(3) Both Buddha and Spinoza agree about acosmism, while they disagree about causation. Buddha completely denies the phenomenal world. Spinoza causes it to be absorbed by the noumenal world. If the world is not reality, whether because it is flatly denied or is absorbed by another world, the problem of the prime mover and planner does not arise.

(4) Buddha's doctrine of causation, fundamental to his philosophy, is inter-woven with his theory of determinism, which assumes the form of fatalism. In its main features, it resembles that of Spinoza. Man is tied to pre-destined forces, from which there is, according to Spinoza, no escape. According to Buddha, however,

of God was only a western copy of the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa. The mystery of Christ was the mystery of Brahman. Marcion, who introduced asceticism into Christianity, owed much to Hinduism. His disciples developed the Gnostic doctrines, and set the stage for Mani. Mani was frankly anti-Judaic and drew his ideas from Hinduism and Zoroastrianism. Simultaneously, the Neo-Platonists, headed by Ammonius, Sakkas and Plotinus, developed philosophical

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man has within himself the possibility of redemption. His four holy truths are an attempt to attain salvation by piercing the iron wall of the law of causation. The possibility of escape from a predestined life to Nirvāṇa implies a theory of being which is less rigid and less immutable than that of Spinoza. Thus Buddha says, "the reality of things is to be found in the oscillations between being and non-being." This is the content of existence. The world is because it is, and it is not at the same time. For the simple the world is, and for the wise it is not. When it is, it is the source and origin of suffering. When it is not, it is redemption and salvation. The worlds of Buddha and Spinoza are prisons, but in the one there is a crack, and the other is hermetically sealed. According to Buddha, redemption is theoretically possible through Nirvāṇa. But, according to Spinoza, there is no such possibility as he denies implicitly any extra-mundane reality.

(5) Buddha did not dogmatise about the soul. Life is impermanent and doomed to destruction and consciousness is ever changing and is thus transitory. That which is transitory is evil and cannot be eternal or soul. Thus Buddha repudiated the conception of the individual ego and denied the reality of the phenomenal world. Both the world and the individual ego are, according to him, in a state of flux. A transitory being, according to him, cannot say that it is permanent. So explicit is he on this point that Heraclitus, the Ephesian, is said by some to have borrowed his idea of the universe being in a constant state of flux from Buddha's doctrine. According to Spinoza, when body perishes, the soul is necessarily dissolved.

(6) In the Buddhistic as in the Spinozistic world-picture, morality is linked with usefulness. Ethics and morality are not based upon God or upon any other metaphysical principle, but are inspired by the vision of the goal—Nirvāṇa. Although no one commands or admonishes man to be good, yet he follows the path of righteousness. He will benefit by it and his life will be attended by joy. Buddha often described Nirvāṇa as

doctrines which were largely Hindu in character. St. Augustine began as a Manichæan and his philosophy was a mixture of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism, with traces of Aristotelianism and Stoicism. His God-idea is like the attributeless of Brahman. His doctrine of pre-destination is an exaggerated form of Buddhistic determinism applied to religious life. His God-idea was adopted by most of the mediæval philosophers. Man's one goal is his return to God—a reverberation of the old Buddhistic yearning for Nirvāṇa, itself the product of the Upanishadic doctrine which inculcated the union of the soul with Brahman. The central doctrine in Christian mysticism represents no more than this panting after union. The theories of self-surrender and grace are aspects of the same doctrine and these aspects were developed by St. Bernard and Meister Eckhart in a manner highly suggestive of the Hindu teaching of *mukti*, which is deep down in the *Upanishads*. The very ideology of mediæval Christian mystics is reminiscent of the *Upanishads*. Christian universalism of the mediæval era which made life in Christ the leading theme, finds its basis in the Upanishadic doctrine which makes the Brahman the one Reality. Spinoza, who drew as much from the Rabbinical as from the Neo-Platonic sources and the teachings of Descartes, owed thus not a little to those who contributed to the

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a union with the cosmic principle Brahman; as such it is identical with Spinoza's *amor Dei intellectualis*. Thus the main features of Spinoza's system, with but few exceptions, can, in the opinion of Mr. Melamed, be traced to Buddha, and his background, the *Upanishads*. (Melamed, *loc. cit.*, 256, 274.)

Goethe thus describes the lesson he found in Spinoza:—"The whole of our education and experience bids us to renounce and resign: '*Dass wir entsagen sollhn.*' The problem of man's life is to reconcile himself to this. One ready way is the superficial way of the many to proclaim that all things are vanity. But the path of wisdom, sought only by a few, is to cut short the pains of resignation in detail by a resignation once for all; to rest one's mind on that which is eternal, necessary, and uniform, and possess ideas which remain undisturbed by the contemplation of a transitory world." This was the secret of Spinoza to Goethe. (See Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 370.)

building of the teaching of the Neo-Platonists and Platonists and Pythagoreans even. The dissemination of the teachings of the *Upanishads*, whether directly through the Alexandrian propounders of Neo-Platonism, or the Gnostics or the still earlier schools represented by Plato and Pythagoras or indirectly through the medium of Buddhism, which spread through the length and breadth of Asia and became particularly dominant in Asia Minor and Palestine, forms thus a not negligible foundation not only for mediæval Christian philosophy but also for the philosophy of Spinoza. Except on this basis, neither the central idea of mediæval Christian philosophy nor of the philosophy of Spinoza—the union of man with the order of the world, *i.e.*, with God—can be traced back to its original source.

#### Mr. Melamed's Views Examined.

Such in very brief is the line of argumentation suggested by Mr. Melamed. The grounds on which it is based may not be new. The presentation of his case is elaborate, though not always adequate; in some parts, it suffers from a lack of first-hand knowledge of Hindu sources of philosophical learning. Though this be so, it must be acknowledged that Mr. Melamed has done well in drawing pointed attention to the fact that the foundations of Christian philosophy, if not belief, are not far removed from the doctrines so definitely conceived of in the *Upanishads* and so scientifically synthetised in the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. This, however, is not to say that agreement is possible in every view propounded by Mr. Melamed or in every suggestion thrown out by him in his highly recondite and vastly learned volume. His idea of "dead" or "static" Brahman, for instance, stresses an aspect which can at all be true only from one view-point of the teachings of the *Upanishads*. Even in that case, it is only theoretically so. His suggestion that a "static" Brahman of the *Upanishads* led to the conception of a "static" God in the hands of Spinoza, seems equally unsustainable. This latter statement does, in fact, serious injustice to Spinoza. Nature or God as conceived by Spinoza is all-comprehensive,

infinite or perfect, so that there is nothing outside of the cosmic system, nothing supernatural. Nature, moreover, according to him, is not static but dynamic, exercising all existing forms of energy. Each ultimate kind of energy is described an attribute of God.<sup>1171</sup> Then, again, his criticism that a "passive" metaphysical idea which inculcates "passivity and eternal peace" lends to the de-individualizing of man and ends in "brutality and despotism", cannot prove acceptable. Expanding his view-point, Mr. Melamed says that "Spinoza's theory of the State and Buddha's indifference to the brutality of the caste system support the implication that causation as the only reality extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history. In the worlds of Spinoza and Buddha, man, overawed by the eternal immutable law, vanishes from the picture. And with him disappear all that revolves about man—history, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, social service, and true philanthropy. All that remains is the ceaselessly revolving wheel of fate which stares at the puppet show called human life."<sup>1172</sup> If this were really so, it would be truly appalling.

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<sup>1171</sup> Mr. Melamed's statement that "philosophical thought in India is either non-dualistic or purely monistic (pp. 21, 40)," is too sweeping in character and betrays a lack of first-hand knowledge of Indian systems of philosophic thought which, it is but right to add, colours his whole study. He later qualifies his statement (see p. 253) by saying that "Monism was not the only religious expression of ancient India" and instances the Sankhya school of thought, which he describes as "one of the most important philosophical groups in India," which "propounded the absolute dualism of mind and matter". But his complaint is that "even the adherents of this system regarded knowledge as only a means to salvation".

<sup>1172</sup> Elsewhere Mr. Melamed remarks that "like all true Eastern mystics, Spinoza was interested not in man, but in the forces of eternity," p. 232. As to Buddha, he writes in the Introduction: "Buddha, too, was not concerned with the lot of the lower castes" p. 13-14. These criticisms form the central parts of Mr. Melamed's work. His description of the State as conceived of by Spinoza reminds one of Vico's characterization of it as "a city of hucksters", because of its alleged lack of the sense of duty. But this seems a piece of superficial criticism.

But fortunately for us, it does not appear to be a correct reading of either Spinoza's political theory or of the Hindu caste system or of caste in the Buddhistic or the Upanishadic view. As Professor Watson points out, Spinoza holds that the State is the great means by which man is freed from "the wretched and almost brutish existence" which is spent by those "who live in a state of barbarism without a political order of life". It is true that the State cannot determine the whole life of man; there are spheres and interests which lie beyond it; nevertheless there is much which only a State can do, and it is one of the most important means of human happiness. From what source then does society derive its powers or rights? "The answer of Spinoza," remarks Prof. Watson, "is that man has a natural right which is coextensive with his power over things. The power is by no means unlimited, because each individual being is only a part of a whole order or system which is constituted by the essential nature of God. The good of man is that which will contribute to his greatest welfare or happiness.... The only way to make a man better is to give him reasons for changing his opinion. The society which by its laws encourages industry, enterprise, honesty and thrift, supplies to its citizens adequate reasons for regarding these qualities as for their good.... The end of the State is.... to make men free, that is, to induce them to live according to reason, and it can only do so by presenting and enforcing certain courses of conduct. The individual must obey the law or submit to the penalties imposed by the State. If every man followed reason, he would cease to speak of being under obligation to obey the law, and would speak only of liberty and happiness and the love of his fellows, which is identical with the love of God. A law is not properly a command, but a rule of conduct which a man prescribes to himself or to any other with a view to a certain end. But as the true end of life is recognized only by a very few, legislators have promised rewards to those who obey the law and threatened punishment to those who violate it. It is for

this reason that a law has come to be regarded as a command. Man is not naturally moral or social, but must fight his way towards sociability, and the State is the chief moral agency in this contest. In the state of nature men are one another's enemies. But this is only the first state of man. Every one desires to live in security and without fear; and this end cannot possibly be attained as long as enmity, hatred, anger and guile rule in place of reason."<sup>1173</sup> Spinoza naturally rejects the view of Hobbes that in a state of nature there is "war of all against all". He holds to the view even in a state of nature, man is a social animal and but for his being social, life would have been impossible. In his view, the government is not an alien force; but the best friend that man has in the world. There is no antagonism between the individual's interest and interests of the community: "The *status civilis* has its natural source in the desire to be free from some common fear and to remove the common causes of unhappiness." The end of the State, then, is not to restrain men by fear, and subject them to a foreign yoke, but to "deliver each man from fear, so that he may be able to live with the utmost possible security; that is to say, that he may maintain in the best way his own natural right to exist and to act, without doing harm either to himself or to his neighbours."<sup>1174</sup> The State is indeed a necessity, but it is a necessity of thought. Spinoza's theory of the State marks a distinct advance upon that of Hobbes, especially in its conception of the source of duties. The notion that men have rights apart from society is the foundation on which Hobbes' theory of the Social Contract is built. Rights are thus divorced from duties and it is supposed that the only rights that they possess are those granted to them by positive enactment, except certain primitive rights, which survive under the new conditions. According to Spinoza, there can be no right which does not flow from the

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<sup>1173</sup> J. Watson, *The State in Peace and War*, 92-101.

<sup>1174</sup> *Tractatus Politicus*, III. 6.

consciousness of a common interest on the part of members of a society. Such a right implies recognition by the common will. Spinoza's theory of the State may not, it may be suggested, seem to be consistent with itself as is, indeed, pointed out with great force by Professor Watson.<sup>1175</sup> But to say that it "extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history" seems an imperfect generalization of uncertain validity. There is, however, reason for this misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Melamed. Spinoza carries out unflinchingly the fundamental principle of his ethical philosophy, that man's highest good is the result of that *conatus sese conservandi* which is found in all forms of being. Anything like self-sacrifice or even self-blame he rejects. Asceticism is for him nothing but a *torva et tristis superstitio*. The true end of all action is to secure the greatest self-satisfaction or individual happiness and in this attitude of pure affirmation, Spinoza finds the secret not only of the State but of the highest form of blessedness. From passion, the motive operative in man in his first mind, liberation is to be obtained by an enlightened self-interest that leads to identification with the common weal. It is entirely a question of the greater enlightenment which comes from the wider view of reason. When we bring our own life into connection with the life of society as a whole, we see the irrationality of the narrow view of passion and we seek our own good in the common good.<sup>1176</sup> The fundamental mistake in Spinoza's political philosophy as in his general philosophy, according to Professor Watson, is "to conceive the bare individual as having a nature apart from society, whereas there can be no distinctively moral action except in so far as the individual discharges a function in society which enables him to minister to the well-being of the whole community."<sup>1177</sup> Spinoza was debarred from taking

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<sup>1175</sup> J. Watson, *loc. cit.*, 99-101.

<sup>1176</sup> *Ibid.*, 100-101.

<sup>1177</sup> *Ibid.*, 1101-02.



this view by his denial of all final causes. Holding that man like other beings is determined solely by material and efficient causes, "he can properly speak neither of rights nor of duties, both of which imply relation to an end, namely, the good of society as a whole." This does not prevent him from tacitly assuming that "human affairs are directed to an end as when he says that men seek to secure a higher form of civil society. He thinks that a clear understanding of the world will lead to an advance from a lower to a higher form of society; and in so doing he tacitly assumes that man is determined by the idea of social perfection and, not simply by the impulse to secure his own well-being."<sup>1178</sup>

So far as to Mr. Melamed's misconception of the true theory of State as evolved by Spinoza. Next, as to his criticism of the Hindu caste system, it is only necessary to say a few words here to indicate his radical misunderstanding of it. The *Upanishads* do not, for instance, support the position put forward by him. According to the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*<sup>1179</sup> which describes the creation of the four castes and the law (*Dharma*) in keeping with the speculations of the period, insists on the essential equality, if not oneness, of all castes, each being created as required for the good of society, the law being above all. The special glorification of the Law which the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* indulges in, shows that at the time it was composed, it was felt that in the eye of the Law all were equal and none could pretend to a higher status over another. In the *Bhagavad-gīta*, the exaltation of the *Dharma* is carried still further. The position taken in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* is emphasised, if not enlarged. The castes have not only their particular qualities but also their particular duties. And then we are told<sup>1180</sup> that the performance of one's own duty—and duty is throughout

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<sup>1178</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>1179</sup> *Bṛihad. Upa.*, I. 4. 10-14.

<sup>1180</sup> *Bhagavad-gīta*, III. 35.

stressed in the *Gīta* as nothing else is—though destitute of merit is better than the performance of another's duty well discharged. Death in performing one's own duty is preferable, the performance of the duties of others is dangerous. The theory of creation is referred to in two places in the *Gīta*<sup>1181</sup> and these indicate the position of the *Bhagavad-gīta* in regard to caste. In the first, Sri Krishna says:—"The four-fold division of castes was created by me according to the apportionment of qualities and duties." In the second, he enumerates the respective duties of the four castes, and then says:—"(*Every*) man intent on his own respective duties obtains perfection. Listen, now, how one intent on one's duty obtains perfection. Worshipping, by (the performance of) his own duty, him from whom all things proceed, a man obtains perfection. One's own duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed. Performing the duty prescribed by nature one does not incur sin." As Mr. K. T. Telang points out, in the *Bhagavad-gīta*, the duties of the different castes do not overlap. In Chapter X, in which the best of everything is mentioned, the Brāhmana is not declared to be the best of castes. On the other hand, the King is mentioned as the highest among men.<sup>1182</sup> The *Bhagavad-gīta* and Buddha agree first in their protests against the authority of the Vēdas, and second in their conception of the true view of the differences of caste. The *Gīta* shelves caste, while Buddha rejects it. The *Gīta* does not totally root out caste; but it places it on a less untenable basis. In Telang's view, the *Gīta* is really the predecessor of the Buddhist attempt to do away with caste.

Buddha's attitude towards caste is well brought out by his definition of an outcaste, which is illustrated by the story of the Chandāla who was re-born in the Brāhman world. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, in which the story is told, we read: "Not by birth does one become an out-caste;

<sup>1181</sup> *Bhagavad-gīta*, IV. 13; XVIII. 41.

<sup>1182</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 27.

not by birth does one become a Brāhman; by deeds one becomes an outcaste, and by deeds one becomes a Brāhmana. Buddha himself is neither a Brāhman, nor a king's son, nor a *Vessa* (Vaisya), but a wandering mendicant." The *Sutta Nipāta* again asserts: "Do not ask about descent, but ask about conduct; from wood, it is true, fire is born; (likewise) a firm *mini*, although belonging to a low family, may become noble, when restrained (from sinning) by humility. One who has seen Buddha is appeased, even if he be of black colour." The Buddhist *Sūtras* maintain that the truth proclaimed by Buddha is open to all. According to the *Vinaya* texts, members of the four castes renounce their names and their lineage when they become Buddhist monks.

The Jaina attitude is equally clear. In the *Jaina Sūtras*, the story is told of the monk Harikesa Bala, born in the family of Svapakesa, the lowest of lowly castes, converting a Brāhmana. The self-same *Sūtras* state that a Brāhmana, Kshatriya, an Ugra or a Chchavi when entering the Order is not stuck up on account of its *Gōtra*. Their reasoning is direct and simple. If there were only one Soul, these could not be of Brāhmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras. This indifference to caste was adopted by the Śaivas, according to whom, men of different castes may become Brāhmanas. According to the *Vēdānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, difference of castes results from the soul's connection with a body, though all souls are part of Brahman and equal.<sup>1183</sup>

The alleged "indifference" of the "brutality of caste" seems thus not justified; nor is it the alleged "brutality" due to his so-called "passive" philosophy. Caste has bound a whole sub-continent to orderliness and to law; caste has helped the spread of culture; and caste has meant social peace and domestic happiness. Politically it has been a great factor in building up a conglomeration of races into a single whole. Its so-called rigidity has been both its

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<sup>1183</sup> See *The Indian Caste System*, 55-61.

merit and demerit. The accident of birth is stressed, but it cannot be said that this bred "brutality" or cruelty—at any rate of the type that has made cruelty to the Negro in America a common thing and cruelty towards the Jew in modern Germany a great virtue. Racial differences have been stressed unduly in these two cases with the result that the so-called inequalities bred by the caste system—caste signifies difference rather than inequality—in India pale into insignificance. Whatever its defects, caste in India has helped to "ensure an amazing continuity, in tradition and in the arts and crafts".<sup>1181</sup> If it is, as has been suggested, a typical example of "introvert" disposition, then the credit for tolerance in religion, tolerance in social custom and habit, and tolerance in regarding differences as natural and even inevitable in some cases should go to the philosophy of the *Upanishads* and to the Buddhist philosophy based on it, which made "looking inward" a not negligible factor in their make-up. It is because that this "looking inward" has been lacking in Europe that, despite the spread of culture and the propagation of philosophical views, tolerance is still unrecognized in practice even in the domains of religion and politics. It is not Spinoza's philosophy that is responsible for this defect in European character any more than caste can be held responsible for the inequalities we see in India, but despite Spinoza's philosophy and despite the doctrine of equality preached in the Upanishadic philosophy that intolerance and inequalities exist. In India at least, caste saved the aborigines from destruction, while its absence in other parts of the world has only meant their disappearance with the approach of immigrant foreign races, as in America, Australia, New Zealand and Africa.

### Differing Saiva View-points.

*Bhēdābhēda* thus has not only a long and interesting history in India but has also been a favourite theory in the West as well. In India, the doctrine has been stressed

<sup>1184</sup> C. G. Seligman in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, 464.

again and again by different writers, some of whose writings have not come down to us. Its earlier upholders are known only by implication in certain of the *Brahma Sūtras* themselves or from other stray references to them or their theory in the works of the later Commentators. In Sṛīpati's view, it is the doctrine propounded by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Sūtras* that, according to him, is the final truth declared in the *Upanishads*. The object of the *Jignyāsa* suggested in I. 1. 1 is nothing more therefore than the declaration of this as the final teaching of the *Upanishads*. As the special deity to which he is devoted is Siva, he throughout identifies the Absolute with that deity. As there are, however, differing Saiva view-points in regard to Upanishadic Philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish between them here. The first of these is the *Saiva Visishtādvaita*, represented by Sṛikanṭha; the second the *Sivādvaita*, represented by Appaya Dikshita; and *Vīrasaiva Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśeṣhādvaita*, propounded by Sṛīpati. Enough has been said about these three view-points but before we conclude it seems necessary to refer briefly to the manner in which the Absolute came to be identified with Siva and what view the later *Upanishads* took of the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēdā* itself.

### Rudra the counterpart of Siva in the *Rig-Veda*.

In the *Rig-Vēda*, Rudra represents Siva, who is not mentioned by that name in it. Rudra and Vishnu, though eclipsed to some extent by Indra, are still invoked in a manner which signifies their importance among the gods of the period. Rudra is celebrated in a lesser number of hymns than Vishnu, but that does not by any means indicate that he occupied a position less important than Vishnu. In one hymn (I. 8. 8) he is praised as "the wise, the most bountiful and mighty Rudra, who is (cherished) in our hearts". A grateful hymn is sung in his honour to obtain gifts "to our cattle, our people, our cows, and our progeny". He is spoken of as "the encourager of hymns, the protector of sacrifices, possessor of medicaments

that confer delight." In another (I. 16. 9) he is spoken of as "the mighty Rudra, with the braided hair (*Kāpardin*), the destroyer of heroes", and the Vēdic singers offer their praises to him "in order that health may be enjoyed by bipeds and quadrupeds and that all beings in this village may be (well) nourished and exempt from disease". He is asked to grant happiness and "freedom from disease and exemption from dangers". He is praised as "the accomplisher of sacrifices, the tortuous, the wise"; he is asked to remove far from them "his celestial wrath", for, they say, "they earnestly solicit his favour". They invoke him with reverence, as he "who has excellent food, who is radiant, and has braided hair (*Kāpardin*), who is brilliant and is to be ascertained (by sacred study), holding in his hands excellent medicaments" and they pray to him to grant them "health, defensive armour, and a (secure) dwelling". They speak of him as "the father of the *Maruts*" and they pray: "Injure not, Rudra, those amongst us who are old or young, who are capable of begetting, or who are begotten, nor a father, nor a mother, nor afflict our precious persons." Again, they pray: "Harm us not Rudra, in our sons or grandsons, or other male descendants, nor in our cattle, nor in our horses; inflamed with anger, kill not our valiant men, for we, presenting clarified butter, perpetually invoke thee." And they add: "Father of the *Maruts*, bestow happiness....; thy auspicious benignity is the cause of successive delight, therefore we especially solicit thy protection." The double aspect of Siva—fierceness and benignity—is here significantly brought out. His universal supremacy is next expressed thus: "Destroyer of heroes, may thus cow-killing or man-slaying (weapon) be far away and let the felicity granted by thee be ours; favour us; speak, brilliant hero, in our behalf, and grant us—thou art mighty over the two (realms of heaven and earth)—prosperity." The idea re-appears in another hymn (II. 4. 1), in which Rudra is spoken of as "the chiefest of beings in glory", as "the wielder of the thunderbolt," "the mightiest of the

mighty" and is asked to "waft" the singers "in safety over (the ocean) of sin" and to "repel all the assaults of iniquity". He is later spoken of in even higher terms. "(Firm) with strong limbs, assuming many forms, fierce and tawny-coloured, he shines with brilliant golden ornaments: vigour is inseparable from Rudra, the supreme ruler and lord of the world." He is not to be provoked to wrath by imperfect adorations; he is the invigorator of sons by his medicinal plants; he is a chief physician among physicians; he is to be pacified by praises; worshipped with invocations and oblations; is reverently invoked; is soft-bellied; of a tawny hue, and handsome chin; is the showerer of benefits; lord of the *Maruts*; supplier of invigorating food; the healer and delighter (of all); the dispeller of the sins of the gods; the white-complexioned; the consumer (of sin); who is glorified in the illustrious name of Rudra; the bearer of arrows and a bow; the wearer of an adorable and omniform necklace; the preserver of all this vast universe; there is no one more powerful than he; his javelin should be avoided; he is the giver of much (wealth), the protector of the virtuous; he is the cherisher of the world, the showerer (of benefits), omniscient and divine (Rudra), etc. (II. 4. 1-15).<sup>1185</sup> In another hymn, the universal character of Rudra is even more strikingly brought out. In it, he is spoken of as "the divine Rudra, armed with the strong bow and fast-flying arrows, the bestower of food, the invincible, the conqueror, the creator, the wielder of sharp weapons";<sup>1186</sup> we are told "he is known by his rule over those of terrestrial birth, by his sovereignty over those of celestial (origin)". His are a thousand medicaments (VII. 3. 13).<sup>1187</sup>

<sup>1185</sup> The epithets "tawny-coloured" and "white-complexioned" both appear as descriptions of Rudra in the *Rig-Vēda* (II. 4. 5 and 8).

<sup>1186</sup> His sharp weapons are referred to again and again. See *Rig-Vēda*, VIII. 4. 9, where he is referred to as holding his sharp weapons in his hand.

<sup>1187</sup> As to Wilson, he sees little of the Rudra of the *Puranas* in the Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda*, except his fierceness. As to his identification with Siva, Wilson holds that except *kāpardin* no other

### Identification of Rudra with Siva.

There has been some discussion as to the identity of Rudra, the Vēdic god. According to Sāyana, there is hardly any doubt that he is to be understood as Siva. At any rate, the Hindu commentators so understood him. Sāyana defines the name *Rudra* to mean "he who makes to weep, who causes all to weep at the end of time", thus identifying him with the destroying principle, or *Siva*. Wilson suggests that "there is nothing in the hymn (I. 8. 8) to bear out such an identification". On the contrary, he says, "he appears as a beneficent deity presiding especially over medicinal plants". Though this be so there, the Vēdic singers show fully well that they are afraid of him; pray to him to remove them far from his celestial wrath and beg of him not to injure them or their cattle or horses. There is an open avowal of his destroying nature in the hymns quoted above, though there is an equally frank declaration as to his capacity to keep them free from disease. His fierceness and his benignity are both acknowledged and it is thus his identity with Siva is established. The reference to him as the holder of medicaments is also indicative of his identity with Siva. According to Sāyana, *Rudriya* is *Rudra sambandhi bheshajam*—medicament in relation to or presided over by Rudra, conformably to the text *Ya te Rudra Shiva tanuh, Shiva Vishwaha, bheshaji Shiva, Rudrasya bheshajiti*,—whatever are thy auspicious forms, O Rudra, they are all auspicious; auspicious are medicaments, the medicaments of Rudra. In I. 16. 9, Rudra is styled *Kapardin*, he with the braided hair. *Kaparda* indicates the *jata* of Siva, for which reason Sāyana gives as its equivalent *jatilaya*. Even Wilson has to concede that "this looks very like a recognition of Siva in the person of Rudra". Rudra is, in II. 4. 1, spoken as the "white-complexioned", *shwetiche shwaietyam anchate*, he who goes to or obtains whiteness. This

epithet applicable to Siva occurs in the *Rig-Vēda*. On the other hand, Macdonell speaks of Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda* as "the earlier form of Siva". (See Wilson, *Rig-Vēda*, Introduction; Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, 74).



refers to the white complexion of Siva, which evidently has its origin in this hymn. Later Western scholars—those who came after Wilson—assert that Rudra in the *Rig-Vēda*, is the earlier form of Siva.<sup>1188</sup> In the *Rig-Vēda*, the term *Siva* (meaning auspicious) is only used as an adjective in the sense of bringing good fortune, being gracious. It has even been suggested that it is used (in the *Rig-Vēda*) euphemistically. There is no doubt that it is commonly so used in the later *Vēdas*, and became his exclusive name in post-Vedic times. The transition is well marked in the period of the *Yajur-Vēda*.

### Siva in the Yajur-Veda.

In the 16th chapter of the *Vājasaneyi Samhita* of the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, god Rudra is spoken of by a large number of epithets which, later, are peculiar to Siva. To these, in the 39th chapter, are added *Īśāna* (Ruler) and *Mahādēva* (Supreme God), which perhaps indicate the final conversion of Rudra into Siva. Evidently, in the special worship of Rudra, he was already reckoned the *Great God* and the *Ruler* of all. Accordingly, we would not be far wrong if we assumed that, in the period of the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, the Rudra of the *Rig-Vēda*, has become Siva, he being several times mentioned by the latter name as well as by other epithets peculiar to him, such as Sankara, Mahādēva, etc.

### Siva in the Brahmanas and the Atharva-Veda.

In the first part of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* attached to the *Atharva-Vēda*, we find mention of Siva, which would seem to show that in post-Vēdic times, if not already in the *Brāhmaṇa* period (800–500 B.C.), Siva had become fully established in place of Rudra. Indeed, in the *Atharva-Vēda*,<sup>1189</sup> Rudra is elevated to a higher position. Many other names are given to him, though the bearer of these different

<sup>1188</sup> *Taittiriya Samhita*, 4. 5. 1; *Vājasaneyi Samhita*, 16. The name Siva occurs at the end of the *Śatarudriya*.

<sup>1189</sup> *Atharva-Vēda*, IV. 28. 1; VI. 93. 2; VII. 87. 1; IX. 7. 7; X. 1. 3; XI. 2. 7; XI. 2. 4; XI. 2. 9; XI. 2. 10; XI. 2. 28; XI. 6. 9; XIII. 4. 4; XIII. 4. 28; XV. 5. 1-7.

names is addressed individually and as a separate God. Among the more prominent names are Bhava, Sarva, Bhūtapati, Pasupati, Mahādēva, Ugra, Īśāna, etc. A study of these names shows that the double character of Rudra—destructive and beneficent—is still maintained. In the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kausītaki Brāhmaṇa*, we see that the *Atharva-Vēda* position is still undisturbed and the names given to Rudra continue the tradition of his creative and destructive characters.<sup>1190</sup> In the *Grihya Sūtras*, however, the fearful side of Rudra is stressed (*Āśvalāyana Grihya Sūtra*, IV. 9; *Pāraskara Grihya Sūtra*, III. 8; III. 15).

### In the Mahabharata.

There are numerous references to Siva in the *Mahābhārata*. The duality of his nature is to be seen in this epic as well. He is commonly styled Mahādēva or the Great God and Dēvadēva, the God of Gods, in it. He is spoken of as the son of Brahma, sprung from his forehead, hence called *Lalāṭaprabhava*.<sup>1191</sup> His abode is the Himavat. He is also called Pasupati and is described as rejoicing in the company of Umā.<sup>1192</sup> He has three eyes, hence called *Trinētra*.<sup>1193</sup> He has a blue neck, and is therefore called *Nīlakantha*<sup>1194</sup>, *Srikantha*<sup>1195</sup> and *Sitikantha*.<sup>1196</sup> He has ten arms.<sup>1197</sup> He is clothed in skins, especially in tiger skins.<sup>1198</sup> His vehicle is the *Vrishabha*.<sup>1199</sup> His weapon is the fearful

<sup>1190</sup> *Atharva-Vēda*, VI. 1. 3-7; VI. 1. 9.

<sup>1191</sup> *Mahābhārata*, XII. 13705, 13723. According to another version, he sprang from Vishnu's forehead, *Ibid.*, III.

<sup>1192</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 218; XIII. 6339.

<sup>1193</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 11984, XII. 10357. How he got this third eye is detailed in *Ibid.*, III. 6362. For another version of the story see *Ibid.*, XII. 13205.

<sup>1194</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1641; XIII. 843, 1154.

<sup>1195</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 13705.

<sup>1196</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 253.

<sup>1197</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 1154.

<sup>1198</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1643; X. 256.

<sup>1199</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 415.

*Pāsupata*, with which he killed the *daityas* in battle.<sup>1200</sup> His battle-axe is the *Parasu*.<sup>1201</sup> His bow is the *Pināka*;<sup>1202</sup> hence he is styled *Pīnākin*.<sup>1203</sup> His trident is called *Trisūla*;<sup>1204</sup> after which he is called the *Sūlin*.<sup>1205</sup> His wife is called *Umā*,<sup>1206</sup> who is also called *Pārvatī*<sup>1207</sup> and *Gauri*.<sup>1208</sup> *Kubēra* is his friend.<sup>1209</sup> Thus, though he has many names and shapes, he is not infrequently made the foremost of all the divinities. Thus he is made out to be *Brahma* himself in certain places.<sup>1210</sup> He has a thousand names and forms, *sahasranāma* and *bahurūpa*, all of which are classified under the terrible or the mild.<sup>1211</sup> In the terrible form, he appears mostly as *Rudra*, his *Rig-Vēdic* name;<sup>1212</sup> as *Hara* he is spoken as the destroyer of the universe;<sup>1213</sup> he is unborn;<sup>1214</sup> he is the maker of the world;<sup>1215</sup> he absorbs, at the destruction of the world, all things created;<sup>1216</sup> he draws in the whole universe at the end of a *yuga* and swallows up all things;<sup>1217</sup> everything owes its origin to him;<sup>1218</sup> he is the Mighty Ruler of the world and as such is called *Īsāna*, the Ruler; *Īsvara*, the Lord; *Māhēsvara*, the Great Lord; *Visvēsvara*,

<sup>1200</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 11985; VII. 2838; XIII. 851.

<sup>1201</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 864.

<sup>1202</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 849, 6396.

<sup>1203</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 567, 7090.

<sup>1204</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 860.

<sup>1205</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 1642.

<sup>1206</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 12169.

<sup>1207</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 13220.

<sup>1208</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 258.

<sup>1209</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 417; XII. 10362.

<sup>1210</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 7496, 880, 1144; XII. 10346 in all of which passages he is made the foremost of all; in XIII. 1043, 590 and 704 he is made out to be *Brahma* himself.

<sup>1211</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 7504—7510; see also VII, 9599.

<sup>1212</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 1642; X. 252; XII. 10375; XII. 10370.

<sup>1213</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 1146; X. 249; XIII. 7497; XII. 2791.

<sup>1214</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 253.

<sup>1215</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 1626.

<sup>1216</sup> *Ibid.*, IX. 2236.

<sup>1217</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 941-943.

<sup>1218</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 9465.

Lord of all; Sthānu, the Immovable, etc.<sup>1219</sup> He is also Kāla as destroyer and as such creates all and sweeps away everything again and again.<sup>1220</sup> He is the beginning of the world and the absorber of the world.<sup>1221</sup> As Siva and Sankara, he is the merciful *Sarvabhūta sivaḥ sivaḥ*, he, who is friendly towards all;<sup>1222</sup> *Saumya vaktradhara*, he who has a mild countenance;<sup>1223</sup> *Sarvabhūtahitē rataḥ*, he who rejoices over the happiness of all beings.<sup>1224</sup> Among the heroic deeds of Siva, the most prominent, perhaps, are the following: the receiving of the heavenly Ganga on his head;<sup>1225</sup> the destruction of Daksha's sacrifice;<sup>1226</sup> reducing to ashes Kāma;<sup>1227</sup> the killing of Bhaga;<sup>1228</sup> the overthrowing of the Asura Andhaka;<sup>1229</sup> and the burning of the three fortresses, Tripura.<sup>1230</sup> Among his famous gifts are the following:—the grant of the spear Pāsupata to Arjuna;<sup>1231</sup> the gift of a sword to Aswathaman (*Sauptika Parva*, Chapter VII); the grant of eight boons to Krishna and eight more to Jāmbavati, Krishna's wife; and the gifts to Upamanyu.<sup>1231</sup> These two latter are mentioned in the *Anusāsana Parva* (Chapter XIV).

### Puranas about Siva and Vishnu.

In the *Mahābhārata* are also to be found a number of *Purānas* whose object is to favour the worship of Siva in

<sup>1219</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 2876; VIII. 436; X. 252; XII. 4498; X. 252; V. 3825; XII. 10292; III. 7042; VII. 9625; X. 252; XIII. 843.

<sup>1220</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 7497, 1161, 1188, 942; XII. 5718, 1175; XIII. 56.

<sup>1221</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII. 918; VI. 1278; XIII. 53.

<sup>1222</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 9622; VIII. 436.

<sup>1223</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII. 869.

<sup>1224</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 5739.

<sup>1225</sup> *Ibid.*, VI. 223; XIII. 1784; XIII. 1856.

<sup>1226</sup> *Ibid.*, X. 786; VII. 9545; XII. 10272; XIX. 12212; III. 1627; X. 253; XIII. 6468.

<sup>1227</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 6975-6980.

<sup>1228</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 9538; XIII. 7475.

<sup>1229</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 2876, 9462; XII. 10357; XIII. 908.

<sup>1230</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 14569; VII. 9555; XIII. 7482.

<sup>1231</sup> *Ibid.*, III. 11985; VII. 2838; XIII. 851.

some cases and of Vishnu, in others. This Epic also contains enumerations of the thousand names of Siva and of Vishnu. Among the *Purānas* which favour the religion of Siva are the *Skanda*, the *Siva*, the *Linga* and the *Bhavishya*. The *Mārkaṇḍeya* and the *Padma Purānas* inculcate the belief that Brahma, Vishnu and Siva are only one being. This doctrine is found already prominently, mentioned in the *Harivamsa*. This tradition of a common origin is seen in the *Vishnu Purāna* as well, where Siva is the God who springs from the forehead of Brahma, who separates into male and female. The old *Rig-Vēdic* idea of his being the parent of the Rudras, or *Maruts*, half of whom are gentle and brilliant, and the others ferocious and black, is also to be traced in this *Purāna*.

### Siva in the Svetasvatara Upanishad.

In the *Svētāśvatara Upanishad*, Siva has not yet become the name of Rudra, though its frequent use as an adjective in connection with the latter indicates that it is in course of becoming fixed as the proper name of the highest God. In this *Upanishad*, Rudra's supremacy is fully maintained, though the *bhakti* aspect is stressed in the most vigorous fashion.<sup>1232</sup> Knowing Siva one is free—we are told—from all nooses (*Svēta. Upa.*, 16). When there was nothing but darkness, Siva alone existed (*Ibid.*, 18). This *Upanishad*, it is worthy of note, ends with a prayer of two verses addressed to Rudra to protect, of which one is taken from the *Rig-Vēda* (I. 114. 8). The Supreme Brahman is often identified in this *Upanishad* with Rudra, Siva, Īśāna and Mahēśvara. Umā is mentioned in the *Kēna Upanishad*, but though she is not identified as the wife of Rudra, there is the suggestion in it that she had come to be so regarded before that *Upanishad* came into existence. In this, as in other *Atharva-Vēda Upanishads*, the Saiva or

<sup>1232</sup> *Svētāśvatara Upa.*, 1-20. This *Upanishad* quotes verses from the *Satarudriya*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Purushasūkta*. The names given to Rudra are : Īśāna, Īśa, Siva and Bhagavat.

Sākta aspect is stressed. In the *Sūryōpanishad*, the earliest phase of the Sākta school is seen. In the *Atharvasiras*, Rudra becomes the Brahman, while the importance of the *Bhasma* (the sacred ash) is urged as the mode of salvation. In the *Sarabhōpanishad*, the superiority of Rudra is indicated by explaining how Rudra, incarnating himself as Śarabha, destroyed the Man-Lion incarnation of Vishnu. It concludes by identifying Siva with the Supreme Brahman. The *Bhasmajābāla Upanishad* deals with *Bhasma*, *Rudrāksha*, the worship of the *linga*, etc., all intended to indicate the greatness of Siva. The *Akshamālīka Upanishad* extols the *Japamāla*; the *Kālāgni-Rudrōpanishad* speaks of the importance of the *Bhasma* (sacred ash); while the *Rudrākshijābāla* refers to the greatness of Pasupati and the virtues attaching to the *Rudrāksha*, *Bhasma* etc. The *Brihad Jābāla* and *Bhasma Jābālōpanishad* likewise deal with the sacred ash and the *Rudrāksha*. The *Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad* makes Pasupati (Siva) the Supreme Brahman. Every phase of Vēdāntic thought is sought to be covered by this *Upanishad*. In the *Paippalādōpanishad*, Brahma is represented as teaching Pippalāda that Rudra is the Supreme Brahman. In the *Atharva-Vēda Upanishads*, the identification of Rudra and the description of Siva as the Absolute is complete.

### Siva in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

In the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, this *Rig-Vēda* conception still persists. The Rudras, the progeny of Rudra, are called the ten vital breaths (*prānās*) with the heart as the eleventh, which seems opposed to the description of Siva as the destroyer of life. The double conception of creator and destroyer seems maintained here.

### In the Bhagavad-Gita.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the supremacy of Siva as the ruler of the world is maintained.<sup>1233</sup> Referring to the Rudras, Sri

<sup>1233</sup> See K. T. Telang, *Bhagavad-gītā*, in the *S.B.E.*, VIII. 219, 347.

Krishna identifies himself with Sankara, which would seem to stress the aspect of beneficence associated with him.<sup>1234</sup>

### Linga worship in the Rig-Veda.

The worship of Siva is closely associated with the *linga*.<sup>1235</sup> The earliest reference to the *linga* is to be found in the *Rig-Veda*, where the context shows that it refers to a kind of worship prevalent not among the Aryans, but among their enemies, whom one authority identifies with the Dasyus.<sup>1236</sup> The worship of the *linga*, it has been suggested, has been taken to correspond to the worship of the phallus, the emblem of the generative power in nature, especially in certain religious or solemn usages. Literally the term *linga* means nothing more than a symbol, mark or sign. Secondly, it has come to signify Siva worshipped in the form of a phallus. In one passage of the *Rig-Veda*, Indra is requested not to allow those whose god is *Śiśna* to disturb the rites of the singers;<sup>1237</sup> while in another, he is spoken of as having acquired the riches of a city after having killed those whose god is *Śiśna*.<sup>1238</sup> Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar thinks that as we find phallic worshippers being denounced by the Aryans in these passages, Aryans must be taken to have been averse to such worship. He suggests that there is "no trace of this characteristic (*i.e.*, the worship of the *linga* or phallus) in the earlier literature, so far as we have examined it", thereby meaning in the *Rig-Veda*. He also points out that this kind of worship should have been "borrowed" by the Aryans "from the

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<sup>1234</sup> *Bhagavad-gītā*, X. 23.

<sup>1235</sup> Siva has been identified with Avestic Saurva, see *Zend-Avesta*, S.B.E., 4, lii; *Pahlavi Texts*, S.B.E., 5, 104.

<sup>1236</sup> A. A. Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, 153.

<sup>1237</sup> *Rig-Veda*, VII. 21. 5.

<sup>1238</sup> Bhandarkar does not quote the exact reference to the *Rig-Veda* for this statement. Professor A. A. Macdonell likewise refers to two passages in the *Rig-Veda*, but does not set down the exact references. See *Sanskrit Literature*, 153.

barbarian tribes with whom the Aryans came in contact". In his view, the learned classes did not adopt it "all at once" but only gradually.<sup>1239</sup> Much weight must naturally attach to this authoritative suggestion, especially as we find that Patanjali does not mention any emblem of Siva as being worshipped in his time but only an image (*pratikriti*).<sup>1240</sup> But apart from Siva worship being identified in *Rig-Vēdic* times with that of the *linga* or the generative principle in nature, there are at least three passages in the *Rig-Vēda* which seem to refer to the possible identification of the male generative organ with the deity. Thus, in one passage, Vishnu is referred to in this manner: "I offer, Vishnu, the oblation placed before thee with the exclamation 'Vashat'; be pleased *Shipivishṭa*, with my offering," etc.,<sup>1241</sup> then in another, we have the following hymn addressed to Vishnu: "What is to be proclaimed, Vishnu, of thee, when thou sayest, 'I am *Shipivishṭa*?' Conceal not from us thy real form, although thou hast engaged under a different form in battle."<sup>1242</sup> In a third, the first of these hymns is thus repeated: "I offer, Vishnu, the oblation placed before thee with the exclamation, 'Vashat'; be pleased, *Shipivishṭa*, with my offering," etc.<sup>1243</sup> The allusion in the second of these texts, is to an incident in which Vishnu is said to have aided Vasishṭha in battle, under an assumed name, and, when questioned, to have said, "I am *Shipivishṭa*,"—a word of ambiguous meaning. In the three contexts in which it occurs, it has been explained as "penetrated, or clothed with rays of light, *Rashmibhiravishṭa*, the radiant, the splendid." In common use, however, it means a man naturally without prepuce, in which sense it may be here

<sup>1239</sup> *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 114—115.

<sup>1240</sup> *Mahābhāṣya*, on Pāṇini V. 3. 99. Patanjali probably lived in the second half of the 2nd century B.C., and in any case not later than the beginning of the Christian era.

<sup>1241</sup> *Rig-Vēda*, VII. 6. 10 (7).

<sup>1242</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 6. 11 (6).

<sup>1243</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. 6. 11 (7).



interpreted as implying comparison; in like manner as a man is so denuded, so is Vishnu, according to his own declaration, uncovered by radiance—*Tējasā anāchchhādītāt*. But this seems, as Wilson remarks,<sup>1244</sup> a refinement and it is probably to be understood as usual. The *Sābdakalpādruma* makes *sēpha* mean *purusha śisna*, the male generative organ.<sup>1245</sup> Modern opinion tends to the view that the worship of the *linga* is fore-shadowed by Vishnu *Shipivishṭa*, the *Vēdic* deity Vishnu conceived as *Shipivishṭa*.<sup>1246</sup> Whether the evidence warrants our going so far as to affirm this as a fact may be doubted to some extent; but there can be no question that the idea of the worship of the generative principle in nature was not entirely absent in *Vēdic* belief. There is ground for the belief, in fact, that the identification of a deity with such worship is also to be seen. But the manner in which it came to be fixed on Siva and how the *linga* came to be identified with Siva, and how Vishnu, the *Vēdic* deity, came to be dissociated from it, are problems still awaiting consideration.

### Linga Worship in the Yajur-Veda and the Mahabharata.

But since we do not see *linga* worship except in its incipient stages in the *Rig-Vēda* and find it in an advanced state in the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda*, where it is part

<sup>1244</sup> Wilson, *Rig-Vēda*, on VII. 6. 11 (6) and VII. 6. 11 (7).

<sup>1245</sup> Rājarādhākāntadēv: *Sābdakalpādruma*; *Sēpha*; *purusha śisna* (male generative organ). See *Mahābhārata*, X. 7. 38:

*Vikatā kāla lambōshṭa bruhaschchēpānda pindakāḥ* ।

*Sēpha sētē rētaḥ pātunā nantaram iti* ॥

*Sisnaḥ* । *Sukrāpātē sēpha sēthē patati iti sēphaḥ* ॥

See also *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 33.

*Idam prajāpatē rētaḥ sikta maghāvat tatsarōbhavattē dēvā abruvan mēdam prajāpate rēlōdushaditi yadubruvan mēdam prajāpatē rēlōdushaditi*, etc.

<sup>1246</sup> See Sir John Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shakta* (Third Edition, 1929), note to Chapter IV, by Brij Lal Mukherji, 104.

of the *Sōma* sacrifice,<sup>1247</sup> it might, perhaps, be inferred that Siva worship and the identification of such worship with the *linga* had become general by then.<sup>1248</sup> In the *Mahābhārata*, we find the worship of the *linga* referred to in many passages. This shows that the *linga* had, by the time of the Epic period, come to be recognized as the emblem of Siva. Upamanyu's discourse with Krishna shows that this identification of Siva with the *linga* is complete. Upamanyu says that Siva and Umā are the real creators of animals, as these bear the marks of the two, and not the *discus* or the conch-shell or marks of any other god.<sup>1249</sup> This episode, in the opinion of Bhandarkar, fixes the adoption, in its final stage, of the *linga* as an object of worship by the higher classes.

### In the Post-Virasaiva Period.

It is quite possible that with the general adoption of the *linga*, the original idea associated with its worship underwent a change. In its latest phase, represented by the period of Virasaiva activity, both the development of the *bhakti* doctrine and the reaction induced by philosophic ideas, made the *linga* the great object round which a complete system of philosophical thought and ritualistic worship came to be evolved. Siva possesses in himself a *sakti*, or power, consisting of the rudiments of the individual soul and the material world, and from this *sakti* develops the whole world.

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<sup>1247</sup> The worship of the *linga* is held to be recognized in the *Pravargya*. See *Satapata Brāhmana*, S.B.E., Vol. 44. xlvii.

<sup>1248</sup> The date of the Mohenjō Dāro remains in Sindh, in which the worship of Siva and the *linga* appears in their full-blown forms, should, from the point of view of the evidence afforded by them, be fixed in a period posterior to the *Rig-Vēda*, in which Siva (another form of Rudra) worship and *linga* worship are still in their early stages. The remains may be said to be *post-Rig-Vēdic* and probably also *post-Yajur-Vēdic*. The *Yajur-Vēda* introduces us not only to a new geographical era but also to a new epoch of religious and social life in India.

<sup>1249</sup> *Mahābhārata*, *Ānūsāsanaparva* (Chapter XIV).

## Evolution of Philosophical Theories.

It is this view that provides the groundwork, as it were, for the development of the opposing philosophical theories of Dvaita, Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaitādvaita schools of thought within the ambit of the Saiva fold.

### The Pāsupata School.

Historically, the Saiva Dvaita view was first propounded by the Pāsupata school, which is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*.<sup>1250</sup> It dates from about the second century B.C. and is referred to in lithic inscriptions and in literary writings dating up to the thirteenth century A.D., text-books on the system being in use in the tenth century A.D.<sup>1251</sup> According to this system, the supreme and individual souls are distinct entities, and the *Pradhāna* the constituent cause of the material world. In the delivered condition, the individual soul shakes off its ignorance and weakness and attains boundless knowledge and power of action.

### The Śaiva Siddhanta School.

The Saiva (or *Saiva Siddhānta*) school which represents the early Saiva system known<sup>1252</sup> is also dualistic but differs from the Pāsupata school in holding that the individual soul in the delivered condition becomes Siva himself; i.e., attains perfect resemblance with God Siva, though he does not possess the power of creation. In the Pāsupata system, the fruit of deliverance is proximity to God, while in the Saiva, it is resemblance to Siva, *sārvūpya* as distinguished from *sāmūpya*.

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<sup>1250</sup> *Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva*, Chapter 349, verse 64. According to Bhandarkar "a certain historical person (Lakular or Nakula) was the founder of the main Saiva system which was the same as that explained by Mādhava as Nakulisa-Pāsupata and that three other systems arose out of it in later times." *loc. cit.*, 121.

<sup>1251</sup> Bhandarkar, *loc. cit.*, 121, f.n. 2.

<sup>1252</sup> The *mantras* on which the Saiva Siddhānta appears to be based are traced to the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, X. 43-47, the *Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*, 17: the *Vāyaviya Saṃhitā* refers to it as the Siddhānta school.

### The Spanda and the Pratyabhijña Schools.

Connected with the Saiva school, but which diverged from it somewhat, are the two systems associated with the names of Vasugupta (ninth century A.D.) and Abhinavagupta (tenth century A.D.) and known as the *Spandasāstra* and the *Pratyabhijñā* schools, together familiarly known as Kashmir Saivism. Both these schools hold that God is independent and creates merely by the force of his will all that comes into existence ; neither a prompting cause like *Karma*, nor a material cause like the *Pradhāna* is required, according to them, for creation. Nor do they admit that God himself is the material cause ; much less do they allow that *Māya* generates appearances which are false. God makes the world appear in himself, as if it were distinct from himself, though not so really, as houses or even towns appear in a mirror, and is as unaffected by it as the mirror is by the images reflected in it. The individual soul is thus, according to this system, identical with the Supreme Soul. According to the *Spandasāstra* school, this identity is not perceived by the individual soul on account of its impurity (*mala*). This impurity vanishes by means of intense contemplation as the result of which the Highest Being breaks in upon the mind of the devotee and absorbs all finite thought. When this condition becomes stabilized, the individual soul is free and becomes the Supreme Soul. According to the *Pratyabhijñāsāstra*, however, the perception of the identity comes through recognition. The individual soul fails to recognize, in its present condition, its real nature, though in its capacity for knowledge and action, it partakes of the nature of God. When it is led to realize its nature by its preceptor, it recognizes God in itself. These two schools thus actually postulate sameness as opposed to absolute non-duality as does the Advaita school.

### The Virasaiva School.

The Virasaiva school, which is based on the older Saiva school and owes its origin to teachers (*āchāryas*) who

preceded Basava,<sup>1253</sup> takes a view somewhat different. Its technique of belief and metaphysical ideology show a course of development which is so entirely different from the older school that it should have required time to develop. Accordingly while the Āchāryas developed a theory based on the ancient Saiva school, Basava, who followed them, probably a century or more later, popularised it and made it the religion of a large number of people inhabiting a vast extent of country. The philosophical idea underlying it has been elaborated in different works. Śrīpati briefly describes it as *Dvaitādvaitābhīdhāna viśeṣhādvaita siddhānta*, *Dvaitādvaita* which connotes a qualified form of Advaita. He also styles it, as we have seen, as *Bhēdābhēdātma viśeṣhādvaita vīrasaiva siddhānta*, the Vīrasaiva Siddhānta, which is a qualified form of Advaita which partakes of the character of *Bhēdābhēda*. It will be seen, he calls it *Dvaitādvaita* and *Bhēdābhēda* and in both cases gives the alternative description that it is a variety of Advaita of the qualified type. It has been usual, until recently, to describe Vīrasaivism as *Saiva viśiṣṭādvaita*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* which makes Siva the Brahman or the Absolute. From the description given by Śrīpati, we have to reckon it as *Bhēdābhēda* or *Dvaitādvaita*, which is a qualified variety of Advaita. The former description has been largely popularised both by a misapprehension of the true character of Vīrasaivism and its theory and by a misattribution of the theory of Śrīkantha to Vīrasaivism. Bhandarkar's suggestion that Śrīkantha's view "appears to be identical with that of the Vīrasaivas" has also helped to increase the effect of the misattribution. Śrīkantha's theory, as we have seen, is confessedly *Saiva viśiṣṭādvaita*, whereas Vīrasaivism, is admittedly something very different. Vīrasaivism as taught by the highest exponents of that faith, enunciates the attainment of *Siva tattva*—the one

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<sup>1253</sup> The Panchāchāryas have been placed in the eleventh century A.D., though some of them at least must be considerably older, while Basava belongs to the twelfth century A.D.

highest Brahman characterized by *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ānanda* ; it is called *Sthala*, because in it exist the *Mahat* and other principles and they eventually resolve in it ; it is the support of the whole world, moveable and immovable ; it holds all the powers, all luminaries, all souls ; it is the resting place of all worlds and of all possessions ; and it is the highest place to be attained by those who seek the highest happiness ; and it is therefore styled the One only and absolute position—*Sthala*. The *sthala*, being the essence of Siva, is possessed of *Sakti* (innate power), which, by agitation, becomes divided into *Lingasthala* and *Angasthala*. The former is Siva and is the worshipped ; and the latter is the individual soul, the worshipper. Similarly, *sakti* divides itself into two parts by its own inherent power, one relating itself to Siva and called *Kalā*, and the other to the individual soul and called *Bhakti*, or devotion. *Sakti* leads to action and *Bhakti* to deliverance. *Sakti*, being with Siva Parabrahman becomes the object of worship and *bhakti* makes one a worshipper. *Sakti* exists in the *linga*, which is Siva himself and not a mere symbol of Him ; and *Bhakti* exists in the *Anga* or the individual soul. *Bhakti*, as it leads away from action and from the world, helps the *Anga* to the attainment of *sāmarasya* with Siva. How this is brought about is laid down in many Vīrasaiva works of note, which also set down detailed descriptions of the conceptions underlying the ideas of *Lingasthala* and *Angasthala*. The *Lingasthala*, being Siva Parabrahman himself, is divided into the triune *Bhāvalinga*, *Prānalinga* and *Ishtalinga*. These represent *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ānanda*—Existence, Intelligence, and Bliss. The first is without any parts (*kalā*) and is perceived by faith ; it is not conditioned by space or time and is higher than the highest. The second is apprehended by the mind and is without parts (*kalā*) ; while the third is possessed of parts and is visible to the eye. The three *lingas* are respectively the highest principle, the subtle form and the gross form. They correspond to the soul, the life and the gross form. Characterized by use (*prayōga*), formulæ (*mantra*),

and action (*kriyā*), they form what are called *Kalā*, *Nāda* and *Bindu*. Again, each of these three *lingas*—*Bhāva*, *Prāna* and *Ishta*—is divided into two: the first into *Mahālinga* and *Prasādalinga*, the second into *Charalinga* and *Sivalinga*, and the third into *Gurulinga* and *Āchāralinga*. Six different kinds of *sakti* operate on these six and produce six different forms. These are: (i) *Mahālinga*, which is formed when the Siva essence is operated on by the power of intelligence (*chitsakti*); its attributes are the absence of birth and death, freedom from taint, perfection, unity, subtleness, being higher than the highest, incorruptibility, unfathomableness, capability of being apprehended by faith and love and idealistic form (*chaitanyarūpa*). (ii) *Prasādalinga* which is produced when the Siva essence is permeated with its highest power (*Parāsakti*); the principle called *Sadākhya* is produced; it is light, eternal, indivisible, imperceptible to the senses, apprehensible by reason, indestructible, and the rudiment which develops. (iii) *Charalinga*, which is produced when the Siva essence is operated upon by its primeval power (*Ādisakti*); it is infinite and pervades the internal and external worlds, which is full of light, is a *Purusha* (person), and is higher than *Pradhāna* or *Prakriti*, and is capable of being contemplated by the mind alone. (iv) *Sivalinga*, which is produced when the Siva essence is permeated by the will power (*Ichhāsakti*); it is a finite principle with a sense of egoism, possessed of knowledge and power, having a celestial refulgence, with one face, and serene. (v) *Gurulinga*, which is produced when the Siva essence is permeated with the knowledge (*Jñānasakti*); it possesses energy, presides over every system or science that instructs, is full of light, a boundless ocean of joy, and dwells in human intelligence. (vi) *Āchāralinga*, which is produced when the Siva essence is influenced by the power of action (*Kriyāsakti*); in the shape of action it serves as the support, for the existence of all things; it is conceivable by the mind, and leads to self-renunciation. In view of the position assigned to *Sakti* in this conception of the Absolute, Vīrasaivism has been sometimes called

*Sakti visishtādvaita*, but such a description would seem to be not quite appropriate, for, the fundamental basis of true *Visishtādvaita* is lacking in it. The basic idea underlying the Vīrasaiva conception is that the original entity becomes divided, by reason of its own *Sakti*, into God and the individual soul, while its six forms represent only six different ways of looking at it. The first is the Infinite by itself ; the second is the form in which it is conceived of as creating by its highest power ; the third, as distinct from the material world ; the fourth, as in its bodily form, the body being celestial in character ; the fifth, as knowledge which it imparts to mankind ; and the sixth, as guide to the individual soul in its efforts at seeking absolution. It will be seen that the relationship stressed as between the Infinite and the individual soul is one of a personal character and the *dvaita* aspect of dependence of the individual soul on the Infinite is fundamental to the conception as also the essential difference between the creator and the created. These aspects are even further stressed when we come to realize the extreme emphasis that is laid upon *Bhakti* as the path to salvation on the part of the individual soul. *Bhakti*, indeed, is described as natural to the individual soul ; it is its characteristic. It is a tendency towards a leaning upon God, which is inherent in the individual soul. There are, according to the Vīrasaiva school, three stages in the progress of the *Bhakti* towards God, and corresponding to these three stages, there are three divisions in the *Angasthala*, the subject of the individual soul. These are *Yōgāṅga*, *Bhōgāṅga* and *Tyāgāṅga*—the means of attaining *yōga* or union with Siva ; the means of enjoyment with Siva ; and the means of self-surrender to Siva. Of each of these there are two kinds. Under the first, come *Aikya* and *Sarana*. *Aikya* consists in the partaking of the joys of Siva. This is familiarly called *Samarasa Bhakti*, in which the individual soul enjoys bliss together with God. In *Sarana Bhakti*, the individual soul sees the *Linga* or God, in himself and in everything else. It is a condition of joy to the individual soul by itself. Under the second,



*Bhōgāṅga*, come *Prāṇa* and *Prasāda*. *Prāṇa* consists of self-renunciation and the concentration of the entire mind on the *Linga*. *Prasāda* is attained when the individual soul resigns completely all its enjoyment to the *Linga* and thus acquires serenity. Under the third, *Tyāgāṅga*, come *Mahēsvara* and *Bhakta*. *Mahēsvara* indicates firm belief in the existence of God and the unity of the *Linga* and the maintenance of rigid discipline which has Siva for its objective. *Bhakta* is one who turns away from this material world and makes to devotion his sole object of life. But in the reverse order, these six stages—*Bhakta*, *Mahēsa* (or *Mahēsvara*), *Prasāda*, *Prāṇalinga*, *Sarāṇa* and *Aikya* of life are called collectively *Shaṭsthaḷa*, a name by which they are famous in Virasaiva literature. They indicate in the order named the progress of the individual soul from a turning away from the material world through *Bhakti*, the first step, to *Aikya* or absolution, the last stage. This last stage is termed as *Lingāṅga sāmārasya*, which indicates equality in blissful experience with Siva. This is the highest stage aimed at and its attainment indicates salvation.<sup>1254</sup> The attainment of this goal, however, does not involve either the perfect identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Being or the shuffling off of its separateness by the individual soul and thus becoming a simple soul unconscious of itself as is propounded by the Advaita school. Virasaivism thus holds that Siva Parabrahman, by his own *śakti*, divided

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<sup>1254</sup> *Sāmārasya*, literally means identity in essence. Cf. *Paramam sāmāyam upāiti*, See *Mand. Upa.*, III. 1. 3. Bhandarkar gives an account of *Shaṭsthaḷa* in his work quoted above and says it is based on an abstract of Māyideva's *Anubhavasāra* (l.c. 136, f.n. 1). The doctrine has received the very widest attention from Virasaiva writers, several important works being wholly devoted to its elucidation. Among these may be mentioned *Prabhudēva's Shaṭsthaḷa Gṇānācharitra Vachana Tika*, also called *Shaṭsthaḷa Viveka*, which is Mahalingadeva's commentary on Prabhudeva's work; *Ēkottarasthaḷa* by the same author; Jakkanārya's *Nūrondu-sthaḷa*; Māyideva's *Shaṭsthaḷa Gadya*, etc. Māyideva wrote about 1430 A.D. and has been famous in later Virasaiva literature as *Shaṭsthaḷa Brahmavādi*. (For further information, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, Vol. I, 328-331.)

himself into *Linga* and *Anga*, Supreme Being and individual soul, and by the influence of other kinds of *sakti*, became the creator of the world. His *sakti* is real; and the rudiment of creation is in his *sakti*. It thus differs from *Visishtādvaita*, which, according to Rāmānuja, holds that there is a real rudiment of the soul and of the material world characterising the Supreme Being which afterwards developes. Srikantha, who calls himself a Siva Visishtādvaitin, and who was not a Vīrasaiva by faith, approximates to the Vīrasaiva philosophical position, though his view is not identical with it. Thus, he suggests that Siva with his *sakti* is the material cause of the world; then, again, he holds that the individual soul in *mukti* is similar to the Supreme Soul, *i.e.*, becomes possessed of its attributes; and finally, he agrees that in blissful experience, the individual and Supreme souls are equal.<sup>1255</sup> These similarities in view as between Srikantha and Vīrasaivism are not to be wondered at when we remember that about the time he wrote—*circa* 1250 A.D.—Vīrasaivism had reached the zenith of its power and popularity. To concede that Srikantha's views *approximate* in some points to the Vīrasaiva philosophical position is not, however, equivalent to admitting that he was a Vīrasaiva (or Lingāyat) by faith or belief. Much less was Appayya Dikshit, who propounded the Sivādvaita view, a Vīrasaiva by faith or belief as has been suggested.<sup>1256</sup> Thus a rapid review of the different philosophical

<sup>1255</sup> Srikantha, *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 2. 38; IV. 4. 3; IV. 4. 2.

<sup>1256</sup> See Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, at page 481, where he says:—"Srikantha Sivāchārya, who wrote a *Saivabhāṣya* (Ed., *Pandit* VI and VII) on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, belonged to the Vīrasaiva or Lingāyat School of Southern India in which *Bhakti* is specially inculcated and Appayya Dikshita, the polymath of the 16th century, was of the same persuasion." It is needless to state that Srikantha was professedly the inculcator of the Sivavisishtādvaita and not the Vīrasaiva school. As for Appayya, he was the chief exponent in his time of the Sivādvaita school. In modern parlance, Srikantha and Appayya would be classed as *Smārthas* who, philosophically, taught the *Sivavisishtādvaita* and *Sivādvaita*

schools which have grown round the name of Siva shows that they have, during the course of ages, developed varying points of view. While the earlier schools, including the Pāsupata and the earlier Saiva, were *dvaitic* in character, the later schools represented by the great names of Śrīkantha, Śrīpati, and Appayya Dīkshita developed theories which have been described as *Sivavisishtādvaita*, *Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viśeṣādvaita* and *Sivādvaita*.

### Influence of Bhedabheda on the Later Upanishads.

In certain of the later *Upanishads*,<sup>1257</sup> the tendency to stress the *abhēda* aspect in *Bhēdābhēda* is seen. Thus, in the *Tejobindu Upanishad*, we have the following characterization which is well worth noting from the point of view suggested:—

*Ajakukshau jagannāstihyātmakukshau jagannahi ।  
Sarvathā bhēda kalanam dvaitādvaitam navidyatē ॥  
Māyā kāryamidam bhēdamastichēd brahmabhāvanam ।  
Dēhō 'ham iti dukkham chēd brahmāhamiti nischayaḥ ॥*

The suggestion is that the *jagat* cannot be born in one who has no birth. In the womb of the formless *ātma*, there can be no world that is evident. Therefore, in *dvaitādvaita*, the idea of *bhēda* is a misnomer, a fault or defect (*Bhēdakalanam*). *Bhēda*, it is added, is an invention through *māya*. That can be true if the form of Brahman (*Brahmabhāvana*) is true. If the undergoing of misery by the body is a fact, then, "I am Brahman" is also a fact. If there is bondage in the

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views, while Śrīpati was a Virasaiva who taught the *Sivādvaitādvaita* view. The statement of Keith may be traced back to Sir Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar who, writing in 1913, said: "Śrīkantha's view appears to be identical with that of the Virasaivas." This, as we have seen above, is only correct in a limited sense.

<sup>1257</sup> The word "later" is used here in a relative sense. The remark of Professor Max Müller that "any attempt to fix their relative age (*i.e.*, the age of the different *Upanishads*) seems.... for the present almost hopeless" seems still to hold the ground. Introduction to the *Upanishads*, lxix.

heart, then only could *Brahmachakra* cut it. If it is doubted, then the truth of Brahman can be immediately made to manifest itself.

The element of reality in *Bhēdābhēda* is stressed, though as might be expected in a qualified way, in the *Varāhōpanishad* (11-12):—

*Subhēchchaādī trayam bhūmi bhēdābhēda yutam smrutam ।  
Yathāvadvēda buddhēdam jagad jāgrati drishyatē ॥  
Advaitē sthairyamāyātē dvaitēcha prāsamam gatē ।  
Pasyanti svapnavallōkam turya bhūmi suyōgataḥ ॥*

Here, we see emphasised the view that the three-fold desires bring to experience the *Bhēda*, the *Abhēda* and *Bhēdābhēda* conditions in this world ; the world appears in the wide-awake state as if it is real ; no sooner does the mind fix itself in immovable *advaita*, the *dvaita* aspect gradually fades off, just as the *ātman* in the dream states becomes one with the Brahman.

In the *Brahmavidyōpanishad*, we have a different note struck. The doctrine of *Dvaitādvaita* is there held to be acceptable. Thus, we have the following declaration :—

*Pragnātō'ham Prāśāntō'ham Prakāśaḥ Paramēśvaraḥ ।  
Ēkadhā chintyamānō'ham dvaitādvaita vilakṣaṇaḥ ॥*

“I am *Pragnāta* personified, *Prāśānta* personified and *Paramēśvara* personified. I am capable of meditating on everything simultaneously. I am both *Dvaita* and *Advaita* in indescribable fashion.”

The *Mahōpanishad* refers to *Bhēdābhēda* both implicitly and explicitly. In one place (VI. 62), we have the following :—

*Dvaitādvaita samudbhūtairjagan nirmāṇa līlayā ।  
Paramātmamayī saktiradvaitaiva vijrumbhate ॥*

Here we have the declaration that *jagan nirmāṇa līla* is the result of (the principle of) *Dvaitādvaita* ; this makes it appear or rather produces the impression—as if *Paramātmā* and his *sakti* were different from each other. *Paramātmā* and his *sakti*, appearing as two different things, become the cause of the sport of creation.

In the *Annapūrnōpanishad* (V. 76-77), we have an echo of the same doctrinal declaration of one appearing to be two, though the stress is manifestly on the *advaita* aspect. Thus, we have the declaration:—

*Ekah sambhidyatē bhrāntyā māyayā na svarūpataḥ ।*

*Tasmādadvaita ēvāsti na prapanchō na samsrutih ॥*

We have here the suggestion that ignorance makes us think that one appears to split into two through the agency of *māya*, though it does not in reality; therefore, *advaita* alone prevails; there is neither the world nor existence (to talk of). Just as *ākāśa* is spoken of as *ghatākāśa* and *mahākāśa*, similarly through ignorance *Īśvara* is spoken of as *Jīva* and *Īśvara* (as being two different entities).

In the *Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad*, we have, as might be expected, a firmer adherence to the *Dvaitādvaita* view. First, we have the declaration (*Pāsupatabrahmōpanishad*, 25):—

*Natat pasyati chidrūpam Brahmaprastvēva pasyati ।*

*Dharmādharmitva vārtiācha bhēdā satih bhidyatē ॥*

Here, we have it stated that the *bhinnarūpa* of *chidrūpa* is not seen by him; but he sees only the *Brahmaprastu*; the expressions *Dharma* and *Dharmi*, even though they surely indicate the existence of *bhēda*, become destroyed of their meaning. Then, we have the following statement (*Ibid.*, 26):—

*Bhēdābhēdastathā bhēdābhēdaḥ sākshāt parātmanah ।*

*Nāsti svātmātirēkēna svayamēvāsti sarvadā ॥*

Here, we are told that *Bhēda*, *Abhēda* and *Bhēdābhēda* are the visible forms of the *Paramātma*; they do not excel in their different eminences; they always exist of their own accord. Then, we have this other declaration (*Ibid.*, 27):—

*Brahmaiva vidyatē sākshād vastutō vastutō apicha ।*

*Tathaiva Brahmapignānī kim grihṇāti jahāti kim ॥*

We are here told that visibly and otherwise the Brahman form only is perceivable to the eye; if this be so, which of these (*Bhēda*, *Abhēda* or *Bhēdābhēda*) could a *Brahmapignāni* accept or reject. The obvious answer to this query is that he can neither abandon the one nor accept the others.

The influence of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory in later Vēdāntic thought is thus seen to be not negligible. It is worthy of note that the theory has never been a spent force but has again and again been enunciated in a manner which has borne testimony to its vitality.

Here, we may conclude. Srīpati's point of view is one that has the merit of correlating popular belief with philosophic texts, and philosophic texts with a conception of the Truth which has had a wide vogue. Srīpati finds a basis for the Virasaiva faith that has not only Vēdic and Upanishadic sanction in its favour, but also the authority of commentators more ancient than himself. He was not a mere systematiser of thought, but one who made faith accord with reason. His view is one that has found an echo in the West as well, and it is one too that can stand the test of a further examination at the hands of philosophic thinkers of the future, in the East and the West.

॥ OM TAT SAT ॥



## APPENDIX A.

A Comparative Table showing how the four principal Bhashyakaras formed the Adhikaranas  
and clubbed the Sutras as required by them.

### Adhyaya I, Pada 1

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣhya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣhya
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—II	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—II
1 Jignāsādhikaraṇam 2 Janmādyadhikaraṇam 3 Śāstrayōnītvādhikaraṇam 4 Samanvayādhikaraṇam 5-11 Ikṣhatyadhikaraṇam 12-19 Ānandamayādhikaraṇam 20-21 Antarādhikaraṇam 22 Ākāśādhikaraṇam 23 Prānādhikaraṇam 24 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam 25-28 Jyōtiṣcharanādhikaraṇam 28-31 Pratardanaādhikaraṇam	1 Jignāsādhikaraṇam 2 Janmādyadhikaraṇam 3 Śāstrayōnītvādhikaraṇam 4 Samanvayādhikaraṇam 5-11 Ikṣhatyadhikaraṇam 12-19 Ānandamayādhikaraṇam 20-21 Antarādhikaraṇam 22 Ākāśādhikaraṇam 23 Prānādhikaraṇam 24 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam 25-28 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam 28-31 Indraprānādhikaraṇam	1 Jignāsādhikaraṇam 2 Janmādhikaraṇam 3 Śāstrayōnītvādhikaraṇam 4 Samanvayādhikaraṇam 5-11 Ikṣhatyadhikaraṇam 12-19 Ānandamayādhikaraṇam 20-21 Antastatvādhikaraṇam 22 Ākāśādhikaraṇam 23 Prānādhikaraṇam 24 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam 25-27 Chchandōbhiddhānādhikaraṇam 28-31 Pādāntyapṛānādhikaraṇam	1 Jignāsādhikaraṇam 2 Janmādyadhikaraṇam 3 Śāstrayōnītvādhikaraṇam 4 Samanvayādhikaraṇam 5-12 Ikṣhatyadhikaraṇam 13-20 Ānandamayādhikaraṇam 21-22 Antarādhikaraṇam 23-24 Ākāśādhikaraṇam 25-28 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam 29-31 Prānādhikaraṇam 32 Bāhyapṛānalingādhikaraṇam

### Adhyaya I, Pada 2

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—7	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—7
1-8 Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam 9-10 Attrādhikaraṇam 11-12 Guhāpravīṣṭādhikaraṇam 13-17 Antarādhikaraṇam	1-8 Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam 9-12 Attrādhikaraṇam 13-18 Antarādhikaraṇam 19-21 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam	1-8 Sarvagatatvādhikaraṇam 9-10 Attrivādhikaraṇam 11-12 Guhādhikaraṇam 13-17 Antarādhikaraṇam	1-8 Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam 9-10 Attrivādhikaraṇam 11-12 Guhādhikaraṇam 13-17 Antarādhikaraṇam	1-8 Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam 9-10 Attrivādhikaraṇam 11-12 Guhādhikaraṇam 13-17 Antarādhikaraṇam	1-8 Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇam 9-10 Attrivādhikaraṇam 11-12 Guhādhikaraṇam 13-17 Antarādhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya I, Pada 2—(Contd.)

According to Śrī Śankara Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣya
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras

18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam  
21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam  
24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam

22-24 Adriśyatvādiguṇakādhikaraṇam  
25-33 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam

18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam  
21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam  
24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam

18-20 Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam  
21-23 Adriśyatvādhikaraṇam  
24-32 Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya I, Pada 3

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-13  
1-7 Dyubhāvadyadhikaraṇam  
8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam  
10-12 Akṣarādhikaraṇam  
13 Ikṣhatikarmādhikaraṇam  
14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam  
22-23 Anukṛtyadhikaraṇam  
24-25 Pramitādhikaraṇam  
26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam  
34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam  
39 Kampanādhikaraṇam  
40 Jyōtiradhikaraṇam  
41 Arthāntaratvādivyapadesādhikaraṇam  
42-43 Sushruptyadhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-11  
1-6 Dyubhāvadyadhikaraṇam  
7-8 Bhūmādhikaraṇam  
9-11 Akṣarādhikaraṇam  
12 Ikṣhatikarmādhikaraṇam  
13-22 Daharādhikaraṇam  
23-24 Pramitādhikaraṇam  
25-29 Dēvatādhikaraṇam  
30-32 Madhvadhikaraṇam  
33-39 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam  
40-41 Pramitādhikaraṇam  
42-44 Arthāntaratvādhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-14  
1-7 Dyubhāvadyadhikaraṇam  
8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam  
10-12 Akṣarādhikaraṇam  
13 Sadadhikaraṇam  
14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam  
22-23 Anukṛtyadhikaraṇam  
24-25 Vāmanādhikaraṇam  
26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam  
34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam  
39 Kampanādhikaraṇam  
40 Jyōtiradhikaraṇam  
41 Akāśādhikaraṇam  
42 Sushruptyadhikaraṇam  
43 Brāhmanādhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-13  
1-7 Dyubhāvadyadhikaraṇam  
8-9 Bhūmādhikaraṇam  
10-12 Akṣarādhikaraṇam  
13 Ikṣhatikarmādhikaraṇam  
14-21 Daharādhikaraṇam  
22-23 Anukṛtyadhikaraṇam  
24-25 Pramitādhikaraṇam  
26-33 Dēvatādhikaraṇam  
34-38 Apaśūdrādhikaraṇam  
39 Kampanādhikaraṇam  
40 Jyōtiradhikaraṇam  
41 Arthāntaratvādivyapadesādhikaraṇam  
42-43 Sushruptyadhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya I, Pada 4

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-8  
1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam  
8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam  
11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam  
14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam  
16-18 Bālākyadhikaraṇam  
19-22 Vākyaṇvayādhikaraṇam  
23-27 Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam  
28 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-8  
1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam  
8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam  
11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam  
14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam  
16-18 Jagadvācchivādhikaraṇam  
19-22 Vākyaṇvayādhikaraṇam  
23-28 Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam  
29 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-7  
1-9 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam  
10-11 Jyōtirupakramādhikaraṇam  
12-14 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam  
15 Akāśādhikaraṇam  
16-23 Samākarsādhikaraṇam  
24-27 Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam  
28 Etenasarvavyākhyātādhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas 1-8  
1-7 Ānumānikādhikaraṇam  
8-10 Chamasādhikaraṇam  
11-13 Sankhyōpasangrahādhikaraṇam  
14-15 Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam  
16-18 Bālākyadhikaraṇam  
19-22 Vākyaṇvayādhikaraṇam  
23-27 Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam  
28 Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇam



## Adhyaya II, Pada 1

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—13	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—10	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—11	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—11
1-2	Smṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-2	Smṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-3	Smṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-2	Smṛtyanavakāśādhikaraṇam
3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam	3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam	4-5	Navilakṣhaṇatvādhikaraṇam	3	Yōgapratyuktyadhikaraṇam
4-11	Navilakṣhaṇatvādhikaraṇam	4-12	Vilakṣhaṇatvādhikaraṇam	6-7	Abhimānyadhikaraṇam	4-11	Navilakṣhaṇatvādhikaraṇam
12	Śiṣhāparigrahaḍdhikaraṇam	13	Śiṣhāparigrahaḍdhikaraṇam	8-13	Asadadhikaraṇam	12	Śiṣhāparigrahaḍdhikaraṇam
13	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam	14	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam	14	Bhōktrādhikaraṇam	13	Bhōktrāpatyadhikaraṇam
14-20	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam	15-21	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam	15-21	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam	14-20	Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇam
21-23	Ītaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam	22-27	Ītaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam	22-27	Ītaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam	21-23	Ītaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam
24-25	Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇam	28-32	Śrutistuśabdātītatvādhikara-	28-32	Śrutistuśabdātītatvādhikara-	24-25	Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇam
26-29	Kṛtsnaprasaktyadhikaraṇam	33-34	Naprayōjanādhikaraṇam	33-34	Naprayōjanādhikaraṇam	26-33	Kṛtsnaprasaktyadhikaraṇam
30-31	Sarvōpētādhikaraṇam	35-37	Vaiśhamyanaigrhnyādhikara-	35-37	Vaiśhamyanaigrhnyādhikara-	34-35	Vaiśhamyanaigrhnyādhikara-
32-33	Prayōjanavatvādhikaraṇam	38	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikara-	38	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikara-	36	Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikara-
34-36	Vaiśhamyanaigrhnyādhikaraṇam						

## Adhyaya II, Pada 2

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—12	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—9
1-10	Rachanānūpapatyadhikaraṇam	1-9	Rachanānūpapatyadhikaraṇam	1-4	Rachanānūpapatyadhikaraṇam	1-9	Rachanānūpapatyadhikaraṇam
11	Mahaddīrgādhikaraṇam	10-16	Mahaddīrgādhikaraṇam	5	Anyatrābhavādhikaraṇam	10	Mahaddīrgādhikaraṇam
12-17	Paramāṇujagadākāraṇatvādhī.	17-26	Samudāyādhikaraṇam	6	Abhyupagamādhikaraṇam	11-16	Paramāṇujagadākāraṇatvādhī.
18-27	Samudāyādhikaraṇam	27-29	Upalabdhyadhikaraṇam	7-8	Paruṣhāsmādhikaraṇam	17-26	Samudāyādhikaraṇam
28-32	Nābhāvādhikaraṇam	30	Sarvathānūpapatyadhikaraṇam	9-10	Anyathānūmitiyadhikaraṇam	27-29	Nābhāvādhikaraṇam
33-36	Ēkasminnasambhavādhī.	31-34	Ēkasminnasambhavādhī.	11-17	Vaiśeshikādhikaraṇam	30-31	Sarvathānūpapatyadhikaraṇam
37-41	Patyādhikaraṇam	35-38	Pasupatyadhikaraṇam	18-25	Samudāyādhikaraṇam	32-36	Ēkasminnasambhavādhī.
42-45	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam	39-42	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam	26-29	Asadadhikaraṇam	37-41	Patyādhikaraṇam
				30-32	Anupalabdhyadhikaraṇam	42-45	Utpatyasambhavādhikaraṇam
				33-36	Naiḥkasminnaadhikaraṇam		
				37-41	Patyuradhikaraṇam		
				42-45	Utpatyadhikaraṇam		

37 Sarvadharmōpapatyādhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya II, Pada 3

According to Śrī Śāṅkara Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣhya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣhya
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras
1-17	1-17	1-7	1-6
Viyadadhikaraṇam	Viyadadhikaraṇam	Viyadadhikaraṇam	Viyadadhikaraṇam
8 Mātariśvādhikaraṇam	10-17 Tējōdhikaraṇam	8 Mātariśvādhikaraṇam	7-8 Mātariśvādhikaraṇam
9 Asambhavadhikaraṇam	18 Ātmādhikaraṇam	9 Asambhavadhikaraṇam	9 Tējōdhikaraṇam
10 Tējōdhikaraṇam	19-32 Gnādhikaraṇam	10 Tējōdhikaraṇam	10 Abadhikaraṇam
11 Abadhikaraṇam	33-39 Karttadhikaraṇam	11 Abadhikaraṇam	11 Prithiviyadhikarādhikaraṇam
12 Prithiviyadhikaraṇam	40-41 Parāyattādhikaraṇam	12 Tadabhidhyādhikaraṇam	12 Tadabhidhyādhikaraṇam
13 Tadabhidhyādhikaraṇam	42-52 Amsādhikaraṇam	13 Viparyayadhikaraṇam	13 Viparyayadhikaraṇam
14 Viparyayadhikaraṇam		14 Viparyayadhikaraṇam	14 Antaravignādhikaraṇam
15 Antaravignādhikaraṇam		15-16 Antarādhikaraṇam	15 Antaravignādhikaraṇam
16 Charāch aravyapāśrayādhī.		17 Ātmādhikaraṇam	16 Ātmādhikaraṇam
17 Ātmādhikaraṇam		18-19 Gnādhikaraṇam	17 Gnādhikaraṇam
18 Gnādhikaraṇam		20-26 Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam	18-30 Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam
19-32 Utkrāntigatyadhikaraṇam		27 Vyatirēkādhikaraṇam	31-37 Karttadhikaraṇam
33-39 Karttadhikaraṇam		28-29 Pruthagadhikaraṇam	38-39 Parāyattādhikaraṇam
40 Takshādhikaraṇam		30 Yāvadadhikaraṇam	40-50 Amsādhikaraṇam
41-42 Parāyattādhikaraṇam		31-32 Pūmstvādhikaraṇam	
43-53 Amsādhikaraṇam		33-42 Karttutvadhikaraṇam	
		43-50 Amsādhikaraṇam	
		51-53 Adruṣṭādhikaraṇam	

## Adhyaya II, Pada 4

According to Śrī Śāṅkara Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣhya	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣhya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣhya
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras
1-4	1-3	1-3	1-3
Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam	Prāṇōtpatyadhikaraṇam
5-6 Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	4-5 Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	4 Tatpragādhikaraṇam	4 Saptagatyadhikaraṇam
7 Prāṇāntvādhikaraṇam	6-7 Prāṇāntvādhikaraṇam	5 Tatpūrvakatvādhikaraṇam	5-6 Prāṇāntvādhikaraṇam
8 Prāṇāśreṣṭhyādhikaraṇam	8-11 Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam	6-7 Saptagatyadhikaraṇam	7-11 Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam
9-12 Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam	12 Śreṣṭhāntvādhikaraṇam	8 Anvadhikaraṇam	12-13 Jyōtirādyadhikaraṇam
13 Śreṣṭhāntvādhikaraṇam	13-14 Jyōtirādyadhikaraṇam	9-10 Śreṣṭhādhikaraṇam	14-15 Ta indriyāni tadvyapadēśādhī.
14-16 Jyōtirādyadhikaraṇam	15-16 Indriyādhikaraṇam	11-12 Chakshurādyadhikaraṇam	16-18 Samgnāmūrtikṛtipatyadhī.
17-19 Indriyādhikaraṇam	17-19 Samgnāmūrtikṛtipatyadhikara	13 Panchavṇityadhikaraṇam	
20-22 Samgnāmūrtikṛtipatyadhikaraṇam		14 Anuvadhikaraṇam	
		15-17 Jyōtirādhikaraṇam	
		18-20 Indriyādhikaraṇam	
		21 Samgnādhikaraṇam	
		22-23 Māmsādhikaraṇam	

## Adhyaya III, Pada 1

Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—6	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—20	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas I—6
1-7 Tāntarapratīpatyadhī-	1-7 Tāntarapratīpatyadhī-	1 Tāntarādhikaraṇam	1 Tāntarādhikaraṇam	1-7 Tāntarapratīpatyadhī-	1-7 Tāntarapratīpatyadhī-
8-11 Kṛitātyayādhikaraṇam	8-11 Kṛitātyayādhikaraṇam	2 Trayātmakatvādhikaraṇam	2 Trayātmakatvādhikaraṇam	8-11 Kṛitātyayādhikaraṇam	8-11 Kṛitātyayādhikaraṇam
12-21 Anishṭhādikāryādhikaraṇam	12-21 Anishṭhādikāryādhikaraṇam	3 Prāṇagatyadhikaraṇam	3 Prāṇagatyadhikaraṇam	12-21 Anishṭhādikāryādhikaraṇam	12-21 Anishṭhādikāryādhikaraṇam
22 Svābhāvāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam	22 Svābhāvāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam	4 Agnyādyadhikaraṇam	4 Agnyādyadhikaraṇam	22 Tatsvābhāvāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam	22 Tatsvābhāvāvyāpatyadhikaraṇam
23 Nāticirādhikaraṇam	23 Nāticirādhikaraṇam	5 Prathamādhikaraṇam	5 Prathamādhikaraṇam	23 Nāticirādhikaraṇam	23 Nāticirādhikaraṇam
24-27 Anyādhishṭhītādhikaraṇam	24-27 Anyādhishṭhītādhikaraṇam	6 Aśrutatvādhikaraṇam	6 Aśrutatvādhikaraṇam	24-27 Anyādhishṭhītādhikaraṇam	24-27 Anyādhishṭhītādhikaraṇam
		7 Bhaktādhikaraṇam	7 Bhaktādhikaraṇam		
		8 Kṛutātyayādhikaraṇam	8 Kṛutātyayādhikaraṇam		
		9 Yathaitādhikaraṇam	9 Yathaitādhikaraṇam		
		10-12 Charanādhikaraṇam	10-12 Charanādhikaraṇam		
		13-15 Anishṭhādhikaraṇam	13-15 Anishṭhādhikaraṇam		
		16 Apisaptādhikaraṇam	16 Apisaptādhikaraṇam		
		17 Tatpāpyadhikaraṇam	17 Tatpāpyadhikaraṇam		
		18 Vidyādhikaraṇam	18 Vidyādhikaraṇam		
		19-23 Natritiyādhikaraṇam	19-23 Natritiyādhikaraṇam		
		24 Tatsvābhāvāvyādhikaraṇam	24 Tatsvābhāvāvyādhikaraṇam		
		25 Nāticirēṇādhikaraṇam	25 Nāticirēṇādhikaraṇam		
		26-27 Anyādhikaraṇam	26-27 Anyādhikaraṇam		
		28 Rēto'dhikaraṇam	28 Rēto'dhikaraṇam		
		29 Yōnyadhikaraṇam	29 Yōnyadhikaraṇam		

## Adhyaya III, Pada 2

According to Śrī Śāṅkara Bhāṣya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—8	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—9
1-6	Sandhyādhikaraṇam	1-6	{ Prāṇōpatyadhikaraṇam	1-6	Sandhyādhikaraṇam
7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam	1-6	{ Sandhyādhikaraṇam	7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam
9	Karmānusmṛtīśabdavidhyādhi.	7-8	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam	9	Karmānusmṛtīśabdavidhyādhi.
10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam	9	Karmānusmṛtīśabdavidhyādhi	10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam
11-21	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam	10	Mugdhādhikaraṇam	11-20	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam
22-30	Prakṛitaitāvatvādhikaraṇam	11-25	Ubhayalingādhikaraṇam	21-25	Prakṛitaitāvatvādhikaraṇam
31-37	Parādhikaraṇam	26-29	Ahikundālādhikaraṇam	26-34	Ahikundālādhikaraṇam
38-41	Phalādhikaraṇam	30-36	Parādhikaraṇam	35-36	Tathānyapratibōdhādhi.
		37-40	Phalādhikaraṇam	37-40	Phalādhikaraṇam

1-4	Sandhyādhikaraṇam
5	Parābhīdyānādhikaraṇam
6	Dēhayōgādhikaraṇam
7	Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam
8	Prabōdhādhikaraṇam
9	Karmānusmṛtyadhikaraṇam
10	Sampatyadhikaraṇam
11-13	Nasthānātō'pyadhikaraṇam
14-17	Arūpādhikaraṇam
18	Upamādhikaraṇam
19	Ambuvadādhikaraṇam
20-21	Vṛddhīrāsādhikaraṇam
22	Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam
23-27	Avyaktatvādhikaraṇam
28-31	Ahikundālādhikaraṇam
32-34	Paramatādhikaraṇam
35-36	Sthānavisēśādhikaraṇam
37	Tathānyatvādhikaraṇam
38	Parādhikaraṇam
39-42	Phalādhikaraṇaśēṣah

## Adhyaya III, Pada 3

According to Śrī Śāṅkara Bhāṣya		According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣya		According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣya	
Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—36	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—25	Sūtras	Adhikaraṇas 1—28
1-4	Sarvavedāntapratyayādhi.	1-5	Sarvavedāntapratyayādhi.	1-5	Sarvavedāntapratyayādhi.
5	Upasambhārādhikaraṇam	6-9	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam	6-9	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam
6-8	Anyathātvādhikaraṇam	10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam	10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam
9	Vyāptyadhikaraṇam	11-17	Ānandādyadhikaraṇam	11-17	Ānandādhikaraṇam
10	Sarvabhēdādhikaraṇam	18	Kāryākhyānādhikaraṇam	18	Kāryākhyādhikaraṇam

- 11-13 Ānandādyadhikaraṇam  
 14-15 Ādhyānādhikaraṇam  
 16-17 Ātmagrihyadhikaraṇam  
 18 Kāryādhikaraṇam  
 19 Samānādhikaraṇam  
 20-22 Sambandhādhikaraṇam  
 23 Sambhruṭyadhikaraṇam  
 24 Purushavidyādhikaraṇam  
 25 Vēdhādyadhikaraṇam  
 26 Hānyadhikaraṇam  
 27-31 Sāmparāyādhikaraṇam  
 32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam  
 33-34 Akṣarādyadhikaraṇam  
 35-37 Antaratvādhikaraṇam  
 38-40 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam  
 41 Tannirḍhāraṇiyamādhikaraṇam  
 42 Pradānādhikaraṇam  
 43 Lingabhūtyastvādhikaraṇam  
 44-50 Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam  
 51-52 Śarīrēbhāvādhikaraṇam  
 53-54 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam  
 55 Bhūmajayastvādhikaraṇam  
 56 Śabdādibhēdādhikaraṇam  
 57-58 Vikalpādhikaraṇam  
 59 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam  
 60 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam  
 61-66 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam  
 67-68 Navādhikaraṇam  
 13 Priyāśrītrastvādhikaraṇam  
 14 Itarādhikaraṇam  
 15-16 Ādhyānādhikaraṇam  
 17 Ātmagrihyadhikaraṇam  
 18 Anvayādhikaraṇam  
 19 Kāryādhikaraṇam  
 20-21 Samānādhikaraṇam  
 22-23 Navādhikaraṇam  
 24 Sambhruṭyadhikaraṇam  
 25 Purushādhikaraṇam  
 26 Vēdhādhikaraṇam  
 27-28 Hānyadhikaraṇam  
 29-31 Chhandādhikaraṇam  
 32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam  
 33-34 Yāvadadhikaraṇam  
 35-37 Iyadāmananādhikaraṇam  
 38 Vyatīhārādhikaraṇam  
 39 Satyādhikaraṇam  
 40-42 Kāmādhikaraṇam  
 43 Nirḍhāraṇādhikaraṇam  
 44 Pradānādhikaraṇam  
 45 Lingabhūtyastvādhikaraṇam  
 46-47 Vikalpādhikaraṇam  
 48-49 Vidyādhikaraṇam  
 50 Śrūtyadhikaraṇam  
 51 Anubandhādhikaraṇam  
 52 Pragnāntarādhikaraṇam  
 53 Prasāmanādhikaraṇam  
 54 Parēnādhikaraṇam  
 55-56 Ekādhikaraṇam  
 57-58 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam  
 59 Bhūmādhikaraṇam  
 60 Nānāśabdādhikaraṇam  
 61 Vikalpādhikaraṇam  
 62 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam  
 63-66 Angādhikaraṇam  
 67-68 Navādhikaraṇam  
 19 Samānādhikaraṇam  
 20-22 Sambandhādhikaraṇam  
 23 Sambhruṭyadhikaraṇam  
 24 Purushavidyādhikaraṇam  
 25 Vēdhādyadhikaraṇam  
 26 Hānyadhikaraṇam  
 27-31 Sāmparāyādhikaraṇam  
 32 Aniyamādhikaraṇam  
 33-34 Akṣarādyadhikaraṇam  
 35-37 Antaratvādhikaraṇam  
 38-40 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam  
 41 Tannirḍhāraṇiyamādhikaraṇam  
 42 Pradānādhikaraṇam  
 43 Lingabhūtyastvādhikaraṇam  
 44-50 Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam  
 51-52 Śarīrēbhāvādhikaraṇam  
 53-54 Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam  
 55 Bhūmajayastvādhikaraṇam  
 56 Śabdādibhēdādhikaraṇam  
 57-58 Vikalpādhikaraṇam  
 59-64 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam  
 60 Kāmādyadhikaraṇam  
 61-66 Yathāśrayābhāvādhikaraṇam  
 67-68 Navādhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya III, Pada 4

According to Śrī Śaṅkara Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Madhva Bhāṣya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣya
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras
Adhikaraṇas I—17	Adhikaraṇas I—15	Adhikaraṇas I—11	Adhikaraṇas I—17
1-17 Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-20 Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-9 Purushārthādhikaraṇam	1-16 Purushārthādhikaraṇam
18-20 Parāmarśādhikaraṇam	21-22 Stūtimātrādhikaraṇam	10-12 Asārvatrikādhikaraṇam	17-20 Ūrdhvarētasādhikaraṇam
21-22 Stūtimātrādhikaraṇam	23-24 Pariplavādhikaraṇam	13 Avīśeṣādhikaraṇam	21-22 Stūtimātrādhikaraṇam
23-24 Pariplavādhikaraṇam	25 Agnīndhanādhikaraṇam	14-33 Stūtyadhikaraṇam	23-24 Pariplavādhikaraṇam
25 Agnīndhanādhikaraṇam	26 Sarvāpekṣhādhikaraṇam	34-40 Ubhayaalingādhikaraṇam	25 Agnīndhanādhikaraṇam
26 Sarvāpekṣhādhikaraṇam	27 Samādamādyadhikaraṇam	41-43 Ādhikāṅkīdhikaraṇam	26 Sarvāpekṣhādhikaraṇam
27 Samādamādyadhikaraṇam	28-31 Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam	44-46 Phalaśrutyadhikaraṇam	27 Samādyadhikaraṇam
28-31 Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam	32-35 Vihitavādhikaraṇam	47-48 Kṛtsnabhāvādhikaraṇam	28-31 Sarvānnānumatyadhikaraṇam
32-35 Vihitavādhikaraṇam	36-39 Vidhurādhikaraṇam	49 Anvayādhikaraṇam	32-35 Vihitavādhikaraṇam
36-39 Vidhurādhikaraṇam	40-43 Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam	50 Aihikādhikaraṇam	36-37 Vidhurādhikaraṇam
40-43 Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam	44-45 Svāmādhikaraṇam	51 Muktiphalādhikaraṇam	40-43 Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam
44-45 Svāmādhikaraṇam	46-48 Sahakāryāntaravidhyādhikaraṇam		44-46 Svāmādhikaraṇam
46-48 Sahakāryāntaravidhyādhikaraṇam	49 Anāvīṣhikādhikaraṇam		47-48 Sahakāryāntaravidhyādhikaraṇam
49 Anāvīṣhikādhikaraṇam	50 Aihikādhikaraṇam		49 Maunādhikaraṇam
50 Aihikādhikaraṇam	51 Muktiphalādhikaraṇam		50 Anāvīṣhikādhikaraṇam
51 Muktiphalādhikaraṇam			51 Aihikādhikaraṇam
			52 Muktiphalādhikaraṇam

## Adhyaya IV, Pada 1

Adhikaraṇas I—14	Adhikaraṇas I—11	Adhikaraṇas I—8	Adhikaraṇas I—10
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras
1-2 Āvṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-2 Āvṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-2 Āvṛtyadhikaraṇam	1-2 Āvṛtyadhikaraṇam
3 Ātmavōpāsādhikaraṇam	3 Ātmavōpāsādhikaraṇam	3 Ātmādhikaraṇam	3 Ātmādhikaraṇam
4 Pratikādhikaraṇam	4-5 Pratikādhikaraṇam	4 Napratikādhikaraṇam	4-5 Pratikādhikaraṇam
5 Brahmadṛṣṭyadhikaraṇam	6 Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇam	5 Brahmādhikaraṇam	6 Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇam
6 Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇam	7-11 Āsinassambhāvādhikaraṇam	6 Ādityādhikaraṇam	7-12 Āsinādhikaraṇam
7-10 Ātmādhikaraṇam	12 Āprāyanādhikaraṇam	7-11 Āsinādhikaraṇam	13 Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam
11 Ekāgratādhikaraṇam	13 Tadadhigamādhikaraṇam	12 Āprāyanādhikaraṇam	14 Itarādhikaraṇam

- 15 Anāradhakāryādihikaraṇam  
16-18 Agnihōtrādihikaraṇam  
19 Bhogādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—11

- 1-2 Vāgadihikaraṇam  
3 Manōdhikaraṇam  
4 Adhyakṣhādihikaraṇam  
5-6 Bhūtādihikaraṇam  
7-13 Asrutyupakramādihikaraṇam  
14 Sarvasampatyadhikaraṇam  
15 Avibhāgādihikaraṇam  
16 Tadōkōgrajvalanādihikaraṇam  
17 Raśmyanusārādihikaraṇam  
18 Nisādihikaraṇam  
19-20 Dakṣhañāyanādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—5

- 1 Archirādyadhikaraṇam  
2 Vāyuvadhikaraṇam  
3 Varuṇādihikaraṇam  
4-6 Ātivāhikādihikaraṇam  
7-16 Kāryādihikaraṇam

- 13-19 Tadadhigamādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—10

- 1-2 Vāngmanōdhikaraṇam  
3 Manahprāṇādihikaraṇam  
4 Adhyakṣhādihikaraṇam  
5 Bhūtādihikaraṇam  
6 Ekasminnādihikaraṇam  
7-14 Samānādihikaraṇam  
15 Parādihikaraṇam  
16 Avibhāgādihikaraṇam  
17-21 Tadōkōdhikaraṇam  
22 Yōgyadhikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—6

- 1 Archirādyadhikaraṇam  
2 Vāyusābādihikaraṇam  
3 Tatidadhikaraṇam  
4-5 Ātivāhikādihikaraṇam  
6 Vaidyutādihikaraṇam  
7-16 Kāryādihikaraṇam

## Adhyaya IV, Pada 2

- 14 Itarādihikaraṇam  
15 Anāradhakāryādihikaraṇam  
16-18 Agnihōtrādihikaraṇam  
19 Itarakṣapanādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—11

- 1-2 Vāgadihikaraṇam  
3 Manōdhikaraṇam  
4 Adhyakṣhādihikaraṇam  
5-6 Bhūtādihikaraṇam  
7-13 Asrutyupakramādihikaraṇam  
14 Parasampatyadhikaraṇam  
15 Avibhāgādihikaraṇam  
16 Tadōkōdhikaraṇam  
17 Raśmyanusārādihikaraṇam  
18 Nisādihikaraṇam  
19-20 Dakṣhañāyanādihikaraṇam

## Adhyaya IV, Pada 3

- 12 Āpṛāyanādihikaraṇam  
13 Tadadhigamādihikaraṇam  
14 Itarasansleshādihikaraṇam  
15 Anāradhakāryādihikaraṇam  
16 Agnihōtrādihikaraṇam  
17 Vidyāgnāśādhanaatvādhi.  
18-19 Itarakṣapanādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—11

- 1-2 Vāgadihikaraṇam  
3 Manōdhikaraṇam  
4-6 Adhyakṣhādihikaraṇam  
7 Asrutyupakramādihikaraṇam  
8-11 Samsārayyapadesādihikaraṇam  
12-14 Pratisēśhādihikaraṇam  
15 Vāgadihikaraṇam  
16 Avibhāgādihikaraṇam  
17 Tadōkōdhikaraṇam  
18-19 Raśmyadhikaraṇam  
20-21 Dakṣhañāyanādihikaraṇam

Sūtras Adhikaraṇas I—6

- 1 Archirādyadhikaraṇam  
2 Vāyuvadhikaraṇam  
3 Tadādihikaraṇam  
4-6 Ātivāhikādihikaraṇam  
7-14 Kāryādihikaraṇam  
15-16 Apratikāmbanādihikaraṇam

## Adhyaya IV, Pada 4

According to Śrī Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāṣya	According to Śrī Maṇḍya Bhāṣya	According to Śrīkara Bhāṣya
Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras	Sūtras
Adhikaraṇas I-7	Adhikaraṇas I-6	Adhikaraṇas I-11	Adhikaraṇas I-6
1-3 Sampadyāvīrbhāvādhikaraṇam	1-3 Sampadyāvīrbhāvādhikaraṇam	1 Sampadyādhikaraṇam	1-3 Sampadyāvīrbhūtādhikaraṇam
4 Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	4 Avibhāgenadrushṭatvādhi.	2 Muktvādhikaraṇam	4-7 Avibhāgādhikaraṇam
5-7 Brāhmādhikaraṇam	5-7 Brāhmādhikaraṇam	3 Ātmādhikaraṇam	8-12 Sankalpādhikaraṇam
8-9 Sankalpādhikaraṇam	8-9 Sankalpādhikaraṇam	4 Avibhāgādhikaraṇam	13-16 Sandhyādhikaraṇam
10-14 Abhāvādhikaraṇam	10-16 Abhāvādhikaraṇam	5-7 Brāhmādhikaraṇam	17-21 Jagadvyāpādhikaraṇam
15-16 Prāpādhikaraṇam	17-22 Jagadvyāpāravartjādhikaraṇam	8 Sankalpādhikaraṇam	22 Anāvṛttīśabdādhikaraṇam
17-22 Jagadvyāpādhikaraṇam		9 Ananyādhīpatītvādhikaraṇam	
		10-16 Abhāvādhikaraṇam	
		17-20 Jagadvyāpādhikaraṇam	
		21-22 Sthitīyādhikaraṇam	
		23 Anāvṛtyādhikaraṇam	



## APPENDIX B.

Table showing Adhikaranas and Sūtras according to the four principal Bhashyakaras.

Bhāshyakāras	Adhyāyas	Pādas	Adhikaraṇas	Sūtras
Śrī Śankara Bhāshya	4	4	192	555
Śrī Rāmānuja Bhāshya	4	4	156	545
Śrī Madhva Bhāshya	4	4	223	564
Śrīkara Bhāshya	4	4	113	544

## APPENDIX C.

Table showing the Differences in Adhikaranas and Sutrās according to four principal Bhashyakaras.

Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śankara Bhāṣya	Rāmānuja Bhāṣya	Madhva Bhāṣya	Śrīkara Bhāṣya	Adhyāya	Pāda	Adhikaraṇa	Śankara Bhāṣya	Rāmānuja Bhāṣya	Madhva Bhāṣya	Śrīkara Bhāṣya
I	1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5-11 12-19 20-21 22 23 24-27 28-31 ..	1 2 3 4 5-12 13-20 21-22 23 24 25-28 29-32 ..	1 2 3 4 5-11 12-19 20-21 22 23 24 25-27 28-31 ..	1 2 3 4 5-12 13-20 21-22 23-24 25-28 29-31 32 ..	II	1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	1-2 3 4-11 12 13 14-20 21-23 24-25 26-29 30-31 32-33 34-36 37	1-2 3 4-12 13 14 15-20 21-23 24-25 26-31 32-36 .. .. ..	1-3 4-5 6-7 8-13 14 15-21 22-27 28-32 33-34 35-37 38 .. ..	1-2 3 4-11 12 13 14-20 21-23 24-25 26-33 34-35 36 .. ..
	2	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	1-8 9-10 11-12 13-17 18-20 21-23 24-32	1-8 9-12 13-18 19-21 22-24 25-33 ..	1-8 9-10 11-12 13-17 18-20 21-23 24-32	1-8 9-10 11-12 13-17 18-20 21-23 24-32		2	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	1-10 11 12-17 18-27 28-32 33-36 37-41 42-45 .. .. .. ..	1-9 10-16 17-26 27-29 30 31-34 35-38 39-42 .. .. .. ..	1-4 5 6 7-8 9-10 11-17 18-25 26-29 30-32 33-36 37-41 42-45 ..	1-9 10 11-16 17-26 27-29 30-31 32-36 37-41 42-45 .. .. ..
	3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	1-7 8-9 10-12 13 14-21 22-23 24-25 26-30 31-33 34-38 39 40 41 42-43	1-6 7-8 9-11 12 13-22 23-24 25-29 30-32 33-41 42-44 .. .. ..	1-7 8-9 10-12 13 14-21 22-23 24-25 26-33 34-38 39 40 41 42 43	1-7 8-9 10-12 13 14-21 22-23 24-25 26-33 34-38 39 40 41 42-43 ..		3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	1-7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19-32 33-39 40 41-42 43-57 .. .. .. ..	1-9 10-17 18 19-32 40-41 42-52 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..	1-7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-16 17 18-19 20-26 27 28-29 30 31-32 33-42 43-50 51-53	1-6 7-8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18-30 31-37 38-39 40-50 .. .. .. ..
	4	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	1-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 16-18 19-22 23-27 28	1-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 16-18 19-22 23-28 29	1-9 10-11 12-14 15 16-23 24-28 29 ..	1-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 16-18 19-22 23-27 28							